Plan of Investigation:
How close did the world come to war during the B-59 Nuclear Submarine crisis? I will start my investigation by looking at the previous events leading up to the events involving submarine B-59. During this I will be examining related sources, such as official documents and reports. In my summary I will also be looking at individual accounts as well as the two sources that I will be examining to get the best possible understanding of the background and the actual events that took place. My two main sources that I will be examining include an official account of what happened on the submarine from a crewmember Vladim Orlov and an official report on the progress of Operation Anadyr. In my analysis I will be looking these two accounts of what happened with submarine B-59 and the Cuban missile crisis, in my analysis. I will conclude by examining how close the world came to nuclear war and the importance of shared information to historians to properly understanding historical events.
Words: 169
Summary:
After Fidel Castro seized power in Cuba the Americans felt threatened by the close proximity of a communist nation to their borders1. The Bay of Pigs invasion was the American response to the impending issue of the proximity of communism. The invasion however was a failure and made Castro seek support from Russia to help prevent another invasion if it were to come in the future2. The support came from the USSR in the form of nuclear missiles that were installed in Cuba, because Khrushchev believed John F. Kennedy to be weak3. This was an important political and strategically move for the USSR as they did not have as many Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile's (ICBM's) however they had far more advanced mid range missiles4 that could easily be launched from Cuba towards the USA. America immediately took action against this by setting up a naval blockade off the coast of Cuba5 to attempt to stop further missiles coming to Cuba from Russia when in reality most of the missiles were already on the Cuban mainland. After Khrushchev realised his miscalculation in the fact that he did not believe that the Americans would go to such great lengths to stop the missiles from reaching Cuba; he attempted to protect the soviet vessels travelling to Cuba four diesel submarines (one being the B-59) were armed with standard and nuclear torpedo's that sailed from the Artic Kola peninsula. The submarines avoided detection from the USA and NATO air surveillance in the North Atlantic, however due to the need to resurface often to charge the batteries of the submarines they were spotted off of the coast of Cuba.
When the B-59 submarine resurfaced on October 27th 1962, it got spotted by an American patrol aircraft and then destroyers blocked the progress of B-597. The Americans began dropping stun grenades. However according to the Russians in the submarine the Americans were dropping depth charges on B-59 to force it to resurface. Tensions were high on the submarine and as Vladim Orlov (the Russian radio intelligence officer) reported that oxygen began to run low and temperatures skyrocketed aboard B-59 and the crew began fainting9. The captain aboard the submarine (Valentin Grigorievitch Savitsky) ordered the crew to arm the nuclear torpedoes10. Communications however were limited because of the depth that the submarine was at and being able to communicate with the Soviet authorities that could authorise the firing of torpedoes would require surfacing11, Savitsky was worried that while they were debating that war might have already broken out above them, he said "We shall die ourselves, sink them all but not stain our navy's honour!"12. However after much debating amongst the officers (Ivan Maslennikov and Vasili Arkhipov) B-59 finally surfaced. The confrontation between the two superpowers was over but nuclear war had never been closer to a reality.
Words: 479
Evaluation of sources:
Recollections of Vladim Orlov (USSR Submarine B-59)
Mozgovoi, A. (2002) The Cuban Samba of the Quartet of Foxtrots: Soviet Submarines in the Caribbean Crisis of 1962 Military Parade, Moscow Orlov is an eyewitness to the events that transpired on October 27th 1962 on the submarine B-59 during its siege by American ships. This gives him incomparable reliability as a primary source as to what occurred in the submarine B-59. However the fact that this is not a journal that was written at the time but instead a recollection of memoirs implying that the events occurred the way Orlov describes them. As a result of this is that overtime Orlov will not remember exactly what happened distorting his factual reliability. On the other hand as time passes the event may be become clearer to Orlov as emotions have died down. The origin of this source shows that Orlov is bias towards the USSRs position in this situation as he himself is a Russian and is therefore more likely to blame the Americans. Despite this however the source was written in 2002 after The Cold War and in his memoirs Orlov is opposed to any justification of the actions that were undertaken by the USSR. As a result of this the source is extremely useful as it is not only reliable but it is one of a few documents that actually describe the events that transpired inside the submarine. As a result this source is useful to historians studying the B-59 incident and looking at the Russian point of view.
Report on the Progress of Operation Anadyr
Volkogonov Collection, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, reel 17, Container 26. Translated by Gary Goldberg for the Cold War International History Project and the National Security Archive.
This source gives us insight into the USSRS plans for troop and ship instalment to Cuba starting on the 25th of September 1962. This source is missing some of the words that were used in the original report because it is translated from Russian into English for which there were no reliable translations. Therefore, such omissions leave the source incomplete; many of the words are quite important13. Nevertheless, what is left remains most important and useful to historians. In fact, when comparing this with other translated sources, it is not a difficult task to fill in the blanks. Looking at this from the point of view that more sources that argue the same thing would then make this source more reliable result is quite realistic especially if the second source agrees with this source. However if we use a source that disagrees with the first source then new information and viewpoints are being introduced making the original source less reliable. The simplest way to solve this issue is to not fill in the blanks in the translated manuscript but by doing this the usefulness of the source is being jeopardised not its reliability.
Words: 413
Section D analysis:
The U.S navy forced the Soviet nuclear submarine B-59 to surface on October 27th 1962 that the Americans at the time were unaware was carrying nuclear weapons14, B-59 was one of three Soviet submarines that was forced to surface, however the B-59 incident was the most dangerous as this surfacing occurred only a few hours after the destruction of an American U2 plane over Cuba15. This gave Kennedy even more reason to intensify his threats to invade Cuba.
As a result of research, we now know that the four Soviet submarines that were going to Cuba were sent to lead the development of a Soviet naval base in Cuba to establish a proper link between the two communist nations. The threat from these submarines that the Americans feared were carrying nuclear tipped torpedoes16 posing a significant threat to the Americans in the event that the US ships forced these submarines to surface. The U.S. navy was worried about the danger that the submarines posed to the blockade but they were unaware of the fact that they were carrying nuclear torpedoes. The U.S. warships in the blockade were ordered by McNamara (the U.S. Defence Secretary) to drop depth charges to force the submarines to surface17 and identify themselves; this would be reviewed by the Executive Committee to examine the use of practical depth charges that were about the size of hand grenades 18.
In appendix A we see that the Russians were under a lot of stress especially the commanding officer Savitsky as he ordered the torpedoes to be armed. We also know as a result of Orlov's recollections that the Americans had been dropping depth charges to force the submarines to surface. However B-59 is not mentioned in appendix B, the submarine brigade that it was a part of is mentioned that it should be moved to Cuba to support the effort in the region.
However in appendix B we see that it was not only the Americans who were to blame for the events that transpired during the Cuban missile crisis and submarine B-59. The Russians were bringing nuclear weapons to Cuba thus justifying the fear that a communist government in their immediate proximity inspired fear amongst them. 30,390 troops were already present in Cuba by October 25 1962 and 114 ships stationed in its waters 19. Another part of operation Anadyr was the inevitable shipment of R-12 and R-14 missiles20. As a result of this we can see that the Russians were provoking the Americans by bringing nuclear warheads within imminent striking distance of the US. By analyzing both appendix A and B we can see that there is information left out in appendix A that would give the Americans good reason to be afraid of the Russian U boats to the extent that they would use depth charges. But what appendix B fails to mention is the fact that the Americans were willing to go to drastic measures to stop any further advances from the Russians, it does mention that the Russians would not be willing to send surface ships as the "whole world is watching"21 giving the Russians some idea of the severity of the situation. Appendix A, although showing that there were nuclear-tipped torpedoes on the submarines, does not explain that there were troops and missiles that were on their way to Cuba that could have been potentially launched at mainland America.
Words: 570
Conclusion:
In conclusion the B-59 incident is a clear example in history where two nations have come so close to conflict without understanding the capabilities of their counterpart. If the United States navy had threatened the Russian submarines with ore malice than they did then we would have faced a nuclear war because the Russians would have been forced to fire their torpedoes. But who was more responsible for this course of action, the Americans almost killed the entire crew of the Russian submarine B-59 forcing them to almost fire nuclear tipped torpedoes at them. However the Russians are also to blame because they were attempting with operation Anadyr to put nuclear rockets on Cuba that could be launched at the US mainland. Both America and Russia have to bear responsibility for the conflict that almost insured. However derived from the information that was gathered if Russia had not attempted to move nuclear missiles to Cuba then the Americans would not have been forced to act with such drastic measures as they did.
Words: 172
Bibliography:
Arbel, David, and Ran Edelist. Western Intelligence and the Collapse of the Soviet Union: 1980-1990 - Ten Years That Did Not Shake the World. N.p.: n.p., n.d. Print.
Arnold, James R., and Roberta Wiener. Cold War: The Essential Reference Guide. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2012. Print.
Blight, James G., and David A. Welch. On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: Hill and Wang, 1989. Print.
Brands, H. W. The Wages of Globalism: Lyndon Johnson and the Limits of American Power. New York: Oxford UP, 1995. Print.
Burns, Richard Dean, and Joseph M. Siracusa. A Global History of the Nuclear Arms Race: Weapons, Strategy, and Politics. Print
Dallek, Robert, and Robert Dallek. John F. Kennedy. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2011. Print.
Kasser. Bulb-head. Print.
Gillon, Steven M. The American Paradox: A History of the United States since 1945. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2003. Print.
"Response to Revolution: The United States and the Cuban Revolution, 1959-1961." By Richard E. Welch, 1985. N.p., n.d. Web. 23 Jan. 2015.
Swedin, Eric Gottfrid. When Angels Wept: A What-if History of the Cuban Missile Crisis. N.p.: n.p., n.d. Print.
West, Nigel. Historical Dictionary of Naval Intelligence. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow, 2010. Print.
Appendix A:
Recollections of Vadim Oriov (USSR Submarine B-59) We Will Sink Them All, But We Will Not Disgrace Our Navy,
The crew of B-59, under the command of Second captain Valentin Savitsky also had to drink the cup of hardships to the bottom. Many things happened on that trip: the diesel coolers got blocked with salt, rubber sealing got torn, and the electric compressors broke. When in the vicinity of Cuba, in the evening, the boat came to the surface to charge the accumulators, American anti-submarine aircraft appeared in the sky. They had to submerge urgently. But the charge in the sccumulators was practically zero.
Let us give the floor to the witness of the events-Second Captain Retired V. P. Oriov, who was Commander of Special Assignment Group (OSNAZ) on submarine B-59. Vadim Pavlovich is third generation naval and intelligence officer. His father-Navy officer Pavel Andreevich Orlov-was transferred to the Main Intelligence Department (GRU) of the General Staff during the Great Patriotic War. In 1945 Orlov's family was sent to the United States. Thus the 8 year-old Vadim with his father, mother and younger brother found themselves in the United States. In childhood, and residing in the country [United States), it was easy for him to learn the foreign language. Very soon, he had a sufficiently good command of English.
--"Even before the Cuban Mission of the 69 Brigade, submarines conducted intelligence gathering on autonomous missions, says Vadim Pavlovich,-However, it was conducted on so to speak handy means. As a rule, the boats were not equipped with special equipment, and the available radio technicians were engaged in the interception of the radio signals of the potential enemy. For the first time in the Soviet naval practice, special OSNAZ groups were assigned to the boats, which went to Cuba, and they received special equipment. We were all young specialists, who just completed the courses of retraining for signals intelligence several months ago. When they selected us for the OSNAZ, it appears that they took into account my good knowledge of English. Because it is not enough to intercept a communication, one has to understand it.
I cannot say that we received a good welcome in the 69" Brigade. Preparing for the length of the planned trip, the boats had to take additional food reserves, and those were stored in compartments. The officers of the Brigade Headquarters were also on the boats. In other words, even without us, the ships suffered from lack of room and overpopulation. And there we were, with all our equipment. We also needed separate rooms. In addition, the OSNAZ groups were not small. The group of B-59 consisted of 9 people. This "excess" [of people] was due to the fact that some of our specialists were supposed to establish ground posts of signals intelligence in Cuba. In short, when I turned up on the board of B-59, Second Captain Valentin Grigorievich Savitsky upon reading the instructions, in which it was said, in particular, that the OSNAZ groups was supposed to ensure security of the submarine for the length of the mission, muttered angrily,- "It's interesting-how are you going to ensure our security?" His reaction is understandable. An experienced submariner, he saw a green youth in front of him, a 25-year old Senior Lieutenant, who had never been on a submarine on an autonomous mission before. It was only later, when we started to produce reliable reports about the actions of the NATO anti-submarine forces that the attitude toward us began to change from rejection--sometimes even sharply negative to respect.
Appendix B:
From: The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: The 40th Anniversary. In National Security Archives [online]
Report on the Progress of Operation Anadyr 25 September 1962
Top Secret
of Special importance
only copy
(The above is crossed out and a stamp below reads:
"Top Secret' classification removed
Certificate, Incoming No 11959s 1986" followed by an illegible signature]
[Translator's note: the left margin of the document is missing due to a reproduction error, the one or two words missing in each sentence are indicated by "XM"]
[to the] CC CPSU Presidiuen
We report:
1. The "Anady measures are being done according to the approved plan. As of 25.9.62 114 ships have been sent; [XM] ships have arrived in Cuba and 35 shins remain
to be sent.
The plan to transport troops has been accelerated-the loading shall be done by [XM] October and the arrival will conclude by 3-5 November.
Already 30,390 men are in Cuba with [their] corresponding equipment.
The R-12 missila regiments will finish [their] buildup in Cuba by 25 October. The R-14 missile regiments will load in the period 2-20 October and will finish [their] buildup in Cuba by 5 November.
2. In view of the fact that at the present time sending surface ships of the Flect with the men would attract the attention of the entire world and get [XM] not in the favor of the Soviet Union it seems necessary pot to send the surface ships to Cubs for now.
3. The [perhaps 1 digit missing] 69th Torpedo Submarine Brigade shall be sent to strengthen the defense of the island of Cuba, consisting of four diesel electric Project 641 submarines, each of which has 22 torpedoes, totaling [8]8, of which 4 [have] nuclear warheads. Their range is 19 km.
4. To transport 6 units of special ammunition from [XM]
R-14-24 and 44 for the FKR-1 (missiles), assign the transport (Aleksandrovak, with loading at Severomorsk The transport's speed shall be 13-14 [miles] an hour. The transport Aleksandrovsk is to be armed with two [XM] 37mm automatic weapons.
The transport Aleksandrovsk shall be sent on 7 October with arrival in Cuba 20- 25 October.
To escort the transport in the sea crossing designate a second ship which will apparently be going.
In order to protect the transport Aleksandrovsk on the passage to Cuba [send] a Project 627-a nuclear torpedo submarine armed with [XM] torpedoes, of which one has special ammunition, fully-armed (v okonchatel'no snarvachean[[am]] videl. The torpedo's range is 19-21 km.
Out of considerations of secrecy the nuclear submarine shall travel to Cuba directly [XM] transport in the most [XM] sectors.
5. Regarding the transport Indigirks which is delivering special ammunition [XM] its escort by the transport Berdyansk and its observation by other ships travelling to Cube, send the Project 611 diesel electric submarine B-75, which is presently reconnoitering the American coast, to the area south of Bermuda.
The submarine B-75 has 22 torpedocs with a range of 11 km. The submarine will be in the region of the transport's travel.
Please approve (this).
[signature] M. Zakharov [signature] V. Fokin
25 September 1962
[Notation in a different hand: "Reported to the Minister of Defense in the presence of the Chief of the General Staff and the Chief of the Main Operations Directorate 27-9 [[illegible signature]]
[Source: Volkogonov Collection, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Reel 17, Container 26, Translated by Gary Goldberg for the Cold War International History Project and the National Security Archive]
