Historians and Quotes

Classical History Quotes
"He who knows only his own generation [without a knowledge of history] remains forever a child."
Marcus Tullius Cicero
Heraclitus: "Nothing endures but change"
Plato: "The price of apathy towards public affairs is to be ruled by evil men."

Thucydides: "What made the war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta."

Livy: "This was the Athenians' war against the King of Macedon, a war of words. Words are the only weapons the Athenians have left."

Julius Cæsar- Iacta alea est (The die is cast)
Veni Vedi Vici (I came, I saw, I conquered)

Cicero- Nihil est incertius vulgo, nihil obscurius voluntate hominum, nihil fallacius ratione tota comitiorum (Nothing is more unpredictable than the mob, nothing more obscure than public opinion, nothing more deceptive than the whole political system)
Augustus- Marmoream relinquo, quam latericiam accepi (I found Rome a city of bricks and left it a city of marble.)
Virgil- Audentis Fortuna iuvat (Fortune favours the brave)
Pliny the Elder- Ruinis inminentibus musculi praemigrant. (When collapse is imminent, the little rodents flee)
Tacitus- Auferre trucidare rapere falsis nominis imperium, atque ubi solitudinem faciunt pacem appellant. (To plunder, slaughter and rape they give the false name of empire, and where they make a solitude they call it peace)
Accius- Oderint dum metuat (Let them fear, as long as they hate)
Si vis pacem, para bellum (If you want peace, prepare for war)

The only thing necessary for evil to triumph is for good men to do nothing.  Edmund Burke

He who fights with monsters should look to it that he himself does not become a monster. And when you gaze long into an abyss the abyss also gazes into you.   Friedrich Nietzsche 

Quotes About History

History is indeed little more than the register of the crimes, follies and misfortunes of mankind.
Edward Gibbon
Study History, study History! In History lies all the secrets of statecraft - Winston Churchill
Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it - George Santayana
The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles - Karl Marx
Human history becomes more and more a race between education and catastrophe - H. G. Wells
Who controls the past controls the future: who controls the present controls the past - George Orwell
History does not long entrust the care of freedom to the weak or the timid - President Eisenhower 
America is the only nation in history which has gone from barbarism to degeneration without the usual interval of civilisation - Georges Clemenceau 
Man will never be free until the last King is strangled with the entrails of the last priest -  Denis Diderot 
Only strong personalities can endure history. The weak are extinguished by it History is a pack of lies we play on the dead - Voltaire
Only a good-for- nothing is not interested in his past - Sigmund Freud
The past is a foreign country: they do things differently there - LP Hartley
God cannot change the past, but historians can - Samuel Butler
"Every man deserves to be judged in the context of his times." - George Bernard Shaw
History is a people’s memory, and without memory man is demoted to the lower animals - Malcolm X
Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past. -Karl Marx The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte
Historiography of World War I
Bernd Huppauf- The Blind War- A War with no Direction- revisionist WWI
Robert Wohl- A Place in the Sun- a German Need- orthodox WWI
Germany had surpassed all other European countries in military power and was also very economically strong. The country believed that they had not earned the respect of Europe even though they were on the top, because they had not become a big imperial power. With a growing population, Germany needed an outlet to progress. This is extremely similar to the United States before the Spanish American War. Both countries were at a point, when the common idea was that remaining stagnant meant the decline to the nation (fuelling imperialism).
 “Wilson made too many promises, and had to negotiate a peace settlement with leaders who were intent on preventing German hegemony, and not world peace” 
Norman Stone- Russia getting too strong for Germany- revisionist WWI
Imanuel Geiss-Orthodox Germany to blame
Gerhard Ritter- defence of Germany
British historian Gary Sheffield: “The battle of the Somme was not a victory in itself, but without it the Entente would not have emerged victorious in 1918.”
Egmont Zechlin- revision WWI
Gerhard Schroeder- no one responsible- German revisionist WWI
Wolfgang Mommsen- German historian, Germany responsible for outbreak
AJP Taylor- revision, European international relations Europe: Grandeur and Decline: “The Austrian government was not much concerned to punish the crime of Sarajevo. They wanted to punish a different crime- the crime that Serbia committed by existing as a free national state.”
"The great armies, accumulated to provide security and preserve the peace, carried the nations to war by their own weight". 
Fritz Fischer- Germany responsible for WWI because of its aggressive pursuit of its Weltpolitik
Richard Hamilton- The Origins of World War I- revisionist
Kenneth Waltz- Man, the State, and War.- examining different views on causes of war. WWI was caused by human nature- supported also by theory of Confucius.
George F. Kennan- 1894 alliance caused WWI
Christopher Clark (Sleepwalkers)- Italy started war with 1911 invasion of Libya which led to Ottoman collapse.
The protagonists of 1914 were "sleepwalkers, watchful but unseeing, haunted by dreams, yet blind to the reality of the horror they were about to bring into the world."
- When Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia and attacked Belgrade on July 28th, 1914, it was Russia and France that bore the main responsibility for the general war that followed because they chose to resist Vienna’s move.
Sidney Bradshaw Fay: “A peaceable, sensible mass 500 million was hounded into war by a few dozen incapable leaders by falsified documents, lying stories of threats, and chauvinistic catchwords, into a war which in no way was destined or inevitable
-  "Imperialism, nationalism, militarism and alliances- “all these things meshed together to create a collective impetus to war”.
British nation: “We want eight and we wont wait
Kaiser Wilhelm in Daily Telegraph, 1908: “You English, are mad, mad, mad as March haresKaiser 1911: “When the hour comes we are prepared for sacrifices, both of blood and of treasure
After 1911 Agadir crisis Daily Mail newspaper: “Germany is deliberately preparing to destroy the British Empire. Britain alone stands in the way of Germanys path to world power and domination
After Agadir crisis Lloyd George: “Britains interests were vitally affected” 
Lloyd George 1934: “The nations slithered over the brink into the boiling cauldron of war without any trace of apprehension or dismay... The nations backed their machines over the precipice not one of them wanted war, certainly not on this scale
Serbian Prime minister Pasic after defeating Bulgaria: “the first round is won, now for the second round- against Austria.
Revisionist Richard Hamilton- The Origins of World War I: “There was no slide to war, no war caused by inadvertence, but instead a world war caused by a fearful set of elite statesmen and rulers making deliberate choices.
Nicholas II to Kaiser 29 July 1914: “An unjust war has been declared on a weak country. The anger in Russia shared fully by me is enormous. I beg you in the name of our friendship to do what you can to stop your allies from going too far.
German chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg asked General Moltke after Russian mobilisation: “Is the fatherland in danger? Yes” 
Bethmann-Hollweg: “For a mere scrap of paper, Great Britain is going to make a war?” (Treaty of London 1839)
World was scared of present, Germany of future.
Edgar Quinet, on the consequences of the 1870 Franco-Prussian War: "The ceding of Alsace-Lorraine is nothing but war in perpetuity under the mask of peace.
 Professor David Fromkin, "Europe's Last Summer: Why the World Went to War in 1914": "The international conflict in the summer of 1914 consisted of two wars, not one. Both were started deliberately. They were started by rival empires that were bound together by mutual need... The wars were about power."
Debate on Causes
Debate began with the war itself. One key formulation was the War Guilt Clause, part of the Versailles Treaty. The Versailles Treaty at the end of the war claimed in Article 231 that Germany and its allies were solely responsible for launching the war. Reflecting wartime sentiment, the clause also justified reparations.
In the 1920s and 1930s, the notion of a collective responsibility became prominent.
In the interwar years, as international tensions relaxed, opinions shifted toward the notion of shared responsibility. British wartime leader David Lloyd George suggested that all European states “slithered over the edge” into war.
In the 1960s, the Fischer Debate renewed the question of the causes of the war. Renewed debate exploded in 1961 when German historian Fritz Fischer’s Grab for World Power (published in English as Germany’s Aims in the First World War) argued that Germany launched the war to become a superpower and developed war aims that anticipated the Nazis. In the furious confrontations that followed, the debate itself changed. Fischer’s critics came to argue that Germany miscalculated its gamble, rather than that the country intended world war.
In a later book, Fischer claimed Germany had planned war from 1912. Other explanations have also been advanced by historians through the years. Other interpretations stressed different causal factors. Did alliances themselves cause the war? “Secret diplomacy” was denounced after the war as a crucial factor. Did arms races and military planning cause the war by forcing a timetable? Henry Kissinger argues that alliances and mobilization plans created a “Doomsday Machine.” Was war an accident, as British historian A. J. P. Taylor argued, turning politicians into “prisoners of their own weapons?” Was imperialism the cause? Although colonial competition certainly poisoned the atmosphere, earlier clashes were negotiated. Was capitalism the cause, as Marxists argued? On the contrary, German industry’s dominance grew in peacetime. Though this is not a scholarly theory, were the Balkans to blame (as some hinted during the Balkan wars of the 1990s)? Rather, outside involvement of the Great Powers was the crucial variable.
Where does the current interpretation of the causes of the war stand today? Most scholars today see Germany as bearing the main responsibility for the war, as it was willing to risk general war, though not aiming for it. Even as Germany is seen as mainly responsible, some degree of responsibility is shared by other actors in this tragedy. Although Fischer moved the debate forward on war aims, his arguments on intentions are not accepted.

Historical Perspectives of the Causes of the Great War
From 1998 Exam Paper II: Topic 1: Causes, practices and effects of war
1.    To what extent should Germany be held responsible for causing both the First and Second World Wars?
1. German Responsibility:
Fischer’s View: (German Historian)
i) Germany was responsible for war because of its aggressive pursuit of its weltpolitik.
Germany willed the war in order to realize expansionist ambitions and to resole an acute domestic crisis.
ii) Fear of ‘encirclement´ after the Triple Entente and Russian army reforms meant that ‘a moment so favourable from a military point of view might never occur again´.
iii) Germany put pressure on Austro-Hungary to retaliate against Serbia (even if it meant General war). evidence for this is in the ‘blank cheque´
Criticism of Fischer:
i) German policy before 1914 seems contradictory and lacking in clear aims.
ii) No evidence that German leader help expansionist aims before the ‘September Programme´ (which Fischer uses to explain the German desire for war)
iii) Places too much importance on the domestic crisis in the decision to launch a war. In fact, in 1914 Bulow and Hollweg dismissed war as a solution to the socialist problem.

What you should consider:
i) Distinguish between Germany´s contribution to the growth in international tensions from 1900-13 with her role during the July crisis itself.
 All Governments were responsible for tension until 1914 but not equally responsible for the fatal turn of events — for which Germany was culpable.
Historians Quotes League of Nations

Audin-Rouzeau- The Versailles Treaty Going Too Far
James Joll- failure of LoN, ToV divided Europe- into countries who wanted to revise it, ones who wanted to uphold it and the ones who were not interested
AJP Taylor- failure of LoN, unfairness of ToV: “No German accepted it as a fair settlement and all Germnas wanted to shake it off.”
-Appeasement was a popular policy and that there was continuity in British foreign policy after 1933 and shattered the common view of the appeasers as a medium, degenerate clique that had mysteriously hijacked the British government sometime in the 1930s and who had carried out their policies in the face of massive public resistance. By portraying the leaders of the 1930s as real people attempting to deal with real problems, he made the first strides towards attempting an explanation of the actions of the appeasers rather than merely condemning them.
-Anschluss was enormously popular in Austria, discrediting the notion of Austria as a victim of Nazi aggression brought unwillingly into the Reich.
-One of the first historians to present Hitler as an ordinary human being rather than as a "madman;", an human being, albeit one who held morally repellent beliefs.
-Germany was capable of paying reparations to France after the First World War; the only problem was that the Germans were unwilling.
-Questioned degree to which fascist states were fulfilling a programme versus taking advantage of events.
-Hitler just as often reacted as acted, offering a balance to previous accounts where he was portrayed as the sole agent and the leaders of Britain and France as entirely reactive.
H.A.L Fisher, OM, FRS, PC - members of LoN responsible for war
John Maynard Keynes: The Economic Consequences of the Peace: "What an extraordinary episode in the economic progress of man was that age which came to an end in August 1914."
E.H.Carr- LoN did not fail but the members did, ToV was based on unworkable idealistic principles-because it did not solve German Problem just selfish needs
Anthony Lentin- ToV failed to tackle the underlying potential of Germany
Baroness Ruth Henig- ToV was a good idea; “wasn’t excessively harsh on Germany”
“The 14 points appeared to promise some protection against punitive French and British demands” 
Paul Birdsall- USA not involved-main reason for failure of ToV and LoN
Paul Kennedy- ToV and LoN was successful in 1920s, but crushed by militarism of Japan, Germany and Italy in 1930’s cause by Great Depression
Denis Mack Smith- criticism of Mussolini
Anonymous French officer during the Great War: "If the Italians come in on our side, they'll get into trouble and we'll have to send ten divisions to save them. If they attack us, we'll have to send ten divisions to hold them off. Either way, ten divisions."
Hannah Arendt- Italian fascism much less totalitarian than Germany and Russia
Sir Ian Keshaw- comparison of domestic policies of Hitler and Mussolini
MacGregor Knox- greatness of Mussolini’s aims
Friedrich von Hayek: "We did not realise how fragile our civilisation was."
"How's school? Don't bother too much about European geography. I think it's all going to change." French ambulance driver to his son from the Western Front.
Philip (P.M.H.) Bell about Versailles: “The settlement was a rickety edifice which was unstable from the start.
About Article 231:  More commonly known as the War Guilt Clause, or Kriegsschuldfrage here in Germany
·       Stated that “Germany accepts the responsibility of her and her allies for causing all of the loss and damage” to the victorious powers, to whom “war was imposed on… by the aggression of Germany and her allies” – Forced Germany to take the blame for the outbreak of WW1, and was used to justify the extortionate £6.6 billion reparations sum. Ironic because Lloyd George had stated previously that WW1 was nobody’s fault, and that it was “stumbled into”
·       Created hostilities in Germany – very controversial, Germans wanted revenge. Was used to placate the British and French public, with cries of ‘hang the Kaiser’ and Eric Geddes (first lord of admiralty) – “squeeze the German lemon until the pips squeak!”
·       Perceived in Germany as inaccurate, led to the TOV being branded as a ‘diktat’
·       If Germany didn’t agree to it, war would reconvene – they had no other choice.
·       War cannot be blamed on one person, can it?
·       “Germany’s death sentence” – historians such as Martin Gilbert argue that this led to the rise of Nazism in Germany, a claim that Margaret Macmillan brands “erroneous”.
·       Led to anger within the Germans – newspaper headings such as “we will never stop until we get back what we deserve.. treaty is only a scrap of paper – we will seek revenge, it is full of injustices, brutalities and exploitations”
·       Dylan Thomas – “The hand that signed the paper felled a city, and locusts came”
Anthony Adamthwaite: Treaty of Versailles "was a brave attempt to deal with intractable, perhaps insoluble problems.”
Lenin – “This is no peace, but terms dictated to a defenceless victim by armed robbers” 
German MP – “shameless blow in the face of common sense” ·        
Harold Nicolson – “We left the conference conscious that the treaty imposed upon out enemy was neither just nor wise” 
About Treaty of Trianon: Wilson: “The proposal to dismember Hungary is absurd” Winston Churchill: “Ancient poets and theologians could not imagine the suffering that Trianon brought to the innocent”
Woodrow Wilson: I would rather belong to a poor nation that was free than to a rich nation that had ceased to be in love with liberty
   "Her military men published books and told us what they were going to do, but we dismissed them. We said 'The thing is a nightmare. The man is a crank. It could not be that he speaks for a great Government. The thing is inconceivable and can not happen'. Very well, could it not happen? Did it not happen? ...The great nations of the world have been asleep." 
British people wanted Germans to pay: “everything you can squeeze out of a lemon
German foreign minister Count Brockdorff-Rantzau- “It is demanded that we confess ourselves guilty. Such a confession in my mouth would be a lie...” “..Those who sign this treaty will sign the death sentence of a million Germans… may the hand that sign this treaty wither”
Lloyd George: “We shall to fight another war again in 25 years time
“We want to protect the future against a repetition of the horrors of war” 
“I didn’t do too bad considering I was sat between Jesus (Wilson) and Napoleon (Clemenceau)”    
Clemenceau – “there are 20 million Germans too many” ·      
French Marshall Ferdinand Foch 1920- “This is not a peace. It is an armistice for 20 years.
JR Western in 1971: “The crisis [Abyssinia] was fatal to the League. Nobody took it seriously again. They got ready for the Second World War.
Historian J Joll 1976: “After Manchuria and Abyssinia, people decided that it was no longer any use putting hopes in the League.”
Historian AJP Taylor 1966: “The League died in 1935. One day it was a powerful body imposing sanctions, the next day it was a useless fraud, everybody running away from if as quickly as possible. Hitler watched.”
HAL Fisher 1935: “If the nations want peace, the League gives them the way by which peace can be kept. Bet, League or no League, a country which is determined to have a war can always have it
Chamberlain: “War is a terrible thing, and we must make sure that it is the great issues that are involved.” “Hitler was a man who could be relied on. Chamberlain on Czechoslovakia- “a quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we know nothing.” 
Chamberlain about Munich: “I believe it is peace for our time.”
- "In the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence and which the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their national forces, His Majesty's Government would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Polish Government all support in their power. They have given the Polish Government an assurance to this effect. I may add that the French Government have authorized me to make it plain that they stand in the same position in this matter." - 31st March 1939 
-  “This morning the British Ambassador in Berlin handed the German Government a final note stating that unless we heard from them by eleven o'clock that they were prepared at once to withdraw their troops from Poland, a state of war would exist between us. I have to tell you that no such understanding has been received and that consequently this country is at war with Germany.” Neville Chamberlain - 3rd September 1939 
-  "This is a sad day for all of us, and to none is it sadder than to me. Everything that I have worked for, everything that I have believed in during my public life, has crashed into ruins. There is only one thing left for me to do: That is, to devote what strength and powers I have to forwarding the victory of the cause for which we have to sacrifice so much... I trust I may live to see the day when Hitlerism has been destroyed and a liberated Europe has been re-established." Neville Chamberlain - 3rd September 1939
Hitler: “He alone, who owns the youth, gains the future.”, “If you tell a big enough lie and tell it frequently enough, it will be believed.”, “The great masses of the people will more easily fall victims to a big lie than to a medium one.”, “The great strength of the totalitarian state is that it forces those who fear it to imitate it.”, “The victor will never be asked if he told the truth.
-We will never attempt to subjugate foreign peoples. speech of May 27, 1933.

-We have no territorial claims to make in Europe. speech of March 7, 1936

-The German Reich Government shall thus unconditionally abide by the other articles governing the coexistence of the nations, including territorial provisions, and put into effect solely by means of peaceful understanding those amendments which become inevitable by virtue of the changing times. speech of May 21, 1935.

-It is the last territorial demand I shall make in Europe... I repeat here before you, once this issue has been resolved; there will no longer be any further territorial problems for Germany in Europe! speech of September 26, 1938.

-We do not want any Czechs at all. ibid.
Mussolini- “Obedience not discussion” "Believe, Obey, Fight!"
Historians Quotes for Germany
ALY, GÖTZ (b. 1947) One of the most innovative and provocative of German historians, Aly stirred up controversy in the 1980s and 1990s by arguing that there were rational, economic motives driving the murder of the Jews in the Holocaust. In the eyes of his critics, attributing rational, utilitarian motives to Nazi perpetrators risked diluting the “absolute evil” of Nazism. Aly’s revelations of the complicity of mid-level academic and bureaucratic officials in the planning of the Final Solution, however, were based on thorough research and have gained general acceptance among historians. His 1991 book, co-authored with Susanne Heim, Architects of Annihilation: Auschwitz and the Logic of Destruction  dealt with the Schreibtischtäter (desk-bound perpetrators) who drew up plans for population transfers in Eastern Europe in the early 1940s to combat the perceived problem of agrarian “over-population” and create space for German colonisation. Although Aly and Heim may have exaggerated the influence of population planners on Nazi decision-making, their research revealed the close linkage between German settlement policies in the east and the Holocaust. Their interpretation – epitomized in their provocative phrase, “the economy of the final solution” – was controversial because in emphasising bureaucratic plans aimed at economic modernization and rationalization in the causation of the Holocaust, Aly and Heim seemed to downplay the significance of irrational racial ideology. 
ARENDT, HANNAH (1906–1975) One of the leading political thinkers of the twentieth century, Arendt sought refuge from the Nazis in Paris in 1933, eventually coming to the US with her husband Heinrich Blücher in 1941. Arendt traced the origins of totalitarianism to nineteenth-century racism and imperialism. Her work helped to popularise the notion of totalitarianism as a novel form of twentieth-century dictatorship by pointing to parallels in the tyrannies of Hitler and Stalin, despite their ideological differences. By mobilising the atomized masses around their respective ideologies both regimes adopted a form of rule that made unprecedented mass murder possible, thus marking a radical break in European history and Western civilisation. Yet in Eichmann in Jerusalem, Arendt struck a different note, emphasizing “the banality of evil” and the potentially pernicious effects of bureaucratic careerism. Her portrait of Eichmann as a colourless but ambitious bureaucrat scrupulously following orders, rather than as a demonic sadist or virulent anti-Semite, aroused controversy by seeming to diminish his wickedness; her purpose, though, was not to trivialise the evil of the Holocaust but rather to warn that the failure to understand the “normality” of many perpetrators was to ignore the dangers of similar horrors occurring in other states under different historical conditions. Her critics accused her of slighting anti- Semitism as a driving factor in the Holocaust so as to emphasise the genocidal potential residing in modern states. Her criticism of the role of some members of the Jewish Councils in collaborating with the Nazis aroused controversy as well, but it also stimulated further research that has borne out some of her contentions. 
BARTOV, OMER (b. 1954) In his books on the German military, (available on the right) Bartov described the barbarous nature of the Nazi war against the Soviet Union and the role of the Wehrmacht as an integral part and willing tool of the Nazi regime. Bartov challenged the post-war myth of the Wehrmacht as an unpolitical professional force and demonstrated the army’s complicity and close involvement in the genocidal programme of the regime. Bartov maintained that German soldiers fought out of conviction, believing themselves to be part of a redemptive project to create a better world. Bartov has been critical both of Goldhagen’s monocausal explanation of the Holocaust as the product of a collective German “eliminationist antisemitism” and of German functionalist or structuralist historians, such as Mommsen or Aly, who seem to downplay the importance of anti- Semitic ideology and the role of moral choice in the causation of the Holocaust. Bartov has also explored and revealed the connections between the mass industrialised killing of the First World War and the readiness to commit genocide in the Second World War. The destruction of war came to be widely viewed in Germany as sweeping away the weak and degenerate, and seemed to confirm the adage that life was war and war was life. German military history cannot be separated from the history of the Holocaust, according to Bartov, nor can the Holocaust be adequately represented or explained without integrating the perspectives of victims with those of the perpetrators.
BAUER, YEHUDA (b. 1926) Has argued forcefully for the uniqueness of the Holocaust in the history of genocide, but has also criticised mythical representations that treated the Holocaust as outside the realm of history and beyond human understanding. Although Bauer has been critical of structuralist or functionalist explanations that minimised Hitler’s personal role in the origins of the Holocaust or the role of racist ideology, he has himself modified his earlier interpretation of the Holocaust as primarily the result of the Nazi leadership’s long-standing intention to destroy the Jews physically. According to Bauer, the basic motives for the killings were not bureaucratic or pragmatic, but ideological.
BESSEL, RICHARD (b. 1948) Bessel, many of whose books are in my classroom) has contributed numerous publications to the study of political violence, paramilitary formations, and the police in twentieth-century Germany. Bessel has been critical of Wehler’s Sonderweg interpretation, which traces the origins of Nazism to an inherited set of social structures peculiar to Germany. He has also been critical of Marxist interpretations and of both totalitarianism theory and modernization theory. In his view Nazism did indeed mark the culmination of a long tradition of European racism, but not one confined to Germany. What was unique to Germany was the fact that the specific conditions resulting from the First World War and German defeat allowed a band of political thugs imbued with racist ideology to capture power in a highly developed industrial nation. The memory of the humiliating end of the First World War and a determination not to permit a repetition remained powerful influences on Nazi policies right up to 1945. Bessel has also made a sharp distinction between the “revolutionary” Nazis and the inept “counter-revolutionary” elite that helped them to gain power and shared many of their goals. 
BOCK, GISELA (b. 1942) Leading German feminist historian and author of Zwangssterilisierung im Nationalsozialismus which linked Nazi racial policy to Nazi policy toward women in general. Bock argued that “compulsory sterilisation affected women more than men . . . because women’s identities were more closely connected to their sexual fertility.” While Bock’s argument that women were more adversely affected than men by the Nazis’ eugenic practices has been generally accepted, her conceptual equation of anti-feminism with anti- Semitism as two sides of the same deadly racial policy remains controversial. Bock acknowledged that some women had contributed to Nazi crimes in their functions outside the home, but she continued to deny any “specifically female guilt” in the traditionally separate private sphere.
BROSZAT, MARTIN (1926–1989) Argued the failure of Weimar was Hindenburg’s fault. He introduced the novel concept of Resistenz to describe a passive kind of nonconformity that was far more widespread in the Bavarian population than active resistance (Widerstand) to Nazi rule. Broszat called for the “historicisation” of National Socialism, a plea to integrate the Third Reich within the continuity of German history rather than treating it as an episode outside of history and thus inaccessible to historical understanding. Broszat warned that routine and ritualistic moral condemnation of Nazism for didactic reasons stood in the way of full understanding, which he believed could only be achieved by applying the same rigorous and objective scholarly methodology as historians applied to other periods of history. He denied that use of normal historical methodology would inevitably lead to a more favourable evaluation of Nazism. Broszat introduced the notion of “polycracy” to describe the often chaotic Nazi administrative system characterized by personal rivalries, jurisdictional disputes, power struggles, overlapping competencies, and bureaucratic confusion.
BROWNING, CHRISTOPHER (b. 1944) A leading American historian of the Holocaust, Browning published what has come to be recognised as the most authoritative work of synthesis on the early stages of the Holocaust. He did not believe that the Nazis pursued a master plan aimed at the physical extermination of the Jews from the very start; but Browning was also critical of historical interpretations that portrayed the Holocaust as motivated predominantly by rational or economic goals, such as modernizing agriculture in eastern Europe by reducing the “surplus population” or combating food shortages by destroying “useless eaters”. According to Browning the Holocaust can only be explained as a consequence of the Nazis’ ideological obsessions and extreme anti-Semitism; the decision-making that led to the “final solution” should be understood as the product of the interaction between local and central authorities in which, however, the central authorities played the predominant role. Browning contended that the decision for the “final solution” must have been reached by October 1941, for in that month plans for the deportation of Jews from the German Reich were developed, all Jewish emigration from areas controlled by Germany was prohibited, and construction of the Belzec extermination camp was under way. More controversially, Browning argued that it was the euphoria of battlefield success in the Soviet Union, not the prospects of impending defeat or the entry of the United States into the war (as argued by Gerlach), that led Nazi leaders to take the decisive step to the physical annihilation of all European Jews.
BULLOCK, ALAN Lord (1914–2004) A focus in class, British historian whose scholarly interests extended well beyond German history and the Nazi era. His importance as a historian of Nazi Germany rests on his influential Hitler: A Study in Tyranny (1952), the first comprehensive biography of the Nazi leader. However, his portrait of Hitler as an opportunist without principles or convictions motivated primarily by the desire to wield power is no longer widely shared. Bullock himself revised his earlier interpretation in his book, Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives (1991), in which he stressed the importance of ideology and Hitler’s commitment to the basic ideas he expressed in Mein Kampf. 
Quotes: Hitler was jobbed into power by the old guard.”   Hitler was a “Mountebank
BURLEIGH, MICHAEL (b. 1955) Trained as a medievalist, Burleigh developed an interest in Nazi Germany as a result of work on his first book, a history of the Teutonic Order in the fifteenth century, published in 1984. His opus magnum, The Third Reich, was written in a tone of moral outrage which described the unique criminality of the Third Reich in grim detail. Its interpretation of Nazism, however, fell well within the conventional parameters of totalitarianism theory and shared the weaknesses of that paradigm, highlighting the similarities between Nazism and communism, while neglecting their significant differences. Burleigh invoked the excessively vague concept of “political religion” as his main explanatory trope, attributing the force of Nazism (like communism) to its utopian urge to create a new kind of man and a heaven on earth based on the triumph of the master race (rather than, as in communism, the triumph of the underclass). In contrast to structural interpretations of Nazi Germany, especially ones that implicate Western rationalism or bourgeois capitalist society in Nazism or in the Holocaust, Burleigh stressed the uniquely irrational, racist, and anti-modern aspects of the Nazi regime and the personal responsibility of Hitler and his leading henchmen for Nazi atrocities.
DAHRENDORF, RALF (b. 1929) Dahrendorf, a German sociologist who became a British citizen, berated his fellow Germans for their lack of social consciousness and sought to educate them in the principles of liberal democracy. His importance for the historiography of Nazism is his structural analysis of the long-range anti-democratic trends in German society that made the Nazi seizure of power possible: First, the persistence of inequalities in class status, educational opportunities, and social advancement. Second, repression of social conflict in the name of national harmony rather than resolution of conflicts through compromise and open debate. Third, the self-preservation and durability of Germany’s social elite, which retained its unity through inherited authoritarian patterns of behaviour and a “cartel of fear” even in the critical years after the First World War. And fourth, a preference for private virtues rather than public political participation, leading to escapism and timidity. According to Dahrendorf, Imperial Germany missed the road to modernity and consolidated itself as an industrial feudal society and an authoritarian welfare state. The failure of Germans to develop the liberal civic consciousness necessary for the responsibilities of citizenship explained the demise of democracy in 1933. The Nazis, gained their legitimacy in the eyes of the German public by carrying out the modernising social revolution that Germany’s illiberal social structures had previously prevented. The Nazi revolution took such a catastrophic form precisely because German social realities made peaceful social reform impossible even in the democratic Weimar Republic.
EVANS, RICHARD Sir (b. 1947) Originally a specialist in nineteenth-century German social history, British historian Richard Evans has become one of the leading authorities on Nazi Germany with his three-volume history of the Third Reich, all of which are in my classroom. Evans adopted a less Hitler-centred or moralistic approach than earlier comprehensive histories of Nazism in English (such as those by Kershaw, Burleigh, or Shirer), and he also challenged the Sonderweg notion that Germany was by tradition or history uniquely susceptible to Hitler’s racist message or totalitarian rule. Evans’s narrative is especially effective in portraying the complexities and ambiguities of the Nazis’ seizure of power, Nazi rule, and popular reactions to the Nazis. His book, Lying about Hitler: History, Holocaust, and the David Irving Trial (available right), resulted from his testimony in American historian Deborah Lipstadt’s successful defence in a libel suit brought by British historian David Irving, whom Lipstadt accused of denying the Holocaust.
Chief quote: "To say someone is morally good or bad is either unnecessary or simplistic. The principal task of history is to explain and interpret, not to issue moral judgements."
FEST, JOACHIM (1926–2006) Conservative journalist and historian best known for the first major biography of Hitler by a German historian, stressing his misguided idealism and nationalism. Taking issue with Bullock’s contention that Hitler was driven only by the desire for power, Fest emphasised the importance of Hitler’s strong ideological convictions. “The problem was not one of criminal impulses but of a perverted moral energy.” Fest answered in the affirmative his own question as to whether Hitler would have been considered “one of the greatest German statesmen” if he had died in 1938. For Fest the “negative greatness” of Hitler’s personality explained Nazism better than did social or economic developments. Fest’s account of the last days of the Third Reich, Inside Hitler’s Bunker, provided the basis for the film Der Untergang (The Downfall) in 2004.
FISCHER, FRITZ(1908–1999) Influential German historian whose landmark book Germany’s Aims in the First World War (first published under the title Griff nach der Weltmacht [Grasp for World Power] in 1961) precipitated a controversy in Germany and led to a new awareness of German responsibility for the outbreak of war in 1914. An older generation of German historians, chief among them Gerhard Ritter, rejected Fischer’s assertion that the German leadership had taken advantage of the assassination of the Austrian crown prince by Serbian nationalists in June 1914 to pursue policies that they knew were likely to result in war. Fischer repudiated the prevailing consensus among Germans that war had been forced on their nation and that Germany bore no greater responsibility for the conflict than the other European powers. Fischer’s thesis that the German leadership consciously risked war because of their confidence in the superiority of German arms in a continental war has been widely accepted and was corroborated by historian Mark Hewitson in his book on the origins of the First World War in 2004. The “Fischer thesis” did not change the historical consensus on Germany’s guilt for the Second World War, which was never in doubt in any case. Its main effect on the historiography of Nazism was to have revealed continuities linking the expansionist goals of the Wilhelmian Empire to those of the Nazis.

FRIEDLANDER, HENRY (b. 1930) A survivor of the Nazi camps, Friedlander  described the continuity between the Aktion T-4 euthanasia program, launched in 1939, and the “final solution,” the killing of the Jews. Friedlander advocated expanding the definition of the Holocaust to embrace not only Jewish victims but all victim groups defined in biological terms, which would include the gypsies and the mentally and physically disabled. Friedlander argues the Holocaust resulted from the conjunction of two main strands of Nazi ideology – anti-Semitism and eugenic selection – under the favourable conditions for systematic murder created by total war.
FRIEDLÄNDER, SAUL (b. 1932) Friedländer introduced the concept of “redemptive” anti-Semitism, a radical form of Jew- hatred resulting from the convergence of racial anti-Semitism and a pseudo-religious ideology of redemption (or perdition). “Redemptive” anti-Semitism was based on a vision of an apocalyptic struggle to the death between the Jews and “Aryan humanity” and served an integrating and mobilising function in the Nazi system. While Friedländer differed with “intentionalists,” who argued that extermination of the Jews had always been Hitler’s goal, he did insist that the “redemptive” anti- Semitism of Hitler and the core of the Nazi Party was the key to the origins of the Holocaust. Friedländer recognised the role of technocratic rationality in the extermination programme, but insisted on the centrality of Hitler and his ideological goals.
GELLATELY, ROBERT (b. 1943) Referred to regularly in HL classes, Canadian-American historian whose most important contributions to the historiography of Nazism to date have been his studies of popular cooperation in the totalitarian Nazi regime which marked a shift in emphasis from public dissent and non- cooperation in earlier literature on Nazi Germany to an emphasis on the participation, compliance, and accommodation of ordinary German citizens. Gellately concluded that the efficient functioning of the understaffed secret police was dependent on the continuing cooperation of ordinary Germans in denouncing their fellow citizens. Gellately argued, however, that loyalty to the regime, ideological fanaticism, or fear of Gestapo reprisal were less important as motives for denunciation than opportunism, conformism, professional rivalries, personal grudges, and conflicts between neighbours. Not only was it far smaller than had previously been assumed, but its personnel were drawn mainly from the professional police force that pre-dated the Nazi regime. Gellately debunked what remained of the popular conception of the Nazi regime as a police state imposed by force on an unsuspecting population, which then found it too late to resist What makes Gellately’s findings on Nazi Germany particularly relevant to contemporary concerns is the implication that a totalitarian system can function effectively even without the use of large- scale coercion. Totalitarianism thus constitutes an insidious potential threat even in societies that perceive themselves as democratic.
GERLACH, CHRISTIAN (b. 1963) Young German historian whose discovery of Heinrich Himmler’s appointment calendar in a newly opened Soviet archive in 1997 led to a reappraisal of the long-disputed question about whether and when Hitler made the decision to launch the “final solution.” Based on several of Himmler’s entries, as well as newly discovered pages of Goebbels’ diary, Gerlach concluded that Hitler announced his decision to exterminate all European Jews to a meeting of Reichsleiter and Gauleiter in Berlin on 12 December 1941, one day after the German declaration of war on the United States. The Wannsee Conference, originally intended to decide the fate of the German Jews, was now assigned the function of coordinating the implementation of the Final Solution and deciding whether German Mischlings and Jews married to Germans should be included in the extermination program. Gerlach’s dating of Hitler’s decision to early December ran counter to Christopher Browning’s contention that Hitler’s decision to extend the killing program to include all European Jews had already been made by October 1941. Gerlach also disputed Browning’s hypothesis that Hitler’s decision was the result of the euphoria that accompanied German battlefield successes in the east in late summer 1941, arguing instead that the US entry into the war was the crucial catalyst of Hitler’s decision.
GOLDHAGEN, DANIEL J. (b. 1959) His best-selling book, Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust (a couple of copies in my classroom), became the subject of a fierce controversy among historians about the causes of the Holocaust, the participation of ordinary people in atrocities, and the motivation of the perpetrators. Goldhagen contended that the Holocaust was a German “national project” perpetrated with the full knowledge and approval of the German public. He identified an “eliminationist” anti-Semitism so deeply rooted in German history and culture as to have become part of the common sense of the average German. In collapsing the distinction between Nazis and Germans, Goldhagen violated a taboo that had been useful in reintegrating the post-war Federal Republic in the Western cold war alliance. Goldhagen was roundly criticised for overstating German exceptionalism, offering an overly simplistic, monocausal explanatory model for the origin of the Holocaust, neglecting the political context in which Nazism arose, insisting that anti-Semitism was more pervasive in Germany than in other countries without providing any comparative data, and for exaggerating the novelty of his thesis that anti-Semitism was the root cause of the Holocaust. 
As the deliberate use of the phrase “ordinary Germans” in his title made clear, Goldhagen directly challenged Christopher Browning who had concluded that ordinary men became brutal killers, not because they were ideological fanatics or bloodthirsty sadists but because of situational factors such as peer pressure, conformism, careerism, deference to higher authority, the brutalisation of war, and the routinisation of killing. Goldhagen argued instead that German killers were decisively motivated by passionate hatred of Jews, a hostility shared by virtually all Germans as a result of their socialisation in a specifically German culture of “eliminationist” anti- Semitism.
HILLGRUBER, ANDREAS (1925–1989)  Prominent West German diplomatic and military historian of the generation just old enough to have been drafted into the German army in the closing stages of the Second World War. Argued a strongly “intentionalist” view in which the course of the Third Reich and the Second World War were almost exclusively attributed to Hitler’s personal and ideological goals. Hillgruber retracted his earlier contention that the German invasion of the Soviet Union had been a “preventive war” (a contention successfully refuted by the American historian Gerhard Weinberg in 1954). Hillgruber now attributed the attack on Russia to Hitler’s fanatical racist beliefs and desire for Lebensraum. Whilst Hillgruber agreed with Fischer that the German leadership brought about the First World War by its high- risk diplomatic strategy, he discounted the role of domestic factors in the German government’s decisions. Hillgruber’s pronounced Hitler-centrism also left him open to the charge of indirectly exculpating the German elites by making Hitler solely responsible for the Holocaust and other Nazi atrocities. 
IRVING, DAVID His controversial 1977 book Hitler’s War suggests that Hitler was very much a creature of his time, rather than a power-crazed madman. Irving’s Hitler is a brilliant politician who seized government not to exploit the situation, but because the situation – and the people of Germany – demanded a dictator.
JÄCKEL, EBERHARD (b. 1929) Jäckel is a leading representative of the “intentionalist” school of thought- Jäckel believed that Hitler’s world-view was formed in the aftermath of the First World War and aimed for the physical destruction of the Jews as early as 1924. According to Jäckel, extermination of the Jews was an essential German war aim from the start of the Second World War. The essential political decisions were taken by Hitler alone as the logical consequence of his ideological obsessions, justifying in Jäckel’s judgement his labelling of the Nazi regime as Alleinherrschaft. Jäckel believed that Hitler’s ultimate aim was continental, not global domination.
KERSHAW, IAN Sir (b. 1943) Leading British historian of Nazi Germany, whose two- volume biography of Hitler, Hitler: Hubris (1998) and Hitler: Nemesis (2002), both in the school library, has been widely recognised as the most reliable account of Hitler’s life and rule to date. It is not so much a personal biography as it is a study of how Hitler interacted with German society and exploited and mirrored the fears and resentments of the German population after the First World War. Kershaw introduced the innovative concept of “working towards the Führer” to explain why so many Nazi policies originated on the local or regional levels and how an apparently dysfunctional Nazi administrative system of competing authorities, personal rivalries, and overlapping competencies was nonetheless able to carry out the murder of the Jews efficiently and obsessively. Hitler, who showed little interest in the day-to-day business of government or in administrative detail, needed only to establish the broad parameters of policy. Subordinate leaders and their underlings were encouraged to exercise their own initiative in fulfilling Hitler’s perceived objectives.
“The repeated claim before the ‘seizure of power’ – that the NSDAP, as a national social-revolutionary movement, and not simply another political party… would create new bonds of unity through its elimination and transcending of the party system, was highly attractive and conveyed much of Nazism’s dynamic appeal.”
KOONZ, CLAUDIA (b. 1940) Leading American feminist historian of Nazism, Koonz described women as active participants in the Nazi system despite their restriction to the private sphere. Whilst men were responsible for public policy, women provided the emotional support in domestic life that helped to stabilise the regime. Koonz emphasised the role of German women as willing accomplices and contributors to Nazi power.
LONGERICH, PETER (b. 1955) A leading member of a younger generation of German historians who have used the opening of East European archives after the collapse of the Soviet Union to make important contributions to the historiography of the Holocaust. Longerich concluded that Hitler played a central, hands-on role in the origins and implementation of the Holocaust, even though there probably was no written order or even a single basic decision (Grundsatzentscheidung). Longerich traced the extermination policy through several stages, beginning with the resettlement of Jews into ghettos after the defeat of Poland in October 1939. Although the ethnic cleansing of Soviet Jews began with the German invasion of the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941, Longerich believed that it was not until May 1942 that the “final solution” was extended to all European Jews under German control. Unlike Christopher Browning, Longerich did not consider the construction of killing centres, the deportation of Jews from the Reich, or the prohibition of Jewish emigration in October 1941 as compelling evidence that a basic decision to include all European Jews in the extermination program had already been made in 1941. “The history of the Holocaust,” Longerich argued, “is not the history of an extermination program that progressed without deviation as a result of a single order, but is rather the history of a process, in the course of which various interests were weighed, priorities established, and decisions made – a process that was, in short, the result of a policy, but shaped by politics.” In “Davon haben wir nichts gewusst!” Longerich addressed the paradox that Nazi leaders spoke openly about the destruction of the Jews in public speeches but treated the details of the death camps as a state secret. By announcing the extermination program without revealing its full scale and barbarity, the Nazis ensured the complicity of the German public while avoiding the potentially demoralising effects of that knowledge. The purpose of this double strategy of treating the Holocaust as an “open secret” was to convince the German people that there was no alternative to fighting the war to the bitter end.
MARRUS, MICHAEL R. (b. 1941) Marrus argues that anti-Semitism was not forced on the Vichy regime by the Nazis but originated from domestic sources and was marked by unusual brutality. Marrus was critical of Pius XII’s reluctance to assist non-Catholic Jews and his failure to publicise reports of the Holocaust or of the plight of the Polish Church. 
MASON, TIMOTHY (1940–1990) Mason is perhaps best known as the historian who introduced the distinction between intentionalism and functionalism (or structuralism) in 1981. At issue was the question whether the peculiar destructiveness and self-destructiveness of the Third Reich could best be understood through an analysis of systemic social and economic structures and processes (the structuralist method), or whether the purposes and decisions of the Nazi leadership, particularly Hitler himself, were ultimately the crucial factor in explaining the criminality of Nazism. At stake was nothing less than the moral responsibility of historians, as both sides accused each other of misrepresenting and understating the evil of Nazism. Mason was particularly critical of the intentionalist interpretative model, which in his view gave far too much explanatory weight to Hitler’s own program and rhetoric, but he also criticized functionalist approaches that failed to attach sufficient importance to economic factors or class analysis.  Richard Overy disputed Mason’s conclusion that war in 1939 was (in part) a response to an insoluble domestic crisis brought about by rearmament. Overy’s conclusion that Germany did not face an economic crisis in 1939 was corroborated by Adam Tooze.
MOMMSEN, HANS (b. 1930) Member of a famous family of historians, Mommsen is the leading representative of the left-liberal “functionalist” interpretation of Nazism that emerged to prominence in Germany in the 1960s and 1970s. Mommsen stressed the culpability of Germany’s conservative economic and military elites both in Hitler’s rise to power and in his system of rule. He has been critical of potentially apologetic interpretations that overemphasise Hitler’s personal role in the Nazi system, thus neglecting the complicity of collaborating elites as well as the conditions and structures that allowed Hitler to gain such indisputable overall control. According to Mommsen, anti-Semitic ideology and Hitler’s intentions are not enough to account for the “final solution,” which was conceived as a sequence of emergency measures to solve the self-created “Jewish problem” rather than as the realization of a master plan for extermination. Mommsen certainly did not slight ideological factors in his interpretation of Nazism, however. Ideology provided the indispensable motor of “cumulative radicalisation.” Mommsen attributed Germany’s fanatical resistance at the end of the war to the Nazis’ ideological mobilisation and their belief that a resolute will could make up for lack of material resources. In his account of Nazi policies in the Second World War, Mommsen gave great weight to Nazi leaders’ determination to avoid the perceived mistakes of German leaders in the First World War, who had failed to secure the unity of the home front. Mommsen was critical of totalitarianism theory, which located Nazism closer to revolutionary movements of the left than to counter-revolutionary movements of the right. Mommsen also rejected interpretations that depicted Nazism as a modernising movement. Mommsen played a leading role in the Historikerstreit.
MOSSE, GEORGE L. (1918–1999) Grandson of the founder of Berlin’s most prestigious press empire before 1933, Mosse turned to a more post-modern interpretation that traced the sources of Nazi criminality not just to a uniquely German anti-Semitism but to the European-wide hatred, intolerance, and exclusion resulting from the marriage of bourgeois nationalism and morality. He came to see Nazism not as a revolt against middle-class values but rather as a corruption and radicalisation of those very values. Nazism represented the most destructive expression of the “bourgeois” drive to dominate and cleanse the world in the name of morality and respectability.
NOLTE, ERNST (b. 1923) The leading representative of right-wing historical revisionism in Germany seeking to “normalise” the history of Nazism, Nolte achieved public notoriety in the Historikerstreit with his assertion that Nazism must be understood as an at least partially justified response to the greater evil and destructiveness of Soviet Communism. He denied the unique criminality of the Holocaust, portraying it instead as a radical defensive reaction to the perceived genocidal threat posed by “Asiatic Bolshevism” and the Russian Revolution. According to him, Nazi plans to destroy an entire race, the Jews, were modelled on the precedent established by the Bolsheviks in their efforts to destroy an entire class, the bourgeoisie. Nolte attributed ultimate responsibility for the atrocities of the twentieth century to the communist revolutionaries, without whose provocation there would have been no Nazi counter-revolution. Nolte’s right-wing bias and apologetic purposes became increasingly apparent, linking Hitler’s cause with the Western cause in the cold war. Nolte thus provided an interpretation that allows Nazism to be at least partially rehabilitated without denying its radical nature or genocidal crimes.
OVERY, RICHARD (b. 1947) British military and economic historian and one of the foremost authorities on the Second World War. He disputed Mason’s claim that Hitler had been forced to go to war in 1939 to prevent an economic crisis. Overy contended that Hitler had only miscalculated the likelihood of Britain and France intervening in the war against Poland. Overy rejected the notion that the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 was a preventive war. In The Dictators: Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Russia (2004) Overy concluded that the similarities between the two regimes outweighed the differences. Both systems were based on utopian visions that were similar in form though divergent in purpose, and both regimes understood that their true enemy was the liberal West. Critics of Overy’s revived totalitarianism model, however, questioned his failure to differentiate between the very different popular bases on which these two regimes rested.
PEUKERT, DETLEV J. K. (1950–1990) Short-lived but highly influential German historian and part of the movement of Alltagsgeschichte in the 1980s to which he contributed a history of the experiences of ordinary Germans during the Third Reich. Peukert stressed the ambivalence of popular interactions with the regime, ranging from active collaboration to passive resistance, and revealed the ambiguous but unavoidable complicity even of Germans who did not share the Nazi ideology. Peukert’s most significant contribution to the historiography of Nazism, however, was his critique of modernisation theory (the notion that Nazism can best be understood as a product of inadequate modernisation). Peukert took issue with the conventional notion that Nazism resulted from Germany’s failure to modernise and argued instead that Nazism represented the dark side of Germany’s extraordinary modernity. In Peukert’s view Nazi racial policy, including compulsory sterilization, eugenic abortion, euthanasia (the killing of the mentally and physically disabled), and the “final solution of the Jewish question,” exemplified a central feature of modernity, Machbarkeitswahn (the illusion that anything is doable), the belief that society could be renovated and social problems resolved through the application of biological principles and practices. In Peukert’s interpretation Nazism typified the murderous potential of modern social engineering projects. Peukert rejected the comforting notion that Nazi barbarism marked a relapse into the primitive past, warning that it might instead offer a preview of a potentially genocidal future. 
RAUSCHNING, HERMANN (1887–1982) A prominent German conservative, veteran of the First World War, and member of the Nazi party in 1931, Rauschning argued Hitler’s movement was solely opportunistic, without consistent ideology, program, or principle. By describing the Nazis as only interested in exercising power, Rauschning in effect extricated his own anti-democratic and anti-communist values and goals from complicity in the Nazi project without denying them. In some respects Rauschning anticipated totalitarianism theory by situating the Nazi movement on the left rather than the right of the political spectrum. Many of the direct quotations in his 1939 book, Hitler Speaks, purportedly based on conversations with Hitler, were fabricated, and this book is no longer considered a reliable historical source.
RITTER, GERHARD (1888–1967) Like most German nationalists he rejected the Versailles Treaty and the Weimar parliamentary system, embraced the “stab-in-the-back” legend, and denied German guilt for the outbreak of the First World War. While rejecting the Nazis’ extremism in the 1930s, particularly their violent persecution of the Jews, Ritter admired and celebrated Hitler’s foreign policy successes and supported German expansionism. These nationalist attitudes coloured his historical works as well. According to Ritter, Nazism was the product of mass politics and the revolutionary movements emanating from the French Revolution. He rejected attempts to trace the origins of Nazism to German history, attributing it instead to such European- wide aspects of modernity as industrialisation, materialism, rationalism, Marxism, secularisation, Darwinian science, and technology. However, the consensus today is that Ritter was simply wrong in identifying Nazism as a direct consequence of the rise of socialism rather than as a reaction to it.
SHIRER, WILLIAM L. (1904–1993) Journalist turned historian, William Shirer is today primarily known for his massive best-seller, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (1960), a well-documented, richly detailed, non-academic narrative account written from a strongly anti-Nazi perspective. Shirer was thoroughly familiar with Germany and with the Nazi hierarchy, having served as a CBS radio reporter in Berlin at the start of the war before being forced to leave in December 1940. His Berlin Diary, published in early 1941, accurately predicted the German invasion of Russia and the outbreak of war with the United States. It also contained eyewitness accounts of the Nuremberg party rallies, the French capitulation on June 22, 1940, and numerous other events.
TAYLOR, A. J. P. (1906–1990) Popular but controversial British historian, whose major work was The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848–1918 (1954). His importance for the historiography of Nazism is based on two works, The Course of German History: A Survey of the Development of Germany since 1815 (1946) and The Origins of the Second World War (1961). The former, written during the war and inevitably reflecting the hostile passions of that conflict, was a classic indictment of Germany’s anti-democratic and militarist tradition. In his later book on the events leading up to the Second World War Taylor seemed to reverse course, blaming the out- break of the war on Britain’s disastrous policy of appeasement, thus seemingly taking some of the onus of guilt from Germany’s leadership. By characterizing Hitler’s foreign policy as not significantly different from earlier German policies, Taylor did not intend to absolve Hitler of culpability, however. Instead, his assertion that Hitler’s policies were consistent with those of mainstream German nationalists was intended as a rebuke to British leaders, whose miscalculations and policy of appeasement made war in September 1939 unavoidable. Taylor was particularly critical of the failure of the British government to follow up Soviet overtures for an anti- fascist military alliance in the 1930s. Only by resurrecting the grand alliance of the First World War, which in fact came about after the German invasion of the USSR and the Japanese attack on the US in 1941, might war have been prevented in 1939. 
Main quote:  "The Depression put the wind in Hitler’s sails"
TOLAND, JOHN Strove for dispassionate objectivity about Hitler. Ignoring the presumption that Hitler was ‘evil’, Toland sought to identify his positive attributes and qualities, to understand why so many supported and even worshipped him.
TOOZE, ADAM Young British economic historian whose impressive tome, The Wages of Destruction, interprets the Second World War as Hitler’s desperate response (in the context of his conviction that Germany was locked in a mortal racial struggle with the Jews) to the challenge posed by the allegedly Jewish-dominated United States, both as a rival to Germany for global power and as a seductive model of a way of life that threatened traditional European institutions by its affluence and gratification of material and sensual desires. The book describes in unprecedented detail the extraordinary mobilisation of German resources during the war to overcome the material advantages of Germany’s foes. Tooze places the genocide of the Jews within a framework that gives weight both to overarching ideological tenets and mundane pragmatic considerations. Whilst in no way denying the Nazis’ predatory practices, Tooze showed that the Nazis would not have been able to finance the war solely by conquest and spoliation. Moreover, the sacrifices imposed on the German population were borne unequally by Germany’s subordinate classes.
WAITE, ROBERT G. L. (1919–1999) Canadian-American historian whose book, Vanguard of Nazism (1952), pioneered the study of the Free Corps as the forerunners of Nazism in the period following the First World War. Waite also authored a biography of Hitler, The Psychopathic God (1977), perhaps the most notable example of the genre of “psycho-history,” which utilised psychoanalytical categories to explain Hitler’s policies and practices and which left a deep impression on me growing up.
WEHLER, HANS-ULRICH (b. 1931) Wehler set forth the so-called Sonderweg theory to help explain the rise and triumph of Nazism in Germany. According to this interpretation, a key factor in Germany’s susceptibility to fascism was the lack of a liberal bourgeois revolution in Germany (due to the failure of the revolution of 1848). The consequence of the weakness of liberalism was that the landed aristocracy continued to wield disproportionate power in German politics. According to Wehler, pre-democratic values and institutions predominated in Bismarckian and Wilhelminian Germany. Whilst the German economy was rapidly modernized, Germany’s political system failed to keep pace with democratic reforms enacted in Western Europe. The resulting social tensions in Germany and differences from the Western European model of liberal democracy helped to account for the aggressive nature of German foreign policy in the twentieth century.
WEINBERG, GERHARD L. (b. 1928) Leading American historian of Nazi foreign policy and the Second World War. His massive A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II is available for download on the right. In contrast to A.J.P. Taylor’s portrait of Hitler pursuing a traditional foreign policy of continental dominance, Weinberg argued that Hitler was driven by global ambitions. Weinberg also effectively refuted David Hoggan’s contention in 1961 that war had been forced on Hitler by the hostile actions of the West. It was Weinberg who first discovered Hitler’s Second Book in the archives, a translation of which he published in 2003.
WELCH, DAVID (b. 1950) Author of The Third Reich: Politics and Propaganda (also available for download on the right), Welch has concentrated his research on Nazi propaganda both in practice and in theory. Welch has investigated not only the specific rhetorical or psychological techniques of persuasion that Hitler, Goebbels and other Nazis used to achieve their desired effects (particularly in the new medium of film), but also the social and political context that enhanced or limited the power of propaganda. One key to the Nazis’ propagandistic success was their skill in merging Nazi ideology with traditional themes of patriotism and religion. Rather than changing people’s minds, they reinforced existing prejudices.
WINKLER, HEINRICH AUGUST Winkler’s main field of expertise is the Weimar Republic, arguing that the SPD’s failure to enact thoroughgoing social reform in the aftermath of the First World War impaired the long-term viability of the Weimar Republic by strengthening the right and alienating the left, but he defended the SPD for pursuing the only course that could possibly have led to the establishment of a functioning parliamentary democracy under extremely adverse conditions.
ZITELMANN, RAINER Conservative publicist whose major claim to inclusion in a survey of the historiography of Nazism was his startling revival of the thesis that Hitler was a man of the left, not the right. Zitelmann set forth this dubious interpretation in his book Hitler as Social Revolutionary in which he claimed that Nazi social programs like Strength through Joy were not intended merely to maintain social peace but rather genuinely to improve the conditions of the working class. For Zitelmann Hitler and the Nazis were modernisers who constructively sought to enhance social equality and mobility in Germany. His critics pointed out that wages remained disproportionately low in Germany and that the social benefits that Zitelmann touted were only available to racially pure “Aryans.”

Bullock and Nicholls- Hitler was important in failure of the Weimar Republic
Gordon Craig- Weimar Republic's "normal state was crisis."
John Maynard Keynes: The Economic Consequences of the Peace. Nazis used government money to put people in jobs- later used in USA Walther Frank- Nazi historian, anti-Semite
David Hoggan- Der Erzwungene Krieg- about Anglo-Polish conspiracy to wage aggression against Germany, The Myth of the Six Million- denying Holocaust
Hugh Trevor-Roper: A. J. P. Taylor, Hitler and the War.

Goebbels: If we are attacked we can only defend ourselves with guns not with butter.”
One German woman told the American reporter Nora Wall: “He is my mother and my father. He keeps me safe from all harm.”
E.H.Carr- pro-Soviet, revolution was perfectly planned ‘coup d’etat’
The suffering and deaths in the Soviet Union during the First Five Year Plan period were justified by the growth in Soviet heavy industry in the early 1930s, which in turn allowed the Soviet Union to defeat Germany
-Economical & political forces shaped Stalin, but Stalin still a strong figure. 
-Stalin as an ‘agent of history’: produced by the circumstances after the Bolshevik Revolution 
- If Stalin had not industrialised Russia, then someone else would have done so. 
- Stalin combined immense achievements with utter brutality: “an emancipator and a tyrant.” 
- Stalin was “the great executor of revolutionary policy.”
Robert Daniels- Revolution was an ‘historical accident’
Marc Ferro- WWI was the main factor leading to revolution
Robert Conquest-Orthodox, The Great Terror: Stalin's Purge of the Thirties
William Taubman- Nikita Khrushchev
Zbigniew Brzezinski- The Grand failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the 20th century
Eric Hobsbawm- Marxist
George F. Kennan- orthodox, diplomacy,
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn- soviet social, Gulag Archipelago
Orlando Figes- People's Tragedy: Russian Revolution 1891-1924
Plakhanov wrote Society and the Political Struggle in 1897- first Russian Marxist book
Christopher Reed- Bolshevik historian
John Reed: Ten Days That Shook the World
Ilyin- Zhenevsky, A.F. From the February Revolution to the October Revolution 1917
Rodzianko, M.V.: The Reign of Rasputin
Michael Lynch-a revisionist historian
Allan Wildman-Russian Army in War and Revolution
Sheila Fitzpatrick- Social historian, revisionist, Russia’s Twentieth Century in History and Historiography
Steve Philips- Stalin and Stalinism
Leon Trotsky- War and the International- Attacked Russian involvement in WWI, History of the Russian Revolution- attacking Stalin
Richard Pipes- orthodox, Three Whys of Russian revolution- describes evilness of Lenin, The Unknown Lenin
Robert Service- Comrades: A World History of Communism
Edvard Radzinsky- more pro-Stalinist, Stalin: The First In-depth Biography Based on Explosive New Documents from Russia's Secret Archives
Dimitri Volkoganov- Stalinist, Stalin: Triumph and tragedy
Applebaum- Gulag
Adam Ulam -Stalin: The Man and his Era: Stalin impeded Soviet victory in WWII, as the purges had liquidated Russian manpower and expertise
Martin McCauley- Stalin & Stalinism: Stalin used brutal, appalling methods but achievement considerable 
- Industrialisation in particular meant victory over the Nazis & that USSR became one of the two superpowers after 1945.
- “The Stalin revolution revitalised the country.” 
- “[Stalin] launched a violent, phenomenally ambitious modernisation of the country.”

- “[Stalinism] was phenomenally successful and eventually a crashing failure."
Ian Grey - Stalin: Man of History: Most staunch Western defender of Stalin 
- Believed historians have been overly influenced by Trotsky
- “Soviet Russia became stronger as a result of Stalin’s campaigns of industrialization, collectivization and social transformation.” 
Service: “…the Russian Empire was deeply fissured between the government and the tsar’s subjects; between the capital and the provinces; between the educated and the uneducated; between Western and Russian ideas; between rich and poor; between privilege and oppression; between contemporary fashion and centuries-old custom”.
Smith: “The collapse of the autocracy was rooted in a crisis of modernisation. The government hoped that it could carry out modernisation whilst maintaining tight control over society. Yet the effect of industrialization, urbanization, internal migration, and the emergence of new social classes was to set in train forces that served to erode the foundations of the autocratic state”.
Pavel Milyukov (Kadet Party): "What is it, stupidity or treason?"
Orlando Figes: “The Romanov dynasty presented to the world a brilliant image of monarchical power and opulence during its tercentenary.”
- “Nicholas had not been blessed with either his father’s strength of character or his intelligence.”   
- “It was not a weakness of will that was the undoing of the last Czar but… a wilful determination to rule from the throne, despite the fact that he clearly lacked the necessary qualities to do so.”  
Rasputin: "The Czar can change his mind from one minute to the next; he’s a sad man; he lacks guts.”     
Norman Stone: "Russia was not advanced enough to stand the strain of war, and the effort to do so plunged her economy into chaos."  
Sergei Witte: “His [Nicholas II] character is the source of all our misfortunes. His outstanding weakness is a lack of willpower.”  
Dimitri Volkognov: “The Russian government’s failings in the war and its weakness at home led to the self-destruction of the autocracy on a wave of discontent" 
Simpson: "With revolutionary parties in confusion and revolutionary leaders absent, the March revolution was a spontaneous, unplanned event. The timing and the cause of its outbreak were unexpected, though quickly exploited by the masses in the city"
Prince Georgy Evgenyevich Lvov: "The Soviet has power without authority, the Provisional Government has authority without power"
Bolsheviks: “suppress all attempts of the bourgeoisie to return to power: and this is what is meant by the dictatorship of the proletariat
Trotsky:We have not organised the revolution to kill.”
War is the instrument of policy.”
E. H. Carr:Trotsky was the great intellectual
Anna Louise Strong: “Leon Trotsky remains the most popular man in the Soviet Republic. . . Russia's best organiser . . . Trotsky is more popular throughout Russia not only than any other man but than the whole of the Central Committee” Leon Trotsky “built an army out of worse than nothing; out of demoralised deserters who had determined never to fight again
Historians Chris Ward and Chris Corin "Rykov and Tomsky were too naïve and blinded by love of NEP
Alec Nove- An Economic History of the USSR: "It remains true beyond question that the second Five-Year Plan period was one of impressive achievement."
Robert Conquest: "Joseph Stalin gives the impression of a large and crude claylike figure, a golem, into which a demonic spark has been instilled." He was nonetheless "a man who perhaps more than any other determined the course of the twentieth century."
Ukraine, "the breadbasket of the Soviet Union,"

Richard Pipes- Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime: "Stalin was a true Leninist in that he faithfully followed his patron's political philosophy and practices. Murdering fellow Communists - he had learned from Lenin, and that includes the two actions for which he is most severely condemned: collectivization and mass terror. A man of meagre education, he had no other source of ideas."
Stalin’s foreign policy was called “cold blooded realism
With Nazi-Soviet pact “Stalin gave the green light to aggression.” Stalin’s action lay in “believing that such a war would be a long drawn out affair rather than a blitzkrieg victory for Germany.”-war with Western Allies.

Churchill's Greatest Quotes
In War: Resolution.
In Defeat: Defiance.
In Victory: Magnanimity.
In Peace: Goodwill.
May 13 1940 in his first address as Prime Minister:'I would say to the House, as I said to those who have joined the government: "I have nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears and sweat."
'We have before us an ordeal of the most grievous kind. We have before us many, many long months of struggle and of suffering. You ask, what is our policy?
'I will say: It is to wage war, by sea, land and air, with all our might and with all the strength that God can give us; to wage war against a monstrous tyranny, never surpassed in the dark and lamentable catalogue of human crime.
'That is our policy. You ask, what is our aim? I can answer in one word: victory; victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory, however long and hard the road may be; for without victory, there is no survival.'
June 4 1940 following the evacuation of forces from Dunkirk:
'We shall not flag or fail. We shall go on to the end. We shall fight in France, we shall fight on the seas and oceans, we shall fight with growing confidence and growing strength in the air.

'We shall defend our island, whatever the cost may be. We shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing-grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills.We shall never surrender!'
June 18 1940 following the collapse of France to Nazi forces:
'Upon this battle depends the survival of Christian civilisation. Upon it depends our own British life, and the long continuity of our institutions and our Empire.
'The whole fury and might of the enemy must very soon be turned on us. Hitler knows that he will have to break us in this island or lose the war. If we can stand up to him, all Europe may be free and the life of the world may move forward into broad, sunlit uplands.
'But if we fail, then the whole world, including the United States, including all that we have known and cared for, will sink into the abyss of a new Dark Age made more sinister, and perhaps more protracted, by the lights of perverted science.
'Let us therefore brace ourselves to our duties, and so bear ourselves that if the British Empire and its Commonwealth last for a thousand years, men will still say, "This was their Finest Hour."'

August 20 1940 in tribute to the RAF:
'The gratitude of every home in our island, in our Empire, and indeed throughout the world, except in the abodes of the guilty, goes out to the British airmen who, undaunted by odds, unwearied in their constant challenge and mortal danger, are turning the tide of the world war by their prowess and by their devotion.
'Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few.'

September 9 1941 on Britain's increasing strength in battle:
'The mood of Britain is wisely and rightly averse from every form of shallow or premature exultation.
'This is no time for boasts or glowing prophecies, but there is this—a year ago our position looked forlorn, and well nigh desperate, to all eyes but our own. Today we may say aloud before an awe-struck world, "We are still masters of our fate. We still are captain of our souls."'

November 10 1942 following the victory at El Alamein, North Africa:
'The Germans have received back again that measure of fire and steel which they have so often meted out to others. Now this is not the end.
'It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning.'

 I am convinced that every man of you would rise up and tear me down from my place if I were for one moment to contemplate parley or surrender. If this long island story of ours is to end at last, let it end only when each of us lies choking in his own blood upon the ground.

- George Bernard Shaw sent him two complimentary tickets to his play with a note, “You are invited to my première. Come and bring a friend—if you have one.” Winston Churchill replied: “Impossible to be present for first performance. Will attend second—if there is one.”
- We make a living by what we get, but we make a life by what we give.
- A lie gets halfway around the world before the truth has a chance to get its pants on.
- A love for tradition has never weakened a nation, indeed it has strengthened nations in their hour of peril.
- All great things are simple, and many can be expressed in single words: freedom, justice, honour, duty, mercy, hope.
- To build may have to be the slow and laborious task of years. To destroy can be the thoughtless act of a single day.
- Although prepared for martyrdom, I preferred that it be postponed.
- Broadly speaking, the short words are the best, and the old words best of all.
- A prisoner of war is a man who tries to kill you and fails, and then asks you not to kill him.
- Some see private enterprise as a predatory target to be shot, others as a cow to be milked, but few are those who see it as a sturdy horse pulling the wagon.
- The inherent vice of capitalism is the unequal sharing of blessings; the inherent virtue of socialism is the equal sharing of miseries.
- We contend that for a nation to tax itself into prosperity is like a man standing in a bucket and trying to lift himself up by the handle.
- An appeaser is one who feeds a crocodile—hoping it will eat him last.
- The problems of victory are more agreeable than the problems of defeat, but they are no less difficult.
- From now on, ending a sentence with a preposition is something up with which I shall not put.
- A fanatic is one who can’t change his mind and won’t change the subject.
- Bessie Braddock: “Sir, you are drunk.”
Churchill: “Madam, you are ugly. In the morning, I shall be sober.”
- Nancy Astor: “Sir, if you were my husband, I would give you poison.”
Churchill: “If I were your husband I would take it.”
- Once in a while you will stumble upon the truth but most of us manage to pick ourselves up and hurry along as if nothing had happened.
- If you are going to go through hell, keep going.
- Much of his imaginative energy was spent in trying to get the sick Roosevelt to do the sensible thing. “No lover,” he said, ever studied every whim of his mistress as I did those of President Roosevelt.”
- After being dismissed by the British electorate after WWII Mrs. Churchill commented, “Perhaps it is a blessing in disguise.” Churchill replied: “It appears to be very effectively disguised.”
- It is a good thing for an uneducated man to read books of quotations.
- Every day you may make progress. Every step may be fruitful. Yet there will stretch out before you an ever-lengthening, ever-ascending, ever-improving path. You know you will never get to the end of the journey. But this, so far from discouraging, only adds to the joy and glory of the climb.
- You have enemies? Good. That means you’ve stood up for something, sometime in your life.
- He has all the virtues I dislike and none of the vices I admire.
- If you have ten thousand regulations, you destroy all respect for the law.
- You can always count on Americans to do the right thing—after they’ve tried everything else.
- History will be kind to me for I intend to write it.
- Writing a book is an adventure. To begin with, it is a toy and an amusement; then it becomes a mistress, and then it becomes a master, and then a tyrant. The last phase is that just as you are about to be reconciled to your servitude, you kill the monster, and fling him out to the public.
- The farther backward you can look, the farther forward you are likely to see.
- Mussolini’s foreign minister, Count Ciano, who had married Mussolini’s daughter, had been accused of treason and shot. Churchill’s reaction: “Well, at least he had the pleasure of murdering his son-in-law.”
- I like pigs. Dogs look up to us. Cats look down on us. Pigs treat us as equals.
- A sheep in sheep’s clothing. (On Clement Atlee)
- A modest man, who has much to be modest about. (On Clement Atlee)
- Once an empty taxi drove up to the House of Commons and Clement Attlee got out.
- I am ready to meet my Maker. Whether my Maker is prepared for the ordeal of meeting me is another matter.
- The truth is incontrovertible, malice may attack it, ignorance may deride it, but in the end; there it is.
- Never hold discussions with the monkey when the organ grinder is in the room.
- Criticism may not be agreeable, but it is necessary. It fulfils the same function as pain in the human body. It calls attention to an unhealthy state of things.
- A pessimist sees the difficulty in every opportunity; an optimist sees the opportunity in every difficulty.
- To improve is to change; to be perfect is to change often.
- When I am abroad, I always make it a rule never to criticise or attack the government of my own country. I make up for lost time when I come home.
- Politics is the ability to foretell what is going to happen tomorrow, next week, next month and next year. And to have the ability afterwards to explain why it didn’t happen.
- Socialism is a philosophy of failure, the creed of ignorance, and the gospel of envy.
- One ought never to turn one's back on a threatened danger and try to run away from it. If you do that, you will double the danger. But if you meet it promptly and without flinching, you will reduce the danger by half.
- When the eagles are silent, the parrots begin to jabber.
- Solitary trees, if they grow at all, grow strong.
- Success consists of going from failure to failure without loss of enthusiasm.
- The best argument against democracy is a five-minute conversation with the average voter.
- It has been said that democracy is the worst form of government except all the others that have been tried.
- Never, never, never believe any war will be smooth and easy, or that anyone who embarks on the strange voyage can measure the tides and hurricanes he will encounter. The statesman who yields to war fever must realize that once the signal is given, he is no longer the master of policy but the slave of unforeseeable and uncontrollable events.
- Everyone has his day and some days last longer than others.
- There are a terrible lot of lies going around the world, and the worst of it is half of them are true.
- The whole history of the world is summed up in the fact that, when nations are strong, they are not always just, and when they wish to be just, they are no longer strong.
- From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent.-“The Sinews of Peace” speech, Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri, March 5, 1946
- If Hitler invaded hell I would make at least a favourable reference to the devil in the House of Commons.
- "We must be very careful not to assign to this deliverance the attributes of a victory. Wars are not won by evacuations."
- Those who can win a war well can rarely make a good peace and those who could make a good peace would never have won the war.
- The price of greatness is responsibility.
- Courage is the first of human qualities because it is the quality that guarantees all the others.
- The problems of victory are more agreeable than those of defeat, but they are no less difficult.
- If you will not fight for right when you can easily win without blood shed; if you will not fight when your victory is sure and not too costly; you may come to the moment when you will have to fight with all the odds against you and only a precarious chance of survival. There may even be a worse case. You may have to fight when there is no hope of victory, because it is better to perish than to live as slaves.
Churchill about Munich 1938: “It is a total defeat. Czechoslovakia will be swallowed up by the Nazis. And do not suppose that this is the end. This is only the beginning.
Second world war was the easiest war to be prevented.”
An Iron curtain is drawn down upon their front. We do not know what is going on behind
Churchill after Yalta to Roosevelt: “The Soviet Union has become a danger to the free world.
Churchill about Korea: “Korea does not really matter. Id never heard of the bloody place until I was seventy-four. Its importance lies in the fact that it has led to the re-arming of America.
Historians Quotes for the Cold War
Kenneth Waltz: What is a good state? Marxists say it is in fair distribution of wealth. USA and allies say multi-party democracy and sovereignty of people
John Marsden- different social structures, and each of them proving that their system was better
George Mitchell- The Iron Curtain: The Cold War in Europe
Stalin was sure that Russia could only gain from a long war in which Britain, France and Germany exhausted themselves.
John-Lewis Gaddis-post-revisionist The Cold War: A New history. We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History  Believed that both America and Russia wanted to keep the peace after the war but that conflict was caused by mutual misunderstanding, reactivity, and above all the American inability to understand Stalin's fears and need to defend himself after the war. 
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn- soviet social, Gulag Archipelago
George F. Kennan- orthodox, diplomacy
Richard Pipes- American orthodox
E.H. Carr- The twenty years crisis pro-soviet historian
Eric Hobsbawm- Marxist
Robert Divine- The Cuban Missile Crisis. Eisenhower and the Cold War
David Holloway- Stalin and the Bomb orthodox
William Taubman- Nikita Khrushchev
John Halliday and Bruce Cumings- Korea: The Unknown War
Chen Jian- Chinese Historian Mao’s China and the Cold War
William Appleman Williams- Tragedy of American Diplomacy- US was blamed for the Cold War
Gar Alperovitz -Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam (1965) Blame for Cold War on the Americans for their use of the atomic bomb 
Gabriel Kolko- The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy Truman should have given Stalin the atomic bomb in 1945, claimed that Russia treated Poland well in 1945, and blamed South Korea for the Korean War of 1950-3. One of the most extreme revisionists.
Timothy Garton Ash- the last part of the Cold War, Europe 1975-present
Howard Zinn- social historian- A People’s History of the United States
Harry Elmer Barnes- history is based on official historians like Churchill, Cold War was artificial (no ideology, just giving labour jobs etc.), Soviets did not start Cold War, origins of Cold War- Truman and Churchill
Peter G. Boyle: American-Soviet Relations: From the Russian Revolution to the Fall of Communism.
Norman Friedman: The Fifty Year War: Conflict and Strategy in the Cold War.
Terry Anderson: The United States, Great Britain, and the Cold War, 1944-1947- orthodox view
Diane Shaver Clemens: Yalta- orthodox
Bruce Cumings: The Origins of the Korean War- pro-NK, against US intervention
Sergei Gorcharov, John Lewis, Xue Litai: Uncertain partners: Stalin, Mao and the Korean War.
Yonosuke Nagai and Akira Iriye: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia.
Michael Beschloss: Kennedy v. Khrushchev
Lawrence Freedman: Kennedy’s Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos and Vietnam.
Alexandr Fursenko, Timothy Naftali: One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964.
Jarolim Navratil: The Prague Spring 68
David Reynolds: The Origins of the Cold War in Europe: International Perspectives.
Frank E. Vandiver: Shadows of Vietnam: Lyndon Johnson’s Wars.
Robin Edmonds: The Soviet Foreign Policy: The Brezhnev Years.
Martin P. Leffler - A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration and the Cold War (1992) Cold War was a clash of two military establishments both seeking world domination 
Marc Trachtenberg- A Contested Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963 (1999) Cold War was really about settling the German question in the aftermath of World War II.

Robert J. Oppenheimer, citing from the Bhagavadgita, after witnessing the world's first nuclear explosion: "I am become Death, destroyer of worlds.
Defence Secretary Henry Stimson 1945: “US could never again be an island to itself
George Marshall June 1947: “Europe is a breeding ground of hate.”
Malenkov after Marshall Plan: “The ruling gang of American imperialists has taken the path of open expansion, of enslaving weakened capitalists countries.”
James Byrnes, 1946 Secretary of State: “Soviets understand only language How many divisions have you? I am tired of babying the Soviets.”
Molotov: “We have troops only where provided by treaties.”
Russian historians after introducing new currency in Bizonia: “The Soviet side was ready to supply food to all Berlin. Yet every day 380 American planes flew into Berlin. It was simply a propaganda move intended to make the Cold War worse.”
US State Department June 1947: “US must develop a policy of firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counter force at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world…”
Brzezinsky stated that “world was now divided into two fronts, one imperialistic, the other socialist and democratic…”
Lord Ismay: NATO's founding purpose back in 1949 was "to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down."
Truman after invasion of South Korea: “I recall some earlier instances: Manchuria, Ethiopia, Austria. I remember how each time the democracies failed to act it had encouraged the aggressor to go ahead If this was allowed to go unchallenged it would mean a third world war.
Bradley Omar- Korea: “The wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time and with the wrong enemy
John Halliday and Bruce Cumings- Korea: The Unknown War: “Each side proclaims that it won, yet each actually seems to feel that it lost.
Kim Il-Sung: “In the Korean War, the US imperialists suffered an ignominious military defeat for the first time in the history of the US; this meant the beginning of a downward path for US imperialism.
Khrushchev 1955 in Yugoslavia: “There are different roads to communism.
1956 in London: “You do not like Communism. We do not like capitalism. There is only one way out- peaceful co-existence.”
Khrushchev in 1971: “…The Cold War set in. Churchill had given his famous speech in Fulton urging the imperialistic forces of the world to fight the Soviet Union. Our relations with England, France and the USA were ruined.
JF Kennedy “There are many people in the world who really don't understand-or say they don't-what is the great issue between the free world and the Communist world. Let them come to Berlin!
Robert McNamara in movie Fog of War (2003) -Kennedy was rational; Khrushchev was rational; Castro was rational. Rational individuals came that close to total destruction of their societies.
Curtis Lemay- Cuban Missile Crisis: “That was the era when we might have destroyed Russia completely and not even skinned our elbows doing it.
Richard Grayson: “Britain was the Coldest Cold War Warrior
Irwin Setzler, The Times: "When President de Gaulle demanded that American troops be removed from French soil, Lyndon Johnson asked whether that included those who were buried beneath it."
How do you tell a communist? Well, it's someone who reads Marx and Lenin. And how do you tell an anti-Communist? It's someone who understands Marx and Lenin.”
Ronald Reagan (American 40th US President (1981- 89), 1911-2004)
“Lenin was the first to discover that capitalism 'inevitably' caused war; and he discovered this only when the First World War was already being fought. Of course he was right. Since every great state was capitalist in 1914. . .”
A. J. P. Taylor

“If anyone believes that our smiles involve abandonment of the teaching of Marx, Engels and Lenin he deceives himself. Those who wait for that must wait until a shrimp learns to whistle.”
Nikita Khrushchev
“Seventy years ago this November, created the modern totalitarian state, transforming simpler forms of tyranny into history's most sophisticated apparatus of rule by terror.”
Michael Johns
“No chronology of Soviet atrocities can convey the crushing of the human spirit under Lenin and his successors. But the retelling of 70 years of grisly facts leaves little doubt that what we face today in Soviet communism is, indeed, an 'evil empire'.”
Michael Johns-
“The Cold War was over. The global standoff between superpowers was at an end. The world saw America and the West triumphant, freedom preserved, and the promises of Marx and Lenin and Stalin discredited.”
Spencer Abraham
“On one level the sixties revolt was an impressive illustration of Lenin's remark that the capitalist will sell you the rope to hang him with.”
Ellen Willis

Andrew Roberts: "As a result of the [Berlin Blockade] crisis, and the message it sent about Soviet assumptions and intentions, the United States began to build up her nuclear arsenal massively: in 1947 she had only thirteen bombs, in 1948 fifty, but by 1949 no fewer than 250."

Cold War Historiography

 Orthodox View: It was clearly Soviet aggression in Eastern Europe and then other parts of the world that had caused the Cold War. The United States had no choice but to meet the challenges posed by Soviet actions – whether those actions were seen as the result of traditional Russian imperialism or of an ideologically- driven expansionism that arose, ultimately, from the Bolshevik revolution of 1917.

 Examples: Herbert Feis, Churchill-Roosevelt- Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought (New York, 1957); Feis, From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Cold War (New York, 1970); Arthur Schlesinger Jr, “Origins of the Cold War” Foreign Affairs, 46, October, 1967, pp. 22-52.

Revisionists or New Left Historians:  Revisionists place the blame on the United States rather than the Soviet Union for the start 67 of the Cold War as the end of the wartime alliance need not in itself have led to cold war. They argued that the Soviets did nothing more in Eastern Europe than any great power would have done in terms of looking after their national interests, especially after two German invasions in less than thirty years. In any event, the Russians were often merely reacting to what the revisionists portrayed as aggressive American demands for business markets and political access into this region.
Examples: William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York, 1959); Williams, The Roots of the Modern American Empire (New York, 1969); Gabriel Kolko and Joyce Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy 1945-1954 (New York, 1972); Thomas G. Paterson, Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War (Baltimore, 1973).

 Post-Revisionists: Tried to show that both sides had their faults and that over time both superpowers pushed their own interests and misunderstood the other side even to the point, on occasions, of leading to the possibility of nuclear war. (In fact the views that are often regarded as post-revisionist have a long pedigree. Realists like Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan and William H. McNeill’s were interpreting the origins of the cold war in a ‘post- revisionist’ way even before the revisionists came along). The post-revisionists have tended to accept the revisionists’ view that Stalin was more concerned with Soviet security, and to that end the creation of a Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern and Central Europe, than with world domination or aggressive ambitions towards Western Europe; but at the same time they have argued that that Western leaders at the time could not be certain of what Stalin was up to, that even a Soviet Union preoccupied with what Stalin perceived to be ‘security’ could still threaten Western interests, and that the Western powers therefore had legitimate and understandable concerns about Russia.

Examples:  John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (New York, 1997).

Check out Old IB History Exam Test Questions

A useful INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND broadly denotes preferences for natural or traditional hierarchies of authority or power (whether based on birth, race, gender, ethnicity, talent, intelligence, wealth, or other traits that can be ranked on a comparative scale from superior to inferior). These terms “left” and “right” are most useful (and least confusing) when not overburdened by any other criterion than attitude toward human equality. The left–right conflict in the modern post-Enlightenment era has been most fiercely fought out on the issues of political power and distributive economic justice. The issues on which left and right have been in greatest disagreement are the questions of how widely and evenly political power is to be dispersed and how the material benefits of the world are to be shared among contending claimants. The nineteenth century can be broadly described as an era of left-wing ascend- ancy in Europe. In fits and starts throughout the century political and social movements favoring greater equality and democracy seemed everywhere to be making headway in Europe to a greater or lesser degree. Often, to be sure, progress toward liberalization and democracy in Europe came at the expense of colonized people on other continents, even though opposition to imperialism was generally stronger on the left than on the right. To what extent the left–right class conflict in Europe contributed to the outbreak of the deadly internecine war that came to be known as the First World War is a question much debated by historians. Although the First World War was not in any clear-cut sense a war between left and right, the left–right conflict raging in different proportions within each of the combatant nations may have contributed to their respective readiness to go to war with each other. Even before the war the political right in most European countries was alert to the egalitarian challenge of the left, and right-wing extremists advocated radical policies (including discriminatory measures against Jews, proverbial outsiders and the perceived agents of divisive social change) to stem the tide of liberalism, socialism, and democracy. This left–right polarization became even more pronounced after the end of the war, particularly in the nations of central Europe. From a right-wing perspective – especially in the defeated natio) Japan renews offensive in China (20 October) British restrict Jewish emigra- tion to Palestine (5 November) Hitler outlines his plans for expansion in “Hossbach Memorandum” (6 November) Italy accedes to Anti- Comintern Pact (19 November) Lord Halifax visits Germany to seek British–German agree- ment 1938 (4 February) Hitler assumes direct control of armed forces through creation of new High Command (OKW) (12 February) Schuschnigg forced to agree to legalize Nazi Party in Austria (9 March) Schuschnigg calls for plebiscite in Austria (12 March) German troops enter Austria (10 April) Daladier forms anti-communist cabinet in France; more than 99 percent of voters in Germany and Austria approve the Austrian Anschluss (May) Hitler informs his generals of his “unalterable decision to smash Czecho- slovakia by military action in the near future” (6 June) Jews in Germany forbidden to buy or sell real estate (1 July) Italy introduces anti-Semitic laws (6–15 July) International conference at Evian in France fails to find a solution to the Jewish refugee problem aggravated by the Anschluss of Austria (17 August) Jewish women and men with- out identifiably Jewish names ordered to add “Sarah” and “Israel,” respectively, for easier identification (18 August) Resignation of army chief of staff Ludwig Beck (20 August) Central Office for Jewish Emigration set up under Adolf Eichmann in Vienna (29 September) Munich Agreement trans- fers Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia to Germany (1 October) German troops march into Sudetenland (5 October) German Jewish passports stamped with “J” at request of Swiss gov- ernment (19 October) Unemployed Jews obligated to do forced labor 13  HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (28 October) Germans expel Polish Jews living in Germany after Poland revokes citi- zenship of all Jews living outside Poland for more than five years; 17,000 Jews caught in no man’s land before being granted admission to Poland (7 November) Herschel Grynszpan, son of Polish Jewish parents expelled from Germany, assassinates German diplomat Ernst vom Rath in Paris (9 November) Reichskristallnacht pogrom against German Jews (12 November) Göring convenes confer- ence to plan compulsory “Aryanization” of Jewish businesses (16 November) Jewish children prohibited from attending German schools 1939 (24 January) Heydrich authorized by Göring to develop comprehensive plan for Jewish emigration (30 January) Hitler threatens annihilation of European Jews in speech to Reichstag (27 February) Britain recognizes Franco’s regime in Spain (2 March) Cardinal Pacelli elected Pope Pius XII (15 March) Nazis occupy Prague in viola- tion of Munich Agreement and establish Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia (22 March) Lithuania returns port of Memel to Germany (28 March) Franco enters Madrid as Spanish Civil War ends (1 April) Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain pledges to support Poland militarily against threats to her sovereignty; Germany renounces Anglo-German Naval Treaty and Non-Aggression Treaty with Poland (3 April) Hitler orders preparation of plans for military attack on Poland (30 April) Soviet Union proposes military alliance with France and Britain (3 May) Vyacheslav Molotov named Soviet foreign minister (17 May) British “White Paper” limits Jewish immigration in Palestine (22 May) Italy and Germany sign Pact of Steel (23 May) Hitler informs his leading gen- erals of his decision “to attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity” (1 August) Opening of Central Office for Jewish Emigration in Prague (2 August) Albert Einstein writes to President Roosevelt suggesting feasibility of atomic bomb (16 August) Germany demands Danzig (Gdansk) from Poland (22 August) France and Britain reaffirm pledge of aid to Poland (23 August) Nazi–Soviet Non-Aggression Treaty signed, with secret protocol divid- ing Poland and Eastern Europe into spheres of influence (1 September) Germans invade Poland; Italy declares neutrality; Hitler authorizes secret euthanasia program (Aktion T-4) (3 September) Britain and France declare war on Germany (5 September) The US declares neutrality and continues embargo of arms to warring nations (9 September) German forces reach Warsaw (16 September) Soviet forces invade Poland (21 September) Heydrich issues guidelines for SS Einsatzgruppen in Poland (27 September) Warsaw surrenders (1 October) SS Main Office for Reich Security (RSHA) established in Berlin under Reinhard Heydrich (6 October) Britain and France reject Hitler’s offer of peace in return for accep- tance of conquest of Poland (7 October) Office of “Reich Commissar for the Strengthening of German Ethnicity” established under Himmler 14  CHRONOLOGY (26 October) Annexation of western Polish provinces (Wartheland); Hans Frank named to head occupied Poland (General- gouvernement) (4 November) US embargo on arms sales to Britain and France lifted (8 November) Hitler escapes attempt on his life by Johann Elser in Munich (23 November) All Jews in Nazi-occupied Poland required to wear yellow Star of David (28 November) Jewish Councils (Judenräte) created on German orders in ghettos of Nazi-occupied Poland (30 November) Soviet Union invades Finland to start “Winter War” (1 December) Deportations begin of Jews and Poles from annexed “incorporated territories” to the Generalgouvernement (12 December) Jewish males between 14 and 60 in Generalgouvernement required to do forced labor in camps set up for that purpose (14 December) Soviet Union expelled from League of Nations (19 December) Conference in RSHA on plans to create a Jewish reservation in Poland 1940 (21 February) Construction of concentra- tion camp at Auschwitz (13 March) Finland signs peace treaty with Soviet Union, ending “Winter War” (23 March) Göring prohibits further depor- tations into the Generalgouvernement (9 April) Germans occupy Denmark and invade Norway (1 May) Lodz Ghetto sealed off with barbed wire (7 May) Resumption of “resettlement” of Jews and Poles from the “incorporated territories” into the Generalgouvernement (10 May) Germans launch Blitzkrieg against France and Benelux countries; Winston Churchill replaces Chamberlain as prime minister (14 May) Holland surrenders (28 May) Belgium surrenders (4 June) Allied expeditionary force evacu- ated from Dunkirk (10 June) Italy declares war on Britain and France; President Roosevelt promises aid to Britain and France (14 June) Germans occupy Paris (22 June) French sign armistice in Compiègne (24 June) Heydrich calls for a “territorial solution” to the Jewish problem (July) German Foreign Ministry (in consultation with RSHA, the Office of the Four-Year Plan, and the Propaganda Ministry) proposes plan to deport Jews to Madagascar after peace with Britain (3 July) British naval squadron destroys French fleet in Algeria, leading to a break of diplomatic relations with Vichy France (10 July) Authoritarian government under Marshal Henri Pétain formally established at Vichy in unoccupied France (16 July) Hitler issues orders for the preparation of “Operation Sea Lion,” the invasion of Britain (22 July) British reject Hitler’s peace proposal (31 July) Hitler announces plans for an invasion of the Soviet Union to his generals (26 August) First British air raid on Berlin; Hitler launches Blitz on British cities (17 September) Standoff in Battle of Britain forces postponement of plans to invade Britain; Madagascar Plan tabled in favor of an “eastern territorial solution” (27 September) Signing of Italo-German- Japanese Tripartite Pact (2 October) Hans Frank protests in Berlin against further deportation of Jews into the Generalgouvernement (3 October) Vichy France passes anti- Semitic legislation 15  HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (23–24 October) Hitler unsuccessful in persuading Vichy France and Franco’s Spain from joining war against Britain. (28 October) Italians invade Greece (12 November) Soviet foreign minister Molotov confers with Hitler in Berlin (15 November) Warsaw Ghetto walled off from rest of the city (18 December) Hitler authorizes plans for “Operation Barbarossa,” the invasion of the USSR (29 December) Roosevelt describes the US as “the arsenal of democracy” 1941 (9 January) Plans for “Operation Felix,” the seizure of Gibraltar, abandoned (1 March) Himmler begins plans for expansion of Auschwitz complex to hold 130,000 inmates (March) Deportations into General- gouvernement halted because of worsen- ing food situation (7 March) Jews in Germany now subject to forced labor (11 March) Roosevelt signs Lend-Lease Act (27 March) Military revolt overthrows pro-German government in Yugoslavia (4 April) Beginning of “Aktion 14 f 13” for the killing of concentration camp inmates, mainly Jewish, incapable of work (6 April) Germans invade Yugoslavia and Greece (10 April) US occupies Danish colony of Greenland (13 April) Soviet Union signs non- aggression pact with Japan (17 April) German forces occupy Belgrade; establish separate fascist state of Croatia (27 April) Greece surrenders; Germans occupy Athens (May) Formation of SS Einsatzgruppen for war against Soviet Union with assign- ment to kill all Jews in Communist Party or government positions (10 May) Hitler’s deputy Rudolf Hess flies to Scotland in hopes of negotiating peace with Britain in anticipation of the invasion of the USSR (6 June) OKW issues the “Commissar Order,” calling for execution of captured political commissars (21 June) Himmler orders his staff to draw up a “general plan for the east” (Generalplan Ost) (22 June) German troops invade the Soviet Union; Einsatzgruppen begin roundup and execution of Jews and Communists (28 June) Wehrmacht and SS agree on selection and execution of Soviet POWs (7 July) US forces land in Iceland to prevent German occupation (15 July) Generalplan Ost submitted by Konrad Meyer, calling for the “evacuation” of 31 million persons (17 July) New Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories established under Alfred Rosenberg (31 July) Heydrich authorized to draw up plan for “final solution” of Jewish Question in Europe (August) Eichmann visits Auschwitz and informs Commandant Höss of the planned “final solution” of the Jewish Question (14 August) Churchill and Roosevelt sign Atlantic Charter (16 August) Himmler is witness to Einsatzgruppen executions in Minsk; first reported killings of Jewish women and children (23 August) Hitler calls official halt to euthanasia program after church protests (27 August) German troops take Smolensk, 200 miles from Moscow (1 September) All Jews in Germany over the age of six compelled to wear yellow Star of David for identification (2–5 September) Cyclon B tested for the first time on Soviet POWs at Auschwitz (4 September) Leningrad surrounded 16  CHRONOLOGY (19 September) Kiev falls to German troops (29 September) Massacre of Jews at Babi- Yar on outskirts of Kiev (14 October) Deportation of German Jews to the east (first trainloads to Minsk, Riga, and Kovno) begins (16 October) Odessa falls to German troops (23 October) Emigration of Jews prohibited from Nazi-occupied Europe (30 October) US destroyer Reuben James sunk by German submarine (November) Euthanasia personnel arrive in Poland to prepare for “final solution” (9 November) Heydrich issues invitations to various ministries for conference on “final solution,” originally planned for 9 December, but postponed to 20 January (24 November) “Model” ghetto for elderly Jews created at Theresienstadt (26 November) Completion of construction of barracks at Auschwitz-Birkenau (5 December) Soviets launch counterattack at Moscow (7 December) Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (8 December) US declares war on Japan; gassing of Jews in mobile gas vans at Chelmno begins (11 December) Germany and Italy declare war on the US (12 December) Hitler announces coming “final solution” to Gauleiter conference in Berlin (16 December) Hans Frank announces planned murder of the Jews to his staff (19 December) Field Marshal Walther von Brauchitsch dismissed as commander of the army; Hitler assumes operational command of the army 1942 (20 January) Wannsee Conference to coordinate “Final Solution of Jewish Question” (21 January) General Rommel launches North African offensive to drive British out of Libya (9 February) Albert Speer takes control of German war production (13 February) “Operation Sea Lion” post- poned indefinitely (15 February) First transports of Jews arrive at Auschwitz (16 March) First transports of Polish Jews to Belzec death camp under “Aktion Reinhard” (4 June) Reinhard Heydrich killed by Czech partisans near Prague (7 June) US naval victory over Japanese fleet at Midway Island in the Pacific (10 June) Czech village of Lidice liquidated in revenge for assassination of Heydrich (21 June) Tobruk falls to German forces (1 July) Soviet Black Sea naval base at Sevastopol falls to Germans (22 July) Beginning of deportation of Jews from Warsaw Ghetto to Treblinka (31 August) Communist resistance network “Red Orchestra” broken up by Gestapo (17 September) German troops reach Stalingrad (31 October) British counter-offensive forces Rommel’s Africa Corps to retreat at El Alamein in Egypt (8 November) Anglo-American landing in North Africa (11 November) Germans occupy Vichy France (12 November) Allies recapture Tobruk (16 November) Beginning of deportation of German gypsies to Auschwitz (17 November) Allied Declaration de- nouncing murder of European Jews and announcing that those responsible will be punished (19 November) Soviets launch counter- offensive that eventually encircles German Sixth Army in Stalingrad 17  HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 1943 (15 January) Roosevelt and Churchill announce policy of “unconditional surren- der” at Casablanca Conference (18 January) Soviet forces break the siege of Leningrad (31 January) Surrender of the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad (18 February) “White Rose” student resistance leaders arrested; Goebbels announces “total war” at mass rally in Berlin (15 September) Mussolini established as head of Republic of Salò (25 September) Soviets retake Smolensk (13 October) Italy declares war on Germany (14 October) Partial success of revolt at Sobibór (16 October) Deportation of Italian Jews begins after Germans occupy northern Italy (6 November) Soviets retake Kiev (28 November) Conference of Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill at Teheran 1944 (4 January) Soviet troops reach former Polish–Soviet border (22 January) Roosevelt establishes War Refugee Board to assist relief and rescue of Jews (19 March) German troops occupy Hungary; beginning of roundup of Hungarian Jews under personal direction of Adolf Eichmann (10 April) Soviet forces retake Odessa (9 May) Soviet forces retake Sevastopol (15 May) Deportation of Hungarian Jews to Auschwitz begins (4 June) Allied forces enter Rome (6 June) D-Day: Allied invasion of Normandy (16 June) Hungarian government halts deportation of Jews (22 June) Opening of Soviet summer offen- sive (20 July) German military revolt fails (23 July) Red Army liberates Lublin- Majdanek death camp (1 August) Start of uprising of Polish Home Army (Warsaw Uprising) (15 August) Allied landing in southern France (18 August) Red Army reaches German borders in East Prussia (25 August) Liberation of Paris; Romania declares war on Germany (3 September) Brussels liberated by Allied troops (10 March) Rommel recalled from Tunisia (14 March) Kracow Ghetto is liquidated (19 April) Start of Warsaw Ghetto upris- ing (12 May) Surrender of Africa Corps at Tunis (16 May) Warsaw Ghetto uprising suppressed and ghetto destroyed (24 May) Admiral Dönitz recalls German submarines in Atlantic due to heavy losses (June) On Himmler’s orders bodies are exhumed from death camps in order to obliterate evidence of Holocaust (19 June) Goebbels announces that Berlin is free of Jews (5 July) Germans launch “Operation Citadel” at Kursk in central Russia (10 July) Allies land in Sicily (13 July) German defeat in the Battle of Kursk (25 July) Mussolini deposed by Fascist Grand Council (28 July) Allies launch “Operation Gomorrha,” the firebombing of Hamburg (2 August) Crushing of prisoner revolt at Treblinka (24 August) Himmler named Reich interior minister (3 September) Allies invade Italian main- land; Italy signs armistice with Allies (12 September) German task force under Skorzeny frees Mussolini from Italian captivity 18  CHRONOLOGY (8 September) Bulgaria declares war on Germany (12 September) Anglo-American forces reach German borders in west (3 October) Surrender of Polish Home Army in Warsaw (15 October) Fascist Arrow Cross govern- ment installed in Hungary by the Nazis (18 October) Allies recognize Tito as head of Yugoslav state (20 October) German city of Aachen falls to Allies (3 November) British forces join in fight against Communist National Liberation Army in Greek civil war (7 November) Roosevelt elected to fourth term as president (November) End of gassing operations at Auschwitz; demolition of crematoria (16 December) German counterattack in the “Battle of the Bulge” in the Ardennes 1945 (15 January) Last German offensive in west fails; Allies resume forward march (17 January) Red Army enters Warsaw ( 27 January) Liberation of Auschwitz by Red Army troops (4–11 February) Big three (Roosevelt, Stalin, Churchill) meet at Yalta in the Crimea and decide on temporary division of Germany into occupation zones after the war (13 February) Red Army takes Budapest (14 February) Allied planes devastate Dresden (6 March) Allied forces take Cologne (8 March) American troops cross Rhine River at Remagen (19 March) Hitler orders scorched earth policy (30 March) Soviet forces take Danzig (11 April) Buchenwald liberated by Allied troops (12 April) President Roosevelt dies and is succeeded by Harry S. Truman (13 April) Soviet forces take Vienna (15 April) Bergen-Belsen liberated by British troops (16 April) Red Army launches its final assault on Berlin (25 April) American and Soviet troops meet at Torgau on the Elbe River; United Nations conference opens in San Francisco (27 April) Sachsenhausen liberated by Red Army (28 April) Mussolini killed by partisans in Milan; Dachau liberated by American troops (30 April) Hitler commits suicide in his bunker in Berlin; Admiral Dönitz appointed to succeed him (1 May) Goebbels commits suicide in Berlin (2 May) Soviet forces complete capture of Berlin (8 May) Germany surrenders uncondition- ally (23 May) Dönitz and other government leaders arrested; Himmler commits suicide (July–August) Potsdam Conference con- firms formation of Allied Control Council to govern Germany from Berlin (6 August) Atomic bomb destroys Hiroshima (2 September) Japan signs unconditional surrender, ending the Second World War (20 November) Beginning of Nuremberg War Crimes trials 1946 (16 October) Execution of Nazi war crimi- nals at Nuremberg 1947 (1 January) American and British zones of occupation combined into “Bizonia” (5 June) Secretary of State George Marshall announces European Recovery Program 19  HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 1948 (15 May) Austrian State Treaty ends occu- pation (September) Adenauer visits Moscow to open diplomatic relations between the FRG and USSR and to secure the return of remaining German POWs 1956 (17 August) Communist Party outlawed in FRG 1960 (23 May) Adolf Eichmann seized in Argentina and brought to Israel for trial 1961 (11 April) Beginning of Eichmann trial in Jerusalem (13 August) Construction of Berlin Wall separating East and West Berlin 1962 (31 May) Execution of Eichmann 1965 (21 April) West German parliament extends 20-year statute of limitation on prosecution of murder (2 May) Full diplomatic relations estab- lished between FRG and Israel 1967 (2 June) The killing of a student by a police- man at a demonstration against the Shah of Iran in Berlin precipitates militant student protests 1969 (11 June) Further extension of statute of limitation on Nazi war crimes (21 October) Willy Brandt (SPD) is elected chancellor (21 March) Soviets walk out of Allied Control Council in protest against failure to create central German government (25 June) Soviets blockade Western land access to Berlin to protest introduction of new Western currency and creation of separate West German state; Allies mount airlift to supply Western sectors 1949 (12 May) End of Berlin blockade (23 May) Establishment of Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) (15 September) Konrad Adenauer becomes first chancellor of FRG (12 October) Establishment of German Democratic Republic (GDR), with Walter Ulbricht as head of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) 1951 (10 April) West German parliament passes bill for rehabilitation and re-employment of civil servants removed from employment in the course of denazification 1952 (10 September) The FRG and Israel sign agreement providing restitution payments to Jewish people 1953 (5 March) Death of Stalin 1955 (5 May) Paris Agreements give FRG full sovereignty with authority to rearm, with- out nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons; FRG joins NATO (14 May) Soviet Union forms Warsaw Pact in response to German rearmament and membership in NATO 20  CHRONOLOGY 1970 1985 (7 December) Brandt signs treaty of reconciliation with Poland and kneels at memorial to the victims of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising 1971 (3 May) Walter Ulbricht replaced by Erich Honecker as first secretary of the SED (3 September) Four-Power Accord recog- nizes special status of West Berlin 1972 (17 May) The West German parliament ratifies treaty recognizing the GDR as a separate state within the German nation (5 May) US president Ronald Reagan joins Chancellor Kohl for a controversial cere- mony at the military cemetery in Bitburg as an act of conciliation on the 40th anniver- sary of the end of the Second World War (8 May) West German president Richard von Weizsäcker reaffirms German respon- sibility for remembering the crimes of Nazism 1986–1987 Historian Ernst Nolte’s revisionism precip- itates bitter historians’ dispute (Historikerstreit) on the place of National Socialism in German history 1989 (9 November) Opening of the Berlin Wall 1990 (18 March) Elections in the GDR bring the CDU to power (18 May) The FRG and GDR sign a treaty to unite Germany under the West German constitution (12 September) Four victor powers and two German states sign a treaty in Moscow conferring full sovereignty on a united Germany and renouncing all German territorial claims arising from the Second World War (3 October) Reunification of Germany with its capital in Berlin 1977 (18 October) Leaders of the terrorist Red Army Fraction (RAF) commit suicide in prison 1979 (3 July) West German parliament votes to lift statute of limitation on Nazi war crimes 1982 (1 October) Chancellor Helmut Schmidt (SPD) replaced by Helmut Kohl of the con- servative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) 1984 (6 June) Neither FRG nor GDR invited to participate in ceremonies commemorating the 40th anniversary of D-Day landings 21  3 HISTORIOGRAPHY The debate about how best to understand and interpret Nazism and its causes began with the rise of the Nazi Party and the triumph of fascism in Italy in the early 1920s and has hardly abated since then. Historical interpretations are ultimately crucially dependent on the vantage point from which history is written. Nazism is today remembered above all as a cultural and political movement of unique destructiveness. After its failure and collapse in universal disgrace in the Second World War, and after revelations of the atrocities of the Holocaust, there is no dispute about the perniciousness of Nazism. This almost universal perception has led to the vigorous and well-justified condemnation of Nazism, but it has not diminished differences of opinion about its nature, significance, or causation. Because neutrality toward Nazism is hardly possible, interpretation of its origins, meaning, and causes has become a battleground between competing political orientations, whether of the egalitarian left, the liberal center, or the conservative right. Ideological assumptions are ultimately the most important determinants of where the explanatory emphases of histories of National Socialism lie. It must be borne in mind that interpretations of Nazism are often used in polemical fashion to discredit opposing political movements and values by attributing to them some of the evil features of Nazism. Because its ideology, ascent to power, and system of rule had so many contrasting – indeed contradictory – features, diverse movements can interpret Nazism in ways primarily designed to reinforce their own value system and policy priorities and to refute those of political opponents. PRE-WAR CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATIONS: THE “RISE OF THE MASSES” Before the war, however, neither fascism nor Nazism were universally perceived as evil or even objectionable. Conservatives in Germany, Britain, and France were particularly reluctant to recognize or acknowledge the extremism of the Nazi movement, or, if they did, to condemn it. Many conservatives, not just in Germany, welcomed Hitler’s accession to power as a salutary setback to inter- national communism. One such conservative, the Christian monarchist Hermann Rauschning, had joined the Nazi Party in 1931, but turned against the Nazis when 22  HISTORIOGRAPHY it became evident that they would not bring about a conservative restoration. His analysis of Nazism, The Revolution of Nihilism, published in 1938, provided the model for many disenchanted conservatives who had hoped that Nazism would strengthen religion, the family, law and order, and traditional institutions. Predisposed to favor authority, hierarchy, and the traditional order, disillusioned conservatives generally associated Nazism with the democratic instinct run wild, the rebellion of plebeian types dissatisfied with their subordinate place in society. Rauschning dismissed Nazi ideology (key elements of which conservatives shared) as purely opportunistic. For Rauschning Nazism was a revolution without a doctrine or Weltanschauung, a movement powered solely by the desire to exercise dominance. In Rauschning’s view the Nazis only gave lip-service to conservative ideals to hoodwink the people. For Rauschning Nazism was a product of the modernity he despised, a symptom of the decline of traditional Western moral and religious values and the “rise of the masses.” According to Rauschning even Nazi anti- Semitism (which Rauschning himself promoted in legislation proposed as president of the Danzig city senate in the mid-1930s) was only opportunistic, not a principled conviction (as presumably was the case with true conservatives). Cultural pessimists like Rauschning could not concede to Nazism any coherent ideology without implicating their own hostility to democracy (at least of the Weimar variety) and to the left. Hence they preferred to view Nazism as a cynical and total break with the past, a movement of criminals pursuing power solely for its own sake and for their own gain. In some respects Rauschning anticipated totalitarianism theory, the hallmark of which was to stress the structural resemblances between Nazism and com- munism. The use by Nazis and Bolsheviks of similarly radical methods, including violence, propaganda, and mass mobilization, made doctrinal differences seem largely irrelevant. This has been a perspective particularly favored by liberals of the center (or center-right) of the political spectrum for whom the repression of individual rights and representative government is the defining characteristic of totalitarian systems. To liberals who valued individual freedom above all else it often made little difference whether such repression occurred in the cause of human equality, as under communism, or in the cause of racial supremacy, as under Nazism. The target populations may have differed, but the effect on victims was the same. The more oriented toward the right such a liberal perspective was, the more likely it was to stress resemblances between Nazism and communism or to locate Nazism on the left of the political spectrum. Rauschning, for instance, called the opportunistic new Nazi elite (in a reference to Catiline, the ancient Roman conspirator against Cicero) “Catilinarians of the Left.”1 Rauschning’s analysis was unhistorical, treating Nazism as an unchanging essence while ignoring its evolution and slighting the historical context in which it arose (as later cold war-inspired interpretations were to do as well). The Revolution of Nihilism described the unscrupulous nature of Nazism well enough, but it is not very useful in explaining how it arose and why it gained power. 23  HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE NAZISM AS A PECULIARLY GERMAN IDEOLOGY Very different from Rauschning’s ahistorical analysis was the approach of the French scholar of German literature, Edmond Vermeil, whose Doctrinaire de la révolution allemande was published in 1938 and reflected the animosities of the First World War. If Rauschning saw Nazism as a totally novel phenomenon without any precedents in German history, Vermeil was excessively fixated on alleged continuities in German history. For Vermeil Nazism was ultimately rooted in the characteristically German tradition of what he called “organized romanticism,” the schizoid German penchant for contradictory ideals, whether of mysticism and technology, imperialism and subservience to authority, elitism and populism, order and disorder. According to Vermeil, the tension between these contradictory deep-historical strands could only be resolved through charac- teristically German aggressiveness.2 Vermeil’s was probably the best and least rigid of a number of works that sought to trace the roots of Nazism deep in the German past and in the German national character. It became a model of sorts for many subsequent works, most of them polemics written in the heat of the Second World War, patterned on the “from Luther to Hitler” theme.3 Some of these works can be subsumed under what at the time was called “Vansittartism” (after the anti-German British Foreign Office official Robert Vansittart [1881–1957]), the notion that Germans were incorrigibly aggressive and shared a collective guilt for their inherited militarism and the rise of Nazism. “Vansittartists” rejected the idea that Nazism was imposed on an innocent, terror- ized German society against the will of the people, but argued instead that it fulfilled long-cherished German aspirations.4 What made all such generalizations problematical, however, was not only their tendency to take abstract ideas out of their social and political contexts but also their implicit acceptance and inversion of the Nazi postulate of German exceptionalism (with values reversed). In many respects these “from Luther to Hitler” narratives unreflectively echoed the Nazis’ own dubious claims of embodying Germany’s great cultural and philosophical traditions. While the Nazis celebrated German culture as proof of German racial superiority, “Vansittartists” denounced it as the source of Germany’s recurrent criminality. Later critics of an alleged German Sonderweg would point out that German political culture was not as different from Western models as the adherents of German exceptionalism claimed. On the other hand there is little doubt that the Nazis’ cynical evocation of specifically German intellectual and cultural traditions contributed to their popularity and success. MARXIST INTERPRETATIONS: THE OFFICIAL PARTY LINE From the early 1920s Marxist interpretations of fascism and Nazism have provided the major stimulus for scholarly inquiry and debate. There is no doubt that both before and after the war the most incisive and thorough – but also the 24  HISTORIOGRAPHY most controversial – analyses of fascism were put forward by theorists who, for all their differences, identified themselves as part of the Marxist tradition. One reason Marxists dominated the discussion before 1945 is that for Marxists an accurate analysis of Nazism was not just an academic exercise but a necessary precondition for effective action to counter the Nazi threat. The goal of committed Marxists, after all, is not just to interpret the world but also to change it. As the primary targets of Nazi aggression and repression, Marxists developed far greater sensitivity to the extraordinary dangers of Nazism than did conservatives or even liberals, who often shared at least some of the Nazi premises, whether it was nationalism, the enforcement of law and order, the promotion of conventional moral norms, or the defense of private property rights. Marxist historians sought the causes of fascism (as of every major historical event) in economic developments, in changes in methods of production and exchange, and in the struggle between the classes to which economic relations under capitalism gave rise. The basic Marxist assumption that fascism was an extreme consequence of capitalism, and that the study of fascism therefore can’t be isolated from the study of the capitalist economy in which it arose, was tersely expressed by the founder of the Frankfurt School of Social Research, Max Horkheimer (1895–1973), in 1939: “Anyone who doesn’t want to speak about capitalism should also keep quiet about fascism.”5 Yet theorists of the communist parties in Europe, disappointed by the failure of revolution in the wake of the First World War and constrained by the Stalinist axiom that whatever served the Soviet national interest was best for the communist cause, often came to simplistic and misleading conclusions about fascism that hampered effective opposition to Nazism in Germany. Embittered by the suppres- sion of communist revolutions by liberal and Social Democratic governments in post-First World War Germany, members of the German Communist Party (KPD) denounced Social Democrats (SPD) as merely lackeys of the bourgeoisie and the pacemakers of fascism, condemning them as “social fascists.” By recruiting workers for reformist policies, the SPD allegedly provided the mass base for bourgeois capitalist interests. In the late 1920s, before the advent of the Nazi state, communists loyal to the Soviet Union tended to view liberal democratic systems such as Weimar Germany as little better than the seedbeds of fascism. The Comintern dubiously defined fascism as simply a more extreme form of bourgeois dominance than liberal democracy. Communists attributed to liberal and social democratic parliamentary parties the same function as fascism; namely, to serve the interests of capital. According to official Communist doctrine, capitalists resorted to fascism when they could no longer rely on parliamentary coalitions to serve their needs. By lumping all anti-communist formations together on the assumption that they were merely agents of capital, such a perspective trivialized fascism and made a united opposition to Nazism impossible. Indeed, based on this fallacious analysis, the KPD supported the Nazis’ efforts to bring down the SPD minority government in Prussia in 1931. 25  HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE This misjudgement of the role of the SPD as facilitators of fascism was not revised until after Hitler’s accession to power. The revised Comintern definition of fascism, first put forth in 1933 and officially adopted in 1935, still identified capitalism as the source of fascism. But by calling fascism in power “the open terroristic dictatorship of the most reactionary, the most chauvinistic, the most imperialistic elements of finance capital,” the new definition did draw a suffi- ciently sharp distinction between fascist and liberal capitalist parties to leave Communists free to form the anti-fascist coalitions with Social Democrats and liberals that they had previously scorned.6 It did, however, perpetuate the vulgar Marxist notion of Nazis and fascists as merely the agents of big capital, acting on instructions issued by their economic bosses. UNORTHODOX MARXIST INTERPRETATIONS While all Marxist analyses shared the assumption that fascism was a product of the contradictions and crises of capitalism, Marxist historians not bound by the party line offered a variety of more dialectical interpretations that challenged the Comintern’s superficial “agent theory” of fascism. Some dissident Marxists, such as August Thalheimer (1884–1948), Leon Trotsky (1879–1940), and the Austrian Otto Bauer (1882–1938) in the early 1930s, sought to provide a more persuasive explanation of the relationship between fascism and capitalism by invoking Marx’s analysis of the Bonapartist state in The 18th Brumaire of Louis Napoleon (1852). According to this analogy to Bonapartism, fascism results from a situation of political stalemate when the ruling capitalist class is no longer able to maintain its rule by constitutional and parliamentary means (whether because of dissension within the ruling class or because of the strength of the proletarian challenge), but the working class is not yet able to establish its dominance either. The Bonapartist state exercises power by mediating between the classes and thus ensuring the smooth operation of capitalist society.7 In contrast to the official Comintern view of the Nazis as merely agents and tools of the bourgeoisie, “Bonapartist” analyses assumed that bourgeois capitalists did in fact cede political power to the Nazis in order to retain economic control of society. While the political power of the bourgeoisie was thus destroyed under Nazism, its social and economic power remained intact. Such an analysis did greater justice to the evident autonomy of the Nazi movement and the Nazi state than the orthodox party line. Nazism’s function was to guarantee the stability of capitalist society (through terror against the labor movement, propaganda to win over the masses, and repression of civil liberties). In such an interpretation Nazis did not just slavishly serve the interests of capital but pursued their own specific political and ideological goals as well, first and foremost the creation of a racial utopia. Racial ideology and anti-Semitism did not just serve the instrumental function of diverting anti-capitalist grievances into channels that did not threaten the economic elites, they also represented a substantive program of racial restructuring that the Nazis pursued as their top priority. 26  HISTORIOGRAPHY The most serious challenge to the official Comintern line from within the Marxist camp came from Trotskyists who had long accused Stalin of under- estimating the fascist adversary and of betraying the cause of social revolution. While the Stalinist Comintern was deriding Social Democrats as “social fascists” in the early 1930s, Trotsky was calling for a united front with Social Democrats to oppose Nazism. Perhaps the most notable Trotskyist interpreter was the French historian Daniel Guérin, who in his books, The Brown Plague (1934) and Fascism and Big Business (1936), took issue with Stalinists for dismissing Nazism as merely a stage on the way to the proletarian revolution. While recognizing that the main function of Nazism was to sustain the capitalist system, Guérin took Nazism seriously as a genuine mass movement. He acknowledged its popular appeal, the stability of the Nazi regime, and its success in atomizing the working class and in attracting the masses. But Trotsky and Guérin also opposed the abrupt about-turn in Communist strategy after 1935, when Stalin endorsed Popular Front coalitions with a wide spectrum of anti-fascist parties, even if this entailed renouncing revolution and suppressing grassroots revolutionary movements (as for instance in republican Spain). Trotsky and Guérin continued to call for a “united front from below,” mobilizing the working-class rank and file while rejecting the tactical compromises of the Comintern with bourgeois parties in favor of promoting popular revolutions in countries in which fascism had not yet taken hold.8 Unorthodox Marxist scholars also pioneered sociological and psychological studies of Nazism that challenged and augmented the simplistic agent theory of the Soviet Comintern. The German émigré scholar Arthur Rosenberg (1889– 1943), who wrote the first history of the Weimar Republic in 1935, was among the first Marxists to recognize Nazism as a genuine mass movement that drew support mainly from the lower middle class, both the “old” Mittelstand of small proprietors and the new Mittelstand of white-collar employees.9 According to Rosenberg, lower-middle-class susceptibility to Nazism could not be attributed solely to capitalist manipulation. Among the most innovative Marxist scholars who tried to account for the “false consciousness” of the masses (i.e., their support for Nazism against their own economic interests) were the maverick psycho- analysts Wilhelm Reich and Erich Fromm, and the equally unorthodox philosopher Ernst Bloch, each of whom proposed alternatives to the exclusive focus on economic forces in orthodox Marxist interpretations.10 These theorists reproached orthodox Marxists for underestimating the importance of irrational factors in the triumph of Nazism and in human motivation in general. Each identified special conditions that made Germans particularly susceptible to Nazism. While they continued to view Nazism as primarily an economic and political problem, both Reich and Fromm sought to explain its hold over the German people on socio-psychological grounds. For Reich the key to the German recep- tivity to fascism lay in the traditional patriarchal and sexually repressive middle- class family structure. For Fromm, on the other hand, the failure of economic, 27  HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE social, and political conditions to offer a basis for the realization of full individual self-development led to the individual’s attempt to escape from the burdens of freedom by seeking refuge in submission to authority and submersion in a larger collective. According to Bloch, it was the backwardness of parts of German society, the disproportionate survival of historical anachronisms – pre- capitalist and pre-democratic ideas, attitudes, and institutions – that made the German public susceptible to fascism and ready to embrace Nazi mythology and destructiveness. The founders of the Frankfurt School, too, Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno (1903–1969), initiated a number of studies that sought to account for the irrational attraction of so many Germans to Nazism and for the fact that Germany developed the most radical and genocidal form of fascism. One of the most influential of such studies was The Authoritarian Personality, completed in American exile and published in 1950. The political scientist Franz Neumann, on the other hand, saw the “authori- tarian personality” not as an antecedent to or cause of Nazism so much as the result of Nazi rule. Like Fromm before him and Hannah Arendt after him, Neumann identified the atomizing of society to isolate its individual members and the creation of a uniform sadomasochistic character type as central Nazi techniques to form a malleable collectivity. Neumann’s classic study Behemoth, published in American exile in 1942, offered a far more variegated and sophis- ticated analysis of Nazism than the mono-causal “agent theory” of the Comintern. Neumann regarded the Nazi state as an ally of heavy industry, not merely its instrument, and he acknowledged that relations between them were sometimes antagonistic. In identifying four major groups – the state bureaucracy, the party elite, industry, and the army – in competition with each other in directing the Nazi state and society, Neumann anticipated post-war structural studies that often corroborated the makeshift rather than monolithic administrative structure of the Nazi regime. AFTER THE WAR: CONSERVATIVE GERMAN INTERPRETATIONS When the war came to a close the focus of explanations of Nazism shifted from “What is to be done?” to “How could this have happened?” In Germany total defeat spawned a number of soul-searching attempts to explain how Germans could have fallen for a movement that turned out to be so ruinous for their nation. It was perhaps inevitable that even the best of these early attempts to come to terms with Nazism, written by distinguished historians who had remained in Germany during the Third Reich, struck an apologetic note that betrayed their nationalist and conservative values. Historians who had remained in Germany during the Nazi era were understandably anxious to absolve their national history and culture of culpability for Nazi crimes. In 1946 the dean of German historians, Friedrich Meinecke, published a pamphlet, The German Catastrophe, which, while critical of Prussian militarism and power politics, de-emphasized social, 28  HISTORIOGRAPHY cultural, economic, and ideological factors in the rise of Nazism and put primary emphasis on international relations as the arena in which the main causes of the Nazi catastrophe had to be sought. His conservative colleague Gerhard Ritter defended the Prussian monarchical tradition and went even further than Meinecke in attributing the origins of Nazism to European-wide developments. According to Ritter Nazism had its source in Enlightenment doctrines and the democratic revolutions of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. For Ritter “Hitler’s proletarian movement,” like the many other single-party dictatorships in twentieth-century Europe (Ritter listed Russia, Italy, Poland, Spain, Portugal, Turkey, and several Balkan states), was an outgrowth of industrial mass society and the materialist discontents it bred.11 According to Ritter, Hitler’s precursors were the populist non-German dema- gogues Robespierre and Lenin, not the German aristocrats Bismarck or Wilhelm II. Ritter even went so far as to claim that the notion of Lebensraum was not a Hitlerian invention, but originated in the Darwinian revolution in biology. For Ritter, Nazism represented a complete rupture with the authentic German past. Meinecke and Ritter established the framework for numerous published attempts by German conservatives to explain the Nazi experience without impli- cating their own conservative values. Two tropes predominated: first, Nazism was seen as part of a general Western moral and political crisis, and, second, it was viewed as an avoidable accident brought on by a small group of immoral and unrepresentative villains taking advantage of an innocent and gullible nation. For Ritter and Meinecke, Nazism was an expression of the cultural and spiritual crisis of Western civilization under the hubris of the idea of worldly progress. Blaming the modern trend toward secularism and materialism became a favorite way of diverting attention from the role played by the organized churches and members of both Catholic and Protestant faiths in facilitating and perpetuating Nazi rule. Nietzsche’s vitalist anti-Christian philosophy, which had indeed been a source of inspiration for many individual Nazis (though not for the Nazi leadership), became a favorite scapegoat for the Nazi catastrophe, especially for Christian writers. Stressing the role of modern technology in the Nazis’ propagandistic successes, Ritter portrayed the Germans as a people seduced and oppressed by a resolute minority of criminal activists with no essential connection to German traditions. In this view, embraced by most German conservatives, Nazism was a historical accident, a pathological aberration in German history brought on by a small clique of political gangsters taking advantage of popular discontents to seize power. In identifying the left with its emphasis on distributional equality and class struggle as the source of the discontents that led to popular demands for dictator- ship, Meinecke and Ritter also pointed the way to totalitarianism theory, in which fascism is seen as the mirror image of communism. Their interpretation received unexpected support from conservative Jewish émigré historian Hans Rothfels (1891–1976), who resumed his university career in West Germany after the war. According to Rothfels, Nazism arose in Germany because the Weimar 29  HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE Republic had been too democratic, permitting the masses to elevate the Nazis to power. His highly laudatory history of the aristocratic resistance designated German conservatives, rather than the left, as the true antipodes of Nazism.12 A general feature of conservative apologetics was the attribution to Nazism of the very egalitarian or leveling traits that the Nazis were ostensibly fighting against. This enabled conservatives to explain what had attracted them to Nazism in the first place or had persuaded them to collaborate with the Nazis, but did not require any fundamental disavowal of their views. The philosopher Martin Heidegger, for instance, could denounce Nazism as part of the nihilistic Western tradition of calculative thinking, even though it was precisely the Nazis’ promise to eradicate Western nihilism that had attracted Heidegger to Nazism in the first place. Although Heidegger had joined the Nazi Party as, in his view, the only reasonable alternative to communism and materialism, he later contended that the Nazis were simply part of the general corruption of the Western tradition that they claimed to be fighting against. Thus by conceding that they had misjudged the true nature of Nazism, conservatives could retain the views and the values that had caused them to collaborate with the Nazis. With a handful of exceptions, most German historians active during the Nazi era successfully navigated the denazification process after 1945 and resumed their university positions, bringing with them the time-honored principles of German historicism: the narrative reconstruction of a course of events based on an understanding of the motives and intentions of leading historical actors as the principal task of historians; the uniqueness of all historical events and decisions, which should only be judged by the standards that obtained at the time in which they occurred; the conflict between states for power on the international stage as the central concern of historians and the reliance on documents of state as the keys to historical reconstruction and explanation; the priority of facts over concepts or theory; and the priority of diplomatic and political over social and economic history.13 German historians also avoided contemporary history and preferred to deal with events safely embedded in the past. After the war, Germany’s lead- ing historical journal, the Historische Zeitschrift, published only one article on National Socialism before 1950.14 The first major critical history of Nazism in Germany was produced not by a scholar working in the historicist tradition but by a political scientist, Karl Dietrich Bracher, employing the analytical methods of the social sciences to explain the collapse of the Weimar Republic and the success of the Nazi seizure of power.15 TOTALITARIANISM THEORY Bracher was also, however, an adherent of conservative totalitarianism theory. The term “totalitarianism” was used polemically as early as the 1920s by opponents of Mussolini’s statism, and in the 1930s by opponents of Nazism as well as critics of the Soviet Union. It also was used in a positive sense by fascists to describe the penetration of their values and institutions into all areas of social life. As a serious 30  HISTORIOGRAPHY scholarly effort to understand and explain both fascist and communist regimes and to stimulate comparative research, totalitarianism theory came into its own after the Second World War. Although the Nazi–Soviet Pact of 1939 had already converted many disillusioned liberals and socialists to the view that the Soviet Union was as much a totalitarian enemy of Western democracy as Nazi Germany was, the major catalyst for the wide dissemination of totalitarianism theory in the West was the cold war between the two military superpowers after the Second World War. Undoubtedly the most influential and philosophically ambitious attempt to develop an explanatory theory of fascist and communist states was the three-part Origins of Totalitarianism by the social philosopher Hannah Arendt, published in 1951. In the first two parts, written in the mid-1940s under the impact of Nazism, Arendt traced the antecedents of totalitarianism in nineteenth-century anti- Semitism and imperialism. In the third part, however, written under the impact of the emerging cold war in the late 1940s, Arendt concluded, somewhat incon- sistently, that the totalitarian societies of the twentieth century were an entirely unprecedented historical phenomenon characterized by the pervasive atomization of the masses. According to Arendt, in totalitarian societies the relationship of individuals to the state completely overshadowed their relationships to each other. Totalitarian policy destroyed the neutral zone in which the daily lives of human beings are ordinarily lived. The destruction of all traditional bonds between people and of all independent interest groups and voluntary citizen organiza- tions allowed the mobilization of the masses around a simple-minded utopian ideology and facilitated a form of rule in which bureaucrats could perform murderous deeds with a clear conscience (an organizing theme of Arendt’s controversial 1962 book, Eichmann in Jerusalem: The Banality of Evil). By frag- menting society into a mass of isolated individuals, each with their own narrow tasks without responsibility for the larger whole, totalitarianism created the conditions for the annihilation of superfluous or unintegrated population groups. Arendt was less concerned with tracing the history of totalitarianism than with counteracting what she regarded as the dangerous tendency of modern societies to discourage citizen participation in political decision-making and responsible civic engagement. Writing under the impact of her direct experience of Nazism, and against a cold war background of “both reckless optimism and reckless despair,” she identified this abdication of moral and political responsibility as the ultimate source of modern totalitarianism.16 The more systematic theory developed by political scientists Carl Friedrich and Zibigniev Brzezinski (b. 1928) in their 1956 study, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, was much more overtly driven by anti-communism. Friedrich and Brzezinski identified a set of six criteria that defined modern fascist and communist states: first, a state-sponsored millenarian ideology; second, a single- party system; third, a secret-police apparatus; fourth, a monopoly of propaganda and means of communication; fifth, a monopoly of arms; and sixth, a centrally controlled or planned economy. Friedrich and Brzezinski were particularly critical 31  HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE of Marxists or liberals who denied or downplayed the similarities between fascism and communism or between Nazism and Stalinism. As the analogy to Nazism was a useful way of discrediting the Soviet system, totalitarianism theory soon attained something approximating official status in the West. It was politically particularly useful at a time when West Germany was being asked to rearm under the auspices of NATO to meet the Soviet threat in the 1950s. Totalitarianism theory was strongly contested, however, by critics who pointed to changes in the post-Stalinist Soviet Union and protested against the ideo- logically driven oversimplifications of the totalitarianism model. Friedrich and Brzezinski were criticized for having produced a static mechanistic model that neglected the social dynamics of totalitarian movements and failed to take into account the very different origins, goals, values, and class character of fascism and communism. Indeed, Friedrich and Brzezinski had deliberately limited their study to a general description “of a novel form of government” rather than attempting to explain how or why such governments came about, “for the authors are convinced that such an explanation is not feasible at the present time.”17 Unwilling to examine the class character of fascist and communist regimes, which might have helped to explain the origins of these regimes and their different aims, most adherents of totalitarianism theory confined themselves to describing the very similar ways in which fascist and communist regimes mobilized the masses, wielded power, and maintained control. CRITICAL HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE 1960s AND 1970s: THE FISCHER CONTROVERSY The turn of German historians away from historicism to more critical social- scientific methods may be dated to the publication of the Hamburg scholar Fritz Fischer’s landmark study in 1961 of Germany’s responsibility for the First World War, translated into English as Germany’s Aims in the First World War (1967). Although Fischer did not deal with the Nazi era itself, his studies of the expan- sionist policies of the German Empire had profound implications for the Nazi period.18 On the basis of a thorough examination of the German Foreign Office documents, Fischer showed that there was indeed far greater continuity between German ambitions in the two world wars than conservative historians like Gerhard Ritter had been willing to concede. Fischer argued that Germany’s expansionist aims were not just a result of the revanchism generated by German defeat in the First World War, and the punitive Versailles Treaty, but actually predated the war. Fischer’s work made it impossible to cordon off the Nazi period as an acci- dental aberration in the otherwise untarnished course of German history. His pioneering effort spawned numerous critical studies of the role of German elites in promoting policies that eventually led to the rise and triumph of the Nazis. Fischer’s methodology, influenced by several years of study in Britain and the United States, led to a break with the venerable nationalist and conservative historical tradition in Germany, which had survived the Nazi trauma and persisted 32  HISTORIOGRAPHY into the post-war era. Fischer’s analysis of the domestic factors that helped to shape aggressive German policies reversed the previously dominant historical paradigm of “the primacy of foreign policy,” according to which German policies were dictated by the threats from rival European states. Ritter, for instance, had rationalized the Prusso-German authoritarian and militarist tradition as unavoid- able in a centrally located nation surrounded on all sides by potential foes. The primacy of foreign policy had traditionally served conservative political purposes by providing a reason to subordinate demands for liberalizing or egalitarian social reform to the needs of national security. Fischer, however, argued that it was not Germany’s exposed geographical position that was decisive in German policy formation but, rather, the exaggerated ambitions of its undemocratic leadership elites. The “opening to the left” in the 1960s that brought to an end the conservative post-war era amidst world-wide protests against United States involvement in the Vietnam War inevitably affected the historiography of Nazism as well.19 As the premises of official cold war ideology were increasingly challenged in the West under the impact of the Vietnam War, a new critical historiography emerged that was also bound to question prevailing conservative or cold war interpreta- tions of Nazism. The paradigm shift in Germany corresponded to the leftward turn in West German politics after Adenauer’s resignation as chancellor in 1963. Influenced by Fischer’s iconoclastic approach, a younger generation of historians challenged the apologetic tendencies of the early post-war era with critical reinter- pretations of the place of Nazism in German history. They questioned the inherited principles of German historicism and the rationalizations of the nationalist- conservative historical school. Younger historians were far more ready to explore and acknowledge continuities in German history in stark contrast to the tendency in the immediate post-war years to treat the Nazi period from 1933 to 1945 as both a historical accident with no true connection to the earlier German past or as the fault of a small clique of gangster leaders – above all Hitler personally – imposing their pathological visions and ambitions on a violated German public. Perhaps the most important group of younger critical historians in the 1960s and 1970s was the so-called “Bielefeld School” of social historians under the leadership of Hans-Ulrich Wehler and Jürgen Kocka (b. 1941). Wehler revived the work of the short-lived dissident historian of the Weimar era, Eckart Kehr (1902–1933), who emphasized the primacy of domestic policies over foreign affairs and stressed the significance of material interests and socioeconomic factors in the formation of German naval policy before the First World War. Wehler and Kocka applied the methods of structural history first introduced by Kehr and Fischer in revising the history of Imperial Germany. Although the Bielefeld School was mainly concerned with German social and political history in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, their findings and methodology had important repercussions for the historiography of Nazism as well. 33  HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE THE SONDERWEG CONTROVERSY Wehler developed the hypothesis of the German Sonderweg, according to which the catastrophic developments in Germany from 1914 to 1945 could be best explained by Germany’s failure, in contrast to Western European nations, to develop liberal and democratic institutions in the course of the nineteenth century.20 Variants of the Sonderweg thesis, which emphasized continuities rather than ruptures in German history, had long informed Anglo-American historiography, especially in studies of Nazi ideology, as in the works of émigré historians Francis Carsten, Fritz Stern, George Mosse, and Hans Kohn (1891–1971).21 Wehler’s model focused more on social and economic forces and on the disproportionate political power of predominantly agrarian aristocratic elites hostile to liberalism and democracy. From Wehler’s unabashed liberal perspective, the striking imbalance between Germany’s rapid economic development and its retarded social and political structure (due to the failure of liberal revolution in German history) was the major source of the tensions that led to Germany’s aggressive and regressive policies in the twentieth century. One function of the Sonderweg theory was to create a “usable past” for liberal democracy and democratic citizenship in the Federal Republic. Conservative critics of the Sonderweg thesis objected to the moral and political didacticism of this interpretation and rejected an approach that seemed to treat the history of Imperial Germany as merely the prehistory of Nazism. In 1976 an American historian of German liberalism, James J. Sheehan (b. 1937), warned that emphasis on the structural flaws of the German Empire was hardening into a rigid new orthodoxy that blocked understanding of the richness and diversity of Imperial society.22 Wehler’s model came under even more scathing attack from the left in the early 1980s by British and American historians who denied that the economic bourgeoisie was any less dominant in Germany than in Western Europe, despite the failure of liberal revolution in 1848 and Germany’s consequently more authoritarian political structure.23 Geoff Eley in particular objected to an inter- pretation that, by stressing German backwardness and its deviance from the British developmental norm, diverted scholarly attention from the crisis of the capitalist state as the most important source of fascism.24 In a later reflection on the Sonderweg controversy, Eley noted the irony that Wehler’s effort to develop a non- or even anti-Marxist interpretation of Germany’s susceptibility to Nazism implied a positive concept of “bourgeois revolution.” The irony lay in the fact that Wehler thus resurrected a staple of earlier Marxist interpretations of the French Revolution at the very time that these interpretations were coming under increasing attack from liberal historians.25 THE REVIVAL OF FASCISM THEORY Numerous new works in the 1960s and 1970s challenged the totalitarianism model and revived interest in earlier Marxist models that had been ignored or rejected in the West during the cold war. A younger generation of German historians ques- 34  HISTORIOGRAPHY tioned the cold war rigidities of the West as well as the Stalinist heritage in the East. Even non-Marxist historians accepted the Marxist claims that Nazism could best be understood as part of a generic fascist movement opposed to socialism and liberal democracy and that fascism had its most important source in the political and economic crisis that afflicted capitalist societies in the inter-war years. Ernst Nolte’s Three Faces of Fascism, published in Germany in 1963, com- pared Nazism to Italian Fascism and the French Action Française and identified anti-Marxism as the defining principle of fascist ideology.26 The American historian William Sheridan Allen’s pioneering regional study, The Nazi Seizure of Power: The Experience of a Single German Town, 1922–1945 (1965), used the concept of social class to explain the popularity of the Nazis among middle-class Germans in the north German town of Northeim. While Bracher remained committed to the totalitarianism paradigm in his work, The German Dictatorship (published in Germany in 1969), Martin Broszat and Hans Mommsen published works critical of the conventional notion of the Nazi regime as a rationally organized, structurally unified, and centrally controlled monolith.27 Edward N. Peterson (b. 1925), too, stressed the institutional chaos of Nazi Germany in The Limits of Hitler’s Power (1969). There was also a perceptible shift in the 1960s and 1970s toward more theoretical explorations of Nazism, especially in West Germany. East German historians began to be taken seriously in the West, participating in debates in the West German Marxist journal Das Argument, despite the fact that the East German regime permitted only minor modifications of the 1930s agent theory in the GDR. East German historians agreed that the interests of monopoly capitalists remained the most important factor determining Nazi policies. While their research may have been politically motivated and circumscribed, such East German historians as Dieter Eichholtz, Kurt Gossweiler (b. 1917), and Kurt Pätzold contributed important empirical findings on the relationship between fascism and capitalism. Western Marxist scholars, on the other hand, influenced by the writings of the Frankfurt School, particularly Adorno, Horkheimer, and Herbert Marcuse (1898–1979), and such unorthodox Marxists as Walter Benjamin (1892–1940) and Wilhelm Reich, as well as the posthumously pub- lished Prison Notebooks of the Italian communist Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937), rejected simplistic interpretations that explained political ideologies and the rise of fascism solely on the basis of immediate economic class interests. Gramsci, who died in a Fascist prison, had developed the notion of “cultural hegemony” to describe the success of Fascists in gaining the active consent of various sectors of society by representing themselves as serving the interests of society as a whole. Western Marxists developed sophisticated theories to account for what the Greek-French political theorist Nicos Poulantzas (1936–1979) called the “relative autonomy” of the Nazis to pursue their own radical racial agenda free from the control of big capital, whose interests they nonetheless served. According to this interpretation, disunity within the ruling class itself provided the opening for the Nazis to perform the vital function of mediation between competing fractions 35  HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE while also mobilizing the mass constituency needed to legitimate capitalist rule in a time of economic crisis.28 The influential British social historian Tim Mason went even further in stressing the “primacy of politics” over the economic sphere, while nonetheless acknowledging the overriding importance of economic imperatives. Mason argued that while the Second World War was ultimately caused by the Nazi drive for Lebensraum, the inability of the Nazi regime to assure Germans a reasonable standard of living while simultaneously diverting huge funds into armaments determined the timing of war in 1939.29 This view was challenged by Richard Overy in a debate carried on in the pages of the British journal Past and Present in the late1980s.30 HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE HOLOCAUST An important development of the 1960s and 1970s was renewed consciousness of and research into the atrocities of the Nazi regime, which had received little attention from historians in the 1950s when the cold war was at its height. The process of integrating the Federal Republic into the NATO alliance tended to divert public attention in the West from the crimes of the Nazi regime in order to maintain Western harmony and gain German support for rearmament. In the 1950s the horrors of the Nazi regime were almost completely excluded from public discussion in Germany. Drawing attention to the systematic mass murder of the Jews was widely seen as a communist tactic in the West and as Zionist special pleading in the East. Even in the nascent state of Israel, fighting to establish itself against Arab opposition, political imperatives worked against publiciz- ing Jewish weakness and passivity during the Shoah. The dean of American Holocaust historians, Raul Hilberg, has recounted the barriers he faced in the 1950s in publishing his magisterial work, The Destruction of the European Jews (1961). Hilberg faced contradictory criticisms. On the one hand, he was accused of understating the extent of Jewish resistance; on the other, he had supposedly adopted an excessively prosecutorial tone toward the Germans.31 While Hilberg’s path-breaking book was finally published in the US in 1961, it was not translated into German until 1983 (and not into Hebrew until even later). The first German account of the Holocaust, by Helmut Krausnick, director of the Institut für Zeitgeschichte (IfZ) in Munich from 1952 to 1972, was published in the second volume of a book devoted to the Anatomy of the SS State in 1965.32 Although the horrors of the concentration camps had been well publicized in the aftermath of the war and the Nuremberg trials, the scale and detail of the genocide of the Jews were slow to seep into world-wide public consciousness. The capture and trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem in 1961 and 1962 was probably the single most important event that brought into sharper public focus the extent to which the Nazi killing program had systematically targeted Jews, but it was only in the 1970s that the term “Holocaust” came into wide academic and public usage in the United States and Europe. 36  HISTORIOGRAPHY The generational transition of the 1960s may have played as important a role as the Eichmann trial in the renewal of scholarly and public attention to both Nazism and the Holocaust. The challenge of the various protest movements against the cold war policies of the 1950s brought with it a resurgence of interest in the crimes of the Nazi period and a new determination among German students to demand an accounting from their parents and grandparents of their roles in the Third Reich. Historians trained in Germany in the aftermath of the Second World War showed considerably less reluctance to tackle the difficult task of explaining the Nazi era than the generation that had come to maturity before the war. A renewed stress on Vergangenheitsbewältigung (coming to terms with the past) informed research on the Nazi era in Germany and generated an ever-increasing number of new publications on various aspects of Nazi rule, including the origins of the Holocaust. The British historian Tim Mason introduced the historiographical concepts of “intentionalist” and “structuralist” (or “functionalist”) in 1981, which for a time dominated the debate on how Nazi policies of destruction were formed and implemented.33 Mason sought to adjudicate the differences between intention- alists such as Lucy Dawidowicz (1915–1990) or Gerald Fleming (1921–2006), who stressed the centrality of the Nazi program and ideology in the planning of the Holocaust, and structuralists such as Martin Broszat or Hans Mommsen, who contended that the Judeocide was not the result of a premeditated plan or long-term conspiracy but of a bureaucratic and systemic dynamic unleashed by increasingly urgent efforts to solve what Nazis identified as Germany’s foremost problem, the so-called “Jewish question.” After the start of the war, structuralists argued, SS and state administrators resorted to increasingly brutal methods to free their territories of Jews once the option of forced emigration was no longer considered practicable. The debate involved more than the origins of the Holocaust. It also concerned the mechanism of government in the Third Reich, the role of ideology, and the extent of Hitler’s power. Intentionalists identified the ideology and goals of the Nazi leadership as the sole or primary determinants of Nazi policies, while structuralists stressed the importance of bureaucratic, regional, or local initiatives, competition between party and government, and other more or less contingent factors in the development and implementation of Nazi policies. What gave the debate between intentionalists and structuralists its polemical edge was the question of historical responsibility. The issue was so contentious because interpretations that stressed contingencies, social structures, or bureau- cratic dynamics seemed to disperse responsibility for the Holocaust and conceal the human actors within a bureaucratic structural system. Diminution of Hitler’s central role and concentration on systemic or structural factors seemed to make responsibility for Nazi atrocities that much harder to pin down. If the road to Auschwitz was “twisted,” not straight, it was more difficult to equate Nazism with absolute evil.34 Attributing rational or utilitarian motives to the perpetrators, as the German historian Götz Aly did, also seemed to downplay 37  HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE the question of personal responsibility.35 Some leading historians, including Christopher Browning and Ian Kershaw, sought to reconcile these conflicting positions, the latter through his concept of “working towards the Führer.” Browning adopted an interpretation he characterized as “moderate function- alism.” In recent years a consensus has developed among historians of Nazism that the distinction is no longer fruitful and that both intentionalist and structuralist perspectives must be taken into consideration in explaining the origins of the Holocaust.36 NEO-CONSERVATIVE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE 1980s AND THE HISTORIKERSTREIT The historiography of Nazi Germany inevitably reflected the shift in political climate to the right in the late 1970s and 1980s in the wake of a widening backlash against what many people came to consider an excessive swing to the left in the late 1960s and 1970s. The “new cold war” of the 1980s unleashed by the West following the elections of the hardline anti-communists Margaret Thatcher in Britain and Ronald Reagan in the United States found a historiographical echo in the renewed ascendancy of more right-wing interpretations of Nazism and renewed efforts to downplay its criminality or its centrality to German history. The furious debate among West German historians known as the Historikerstreit in 1986 offered a striking example of how political concerns can affect historical interpretations. It was no coincidence that this debate about the appropriate interpretation of Nazism and the causes of the Holocaust took place in the midst of a heated election campaign, in which conservative German chancellor Helmut Kohl narrowly won reelection on the promise of a more resolute defense against the dangers of Soviet and East German Communism than the left could be expected to provide. The verdict of professional historians is that the Historikerstreit shed more heat than light on historical issues and that it contributed little of enduring value to historical scholarship. It was primarily a political conflict. Nonetheless, it must be included in any historiographical survey of Nazism for at least three reasons: first, it involved a wide array of influential historians (and other public figures) in West Germany, almost exclusively from the generation born before the Second World War; it also provided an important spur to detailed empirical investigations of the Holocaust in the 1990s; and third, it served as an object lesson of how closely linked historical interpretation often is to political ideology and how scholar- ship is sometimes at odds with personal memory and experience. The German historian Michael Stürmer (b. 1938), a leading spokesman for the ascendant conservatives, candidly admitted the political motive behind the conservative reinterpretation of Nazism: “The future is controlled by those who determine the content of memory, define the concepts, and interpret the past.”37 Stürmer believed that West Germans could not overcome the challenge posed by East German anti- fascism if they continued to labor under a burden of guilt about the Nazi past. 38  HISTORIOGRAPHY At the center of the dispute were two theses advanced by the historian Ernst Nolte, whose scholarly reputation rested on his widely praised study of fascist ideology in France, Italy, and Germany, Three Faces of Fascism (1963). Ironically, this book had contributed to the new wave of interest in generic fascism that challenged the ideologically driven totalitarianism theory of the cold war. Now, more than 20 years later, with the conservative backlash against the 1960s intellectual revolt in full swing, Nolte’s publications helped to revive totalitarian- ism theory, although this time with an important and provocative modification. Nolte posited not only a parallelism between fascism and communism, a long- standing thesis on which all adherents of totalitarianism theory could more or less agree, but now also insisted that communism had caused the fascist reaction and had exceeded fascism in destructiveness and criminality.38 For Nolte com- munism therefore bore greater responsibility for the atrocities of the twentieth century than National Socialism, which he presented as an understandable, albeit excessive, defensive reaction to the greater communist threat. According to Nolte, the racial murder of the Holocaust was an admittedly disproportionate, but not irrational, Nazi response to the class-based murders of the Soviet Gulag. Although Nolte denied any apologetic intent, he candidly admitted that his objective was to “normalize” National Socialism and free it of its stigma of unique criminality. He called for an end to the self-flagellating, anti-national “pedagogical historiography” of the 1960s with its left-wi from domestic policies. His work helped to inspire the Sonderweg (special path) inter- pretation of social historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler. FREI, NORBERT (b. 1955) Leading mem- ber of the younger generation of German historians who have entirely accepted liberal democratic values and are highly critical not only of Nazism but also of the post-war “politics of the past” (the title of Frei’s 1997 book, Vergangenheitspolitik, translated into English in 2002 as Adenauer’s Germany and the Nazi Past: The Politics of Amnesty and Integration). Frei linked the widespread German demands for the curtailment of denazifica- tion and the rehabilitation of former Nazis, including convicted war criminals, to a still pervasive, though muted, nationalism 66  A–Z OF HISTORIANS in the early years of the Federal Republic. Frei credited Adenauer for helping to cre- ate an anti-Nazi consensus in the late 1940s and 1950s, but also pointed out how ever more forceful repudiation of Nazi ideology could serve to cover up the growing retreat from denazification and the prosecution of war criminals. Frei also stressed the role of Allied pressure in blocking German efforts to free convicted war criminals, at least until the Allies themselves lost interest in prosecuting Nazi war crimes during the Korean War. It was not until the 1960s that a serious confrontation with the Nazi past finally emerged in the Federal Republic. In his earlier book, National Socialist Rule in Germany: The Führer State, 1933–1945 (1987), Frei seconded his generational colleague Detlev Peukert’s stress on the modern, technocratic aspects of Nazism, an implicit warning against the potential for barbarism in modern industrial societies. Frei’s book, 1945 und wir: Das Dritte Reich im Bewusstsein der Deutschen (2005) (The Third Reich in German Consciousness since 1945), traced Vergangenheits- bewältigung in Germany through various phases to the institutionalizing of Holo- caust memory and the simultaneous rediscovery of German victimization (at the hands of Allied bombers) at the start of the twenty-first century. FRIEDLANDER, HENRY (b. 1930) A sur- vivor of the Nazi camps, Friedlander is author of a thorough study of The Origins of Nazi Genocide (1995), which described the continuity between the Aktion T-4 euthanasia program, launched in 1939, and the “final solution,” the killing of the Jews. In contrast to Jehuda Bauer, Friedlander advocated expanding the definition of the Holocaust to embrace not only Jewish victims but all victim groups defined in biological terms, which would include the gypsies (Roma and Sinti) and the mentally and physically disabled. In Friedlander’s explanation the Holocaust resulted from the conjunction of two main strands of Nazi ideology – anti-Semitism and eugenic selection – under the favorable conditions for systematic murder created by total war. Friedlander also co-edited with Sybil Milton the 26-volume documentary series Archives of the Holocaust (1988–1993). The post-war prosecution of Nazi war criminals is another area of research to which Friedlander has made important contributions. FRIEDLÄNDER, SAUL (b. 1932) In his most important book to date, Nazi Germany and the Jews (1997), the first of a projected two volumes tracing the persecution of the Jews under Nazism (volume II is to be published in English in 2007), Friedländer introduced the concept of “redemptive” anti-Semitism, a radical form of Jew- hatred resulting from the convergence of racial anti-Semitism and a pseudo-religious ideology of redemption (or perdition). “Redemptive” anti-Semitism was based on a vision of an apocalyptic struggle to the death between the Jews and “Aryan humanity” and served an integrating and mobilizing function in the Nazi system. While Friedländer differed with “intention- alists,” who argued that extermination of the Jews had always been Hitler’s goal, he did insist that the “redemptive” anti- Semitism of Hitler and the core of the Nazi Party was the key to the origins of the Holocaust. Friedländer recognized the role of technocratic rationality in the exter- mination program, but insisted on the centrality of Hitler and his ideological goals. Unlike Goldhagen, who posited an “eliminationist” anti-Semitism throughout 67  HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE German society and history, Friedländer differentiated the Nazis’ extreme anti- Semitism from traditional völkisch or reli- gious anti-Semitism, which he viewed as necessary, but not sufficient causes of the Holocaust. In addition to books on Pius XII and Kurt Gerstein, the SS officer whose graphic description of the extermination camps helped to reveal the extraordinary criminality of the Nazi regime, Friedländer has also published widely on the history and memory of the Holocaust. He helped to found the new journal History and Memory in 1989, and has edited the influential vol- ume Probing the Limits of Representation: Nazism and the “Final Solution” (1992). Friedländer raised the question whether an unproblematic representation of so unique an event as the Holocaust was possible. He also engaged in an important scholarly debate with Martin Broszat, the German historian who called for the “historiciza- tion” of the Nazi era in the late 1980s. While Friedländer agreed with Broszat that the Nazi era should be treated with the same rigorous scholarship and objectivity as other historical eras, he cautioned against the kind of normalization that Ernst Nolte had advocated in the Historikerstreit. Friedländer also warned against the kind of “historicization” that Andreas Hillgruber had practiced in empathetically identify- ing with German soldiers on the eastern front in the closing stages of the Second World War. FRIEDRICH, CARL J. (1901–1984) German-born political scientist and co- author with Zibigniev Brzezinski of the influential study, Totalitarian Dictator- ship and Autocracy (1956), which gave scholarly respectability to the concept of “totalitarianism,” a category under which communism, fascism, and Nazism were subsumed. Although Friedrich conceded that communism and fascism were quite different in their proclaimed purposes and intentions, and that fascism appealed to the middle classes precisely because of their fear of communism, he nonetheless considered their similarities to be more important than their differences. Among these similarities he included a chiliastic ideology, a mass party led by a dictator, police control by means of terror, control of communications, control of arms, and a centrally planned economy. Totalitarian governments, Friedrich claimed, trans- formed classes into masses, supplanted a party system with a mass movement, shifted the center of power from the army to the police, and pursued a foreign policy aimed at world domination. Friedrich con- trasted totalitarian societies to traditional tyrannies that supposedly pursued less ambitious goals and left the private sphere intact. Friedrich’s totalitarianism theory enjoyed wide appeal in the US during the cold war as it provided a useful tool to tar the Soviet Union and other communist societies with the fascist brush. It was severely criticized by many historians, however, for failing to differentiate com- munist from fascist movements. Totali- tarianism theory occluded differences in their origins, their economic systems, their relationship to private property, and the coalition of forces that sustained them. Totalitarianism theory fell out of favor in the 1960s and 1970s only to reemerge in somewhat more sophisticated form after the demise of the Soviet Union in the 1990s. FROMM, ERICH (1900–1980) Fromm’s 1941 book, Escape from Freedom, offered a socio-psychological explanation for the origins of Nazism combining both Marxist and Freudian insights. According 68  A–Z OF HISTORIANS to Fromm, freedom becomes an unbearable burden for individuals when social, eco- nomic, and political conditions do not permit self-realization, and family ties no longer offer the security they once did. Traumatized by the collapse of the Empire, impoverished by the Great Inflation, and aggrieved by the loss of parental authority, the lower middle classes in Germany were particularly susceptible to an immature longing to escape from the responsibilities of freedom by dissolving their individuality in a larger whole. Fromm believed that this servile attitude was formed by a com- bination of social relations and family structure. Submission to authority satisfied both masochistic and sadistic urges, result- ing in conformism and destructiveness and paving the way to Nazi domination. Hitler’s own personal traits, his love of the strong and hatred of the weak, his petti- ness, hostility, and asceticism, symbolized, reflected, expressed, and strengthened typically lower-middle-class attitudes. GELLATELY, ROBERT (b. 1943) Canadian-American historian whose most important contributions to the historio- graphy of Nazism to date have been his studies of popular cooperation in the totalitarian Nazi regime, The Gestapo and German Society: Enforcing Racial Policy 1933–1945 (1990) and Backing Hitler: Consent and Coercion in Nazi Germany (2001). These studies marked a shift in emphasis from public dissent and non- cooperation in earlier literature on Nazi Germany (such as Sarah Gordon’s Hitler, Germans, and the “Jewish Question” [1984] and the six-volume Bavaria project of Martin Broszat) to an emphasis on the participation, compliance, and accom- modation of ordinary German citizens. Gellately concluded that the efficient func- tioning of the understaffed secret police was dependent on the continuing coopera- tion of ordinary Germans in denouncing their fellow citizens. Gellately argued, however, that loyalty to the regime, ideo- logical fanaticism, or fear of Gestapo reprisal were less important as motives for denunciation than opportunism, con- formism, professional rivalries, personal grudges, and conflicts between neighbors. Gellately also refuted conventional wis- dom on the make-up of the secret police. Not only was it far smaller than had pre- viously been assumed, but its personnel were drawn mainly from the professional police force that predated the Nazi regime. Gellately debunked what remained of the popular conception of the Nazi regime as a police state imposed by force on an un- suspecting population, which then found it too late to resist. His image of a widely accepted and popularly supported police state corroborated similar findings by Ian Kershaw, Detlev Peukert, and the German sociologist Reinhard Mann. Gellately’s conclusions about the “auto-surveillance” of German society, as well as his profiles of Gestapo personnel, were in turn largely cor- roborated by the German scholars Gerhard Paul (b. 1951), Klaus-Michael Mallmann (b. 1948), and Nikolaus Wachsmann (b. 1971), as well as in Eric Johnson’s (b. 1948) Nazi Terror: The Gestapo, Jews, and Ordinary Germans (1999) and (with Karl- Heinz Reuband) What We Knew: Terror, Mass Murder, and Everyday Life in Nazi Germany (2005). Both Gellately and Johnson, however, disputed Goldhagen’s contention that ordinary Germans were G 69  HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE driven by a unique “eliminationist” anti- Semitism. What makes Gellately’s findings on Nazi Germany particularly relevant to contemporary concerns is the implication that a totalitarian system can function effectively even without the use of large- scale coercion. Totalitarianism thus con- stitutes an insidious potential threat even in societies that perceive themselves as democratic. Gellately’s edited volume, The Specter of Genocide (2003), identified state-sponsored mass murder as one of the defining characteristics of the twentieth century. GERLACH, CHRISTIAN (b. 1963) Young German historian whose discovery of Heinrich Himmler’s appointment calendar in a newly opened Soviet archive in 1997 led to a reappraisal of the long-disputed question about whether and when Hitler made the decision to launch the “final solution.” Based on several of Himmler’s entries, as well as newly discovered pages of Goebbels’ diary, Gerlach concluded in 1997 that Hitler announced his decision to exterminate all European Jews to a meeting of Reichsleiter and Gauleiter in Berlin on 12 December 1941, one day after the German declaration of war on the United States. The Wannsee Conference, origi- nally intended to decide the fate of the German Jews, was now assigned the func- tion of coordinating the implementation of the Final Solution and deciding whether German Mischlings and Jews married to Germans should be included in the extermination program. Gerlach published his findings in an important article, “The Wannsee Conference, the Fate of the German Jews, and Hitler’s Decision in Principle to Exterminate All European Jews,” in The Journal of Modern History in 1998. Gerlach’s dating of Hitler’s deci- sion to early December ran counter to Christopher Browning’s contention that Hitler’s decision to extend the killing program to include all European Jews had already been made by October 1941. Gerlach also disputed Browning’s hypo- thesis that Hitler’s decision was the result of the euphoria that acc Otto Dietrich and Alfred Rosenberg, at the top of the key opinion-shaping institutions. In a dictatorship resting on the ‘leadership principle’, Hitler’s anti-Semitic convictions defined policy.” Jeffrey Herf (historian) “Any alliance whose purpose is not the intention to wage war is senseless and useless.” Adolf Hitler “Chamberlain’s stubborn, fanatical insistence on giving Hitler what he wanted, his trips to Berchtesgaden and Godesberg and finally the fateful journey to Munich rescued Hitler from his limb and strengthened his position in Europe, in Germany, in the Army, beyond anything that could have been imagined a few weeks before. It also added immeasurably to the power of the Third Reich.” William Shirer (historian) “If the day should ever come when we [the Nazis] must go, if some day we are compelled to leave the scene of history, we will slam the door so hard that the universe will shake and mankind will stand back in stupefaction.” Joseph Goebbels