The Most Dangerous Enemy: A History Of The Battle Of Britain, Stephen Bungay
A limitation of content is that the book is focused on the Battle of Britain as a whole and therefore only passes over the RDF system. A limitation of the purpose is that Stephen Bungay is subjective in his introduction demonstrating a strong stance against the German efforts, which may indicate bias. For instance Bungay states “Our boys (RAF) were braver and better still” suggesting a nationalistic British viewpoint. Lastly, a limitation of the origin is that it does not incorporate the insight and feelings of someone who actually experienced the battle.
The origin of the source is valuable as it is written by military historian Correlli Barnett, who has written a book in which he examines the Battle of Britain in the context of WWII. Moreover, the article was published in The Independent, therefore it is bolstered by the reputation of an international newspaper. A value in content is that Correlli uses vital quotes. For example, the Chief of Staff concluded that "the crux of the matter is air superiority" revealing what critical officials thought of the situation. Barnett also effectively analyses the role of RDF in the battle. As a military historian Barnett’s purpose is to present accurate information about the Battle of Britain and to analyse factors that lead to British victory.
However, the origin of the source is a limitation because it is a newspaper and has to go through far less fact-checking compared to an academic book. A limitation of the content is that newspapers typically do not cite sources for claims they make, forcing the reader to believe the statistics provided by Barnett. A limitation of the purpose is that the article was published in a British newspaper on the Battle of Britain day suggesting that it is not as nuanced as it could be, and is triumphant as that is a day for celebrating victory.
Section B
RDF was highly effective as it allowed the RAF to estimate four things: the range, bearing, strength and height of hostile squadrons (Bungay 61-62). The system worked through the RDF masts which would calculate the position, rough height and raid size and pass data on to filter rooms. Information was then passed on to command operation rooms and then to six group operations rooms where the Air Officer Commanding would assign units from different sector operation rooms to intercept incoming raids (Notes on the Air Defence of Great Britain). After being detected, it took 6 minutes 55 for planes in "readiness" to take off (Notes on the Air Defence of Great Britain - Appendix B). Eventually the system was so effective that Fighter Command was aware of the position of German Planes when they departed from their airfields in western Europe (Shirer 250). This was crucial as fighter command could intercept hostile squadrons before reaching the mainland. Furthermore, the bearing (direction of flight) was given, allowing fighter command to vector intercepting squadrons closest to the path of the incoming hostile planes (saving fuel and engine hours). The strength of the raid was also indicated, this was vital as fighter command would only send the necessary amount of squadrons to intercept the raid. And lastly the height was estimated, this was crucial because it allowed fighter command to forecast the movement of hostile aircraft making interception much more feasible, through which radar became an invaluable asset (Taylor 137). The effectiveness of the RDF is substantiated by the Luftwaffe’s loss of bombers during the phase 1 battle, with the RAF destroying 40 stuka dive bombers (12% of the total force) and another 127 twin engine bombers (10% of the total force) (Dildy 34). The use of radar improved so that during the Blitz in March 1941, 39 Luftwaffe planes were downed, 87 in April and in May 128 planes, showing a steady increase (Cross et al. 63). Therefore, according to the triumphant perspective of Barnett, the Luftwaffe continuously found Spitfires and Hurricanes ready for combat at the right place and at the right time (Barnett). But RDF was not continuously accurate at the beginning of the battle, and fraught with problems until July 1940 (Cumming 689). But when the battle began on July 10 1940, RDF allowed RAF to track Luftwaffe squadrons and down 11 Luftwaffe planes, and distract German bombers so that only 1/150 bombs hit their target, revealing that RDF was actually working effectively in July. These points show how RDF helped to effectively and destroy hostile plane squadrons, and maintain air superiority which won the Battle of Britain.
In conclusion, RDF gave the Royal Air Force several advantages, such as the ability to track and predict Luftwaffe squadrons directions, bearings, strength and height, allowing earlier interceptions resulting in less damage to the British mainland. Moreover, it allowed the RAF to conserve critical resources such as planes, pilots and fuel. The decision of the Luftwaffe to not destroy the RAF was the turning point of the battle, and therefore a necessary condition for victory. However the RDF was the main cause that allowed the RAF to intercept Luftwaffe squadrons long before reaching British mainland, therefore securing victory.
Another issue raised by this study is for historians to decide between informing and persuading. In this IA the goal was to effectively evaluate the significance of RDF in WWII, and evaluate its merits in comparison to German tactical errors. I tackled this issue by incorporating a range of sources in order to obtain a non biased picture of various perspectives, through which I could then argue for the merits of the RDF without becoming subjective as I knew how important Luftwaffe tactical errors were as well. Therefore, historians must not start with a hypothesis and work towards confirming it, but should be guided by evidence towards the most accurate argument.
This leads to the next issue, which is the challenge a historian faces with bias in source selection. I solved the underlying problem by first analysing and evaluating sources from an English perspective and sources from a German perspective. For instance I looked at the Imperial war Museum, but also conducted research on the German News Media site ZDF and read up on the German perspective on the battle. Therefore, since I used sources from different perspectives I did not just pick the arguments and evidence to prove RDF won the battle. It can be concluded from this that historians need to evaluate their own paradigms when picking sources, in order to avoid confirmation bias. Language may be a barrier for historians as for instance someone not capable of reading German may not be able to access German sources, and may therefore be more likely to confirm the prevailing view of their native language.
Word Count: 2200
Bibliography:
Barnett, Correlli. “V for Victory: The day the battle of Britain was won.” Independent. Sep. 12 2010, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/v-for-victory-the-day-the-battle-of-britain-was-won-2077139.html. Accessed 19 Jul. 2020
Bungay, Stephen. The Most Dangerous Enemy: A History Of The Battle Of Britain. Aurum Press Ltd; reissue Edition, 2010.
Clapson, Mark. “European Cities Under the Bomb: Nazi and Allied Bombing Campaigns, 1939–45.” The Blitz Companion: Aerial Warfare, Civilians and the City since 1911, vol. 1, 2019, pp. 77–96. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvggx2r2.10. Accessed 21 Oct. 2020.
Cumming, Anthony J. “Did Radar Win the Battle of Britain?” The Historian, vol. 69, no. 4, 2007, pp. 688–705. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/24453576. Accessed 17 Jul. 2020.
DeGering, Randall. The RAF’s Fighter Control System. Air University Press, 2018, pp. 43, “Radar Contact!”: The Beginnings of Army Air Forces Radar and Fighter Control, www.jstor.org/stable/resrep19549.9. Accessed 15 Sep. 2020.
Dildy, Douglas C. “The Air Battle for England: The Truth Behind the Failure of the Luftwaffe's Counter-Air Campaign in 1940.” Air Power History, vol. 63, no. 2, 2016, pp. 27–40. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/26276742. Accessed 10 Sep. 2020.
Gropman, Alan L. “The Battle Of Britain And The Principles Of War.” Aerospace Historian, vol. 18, no. 3, 1971, pp. 138–144. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/44522510. Accessed 16 Nov. 2020.
Harrison, Mark. “Resource Mobilization for World War II: The U.S.A., U.K., U.S.S.R., and Germany, 1938-1945.” The Economic History Review, vol. 41, no. 2, 1988, pp. 171–192. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/2596054. Accessed 16 Nov. 2020.
Levine, Joshua. “Greatest Events of WWII in Colour.” ZDF.enterprises. 2019, https://zdf-enterprises.de/en/catalogue/international/zdfeunscripted/history-biographies/greatest-events-of-world-war-two-in-colour/battle-of-britain-eps-2. Accessed 12 Jul. 2020
Records of the Navy Board and the Board of Admiralty. Notes on the Air Defence of Great Britain (TNA, ADM199/64). London: undated. Web. Accessed 20 Sep. 2020
Records of the Navy Board and the Board of Admiralty. Notes on the Air Defence of Great Britain - Appendix B (TNA, ADM199/64). London: undated. Web. Accessed 22 Sep. 2020
Shirer, William. The Rise And Fall Of The Third Reich. Simon & Schuster Paperbacks; reissue Edition, 2011.
Taylor, A.J.P. The Second World War and its Aftermath. Folio Society, 1998.
Willmott, H.P., et al. World War II. Dorling Kindersley Limited, 2010.
Wood, Derek and Derek Dempster. The Narrow Margin: The Battle of Britain & the Rise of Air Power. Pen & Sword Aviation, 2010.
Zabecki, David, editor. World War II In Europe An Encyclopedia. Garland Publishing, Inc., 1999
“8 Important Dates In The Battle Of Britain.” Imperial War Museum. https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/8-important-dates-in-the-battle-of-britain. Accessed 24 Sep. 2020
Section A
This
investigation will explore the question: To what extent was the Polish
Squadron 303 influential in the defeat of the Nazis in the Battle of
Britain?. One of the sources chosen to answer this question is an
educational video about Polish pilots who fought in the Battle of
Britain published by the Imperial War Museums on Youtube and the other
is a document about Polish pilots written by Marek Rogusz and published
on a website about Polish history from 1918 to 1989 commissioned and
approved by the Polish government.
Source I: Imperial War Museum and Craig Murray, dirs. 2020. The Polish Pilots of the Battle of Britain
The
video was created to raise awareness of the importance of the role
Polish pilots played in the Battle of Britain, which directly
corresponds to the topic I’m exploring in this essay. This is incredibly
useful as the source is focused on the topic and therefore provides
detailed information. The value of the source is also high as it was
released by the Imperial War Museums and the topic was explained by
their curator (Murray, Craig ) who is a specialist in the history of the
Royal Air Force. This shows that the information provided is reliable
as it had to be extensively monitored and fact-checked before being
approved for publication. The video was created by specialists with
extensive knowledge on the topic. The source uses anecdotal evidence,
numbers and a quote to present the impact of Squadrons 302 and 303. This
kind of mixed data is very valuable as it provides unbiased
information. On the other hand, the use of numbers and statistics isn’t
fully useful as no comparative information is presented. This makes it
difficult to realize the scale of squadron 303’s impact.
Source
II: Institute of National Remembrance and Marek Rogusz. 2015. “That"
Polish Squadron,” Additional article meant to help explore Squadron 303
and its role on IPN's page about Poles in Britain during WW2 in WW2.
From Independence to Independence
This source was written by the
vice president of the Polish Historical Aircraft Foundation and
aeronautical engineer, Marek Rogusz. It was published as an attachment
to an article about the Polish government and military in France and
Great Britain in the years 1939-41 on the Institute of National
Remembrance-funded website dedicated to explaining the history of Poland
in the years 1918-1989. The value of the source is further increased by
its detail, extensiveness and reliability. It is the result of the work
of a specialist commissioned by the British government to focus on the
efficiency of Squadron 303. It is crucial to consider the cultural
context of the origins of the source, though. Seeing as Marek Rogusz is
not a historian, but an engineer and an enthusiast of the Polish
Airforce and the Institute of National Remembrance focuses on
cultivating pride and
legend from Polish history, the
credibility of the source is called into question. This is because in
the pursuit of creating a more captivating story about the pilots, the
actual history behind them might have been slightly altered as it only
served as a supplementary article to an educational board game, meaning
the stories might have been sensationalized for the sake of
entertainment. Although it is highly unlikely that the information
provided is false, there is a chance that it may have been slightly
biased in order to glorify the Polish pilots that fought in WWII to
compensate for the feeling of injustice about how Poles were treated
during and after the war.
Section B-Investigation
To
understand how meaningful the success of Squadron 303 is to Poland, it
is crucial to consider the way the country had been treated throughout
and after the end of the second world war. WW2 is marked with betrayal
in Polish history. Starting with the invasion of Poland on the 1st of
September in 1939, when Poles were expecting British and French support
in vain to the Yalta Conference in 1945 in which the UK dealt with the
Polish question by no longer supporting the existing Polish government
in exile in London and instead allowing the Lublin Committee supported
by the Soviet Union to take control of Poland, establishing a communist,
authoritarian regime for 42 years1. This elicited feelings of betrayal
and abandonment by the United Kingdom in Poland due to the former’s
guarantee to protect Poland before it was invaded by the Third Reich 2 .
However,
Britain’s perspective was quite different. At the time, the UK was
actually praising Poland, especially the Polish pilots that fled there
to help the war effort away from home. The men that received the most
recognition and appreciation belonged to Squadron 303, famous for its
help in the Battle of Britain3. They were praised for their bravery and
ingenuity, which affected the stakes of the battle as well as the
morale4. This investigation will explore the reality of Squadron 303’s
impact on the outcome of the Battle of Britain.
First, it is
important to understand the context and importance of British
independence in the second world war.As the last undefeated Allied power
in Europe, Great Britain was Germany’s next target to secure victory in
WWII in 1940. Hitler planned to quickly dominate the skies over England
to be able to sail over to Britain and perform the operation Seelöwe,
the success of which would force Britain to capitulate 2. The key to
this operation was swiftly crushing the Royal Air Force so that the navy
transporting the soldiers to English shores wouldn’t be attacked from
above. Although it was generally expected by the German officers for
Britain to give up quickly early on in the fight, the Nazis were met
with a strong retaliation, thus starting the Battle of Britain 2. The
Battle of Britain is often remembered as one of the greatest Allied
victories in WWII, and the bravery of the pilots fighting to protect
Britain was even acknowledged by Winston Churchill when he paid tribute
to them, saying that “never in the field of human conflict has so much
been owed by so many to so few”.5 This brings up the question of exactly
how much the squadron was valued by the British.
Squadron 303’s
success in turning the odds of winning in Britain’s favour was not
limited to the number of their victories in the air. It’s imperative to
consider the positive effect that their “unsurpassed gallantry” had on
their colleagues and the British civilians.6 Although at first, the
British were doubtful about the Polish pilots’ skills mostly due to how
quickly Poland fell in September 1939 as well as successful Nazi
propaganda that played up Polish incompetence, they were quick to change
their minds upon witnessing them in action.7 Even when Polish pilots
were flying in the British squadrons waiting to be assigned to
independent Polish squadrons subordinate to the RAF, their fellow
British pilots were impressed by how skilled they were and requested
that they stay in their Squadrons.8 This boosted morale and enthusiasm
among all the pilots, making them more effective and daring in battle9.
Soon
enough, Squadron 303 was also recognized by the general public thanks
to their fighting prowess as well as their eagerness to engage with the
German fighters and bravery in the face of danger.10 An example of this
is the civilian-written report of a fight that was carried out above
Westerham, where sergeant Wojtowicz’s final battle was seen by the
townsfolk.11 The pilot emerged from over the clouds, with three enemy
planes on his tail6. Even though he was outnumbered, he chose to stay
and fight rather than retreat to safety and managed to shoot down two of
the planes before being defeated by the third pilot6. This represented
the spirit of the Polish pilots- even in the most hopeless of
situations, they met their odds head on and did their absolute best
until they couldn’t. This is one of the examples of how the civilians
came to recognize and were uplifted and reassured by Squadron 303’s
diligence and devotion. The Squadron became a recognizable enough symbol
for the London press and broadcasts, as well as other serious
institutions, to praise their efforts. The British Broadcasting
Corporation sent in a telegram with “warm greetings” and “lively
congratulations upon [the Squadron’s] magnificent record and best wishes
for the future”, promising to tell the world of its “gallant exploits'
'.12 Thanks to their nation-wide recognition, even King George VI
decided to pay them a visit, during which they were called to fight 50
German bombers, sharing his appreciation of their skill with their
superiors on the ground.13 All this shows that as Squadron 303 rose in
fame, more and more people looked up to the pilots and were inspired by
their effectiveness and dedication to the cause, becoming more hopeful
that Britain would actually be able to defend itself against Germany.
The
positive influence of squadron 303 is further supported by Sir Hugh
Dowding, the Commander-in-Chief of the Fighter Command. He said about
them:“Had it not been for the magnificent work of the Polish squadrons
[...] I hesitate to say that the outcome of battle would have been the
same”14. This appreciation could be explained by the pilots’ performance
during the Battle of Britain: as the highest-scoring squadron in the
Battle of Britain,they had a highly impressive record15. From the start
of its service, squadron 303 was very effective in their fights,
shooting down six enemy planes on their very first day.16 Of the 126
confirmed planes shot down in total, 13 more were likely shot down and 9
were damaged- that being the highest result of all the 71 squadrons in
Fighter Command 11. Another skill that made squadron 303 so successful
in the air was their ability to avoid being shot down. An example of
that was made on their very first day of active service, when they
managed to debut without any losses on their side13. This proves they
were highly skilled from the very start of their involvement in the
battle, also giving credit to their training in Poland. Overall, it is
not surprising, considering their skill and count of shot down planes,
that Squadron 303 ended up receiving such high praise from Sir Hugh
Dowding- their contribution to the war effort was certainly significant.
On
the other hand, while the success rate of squadron 303 undeniably had a
positive influence on Britain’s victory, in comparison to the overall
results of the Fighter Command their results turn out to be quite
underwhelming. While they did score the highest out of all the
squadrons, their contribution to the overall RAF count was only 4,7%17.
Although squadron 303 shot down the most planes out of the squadrons
involved, the shared score of all the squadrons in the Fighter Command
strongly overpowered it. This means that while the effort made by the
squadron in those 42 days was definitely impressive, it could not have
played a decisive role in the fight. Additionally, the reported numbers
of the shot planes is not entirely reliable- oftentimes pilots would
shoot the same plane, which then would be reported and counted
separately18. Squadron 303, as remarkable as it was, was only part of
the collective effort that defeated Germany in the Battle of Britain in
the end, and the results would have been probably the same had Squadron
303 not participated.
It is also important to consider that the
way the Polish pilots were organized to join the effort was
unnecessarily inefficient. The entrance the pilots into the war effort
was delayed due to the tedious bureaucratic process of creating an
independent squadron within the RAF, so they only ended up actively
serving for 42 days during the Battle of Britain- they joined two months
late instead of joining immediately19. The arrival of Polish pilots and
their demand to be allowed to fly with the RAF disturbed Britain’s
actions to counter the Nazi advance as time and resources had to be used
to control their integration into the Force. When the pilots first
arrived to the UK, they had to undergo training in the English language
as well as unlearn the metric system and adapt their style of flying due
to the differences between Polish and British aircraft20. Those
resources had to be dedicated to a foreign force rather than supporting
the already trained and English speaking British pilots21. Despite such
thorough preparation, there were times when the pilots couldn’t
understand orders and had to improvise in the air, lowering the
effectiveness of the whole formation.22
Nonetheless, it is important
to address the fact that Squadron 303 couldn’t have been the only one to
report more planes shot down than necessary, and even if, the RAF has
explicitly said that this should not in any way diminish their
contribution to Britain’s victory in the Battle. 23
In conclusion,
the contribution of Squadron 303 to the triumph over the Nazis in the
Battle of Britain is certainly notable. However, having reviewed the
statistics of the battle, it is clear that the sources that dub them the
sole heroes of the Battle of Britain, such as Jerzy Cynk’s The Polish
Air Force At War seem to play up their importance- squadron 303 was
hardly decisive in the defense against Nazis. It is easy to understand
that Poles, feeling betrayed and abandoned by the West, would over
exaggerate the success of squadron 303- after all, it was one of the
very few events in WW2 they could be truly proud of, and with the shadow
of the Soviet Union taking control of the country, national pride and
comfort had to be found in half-truths about the glory days of squadron
303. Even so, it had the highest record among the RAF Squadrons and
while it might not have been enough to be a deciding factor in the
victory, that combined with the hope they provided to the civilians and
cheerful attitude they shared with the other Fighter Command pilots was
enough to make them very impactful. It also should be noted that
squadron 303’s unreliability when reporting the amount of planes shot
down was not exclusive to them. All of the pilots sometimes happened to
take down a target without knowing that they had had help from another
pilot24. This is also addressed by the RAF, who have stated that the
fact that squadron 303 may have shot down fewer planes in reality does
not diminish their contribution to the Battle of Britain25. It was
squadron 303 in addition to everything else that helped defend Britain
from Nazi victory, although they certainly weren’t the singular or the
main reason for the defeat of the Nazis in the Battle of Britain.
Section C
Having
grown up in Poland, I have witnessed the almost cult adoration
surrounding squadron 303, where they are featured as heroes vital to
defeating Germany in the Battle of Britain in textbooks, fictional
books, board games and movies like Squadron 303 directed by Denis Delic.
Doubtlessly, the pride my fellow Poles feel towards the squadron has
rubbed off on me, and thus I went into this investigation wanting very
badly to prove that squadron 303 was pivotal to the Battle of Britain.
Bearing in mind all the failures Poland has faced throughout History, I
felt compelled to find the good impact left by my people, not even for
Poland but for Europe. My goal was to justify my national pride and find
at least one time when Poles were the winners.
This already shows a
struggle historians have to face when investigating a topic they have a
personal interest in- overcoming bias. It’s a challenge to remain
objective when the evidence found doesn’t support your preferred version
of history, but that’s the responsibility a person takes on when
committing to a historical investigation.
Furthermore, hard evidence
was scarce in my investigation. It was easier to access accounts of
fights or general retellings of the pilots’ stories rather than
statistics- numbers of planes shot down in each squadron, rate of
success, efficiency, overall contribution to the effort. As mentioned in
the footnotes above, I have had to seek out individual numbers
regarding the scores of the 303rd squadron and of the Fighter Command
overall. Then I had to decide how to measure their success and compare
it to the overall score and having decided on a percentage, I had to
calculate one individually. Furthermore, it’s important to consider that
even the statistics I used for my calculations might not be entirely
reliable as oftentimes pilots would often claim the same kill, which
would then be counted as two. Not only does this reduce the credibility
of the result as I am not a trained mathematician nor was this
calculation monitored by anyone, which means it carries the possibility
of human error, this shows the lack of sufficient evidence.
Additionally,
it was easier to find sources supporting the idea of squadron 303 as
the sole hero of the Battle of Britain than to find ones debunking it,
so I struggled to balance the essay as one side of the argument had more
evidence to support than the other. To find a variety of sources I
have had to contact museums and organizations like the Polish Air Force
memorial in London or the Polish Air Force Museum in Dęblin.
Fortunately, I heard back from Dr Roman Kozłowski who shared with me
documents like Wacław Król’s The Polish Air Force in Britain or Jerzy
Cynk’s The Polish Force At War. While many historical sources, including
these two, are tainted by bias, this granted me access to statistics
and accounts of events that aren’t usually available to the public.
Unfortunately, the Polish Air Force Memorial couldn’t provide me with
academic resources produced by the British, leaving me mostly with
Polish-sourced recounts of the British perspective. This shows that
historians might have limited access when carrying out their research,
and have to make extra effort to access private sources and sometimes
rely on less than they think is sufficient to support their arguments.
Overall,
this investigation was a highly informative exploration of a
historian’s experience. I have learned that there are so many factors
that need to be taken into account- having a range of sources, making
sure those sources are reliable and keeping your own bias in check to
introduce a fair and objective argument. It is a whole ordeal and thus a
good historical investigation has incredible value.
Bibliography
1. Cynk, Jerzy B. 1998. The Polish Air Force At War: 1939-1943. Vol. I. Warsaw: L&L.
2.
Historic UK and Joss Meakins. n.d. “Polish Pilots and the Battle of
Britain.” Historic UK.
https://www.historic-uk.com/HistoryUK/HistoryofBritain/Polish-Pilots-the-Battle-of-Britai
n/#:~:text=In%20just%2042%20days%20303,who%20scored%2017%20downed%20
planes.
3. Hughes, Thomas A., and John G. Royde-Smith. 1998. “World
War II - Yalta.” Britannica.
https://www.britannica.com/event/World-War-II/Yalta#ref512234.
4.
Imperial War Museum and Mariusz Gasior. 2020. “The Polish Pilots Who
Flew in the Battle of Britain.” Imperial War Museum.
https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/the-polish-pilots-who-flew-in-the-battle-of-britain.
5. Imperial War Museum and Craig Murray, dirs. 2020. The Polish Pilots of the Battle of Britain.
https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/the-polish-pilots-who-flew-in-the-battle-of-britain.
6. Institute of National Remembrance. 2015. “"That" Polish Squadron,” Additional article
meant
to help explore Squadron 303 and its role on IPN's page about Poles in
Britain during WW2 in WW2. From Independence to Independence. History of
Poland 1918-1989. https://www.polska1918-89.pl/index.html.
7. Król, Wacław. 1976. The Polish Air Force in Britain . Warsaw: Publishing House of the Ministry of National Defense.
8.
Royal Air Force Museum. n.d. “303 Squadron.” RAF Museum. Accessed
December 1, 2021.
https://www.rafmuseum.org.uk/research/online-exhibitions/the-polish-air-force-in-world-
war-2/303-squadron/.
9. UK Parliament. n.d. “'Never in the field of
human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few.'” UK Parliament.
https://www.parliament.uk/about/living-heritage/transformingsociety/private-lives/yourco
untry/collections/churchillexhibition/churchill-the-orator/human-conflict/.
