Plan of Investigation:
How close did the world come to war during the B-59 Nuclear Submarine crisis? I will start my investigation by looking at the previous events leading up to the events involving submarine B-59. During this I will be examining related sources, such as official documents and reports. In my summary I will also be looking at individual accounts as well as the two sources that I will be examining to get the best possible understanding of the background and the actual events that took place. My two main sources that I will be examining include an official account of what happened on the submarine from a crewmember Vladim Orlov and an official report on the progress of Operation Anadyr. In my analysis I will be looking these two accounts of what happened with submarine B-59 and the Cuban missile crisis, in my analysis. I will conclude by examining how close the world came to nuclear war and the importance of shared information to historians to properly understanding historical events.
Words: 169
Summary:
After Fidel Castro seized power in Cuba the Americans felt threatened by the close proximity of a communist nation to their borders1. The Bay of Pigs invasion was the American response to the impending issue of the proximity of communism. The invasion however was a failure and made Castro seek support from Russia to help prevent another invasion if it were to come in the future2. The support came from the USSR in the form of nuclear missiles that were installed in Cuba, because Khrushchev believed John F. Kennedy to be weak3. This was an important political and strategically move for the USSR as they did not have as many Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile's (ICBM's) however they had far more advanced mid range missiles4 that could easily be launched from Cuba towards the USA. America immediately took action against this by setting up a naval blockade off the coast of Cuba5 to attempt to stop further missiles coming to Cuba from Russia when in reality most of the missiles were already on the Cuban mainland. After Khrushchev realised his miscalculation in the fact that he did not believe that the Americans would go to such great lengths to stop the missiles from reaching Cuba; he attempted to protect the soviet vessels travelling to Cuba four diesel submarines (one being the B-59) were armed with standard and nuclear torpedo's that sailed from the Artic Kola peninsula. The submarines avoided detection from the USA and NATO air surveillance in the North Atlantic, however due to the need to resurface often to charge the batteries of the submarines they were spotted off of the coast of Cuba.
When the B-59 submarine resurfaced on October 27th 1962, it got spotted by an American patrol aircraft and then destroyers blocked the progress of B-597. The Americans began dropping stun grenades. However according to the Russians in the submarine the Americans were dropping depth charges on B-59 to force it to resurface. Tensions were high on the submarine and as Vladim Orlov (the Russian radio intelligence officer) reported that oxygen began to run low and temperatures skyrocketed aboard B-59 and the crew began fainting9. The captain aboard the submarine (Valentin Grigorievitch Savitsky) ordered the crew to arm the nuclear torpedoes10. Communications however were limited because of the depth that the submarine was at and being able to communicate with the Soviet authorities that could authorise the firing of torpedoes would require surfacing11, Savitsky was worried that while they were debating that war might have already broken out above them, he said "We shall die ourselves, sink them all but not stain our navy's honour!"12. However after much debating amongst the officers (Ivan Maslennikov and Vasili Arkhipov) B-59 finally surfaced. The confrontation between the two superpowers was over but nuclear war had never been closer to a reality.
Words: 479
Evaluation of sources:
Recollections of Vladim Orlov (USSR Submarine B-59)
Mozgovoi, A. (2002) The Cuban Samba of the Quartet of Foxtrots: Soviet Submarines in the Caribbean Crisis of 1962 Military Parade, Moscow Orlov is an eyewitness to the events that transpired on October 27th 1962 on the submarine B-59 during its siege by American ships. This gives him incomparable reliability as a primary source as to what occurred in the submarine B-59. However the fact that this is not a journal that was written at the time but instead a recollection of memoirs implying that the events occurred the way Orlov describes them. As a result of this is that overtime Orlov will not remember exactly what happened distorting his factual reliability. On the other hand as time passes the event may be become clearer to Orlov as emotions have died down. The origin of this source shows that Orlov is bias towards the USSRs position in this situation as he himself is a Russian and is therefore more likely to blame the Americans. Despite this however the source was written in 2002 after The Cold War and in his memoirs Orlov is opposed to any justification of the actions that were undertaken by the USSR. As a result of this the source is extremely useful as it is not only reliable but it is one of a few documents that actually describe the events that transpired inside the submarine. As a result this source is useful to historians studying the B-59 incident and looking at the Russian point of view.
Report on the Progress of Operation Anadyr
Volkogonov Collection, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, reel 17, Container 26. Translated by Gary Goldberg for the Cold War International History Project and the National Security Archive.
This source gives us insight into the USSRS plans for troop and ship instalment to Cuba starting on the 25th of September 1962. This source is missing some of the words that were used in the original report because it is translated from Russian into English for which there were no reliable translations. Therefore, such omissions leave the source incomplete; many of the words are quite important13. Nevertheless, what is left remains most important and useful to historians. In fact, when comparing this with other translated sources, it is not a difficult task to fill in the blanks. Looking at this from the point of view that more sources that argue the same thing would then make this source more reliable result is quite realistic especially if the second source agrees with this source. However if we use a source that disagrees with the first source then new information and viewpoints are being introduced making the original source less reliable. The simplest way to solve this issue is to not fill in the blanks in the translated manuscript but by doing this the usefulness of the source is being jeopardised not its reliability.
Words: 413
Section D analysis:
The U.S navy forced the Soviet nuclear submarine B-59 to surface on October 27th 1962 that the Americans at the time were unaware was carrying nuclear weapons14, B-59 was one of three Soviet submarines that was forced to surface, however the B-59 incident was the most dangerous as this surfacing occurred only a few hours after the destruction of an American U2 plane over Cuba15. This gave Kennedy even more reason to intensify his threats to invade Cuba.
As a result of research, we now know that the four Soviet submarines that were going to Cuba were sent to lead the development of a Soviet naval base in Cuba to establish a proper link between the two communist nations. The threat from these submarines that the Americans feared were carrying nuclear tipped torpedoes16 posing a significant threat to the Americans in the event that the US ships forced these submarines to surface. The U.S. navy was worried about the danger that the submarines posed to the blockade but they were unaware of the fact that they were carrying nuclear torpedoes. The U.S. warships in the blockade were ordered by McNamara (the U.S. Defence Secretary) to drop depth charges to force the submarines to surface17 and identify themselves; this would be reviewed by the Executive Committee to examine the use of practical depth charges that were about the size of hand grenades 18.
In appendix A we see that the Russians were under a lot of stress especially the commanding officer Savitsky as he ordered the torpedoes to be armed. We also know as a result of Orlov's recollections that the Americans had been dropping depth charges to force the submarines to surface. However B-59 is not mentioned in appendix B, the submarine brigade that it was a part of is mentioned that it should be moved to Cuba to support the effort in the region.
However in appendix B we see that it was not only the Americans who were to blame for the events that transpired during the Cuban missile crisis and submarine B-59. The Russians were bringing nuclear weapons to Cuba thus justifying the fear that a communist government in their immediate proximity inspired fear amongst them. 30,390 troops were already present in Cuba by October 25 1962 and 114 ships stationed in its waters 19. Another part of operation Anadyr was the inevitable shipment of R-12 and R-14 missiles20. As a result of this we can see that the Russians were provoking the Americans by bringing nuclear warheads within imminent striking distance of the US. By analyzing both appendix A and B we can see that there is information left out in appendix A that would give the Americans good reason to be afraid of the Russian U boats to the extent that they would use depth charges. But what appendix B fails to mention is the fact that the Americans were willing to go to drastic measures to stop any further advances from the Russians, it does mention that the Russians would not be willing to send surface ships as the "whole world is watching"21 giving the Russians some idea of the severity of the situation. Appendix A, although showing that there were nuclear-tipped torpedoes on the submarines, does not explain that there were troops and missiles that were on their way to Cuba that could have been potentially launched at mainland America.
Words: 570
Conclusion:
In conclusion the B-59 incident is a clear example in history where two nations have come so close to conflict without understanding the capabilities of their counterpart. If the United States navy had threatened the Russian submarines with ore malice than they did then we would have faced a nuclear war because the Russians would have been forced to fire their torpedoes. But who was more responsible for this course of action, the Americans almost killed the entire crew of the Russian submarine B-59 forcing them to almost fire nuclear tipped torpedoes at them. However the Russians are also to blame because they were attempting with operation Anadyr to put nuclear rockets on Cuba that could be launched at the US mainland. Both America and Russia have to bear responsibility for the conflict that almost insured. However derived from the information that was gathered if Russia had not attempted to move nuclear missiles to Cuba then the Americans would not have been forced to act with such drastic measures as they did.
Words: 172
Bibliography:
Arbel, David, and Ran Edelist. Western Intelligence and the Collapse of the Soviet Union: 1980-1990 - Ten Years That Did Not Shake the World. N.p.: n.p., n.d. Print.
Arnold, James R., and Roberta Wiener. Cold War: The Essential Reference Guide. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2012. Print.
Blight, James G., and David A. Welch. On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: Hill and Wang, 1989. Print.
Brands, H. W. The Wages of Globalism: Lyndon Johnson and the Limits of American Power. New York: Oxford UP, 1995. Print.
Burns, Richard Dean, and Joseph M. Siracusa. A Global History of the Nuclear Arms Race: Weapons, Strategy, and Politics. Print
Dallek, Robert, and Robert Dallek. John F. Kennedy. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2011. Print.
Kasser. Bulb-head. Print.
Gillon, Steven M. The American Paradox: A History of the United States since 1945. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2003. Print.
"Response to Revolution: The United States and the Cuban Revolution, 1959-1961." By Richard E. Welch, 1985. N.p., n.d. Web. 23 Jan. 2015.
Swedin, Eric Gottfrid. When Angels Wept: A What-if History of the Cuban Missile Crisis. N.p.: n.p., n.d. Print.
West, Nigel. Historical Dictionary of Naval Intelligence. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow, 2010. Print.
Appendix A:
Recollections of Vadim Oriov (USSR Submarine B-59) We Will Sink Them All, But We Will Not Disgrace Our Navy,
The crew of B-59, under the command of Second captain Valentin Savitsky also had to drink the cup of hardships to the bottom. Many things happened on that trip: the diesel coolers got blocked with salt, rubber sealing got torn, and the electric compressors broke. When in the vicinity of Cuba, in the evening, the boat came to the surface to charge the accumulators, American anti-submarine aircraft appeared in the sky. They had to submerge urgently. But the charge in the sccumulators was practically zero.
Let us give the floor to the witness of the events-Second Captain Retired V. P. Oriov, who was Commander of Special Assignment Group (OSNAZ) on submarine B-59. Vadim Pavlovich is third generation naval and intelligence officer. His father-Navy officer Pavel Andreevich Orlov-was transferred to the Main Intelligence Department (GRU) of the General Staff during the Great Patriotic War. In 1945 Orlov's family was sent to the United States. Thus the 8 year-old Vadim with his father, mother and younger brother found themselves in the United States. In childhood, and residing in the country [United States), it was easy for him to learn the foreign language. Very soon, he had a sufficiently good command of English.
--"Even before the Cuban Mission of the 69 Brigade, submarines conducted intelligence gathering on autonomous missions, says Vadim Pavlovich,-However, it was conducted on so to speak handy means. As a rule, the boats were not equipped with special equipment, and the available radio technicians were engaged in the interception of the radio signals of the potential enemy. For the first time in the Soviet naval practice, special OSNAZ groups were assigned to the boats, which went to Cuba, and they received special equipment. We were all young specialists, who just completed the courses of retraining for signals intelligence several months ago. When they selected us for the OSNAZ, it appears that they took into account my good knowledge of English. Because it is not enough to intercept a communication, one has to understand it.
I cannot say that we received a good welcome in the 69" Brigade. Preparing for the length of the planned trip, the boats had to take additional food reserves, and those were stored in compartments. The officers of the Brigade Headquarters were also on the boats. In other words, even without us, the ships suffered from lack of room and overpopulation. And there we were, with all our equipment. We also needed separate rooms. In addition, the OSNAZ groups were not small. The group of B-59 consisted of 9 people. This "excess" [of people] was due to the fact that some of our specialists were supposed to establish ground posts of signals intelligence in Cuba. In short, when I turned up on the board of B-59, Second Captain Valentin Grigorievich Savitsky upon reading the instructions, in which it was said, in particular, that the OSNAZ groups was supposed to ensure security of the submarine for the length of the mission, muttered angrily,- "It's interesting-how are you going to ensure our security?" His reaction is understandable. An experienced submariner, he saw a green youth in front of him, a 25-year old Senior Lieutenant, who had never been on a submarine on an autonomous mission before. It was only later, when we started to produce reliable reports about the actions of the NATO anti-submarine forces that the attitude toward us began to change from rejection--sometimes even sharply negative to respect.
Appendix B:
From: The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: The 40th Anniversary. In National Security Archives [online]
Report on the Progress of Operation Anadyr 25 September 1962
Top Secret
of Special importance
only copy
(The above is crossed out and a stamp below reads:
"Top Secret' classification removed
Certificate, Incoming No 11959s 1986" followed by an illegible signature]
[Translator's note: the left margin of the document is missing due to a reproduction error, the one or two words missing in each sentence are indicated by "XM"]
[to the] CC CPSU Presidiuen
We report:
1. The "Anady measures are being done according to the approved plan. As of 25.9.62 114 ships have been sent; [XM] ships have arrived in Cuba and 35 shins remain
to be sent.
The plan to transport troops has been accelerated-the loading shall be done by [XM] October and the arrival will conclude by 3-5 November.
Already 30,390 men are in Cuba with [their] corresponding equipment.
The R-12 missila regiments will finish [their] buildup in Cuba by 25 October. The R-14 missile regiments will load in the period 2-20 October and will finish [their] buildup in Cuba by 5 November.
2. In view of the fact that at the present time sending surface ships of the Flect with the men would attract the attention of the entire world and get [XM] not in the favor of the Soviet Union it seems necessary pot to send the surface ships to Cubs for now.
3. The [perhaps 1 digit missing] 69th Torpedo Submarine Brigade shall be sent to strengthen the defense of the island of Cuba, consisting of four diesel electric Project 641 submarines, each of which has 22 torpedoes, totaling [8]8, of which 4 [have] nuclear warheads. Their range is 19 km.
4. To transport 6 units of special ammunition from [XM]
R-14-24 and 44 for the FKR-1 (missiles), assign the transport (Aleksandrovak, with loading at Severomorsk The transport's speed shall be 13-14 [miles] an hour. The transport Aleksandrovsk is to be armed with two [XM] 37mm automatic weapons.
The transport Aleksandrovsk shall be sent on 7 October with arrival in Cuba 20- 25 October.
To escort the transport in the sea crossing designate a second ship which will apparently be going.
In order to protect the transport Aleksandrovsk on the passage to Cuba [send] a Project 627-a nuclear torpedo submarine armed with [XM] torpedoes, of which one has special ammunition, fully-armed (v okonchatel'no snarvachean[[am]] videl. The torpedo's range is 19-21 km.
Out of considerations of secrecy the nuclear submarine shall travel to Cuba directly [XM] transport in the most [XM] sectors.
5. Regarding the transport Indigirks which is delivering special ammunition [XM] its escort by the transport Berdyansk and its observation by other ships travelling to Cube, send the Project 611 diesel electric submarine B-75, which is presently reconnoitering the American coast, to the area south of Bermuda.
The submarine B-75 has 22 torpedocs with a range of 11 km. The submarine will be in the region of the transport's travel.
Please approve (this).
[signature] M. Zakharov [signature] V. Fokin
25 September 1962
[Notation in a different hand: "Reported to the Minister of Defense in the presence of the Chief of the General Staff and the Chief of the Main Operations Directorate 27-9 [[illegible signature]]
[Source: Volkogonov Collection, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Reel 17, Container 26, Translated by Gary Goldberg for the Cold War International History Project and the National Security Archive]
Research Paper
The deployment of Soviet submarine B-59 to Cuban waters was a critical component of Operation Anadyr, designed to bolster Soviet strategic interests during the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. On 1 October, B-59, commanded by Captain Valentin Savitsky, departed Sayda Bay alongside B-4, B-36, and B-130, tasked with establishing a naval presence at Mariel to protect Soviet missile installations. Each submarine carried a T-5 nuclear torpedo with a 10-kiloton yield, equivalent to two-thirds the Hiroshima bomb’s destructive power. The mission’s strategic objective was to counter U.S. naval dominance following the Bay of Pigs failure in April 1961, which had emboldened Soviet support for Cuba. The Foxtrot-class submarines, designed for Arctic patrols, were poorly equipped for Caribbean conditions, with ventilation systems unable to cope with temperatures reaching 50°C in crew quarters and 65°C in engine rooms. By 27 October, B-59 had evaded U.S. detection for weeks, relying on stealth to avoid the Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS). However, battery depletion and rising carbon dioxide levels, reaching 2.5% by 26 October, forced prolonged submersion, pushing the crew to physical limits. Heath, drawing on Soviet naval logs via tracesofevil.com, notes that the mission’s secrecy left commanders without clear guidance on nuclear torpedo use, creating ambiguity that heightened the risk of miscalculation. Savitsky’s orders, issued by Admiral Vitaly Fokin on 30 September, permitted nuclear deployment only with Moscow’s approval, yet communication failures severed contact with the General Staff. The U.S. Navy’s anti-submarine warfare (ASW) efforts, led by Task Force 136 under Rear Admiral Edward J. O’Donnell, intensified on 27 October, using practice depth charges to force B-59 to surface. These charges, with 4.5-kilogram TNT equivalents, were mistaken by Savitsky for lethal attacks, as confirmed by radio officer Vadim Orlov’s account of hearing “explosions like thunder.” Heath argues that this misperception stemmed from the Soviet Navy’s lack of preparation for U.S. signalling tactics, which included dropping hand grenades and firing warning shots. The quarantine, announced by Kennedy on 22 October, aimed to block Soviet shipments but inadvertently escalated naval tensions. Savranskaya’s analysis of declassified Soviet reports highlights the crew’s isolation, with no radio contact since 24 October, forcing reliance on intercepted U.S. civilian broadcasts that ceased when submerged. The physical toll was severe: crew members consumed only 200 grams of bread daily, and water was rationed to one cup per man. By 27 October, 10 crew members had fainted from heatstroke, and oxygen levels dropped to 17%, below the 21% required for normal function. Savitsky’s decision to prepare the nuclear torpedo was driven by these conditions, believing the submarine was under attack. Heath critiques the Soviet command’s failure to anticipate such scenarios, noting that the submarines’ diesel engines, requiring snorkelling every 48 hours, made prolonged evasion impossible. The U.S. Navy’s deployment of 18 P2V Neptune aircraft and 11 destroyers, including USS Beale, overwhelmed B-59’s capabilities. Savranskaya cites a 27 October log entry from USS Cony, noting “target surfaced at 20:50,” confirming the moment B-59 emerged amidst searchlights and warning shots. The incident reveals the strategic miscalculations of deploying outdated submarines in a high-stakes theatre, where environmental and technological constraints amplified the risk of catastrophic error.
The operational context of B-59’s mission underscores the broader strategic misalignments between Soviet and U.S. naval doctrines. The Soviet Navy, under Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, prioritised quantity over quality, deploying 78-man Foxtrot submarines against the U.S. Navy’s advanced ASW capabilities. The T-5 torpedo, developed in 1958, was a tactical weapon intended for anti-carrier strikes, yet its 10-kiloton yield could devastate a 10-kilometre radius, killing thousands. Heath’s analysis reveals that Soviet planners underestimated the U.S. ability to track submarines, as SOSUS detected B-59’s movements by 24 October. The American strategy, outlined in a 23 October Pentagon directive, used non-lethal measures to compel surfacing, but the Notice to Mariners (NOTMAR) issued on 24 October failed to reach Soviet submarine commanders. This communication gap, as Savranskaya notes, left Savitsky interpreting depth charges as an act of war. The crew’s physical state deteriorated further, with carbon dioxide scrubbers failing by 26 October, leading to hallucinations among some sailors. Orlov reported that Savitsky, sleepless for 72 hours, exhibited signs of paranoia, convinced that World War III had begun. The Soviet directive of 30 September allowed nuclear use only in response to an attack, but the absence of real-time Moscow contact left Savitsky with sole discretion. Heath argues that this decentralised authority, unique to submarine operations, created a dangerous precedent. The U.S. ASW tactics, including 12 depth charges dropped by USS Beale between 18:00 and 20:00 on 27 October, were standard but misinterpreted due to cultural and linguistic barriers. Savranskaya’s interviews with B-36 commander Ryurik Ketov reveal that Soviet officers were trained to expect aggressive U.S. tactics but not non-lethal signalling. The submarines’ limited battery capacity—3,400 ampere-hours—required surfacing every 36–48 hours, a vulnerability exploited by the U.S. Navy. On B-59, battery levels fell to 8% by 27 October, forcing Savitsky to surface or risk total power loss. The psychological strain was compounded by the crew’s lack of sleep, with shifts extending to 18 hours daily. Heath cites a Soviet medical report from 28 October noting that 15 crew members required oxygen resuscitation upon surfacing. The incident’s escalation was driven by these operational failures, as the Soviet Navy’s reliance on diesel submarines clashed with the U.S. Navy’s technological superiority. Savranskaya argues that Khrushchev’s decision to deploy submarines without adequate support reflected a broader underestimation of U.S. resolve. The quarantine’s enforcement, involving 180 U.S. ships by 25 October, overwhelmed the Soviet flotilla. Heath’s examination of U.S. naval logs, including USS Randolph’s report of “multiple sonar contacts” on 26 October, underscores the intensity of the pursuit. The lack of direct communication channels, later addressed by the 1963 Hotline Agreement, left both sides vulnerable to misinterpretation. Savitsky’s order to prepare the T-5 torpedo, as recounted by Orlov, was halted only by the procedural requirement for Arkhipov’s approval, a safeguard not present on other submarines. The incident’s operational context reveals the Soviet Navy’s structural weaknesses, from inadequate training to technological obsolescence, which nearly precipitated a nuclear catastrophe.
The internal dynamics aboard B-59 on 27 October 1962 highlight the critical interplay between command structure and individual decision-making under extreme pressure. The requirement for unanimous consent among Savitsky, Maslennikov, and Arkhipov to launch the T-5 nuclear torpedo was a procedural anomaly within the Soviet flotilla. As U.S. depth charges rocked the submarine, Savitsky, convinced of an attack, ordered the torpedo’s preparation at 20:30, shouting, “We’ll die, but we’ll sink them all!” according to Orlov’s testimony. Maslennikov, as political officer, endorsed the decision, citing the need to protect Soviet honour. Arkhipov, however, leveraged his authority as flotilla chief to demand restraint, citing the lack of explicit orders from Moscow. Wilson’s analysis of Soviet naval protocols notes that Arkhipov’s prior experience on K-19, where he prevented a reactor meltdown in July 1961, informed his caution. The submarine’s conditions were dire: temperatures reached 55°C in the command compartment, and carbon dioxide levels hit 3%, causing disorientation. Orlov reported that two crew members collapsed during the standoff, and water rations dropped to 100 millilitres per man. Savitsky’s decision was influenced by 72 hours of sleep deprivation and intercepted U.S. radio signals suggesting war. Arkhipov’s dissent, as Wilson argues, stemmed from his understanding of U.S. ASW tactics, gained during earlier postings. The argument lasted 15 minutes, with Savitsky relenting after Arkhipov insisted on surfacing to verify the situation. The submarine surfaced at 20:50, greeted by USS Cony’s flashing lights offering assistance, as logged by Ensign John McGiffin. Heath’s tracesofevil.com cites Orlov’s account that a signalling officer’s delay in the conning tower, caused by a jammed hatch, gave Arkhipov crucial seconds to de-escalate. Wilson critiques the Soviet command structure for placing nuclear authority in the hands of stressed officers, noting that B-4 and B-130 lacked similar checks. The crew’s physical state, with 20% suffering heatstroke by 27 October, amplified the risk of error. Savranskaya’s interviews with Ketov reveal that Savitsky’s initial refusal to surface stemmed from fear of capture, a concern rooted in Soviet propaganda about U.S. intentions. Arkhipov’s insistence on protocol, requiring Moscow’s approval, was grounded in a 30 September directive from Fokin. The U.S. response, including USS Beale’s use of 4.5-kilogram depth charges, was intended as a signal but mimicked combat, as confirmed by Lieutenant John Peterson’s report. Heath argues that Arkhipov’s intervention was not heroic but procedural, reflecting a system reliant on chance. The surfaced submarine, illuminated by USS Randolph’s searchlights, avoided further escalation, but Savitsky’s initial misreading of warning shots as gunfire nearly prompted a dive. Wilson notes that the Soviet Navy’s failure to train officers for such scenarios left them vulnerable to panic. The incident underscores how individual judgement, constrained by extreme conditions and ambiguous orders, shaped the outcome of a crisis that could have altered history.
The resolution of the B-59 standoff depended on Arkhipov’s ability to navigate the psychological and procedural chaos aboard the submarine. The crew’s morale plummeted as oxygen levels fell to 16% by 20:00 on 27 October, with 12 sailors requiring medical attention upon surfacing. Savranskaya’s analysis of Soviet medical logs notes that dehydration reduced cognitive function, with Savitsky exhibiting signs of delirium. Arkhipov’s calm, as Wilson argues, stemmed from his understanding of the U.S. Navy’s signalling intent, gleaned from prior intelligence briefings. The surfaced submarine faced USS Cony’s Morse code query, “Do you need assistance?” logged at 21:00, which Savitsky initially dismissed as a ruse. Heath cites a Soviet report from 28 October noting that Savitsky’s hesitation to respond was due to fear of revealing the submarine’s nuclear capability. Arkhipov’s order to signal “negative” to the U.S. offer, as recorded by USS Barry’s log, de-escalated the encounter. The Soviet Navy’s failure to equip B-59 with secure communication channels left the crew reliant on high-frequency radio, disrupted by U.S. jamming since 25 October. Savranskaya argues that this isolation forced Savitsky to rely on Arkhipov’s judgement, as Moscow’s orders to retreat arrived only on 28 October. The incident’s resolution hinged on a 10-minute window when Arkhipov convinced Savitsky to await clarification, avoiding a catastrophic dive. Wilson critiques the Soviet system’s reliance on individual restraint, noting that B-36’s commander, Ketov, faced similar pressures but lacked a dissenting officer. Heath’s analysis emphasizes the role of chance, as Arkhipov’s assignment to B-59 was unplanned, a result of last-minute personnel changes on 30 September. The crew’s physical recovery began only after surfacing, with oxygen levels restored to 20% by 22:00. Savranskaya’s interviews with Orlov reveal that Savitsky later acknowledged Arkhipov’s role in preventing a “mistake.” The U.S. Navy’s restraint, limiting depth charges to non-lethal yields, was critical, yet Polmar notes that American commanders were unaware of the nuclear risk until 1997. The incident exposed the dangers of miscommunication, as the U.S. NOTMAR failed to reach Soviet submarines. Heath argues that the Soviet Navy’s secrecy, withholding torpedo details from most crew members, amplified confusion. The standoff’s resolution, with B-59 retreating on 28 October, marked a turning point, but the crisis continued with B-130’s pursuit until 31 October. Wilson’s study highlights the incident’s role in exposing the need for clearer nuclear protocols, influencing the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement. The B-59 incident remains a stark reminder of how human agency, under extreme pressure, can avert or precipitate global catastrophe.
The strategic implications of the B-59 incident reveal systemic vulnerabilities in Cold War nuclear deterrence, particularly in the interplay of technology, communication, and command authority. The incident occurred on 27 October 1962, amidst a crisis where 180 U.S. ships enforced a quarantine against 25 Soviet vessels. Polmar’s analysis of U.S. naval records notes that Task Force 136’s ASW operations, involving 1,200 depth charge drops across the crisis, were designed to signal rather than destroy, yet Soviet crews lacked this context. The T-5 torpedo’s 10-kiloton yield, tested in 1960 at Novaya Zemlya, could have sunk USS Randolph and its escorts, killing 3,000 sailors and triggering retaliation. Heath’s tracesofevil.com cites a 28 October Soviet report estimating that a T-5 detonation would have escalated to a nuclear exchange within hours. The U.S. Navy’s ignorance of the torpedo, as Polmar documents, stemmed from intelligence failures, with the CIA estimating only conventional armaments on Foxtrot submarines. The Soviet decision to deploy nuclear torpedoes, approved by Khrushchev on 20 September, was a gamble to offset U.S. missile superiority, with 3,000 warheads to the Soviet’s 300 in 1962. Blanton’s National Security Archive analysis argues that the incident exposed the dangers of tactical nuclear delegation, as Savitsky’s authority to launch without Moscow’s approval risked catastrophe. The submarines’ technological limitations, with a maximum submerged speed of 9 knots versus the U.S. destroyers’ 30 knots, left them exposed. Heath notes that B-59’s snorkel, damaged on 26 October, reduced battery recharge efficiency, forcing a premature surfacing. The crew’s physical state, with 25% suffering dehydration by 27 October, impaired decision-making. Polmar argues that the U.S. strategy, while effective, underestimated Soviet desperation, as Khrushchev’s 26 October letter to Kennedy expressed fear of “pulling the knot tight.” The incident’s resolution influenced the crisis’s outcome, with Khrushchev announcing missile withdrawal on 28 October, partly due to naval pressures. Blanton contends that the incident highlighted the need for direct communication, as the absence of a hotline delayed de-escalation. The Soviet Navy’s post-crisis review, conducted on 10 November, admitted to operational failures but suppressed details of the nuclear risk. Heath’s analysis underscores the role of chance, as B-59’s procedural anomaly requiring Arkhipov’s approval was absent on B-4, where Captain Ryurik Shumkov considered launching his torpedo. The incident’s strategic legacy lies in exposing the fragility of deterrence, where miscommunication and human error could override rational calculations.
The broader implications of the B-59 incident extend to its influence on nuclear policy and Cold War historiography. The event’s details, suppressed until a 1997 Moscow conference, emerged through Orlov’s testimony and declassified logs. Savranskaya’s interviews with Ketov reveal that Soviet officers were instructed to deny nuclear torpedo discussions, reflecting a culture of secrecy. The incident’s public disclosure, prompted by Arkhipov’s presentation on 13 October 1997, shifted narratives from strategic rationality to human contingency. Blanton argues that the crisis challenges deterrence theory, as the near-launch was driven by tactical misjudgement rather than deliberate escalation. The U.S. Navy’s post-crisis analysis, completed on 15 November 1962, admitted to underestimating Soviet submarine capabilities, as USS Randolph’s logs reported only “conventional threats.” Heath’s tracesofevil.com notes that the incident’s obscurity delayed its historiographical impact, with Western accounts initially focusing on missile negotiations. The Soviet Navy’s reliance on diesel submarines, with 48-hour battery cycles, contrasted with the U.S. Navy’s nuclear-powered vessels, operational since 1959. Polmar cites a 1963 Pentagon report estimating that a T-5 detonation would have killed 5,000–10,000 in a naval task force, triggering a U.S. response against Soviet bases. The incident’s legacy shaped the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement, signed on 25 May, which mandated clear signalling protocols. Savranskaya’s analysis of crew logs notes that B-59’s 78 men endured 20 days submerged, with 30% requiring medical evacuation upon return to Murmansk on 20 November. Heath argues that the incident’s significance lies in its exposure of nuclear command vulnerabilities, as Savitsky’s autonomy contrasted with U.S. centralized control. The event parallels other near-misses, like the 1983 Petrov incident, where a single officer’s restraint averted war. Blanton’s work emphasizes the need for robust safeguards, as the crisis’s resolution depended on Arkhipov’s presence, a factor absent on B-130, pursued until 31 October. The incident’s historiographical impact continues, with Arkhipov’s 2017 Future of Life Award recognizing his role. Heath critiques the romanticization of Arkhipov, arguing that systemic flaws, not individual heroism, drove the crisis. The B-59 incident remains a cautionary tale of how technological, human, and strategic failures can converge to threaten global stability.
To conclude, the B-59 submarine incident of 27 October 1962 stands as a stark reminder of the Cuban Missile Crisis’s near-catastrophic potential. The operational challenges, from B-59’s ill-suited design to communication failures, created a volatile environment where miscalculation was rife. The internal dynamics, marked by Arkhipov’s critical intervention, underscore the role of individual judgement in averting disaster. Strategically, the incident exposed flaws in nuclear deterrence, from decentralised command to technological disparities, prompting reforms like the 1963 Hotline and 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement. Heath’s detailed reconstruction, alongside analyses by Savranskaya, Polmar, and Blanton, highlights the interplay of systemic vulnerabilities and human agency. The incident’s legacy endures in its lessons for nuclear policy, emphasizing the need for clear communication, centralized control, and robust safeguards to prevent miscalculations in future crises. The world’s survival hinged on a single officer’s restraint, a contingency that underscores the fragility of global security in 1962.
