In this course, An History of Hitler’s Empire, Professor Thomas Childers delivers twelve lectures tracing the rise and fall of Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party. Listening to the lectures as part of The Great Courses series, one notes Childers’s emphasis on two fundamental questions: first, how could Hitler and the Nazis gain power in a highly educated, industrially advanced nation at the heart of Western civilisation? Second, how did the Nazis establish a totalitarian regime so swiftly, plunging Europe into a catastrophic war that claimed millions of lives and reshaped 20th-century global politics? Childers argues, “We will address a wide variety of issues,” including what Germans expected when voting Nazi, how the Nazis presented themselves, and why resistance was minimal. He stresses the need to understand the Nazis’ appeal, their control over institutions like the press and police, and their popularity, particularly through Hitler’s foreign policy.
A professor at the University of Pennsylvania, Childers specialises in
modern German history and the Second World War. His publications, including The
Nazi Voter: The Social Foundations of Fascism in Germany, 1919–1933, provide
rigorous analysis of Nazi electoral support, grounding his lectures in primary
research. Childers’s prior delivery of this course a decade earlier, as he
mentions, “Ten years ago, I was on the set doing exactly this same course,”
reflects his long engagement with the subject. His approach combines scholarly
depth with emotional resonance, as he admits, “I’ve taught this for over a
period, and it doesn’t get easier… the emotional demands are daunting.” The course is structured in two parts. The first
six lectures cover the Nazis’ rise from 1919 to 1933, examining long-term
factors like Germany’s 1871 unification and social cleavages—religious,
regional, and class-based—exacerbated by rapid industrialisation. Childers
notes, “We will focus on the problematic nature of German national unification
in 1871 and on the deep cleavages… that made nation building in the new Germany
difficult.” He also highlights the First World War’s impact, which left Germany
reeling from defeat and burdened the Weimar Republic with a humiliating treaty.
Short-term factors, such as hyperinflation in 1923, the 1924 stabilisation, and
the Great Depression, are analysed for their role in the Nazis’ electoral gains
through innovative campaigning.
The second half examines the Third Reich’s consolidation of power from 1933 to 1945. Childers details the Nazis’ rapid control over institutions, their use of terror and propaganda, and the implementation of Hitler’s racial ideology, particularly against Jews, under Heinrich Himmler’s SS. He states, “We will examine Hitler’s racial ideas and the policies adopted to transform those ideas into reality.” The lectures also cover Hitler’s foreign policy, the destruction of the Treaty of Versailles, and the path to World War II, framed as a racial conflict against “Judeo-Bolshevism.” The course concludes with the Holocaust, tracing Nazi anti-Semitism from Mein Kampf to Auschwitz, and the Third Reich’s collapse.
Professor Childers opens his lecture by asserting the necessity of studying the Nazi Party’s rise, describing it as a defining event of the 20th century. He argues, “We can’t afford not to try and understand what National Socialism meant about, where it came from.” The Nazi regime’s impact was staggering, with 55 million deaths in World War II—soldiers and civilians perished in military operations or the Holocaust—and millions more endured postwar recovery and dislocation. Childers notes that the war shifted global power, leading to the Cold War division of Germany and Berlin between the U.S. and Soviet Union, lasting nearly 50 years. The Berlin Wall’s fall in 1989, for example, underscores the enduring geopolitical consequences.
Childers emphasises Germany’s central role in Western civilisation, making the Nazi rise particularly jarring. He states, “Germany stood and remains an integral part of our civilisation,” citing its contributions through Goethe, Schiller, Beethoven, Bach, and its advanced industrial economy in the 1920s and 30s. Germany’s near-universal literacy and 33 Nobel Prizes by 1933 highlight its sophistication, prompting Childers to ask: “How could a political movement of such sheer barbarism come to power in such a society?” This question drives his analysis, questioning whether such a movement could emerge elsewhere.
He challenges the view that the Third Reich was a logical outcome of German history. Some scholars argue it followed a “special path” (Sonderweg), from Luther’s authoritarian ethics to Prussian militarism and 19th-century romanticism, deviating from Western democratic norms exemplified by Britain, or the United States Childers questions this, noting, “Some analysts have certainly seen this to be the case,” but suggests Germany’s progressive elements, like universal male suffrage in 1871, complicate this narrative. He also explores whether Nazi ideology itself attracted Germans, asking, “Did these ideas themselves attract the German people? If so, what aspect of this programme elicited such a strong ideological response?”
Childers outlines key questions: How did the Nazis subvert the Weimar Republic (1919–1933)? Who supported them, and why? How did they break political opposition with little resistance? He promises to examine daily life under Nazi rule for average Germans and victims of racial policies, using sources like his book, The Nazi Voter. He introduces long-term factors, focusing on Germany’s late unification in 1871 under Otto von Bismarck. “German unification came very late,” he states, noting that until the 19th century, Germany was fragmented, lacking shared traditions. Bismarck’s unification, achieved through Prussian victories against Denmark (1864), Austria (1866), and France (1870–71), prioritised elite commercial interests over mass nationalism. The Zollverein, a customs union from 1834, exemplifies economic motivations.
The new state faced three cleavages: religious (Catholic south versus Protestant north), regional (Bavaria versus Prussia), and class (workers versus elites). Childers notes, “These three cleavages would be the basic areas of conflict.” Rapid industrialisation, making Germany Europe’s industrial leader by 1914, intensified tensions. The Social Democratic Party’s rise, with 34.8% of the vote by 1912, reflected class conflict. Childers concludes by foreshadowing the First World War’s role, urging students to consider moral questions: “Would you have had the courage to act?” against such a regime.
Childers here examines the First World War (1914–1918) as a pivotal moment in German political culture, arguing it was “the crucial turning point in the development of German political culture in the 20th century.” He begins by reviewing Germany’s pre-war divisions—religious, regional, and class—worsened by rapid industrialisation. “Germany was wracked by regional, religious, and class divisions,” he states. The Ruhr’s transformation into Europe’s industrial hub by 1875, producing 50% of Germany’s steel by 1914, juxtaposed modern workers with traditional artisans in guilds, creating value conflicts.
Childers discusses Bismarck’s “negative integration,” targeting Catholics in the 1870s Kulturkampf and Socialists via anti-Socialist laws (1878–1890) to unify majorities against minorities. He argues, “Bismarck adopted… a very successful short-term expedient… which, in the long run, would have a devastating impact on German political culture.” This confrontational style, alienating one-third of Germans (Catholics) and growing worker support for the Social Democrats, persisted until 1933. The SPD’s 34.8% vote share in 1912 underscores its threat to elites.
The Nazis, Childers notes, aimed to overcome these divisions with a “people’s community” (Volksgemeinschaft). He states, “The Nazis would seek to overcome the political and social divisions left by Bismarck.” The war initially unified Germans, with Kaiser Wilhelm II’s call for “peace within the castle” (Burgfrieden) fostering solidarity. “I do not recognise parties any longer. I recognise only Germans,” Childers quotes the Kaiser, noting even the SPD supported the war effort despite its pacifist roots.
However, the war’s prolonged devastation—2 million German deaths, second only to Russia’s losses—shattered unity. Childers explains, “The war gravely aggravated the already deep divisions in German society.” Martial law, imposed by generals Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff, favoured big business and labour, alienating artisans and farmers. Over 250,000 Germans died of starvation in 1916 due to food shortages and a British blockade. Strikes erupted in 1917, reflecting urban-rural and class tensions.
German propaganda claimed victory was near, but the 1918 armistice shocked the public. Childers notes, “The sudden armistice and defeat left most Germans shocked and dismayed.” The army blamed a “stab in the back” by Jewish liberals, Catholics, and Socialists, a myth Childers calls a convenient excuse. Kaiser Wilhelm II’s abdication and a revolution led to the Weimar Republic’s formation in 1919, which signed the hated Treaty of Versailles. “The new republic would be born with this legacy of war and defeat,” Childers states, detailing territorial losses (Alsace-Lorraine to France), reparations, and a “war guilt clause.”
The Weimar Constitution, drafted in Weimar to avoid Berlin’s unrest, was progressive, granting universal suffrage, a Bill of Rights, and proportional representation. Childers notes, “The Weimar constitution was progressive,” but its 35+ parties by 1928 caused instability. Political terror, including assassinations of leftists like Matthias Erzberger, plagued 1919–1924. Childers concludes that the war’s social lessons—trench egalitarianism—influenced the Nazis’ appeal, with Adolf Hitler, a war veteran, emerging in this turbulent context.
In his lecture on the Weimar Republic and the rise of the Nazi Party, Prof. Thomas Childers detailed the chaotic early years of the Weimar Republic and the emergence of the Nazi Party as a significant political force. He began by explaining that the Weimar Republic, established in 1919 following Germany’s defeat in the First World War, struggled with legitimacy from its inception. Childers argued, “This new democratic republic was forced to bear a legacy of war and defeat—a legacy it did not deserve.” The republic was unfairly blamed for Germany’s surrender, while the military sidestepped responsibility, creating a perception of illegitimacy. This was compounded by the failure to reform key institutions. Childers emphasised, “The failure to purge the judiciary would prove to be quite important for the fate of the Weimar Republic.” The judiciary, rooted in the old imperial system, showed leniency towards right-wing extremists, often issuing light sentences for political crimes, which Childers noted as receiving “slaps on the wrist.” This leniency encouraged political violence, with assassinations targeting leftist politicians and those linked to the republic’s founding.
Childers described the period from 1919 to 1923 as marked by intense instability, with nine cabinet changes reflecting the fragility of coalition governments unable to secure stable majorities in the Reichstag. He pointed out that the Weimar constitution’s proportional representation system, where every 60,000 votes secured a parliamentary seat, allowed splinter groups to gain representation, making coalition-building difficult. Childers stated, “Every splinter group, every glorified lobby, would have a chance to have a seat in the Parliament, and it made coalition-building quite difficult.” This system, while democratic, contributed to political fragmentation, as evidenced by the frequent cabinet reshufflings.
The economic and political crises of this period provided fertile ground for extremist groups, including the Nazi Party, originally the German Workers’ Party (DAP). Childers explained that the DAP, founded by Anton Drexler in Munich, was initially a small debating society. He noted, “The DAP was really a kind of glorified debating society,” holding meetings in beer halls, which he clarified were akin to conference rooms in modern hotels, dispelling the notion of a casual setting. The party’s transformation began when Adolf Hitler, an Austrian-born corporal sent by the army to monitor its activities, joined in 1919. Childers highlighted Hitler’s rapid rise, stating, “Adolf Hitler quickly emerged as the top attraction of the party.” Hitler’s oratorical skills, developed through army propaganda courses, made him a standout. Childers quoted Hitler’s early political stance: “The Jews are our misfortune,” reflecting his “rational anti-Semitism” aimed at the “removal of Jews altogether.” This ideology, Childers argued, was rooted in racial rather than religious or socioeconomic grounds, distinguishing it from traditional anti-Semitism.
Childers detailed how Hitler reshaped the party, renaming it the Nazi Party and drafting the “25 Points of 1920” to broaden its appeal. He stated, “Hitler drafted the party’s platform, the ‘25 Points of 1920,’ broadening the party’s constituency.” The platform rejected the Treaty of Versailles, promoted anti-Semitism by limiting citizenship to those of German blood, and aimed to create a “people’s community” where class, religion, and region were irrelevant. Childers noted, “What the DAP and Hitler wanted to do was to create what he called the volksgemeinschaft, a ‘people’s community,’ where class, religion, region would no longer be important.” This vision, rooted in wartime camaraderie, appealed across social strata, unlike traditional parties. Additional context supports Childers’s point: the Treaty of Versailles, signed in 1919, imposed harsh reparations and territorial losses, fuelling resentment that Hitler exploited to gain traction.
The crisis of 1923, particularly the French and Belgian occupation of the Ruhr, provided the Nazi Party with a national stage. Childers explained that the occupation, prompted by Germany’s failure to meet reparations payments, led to a policy of passive resistance, exacerbating hyperinflation. He described the economic turmoil: “It’s difficult to exaggerate the trauma of the great inflation, the Hyperinflation of 1923, as it came to be known.” By November 1923, a dollar was worth 4 trillion Reichmarks, rendering life “madness, nightmare, desperation, chaos.” This economic collapse, coupled with political unrest, including Communist uprisings and separatist movements, created an opportunity for the Nazis. Childers argued, “This situation convinced Hitler that the time was ripe for action.”
Childers then focused on the Beer Hall Putsch of November 1923, an attempt by Hitler and his followers to seize power in Bavaria and march on Berlin. He described it as a “fiasco” that unravelled quickly, with German troops halting the marchers in Munich. However, Childers emphasised Hitler’s ability to turn this failure into a political victory during his trial in 1924. He quoted Hitler’s courtroom defiance: “If overthrowing this government of November criminals who stabbed the German army in the back is high treason, I’m guilty.” The trial, covered nationally, elevated Hitler’s profile. Childers noted, “Hitler turned his trial into a political success, gaining national press coverage of his attacks on various ‘enemies’ of Germany.” Sentenced to five years for high treason, Hitler served only one year in Landsberg prison, where he dictated Mein Kampf. The lenient sentence, Childers argued, reflected the judiciary’s bias, as figures like General Ludendorff were acquitted.
Additional historical context supports Childers’s analysis: the hyperinflation of 1923 wiped out savings, particularly for the middle class, fostering resentment that extremist groups like the Nazis capitalised on. The Weimar Republic’s inability to stabilise the economy or curb political violence further eroded public trust, aligning with Childers’s depiction of a fragile democracy.
Lecture 4: The Twenties and the Great Depression
In his fourth lecture, Prof. Thomas Childers traced the Nazi Party’s rise from
a marginal group to a mainstream political force between 1923 and 1932, against
the backdrop of the Weimar Republic’s economic and political struggles. He
began by reiterating the chaos of 1923, when hyperinflation devastated Germany.
Childers stated, “It’s difficult to exaggerate the trauma of the great
inflation, the Hyperinflation of 1923.” A dollar, worth five marks in 1914,
reached 4 trillion Reichmarks by November 1923, making everyday purchases like
a streetcar ticket or a kilo of potatoes astronomically expensive. Childers
described the surreal quality of life: “Life, as one German glumly observed,
was madness, nightmare, desperation, chaos.” Workers were paid three times
daily to keep up with inflation, and shopkeepers avoided selling goods, fearing
their money would be worthless.
Childers explained that the government’s policy of passive resistance during
the Ruhr occupation, where workers were paid to slow production, fuelled
hyperinflation. He noted, “The German government simply let the printing
presses roll, making it impossible to determine, for the French or the
Belgians, just exactly how much a mark was worth.” The stabilisation of 1924,
achieved through high interest rates and U.S. loans, was a “dramatic, if
problematic, success,” according to Childers. However, it led to layoffs of
150,000 civil servants and 750,000 white-collar workers, creating widespread
dissatisfaction. Childers argued, “There was a lot of dissatisfaction out
there,” which the Nazis exploited.
Following the Beer Hall Putsch’s failure, Childers described how Hitler,
released from prison in 1924, re-founded the Nazi Party in 1925. He quoted
Hitler’s new strategy: “We want to enter the Parliament, not because we’ve
become Democrats and we believe in parliamentary government. Far from it. We
want to enter the Parliament in order to destroy it.” Childers emphasised that
Hitler pursued a “path of legality to power,” focusing on organisation and propaganda
rather than violent coups. He established a national network of propaganda
cells to gather public sentiment and tailor appeals. Childers noted, “Hitler
had a vision, largely borrowed from the Communists, of establishing a network
of propaganda cells all over Germany.” However, during the “Golden Twenties”
(1924–1929), a period of relative economic recovery, the Nazis struggled
electorally, securing only 2.6 percent of the vote in 1928. Childers quoted a
German official’s assessment: “This is a party that, despite great enthusiasm
and energy, is going nowhere.”
The Great Depression, beginning in 1929, provided the Nazis with their
breakthrough issue. Childers stated, “The Great Depression in 1929 brought a
stunning drop in industrial production, a sharp increase in unemployment, and a
spiraling government deficit.” Industrial production fell 31 percent,
unemployment rose 200 percent, and the coalition government collapsed in 1930.
Chancellor Heinrich Brüning’s austerity measures, including tax increases and
benefit cuts, were implemented via emergency decrees under Article 48 of the
Weimar constitution. Childers argued, “By 1932, the German public had grown
accustomed to the use of emergency decree powers,” setting a precedent for
non-parliamentary rule. Brüning’s dissolution of the Reichstag in 1930 led to
elections where the Nazis, under Joseph Goebbels’s propaganda leadership, won
18.3 percent of the vote, becoming Germany’s second-largest party. Childers
noted, “The Nazis were associated with no failed policy,” allowing them to
capitalise on public discontent.
Additional context supports Childers’s points: the Dawes Plan of 1924
facilitated U.S. loans to Germany, stabilising the economy but tying it to
American markets, which collapsed in 1929, exacerbating Germany’s economic
woes. The Nazis’ focus on propaganda, including their newspaper Völkischer
Beobachter, amplified their anti-Weimar message, resonating with a population
frustrated by economic hardship.
In his fifth lecture, Prof. Thomas Childers examined the Nazi Party’s dramatic rise in 1932, a pivotal year that positioned them on the verge of power. He began by highlighting their strategy of perpetual campaigning, unlike other German parties that faded between elections. Childers stated, “Most German parties were like that as well, but not the Nazis. They campaigned and campaigned, even when there was no election around.” In 1931, despite no national elections, the Nazis remained active, using dues-funded propaganda events that combined entertainment with political speeches. Childers noted, “Nazi propaganda was a self-financing operation,” with events featuring bands and dancing to draw crowds.
Childers described 1932 as a year of intense electoral activity, with two presidential ballots, two Reichstag elections, and regional elections across Germany. The Nazis’ campaigns were well-financed and meticulously orchestrated. Childers explained, “The Nazis launched a massive media blitz unparalleled in German history.” Under Goebbels’s direction, they held over 30,000 rallies, distributed millions of leaflets, and used films, records, and motorcade convoys to amplify their message. Childers quoted Goebbels’s strategy: “Identify an area that looks like a good prospect for us, and then throw everything we have at it.” The Nazis’ Sturmabteilung (SA) played a key role, protecting speakers and engaging in street battles with Communists, which Childers described as a “plague” of public violence.
Childers detailed Hitler’s decision to challenge President Paul von Hindenburg in the 1932 presidential elections, a risky move given Hindenburg’s stature. He stated, “Hitler was afraid, Goebbels was afraid, that they would alienate the conservative voters that they needed.” Despite this, Hitler’s campaign, featuring a “Deutschlandflug” where he flew across Germany, projected an image of dynamism. Childers noted, “The image was that of a peripatetic, all-powerful man who could be all places at all times.” Although Hitler lost with 36 percent to Hindenburg’s 49.6 percent, Childers argued, “This was a tremendous infusion of prestige for him,” elevating Hitler’s national visibility.
The Nazis’ success continued in regional elections, securing 36 percent in Prussia and up to 48 percent in smaller states. Childers stated, “It looked very much like this picture, this image, that the Nazis were trying to create of a dynamic leader, a dynamic movement.” However, Chancellor Brüning’s inability to address the Depression led to his dismissal in spring 1932, following pressure from business and military figures like General Kurt von Schleicher. Childers noted, “Business leaders were convinced that Brüning had to go.” Brüning’s replacement, Franz von Papen, lacked broad support and called for Reichstag elections in July 1932. Childers described the Nazi campaign as “the most effective campaign in German history,” resulting in 38 percent of the vote, making them the largest party. He quoted their claim: “The Nazis argued that they had become a true people’s party, a volkspartei.”
Despite this success, Childers highlighted internal Nazi disappointment, as they fell short of a majority. Hindenburg refused to appoint Hitler chancellor with emergency powers, leading to parliamentary gridlock. Childers stated, “Parliamentary government in Germany had now become a farce.” In November 1932, the Nazi vote dropped to 33 percent, and Goebbels admitted, “We’ve blown it.” Childers concluded with the irony that, as the Nazi constituency began to fray, Hitler was appointed chancellor on January 30, 1933, through backdoor intrigue. Additional context underscores Childers’s analysis: the Weimar Republic’s collapse was accelerated by economic despair and political polarisation, with the Nazis’ broad appeal—evidenced by their diverse voter base, including farmers and small-shop workers—exploiting this instability.
Childers began by urging students to consider the contingencies that led to Adolf Hitler’s appointment as chancellor in January 1933, cautioning against viewing the outcome as inevitable. He stated, “Try to forget what you know—that no outcome is more obvious than the one that happened as we look back on it. But there is so much contingency involved—being at the right place at the right time, the right confluence of circumstances, which is certainly where Adolf Hitler found himself in 1933.” Childers described the Nazi Party’s electoral support as volatile, with a diverse constituency driven more by protest than ideological commitment. He quoted Joseph Goebbels’s concern: “We’ve got to come to power soon, or we’re going to win ourselves to death in these elections.” The November 1932 elections showed a decline in Nazi support to 33 percent, revealing the fragility of their base.
Childers detailed the political manoeuvring that led to Hitler’s chancellorship. In December 1932, General Kurt von Schleicher became chancellor after Franz von Papen’s dismissal, aiming to form a coalition with Social Democrats and Nazis. Schleicher’s plan failed, and Papen, resentful and retained as President Paul von Hindenburg’s adviser, intrigued against him. Childers noted, “Papen had decided that the thing to do was to intrigue against Schleicher, and to get him out.” Papen arranged secret meetings with Hitler, proposing a Hitler-Papen cabinet. The Nazis’ strong performance in January 1933 regional elections convinced Hitler to agree, though he insisted on being chancellor, not vice-chancellor. On January 30, 1933, Hindenburg appointed Hitler chancellor, with Papen as vice-chancellor, a decision Childers described as a “slapdash” compromise.
Hitler moved cautiously to avoid the appearance of a coup. The cabinet included only three Nazis: Hitler, Wilhelm Frick as Minister of the Interior, and Hermann Goering as Reich Commissar for Prussia, giving them control over police forces. Childers explained, “That put Hermann Goering in charge of the police in Prussia,” which comprised three-fifths of Germany. The Sturmabteilung (SA) were deputised as auxiliary police, escalating their influence. Hitler demanded new elections for March 5, 1933, over Papen’s objections, to capitalise on his new position. Childers highlighted the Nazis’ effective use of radio and their refusal to use Treasury funds for campaigning, projecting financial integrity.
The Reichstag fire on February 27, 1933, marked a turning point. Childers stated, “The Nazis were absolutely convinced this was the first shot in the Communist revolution.” Hitler used the incident, blamed on Dutch Communist Martinus van der Lubbe, to secure the Reichstag Fire Decree, which he described as ending “all civil rights guaranteed by the Weimar constitution: freedom of the press; freedom of expression; freedom of association; the secrecy of the mail and the telephone.” This decree, issued on February 28, became the legal foundation for the Third Reich, allowing mass arrests of Communists and Social Democrats. Childers quoted Goering’s aggressive stance: “It will be my chief objective to expunge the pestilence of Communism.” By March 25, approximately 10,000 Communists were arrested in Prussia alone.
Despite SA intimidation at polling stations, the Nazis secured only 44 percent of the vote in the March 5 election. Childers noted, “Even with that, they didn’t get a majority.” However, with the conservatives’ 8 percent, the coalition achieved a parliamentary majority. Hitler banned the Communist Party, introduced a new flag on March 12, and was sworn in as chancellor on March 21 at a grand ceremony in Potsdam’s Garrison Church, symbolically aligning with German tradition. He proposed the Enabling Act, granting the government legislative power without Reichstag approval. Childers explained, “Hitler waited until after the election so he could run against the Communist menace, then banned them so that he would have a two-thirds majority in the Reichstag for the passage of this Enabling Act.” Only the Social Democrats opposed it, and with its passage, the Weimar Republic ceased to exist.
By July 1933, all parties except the Nazis were outlawed, creating a one-party state. The first concentration camp opened at Dachau in April, and labour unions were banned in May. Childers described Heinrich Himmler’s unauthorised consolidation of police control: “Himmler, acting on his own, simply went out to Bavaria, to Baden, to Wuerttemberg and implied that the Fuehrer wanted him to organise police activities in Germany.” The SA’s growing power alarmed the German army, which feared absorption. In June 1934, during the “Night of Long Knives,” Hitler ordered the execution of SA leader Ernst Roehm and others, consolidating his alliance with the army. Childers noted, “Hitler needed the army; he needed big business, which was also not happy with the SA.” When Hindenburg died on August 2, 1934, Hitler assumed both president and chancellor roles, and the army swore allegiance to him personally, not the constitution. Childers concluded, “By the summer of 1934, the Nazis had achieved the basis of a totalitarian state.”
Additional context supports Childers’s narrative: the Reichstag Fire Decree enabled the Nazis to suppress opposition legally, while the Enabling Act, passed on March 23, 1933, allowed Hitler to enact laws without parliamentary consent, effectively dismantling democratic institutions. The Night of Long Knives eliminated internal threats and secured military loyalty, critical for Hitler’s later foreign policy ambitions.
Childers began by discussing the Nazi regime’s totalitarian aspirations and racial policies after consolidating power by 1934. He described totalitarianism as a system claiming “total control over the individual,” erasing distinctions between public and private life, driven by an ideology that saw race as the key to history. Childers stated, “For the Nazis, it would become clear in the course of the 1930s that it was race that was the key to understanding human history.” This ideology justified extreme measures, overriding traditional morality.
Childers explained that the regime combined relentless propaganda with state terror. The media portrayed a unified, classless “people’s community” (Volksgemeinschaft), celebrating Hitler as a populist leader. He noted, “There’s no such thing as bad news reported in the press, not in this sort of regime.” Meanwhile, the Gestapo and SS enforced fear, arresting perceived enemies at night to maximise vulnerability. Childers highlighted the tactic of Sippenhaft, where families of dissenters faced punishment, deterring opposition. He quoted a German clergyman’s reflection: “At first they went after the Communists, and I was not a Communist, so I did nothing. Then they went after the Socialists, and I was a little uneasier, but I wasn’t a Socialist, and so I did nothing. Then they went after the church, and I was a churchman, but then it was too late.”
Social life was tightly controlled through organisations like the Hitler Youth and the League of German Girls. Childers cited the slogan, “Barbers, too, face great tasks,” illustrating the regime’s pervasive reach. Propaganda events, such as the annual Nuremberg rallies, reinforced Nazi ideology, while dissent was silenced. He described the “whispered jokes” about Nazi leaders, noting, “You might tell this joke at the pub one night. Everyone would laugh, and then you might tell it at another pub two days later. And everybody would laugh. That night, there would be a knock on the door, and it would be the Gestapo.”
Anti-Semitism was central to Nazi ideology, Childers argued, referencing Hitler’s Mein Kampf, where he claimed Jews corrupted German society. Before 1933, the Nazis linked anti-Semitism to economic grievances, but after taking power, they pursued it openly. Childers outlined three phases of Nazi racial policy. From 1933 to 1935, Jews faced “legal” discrimination, including a boycott of Jewish businesses in April 1933, which Childers called “a disaster from beginning to end” due to public and international backlash. Laws banned Jews from civil service, law, and medicine, though Hindenburg’s intervention spared Jewish war veterans. Childers noted, “Hitler backtracked and said, ‘Oh, no, of course not, not veterans,’” reflecting early sensitivity to Hindenburg’s influence.
From 1935 to 1938, the Nuremberg Laws of 1935, announced at the Nuremberg rally, stripped Jews of citizenship and banned intermarriage with Aryans. Childers described their chaotic drafting: “The first drafts of the Nuremberg laws were written on napkins in a beer hall in Nuremberg.” The laws, retroactive, defined Jewishness inconsistently, with disputes over whether one or three Jewish grandparents qualified. Childers noted, “Hitler wouldn’t decide. This was quite typical; he said, ‘I can’t be bothered with these sorts of things.’” The SS pursued “Entjudung” (de-Jewification), pressuring Jews to emigrate, though few countries accepted them.
The third phase began with Reichskristallnacht in November 1938, the first government-orchestrated pogrom. Childers described it as “the most pivotal and terrifying moment of Nazi racial policy before the war,” involving widespread violence against Jewish communities, with synagogues and businesses destroyed. He argued that this event, coinciding with Hitler’s foreign policy triumphs, was overshadowed in public perception. The final phase, during the war, involved the “final solution,” mass murder enabled by Nazi conquests in Poland and the Soviet Union. Childers questioned whether Nazi policy followed a blueprint, noting Hitler’s early writings about eliminating Jews but suggesting bureaucratic politics and improvisation shaped outcomes. He asked, “Is there a straight line from the pages of Mein Kampf to the ovens at Auschwitz?”
Additional context clarifies Childers’s points: the Nuremberg Laws, passed on September 15, 1935, institutionalised anti-Semitism, while Reichskristallnacht, triggered by the assassination of a German diplomat by a Jewish refugee, saw over 7,000 Jewish businesses vandalised and 30,000 Jews arrested. International condemnation was muted, partly due to global economic concerns and anti-Semitism.
Here Childers examined Nazi foreign policy from 1933 to 1938, emphasising Hitler’s aim to restore German grandeur by dismantling the Treaty of Versailles. He stated, “The Nazis had come to power, of course, with their program of restoring German grandeur, undoing the hated Treaty of Versailles, restoring the German military to a position of prominence.” Hitler envisioned a multipolar world with Germany dominating Europe, Britain its global empire, the United States the Western Hemisphere, and Japan Asia. Childers noted, “Hitler thought, in the long run, that the United States was doomed, that you could not have a country of such racial mixture that could survive over the long haul.”
Hitler’s ideology linked racial policy, the quest for “living space” (Lebensraum) in the East, and a crusade against “Judeo-Bolshevism” in the Soviet Union. Childers explained, “For Hitler, the great objective was, from the beginning of his career to the end, the showdown with the Soviet Union.” Publicly, Hitler framed his actions as seeking equality, stating in speeches, “I’m a veteran of the front; I was there in the trenches, and I know what war means, and I’m not in favour of war.” At the 1933 Geneva Disarmament Conference, Hitler proposed universal disarmament, knowing other powers would refuse. Childers noted, “When the French balked at this—they didn’t say ‘no’ immediately, but it was clear they weren’t going to do it—Hitler in a huff withdrew Germany’s representation from the conference.” This withdrawal from the League of Nations resonated domestically, as the Versailles Treaty was universally despised.
In 1935, Hitler announced the creation of the Luftwaffe and introduced conscription, defying Versailles. Childers stated, “Hitler announced his determination to build an air force, a Luftwaffe.” The League of Nations protested, but no action followed. The Anglo-German Naval Agreement limited Germany’s fleet to one-third of Britain’s, undermining French trust in British enforcement of Versailles. In 1936, Hitler remilitarised the Rhineland, a gamble against his generals’ advice. Childers quoted their concerns: “If the French send so much as a battalion of troops into the Rhineland, we can’t stop them. It’ll be a humiliation on a grand scale.” The lack of Western response emboldened Hitler.
The 1936 Berlin Olympics showcased Germany’s resurgence, with Childers noting, “For Hitler, far from the ’36 Olympics being an embarrassment, it was a great public relations victory.” Germany’s support for Franco in the Spanish Civil War strengthened ties with Mussolini, isolating Britain and France. In November 1937, the Hossbach Memorandum outlined Hitler’s plans for Lebensraum by 1943–1945, mentioning Austria and Czechoslovakia. Childers questioned its intent: “Was Hitler sort of giving a tour of the rise and talking in very general terms, or was this a kind of timetable?” The removal of dissenting generals and Foreign Minister von Neurath in 1938 cleared obstacles to Hitler’s agenda.
The 1938 Anschluss with Austria marked a high point. Childers described Hitler’s ultimatum to Austrian Chancellor Kurt von Schuschnigg: “Schuschnigg was led inside, all the way down this long tunnel with torch lights all the way down, where SS men in dress uniform stood.” Austria’s annexation, greeted by cheering crowds, fulfilled Hitler’s vision of a greater German Reich. Childers noted, “He had fulfilled his childhood dream, he said, of bringing the Germans of Austria and Germany together.” This success, alongside Reichskristallnacht, highlighted the interplay of foreign triumphs and domestic repression.
Additional context supports Childers’s analysis: the Rhineland’s remilitarisation on March 7, 1936, violated the Treaty of Locarno, but Britain’s view of Versailles as unfair weakened Western resolve. The Anschluss, completed on March 12, 1938, faced no military resistance, partly because Austria’s government collapsed under pressure.
Prof. Childers began his ninth lecture by addressing the escalating tensions in 1938, culminating in the Munich Conference. He stated, “For diplomats in Europe—and all over the world in fact—concern grew over the summer of 1938 that something would lead to a German invasion, and then this would be the start of a second world war.” The crisis centred on the Sudetenland, where ethnic Germans, led by Konrad Heinlein’s pro-Nazi Sudeten German Party, claimed oppression by Czechoslovakia. Childers noted, “The Sudeten Germans were encouraged by Berlin to make impossible demands, to provoke incidents.” Czechoslovakia mobilised, raising fears of a broader conflict due to its treaties with France and the Soviet Union.
British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain sought to avert war through summit diplomacy, meeting Hitler at Berchtesgaden on September 15, 1938. Childers described Hitler’s charm: “What he found was the agreeable Hitler, the charming Hitler, who welcomed him.” Chamberlain proposed a plebiscite for the Sudetenland, securing British and French agreement. However, at a second meeting in Bad Godesberg, Hitler rejected this, demanding immediate German control. Childers quoted Hitler’s ultimatum: “The German people’s patience was finished, that the Czechs were persecuting Germans in the Sudetenland.” As Britain and France mobilised, Mussolini proposed a conference, leading to the Munich Conference on September 29, 1938.
At Munich, Chamberlain, Mussolini, Hitler, and French Prime Minister Edouard Daladier agreed to cede the Sudetenland to Germany. Childers noted the exclusion of Czechoslovakia: “The Czechs, whose delegation literally had to stand outside the building, waiting to hear the fate of their country.” He described the leaders’ reactions: “There’s a picture that shows Chamberlain, who just looks pleased as punch with himself. Next to him is Edouard Daladier, who has a look on his face like someone who’s just supped with the Devil.” Hitler’s triumph boosted his domestic popularity, as Childers stated, “His popularity in Germany soared after this—a great victory.”
Opposition within the German army, led by General Ludwig Beck, collapsed after Munich. Childers quoted Beck’s concerns: “This is suicide. This will not work. The region that Germany would have to invade is all mountains.” Munich convinced Stalin of Western weakness, reinforcing his belief that Britain and France aimed to divert German aggression eastward. In March 1939, Germany invaded the rest of Czechoslovakia, violating Munich. Childers noted, “The Czech government was in an impossible position. There was no real resistance.” Britain and France guaranteed Poland’s sovereignty, anticipating Hitler’s next move.
Hitler targeted Poland’s corridor and Danzig, using claims of German mistreatment. Childers cited Hitler’s orders: “Danzig is not the object of our activities. It is a question of expanding our Lebensraum, our living space in the east.” In August 1939, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact shocked the world, dividing Poland between Germany and the Soviet Union. Childers explained Hitler’s rationale: “It would remove the danger of a two-front war for Germany.” Stalin, wary of Western intentions, sought time to rebuild his military. On September 1, 1939, Germany invaded Poland, triggering British and French declarations of war. Childers quoted Hitler’s disbelief: “What now?” The rapid Polish defeat, marked by civilian bombings, signalled a new kind of war.
Additional context underscores Childers’s points: the Munich Agreement ceded 11,000 square miles of Czechoslovakia, weakening its defences. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact’s secret protocols, revealed later, allocated spheres of influence, enabling Germany’s swift conquest of western Poland by October 1939.
Lecture 10: War in the West, War in the East
Professor Thomas Childers’s lecture focused on the Nazi Party’s military
campaigns during the early stages of World War II, highlighting the contrasting
dynamics of the Western and Eastern fronts and the ideological underpinnings of
Germany’s actions. He began by addressing the unexpected response of Britain
and France to Germany’s invasion of Poland in 1939. Childers noted, “They had
surprised Hitler by declaring war, honouring their obligations to Poland,” which
disrupted Hitler’s assumption that the Western powers would remain passive.
This led to a period of relative inactivity known as the Phony War, or
Sitzkrieg, as Childers explained, “The English and the Americans called it the
period of the Phony War; the French called it the drole de guerre, the strange
war; the Germans called it the Sitzkrieg, the sitting war, as opposed to the
Blitzkrieg.” During this time, from late 1939 to early 1940, Hitler sought
diplomatic means to avoid conflict with Britain, but Childers pointed out that
Britain’s demand for German withdrawal from Poland was unacceptable to Hitler.
Childers detailed Germany’s invasion of Norway and
Denmark to secure strategic northern routes, followed by a major offensive in
May 1940 against France, Belgium, and Holland. He emphasised the success of the
Nazi Party’s Blitzkrieg strategy, which combined rapid armoured advances with
air support. Childers stated, “Hitler had used a new strategy in the attack on
Poland. It was called Blitzkrieg, lightning war, the mounting of armoured units
supported by air power to break through enemy lines.” This tactic led to the
swift collapse of France, which Childers described as a shocking event: “On
June 22, 1940, barely a month after the hostilities had actually begun, France
surrendered. It was a shock of enormous proportions.” The rapid defeat,
facilitated by Germany’s bypassing of the Maginot Line through the Ardennes,
marked a high point in Hitler’s domestic support, as France was expected to
offer stout resistance based on its World War I performance.
Childers then discussed Germany’s plans for Operation Sea Lion, the intended
invasion of Britain, and the Battle of Britain, where the Luftwaffe failed to
gain air superiority. He noted Hitler’s lack of commitment to this campaign,
quoting, “Britain refused, in other words, to see reason, Hitler believed, and
continued to fight.” The British success, bolstered by radar and effective
fighter command, led Hitler to abandon the invasion, redirecting his focus
eastward. Britain’s resilience under Churchill’s leadership, who Childers
described as a staunch opponent of appeasement, frustrated Hitler’s plans, as
confirmed by historical accounts of the RAF’s strategic advantage.
On the Eastern Front, Childers underscored Hitler’s ideological fixation on the
Soviet Union as the centre of a “Judeo-Bolshevist conspiracy.” He stated, “For
Hitler, the war against the Soviet Union had always been the main event,”
driven by the Nazi Party’s pursuit of Lebensraum and the destruction of
Bolshevism. Hitler underestimated the Red Army, believing it weakened by
Stalin’s purges and its struggles in the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940.
Childers quoted Hitler’s overconfidence: “One only had to kick in the door,
Hitler said, and the whole rotten structure would collapse within a matter of
weeks.” The Soviet Union’s initial poor performance against Finland, despite
eventual victory, reinforced this view, with historical estimates suggesting
Soviet losses of around 300,000 compared to Finland’s 70,000.
Childers described the launch of Operation Barbarossa on June 22, 1941, as “the
largest military operation in human history.” The German forces achieved
stunning initial success, with Childers noting, “In the first 48 hours, the
Germans enjoyed unparalleled success. They caught the Russian troops completely
unprepared, completely by surprise.” The destruction of much of the Soviet air
force and rapid advances towards Leningrad, Moscow, and Kiev demonstrated the
Blitzkrieg’s effectiveness. However, logistical issues, including inadequate
roads and supply lines, slowed progress. Childers highlighted the environmental
challenges: “Fall rains slowed the German advance, and in late November and
early December, the snows came to Russia’s aid.” The Soviet counteroffensive on
December 5-6, 1941, halted the German advance, ending the Blitzkrieg phase.
Historical records indicate German casualties reached approximately 750,000 by
December 1941, while Soviet losses were far higher but offset by their vast
manpower reserves. The lecture concluded with the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor on December 7, 1941, and Hitler’s declaration of war on the United
States four days later, transforming the conflict into a global war.
Childers detailed Germany’s invasion of Norway and
Denmark to secure strategic northern routes, followed by a major offensive in
May 1940 against France, Belgium, and Holland. He emphasised the success of the
Nazi Party’s Blitzkrieg strategy, which combined rapid armoured advances with
air support. Childers stated, “Hitler had used a new strategy in the attack on
Poland. It was called Blitzkrieg, lightning war, the mounting of armoured units
supported by air power to break through enemy lines.” This tactic led to the
swift collapse of France, which Childers described as a shocking event: “On
June 22, 1940, barely a month after the hostilities had actually begun, France
surrendered. It was a shock of enormous proportions.” The rapid defeat,
facilitated by Germany’s bypassing of the Maginot Line through the Ardennes,
marked a high point in Hitler’s domestic support, as France was expected to
offer stout resistance based on its World War I performance.
Childers then discussed Germany’s plans for Operation Sea Lion, the intended
invasion of Britain, and the Battle of Britain, where the Luftwaffe failed to
gain air superiority. He noted Hitler’s lack of commitment to this campaign,
quoting, “Britain refused, in other words, to see reason, Hitler believed, and
continued to fight.” The British success, bolstered by radar and effective
fighter command, led Hitler to abandon the invasion, redirecting his focus
eastward. Britain’s resilience under Churchill’s leadership, who Childers
described as a staunch opponent of appeasement, frustrated Hitler’s plans, as
confirmed by historical accounts of the RAF’s strategic advantage.
On the Eastern Front, Childers underscored Hitler’s ideological fixation on the
Soviet Union as the centre of a “Judeo-Bolshevist conspiracy.” He stated, “For
Hitler, the war against the Soviet Union had always been the main event,”
driven by the Nazi Party’s pursuit of Lebensraum and the destruction of
Bolshevism. Hitler underestimated the Red Army, believing it weakened by
Stalin’s purges and its struggles in the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940.
Childers quoted Hitler’s overconfidence: “One only had to kick in the door,
Hitler said, and the whole rotten structure would collapse within a matter of
weeks.” The Soviet Union’s initial poor performance against Finland, despite
eventual victory, reinforced this view, with historical estimates suggesting
Soviet losses of around 300,000 compared to Finland’s 70,000.
Childers described the launch of Operation Barbarossa on June 22, 1941, as “the
largest military operation in human history.” The German forces achieved
stunning initial success, with Childers noting, “In the first 48 hours, the
Germans enjoyed unparalleled success. They caught the Russian troops completely
unprepared, completely by surprise.” The destruction of much of the Soviet air
force and rapid advances towards Leningrad, Moscow, and Kiev demonstrated the
Blitzkrieg’s effectiveness. However, logistical issues, including inadequate
roads and supply lines, slowed progress. Childers highlighted the environmental
challenges: “Fall rains slowed the German advance, and in late November and
early December, the snows came to Russia’s aid.” The Soviet counteroffensive on
December 5-6, 1941, halted the German advance, ending the Blitzkrieg phase.
Historical records indicate German casualties reached approximately 750,000 by
December 1941, while Soviet losses were far higher but offset by their vast
manpower reserves. The lecture concluded with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour on December 7, 1941, and Hitler’s declaration of war on the United
States four days later, transforming the conflict into a global war.
This lecture examines the Nazi Party’s racial policies, particularly the escalation of anti-Jewish measures following the invasions of Poland in 1939 and the Soviet Union in 1941, which placed Europe’s largest Jewish communities under German control. Childers began by noting Hitler’s delegation of racial policy to Heinrich Himmler, who tasked Reinhard Heydrich with finding a “solution to the Jewish question.” Childers quoted Hitler’s chilling 1939 Reichstag speech: “If international financed Jewry within Europe and abroad should succeed once more in plunging the peoples into a world war, then the consequence will be... the destruction of the Jewish race in Europe!” This set the stage for the radicalisation of Nazi policy from immigration to expulsion.
Childers explained that the Nazis established the Government General of Poland as a “dumping ground” for Jews from annexed territories like Czechoslovakia and Austria by October 1939. He noted, “All Jews were to be rounded up and concentrated in a few selected urban areas in this Government General,” with ghettos near rail centres hinting at further deportations. The deportation of Western European Jews to the Government General began in 1940, overwhelming the region, as Childers cited Hans Frank’s complaints that it was becoming unmanageable. Historical estimates suggest around one million people were forcibly relocated to these ghettos by 1940.
Childers discussed various Nazi proposals, including a Jewish reservation beyond the Urals and the Madagascar Plan to deport Jews to the French colony. He quoted Himmler’s 1940 memo: “I hope to see the concept of Jews completely obliterated, with the possibility of a large migration of all Jews to Africa, or else to a colony.” However, these plans were deemed impractical, and Childers noted the Nazis’ rejection of using German concentration camps like Dachau for Jews due to logistical and visibility concerns. Instead, the Einsatzgruppen, special SS units, were tasked with rounding up Jews into ghettos, with Childers highlighting their brutal actions in Poland and the Soviet Union.
Childers described the Nazi euthanasia program initiated in 1939 to enforce “racial hygiene,” targeting children and adults deemed “racially valueless.” He stated, “Over 5,000 racially valueless children, as the Nazis put it, died in this euthanasia program in this period; 80,000—100,000 mentally defective or handicapped adults also fell victim.” The use of poison gas in this program foreshadowed later extermination methods. Childers noted the secrecy surrounding these actions, with public backlash in 1941 temporarily halting the program after protests from relatives.
On the Eastern Front, Childers detailed the Einsatzgruppen’s mass shootings, quoting an SS report: “In Rokiskis, 3,208 people had to be transported three miles before they could be liquidated.” He emphasised the inefficiency and publicity of these actions, which Heydrich found problematic, stating, “The shootings could not be concealed from the German troops, and in many cases German troops participated.” Historical accounts estimate that the Einsatzgruppen killed around two million people, mostly Jews, in 1941-1942. Childers noted that by summer 1941, Himmler received a verbal order from Hitler to devise a more systematic solution, as Allied intelligence, including reports from the Polish underground, began revealing the scale of these atrocities, though no immediate action was possible.
Childers’s lecture on the Final Solution outlined the Nazi Party’s systematic plan for the extermination of European Jews, developed in 1941 and formalised in 1942. He began by noting that, intoxicated by early successes in the Soviet Union, Hitler and his advisors concluded that a “final solution to the Jewish question” was feasible. Childers stated, “At some point in the summer of 1941, perhaps intoxicated by their apparent victory over the USSR, Hitler and his top advisers had come to the conclusion that some sort of final solution to the Jewish question was at hand.” Reinhard Heydrich devised a plan involving deportation to eastern death camps like Auschwitz and Treblinka for mass extermination using gas chambers. Childers emphasised Hitler’s avoidance of written orders, noting, “There appears to be no written document linking Hitler to the plan; he almost never committed himself to paper.”
Childers detailed the Wannsee Conference on January 20, 1942, where Heydrich announced the plan to a select group of officials. He quoted Hans Frank’s pre-conference remarks: “With respect to the Jews, therefore, I will only operate on the assumption that they will disappear. They must go.” The conference outlined the creation of death camps in Poland and elsewhere, with immediate gassing of the “unfit.” Childers stressed the secrecy, stating, “Heydrich emphasised the need for secrecy because the German public was not ready for this sort of extreme action, the Allies would make great propaganda out of it, and the victims must be ignorant of the fate awaiting them.” Implementation began in spring 1942, with deportations from the Warsaw ghetto to Treblinka starting July 22, 1942.
Childers described the death camps’ operations, where victims were deceived into believing they were to be showered, only to be gassed in chambers using Cyclon B. He noted, “The dying took anywhere from 10 to 30 minutes for everyone to perish,” with valuables like gold teeth and hair extracted post-mortem. Historical estimates suggest four to five million Jews died in the camps, with an additional one to two million killed by the Einsatzgruppen, totaling around six to eight million victims, including Poles, Russians, and Roma.
Childers addressed Allied knowledge, noting that while reports of Einsatzgruppen pogroms emerged in 1941, concrete evidence of the death camps surfaced only in 1944. He stated, “It was not until 1944 that hard information about the camps became really available to the Allies.” Debates over bombing the camps were dismissed in favour of defeating the Nazi military machine, as Childers explained, “The Allies chose, instead, to take the position that the best way to save Jewish lives and those others caught in the concentration camps was to concentrate on defeating the Nazi military machine.”
Childers concluded with the war’s turning points: the German defeat at Stalingrad (October 1942-February 1943), with over 500,000 German casualties, and the Allied invasion of North Africa and Italy in 1942-1943. The D-Day invasion on June 6, 1944, and the Soviet advance through Poland marked Germany’s decline. A failed assassination attempt on Hitler on July 20, 1944, intensified Nazi repression. By April 1945, Allied forces closed in, liberating camps like Buchenwald and Belsen, revealing the Holocaust’s horrors. Childers quoted Hitler’s unrepentant final testament: “It is not true that I or anyone else in Germany wanted war in 1939. It was desired and provoked exclusively by those international statesmen who are either of Jewish ancestry or who worked for the Jewish interests.” On May 2, 1945, Germany surrendered, ending the Third Reich. Childers reflected on the moral imperative, stating, “For the Germans, that haunting question was accompanied by an enormous burden of guilt, shame, and horror at what had been done by Germans, in the name of the German people,” urging vigilance to prevent such atrocities in democratic societies.
