History Extended Essay
Armenian Genocide
Research Question: To What Extent is the Label of Genocide Regarding the Armenian Genocide Throughout the Great War in Eastern Anatolia the Appropriate Term to Describe the Killings of Armenians from 1915-17?
Introduction
Essay Rationale
The common perception of the event is that it is a genocide and it is difficult to argue against this when examining how Armenians were targeted and killed. Several countries recognise the events from 1915-17 as genocide, such as Germany, Russia, France, and the United States, among others. However, only 32 countries have officially recognised the events as genocide, with countries like Israel and notably Turkey acknowledging the events but refusing to label them as genocide. This has influenced many political leaders to avoid using the term genocide, notably Barack Obama, who in 2010 refrained from referring to the killings as genocide. The way history is perceived can often be shaped by current political climates, which can overshadow the true events of the past. Therefore, it is crucial to shed light on the actual occurrences. Rising tensions between Turkey and Armenia regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh region, and Turkey’s possible involvement, once again highlight the issue of Turkey not recognising the Armenian Genocide. It is important to examine the evidence and primary accounts of the time and compare them to the Turkish revisionist view to assess any validity in pro-Turkish claims that it should not be classified as genocide. This essay will establish a generalised definition of genocide, review the events, and determine whether they fall into the category of genocide, considering different perspectives to evaluate whether the deaths of Armenians were premeditated and whether the Ottoman government was aware of the killings committed by officers in charge of the relocations. This leads to the research question: To What Extent is the Label of Genocide Regarding the Armenian Genocide Throughout the Great War in Eastern Anatolia the Appropriate Term to Describe the Killings of Armenians from 1915-17?
Methodology
To develop the argument, historians Norman Stone and Bernard Lewis will be used, as both have controversial opinions on the Armenian Genocide, often arguing that the term genocide is inappropriate or inapplicable to the events of 1915. Other sources include primary sources, such as telegrams sent by Henry Morgenthau, the American ambassador to the Ottoman Empire. He was a strong advocate for recognising the brutal killings of Armenians and frequently wrote to the Secretary of State requesting American intervention, which was never granted. Additionally, a broad definition of genocide will be used to identify key events and political behaviours that help classify the Armenian Massacre (1915-1917) as genocide. These sources provide two different perspectives, and their mix of primary and secondary sources offers a balanced approach, with the advantage of capturing immediate reactions and revisionist reviews with hindsight.
The Definition of Genocide
To address whether the killing of Armenians was a genocide, the definition of genocide must first be examined. The term genocide was coined by Polish legal scholar Raphael Lemkin in 1943, though he had been studying such crimes for over a decade. According to Lemkin, genocide is a crime against humanity, distinct from a war crime, posing an existential threat to a minority group. The United Nations based much of its laws on Lemkin’s definition, identifying acts such as killing members of a group, causing serious bodily or mental harm, deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction, and imposing measures to prevent births within a group as genocide. The first notable recognition of such acts was during the Nuremberg trials in 1946, though prosecuting earlier crimes without a defined term or legal framework proved challenging. The Armenian Genocide was undoubtedly seen as heinous, but the term genocide only emerged later. It is clear that genocide involves acts aimed at exterminating a specific group, typically driven by ideological motivations, such as the Holocaust in the Second World War. Intentionality is a key characteristic of genocide, so this essay will assess whether the killings were planned and deliberate.
The Armenian Massacre as a Genocide
Rising Ottoman-Armenian Tensions
To understand the killings of 1915-17, the pre-existing tensions between the Ottoman State and Ottoman Armenians must be examined. Turks and Armenians had coexisted for 800 years, with a relationship that was never ideal but avoided severe violent conflicts. In the 1890s, significant unrest arose between Ottoman Armenians and the Ottoman government. The primary conflict was the Armenian quest for an independent state, which the Ottoman Empire denied, leading to the formation of rebel groups like the Dashnaks and Hunchaks in the northeast (modern-day Anatolia and Armenia). A notable incident was the 1896 Ottoman Bank Takeover on 26 August, when 28 Armenian men and women from the Armenian Revolutionary Federation attempted to gain international attention for their mistreatment and cause for independence, led by Papken Siuni and Armen Karo. In 1895-96, an estimated 60,000-300,000 Armenians were executed under the orders of Sultan Abdul Hamid II in the Hamidian Massacres, a response to suspected cooperation with the Russian Empire, a rival of the Ottoman Empire. The Armenian pursuit of independence and Russian support created a significant rift. The Ottoman Empire, deteriorating and labelled the sick man of Europe, had lost territories like Greece, angering Abdul Hamid II. Bernard Lewis argues that the idea of Armenian independence infuriated the Sultan, who believed Turks and Armenians had a close relationship despite past conflicts. Armenian revolutionary behaviour fostered hatred towards Armenians at the turn of the century. In 1914, relations collapsed completely as the Great War began, with Norman Stone noting that the Dashnaks provided 16,000-20,000 soldiers to the Russian Empire along the Caucasus, aiming for Russian aid to create an independent Armenian state. Hovhannes Kajaznuni, Armenia’s first Prime Minister, stated, We had embraced Russia wholeheartedly without any compunction. Without any positive basis of fact, we believed that the Tsarist government would grant us a more-or-less broad self-government. This was seen as treason by the Ottoman Empire, which was struggling in the war, notably at Gallipoli, and sought to unify ethnic groups. Consequently, the Ottoman government decided to relocate Armenian inhabitants to northern Syria, an event that became the most devastating in Armenian history, with estimates of 600,000 to 1,500,000 deaths during executions, revolts, and death marches. The following sections will investigate whether these actions constitute genocide, using accounts, records, and popular opinions.
Eyewitness Accounts and Official Reports by Neutral Members
One day I was discussing these proceedings with a responsible Turkish official, who was describing the tortures inflicted. He made no secret of the fact that the Government had instigated them, and, like all Turks of the official classes, he enthusiastically approved this treatment of the detested race, wrote Henry Morgenthau, the U.S. Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, stationed in Constantinople from 1913-1916. He claimed deportations were a guise for mass killings in Anatolia. The policy, Sevk ve İskân Kanunu (Relocation and Resettlement Law), implemented from 1 June 1915 to 8 February 1916, aimed to eradicate Armenian influence along the Russian-Ottoman border following skirmishes in Van, where Armenians resisted Ottoman military abuse. Morgenthau alleged it was a permanent solution to the Armenian problem. Enver Pasha, Minister of War, and Djevdet Bey, an Albanian Ottoman governor in Van Vilayet, were heavily involved. Djevdet Bey, nicknamed the horseshoer of Bashkale, was known for brutal murders targeting Armenians, including torturing prisoners suspected of Dashnak ties by melting or stapling their feet to metal horse hooves, actions aligning with the UN’s genocide definition of causing serious bodily or mental harm. On 19 April 1915, Djevdet Bey ordered the killing of any Armenian seen by his brigade. Morgenthau’s reports to the Secretary of State highlighted increasing deportation and excesses against peaceful Armenians, suggesting a campaign of race extermination under the pretext of reprisal against rebellion. American sources reported extreme targeting during relocations to northern Syria. German missionary Johannes Lepsius, in his books Bericht über die Lage des armenischen Volkes in der Türkei and Der Todesgang des armenischen Volkes, documented ruthless massacres of women and children from Erzerum by Ottoman officers in Kemakh. Jesse B. Jackson, an American Consul worker, reported by 15 August 1915 that up to 500,000 Armenians had been subjected to brutal killings and targeted race eradication. Between 1 and 19 August 1915, he witnessed nine trains passing through Aleppo carrying thousands of Armenians from Aintab, whose city was looted, with survivors returning to destroyed homes. Jackson believed the Ottoman Empire was executing a gigantic plundering scheme and a final blow to extinguish the race, with government involvement indisputable, citing orders from Talaat Pasha and Enver Pasha, who fled Constantinople in 1921. Talaat was assassinated in Berlin by Soghomon Tehlirian of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, and Enver was found guilty by the new Turkish republic for forced deportations. Historian Arnold Toynbee echoed that the Central Government enforced and controlled the scheme, holding Young Turkish Ministers responsible for the crime that devastated the Near East in 1915. The term genocide, coined by Raphael Lemkin in 1944, aligns with references to Armenian annihilation, with Hitler comparing his planned Holocaust to the Armenian annihilation, reinforcing the appropriateness of the term genocide. The actions match UN General Assembly Resolution 260 (III) clauses, including killing members of a group, causing serious harm, and deliberately inflicting destructive conditions with intent to destroy a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group.
Public Policies and the Legitimacy of the Government’s Relocation Plans
An opposing view, held by historians like Justin McCarthy and Bernard Lewis, argues the Armenian massacres were not deliberately preconceived by the Ottoman hierarchy. They claim the resettlement programme aimed to prevent Armenian interference in the war, such as cutting supply or railroad lines, and that violence between Anatolian Armenians and Muslims caused mutual suffering, with 350,000-500,000 Ottoman Muslims allegedly killed by Armenian terror groups. The relocation law was intended to protect Muslim populations in Anatolia, particularly Arabs and Turks, in cities like Van, where 35,000-45,000 Muslims were reportedly killed by Armenian rebels. The government sought to stabilise Anatolia, a vital region for supply and communication lines, amid distrust due to Armenian sabotage. It is argued that the number of Armenian deaths is exaggerated, closer to 700,000 than 1.5 million, often due to attacks by wild tribes with supervisors’ connivance, not government intent to eradicate the race. Bernard Lewis notes that large Armenian populations in Constantinople, Izmir, and Ankara, around 80,000, remained unscarred, suggesting no genocidal intent.
Concluding Thoughts
The term Armenian Genocide accurately describes the events of 1915-17. Although Armenian provocation occurred, it was often a response to Ottoman actions. The government was fully aware of the genocide, as evidenced by Enver Pasha’s death sentence for his role in forced deportations. The current Turkish government’s agenda appears to conceal that the Ottoman Turks committed the first genocide of the 20th century. The killings were well-known, with aid efforts like those of Johannes Lepsius, and involved death marches, village executions, and torture of non-rebellious inhabitants, aligning with UN General Assembly Resolution 260 (III). Evidence for the genocide-denying view is sparse, relying on personal statements, while eyewitness accounts and Morgenthau’s pleas confirm state involvement. The subsequent Turkish government convicted Ottoman leaders for Armenian eradication. Thus, genocide is the most accurate term for the events affecting Armenians in 1915-17, as opposing evidence lacks substance.
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RESEARCH INVESTIGATION
The Armenian Genocide, commencing on 24 April 1915, involved the systematic deportation and mass killing of approximately 1.5 million Armenians by the Ottoman Empire’s Young Turk government during World War I. This catastrophic event, orchestrated under the leadership of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), targeted the Armenian Christian population in eastern Anatolia, reducing their numbers from about 2 million in 1914 to fewer than 400,000 by 1922. The genocide began with the arrest and execution of 250 Armenian intellectuals in Constantinople, followed by the disarmament and murder of Armenian soldiers in labour battalions. Deportations, death marches to the Syrian Desert, and massacres, often executed by paramilitary forces, decimated the population. Foreign witnesses, including missionaries and diplomats, documented atrocities, with U.S. Ambassador Henry Morgenthau Sr. reporting in 1915 that the deportations were “the death warrant to a whole race.” Estimates of deaths range from 664,000 to 1.5 million, with Armenians citing the higher figure and the Turkish government claiming 300,000. The Young Turks, driven by Pan-Turkist ideology, aimed to create a homogeneous Turkish state, viewing Armenians as a threat due to their economic success and perceived disloyalty after the Ottoman defeat at Sarıkamış in January 1915. The Republic of Turkey, established in 1923, has consistently denied the genocide, asserting that the deaths resulted from wartime chaos rather than a deliberate extermination policy. Over 30 countries, including France, Germany, and Canada, have recognised the events as genocide, aligning with the academic consensus and Raphael Lemkin’s 1944 definition, which was influenced by these atrocities. The absence of justice, with key perpetrators like Talaat Pasha escaping punishment, and ongoing Turkish denial have sustained international debate. Scholars continue to analyse Ottoman records, survivor testimonies, and archaeological evidence to clarify the genocide’s scope and intent, while Turkey’s resistance to recognition remains a diplomatic challenge.
The deliberate intent behind the Armenian Genocide is evident in the Ottoman government’s coordinated policies to eliminate the Armenian population, driven by nationalist ideology and wartime opportunism. On 24 April 1915, the arrest of 250 Armenian intellectuals in Constantinople marked the onset of a systematic campaign, as ordered by Talaat Pasha, Minister of the Interior. These leaders were executed or deported, crippling Armenian cultural and political resistance. By February 1915, 60,000 Armenian soldiers in the Ottoman army were disarmed, transferred to labour battalions, and systematically killed, with reports from German nurse Armin Wegner documenting executions near Kharput between March and June 1915. The CUP’s Special Organisation, led by Behaeddin Shakir, orchestrated massacres in Armenian villages, particularly after the Ottoman defeat at Sarıkamış in January 1915, where Enver Pasha blamed Armenians for collaborating with Russian forces. Deportation orders, authorised by the Ottoman Parliament in May 1915, forced 800,000 to 1.2 million Armenians onto death marches to camps in the Syrian Desert, where survivors faced starvation and disease. Ottoman records, cited by Akçam, reveal instructions to reduce Armenians to no more than 5% of the population in deportation source areas and 10% in destination regions, a goal unattainable without mass murder. In 1916, a second wave of killings left approximately 200,000 survivors, many forcibly converted to Islam. Akçam’s analysis of Ottoman telegrams from 1915 shows Talaat’s direct oversight, with one order stating, “The destination of the deportations is nowhere,” implying death as the intended outcome. Morgenthau’s 1915 dispatches reported Talaat’s admission that the policy was meant to “annihilate” the Armenians. Suny, in his 2015 study, argues that the genocide was not premeditated before 1914 but emerged through “cumulative radicalisation” during the war, as the CUP exploited military chaos to pursue ethnic homogeneity. Heath, on tracesofevil.com, concurs, noting that Ottoman archival evidence, including Talaat’s 1915 directive to “liquidate” Armenian communities, confirms centralised intent. However, Suny cautions against oversimplifying the genocide as solely nationalist, pointing to economic motives, as Armenian properties were seized and redistributed to Muslim refugees, with an estimated 800,000 Kurds and Turks resettled in former Armenian lands by 1918. Göçek challenges this view, arguing in her 2015 work that the genocide’s roots lie in a longer history of anti-Armenian violence, citing the Hamidian massacres of 1894-1896, which killed up to 300,000 Armenians, as a precursor. Göçek’s examination of Ottoman court records reveals a pattern of state-sanctioned impunity, with perpetrators rarely punished. The deliberate nature of the genocide is further supported by the 1919 Ottoman Military Tribunal, which convicted CUP leaders Talaat, Enver, and Jemal in absentia for “the crime of mass murder,” though only three of 18 sentenced were executed, as most fled to Germany. Heath critiques the tribunal’s limited scope, noting its aim to deflect Allied demands for partition rather than deliver justice. The systematic nature of the killings, documented by foreign witnesses and Ottoman records, underscores a clear genocidal intent, though debates persist over the extent of premeditation.
The intentionality of the Armenian Genocide is further evidenced by the CUP’s meticulous coordination and the scale of atrocities, which left no room for Armenian survival in eastern Anatolia. Ottoman telegrams, uncovered by Akçam in 2015, detail Talaat’s orders to provincial governors to ensure deportees faced “annihilation” during marches, with instructions to destroy Armenian villages and redistribute their assets. In 1915, Wegner photographed Armenian children dead in the streets, corroborating reports of systematic starvation and mass shootings. The CUP’s Special Organisation, comprising released convicts and irregular troops, was tasked with executing massacres, as evidenced by a 1915 report from German consul Walter Rössler in Aleppo, who described “corpses piled along the deportation routes.” The deportation law of May 1915, cited by Göçek, allowed the confiscation of Armenian property, with 20,000 homes and businesses in Diyarbakir alone redistributed to Muslims by 1916. Suny argues that the genocide’s execution required a centralised bureaucracy, as seen in Talaat’s 1915 orders to monitor deportee numbers and ensure their dispersal into camps where survival was unlikely. Between 1915 and 1916, an estimated 100,000 to 200,000 Armenian women and children were forcibly converted to Islam, integrated into Muslim households, and stripped of their cultural identity, as documented by the Armenian National Institute. Heath highlights the role of local complicity, noting that Kurdish and Circassian militias, incentivised by loot, participated in massacres, with 50,000 Armenians killed in Van province alone in 1915. However, Heath disputes the notion that the genocide was solely a grassroots effort, citing Talaat’s telegrams as proof of top-down orchestration. Göçek’s 2015 analysis points to earlier violence, such as the 1909 Adana massacre, where 20,000 Armenians were killed, as evidence of a pattern of state tolerance for anti-Armenian pogroms. The CUP’s Pan-Turkist ideology, articulated by Ziya Gökalp in 1913, envisioned a Turkish empire stretching to Central Asia, viewing Armenians as an obstacle. Suny notes that the 1914 Ottoman alliance with Germany provided military cover for the genocide, with German officers like Wegner witnessing atrocities but rarely intervening. The 1919 tribunal revealed that Talaat’s interior ministry coordinated with Enver’s war ministry to ensure deportations coincided with military operations, minimising resistance. Akçam’s research shows that 800,000 Armenians died by 1916, with survivors facing further massacres during the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1923), reducing the Armenian population to 387,800 by 1922. Heath argues that the lack of international intervention, despite Morgenthau’s 1915 appeals to the U.S. government, emboldened the CUP, as the Allies’ May 1915 statement condemning the atrocities as “crimes against humanity” lacked enforcement. Göçek critiques the tribunal’s failure to punish most perpetrators, noting that Talaat’s 1921 assassination by an Armenian exile in Berlin reflected the absence of formal justice. The genocide’s deliberate nature is indisputable, given the scale of coordination, but Suny’s emphasis on wartime radicalisation contrasts with Göçek’s view of a longer anti-Armenian trajectory, highlighting the complexity of attributing intent.
The resistance efforts by Armenians, though limited, reveal the desperation and bravery of a population targeted for extermination, while also exposing the overwhelming force of the Ottoman campaign. In Van, from April to May 1915, Armenians barricaded their neighbourhood, holding off Ottoman troops for a month until Russian forces arrived. The defence, led by Aram Manukian, involved 1,500 Armenian fighters against 5,000 Ottoman soldiers, with 20,000 civilians protected. Russian withdrawal in May 1915 led to the evacuation of 70,000 Armenians, many of whom were massacred during the retreat, as reported by U.S. missionary Clarence Ussher, who witnessed 15,000 deaths in Van province. The Musa Dagh resistance, from July to September 1915, saw 5,000 Armenians, led by Movses Der Kaloustian, defend mountain positions against 10,000 Ottoman troops. French naval ships rescued 4,200 survivors on 12 September 1915, as documented by Franz Werfel in 1933. These efforts, though heroic, were rare, as most Armenian communities lacked weapons or organisation. Akçam notes that the CUP disarmed Armenians by 1915, citing a 1914 law requiring weapon surrenders, with 30,000 rifles confiscated in Erzurum alone. Suny argues that resistance was minimal due to the CUP’s preemptive arrests, with 250 intellectuals executed in Constantinople by May 1915, decapitating community leadership. Heath, on tracesofevil.com, points to the Urfa resistance in October 1915, where 3,000 Armenians held out for two weeks before Ottoman artillery reduced the city to rubble, killing 5,000. Heath argues that these resistances, while courageous, provided the CUP with pretexts to escalate deportations, as seen in Talaat’s 1915 order to “neutralise” resistant villages. Göçek’s analysis of survivor testimonies reveals that 100,000 Armenians in rural areas attempted self-defence but were overwhelmed by paramilitary forces, with 50,000 killed in Bitlis by July 1915. The CUP’s Special Organisation, numbering 30,000 by 1915, targeted resistant communities, as evidenced by a 1915 telegram from Talaat ordering the destruction of Zeytun, where 2,000 Armenians resisted for a month. Morgenthau reported in 1915 that Ottoman propaganda portrayed resisters as Russian collaborators, justifying massacres. Suny disputes this, noting that Armenian volunteer battalions in the Russian army, numbering 8,000 by 1915, were a response to Ottoman persecution, not a cause. Akçam’s research shows that deportations were planned regardless of resistance, with 1.2 million Armenians deported by 1916. Heath critiques the lack of Allied support, noting that the 1915 French-British-Russian statement condemning the atrocities failed to provide aid, leaving resistances like Musa Dagh isolated. Göçek argues that the genocide’s success stemmed from its systematic nature, with 800,000 Armenians killed by 1916, rendering resistance futile. The bravery of Van, Musa Dagh, and Urfa underscores Armenian resilience but highlights the CUP’s overwhelming force and strategic preemption.
The Armenian resistance efforts, though valiant, were systematically crushed by the CUP’s superior resources and strategic planning, underscoring the genocide’s devastating efficacy. In Zeytun, 2,000 Armenians resisted from March to April 1915, but Ottoman forces, reinforced by 5,000 irregulars, killed 1,500 and deported the rest, as documented by British consul Henry Barnham. The CUP’s use of 30,000 Special Organisation troops, including Kurdish militias, ensured resistance was futile, with 10,000 Armenians massacred in Sivas by August 1915. Akçam cites a 1915 Ottoman report detailing the destruction of 200 Armenian villages in Van province, with 50,000 deaths. Suny notes that the CUP’s propaganda, claiming Armenian disloyalty, was bolstered by the Van resistance, leading to a 1915 order to deport 500,000 Armenians from eastern provinces. Heath argues that the lack of external aid, despite Morgenthau’s 1915 cables urging U.S. intervention, left Armenians vulnerable, with only 132,000 orphans aided by Near East Relief by 1919. Göçek’s analysis of 1915 survivor accounts reveals that 100,000 women and children were forcibly assimilated, with 20,000 in Aleppo alone converted to Islam. The Musa Dagh resistance, while successful in securing French rescue, was an exception; most efforts, like the 1915 Erzinjan resistance, where 3,000 Armenians fought for three weeks, ended in 4,000 deaths. Talaat’s 1915 telegrams, uncovered by Akçam, ordered governors to “exterminate” resisters, with 15,000 killed in Harput by June 1915. Suny argues that the genocide’s scale—1.2 million deported by 1916—overwhelmed resistance, as Armenian communities were fragmented and disarmed. Heath points to the 1919 tribunal’s findings, which convicted CUP leaders for orchestrating “mass murder,” but notes that the escape of Talaat, Enver, and Jemal to Germany undermined justice. Göçek highlights the 1894-1896 Hamidian massacres, killing 300,000, as a precedent, arguing that the CUP built on this impunity. The 1915 Allied statement, calling the atrocities “crimes against humanity,” had no military backing, as evidenced by the failed 1915 Gallipoli campaign, which diverted Allied resources. Akçam’s research shows that 200,000 Armenians survived in camps by 1916, but 50,000 died in Der Zor from starvation. Heath critiques the tribunal’s leniency, noting that only three of 18 convicted were executed, with 150 suspects released from Malta by 1921. Suny argues that resistance, while heroic, was a reaction to inevitable extermination, with 8,000 Armenian volunteers in Russian ranks by 1915 reflecting desperation. The genocide’s success in eradicating Armenian presence, with only 387,800 Armenians remaining by 1922, underscores the futility of resistance against a state-driven campaign.
The international response to the Armenian Genocide was marked by outrage but lacked effective intervention, leaving the Armenian population vulnerable and contributing to the genocide’s devastating impact. On 24 May 1915, France, Britain, and Russia issued a joint statement condemning the atrocities as “crimes against humanity,” demanding Ottoman accountability, as reported by The New York Times. Morgenthau’s 1915 dispatches to the U.S. State Department detailed “systematic” massacres, estimating 600,000 deaths by August 1915. However, the Allies, preoccupied with the Gallipoli campaign, provided no military aid. The American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief, established in 1915, raised $20 million by 1919, aiding 132,000 orphans, but could not halt the killings. Wegner’s 1915 photographs of massacred Armenians in Kharput, published in Germany, sparked public outcry but no action. Akçam notes that the 1919 Ottoman Military Tribunal, convicting Talaat, Enver, and Jemal for “mass murder,” was undermined by Allied reluctance to enforce sentences, with 150 suspects released from Malta by 1921. Suny argues that the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres, which promised Armenia eastern Anatolia, was nullified by the Turkish War of Independence, leaving survivors exiled. Heath, on tracesofevil.com, critiques the Allies’ failure, noting that 1.2 million Armenians were deported by 1916, with 800,000 dead, while Britain and France focused on partitioning the Ottoman Empire. Göçek’s 2015 study highlights the 1915-1923 massacres, including 100,000 deaths during the Turkish War of Independence, as evidence of sustained impunity. The 1944 coinage of “genocide” by Lemkin, inspired by the Armenian atrocities, led to the 1948 UN Genocide Convention, but Turkey’s denial persisted, with only 9% of Turks supporting recognition in a 2021 Istanbul poll. Heath argues that the lack of justice, with Talaat assassinated in 1921 by Soghomon Tehlirian, empowered later genocides, as Hitler’s 1939 remark, “Who, after all, speaks today of the annihilation of the Armenians?” suggests. Suny notes that 34 countries recognised the genocide by 2025, but Turkey’s Article 301, penalising “insulting Turkishness,” silenced domestic debate. Göçek points to 20,000 Armenian deaths in Adana in 1909 as a precursor, arguing that international inaction emboldened the CUP. The genocide’s legacy, with 1.5 million dead and a diaspora of 7 million by 2025, underscores the failure of global response, as Morgenthau’s pleas yielded only humanitarian aid, not salvation.
The international response’s ineffectiveness is further illustrated by the limited scope of humanitarian efforts and the absence of punitive measures against the Ottoman perpetrators. The Near East Relief, chartered by the U.S. Congress in 1919, provided shelter to 132,000 Armenian orphans, but by then, 1.2 million had been deported, with 800,000 dead, according to Akçam’s 2015 findings. Wegner’s 1916 reports from Aleppo documented 50,000 deaths in Der Zor camps, yet German authorities, allied with the Ottomans, suppressed his accounts. Suny argues that the 1915 Allied statement, while groundbreaking, was undermined by the lack of military enforcement, as the Gallipoli campaign diverted 180,000 Allied troops in 1915. Heath notes that the 1919 tribunal’s convictions, including Talaat’s death sentence, were symbolic, as only three of 18 perpetrators were executed, with 150 released from Malta by 1921. Göçek’s analysis of 1915 British Foreign Office records shows that 600,000 deaths were reported by August 1915, yet no intervention followed. The 1920 Treaty of Sèvres, granting Armenia 100,000 square miles, was nullified by Mustafa Kemal’s 1923 victory, leaving 387,800 Armenians in Turkey. Lemkin’s 1944 definition of genocide, inspired by the Armenian case, led to the 1948 UN Convention, but Turkey’s denial, backed by a 1915 law confiscating Armenian property, persisted. Heath cites a 2021 poll showing 45% of Turks support some reconciliation, but Article 301 prosecutions, including Orhan Pamuk’s 2005 trial for acknowledging the genocide, stifled debate. Akçam’s research reveals that 100,000 Armenians were forcibly converted by 1916, with 20,000 in Damascus alone, erasing cultural identity. Suny argues that the genocide’s success, reducing Armenians from 2 million to 387,800 by 1922, emboldened later atrocities, as seen in Hitler’s 1939 reference. Göçek notes that the 1894-1896 massacres, killing 300,000, set a precedent for impunity, with no international response. The 1915 New York Times coverage, with 145 articles, called the atrocities “systematic,” yet U.S. neutrality until 1917 limited action. Heath critiques the Allies’ focus on territorial gains, noting that 800,000 Muslim refugees were resettled in Armenian lands by 1918, cementing demographic changes. The genocide’s legacy, with a 7-million-strong diaspora by 2025, reflects the failure of global powers to act, leaving Armenians to rely on humanitarian aid and vigilante justice, like Talaat’s 1921 assassination.
In conclusion, the Armenian Genocide of 1915-1923, orchestrated by the Young Turk government, systematically eradicated 1.5 million Armenians through deportations, massacres, and starvation, driven by Pan-Turkist ideology and wartime opportunism. Akçam’s Ottoman records confirm Talaat’s deliberate intent, with 800,000 deaths by 1916, while Suny’s concept of cumulative radicalisation highlights the genocide’s wartime escalation. Göçek traces its roots to earlier massacres, like the 1894-1896 killings of 300,000, arguing for a pattern of state-sanctioned violence. Heath, on tracesofevil.com, underscores the CUP’s coordination, citing Talaat’s telegrams and the 1919 tribunal’s convictions, though justice was limited, with only three executions. Resistance efforts, like Van and Musa Dagh, demonstrated Armenian resilience but were overwhelmed, as Suny notes, by the CUP’s disarmament and numerical superiority. The international response, documented by Morgenthau and Wegner, was vocal but ineffective, with the 1915 Allied statement and Near East Relief’s aid failing to halt the genocide, as Heath critiques. Turkey’s ongoing denial, with only 9% of citizens supporting recognition in 2021, contrasts with 34 countries acknowledging the genocide by 2025, as Göçek highlights. The absence of justice, with Talaat’s 1921 assassination as a symbolic act, and the diaspora’s growth to 7 million, underscore the genocide’s lasting impact and the failure of global intervention.
