History Internal Assessment 2024
Was the ‘Sputnik Crisis’ viewed as a crisis by President Eisenhower from 1957–1958?
Word Count: 2200 words
Section 1: Identification and Evaluation of Sources
This study will investigate the question: Was the ‘Sputnik Crisis’ viewed as a crisis by President Eisenhower from 1957–1958?
One immensely valuable source is the official transcript from President Eisenhower’s 9 October 1957 “Press and Radio Conference #123”. This source is pivotal to the investigation, as it captures his initial reaction to Sputnik. The second crucial source is Walter Lippmann’s article, “A Society Cannot Stand Still”, published in the New York Herald Tribune on 10 October 1957. This source is essential as it illuminates America’s provocative reflections after the launch of Sputnik, which is crucial for understanding the president’s perspective at that time.
Delivered only five days after the Sputnik launch, source one offers an authentic record of President Eisenhower’s immediate response, but also conveys his well-versed military perspective, significantly contributing to the analysis of his perception of the Sputnik Crisis and its immediate implications, which drove his course of action. Secondly, the purpose of the press conference, explicitly arranged in response to the launch, was to present Eisenhower’s assessments and actions regarding Sputnik, thereby providing crucial insights into whether the event was truly categorised as a crisis. Additionally, the content is valuable as it addresses both the military and scientific implications of Sputnik, with a specific focus on American scientific ambitions, facilitating a concise assessment of President Eisenhower’s response during this supposed ‘crisis’.
However, a notable limitation of the content is the fact that Eisenhower does not provide a concrete answer on the technological and military significance of Sputnik, which raises the question of whether he considered Sputnik a genuine crisis. Moreover, the press conference’s purpose was also to reassure the public that the US had not fallen behind technologically, which is a major limitation, as some of the information presented may have been selective or framed in a way that distorts readers’ understanding of Eisenhower’s agenda. Another serious limitation of the source is that, as a transcript, the crucial aspect of Eisenhower’s intonation is lost, altering our interpretation of his words and clouding our understanding of his stance and composure during this ‘crisis’.
The significance of source two’s origin is evident in its author, a two-time Pulitzer Prize winner, one of these awards being granted for this very article. Lippmann’s esteemed reputation provides profound insight into America’s, and consequently Eisenhower’s, view of the Sputnik Crisis. Additionally, Lippmann’s purpose is to ‘call the government to arms’ in response to Sputnik, reflecting the urgency and crisis-like nature of the matter, and highlighting the value of his purpose. Finally, source two’s content is valuable since it references Sputnik’s implications for American society and the immediate actions required to respond to the “harrowing” threat, perhaps reflecting the president’s apparent lack of decisive action against Sputnik.
Nonetheless, Lippmann’s article is an opinion piece and is therefore inherently limited by his personal views rather than verifiable facts, making the origin of source two a limitation. In the same way, the urgent ‘call to arms’ may be more a product of Lippmann’s own perspective than a fact-based conclusion; therefore, its purpose also becomes a limitation because of its potential distortion of the urgency of the ‘crisis’. Furthermore, the article’s content lacks concrete facts or statistics to support Lippmann’s post-Sputnik call to arms, reducing the reliability of his article and rendering the content a further limitation.
Section 2: Investigation
In 1957, the Soviets launched the first artificial satellite, Sputnik 1, a jarring achievement that marked the beginning of the Space Race. This event, set against the backdrop of the Cold War, can be compared to similar “Sputnik Moments” encountered amidst heightened geopolitical tensions. Yet the idea of a “Sputnik Moment” may actually be misunderstood by historians, as the event itself is questionable as a ‘crisis’ at all. To truly understand whether the classification of ‘crisis’ is justified, it is essential to examine the reaction and response of President Eisenhower in depth, in order to assess whether this event was more superficial than substantive.
This essay offers a comprehensive evaluation of the ‘Sputnik Crisis’ within the context of President Eisenhower’s perspective during this critical period of the Cold War. It will explore the political pressure generated, the measured response of President Eisenhower, and the broad strategic and scientific implications, aiming to determine whether the ‘Sputnik Crisis’ truly encapsulates the atmosphere and sentiment of crisis at the time as perceived by the president from 1957–1958. [1]
A close examination of President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s reaction and policy decisions during that period suggests that Eisenhower did not in fact consider Sputnik a ‘crisis’. Eisenhower’s military background, deep understanding of intelligence data, and the sheer level of intelligence available to him as president provided him with a broader perspective on the implications of Sputnik, free from media sensationalism and Cold War anxieties. Eisenhower’s public statements during this period would therefore reflect this well-informed and measured view of the situation, argues historian Yanek Mieczkowski. [2] In his 9 October press conference, Eisenhower acknowledged the significance of the Soviet achievement but did not resort to alarmist rhetoric, going so far as to crack a joke, telling reporters that “suddenly all Americans seem to have become scientists”, which was met with “laughter”. He stated in that same conference that “so far as the satellite itself is concerned, that does not raise my apprehensions, not one iota”. [3] This approach was in line with Eisenhower’s philosophy of “dynamic conservatism”, argues Mieczkowski, [4] advocating a measured and thoughtful handling of Cold War tensions and suggesting that he viewed Sputnik as a ‘non-crisis’ event.
Even so, the official Department of State history website suggests that Eisenhower was in fact in a “panic state”, and that his calm demeanour at press conferences was an attempt to dispel and downplay the significance of Sputnik so as not to raise the American public’s apprehensions. [5] This depiction, however, fails to account for the intelligence reports provided by the CIA. [6] The classified U-2 programme had taken numerous photographs of the Soviet rocket launch site and the satellite itself as early as 1955. The Eisenhower administration’s top advisers had, by 1956, already estimated that the satellite would achieve orbit before the end of 1957. [7]
In addition to being well informed about Soviet scientific developments, Eisenhower had little need for concern. The United States had its own satellite programme, Project Vanguard, which, despite not yet achieving launch, was, according to aerial intelligence, not significantly behind its Soviet counterpart. [8] Eisenhower was further reassured by the American scientific community at an October 16th conference attended by physicist and Chairman of the President’s Science Advisory Committee, Dr I. I. Rabi. In General Andrew Goodpaster’s memorandum of the conference, Dr Rabi assured those present that “despite the Soviet’s tremendous momentum, there are great advantages on our part”. Although General Goodpaster did not record any precise scientific data that may have been cited by Dr Rabi to support this claim, he clearly remembered the positive summary of their discussion. Eisenhower was therefore fully aware that the gap between the two countries was not as wide as public perception suggested. He made this clear in his 7 November conference, [9] in which he spoke at length about the ICBM and rocket technology the US had developed in the preceding year. Rather than reacting impulsively, Eisenhower remained composed throughout the crisis, which is strong evidence that he was not panicked by the matter.
Nevertheless, after the launch of Sputnik 2 and the failure of the Vanguard rocket, Eisenhower did begin to view the ‘Sputnik Crisis’ as a genuine threat to American national security and prestige. Despite his calm and collected public manner, his language during the 7 November press conference, delivered on the day of Sputnik 2, showed greater urgency. The fact that he opened with “this talk was to be part of one I intended to make next week” highlights the seriousness of his position, implying that he had moved it forward to address an immediate concern. The repeated suggestion that “we could fall behind” [10] further reflected a desire for swift change. This urgency is also emphasised by the actions attributed to Eisenhower by space journalist Jay Barbree in his book Live from Cape Canaveral. Barbree asserts that Eisenhower pushed the unfinished Vanguard rocket to the launch pad despite Dr Wernher von Braun’s objections. [11] After the failure of the Vanguard rocket on 6 December, Barbree suggests that Eisenhower entered an even deeper ‘crisis mode’ in response to the escalating situation.
If this was not enough to exert pressure on the president, Dr J. R. Killian, the successor to Dr Rabi, warned Eisenhower during the first Legislative Leadership meeting of 1958 about serious national security concerns arising from the Soviet Union’s capability to launch intercontinental ballistic missiles, especially considering that the US did not yet possess such a capability. Dr Killian cautioned that “if we continue like we are now the Russians will surpass us; we need to get the defence research and development programme into focus”. [12] Eisenhower was keenly aware of the military implications of Sputnik, which may have caused significant concern and prompted him to take decisive action to address the crisis. This urgency fuelled Eisenhower’s support for creating NASA and for passing the National Defense Education Act in September 1958, a measure aimed at overhauling both education and science funding throughout the United States. [13] Upon signing the NDEA, he stated that it was in direct response to the “broad and increasing demands imposed by considerations of basic national security”. [14] Although he does not explicitly mention Sputnik, his allusion to the issue is clear, providing further support for Barbree’s argument that Eisenhower sought to enhance American capabilities in space and defence in order to mitigate the perceived crisis.
However, the idea of passing legislation to fund education and science existed before Sputnik. It was only in the aftermath of Sputnik, as claimed by Senator Lister Hill, that the bill was reframed as a defence bill as a strategic legislative manoeuvre to secure its passage through the House. [15] Therefore, while Eisenhower may not have driven the bill as a direct response to the crisis, he certainly seized the opportunity to ease the growing tensions.
Moreover, Eisenhower faced early pressure fuelled by public perception and political expectations regarding his response. According to Lee Sigelman, an American political scientist, the public’s response to an event significantly influences the president’s own view and reaction to that same event. [16] The launch of Sputnik took the American public by surprise, with influential columnist Walter Lippmann among the first to address the matter, playing a pivotal role in shaping public opinion. Lippmann framed the launch as an imminent ‘crisis’ in which the US had “lost the race” and was “falling behind”, describing the event as “grim business”. [17] This Pulitzer Prize-winning piece undoubtedly shaped the views of many Americans. Although the White House was already aware of the satellite, revealing the sources of their intelligence would have risked exposing their capabilities to the Soviets. Therefore, in order both to protect the secrecy of the U-2 programme and to manage public opinion, Eisenhower likely took care to retain public confidence. [18] Consequently, his response after the launch can be seen as a carefully considered action emerging from a relatively calm position.
In conclusion, the evidence presents a nuanced picture of how President Eisenhower interpreted the ‘Sputnik Crisis’ from 1957 to 1958. While there were moments of genuine concern, especially following the launch of Sputnik 2 and the failure of the Vanguard rocket, Eisenhower’s overall response was characterised by a measured and strategic approach. His actions and statements demonstrate that he maintained composure and offered calculated responses, guided by a focus on long-term strength and preparedness rather than short-term panic. Eisenhower’s legacy is one of steady leadership and strategic thinking, guiding the nation through a challenging period. The evidence suggests that, during this critical time, the ‘Sputnik Crisis’ was not viewed solely as a crisis by President Eisenhower, but rather as an opportunity to reinforce American capabilities and strengthen the nation’s position for the future.
Section 3: Reflection
This investigation deepened my understanding of the measured approach historians take, highlighting the complexities of assessing perspectives and maintaining objectivity in research. However, as a STEM student, I encountered a notable challenge in locating historical sources that specifically addressed the scientific aspects of Sputnik. Despite initially expecting to gain insight into the physics and general science behind rockets, I found that even sources written by physicists tended to discuss the technological and scientific implications of Sputnik only in broad terms. Historians and physicists alike generally wrote that Sputnik had significant technological and scientific implications, and that it emblematically suggested that the Russians possessed ICBMs, yet they often failed to explain the scientific reasoning behind these claims. This lack of detailed explanation made it particularly challenging to evaluate Eisenhower’s perception of the crisis, as there was a shortage of scientific evidence supporting claims made by figures such as Dr Rabi and Eisenhower himself.
Additionally, when examining the wide range of perspectives available, I came to understand the difficulty not only of incorporating them all, but of doing so in a way that avoids repetition. In reality, history does not present only two alternate perspectives; it offers many overlapping ones, some of which are similar in certain respects and others which are entirely different while still making the same point. Therefore, one major challenge when studying Sputnik was the abundance of overlapping historical perspectives on the matter. Most historians argued that Eisenhower was not panicked by the issue at all, yet some maintained that Sputnik was his foremost concern, while others adhered to the idea that he was simply putting on a brave face for the public. What made this particularly difficult was that they often used the same examples to support these differing conclusions.
Endnotes
[1] Brian Weeden, “Bad Idea: Declaring a ‘Sputnik Moment’ (Unless You Really Mean It)”, Defense360, 17 December 2021, https://defense360.csis.org/bad-idea-declaring-a-sputnik-moment-unless-you-really-mean-it/
[2] Yanek Mieczkowski, Eisenhower’s Sputnik Moment: The Race for Space and World Prestige (Cornell University Press, 2017).
[3] “Official White House Transcript of President Eisenhower’s Press and Radio Conference #123”, 9 October 1957.
[4] Yanek Mieczkowski, Eisenhower’s Sputnik Moment: The Race for Space and World Prestige (Cornell University Press, 2017).
[5] “Milestones: 1953–1960 - Office of the Historian”, State.gov, 2023, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/sputnik
[6] Jacey Fortin, “When Soviets Launched Sputnik, C.I.A. Was Not Surprised”, The New York Times, 6 October 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/06/science/sputnik-launch-cia.html
[7] Brian Weeden, “Bad Idea: Declaring a ‘Sputnik Moment’ (Unless You Really Mean It)”, Defense360, 17 December 2021, https://defense360.csis.org/bad-idea-declaring-a-sputnik-moment-unless-you-really-mean-it/
[8] Yanek Mieczkowski, Eisenhower’s Sputnik Moment: The Race for Space and World Prestige (Cornell University Press, 2017).
[9] Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Science in National Security”, 7 November 1957, https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/research/online-documents/sputnik/11-7-57.pdf
[10] Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Science in National Security”, 7 November 1957, https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/research/online-documents/sputnik/11-7-57.pdf
[11] Jay Barbree, Live from Cape Canaveral: Covering the Space Race, from Sputnik to Today (New York: Smithsonian Books/Collins, 2007).
[12] L. A. Mianich, “Legislative Leadership Meeting”, 7 January 1958, https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/research/online-documents/sputnik/1-7-58.pdf
[13] Douglas Brinkley, American Moonshot Young Readers Edition: John F. Kennedy and the Great Space Race (New York: HarperCollins Children's Books, 2020).
[14] John Woolley and Gerhard Peters, “Statement by the President upon Signing the National Defense Education Act”, The American Presidency Project, accessed 19 August 2023, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement-the-president-upon-signing-the-national-defense-education-act
[15] United States Senate, “U.S. Senate: Sputnik Spurs Passage of the National Defense Education Act”, Senate.gov, 12 December 2019, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/Sputnik_Spurs_Passage_of_National_Defense_Education_Act.htm
[16] Lee Sigelman, Presidential Studies Quarterly, 2000.
[17] Walter Lippmann, “A Society Cannot Stand Still”, New York Herald Tribune, 10 October 1957.
[18] Lee Sigelman, Presidential Studies Quarterly, 2000.
Bibliography
Barbree, Jay. Live from Cape Canaveral: Covering the Space Race, from Sputnik to Today. New York: Smithsonian Books/Collins, 2007.
Barbree, Jay. Revisiting America's Fear of Sputnik. Interview by Alison Stewart, 4 October 2007.
Brinkley, Douglas. American Moonshot Young Readers Edition: John F. Kennedy and the Great Space Race. New York: HarperCollins Children's Books, 2020.
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