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"This book seeks to explain the war which began on 3 September 1939. It does not attempt to answer the questions: why did Hitler invade Soviet Russia? why did Japan attack Pearl Harbour? or why did Hitler and Mussolini then declare war on the United States? It is directed solely to the question: why did Great Britain and France declare war on Germany?" (Page 2)
"American policy had very little to do with the British and French declaration of war on Germany. Perhaps it would be truer to say that what it had to do with their declarations of war was of a negative kind, like the significant episode of the dog in the night-time. The dog did not bark. This was the most important thing it did, or failed to do, in European affairs." (Page 3)
"The German problem, as it existed between the wars, was largely the creation of American policy. The first World war would obviously have had a different end if it had not been for American intervention: the Allies, to put it bluntly, would not have won. Equally, the victory over Germany would have had a different character if the United States had been an Allied, not an Associated, Power." (Page 3)
"The recovery of Germany was America’s doing. It was welcomed by most people in Great Britain and even by a certain number in France. It would have happened, to a lesser extent, in any case. Nevertheless, American policy was a powerful obstacle against any attempt to retard the recovery of Germany and a considerable assistance to those who promoted it." (Page 4)
"What indeed—a thought which occurred to many Englishmen also—can you do with Germany except make her the strongest Power in Europe? Still, the process might have taken longer if Americans had not been so insistent that Germany was the main pillar of European peace and civilisation." (Page 4)
"Roosevelt retreated, explaining that he had meant nothing in particular. Soon afterwards he renewed his attempt at education. His proposal for a world conference to consider the grievances of the dissatisfied Powers was made in the hope of demonstrating to Americans the mounting dangers throughout the world; but it contained no prospect that the United States would actively support the Powers who were trying to maintain some sort of peaceful order in the world." (Page 7)
"The general moral of this book, so far as it has one, is that Great Britain and France dithered between resistance and appeasement, and so helped to make war more likely. American policy did much the same. A resolute continuance of isolationism might well have choked Great Britain and France off from war altogether; a resolute backing of them, based on rearmament launched long before, might well have choked off Hitler." (Page 8)
"But I do not believe that a historian should either excuse or condemn. His duty is to explain. I have tried to explain how Hitler succeeded as much as he did and why the British and French governments finally declared war on Germany." (Page 9)
"Historians often dislike what happened or wish that it had happened differently. There is nothing they can do about it. They have to state the truth as they see it without worrying whether this shocks or confirms existing prejudices." (Page 10)
"I do not come to history as a judge; and that when I speak of morality I refer to the moral feelings at the time I am writing about. I make no moral judgement of my own. Thus when I write that 'the peace of Versailles lacked moral validity from the start', I mean only that the Germans did not regard it as a 'fair' settlement and that many people in Allied countries, soon I think most people, agreed with them." (Page 10)
"As a matter of fact, there was no half way house: either three and a half million Germans in Czechoslovakia or none. The Czechs themselves recognised this by expelling the Germans after the second World war. It was not for me to endorse, or to condemn, Hitler’s claim; only to explain why it was so widely endorsed." (Page 10)
"A historian must not hesitate even if his books lend aid and comfort to the Queen’s enemies (though mine did not), or even to the common enemies of mankind. For my part, I would even record facts which told in favour of the British government if I found any to record." (Page 11)
"This book is not a contribution to 'revisionism' except in the lesser sense of suggesting that Hitler used different methods from those usually attributed to him. I have never seen any sense in the question of war guilt or war innocence. In a world of sovereign states, each does the best it can for its own interests; and can be criticised at most for mistakes, not for crimes." (Page 12)
"As a historian, I recognise that Powers will be Powers. My book has really little to do with Hitler. The vital question, it seems to me, concerns Great Britain and France. They were the victors of the first World war. They had the decision in their hands." (Page 12)
"Why did the victors not resist her? There are various answers: timidity; blindness; moral doubts; desire perhaps to turn German strength against Soviet Russia. But whatever the answers, this seems to me the important question, and my book revolves round it, though also of course round the other question: why did they resist in the end?" (Page 12)
"In the world of action; and here, I think, he exploited events far more than he followed precise coherent plans. The story of how he came to power in Germany seems to me relevant to his later behaviour in international affairs." (Page 14)
"There was no long-term plot; there was no seizure of power. Hitler had no idea how he would come to power; only a conviction that he would get there. Papen and a few other conservatives put Hitler into power by intrigue, in the belief that they had taken him prisoner." (Page 14)
"Hitler in power had once more no idea how he would pull Germany out of the Depression, only a determination to do it. Much of the recovery was natural, due to the general upturn in world conditions which was already beginning before Hitler gained power." (Page 15)
"German recovery was caused by the return of private consumption and nonwar types of investment to the prosperity levels of 1928 and 1929. Rearmament had little to do with it. Until the spring of 1936, 'rearmament was largely a myth'." (Page 15)
"The Nazis had nothing to do with the burning of the Reichstag. The young Dutchman, van der Lubbe, did it all alone, exactly as he claimed. Hitler and the other Nazis were taken by surprise. They genuinely believed that the Communists had started the fire; and they introduced the Exceptional Laws because they genuinely believed that they were threatened with a Communist rising." (Page 16)
"He expected an opportunity to turn up; and one did. Of course the Communists, too, had nothing to do with the burning of the Reichstag. But Hitler thought they had. He was able to exploit the Communist danger so effectively largely because he believed in it himself." (Page 16)
"He did not so much aim at war as expect it to happen, unless he could evade it by some ingenious trick, as he had evaded civil war at home. Those who have evil motives easily attribute them to others; and Hitler expected others to do what he would have done in their place." (Page 17)
"It is the job of general staffs to prepare for war. The directives which they receive from their governments indicate the possible war for which they are to prepare, and are no proof that the government concerned have resolved on it. All the British directives from 1935 onwards were pointed solely against Germany; Hitler’s were concerned only with making Germany stronger." (Page 17)
"People regard Hitler as wicked; and then find proofs of his wickedness in evidence which they would not use against others. Why do they apply this double standard? Only because they assume Hitler’s wickedness in the first place." (Page 17)
"It is dangerous to deduce political intentions from military plans. Some historians, for instance, have deduced from the Anglo-French military conversations before 1914 that the British government were set on war with Germany. Other, and in my opinion wiser, historians have denied that this deduction can be drawn. The plans they argue, were precautions, not 'blueprints for aggression'." (Page 18)
"Or maybe it shows that historians should be careful not to seize on an isolated clause in a document without reading further. This marvellous directive merely proves (if it proves anything) that Hitler was not interested at this time in war against France and Great Britain; and that Italy was not interested in war at all." (Page 18)
"To the Germans, the status quo was not peace, but a slave treaty. It all depends on the point of view. The victor Powers wanted to keep the fruits of victory with some modifications, though they did it ineffectively. The vanquished Power wanted to undo its defeat." (Page 19)
"All Germans, including Hitler, assumed that Germany would become the dominant Power in Europe once she had undone her defeat, whether this happened by war or otherwise; and this assumption was generally shared in other countries. The two ideas of 'liberation' and 'domination' merged into one." (Page 19)
"Total war is probably beyond the strength of any Great Power. Now even preparations for such a war threaten to ruin the Great Powers who attempt them. Nor is this new." (Page 20)
"Though the object of being a Great Power is to be able to fight a great war, the only way of remaining a Great Power is not to fight one, or to fight it on a limited scale. This was the secret of Great Britain’s greatness so long as she stuck to naval power and avoided the mass armies of the Continent." (Page 20)
"Far from wanting war, a general war was the last thing he wanted. He wanted the fruits of total victory without total war; and thanks to the stupidity of others he nearly got them. Other Powers thought that they were faced with the choice between total war and surrender." (Page 21)
"Until the spring of 1936 German rearmament was largely a myth. This does not mean merely that the preliminary stages of rearmament were not producing increased strength, as always happens. Even the preliminary stages were not being undertaken at all seriously. Hitler cheated foreign powers and the German people in exactly the opposite sense from that which is usually supposed." (Page 22)
"He, or rather Goering, announced: 'Guns before butter'. In fact, he put butter before guns. In 1936, according to Churchill, two independent estimates placed German rearmament expenditure at an annual rate of 12 thousand million marks. The actual figure was under 5 thousand million." (Page 22)
"Most important of all, Hitler did not make large war preparations simply because his 'concept of warfare did not require them'. Rather he planned to solve Germany’s living-space problem in piecemeal fashion—by a series of small wars. This is the conclusion at which I also arrived independently from study of the political record, though I suspect that Hitler hoped to get by without war at all." (Page 23)
"The one thing he did not plan was the great war, often attributed to him. There was no clear dividing line in his mind between political ingenuity and small wars, such as the attack on Poland." (Page 23)
"Pretending to prepare for a great war and not in fact doing it was an essential part of Hitler’s political strategy; and those who sounded the alarm against him, such as Churchill, unwittingly did his work for him. The device was new and took everyone in." (Page 24)
"How was it possible that a statesmen could exaggerate his armaments instead of concealing them? Yet this was what Hitler had done. On 24 March 1935 Sir John Simon and Anthony Eden visited Hitler. He told them that the German air force was already equal to that of Great Britain, if not indeed superior. He was at once believed, and has been believed ever since." (Page 24)
"In 1938-39, the last peacetime year, Germany spent on armament about 15% of her gross national product. The British proportion was almost exactly the same. German expenditure on armaments was actually cut down after Munich and remained at this lower level, so that British production of aeroplanes, for example, was way ahead of German by 1940." (Page 25)
"In each case Allied intelligence estimated German strength at more than twice the true figure. As usual, Hitler was thought to have planned and prepared for a great war. In fact, he won his first victories because he was better at bluffing than his opponents." (Page 25)
"Though Hitler won, he won by mistake—a mistake which he shared. Of course the Germans were confident that they could defeat Poland if they were left undisturbed in the west. Here Hitler’s political judgement that the French would do nothing proved more accurate than the apprehensions of the German generals." (Page 26)
"The conquest of France was an unforeseen bonus. Even after this Hitler did not prepare for a great war. He imagined that he could defeat Soviet Russia without serious effort as he had defeated France." (Page 26)
"Germany remained with 'a peacelike war economy'. Only the British bombing attacks on German cities stimulated Hitler and the Germans to take war seriously. German war production reached its height just when Allied bombing did: in July 1944." (Page 26)
"From first to last, ingenuity, not military strength, was Hitler’s secret of success. He was done for when military strength became decisive, as he had always known he would be." (Page 26)
"I feel justified in regarding political calculations as more important than mere strength in the period before the war. There was some change of emphasis in the summer of 1936. Then all the Powers, not merely Hitler, began to take war and preparations for war seriously into account." (Page 27)
"It shows how difficult it is to shake off legends even when trying to do so. I was taken in by the Hossbach Memorandum. Though I doubted whether it was as important as most writers made out, I still thought that it must have some importance for every writer to make so much of it. I was wrong." (Page 27)
"At the time, no one attached importance to the meeting. Hossbach left the staff soon afterwards. His manuscript was put in a file with other miscellaneous papers, and forgotten. In 1943 a German officer, Count Kirchbach, looked through the file, and copied the manuscript for the department of military history." (Page 28)
"Even at Nuremberg the Hossbach memorandum was not produced in order to prove Hitler’s war guilt. That was taken for granted. What it 'proved', in its final concocted form, was that those accused at Nuremberg—Goering, Raeder, and Neurath—had sat by and approved of Hitler’s aggressive plans." (Page 28)
"The memorandum, far from being an 'official record', is a very hot potato. It contains themes which Hitler also used in his public speeches: the need for Lebensraum, and his conviction that other countries would oppose the restoration of Germany as an independent Great Power. It contains no directives for action beyond a wish for increased armaments." (Page 28)
"Lebensraum always appeared as one element in these blueprints. This was not an original idea of Hitler’s. It was a commonplace of the time. Volk ohne Raum, for instance, by Hans Grimm sold much better than Mein Kampf when it was published in 1928." (Page 30)
"Hitler, far from transcending his respectable predecessors, was actually being more moderate than they when he sought only Lebensraum in the east and repudiated, in Mein Kampf, gains in the west. Hitler merely repeated the ordinary chatter of Rightwing circles." (Page 30)
"In my sense Hitler never had a plan for Lebensraum. There was no study of the resources in the territories that were to be conquered; no definition even of what these territories were to be. There was no recruitment of a staff to carry out these 'plans', no survey of Germans who could be moved, let alone any enrolment." (Page 31)
"The abstract speculator turned out to be also a statesman on the make who did not consider beforehand what he would make or how. Whatever his theories, he did not adhere in practice to the logical pattern of status quo in the west and gains in the east." (Page 32)
"He got as far as he did because others did not know what to do with him. I want to understand the 'appeasers', not to vindicate or to condemn them. Historians do a bad day’s work when they write the appeasers off as stupid or as cowards. They were men confronted with real problems, doing their best in the circumstances of their time." (Page 33)
"Can any sane man suppose, for instance, that other countries could have intervened by armed force in 1938 to overthrow Hitler when he had come to power by constitutional means and was apparently supported by a large majority of the German people?" (Page 33)
"Every newspaper in the country applauded the Munich settlement with the exception of Reynolds’ News. Yet so powerful are the legends that even when I write this sentence down I can hardly believe it." (Page 34)
"The British stand in September 1939 was no doubt heroic; but it was heroism mainly at the expense of others. The British people suffered comparatively little during six years of war. The Poles suffered catastrophe during the war, and did not regain their independence after it." (Page 34)
"I am more interested to discover why the things I wanted did not work out than in repeating the old denunciations; and if I am to condemn any mistakes, I prefer to condemn my own. However it is no part of a historian’s duty to say what ought to have been done. His sole duty is to find out what was done and why." (Page 36)
"Little can be discovered so long as we go on attributing everything that happened to Hitler. He supplied a powerful dynamic element, but it was fuel to an existing engine. He was in part the creation of Versailles, in part the creation of ideas that were common in contemporary Europe." (Page 36)
"He would have counted for nothing without the support and co-operation of the German people. It seems to be believed nowadays that Hitler did everything himself, even driving the trains and filling the gas chambers unaided. This was not so. Hitler was a sounding board for the German nation." (Page 36)
"In international affairs there was nothing wrong with Hitler except that he was a German. He aimed to make Germany the dominant Power in Europe and maybe, more remotely, in the world. Other Powers have pursued similar aims, and still do." (Page 36)
"The second World war has ceased to be 'today' and has become 'yesterday'. This makes new demands on historians. Contemporary history, in the strict sense, records events while they are still hot, judging them from the moment and assuming a ready sympathy in the reader." (Page 37)
"What happened afterwards was merely a muddied working-out of inevitable consequences, without lessons or significance for the present. If we understood why the war began, we should know how we got where we were—and of course how not to get there again." (Page 39)
"We already know the answers, and do not need to ask further questions. The leading authors to whom we turn for accounts of the origins of the second World war—Namier, Wheeler-Bennett, Wiskemann in English, Baumont in French— all published their books soon after the war ended; and all expressed views which they had held while the war was on, or even before it began." (Page 40)
"Maybe the second World war, unlike almost any other great event in history, had a simple and final explanation which was obvious to everyone at the time and which will never be changed by later information or research." (Page 41)
"Germany, as a Great Power, ceased to be the central problem in world affairs almost before the war was over. Soviet Russia took her place. Men wanted to know about the mistakes that had been made in dealing with Soviet Russia during the war, not about those made in dealing with Germany before it started." (Page 43)
"An explanation existed which satisfied everybody and seemed to exhaust all dispute. This explanation was: Hitler. He planned the second World war. His will alone caused it." (Page 44)
"With Hitler guilty, every other German could claim innocence. The blame for everything—the second World war, the concentration camps, the gas-chambers— could be loaded on to his uncomplaining shoulders." (Page 44)
"The lawyer aims to make a case; the historian wishes to understand a situation. The evidence which convinces lawyers often fails to satisfy us; our methods seem singularly imprecise to them. But even lawyers must now have qualms about the evidence at Nuremberg." (Page 46)
"In retrospect, though many were guilty, none was innocent. The purpose of political activity is to provide peace and prosperity; and in this every statesman failed, for whatever reason. This is a story without heroes; and perhaps even without villains." (Page 52)
"Germany fought specifically in the second war to reverse the verdict of the first and to destroy the settlement which followed it. Her opponents fought, though less consciously, to defend that settlement; and this they achieved—to their own surprise." (Page 53)
"The first war explains the second and, in fact, caused it, in so far as one event causes another." (Page 53)
"Russia fell out of Europe and ceased to exist, for the time being, as a Great Power. The constellation of Europe was profoundly changed—and to Germany’s advantage. Where there had formerly been a Great Power on her Eastern frontier, there was now a No Man’s land of small states and beyond it an obscurity of ignorance." (Page 55)
"In a longer perspective, the most important thing in the treaty is that it was concluded with a united Germany. Germany had only to secure a modification of the treaty, or to shake it off altogether; and she would emerge as strong, or almost as strong, as she had been." (Page 60)
"The immediate problem was German weakness; but given a few years of 'normal' life, it would again become the problem of German strength. More than this, the old balance of power, which formerly did something to restrain Germany, had broken down." (Page 61)
"The French and the Americans proposed that Danzig, a city inhabited by Germans though economically essential to Poland, should be incorporated in Poland. Lloyd George insisted that it become a Free City under a High Commissioner appointed by the League of Nations. In this odd way the German grievance which ostensibly produced the second World war was actually set up for Germany’s benefit." (Page 64)
"The Germans had this measureless advantage that they could undermine the system of security against them merely by doing nothing; by not paying reparations and by not disarming. They could behave as an independent country normally behaves." (Page 66)
"The peace of Versailles lacked moral validity from the start. It had to be enforced; it did not, as it were, enforce itself. This was obviously true in regard to the Germans. No German accepted the treaty as a fair settlement between equals 'without victors or vanquished'." (Page 67)
"The negotiations between Germany and the Allies became a competition in blackmail, sensational episodes in a gangster film. The Allies, or some of them, threatened to choke Germany to death; the Germans threatened to die. Neither side dared carry its threat to extremity." (Page 69)
"The United States were debarred both by geography and by political outlook from belonging to a European system of security; the most that could be expected from them was that they would intervene belatedly if this system of security failed." (Page 72)
"British sentiment swung back towards isolation as it had often done after a great war. It doubted whether the war had been worth while; became resentful of former allies, and friendly towards the former enemy." (Page 76)
"The price of British support was that France should renounce all interest east of the Rhine, and hence all standing as a European Great Power." (Page 77)
"Communism continued to haunt Europe as a spectre—a name men gave to their own fears and blunders. But the crusade against Communism was even more imaginary than the spectre of Communism." (Page 79)
"International affairs always run more easily without Russian participation, as everyone knows nowadays. The most practical reason for Russia’s exclusion was, however, a simple matter of geography. The cordon sanitaire did its work." (Page 80)
"French diplomacy and French strategy ran in clear contradiction. The Anglo-French entente and the Eastern alliances did not supplement each other; they cancelled out. France could act offensively, to aid Poland or Czechoslovakia, only with British support; but this support would be given only if she acted defensively." (Page 82)
"The history of Europe between the wars revolved round 'the German problem'. If this were settled, everything would be settled; if it remained unsolved, Europe would not know peace." (Page 84)
"Reparations counted as a symbol. They created resentment, suspicion, and international hostility. More than anything else, they cleared the way for the second World war." (Page 90)
"The cry of a hungry child was a cry against reparations. Old men stumbled into the grave because of reparations. The campaign against 'the slave-treaty' hardly needed the prompting of extremist agitators. Every touch of economic hardship stirred the Germans to shake off 'the shackles of Versailles'." (Page 93)
"The demonstration has been in vain; every textbook continues to attribute Germany’s difficulties to the treaty of Versailles. There could be no clearer demonstration that the economic difficulties of Germany between the wars were due to defects in her domestic policy, not to unjust frontiers." (Page 95)
"Stresemann was as determined as the most extreme nationalist to get rid of the whole treaty lock, stock, and barrel. But he intended to do this by the persistent pressure of events, not by threats, still less by war." (Page 101)
"MacDonald should be the patron-saint of every contemporary Western politician who favours co-operation with Germany. More than any other British statesman, MacDonald faced 'the German problem' and attempted to solve it." (Page 102)
"Locarno was the greatest triumph of 'appeasement'. Germany accepted the loss of Alsace and Lorraine; she agreed to keep the Rhineland demilitarised; Great Britain and Italy underwrote the German promise." (Page 107)
"Everything about Fascism was a fraud. The social peril from which it saved Italy was a fraud; the revolution by which it seized power was a fraud; the ability and policy of Mussolini were fraudulent. Fascist rule was corrupt, incompetent, empty; Mussolini himself a vain, blundering boaster without either ideas or aims." (Page 110)
"The statesmen no longer believed their own phrases; and the peoples followed their example. The presence of Fascist Italy at Geneva, the actual presence of Mussolini at Locarno, were the extreme symbols of unreality in the democratic Europe of the League of Nations." (Page 110)
"The divorce between French policy and French strategy was complete. French politicians still talked of acting against Germany; the means of action did not exist." (Page 114)
"International stability was first shaken by the collapse of economic stability in the great Depression which began in October 1929. The Depression had little to do with the preceding war." (Page 115)
"The Depression removed the strongest argument for doing nothing: prosperity. Men who are well off forget their grievances; in adversity they have nothing else to think about." (Page 116)
"Hitler was appointed Chancellor by President Hindenburg in a strictly constitutional way and for solidly democratic reasons. Whatever ingenious speculators, liberal or Marxist, might say, Hitler was not made Chancellor because he would help the German capitalists." (Page 125)
"In my opinion, statesmen are too absorbed by events to follow a preconceived plan. They take one step, and the next follows from it. The systems are created by historians, and the systems attributed to Hitler are really those of Hugh Trevor-Roper, Elizabeth Wiskemann, and Alan Bullock." (Page 126)
"His aim was change, the overthrow of the existing European order; his method was patience. Despite his bluster and violent talk, he was a master in the game of waiting. Like Joshua before the walls of Jericho, he preferred to wait until the forces opposing him had been sapped by their own confusions." (Page 130)
"The 'artificial' system of security was dead—striking proof that a system cannot be a substitute for action, but can only provide opportunities for it. Hitler had shaken off the restrictions on German armament in just over two years; and there had never been a moment when he had had to face real danger." (Page 152)
"The real death of the League was in December 1935, not in 1939 or 1945. One day it was a powerful body imposing sanctions, seemingly more effective than ever before; the next day it was an empty sham, everyone scuttling from it as quickly as possible. What killed the League was the publication of the Hoare-Laval plan." (Page 167)
"Hitler watched the conflict with sharp eyes, fearful that a triumphant League might next be used against Germany, yet eager to drive a wedge between Italy and her two former partners in the Stresa front." (Page 168)
"The reoccupation of the Rhineland did not affect France from the military point of view... Germany, by reoccupying the Rhineland, used up the priceless asset which had brought her so many advantages: the asset of being disarmed." (Page 175)
"Wars are much like road accidents. They have a general cause and particular causes at the same time. Every road accident is caused, in the last resort, by the invention of the internal combustion engine and by men’s desire to get from one place to another." (Page 177)
"Lebensraum, in short, did not drive Germany to war. Rather war, or a warlike policy, produced the demand for Lebensraum. Hitler and Mussolini were not driven on by economic motives. Like most statesmen, they had an appetite for success." (Page 182)
"The effect of Fascism was seen in public morality, not in economics. It permanently debased the spirit of international affairs. Hitler and Mussolini boasted of their freedom from accepted standards. They made promises without any intention of keeping them." (Page 183)
"Post-war ended when Germany reoccupied the Rhineland on 7 March 1936; pre-war began when she annexed Austria on 18 March 1938. The accepted answer is clear: it was Hitler. The moment of his doing so is also accepted: it was on 5 November 1937. We have a record of the statements which he made that day. It is called 'the Hossbach memorandum'." (Page 218)
"Neville Chamberlain is an obvious candidate for this position. From the moment that he became prime minister in May 1937, he was determined to start something. Of course he resolved on action in order to prevent war, not to bring it on; but he did not believe that war could be prevented by doing nothing." (Page 224)
"Papen, not Hitler, started the ball rolling in Austria; and he did so for casual motives of personal prestige. No doubt chance provided that he should give the decisive push; yet it was strangely appropriate that the man who had frivolously brought Hitler to power in Germany should also be the one who started Germany’s advance towards European domination." (Page 234)
"The belief soon became established that Hitler’s seizure of Austria was a deliberate plot, devised long in advance, and the first step towards the domination of Europe. This belief was a myth. The crisis of March 1938 was provoked by Schuschnigg, not by Hitler. There had been no German preparations, military or diplomatic. Everything was improvised in a couple of days." (Page 245)
"The three million Germans in Czechoslovakia were in a state of ungovernable excitement. Hitler did not create this movement. It was waiting for him, ready—indeed eager—to be used. Even more than in the case of Austria, Hitler did not need to act. Others would do his work for him." (Page 248)
"By seeking to avert a crisis, the British brought it on. The Czechoslovak problem was not of British making; the Czech crisis of 1938 was." (Page 252)
"The British were trapped. Chamberlain’s policy rested on the dogma that Hitler was acting in good faith; he could not repudiate this dogma without accepting Daladier’s arguments in favour of resistance. In this casual way, the British government, which had steadily refused to extend their commitments east of the Rhine, now underwrote Czechoslovakia when she was weak." (Page 286)
"Benes turned despairingly to the Soviet ambassador. 'Czechoslovakia is confronted with the choice either of beginning war with Germany, having against her Britain and France... or capitulating to the aggressor'. Before the Soviet government could debate the question, another telegram informed them: 'the Czechoslovak Government has already decided to accept all the conditions'." (Page 300)
"Munich was a triumph for British policy, which had worked precisely to this end; not a triumph for Hitler, who had started with no such clear intention. It was a triumph for all that was best and most enlightened in British life; a triumph for those who had preached equal justice between peoples." (Page 306)
"Hitler took the decisive step in his career when he occupied Prague. He did it without design; it brought him slight advantage. He acted only when events had already destroyed the settlement of Munich. But everyone believed that he had deliberately destroyed it himself." (Page 328)
"The occupation of Prague did not represent anything new in Hitler’s policy or behaviour. President Hacha had succumbed more easily and more willingly than either Schuschnigg or Benes. Yet British opinion was stirred as it had not been by the absorption of Austria or the capitulation at Munich." (Page 331)
"Beck accepted it 'between two flicks of the ash off his cigarette'. Two flicks; and British grenadiers would die for Danzig. Two flicks; and the illusory great Poland, created in 1919, signed her death-warrant." (Page 342)
"In 1939 the British were themselves at question, faced with the choice between resistance or conciliation. British ministers preferred the second course. They were still the men of peace who had rejoiced at the settlement of Munich. They still hated the prospect of war; still hoped to find a way out by means of negotiation." (Page 346)
"The state of German armament in 1939 gives the decisive proof that Hitler was not contemplating general war, and probably not intending war at all." (Page 351)
"It was no doubt disgraceful that Soviet Russia should make any agreement with the leading Fascist state; but this reproach came ill from the statesmen who went to Munich and who were then sustained in their own countries by great majorities." (Page 415)
"Hitler was not to know that Henderson no longer carried the weight in London which he had carried the year before. Hitler had not got the twenty-four hours. He was the prisoner of his own time-table. At 4.45 a.m. on the following morning the German attack on Poland began." (Page 435)
"Mussolini had got his timing wrong. In 1938 he had three days in which to avert war; in 1939 less than twenty-four hours, and this was not enough." (Page 437)
"The war which broke out in 1939 has become a matter of historical curiosity. We still live in its shadow." (Page 440)
"Images of the 1930s continue to flash past us: Hitler’s moustache and Chamberlain’s umbrella are still instantly recognizable; Nazi war criminals still make the front pages; novels and films warning of a new menace emanating from Brazil or Bavaria can be almost assured of popular success." (Page 1)
"Thus the war – and its origins – functions today as a mental and moral shorthand: anyone wishing to evoke an image of wickedness personified need only mention 'Hitler'; for stupidity, blundering or cowardice, substitute 'Chamberlain.'" (Page 1)
"Politicians find these words useful because ordinary citizens agree that the Second World War was caused by Hitler and his totalitarian dictatorship, and that it might have been prevented had it not been for the policy of appeasement that served only to whet his appetite." (Page 1)
"Anyone who doubts that these simple assumptions are widely, almost universally, subscribed to is invited to witness the effect of setting loose a class of undergraduates on A. J. P. Taylor’s The Origins of the Second World War. There the effect is electric: they are stunned to read that Hitler neither planned nor caused the war, that appeasement was not necessarily a bad thing, that new ideologies such as fascism and communism were much less significant than the aims and ambitions of statesmen, typical of all regimes, at all times." (Pages 1-2)
"When the book first appeared in 1961 it created a storm. Professional historians attacked Taylor for almost every imaginable sin: his evidence was scanty and unreliable; he distorted documents by means of selective citation and dismissed those he disliked by claiming they did not count; his logic was faulty; he contradicted himself repeatedly and drew conclusions at variance with his own evidence." (Page 2)
"Nor was the storm confined to the citadels of academia – to scholarly journals, college corridors, senior common-rooms and faculty clubs. The debate was carried on in public – in newspapers, on television and radio. Questions were asked in Parliament. Lifelong friendships were dissolved. Careers were made and unmade." (Page 2)
"Taylor was soon the best-known historian in Britain: his autobiography was a best-seller; an entire issue of The Journal of Modern History was devoted to him; he has been honored with three Festschriften, and any book with his name on it has been assured of popular success." (Page 2)
"One eminent historian, when asked to contribute an essay to the first edition of this book, declined on the ground that Taylor had no right to hold the first-mortgage on the subject of the origins of the Second World War. He may not have the right, but hold the mortgage he does." (Page 2)
"Teachers wishing to shake students out of their lethargy do well to introduce them to A. J. P. Taylor." (Page 2)
"New surveys... have certainly replaced Taylor’s as books in which teachers can have confidence when introducing students to the subject. But those very characteristics that make these newer works more reliable make them less exciting, less challenging and – ultimately – less enduring." (Page 2)
"Less careful, less balanced, more opinionated and more provocative, Taylor’s book will remain in print long after his successors’ have ceased publication." (Page 2)
"The first question to be asked is why the book caused such a storm when it appeared. The answer is that Taylor challenged an interpretation of the war’s origins that had until 1961 satisfied almost everyone in the postwar world, and because he conducted his challenge in flamboyant prose with such scathing wit." (Page 2)
"Before Taylor launched his attack, the only point being debated was whether the appeasers were foolish cowards who allowed themselves to be duped by Hitler, or cunning capitalists who hoped to use Hitler to crush communism in the Soviet Union." (Page 2)
"Blaming the war on Hitler certainly suited the Germans: with the Nazis either dead or in hiding, they could claim to be blameless and to have a claim to a respectable role in the new democratic alliance." (Page 2)
"The Second World War had been fought for a great and noble principle, and this principle endured into the era of the Cold War. The enemy had merely changed location: his ambitions and tactics remained the same." (Page 3)
"Taylor would have none of this. The war had not been fought over great principles, nor had Hitler planned its outbreak from the start." (Page 3)
"While others saw in Hitler a demonic genius who was able to pull the strings of European politics so masterfully because he had a carefully mapped out plan, Taylor saw only an ordinary politician who responded to events as they occurred, who asked only how he might benefit from them." (Page 3)
"Where others saw laid down in Mein Kampf a blueprint, Taylor heard the confused babble of beer-hall chatter. Where others saw a timetable for war in such documents as the 'Hossbach memorandum,' Taylor saw the petty intrigue and political machinations typical of the Nazi system of government." (Page 3)
"If Taylor was right – if Hitler had not in fact carefully plotted his route to world dominion well in advance and then followed the route step-by-step this could only raise new, and possibly awkward, questions. Some believed that Taylor was whitewashing Hitler, absolving him of guilt." (Page 3)
"But Taylor did not stop with Hitler. He took a contrary view of almost every significant figure of the interwar period: Chamberlain was neither a bungler nor a coward, but a highly skilled politician who enjoyed the overwhelming support of his party and his nation; Stresemann... turns out to have shared Hitler’s dreams of dominating eastern Europe; Stalin turns out to have been Europe’s most conservative statesman, proposing to uphold the peace settlement of 1919 and wishing the League of Nations to be an effective international institution." (Page 3)
"Anyone who believed in a wicked Russia, a noble Poland, a beleaguered France, an efficient Italy or a nationalistic Czechoslovakia would have their assumptions rudely challenged." (Page 3)
"Russia never did more than ask to be accepted as a legitimate sovereign state; Poland – corrupt and elitist as it was – was not a state such that one could be proud of having fought to save it." (Page 3)
"Throughout Origins Taylor demonstrated an uncanny ability to see parallels and ironies that were certain to make readers squirm in their chairs." (Page 4)
"The intervention of the League of Nations in the Abyssinian crisis resulted in Haile Selassie losing all of his country instead of only half." (Page 4)
"Was Ramsay MacDonald not fittingly described as a 'renegade socialist'?" (Page 4)
"Was it better to be an abandoned Czech or a saved Pole?" (Page 4)
"Did Munich not represent much that was best in British public life?" (Page 4)
"Taylor’s wit could cut deep." (Page 4)
"Instead of treating statesmen and their policies as the products of deep-rooted impersonal forces, he placed them at the center of the story. Popular audiences always respond more enthusiastically to history that concentrates on people, and those who read Origins when it appeared still had vivid impressions of, and strong feelings toward, the people about whom Taylor was writing." (Page 4)
"The embittered irony characteristic of his approach was certain to arouse an impassioned response because Taylor treated the subject in an old-fashioned way." (Page 4)
"Taylor struck a blow against the complacency of the 1950s. In his account the origins of the war ceased to be a simple morality play in which the weak-kneed failed to face up to the evil." (Page 4)
"The interests of states and the ambitions of statesmen were treated as if there had been no break with the nineteenth century, as if ideology and technology were of trivial importance compared to the basic principles of modern statecraft first enunciated by Machiavelli four centuries earlier." (Page 4)
"Eschewing underlying forces and political philosophies, Taylor restored drama to the events leading up to the war. He told his story in narrative form, but readers who followed the story would not find themselves, in the Churchillian phrase, being led 'step-by-step' into the abyss." (Page 5)
"No – the events were not neat and simple but complicated, ragged, contradictory, and ironic." (Page 5)
"Few things were what they seemed: the Reichstag fire should be attributed not to clever Nazi plotting but to a Dutch arsonist (and the Nazis genuinely believed it to have been the communist intrigue they proclaimed it); the result 'odd and unforeseen' – of the Locarno treaties was to prevent military co-operation between Britain and France." (Page 5)
"The Anschluss between Germany and Austria was not the result of a carefully planned invasion – 70 percent of German vehicles broke down on their journey to the frontier, while 99 percent of the people of united Germany and Austria voted in favor of the union, 'a genuine reflection of German feeling'." (Page 5)
"In Taylor’s presentation, instead of Hitler and Mussolini cleverly pulling all the strings that made the others move, it was the weak, the second-rate, and the forgotten who made things happen." (Page 5)
"The puppets and their masters had changed places." (Page 5)
"Papen and Hindenburg 'thrust' power on Hitler by imploring him to become chancellor; he did not have to 'seize' control." (Page 5)
"Schuschnigg brought about the collapse of Austria when his police raided the headquarters of the Austrian Nazis – there was no 'planned aggression only hasty improvisation' – Hitler was taken by surprise and Papen 'started the ball rolling'." (Page 5)
"Benes chose 'to screw up the tension' in Czechoslovakia, negotiating with the Sudeten Germans in order to force them openly into demanding Czechoslovakia’s dissolution and thereby compelling the western powers to assert themselves against such an extreme and unfavorable solution." (Page 5)
"Throughout Origins readers are given the distinct impression that no one was in control, that Hitler and Mussolini did no more than respond to the movements of others." (Page 5)
"According to Taylor, even when men know what they want and believe they see their way clear to getting it, the consequences are rarely foreseen and often turn out to be the opposite of what was intended." (Page 6)
"The reason why The Origins of the Second World War proved so explosive is that Taylor’s revisionism went far beyond the usual boundaries erected by his profession." (Page 6)
"Instead, Taylor turned the interwar world upside down – and shook it hard. Leaders turned out to be followers; ideologues became realists; the weak were strong. Events followed no pattern. Accidents ruined plans." (Page 6)
"Of particular concern was the way in which states were made and unmade, and how nationalism and imperialism – the two driving forces of the modern era – are connected with the onset of total war." (Page 6)
"By the time he came to write Origins, he regarded Germany as the dynamic element in European politics over the past century; it was Germany that was growing, expanding, looking forward to a future when it would be dominant in Europe and able to take up the position of a full-fledged world power." (Page 7)
"Palmerston’s greatness resided in his ability to recognize that, although he trumpeted liberal Whig ideas, the interest of peace sometimes meant cooperating with Austria in spite of the two countries’ ideological incompatibility." (Page 8)
"In all of Taylor’s work a motif is constructed in which it is the dreamers, the speculators, and the ambitious who allow their grand designs to overpower their appreciation of what is possible." (Page 8)
"Napoleon III, who attempted to destroy the balance of power, 'substitute his own hegemony,' and replace the Holy Alliance with the 'revolutionary association' of his dreams, led the Second Empire to destruction." (Page 8)
"Men continued to dance 'the perpetual quadrille of the Balance of Power,' as much as some of them might wish the music to stop so 'that they could sit out a dance without maintaining the ceaseless watch on one another.'" (Page 9)
"The problem confronting European diplomacy remained the same: how to deal with the fact that Germany, still the greatest of the European powers, was more convinced than ever that the international system had been specially designed to thwart its designs." (Page 9)
"Ringing it with small states, and forcing the Soviet Union out of the European equation, meant that when it recovered its cohesion and efficiency it would be stronger than ever." (Page 9)
"Hitler ceased to be the mad genius who pulled all the strings and had the whole play worked out in advance; and he became just another German, struggling for mastery in Europe." (Page 9)
"If Taylor was right, Hitler could not be expunged from the historical map because of his uniqueness: he must be seen as a part of German, and even of European, history." (Page 9)
"If Hitler had no plan, just vague wishes and daydreams, it meant that the range of responsibility extended far beyond a few individuals: it would include, in various ways and at different stages, those who believed in collective security, in self-determination, in disarmament, in anti-communism." (Page 10)
"Responsibility is different from guilt: those who believed in alternatives to war and the balance of power were not necessarily weak or evil – most of them genuinely believed that new ways for reconciling differences and righting wrongs had to be found if the world was to avoid a repeat performance of the catastrophe of 1914–18." (Page 10)
"Reduced to its simplest elements, Origins stands as a monumental attack on the way in which the international system works." (Page 10)
"The only difference between the fascist dictators and other statesmen was 'that their appetite was greater; and they fed it by more unscrupulous means'." (Page 10)
"Hitler, as Taylor sketches him, was about as evil a man as may be imagined. Even though he acted as a sounding-board for the German nation, he bore the responsibility for the destruction of German democracy, for the concentration camps, and for the extermination of peoples during the Second World War." (Page 10)
"What does it say about the way in which international affairs are conducted that this personification of wickedness, when regarded from the perspective of traditional European diplomacy, was simply an ordinary statesman going about his business in a time-honored fashion?" (Page 11)
"His work will surely endure, if only because he rescued this vital part of the human story from the vapid simplicities of good versus evil and returned it to its proper place of complexity and paradox." (Page 11)
"Such philosophy as may be found in Origins can be summed up as a warning to mistrust historical truths and parallels." (Page 11)
"The controversy over A. J. P. Taylor’s The Origins of the Second World War centered on the prewar years and the outbreak of war. Taylor’s dissent from the assumption that Adolf Hitler was the primary cause and his views on appeasement angered many, generating a debate on certain issues." (Page 13)
"Regarding other leaders of the 1930s, did Taylor equate ineptitude or error with evil?" (Page 13)
"The early exegesis glitters but is marred by instability of viewpoint, contradiction, carelessness, a fatal cleverness, and illogicality." (Page 15)
"Taylor rightly says that the interwar era centered on the German problem, but illogically adds 'if this were settled, everything would be settled'." (Page 15)
"Taylor asserts variously that the First World War, the armistice, or the treaty caused the Second World War. This is overstatement, contradiction, and simplification, and approaches preaching historical inevitability." (Page 16)
"He disregards the nature of German nationalism, the self-delusions of the citizenry and the reasons for each." (Page 16)
"Taylor perceives many pieces of the puzzle but not their connections." (Page 17)
"Indeed, when Taylor says the treaty 'lacked moral validity,' edging close to implying that it was another 'scrap of paper,' he is paying unconscious tribute to German and Anglo-American propaganda." (Page 20)
"Taylor suggests also that the treaty was unenforceable because Germany was responsible for implementing it. The Allies, assuming acceptance of defeat and the treaty by a sturdier German Republic than existed, expected German cooperation." (Page 21)
"Britain began reverting in 1919 to its traditional role as the fulcrum in the power equation, seeking a strong Germany to balance France and block bolshevism." (Page 22)
"Taylor sees that America was more involved in Europe than most realized, but should add that the involvement was sporadic, financial, and often unofficial. He overlooks the role played in the 1920s by New York bankers." (Page 22)
"Taylor’s treatment of Italy’s revisionism, lack of genuine power status, and absence from involvement in the German problem is sound, though he errs in that thinking Italy (or France) liked the Locarno treaties." (Page 23)
"Taylor’s focus on force obscures other factors." (Page 31)
"This is also why Taylor barely mentions the 1930 Rhineland evacuation." (Page 31)
"Whether one looks back on the Weimar years from the perspective of the late 1930s or forward from the 1920s toward the Nazi era, the idea that the Second World War had been 'implicit since the moment when the first war ended' is simplistic." (Page 32)
"Taylor never quite makes up his mind in The Origins of the Second World War. He devotes almost one-third of his book to charting the successive stages in the disintegration of the peace settlement over the course of fifteen years. But he attaches at most secondary importance to these epiphenomena." (Page 38)
"He approaches the subject on the assumption that the Versailles treaty 'lacked moral validity from the start'." (Page 38)
"He rivets one’s attention with an extraordinary claim, and then qualifies it, or contradicts it, before objections are raised. Like a bantam-weight boxer, nimble on his toes, he lands a darting blow here, executes a clever feint there, and dances out of range before the reader knows what has happened." (Page 39)
"As a matter of fact, Taylor offers no footnotes for his interpretation of events before 1932. He provides but a handful for the period before 1935." (Page 39)
"The marvel is that Taylor the mature historian could so far transcend the sentiments of his youthful milieu as to approach objectivity at all." (Page 40)
"Yet one must somehow explain a perceptible inconstancy in Taylor’s interpretation of the 1920s." (Page 40)
"How else can the reader account for his disconcerting tendency to write on both sides of almost every issue?" (Page 40)
"Paradox after paradox – the mind reels as Taylor presses onward with his pellucid prose and opaque meaning." (Page 42)
"Taylor Library concluded that Etienne Mantoux had the better of his controversy with John Maynard Keynes over reparations." (Page 42)
"Taylor does not traffic in economic statistics, but he perceptively observes that Germany ultimately emerged as the net gainer through the financial transactions of the 1920s." (Page 43)
"In discussing security problems of the 1920s Taylor offers his usual mixture of good sense and artful obfuscation." (Page 47)
"Taylor, however, employs all his ingenuity to show why the Allies could not maintain a preponderance of power on their side. He deprecates security arrangements as 'artificial' expedients that 'ran against the common sense of mankind'." (Page 48)
"None of the objections made to The Origins of the Second World War – least of all those to the early chapters appeared to bother Taylor a whit." (Page 50)
"Doubtless those explanations represent much of the truth. Yet elsewhere Taylor observes, half in jest, that we have left behind the era of Ranke: nowadays we read diplomatic history 'for purposes of entertainment'. If the office of history is to amuse, then Taylor stands without peer." (Page 50)
"No single aspect of Taylor’s argument has occasioned more criticism than his judgment of Hitler’s political intentions and behavior in the years leading to war." (Page 93)
"Taylor sought to make Hitler plausible: 'Hitler had no clear-cut plan and instead was a supreme opportunist, taking advantages as they came'." (Page 94)
"In Taylor’s hands Hitler was no more a monster, but a vain power-seeker whose ideological rhetoric amounted to mere incantations." (Page 94)
"More than thirty years of scholarship on German foreign and military policy in the 1930s, and on the role of Hitler himself, threaten to make Taylor’s view of Germany nothing more than a historiographical curiosity. Yet it is important to remember in the first instance what Taylor got right." (Page 94)
"Taylor was right, however, in another respect. Hitler did not act alone in the conduct of foreign policy in the 1930s, neither did he dictate its course exclusively." (Page 95)
"The weaknesses of Taylor’s argument about Germany and Hitler lie not in the realm of diplomacy but in that of domestic politics." (Page 98)
"Taylor makes no mention of this memorandum [the Four-Year Plan], and that he would have taken it at all seriously is questionable." (Page 99)
"Evidence of how the two levels interacted can be exemplified by a document for which Taylor had little respect: the so-called 'Hossbach memorandum'. Taylor was skeptical of its provenance and authenticity." (Page 103)
"The authenticity and accuracy of Hossbach’s account should now no longer be in doubt." (Page 104)
"In the end Taylor misjudged Hitler, just as many in the 1930s misjudged him." (Page 111)
"What may perhaps be more surprising is the extent to which many of Taylor’s judgments and (for want of a better word) 'hunches' have stood the test of time." (Page 116)
"Taylor’s revisionism assaulted this orthodoxy on both the intellectual and the moral front." (Page 117)
"The greatest indignation was, of course, reserved for Taylor’s implicit (and sometimes explicit) 'de-demonization' of Hitler, an interpretation that many critics thought untenable on both moral and factual grounds." (Page 118)
"Many of Taylor’s observations, it ought to be said at once, have stood the test of time rather well." (Page 119)
"His coverage of Sir Nevile Henderson’s debilitating functions as British ambassador in Berlin... have required no amendments now that the files are open." (Page 119)
"On the internal politics of Great Britain in the interwar years, and their effect on foreign policy, Taylor has not much to say, although the remarks he makes are usually accurate enough." (Page 120)
"In discussing the general external structure in which the British government now had to carry out its diplomacy, Taylor’s book is very lucid." (Page 123)
"It is also essentially correct in its portrayal of British policy toward potential allies among the other Great Powers." (Page 123)
"Soviet Russia is ascribed a lesser role, as earlier critics have pointed out. For Taylor, the really important action takes place in Berlin, London and Paris, not Moscow." (Page 135)
"This is a serious weakness because, by 'tilting' his analysis to the west, Taylor limits himself to an incomplete and interpretively distorted account of Europe’s descent into war." (Page 135)
"This oversight, fostered by Taylor’s disinclination to give weight to ideological factors in international relations, causes him to misinterpret western policy in a number of important ways." (Page 135)
"Having dismissed these fears as either rhetorical or manipulative devices, Taylor underrates the tremendous importance the Rapallo treaty had for the Russians." (Page 136)
"Taylor recognizes that the defensive pacts which the USSR signed with France and Czechoslovakia did not allay those fears and suspicions." (Page 136)
"The subject of British views of and policy toward the USSR is, on the whole, perceptively handled in The Origins of the Second World War." (Page 136)
"Chamberlain was doctrinally opposed to any real alliance with the Communist state – even had Stalin been a benevolent ruler instead of a bloody tyrant. Taylor... misses this more important point." (Page 136)
"Taylor’s characterization of Nazi policy toward Bolshevik Russia is completely inadequate. The source of this problem... is the author’s failure to take Hitler’s ideas seriously." (Page 138)
"Taylor is considerably less critical of Soviet diplomacy during the 1930s than many other western historians." (Page 138)
"In his treatment of the Spanish Civil War... A. J. P. Taylor managed to delineate the causes, course, and consequences of a complex international crisis in a most succinct and skillful way." (Page 204)
"Using less than fifteen pages, Taylor showed the profound impact that the nationalist rebellion had on great power politics." (Page 204)
"Scholars since Taylor have added greatly to our knowledge of the facts surrounding the Civil War, but have not bettered his interpretation of its significance." (Page 204)
"As with other supposed examples of a Hitlerian master plan, Taylor decisively rejected this view of the Civil War." (Page 205)
"Historians over the last thirty years have generally agreed with Taylor’s view of the conflict." (Page 205)
"Taylor provides us with a striking passage on the atmosphere surrounding the final dispute which was to lead to the Second World War. While this is a pertinent observation... Taylor is right but for the wrong reasons." (Page 225)
"Taylor’s interpretation of the advent of war is founded on the proposition that possession of the Free City was what Hitler truly wanted... In reality, the central issues were the wider ambitions of Hitler." (Page 225)
"Taylor is surely right to suggest that Hitler’s overtures at the end of 1938 rested on a recognition that Poland 'had stretched the Non-Aggression Pact far in Germany’s interest'." (Page 226)
"This is the central problem with Taylor’s account. Why the Hitler of Taylor’s construction... should now have bothered to put his sketches aside in order to raise the future of Danzig presents a problem which Taylor attempts to resolve by resorting to equivocation." (Page 227)
"But the Hitler of The Origins of the Second World War is, as is now generally accepted, Taylor’s particular fabrication." (Page 228)
"The ambiguity in British policy following the occupation of Prague on March 15, provides us with one of Taylor’s more convincing passages." (Page 229)
"The consensus is with Taylor. This is the view that 'a general settlement with Hitler remained the British object'." (Page 229)
"Taylorian hyperbole. The undoubted scramble surrounding the issuing of the guarantee – not yet an alliance – is deceptive." (Page 234)
"Taylor’s charge that the British were not interested in an alliance with the Soviets is overstated, though without access to cabinet records it was an easy assumption to make." (Page 236)
"Origins remains a monument to Taylor’s passion for argument. Despite its clear signs of age, its insights still have the capacity to impress largely because of the verve and audacity of the author’s style." (Page 244)
"Yet it is often this very stylistic impudence, with its arrogant over-assertions, which grate to the extent of detracting from much of its acuity." (Page 244)
"His treatment of Polish policy and the transformation of appeasement after Prague still have something valuable to tell us. His insistence upon Danzig as itself the pivotal issue is against the evidence, while the immediate circumstances which produced war are simply perverse." (Page 244)
Other A.J.P. Taylor Quotes
The great armies, accumulated to provide security and preserve the peace, carried the nations to war by their own weight.
The First World War 1963.
The First World War had begun - imposed on the statesmen of Europe by railway timetables. It was a war by timetable.
War by Timetable 1969.
The history of the Germans is a history of extremes. It contains everything except moderation.
The Course of German History 1945 p. 13.
1848 was the decisive year of German, and so of European, history.
The Course of German History 1945 p. 68.
History gets thicker as it approaches recent times: more people, more events, and more books written about them.
English History 1914-1945 1965 p. 729.
British history has been made by a series of true compromises.
English History 1914-1945 1965.
The object of policy is not to prove ones moral worth, but to succeed.
From Napoleon to Stalin 1950.
Human
reason is the only saviour we have. We need more education, not less;
more science, not less; more hope for the future, and more confidence in
it.
The Course of German History 1945.
Bismarck only
considered the interests of his own country - always the worst offense
that a statesman can commit in the eyes of foreigners.
Bismarck The Man and the Statesman 1955.
If there had been no trouble-makers, no Dissenters, we should still be living in caves.
The Trouble Makers 1957.
Decay and destruction have hardly begun their beneficent work.
English History 1914-1945 1965 p. 729.
The struggle for mastery in Europe was a struggle for power.
The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1918 1954.
War is an invention of politicians.
The First World War 1963.
The First World War had begun - imposed on the statesmen of Europe by railway timetables.
War by Timetable 1969.
The First World War was a war by timetable.
War by Timetable 1969.
Bismarck fought necessary wars and killed thousands, the idealists of the twentieth century fight just wars and kill millions.
The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1918 1954.
The balance of power is the great stabilising factor in European history.
The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1918 1954.
Until August 1914 a sensible, law-abiding Englishman could pass through life and hardly notice the existence of the state.
English History 1914-1945 1965.
The state was something that happened to other people.
English History 1914-1945 1965.
The
history of the Germans is a history of extremes. It contains everything
except moderation and in the course of a thousand years the Germans
have experienced everything except normality.
The Course of German History 1945 p. 13.
1848
was the decisive year of German and so of European history it
recapitulated Germanys past and anticipated Germanys future. Echoes of
the Holy Roman Empire merged into a prelude of the Nazi New Order the
doctrines of Rousseau and the doctrines of Marx the shade of Luther and
the shadow of Hitler jostled each other in bewildering succession. Never
has there been a revolution so inspired by a limitless faith in the
power of ideas never has a revolution so discredited the power of ideas
in its result. The success of the revolution discredited conservative
ideas the failure of the revolution discredited liberal ideas. After it
nothing remained but the idea of Force and this idea stood at the helm
of German history from then on. For the first time since 1521 the German
people stepped on to the centre of the German stage only to miss their
cues once more. German history reached its turning-point and failed to
turn. This was the fateful essence of 1848.
The Course of German History 1945 p. 68.
History
gets thicker as it approaches recent times more people more events and
more books written about them. More evidence is preserved often one is
tempted to say too much. Decay and destruction have hardly begun their
beneficent work.
English History 1914-1945 1965 p. 729.
Until
August 1914 a sensible law-abiding Englishman could pass through life
and hardly notice the existence of the state beyond the post office and
the policeman. He could live where he liked and as he liked. He had no
official number or identity card. He could travel abroad or leave his
country for ever without a passport or any sort of official permission.
He could exchange his money for any other currency without restriction
or limit. He could buy goods from any country in the world on the same
terms as he bought goods at home.
English History 1914-1945 1965.
Bismarck
fought necessary wars and killed thousands the idealists of the
twentieth century fight just wars and kill millions. Moreover Bismarck
disliked war and did everything he could to limit it to a short decisive
blow. The idealists of the twentieth century do not mind war because
they do not have to fight it themselves.
The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1918 1954.
