Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius is an Associate Professor of History at the University of Tennessee and here he brings his expertise in modern German history and European conflicts to his lecture series, World War I: The “Great War” for The Teaching Company. Born in Chicago and educated in Denmark and Germany, he earned his Ph.D. from the University of Pennsylvania in 1994, focusing on German relations with Eastern Europe, a key theme in his course. His research, including his book War Land on the Eastern Front and ongoing work on German stereotypes of the East, directly informs his exploration of the war’s cultural and political dimensions. Recognised with the University of Tennessee’s Excellence in Teaching Award in 2003 and a National Endowment for the Humanities Fellowship in 2005, Liulevicius is well-equipped to dissect the war’s complexities.His lecture series examines the First World War as a cataclysmic event that reshaped the 20th century through its unprecedented scale and violence. It traces the war’s origins in the political and intellectual tensions of 1914 Europe, sparked by the Sarajevo assassination, and the misguided enthusiasm that followed. The course vividly portrays the brutal realities of trench warfare on the Western Front, the expansive Eastern Front, and lesser-known southern and global theatres, including the Gallipoli campaign. It delves into the societal toll, from soldiers’ psychological traumas to civilians’ endurance under state-controlled economies and propaganda. The war’s global impact is highlighted through events like the Armenian genocide, the Russian Revolution, and America’s emergence as a world power in 1917. The series concludes with the war’s chaotic end, the 1918 Armistice, the collapse of empires, and the flawed Versailles Treaty, which sowed seeds for further conflict. Liulevicius also explores the war’s lasting cultural echoes in memorials, literature, and the rise of militarised ideologies like Fascism and Communism, presenting the conflict as a pivotal hinge that normalised extreme violence and set the stage for World War II.
Professor
Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius introduces his course by framing the First
World War as the "seminal catastrophe" of the 20th century, a term he
attributes to George Kennan, arguing it reshaped modern civilisation
through its unprecedented scale and brutality. He defines the war as the
first instance of "total war," a concept coined during the conflict to
describe a clash mobilising entire societies—economies, politics, and
intellectual life—for absolute victory. He stresses, "Total war demanded
total mobilisation of mass armies, economies, societies, and the hearts
and minds of people," contrasting it with traditional conflicts between
professional armies. This mobilisation extended to civilians, who
became targets, as seen in economic blockades like Britain’s against
Germany, which he notes aimed to "deny the enemy resources." The war’s
economic dimension and social tensions, he argues, led to scapegoating
within societies, fraying unity between soldiers, civilians, and
governments.He explores the war’s ideological underpinnings, challenging
the view that it was solely about geopolitics. He asserts, "Ideas and
beliefs played a crucial role throughout World War I," highlighting a
distinct "war culture" that fuelled initial enthusiasm but was later
forgotten. The war’s meanings varied starkly: in Western Europe, it
became synonymous with "senseless sacrifice," while in Eastern Europe,
it signified national rebirth, as new states emerged from imperial
collapse. He cites the "multiplicity of wars" experienced differently on
Western and Eastern fronts, shaping divergent memories.Liulevicius
emphasises the war’s novelties—tanks, aeroplanes, poison gas, and
civilian targeting, including the Armenian genocide—as markers of
brutalisation. He argues, "The war functioned as a hinge of violence in
modern history," hardening sensibilities and devaluing human life. Its
legacy permeates language ("trenches," "No Man’s Land") and innovations
like wristwatches and Daylight Savings Time. He links the war’s
disillusionment to an "Age of Belief," spawning totalitarian ideologies
like Communism, Fascism, and Nazism, which sought to replicate total
mobilisation. The course, he explains, balances thematic and
chronological approaches, covering cultural, social, political, and
military history across all fronts, not just the Western Front, to
reveal the war’s lasting impact on borders, perils, and hopes.
Lecture Two: Europe in 1914
Liulevicius sets the stage for the First World War by examining Europe’s state in 1914, arguing it was a self-confident civilisation teetering on the brink of catastrophe due to imperial rivalries and shifting power dynamics. He describes the Great Powers—Britain, Germany, France, Russia, and Austria-Hungary—as dominant players in a delicate balance of power, disrupted by Germany’s unification in 1871 under Otto von Bismarck. He notes, "The creation of the German Empire was of such importance to international affairs that it was called the ‘German Revolution,’" raising the "German Question" about its role as a stabilising or destabilising force. Britain, with its vast empire covering 20 percent of the world’s land and a population of 45 million, maintained "splendid isolation" as a naval and commercial power. Germany, with 65 million people and a booming economy, embraced Prussian militarism, but Kaiser Wilhelm II’s aggressive policies after 1890 alienated others, as he "sanctioned an aggressive foreign policy."France, weakened by its 1870-1871 defeat to Germany, sought allies like Russia to counter its rival, harbouring resentment over lost Alsace-Lorraine. Russia, a vast empire of 164 million under Tsar Nicholas II, lagged in development but pursued ambitious reforms, while facing internal dissent and promoting Pan-Slavism. Austria-Hungary, a multinational empire of 50 million under Franz Josef, struggled with ethnic tensions and relied increasingly on Germany. He highlights the Ottoman Empire’s decline, termed the "Sick Man of Europe," and the "Eastern Question" of its fate, alongside Italy’s and Serbia’s nationalist ambitions and Japan’s rise as an imperialist power.Liulevicius argues that the balance of power, established post-1815, broke down with the Crimean War and Germany’s assertive policies, leading to an arms race. He states, "Germany built the world’s second largest fleet, touching off a naval arms race with Britain." Land armies doubled from 1890 to 1914, driven by meticulous planning and railway timetables. Imperialism intensified colonial rivalries, particularly between Britain and France, while Germany’s Weltpolitik heightened tensions. He concludes that these dynamics—militarism, alliances, and imperial competition—propelled Europe toward a general war after a century of relative peace, setting the stage for the cataclysm.
Lecture Four: Causes of the War and the July Crisis, 1914
Professor Vejas
Gabriel Liulevicius examines the causes of the First World War, arguing that a
mix of long-term tensions and the July 1914 crisis escalated into a global
conflict, with Germany bearing primary responsibility through miscalculation.
He traces the prehistory to Germany’s 1871 unification, which disrupted the
balance of power. Bismarck’s diplomacy, including the Dual Alliance with
Austria-Hungary and the secret Reinsurance Treaty with Russia, aimed to
stabilise Europe, but Wilhelm II’s aggressive Weltpolitik and fleet-building
after 1890 strained relations. He notes, "German diplomats provoked
colonial crises over Morocco in 1905 and 1911," cementing the Triple
Entente of France, Russia, and Britain against the Triple Alliance. The Balkans, a power vacuum after Ottoman decline, intensified rivalries. He argues, "Austria-Hungary considered it imperative to impede Serbian ambitions," citing the 1908 annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina, which humiliated Serbia and Russia. The 1912-1913 Balkan Wars doubled Serbia’s size but left unresolved tensions. The July Crisis began with the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand on 28 June 1914 by Gavrilo Princip, a Black Hand member. Liulevicius states, "The Austro-Hungarian government saw the assassination as an opportunity to stage a showdown with Serbia," backed by Germany’s "blank check" on 5 July. Austria’s ultimatum to Serbia on 23 July was deliberately harsh, and despite Serbia’s partial acceptance, war was declared on 28 July. Russia’s mobilisation on 30 July prompted Germany’s ultimatum and declarations of war on Russia (1 August) and France (3 August), with Belgium’s invasion on 4 August triggering Britain’s entry. He navigates the Fischer Debate, where Fritz Fischer argued Germany sought superpower status, a view tempered by critics who see miscalculation, not intent, as key. Liulevicius concludes, "Most scholars today see Germany as bearing the main responsibility for the war, as it was willing to risk general war," though other powers shared some blame. Fatalism and misunderstandings about modern war’s nature, encapsulated in the German saying, "Better a terrible end than endless terror," made conflict seem inevitable. He underscores that alliances, arms races, and military timetables, as Henry Kissinger described, created a "Doomsday Machine," propelling Europe into a war no single factor alone caused.
Lecture Five: The August Madness
This lecture explores the "August Madness" of 1914, arguing it was a mythologised outburst of enthusiasm that masked varied reactions to the war’s outbreak, revealing deep societal dynamics. He describes jubilant crowds in European capitals like Berlin and Paris, waving flags and singing anthems, as an "hysterical relief" from pre-war anxiety. He notes, "Contemporaries celebrated a feeling of social unity, with internal differences swept away," terming this shift from society to community the "Spirit of 1914." This enthusiasm, strongest among urban middle classes and students, was less prevalent in rural areas or among ethnic minorities, with historian Jeffrey Verhey estimating only one percent of Berliners joined initial gatherings.He argues the myth was politically instrumentalised, as governments leveraged it to sustain morale. Domestic truces, like France’s Union Sacrée and Germany’s Burgfrieden, aimed to unify nations, with Kaiser Wilhelm II declaring, "I no longer see people of different parties or religions, but only Germans." However, these truces were fragile, undermined by paranoia and spy manias, like Germany’s "Spionitis," which targeted minorities. He highlights spontaneous propaganda, noting, "More than a million war poems were published in German newspapers" in the war’s early months, reflecting self-mobilisation for national causes framed as self-defence.Liulevicius underscores the failure of international socialism, which collapsed as patriotism trumped ideology. He cites Lenin’s disgust, stating, "Lenin saw the war as the final crisis of capitalism," advocating for class warfare. Intellectuals like Sigmund Freud and Stefan Zweig, despite later anti-war stances, initially embraced the rapture, with Zweig recalling it as "rapturous." The mobilisation of 20 million men across Europe, driven by this fervor, overwhelmed volunteering stations. He argues the August Madness, while not universal, shaped wartime narratives, as governments harnessed it to sustain determination. However, public opposition and sober reactions in rural areas reveal a complex spectrum of responses, challenging the monolithic myth. The churches’ ambivalent role and linguistic purges, like renaming St. Petersburg to Petrograd, further illustrate the era’s intense nationalism, setting the stage for the war’s divisive impact on societies.
Lecture Six: The Failed Gambles—War Plans
Break Down
Liulevicius analyses the collapse of initial war plans in 1914, arguing that their failure transformed the First World War into an unforeseen, protracted conflict marked by violence and atrocities. He focuses on Germany’s Schlieffen Plan, designed by Alfred von Schlieffen to secure victory in six weeks by invading France through Belgium and Holland, then turning to Russia. He notes, "It called for the violation of Belgian and Dutch neutrality to achieve surprise," but Helmuth von Moltke’s modifications weakened its focus, diverting troops to the Eastern Front. France’s Plan XVII, driven by the "cult of the offensive," aimed to reclaim Alsace-Lorraine but underestimated German reserves, playing into Germany’s strategy. He states, "The French plan broke against German defences," resulting in massive losses.The Schlieffen Plan faltered at the Miracle of the Marne (6-10 September 1914), where French and British forces counterattacked, exploiting a gap between German armies. Liulevicius describes how "troops brought in taxicabs from Paris" aided the defence, forcing German retreat to the Aisne River, where trenches emerged. The subsequent "Race to the Sea" saw both sides fail to outflank each other, stabilising the front by November. He highlights German atrocities in Belgium, noting, "German troops killed more than 6,000 civilians," including the burning of Louvain’s library, which branded Germans as "barbarians" in Allied propaganda.On the Eastern Front, Russia’s early invasion of East Prussia aided France but led to disaster at Tannenberg (26-30 August 1914), where Hindenburg and Ludendorff’s victory, intercepting Russian communications, yielded 92,000 prisoners. He argues, "The Russian attack had drawn two German army corps away from the Western Front," a critical contribution. The failure of both plans forced Germany into a multi-front war, with the British blockade threatening economic strangulation. Liulevicius concludes that these early failures revealed the war’s unfamiliar form, as "tactical victories might not alter the strategic equation." The Central Powers’ economic disadvantage and the shift to trench warfare set the stage for a prolonged, devastating conflict, undermining pre-war expectations of a swift victory.
Lecture Seven: The Western Front Experience
Liulevicius examines the Western Front’s trench warfare, arguing it epitomised the First World War’s brutal modernity, where defensive superiority thwarted offensive dreams, leading to horrific slaughter. By winter 1914-1915, a 500-mile deadlock from the Channel to Switzerland emerged, shaped by military technology like machine guns and barbed wire. He states, "The key fact of this new warfare was the strength of the defensive," a reality generals slowly grasped, contradicting the "cult of the offensive." This led to massacres, as "mass attacks often turned into massacres," with attackers facing uncut wire and rapid enemy recovery.He describes the trench landscape: zigzagging front lines, machine gun nests, and No Man’s Land, typically 275 yards wide, where soldiers endured mud, rats, and constant death. The 1914 Battle of Langemarck exemplifies this futility, where German volunteers suffered 41,000 casualties. He notes, "A Germany army dispatch wrote of young units attacking enemy lines, singing the national anthem," fostering a myth of heroic sacrifice, though only 18 percent were students. The reality, he argues, was a "Kindermord"—slaughter of the innocents—disproving notions of a unified "front community."Allied offensives in 1915, like Artois and Neuve-Chapelle, yielded minimal gains at immense cost, with France losing a million men in the war’s first five months. He cites A. J. P. Taylor’s observation: "Defence was mechanized, attack was not," highlighting the technological imbalance. The introduction of poison gas at Ypres in 1915 marked further brutalisation, as "German forces used poison gas," prompting Allied retaliation. Soldiers’ anonymity grew, with uniforms and language reflecting diminished heroism. Liulevicius argues the front’s horrors left a "decisive imprint on modern consciousness," evident in literature like Wilfred Owen’s poetry. Generals’ persistence with frontal attacks, dreaming of cavalry breakthroughs, ignored lessons from the American Civil War and Russo-Japanese War, which foreshadowed industrial warfare. The Western Front’s stalemate, driven by defensive dominance and commanders’ incomprehension, became a symbol of the war’s senseless devastation, shaping collective memory and exposing the futility of pre-war military doctrines.
Lecture Eight: Life and Death in the Trenches
The trenches are a defining symbol of modernity that stripped soldiers of agency and mocked heroism, shaping a collective memory of loss and endurance. He describes the trench landscape as a harsh world of elaborate fortifications, barbed wire, and No Man’s Land, where soldiers faced constant death, mud, and vermin. He states, "The trenches are a symbol for the loss of human agency," with soldiers enduring a "fog of war" that obscured the battlefield. Rotation systems limited front-line exposure to one week monthly, but daily routines—stand-to, inspections, and repairs—were gruelling, worsened by diseases like trench foot.National trench styles emerged, with German soldiers celebrated for their "domesticity and elaborate care," as propagandists claimed. Death’s omnipresence, with bodies resurfacing from shell-churned soil, fostered grim coping mechanisms. He notes, "Grim humour was another way in which soldiers tried to deal with horrifying scenes," alongside trench newspapers and theatres for diversion. Paul Fussell’s argument that the war’s ironies reshaped English resonates, as terms like "over the top" persist.Liulevicius highlights the "live and let live" system, where informal truces allowed brief respites, such as not attacking during breakfast. The 1914 Christmas fraternisation, with "German soldiers put up Christmas trees" and shared hymns, was a striking example, though generals swiftly suppressed it. Superstitions, like amulets and taboos, offered psychological control, while legends, such as Mons’ angelic archers, expressed deeper fears. He argues the trenches forged a "trench community," where loyalty to comrades surpassed class or regional divides, sometimes fostering empathy with enemies over civilians. However, this also bred alienation, as "hatred of officers and resentment of the home front" grew. The mythology of a new community, he suggests, held political potential, influencing post-war ideologies. The trenches’ brutal reality—marked by boredom, terror, and death—left an indelible mark, captured in works by Wilfred Owen and Siegfried Sassoon, cementing their place as a site where industrial warfare redefined human experience and collective identity.
Lecture Nine: The Great Battles of Attrition
I remember listening to this lecture whilst cycling towards Passchendaele as Liulevicius analysed the 1916-1917 battles of attrition—Verdun, Somme, Champagne, and Passchendaele—arguing they epitomised the First World War’s senseless slaughter, driven by misguided strategies and national pride. He defines attrition as "a grinding down or draining of the enemy’s forces," noting these battles escaped rational control, becoming symbols of endurance and futility. At Verdun, General Falkenhayn aimed to "bleed white" the French army, targeting its symbolic forts. He states, "Falkenhayn’s plans aimed to exhaust its reserves by drawing it into a ‘blood mill,’" with a million shells fired on 21 February 1916. General Pétain’s defence, via the "Sacred Road" supply line, ensured French resilience, as he vowed, "They shall not pass." The ten-month battle cost 700,000 casualties, nearly equal on both sides, shattering France’s offensive capacity.The Somme, launched on 1 July 1916, saw 60,000 British casualties in one day, the worst in any army’s history, as "soldiers carried about 70 pounds of equipment," slowing advances against uncut wire. By November, seven miles gained cost over a million casualties. In 1917, General Nivelle’s Champagne offensive failed amid German withdrawals to the Hindenburg Line, sparking French mutinies. Liulevicius notes, "In late April, mutinies broke out among French troops," leading to Pétain’s appointment to restore order. The Third Battle of Ypres (Passchendaele), launched by General Haig, aimed for a breakthrough but bogged down in mud, gaining five miles for 325,000 casualties. He argues these battles revealed generals’ "inability to understand how to employ new technology," like tanks, and a "growing callousness" toward lives.The battles’ symbolic weight, driven by national pride, overshadowed strategic failure. Verdun’s aftermath, with 12 million unexploded shells and shrines like the "Bayonet Trench," cemented its hallowed status. Liulevicius concludes that these offensives, costing millions of lives for minimal gains, underscored the war’s futility, prompting searches for alternative strategies—new fronts, allies, or subversion—as the stalemate persisted. The enduring image of mass death, he suggests, defined the war’s legacy, highlighting soldiers’ resilience against commanders’ persistent miscalculations.
Lecture Ten: The Eastern Front Experience
Liulevicius illuminates the Eastern Front, dubbed the "Unknown War" by Winston Churchill, arguing its mobility, scale, and outcomes distinguished it from the Western Front, profoundly shaping the war’s course. He describes Russia’s invasion of East Prussia in 1914, driven by the "Russian Steamroller" fear, as a traumatic shock for Germany. He notes, "Russian forces had moved before they were fully ready, to aid their French ally," occupying eastern Prussia but suffering defeat at Tannenberg (26-30 August 1914). Generals Hindenburg and Ludendorff, using intercepted messages, crushed General Samsonov’s army, taking 92,000 prisoners. He states, "The Russian attack had drawn two German army corps away from the Western Front," aiding the Allies.Austria-Hungary’s campaign faltered, losing over a million men in 1914, including Galicia and the Przemysl fortress. Liulevicius highlights German support at Gorlice-Tarnow in 1915, which regained Galicia and captured 250,000 Russians. The German "Great Advance" of 1915, he argues, was "the only real breakthrough of the entire war," conquering Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia, pushing Russian forces back 300 miles with a scorched-earth retreat. Administering these devastated territories, termed Ober Ost, posed challenges, as German soldiers encountered unfamiliar Eastern European populations.The 1916 Brusilov Offensive, launched to relieve Verdun, saw Russian gains in Volhynia and Galicia, taking 250,000 Austro-Hungarian prisoners. However, lacking northern support, it cost a million Russian casualties, marking Russia’s last major success. Liulevicius notes, "The Russian army was in the process of disintegration," exacerbated by Tsar Nicholas II’s decision to assume command, making him accountable for defeats. By 1917, Central Powers’ advances, including Serbia’s and Romania’s conquest, and Russia’s exit via the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918, seemed to secure half the war. He argues the Eastern Front’s mobility contrasted with Western stagnation, but its gains masked strategic weaknesses, as Germany’s occupation burdens and Russia’s collapse foreshadowed further turmoil, shaping the war’s global repercussions.
Lecture Eleven: The Southern Fronts
The First World War’s Southern Fronts, marked by complex campaigns and elusive victories, expanded with the Ottoman Empire’s entry into the conflict. A secret treaty on 2 August 1914 aligned Turkey with the Central Powers, driven by the Young Turk movement’s pro-German stance under Enver Pasha. “Turkey’s entry widened the war’s scope dramatically,” the professor notes. German battleships Goeben and Breslau shelled Odessa in October 1914, prompting Allied war declarations against Turkey in November. Britain, abandoning longstanding diplomacy, promised Russia the Dardanelles. Turkey’s 1914–1915 Caucasus offensive, aiming for a Pan-Turanian empire, ended disastrously, with only 13 percent of forces surviving. “Turkish soldiers froze to death in a disastrous winter offensive,” he emphasises. Russian advances into Anatolia in 1915 were welcomed by some Armenians. The Turkish Sultan’s jihad declaration on 14 November 1914 sought to ignite Muslim unrest in British and Russian territories but had limited impact. Turkish attacks on the Suez Canal further alarmed Britain.The Gallipoli campaign, designed to knock Turkey out and relieve Russia, was a bold but flawed Allied strategy. Championed by Winston Churchill, it aimed to seize Constantinople via landings at the Dardanelles. “The only strategic idea of the war,” the professor calls it. Naval efforts failed, alerting Turkish forces under Otto Liman von Sanders. On 25 April 1915, Franco-British and Anzac troops landed at Cape Helles and Anzac Cove but failed to exploit early opportunities. Turkish defenders, including Mustafa Kemal, held high ground, reinforcing defensive advantages. “The advantages of the defensive were again demonstrated,” he states. Renewed assaults in August 1915 at Suvla Bay faltered, and by December, British commander Sir Ian Hamilton was sacked. Troops evacuated by 9 January 1916, with 200,000 Allied deaths among one million engaged. The disaster shaped Australian identity and disgraced Churchill, underscoring the Western Front’s decisiveness.Italy’s entry, guided by “sacred egoism,” followed a bidding war. The Secret Treaty of London on 26 April 1915 promised Italy Austro-Hungarian territories like Trentino and Trieste. On 23 May 1915, Italy declared war on Austria-Hungary, celebrated by nationalists like Gabriele D’Annunzio. Italian commander Luigi Cadorna launched one million troops against Alpine regions and the Isonzo River, but 11 Isonzo battles yielded half a million Italian casualties by 1916. The 1917 Caporetto disaster, with German aid including Erwin Rommel, saw Italian lines collapse, retreating to the Piave River. “Entire Italian units surrendered,” the professor remarks, noting 250,000 prisoners. General Armando Diaz replaced Cadorna, stabilising the front.Serbia and Romania faced devastation. Bulgaria joined the Central Powers in September 1915, enabling Serbia’s conquest by December. Serbia lost one-sixth of its population, with survivors retreating across Albanian mountains. Romania, lured by Allied promises, joined in August 1916 but was overrun by December, yielding oil and food to the Central Powers. An Allied expedition to Salonika, Greece, stalled, with 500,000 troops trapped in what Germans called their “largest internment camp.” Victory remained elusive, redirecting focus elsewhere.
Lecture Twelve War: Aims and Occupations
The war’s prolonged nature forced both sides to articulate evolving war aims, often conflicting even among allies. The Allies’ Treaty of London in September 1914 barred separate peace agreements. France sought to expel Germany, reclaim Alsace-Lorraine, and weaken Germany to prevent future threats, eyeing African and Middle Eastern colonies. Russia aimed to control Poland and seize Constantinople for Black Sea access. “Russian dreams of the Dardanelles reshaped traditional diplomacy,” the professor observes. Britain focused on restoring continental balance and securing colonial gains. Italy, driven by “sacred egoism,” demanded Austro-Hungarian territories via the 1915 Secret Treaty of London, later a diplomatic liability. The Central Powers, led by Germany, prioritised expansive goals. Germany’s 1914 September Program outlined control over Poland, the Baltic states, Luxembourg, Belgium, and northern France, alongside a Mitteleuropa economic union to counter Britain’s naval blockade. “Mitteleuropa was Germany’s vision for continental dominance,” he notes. Austria-Hungary, struggling for survival, resisted annexations to avoid further ethnic complexity. The Fischer Debate later linked German aims to Nazi goals, though public discussion was suppressed to avoid unrest.War aims shifted under pressure. Britain and France conceded Russia’s Dardanelles claim in March 1915, a diplomatic rupture. German annexationists escalated demands as the war dragged on, arguing losses justified greater gains. Austria-Hungary and Germany clashed over Poland’s future, complicating cohesion.Military occupations brought total war to civilians, foreshadowing World War II’s horrors. Russian occupations of East Prussia and Galicia in 1914–1915 involved pogroms, deportations, and scorched-earth retreats, traumatising populations. “Russian brutality in Galicia aimed at imperial incorporation,” the professor states. Germany’s invasion of Belgium saw atrocities, with 800,000 refugees fleeing. An electrified fence sealed the Dutch border, and economic exploitation through requisitions and forced labour intensified. Occupied northern France endured similar hardships, with ten departments under German control. In Eastern Europe, Poland suffered devastation, with Kalisz and Czestochowa destroyed. Germany and Austria-Hungary divided Poland, establishing a puppet kingdom in 1916 to muster Polish troops, but results disappointed. The Baltic region’s Ober Ost became a German military colony, marked by cultural manipulation and harsh economic policies. “Ober Ost was a German vision of cultural redemption amid Unkultur,” he explains. Romania, occupied in 1916, became an economic colony, while Serbia faced brutal division and resistance.International relief, led by Herbert Hoover’s Commission for Relief in Belgium, fed ten million, delivering three million tons of food. Eastern Europe’s aid lagged but grew post-war under Hoover’s American Relief Administration. Occupations varied, with Western Europe facing systematic exploitation and Eastern Europe enduring ethnic and cultural manipulation, intensifying civilian suffering.
Lecture Thirteen: Soldiers as Victims
Liulevicius examines the devastating impact of World War I on soldiers, portraying them as both perpetrators and victims in a conflict that blurred the lines between combatants and civilians. He estimates that half of the mobilised soldiers were killed or wounded, with nearly half of survivors suffering psychological traumas. "The sheer scale of the carnage was staggering," he notes, highlighting the industrial nature of the war that obliterated bodies, leaving half of the dead unidentified. Approximately 9–10 million soldiers perished, with Serbia losing 37 percent of its forces and France 16 percent, particularly in its infantry, where one-third of officers died. The anonymity of death in trench warfare, where bodies were often "obliterated," deepened the tragedy.Liulevicius details the horrific nature of wounds, with 85 percent caused by exploding shells, leading to high infection rates from mud and dirt. He describes trench foot, trench fever from lice, and self-inflicted injuries as desperate escapes from the front. Gas poisoning, affecting 1.3 million, left long-term consequences, with victims fearing it as "an especially dreadful fate." Advances in military medicine, including antiseptic care, blood transfusions, and amputations, saved lives, but the focus remained on returning men to battle. Volunteer nurses gained recognition, and hygiene measures like delousing were obsessive, yet medicine prioritised battlefield utility.Prosthetics, including artificial limbs and facial reconstructions, advanced significantly, but could not restore normalcy. "The disabled veteran was a ubiquitous figure, a visible reproach," Liulevicius observes, noting their lasting presence in European societies. Soldiers’ self-image eroded, with terms like French Poilus, German Frontschwein, and British Tommy Atkins reflecting their sense of expendability. Psychological trauma, termed "shell shock" in 1915, affected nearly half of survivors, manifesting in mental collapse, convulsions, and amnesia. Initially misunderstood as physical, it led to brutal treatments like shock therapy, with some soldiers executed for perceived cowardice. Liulevicius cites Sigmund Freud’s reflection on the "death drive" to underscore the psychological toll.He also explores the plight of 8.5 million prisoners of war, describing capture as fraught with "uncertainties, fears, and shame." While international agreements like the Geneva Conventions aimed to improve conditions, PoWs faced hunger, disease, and "barbed wire psychosis." Liulevicius contrasts their treatment with the genocidal policies of World War II, noting that some scholars see World War I camps as precursors to later gulags, though this remains debated.
Lecture Fourteen: Storm Troopers and Future Dictators
The emergence of storm troopers and the wartime experiences of future dictators Benito Mussolini and Adolf Hitler are here linked with their roles to the war’s lasting political consequences. He explains that storm troopers, first developed by Germany in 1915 as Sturmtruppen, were a response to trench warfare’s stalemate. These elite units, composed of young, unmarried men, used infiltration tactics, automatic rifles, and grenades to restore mobility. "They aimed to regain speed and heroism," he states, noting their elite status and resentment from regular troops for disrupting "live and let live" arrangements. Ernst Jünger’s memoir, The Storm of Steel, celebrated their violence, calling them "princes of the trenches." Their legacy influenced Nazi paramilitary groups.The professor traces Mussolini’s path, born in 1883 to a socialist father, initially a socialist himself but expelled for supporting Italy’s entry into the war. Conscripted in 1915, he served without distinction, reaching sergeant rank. A 1917 grenade explosion wounded him, later mythologised by Fascists. "Mussolini planned a trenchocracy, rule by veterans," Liulevicius observes, linking his wartime disappointment to the 1919 founding of Fascism, shaped by the war’s violence. Similarly, Hitler, born in 1889, found purpose in the war, volunteering for a Bavarian regiment. As a dispatch runner, he earned an Iron Cross but was gassed in 1918, experiencing a breakdown. "The First World War made Hitler possible," Liulevicius quotes historian Ian Kershaw, noting his self-presentation as a representative of unknown trench soldiers.He emphasises how storm troopers’ tactics and glorification of violence shaped post-war ideologies. While Jünger distanced himself from Nazism, his writings inspired their rhetoric. The professor contrasts the individual heroism storm troopers reclaimed with the dehumanised conditions of trench warfare, arguing that their elite status and aggressive tactics foreshadowed the militarised politics of the interwar period. Mussolini and Hitler’s wartime experiences, he concludes, were pivotal in their rise to power, with the war’s chaos providing fertile ground for their destructive ideologies.
Lecture Fifteen: The Total War of Technology
Liulevicius explores the transformative role of technology in World War I, describing it as a "war of the engineers" that reshaped warfare. He highlights the shift from plumed caps to steel helmets, symbolising the war’s industrial anonymity. "Soldiers became interchangeable workers in a war machine," he notes, explaining that helmets like the French Adrian and German Stahlhelm protected against shrapnel, which caused 85 percent of wounds. Uniforms also became drabber to avoid detection.The machine gun, perfected by Hiram Maxim in 1884, epitomised the war’s deadliness, firing 600 rounds per minute and reinforcing defensive stalemates. Initially resisted by traditionalists, it became crucial in attrition warfare. Tanks, introduced by the British in 1916, eventually broke trench stalemates, with 400 Mark IVs achieving a breakthrough at Cambrai in 1917. "Tanks were not initially reliable," Liulevicius cautions, noting Germany’s focus on submarines instead.Poison gas, pioneered by German scientist Fritz Haber, marked a horrific innovation. First used in 1915 at Ypres, chlorine gas caused drowning-like deaths, ripping a gap in Allied lines. "Allies condemned it as frightfulness but soon replicated it," he observes, detailing the escalation to phosgene and mustard gas, with 20–30 percent of shells containing gas by 1918. Gas caused 90,000 deaths, including 56,000 Russians. Submarines, flamethrowers, and long-range artillery like Big Bertha further intensified the war’s destructiveness.Liulevicius also examines ersatz materials, developed to counter Britain’s blockade. Fritz Haber’s nitrogen-fixing process sustained Germany’s war effort, producing explosives and fertilisers. Over 11,000 ersatz products, including synthetic rubber and poor-quality food, emerged by 1918. "Without Haber’s process, Germany would have lost almost immediately," he asserts. The professor underscores how technology trumped moral considerations, creating new moralities while older forms like carrier pigeons persisted. The war’s technological races, he concludes, accelerated innovation but deepened its destructive potential, setting the stage for future conflicts.
Lecture Sixteen: Air War
This lecture surveys the evolution of air warfare in World War I, a non-decisive but portentous development. He notes that pre-war speculation, like H.G. Wells’s The War in the Air, foresaw air combat’s potential. Initially used for reconnaissance, planes replaced cavalry, but soon dogfights emerged to counter enemy observers. "Air war saw incredible transformation," he states, with aircraft numbers exploding—Britain’s air forces grew from 300 officers in 1914 to 27,000 by 1918. New models like the Fokker triplane and Sopwith Camel proliferated, alongside advances in photography and wireless communication. Anthony Fokker’s synchronised propeller-gun gear briefly gave Germany air superiority.The professor highlights the myth of the fighter ace, seen as "knights of the air" restoring heroism above the trenches. Aces like Manfred von Richthofen, with 80 victories, embodied chivalric ideals, though Liulevicius notes, "Richthofen often targeted the vulnerable." Propaganda amplified their fame, with both sides honouring fallen foes. However, airmen faced great dangers, with 50,000 killed and British pilots suffering 50 percent casualties. Massed formations, like Richthofen’s "flying circus," contrasted with the lone hero myth.Bombing evolved from grenades to heavy bombs, targeting enemy morale and infrastructure. "Bombing underlined the war’s totality, as civilians became targets," he observes. German Zeppelins bombed Britain from 1915, causing panic but proving vulnerable, with 80 of 123 shot down. By 1917, Gotha bombers replaced them, killing 1,400 in Britain. The British responded with attacks on German targets and formed the Royal Air Force in 1918. Liulevicius concludes that air war’s legacy lay in its foreshadowing of World War II’s mass bombing, with planners intrigued by its unrealised potential in 1918.
Lecture Seventeen: War at Sea
Liulevicius examines the ambiguous role of navies in World War I, marked by stalemate despite pre-war tensions over the naval race. He notes that Britain’s navy, crucial for global interests, and Germany’s, symbolising modernity, anticipated a decisive clash that never fully materialised. "Expectations of naval warfare were overturned," he states. Britain’s distant blockade, avoiding close engagements due to submarines, strangled German commerce, declaring the North Sea a war zone in 1914. The blockade’s economic impact was profound, targeting even neutral trade.The Battle of Jutland in 1916, the war’s largest naval clash, was indecisive. German Admiral Reinhard Scheer planned to lure British forces into a trap, but British Admiral John Jellicoe, forewarned by decoded messages, countered. "Jellicoe let slip the chance to crush German forces," Liulevicius observes, noting the British lost more ships but maintained strategic control. Germany shifted focus to submarines, with the U9 sinking three British cruisers in 1914. Unrestricted submarine warfare, declared in 1915 and resumed in 1917, aimed to choke Britain but provoked the United States’ entry after sinkings like the Lusitania, which killed over 1,000. "The gamble resembled the Schlieffen Plan," he remarks, noting its failure as convoys reduced losses by 1917.Initial encounters, like the Battle of Heligoland Bight, and raiding by German cruisers like the Goeben, which drew Turkey into the war, highlighted naval caution. The professor concludes that the blockade’s economic stranglehold and submarine warfare’s political consequences outweighed Jutland’s tactical ambiguity, reshaping global perceptions of naval power.
Lecture Eighteen: The Global Reach of the War
This lecture explores World War I’s global dimensions, as combatants sought to break the stalemate by expanding theatres and gaining allies. He notes that the war’s intensity, driven by late 19th-century imperialism, affected even non-combatant regions. German colonies were quickly overrun, except in East Africa, where General Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck’s forces held out until 1918, causing 120,000 deaths. Japan, allied with Britain, seized Germany’s Pacific holdings and attacked Tsingtau, aiming for Chinese dominance through the Twenty-One Demands.He highlights the Allies’ use of colonial resources. Britain’s empire, including Australia, New Zealand, and India, contributed more troops than the United States. "Dominions’ contributions raised expectations of greater independence," he observes, noting the Imperial War Cabinet’s symbolic role. Colonial troops, including Indian and African soldiers, bolstered the Western Front, while labourers like Ho Chi Minh worked in France. In the Middle East, Britain protected the Suez Canal and occupied Egypt, with dominion troops pivotal. The Arab Revolt, led by T.E. Lawrence, and British successes like Jerusalem’s capture in 1917 were propaganda victories.Diplomatically, both sides sought allies, with the United States’ sympathies a key prize. Germany’s revolutionary tactics targeted Ireland and Russia, while Allies cultivated Austria-Hungary’s minorities. The Sykes-Picot Agreement and Balfour Declaration shaped the Middle East’s future, often conflicting with promises to locals. Economically, the war shifted power, with Europe’s industrial share dropping and the United States becoming a creditor nation. "New York replaced London as the banking capital," Liulevicius notes, underscoring the war’s lasting global economic impact.
Lecture Nineteen: The War State
The emergence of the war state is outlined, as total war demanded unprecedented state mobilisation. He notes that shell shortages early in the war revealed unpreparedness for protracted conflict, prompting state reorganisation. "The war state became the total organiser," he states, breaking with liberal traditions of limited government. Germany’s authoritarian yet inefficient system saw Walther Rathenau coordinate resources through the War Raw Materials Board. The Hindenburg Plan of 1916, dubbed "War Socialism," centralised production, drafting men aged 17–60 and using forced labour, though civilian needs were neglected.In Britain, liberal traditions initially hindered mobilisation, but Lord Kitchener’s volunteer New Army and David Lloyd George’s Ministry of Munitions, established in 1915, addressed shell shortages. "Lloyd George introduced control and drive," Liulevicius observes, noting conscription in 1916 and the Defence of the Realm Act’s sweeping powers. France, despite losing industrial capacity, muddled through with "System D." Political turmoil and early losses of 600,000 men strained efforts, but Georges Clemenceau’s 1917 reforms stabilised the war effort. Less successful were Russia, crippled by inadequate arming, and Austria-Hungary, destabilised by Emperor Franz Joseph’s death.The professor highlights economic controls like price regulation and nationalisation, with daylight savings time symbolising state power. Unions gained influence, and socialist leaders joined governments. Inflation and social disparities grew, with industrialists profiting while the middle class suffered. "The war broke with classical liberalism," Liulevicius concludes, noting that the state’s expanded role and collectivist ideals influenced future governance, despite inefficiencies in practice.
Lecture Twenty Propaganda War
Propaganda’s role in the First World War,
was a politically instrumentalised effort to shape attitudes, crucial in total war where hearts and minds were strategic resources. He argues that propaganda evolved from crude censorship to sophisticated media campaigns, with governments initially slow to recognise the power of spontaneous propaganda from citizens. He notes, “The most effective propaganda was that which was spontaneous, or which built on established opinions,” highlighting its shift to a “horizontal” war culture where societies self-propagandised through rumours, myths, and enemy stereotypes. These had significant psychological impact, though he questions propaganda’s decisive role in the war’s outcome.He explains that all warring powers framed their efforts as defensive, essential for motivating home fronts and swaying neutral opinion. National differences shaped propaganda: France focused on defending against a hereditary foe, Britain justified its fight on political principles, and Germany struggled to present a defensive narrative while occupying enemy territory, risking the Burgfrieden truce. He cites German propaganda’s failures, stating, “German propaganda in particular often backfired catastrophically,” as seen in the “Hymn of Hate” and the Lusitania medal, which Allied propaganda exploited. Sophistication grew with poster campaigns and films, with women symbolising home fronts and religious imagery portraying the war as a crusade.The professor contrasts German Kultur with Anglo-Saxon and French Zivilisation, noting how academics fuelled cultural debates, dehumanising enemies with racial stereotypes. He describes spontaneous propaganda, like Germany’s million war poems in 1914, and British white feather campaigns shaming “slackers.” He argues, “The fervor with which ordinary people embraced the war has led to the term ‘war culture,’” evident in folk art and hero-worshipping souvenirs. However, growing war weariness bred distrust, with soldiers mocking propaganda as “eyewash” and terms like “honour” becoming ironic. He concludes that Germany’s propaganda struggled with less inspiring themes, while Allies leveraged popular energies. Historians, he notes, debate its effectiveness, suggesting Germany faced a harder case.
Lecture Twenty-One Endurance and Stress on the Home Front
Liulevicius explores the home front’s endurance and stress during the First World War, highlighting how total war targeted civilians, causing profound privation. He argues that Britain’s naval blockade exposed Germany’s vulnerabilities, with food imports cut off and agriculture disrupted. He states, “The harsh winter of 1916–1917, the potato crop had failed, and the result was the ‘Turnip Winter,’” reducing caloric intake from 1,350 in 1916 to 1,000 in 1917. Estimates suggest 750,000 civilian deaths from starvation, with hints of passive euthanasia in asylums, possibly 70,000 deaths.He describes economic strain, with inflation doubling prices in France and black markets eroding trust. Regimentation intensified, with skilled workers valued but conscripted farmers causing rural shortages. Trade unions gained influence, laying welfare state foundations, while churches played an equivocal role. He emphasises women’s transformed roles, noting, “Women’s work in industry was not new, but the influx into jobs that earlier were male preserves was striking.” In Britain, women in banking increased sixfold; in Vienna, half the metal workers were women. Dangerous munitions work led to “Yellow Canaries” poisoned by chemicals. These shifts caused friction, though many saw employment as temporary.The professor highlights children’s militarised education and psychological involvement, with war-themed books and games. Social structures buckled, with aristocracies decimated as junior officers faced high death rates. He notes, “Traditional morality was under strain,” with army-run brothels and fraternisation in occupied territories. Social critics decried women’s independence and juvenile delinquency. Scapegoating targeted minorities, particularly Jews, with Germany’s 1916 “Jewish Census” falsely alleging shirking, fueling anti-Semitism. He concludes that these pressures reshaped social roles, with women gaining voting rights in Britain (1918), Germany, Austria, and the U.S. (1920), reflecting significant societal shifts driven by war’s demands.
Lecture Twenty-Two Dissent and Its Limits
Professor Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius examines dissent during the First World War, noting that total war reduced tolerance for opposition, yet voices persisted at great cost. He argues that after 1916, growing war weariness fueled unrest, with strikes re-emerging, such as 50,000 Berlin workers protesting in May 1916 over Karl Liebknecht’s arrest. He states, “Censorship was the rule of the day,” with France imprisoning or executing dissenters like Joseph Caillaux. Despite this, desires for peace emerged, with Woodrow Wilson’s 1916 mediation attempts and Pope Benedict XV’s 1917 peace note, both ignored.He explores pacifism’s diversity, from religious to ethical objections. In Britain, 16,000 conscientious objectors faced vilification, with white feathers symbolising cowardice. He highlights literary dissent, citing Siegfried Sassoon’s 1917 open letter rejecting the war, stating, “Sassoon came to question and then, in an open letter, to reject the war.” Socialists faced a crisis, with the Second International collapsing as most supported national war efforts. Radicals like Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg formed Germany’s Independent Social Democratic Party in 1917, advocating revolution. Lenin, in exile, saw the war as a capitalist crisis, arguing in his 1916 book, “This war among nations could be turned into a civil war between classes.”The professor notes failed socialist conferences in Switzerland, with Lenin pushing for immediate revolution. He describes Lenin’s radicalisation after his brother’s execution, leading the disciplined Bolsheviks. Transported by Germany to Russia in 1917, Lenin’s revolutionary defeatism gained traction. He concludes that dissent, though suppressed, revealed war’s strain, with radical socialists exploiting it for revolutionary aims, setting the stage for Russia’s upheaval. Lecture Twenty-Three: Remobilisation in 1916–1917
Professor Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius analyses the 1916–1917 remobilisation efforts as wartime societies faced growing strains. He argues that domestic truces from 1914 broke down, with democratic nations like Britain and France better equipped to handle friction than Germany’s authoritarian system. He notes, “The period 1916–1917 saw a remobilisation to summon revitalized energies.” In Britain, David Lloyd George’s energetic leadership prioritised victory, with a streamlined war cabinet, though he clashed with General Haig. In France, Georges Clemenceau, appointed premier in 1917, asserted civilian control, declaring, “War is too serious a matter to be left to generals,” and suppressed dissent harshly.In Germany, the Reichstag demanded democratisation, but responses were symbolic, like Kaiser Wilhelm II’s vague reform promises. He cites the 1917 Peace Resolution, which endorsed peace without annexations but was undermined by the military, stating, “Bethmann-Hollweg was fired as chancellor.” The Fatherland Party, formed in 1917, pushed for an annexationist “Hindenburg Peace,” possibly prefiguring Nazi ideologies. The government’s “Patriotic Instruction” campaign urged endurance for victory. He contrasts Austria-Hungary and Russia’s collapse, with the former subordinated to Germany and the latter buckling under losses of two million dead and millions wounded or captured.The professor concludes that remobilisation reflected desperation to sustain the war effort, with democratic systems proving more adaptive, while authoritarian regimes like Germany’s struggled, and empires like Austria-Hungary and Russia neared collapse under internal and external pressures.
Lecture Twenty-Four: Armenian Massacres—Tipping into Genocide
Here the 1915 Armenian massacres in Ottoman Turkey are described as the first modern genocide, arguing that total war normalised mass violence. He estimates 500,000 to one million Armenians died, targeted as a suspect Christian minority. He states, “The intensity of total war helps make genocidal conditions possible.” Historically, Armenians were an exemplary minority, but the “Armenian Question” fuelled Ottoman resentment. The Young Turks’ Turkish nationalism replaced Ottomanism, and fears of Armenian collaboration with Russia prompted deportations led by Talat Pasha.He describes the massacres’ systematic nature, with Armenian soldiers disarmed and intellectuals targeted first. He notes, “The first wave of civilian arrests and killings coincided with the Allies’ Gallipoli landing,” escalating into death marches where “a third of Armenians were massacred, a third perished en route, and a third survived.” International reactions were muted; the Allies warned of accountability, but Germany, an ally, ignored protests. He cites American ambassador Henry Morgenthau’s anguish, but U.S. neutrality limited action.The professor argues the massacres set a precedent for later genocides, with Hitler reportedly saying, “Who today remembers the Armenians?” Post-war trials were ineffective, and Talat Pasha’s 1921 assassination by an Armenian highlighted fading attention. He concludes that the term “genocide,” coined by Raphael Lemkin, reflects the Armenians’ targeting for their identity, marking a tragic step toward 20th-century mass murders, obscured by wartime suffering and international indifference.
Lecture Twenty-Five: Strains of War—Socialists and Nationalists
The Great War’s pressures fuelled social and nationalist revolts, Liulevicius arguing that 1917’s war weariness intensified revolutionary dynamics. He states, “The suspicion dawned that the war might last forever,” pushing societies toward collapse. The French army’s 1917 mutinies, sparked by Nivelle’s failed Aisne offensive, saw soldiers refuse attacks, bleating like sheep, yet insisting, “We’ll defend the trenches, but we will not attack.” Pétain restored order with discipline and improved conditions, but the offensive spirit waned. German discontent simmered, with ethnic minorities distrusted.Nationalist revolts included Ireland’s 1916 Easter Rising, where rebels seized Dublin’s Post Office, proclaiming a republic. He notes, “Harsh reprisals affected Irish public opinion,” turning sympathy toward martyrs, later fuelling independence. In Austria-Hungary, Slavic defections and Hasek’s Good Soldier Svejk highlighted disloyalty stereotypes. Czech exiles like Tomáš Masaryk pushed for independence, imperilling the Habsburg Empire. Poland’s aspirations grew, with Józef Pilsudski’s legions aiming for independence, though tragically, 1.5 million Poles fought for opposing empires.He examines “revolutionising” policies, like Britain’s support for the Arab revolt led by Lawrence of Arabia, capturing Aqaba in 1917, and Germany’s disastrous Zimmermann Telegram, which galvanised American war entry. The professor highlights Germany’s transport of Lenin to Russia, stating, “Lenin cheerfully accepted German assistance while pursuing his own plans,” leading to Russia’s revolution. He concludes that these revolts made compromise unlikely, as leaders believed only total victory could quell dissent, fuelling a revolution of rising expectations among nationalities and colonial subjects.
Lecture Twenty-Six: Russian Revolutions
Here Liulevicius examines the 1917 Russian Revolutions, arguing that total war provoked total revolution, collapsing the tsarist regime. He cites historian A. J. P. Taylor, stating, “It marked the start of world history,” with Russia’s upheaval and America’s emergence. Tsar Nicholas II, ill-suited for rule, faced a near-toppling in 1905, with soviets and revolutionaries like Trotsky rising. World War I’s disasters, with two million dead, crumbled morale, and the tsar’s command role drew blame. He notes, “Ordinary soldiers ‘voted with their feet’ by simply leaving for home.”The March 1917 Revolution erupted spontaneously, with Petrograd’s women and workers striking, joined by soldiers. Nicholas abdicated, ending Romanov rule. The provisional government, formed from Duma liberals, pledged democracy but faced rival soviet authority. Lenin, arriving via German transport, declared his April Theses, promising “peace, land, and all power to the soviets,” shocking allies. The provisional government’s failed Galicia offensive and Kerensky’s leadership faltered. By November 1917, the Bolsheviks seized power easily, storming the Winter Palace. He states, “They announced that they were taking power in the name of the Soviets,” though real power lay with the Sovnarkom.The professor details Lenin’s decrees: a peace decree led to the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, ceding vast territories; land was seized by peasants; the Cheka enforced “Red Terror.” He notes, “Lenin saw the need for dictatorship,” defined as unrestricted force. The Bolsheviks shut down rival parties and the constituent assembly, executing the tsar’s family. Expecting world revolution, Lenin admired German efficiency, believing its fusion with Russian fervor would spark global change. He concludes that the Bolshevik coup introduced a new ideological state, shaping 20th-century discourse by challenging global governments.
Lecture Twenty-Seven America’s Entry into the War
America’s 1917 entry into the First World War transformed the conflict ideologically. Initially neutral, America’s stance shifted due to German submarine warfare, notably the Lusitania sinking, and growing economic ties with the Allies. He states, “American trade with the Allies grew,” with exports quadrupling and $2 billion in loans. Woodrow Wilson, a progressive academic, believed he embodied America’s will, pursuing mediation until Germany’s unrestricted submarine warfare and the Zimmermann Telegram forced action. He notes, “Wilson announced that the ‘world must be made safe for democracy,’” joining the Allies as an Associate Power in April 1917.The professor highlights Wilson’s Fourteen Points, announced in 1918, advocating national self-determination, open covenants, and a League of Nations. He argues, “These principles represented a rejection of Old Europe’s balance of power politics,” appealing to war-weary populations but clashing with Allied imperial ambitions. Clemenceau quipped, “Even God had only ten points.” The points countered Bolshevik calls for revolution, engaging an ideological struggle. American mobilisation was swift, with the Selective Service Act drafting three million men. General Pershing led the American Expeditionary Force, insisting on unity, though African-American units served under French command.He concludes that America’s entry expanded the war’s scope and injected democratic ideals, shifting its nature. Wilson’s vision, despite European skepticism, inspired hope, while military buildup, with two million troops reaching France, tipped the strategic balance, setting the stage for the war’s final phase. Lecture Twenty-Eight: America at War—Over There and Over Here
Liulevicius now explores America’s First World War experience, arguing it reshaped society and its global role. Woodrow Wilson mobilised public opinion, framing the war as a democratic crusade. He states, “Without the immediate motive of a defensive war, American participation had to be explained in terms of ideas.” The Committee of Public Information, led by George Creel, produced over one million publications and deployed “Four Minute Men” for a million oratorical performances. A self-propagandising “war culture” emerged, with universities teaching Western civilisation and German culture attacked, renaming hamburgers “Liberty sandwiches.”Economic mobilisation saw the War Industries Board, led by Bernard Baruch, regulate prices, while railroads were nationalised. Herbert Hoover, as Food Administrator, used voluntary measures to manage resources. He notes, “The scope of the income tax was expanded enormously,” transforming America’s tax structure. Labour shortages empowered unions, doubling membership. The Espionage and Sedition Acts suppressed dissent, jailing socialist Eugene Debs. Women entered the workforce in droves, with one million in war work, aiding suffrage, passed in 1918. The Great Migration saw African-Americans move north, facing riots.The professor details American troops’ European experience, with two million “doughboys” arriving by 1918. He states, “Their sheer numbers and fresh reserves made clear that the strategic balance was tipping.” African-American units, like the “Harlem Hellfighters,” served bravely under French command, introducing jazz. Heroes like Alvin York emerged, though 117,000 Americans died. He concludes that America’s brief but intense engagement, driven by ideological and economic mobilisation, transformed its society and global standing, with lasting impacts on race, gender, and national identity. Lecture Twenty-Nine: 1918—The German Empire’s Last Gamble
Germany’s final 1918 offensive was a desperate gamble to win before American forces tipped the balance. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, signed in March 1918, freed German troops from the Eastern Front. He states, “Russia lost a third of its territory, a quarter of its population,” fulfilling annexationist dreams but requiring one million troops to hold the East. The spring offensive, “Operation Michael,” began in March, using storm trooper tactics to push Allies back 40 miles, bombarding Paris with Big Bertha. He notes, “The gamble had failed,” as German troops, demoralised by Allied supplies, were halted.The professor describes the “Black Day” on 8 August 1918, when an Allied counterattack at Amiens, using tanks, broke German lines. Morale collapsed, and Bulgaria signed an armistice in September, followed by Turkey in October. Austria-Hungary disintegrated, signing an armistice in November. In Germany, Ludendorff admitted defeat, urging an armistice. He states, “On November 3, 1918, news of orders for a naval ‘deathride’ touched off mutinies.” Kaiser Wilhelm II abdicated, and a democratic republic was declared. On 11 November, the armistice was signed at Compiègne.He concludes that Germany’s last wager, driven by Eastern victories but undermined by exhausted reserves and Allied counteroffensives, led to the Central Powers’ collapse. The war’s end, with revolutions and armistices, marked the failure of Germany’s high-stakes strategy, reshaping Europe amid internal turmoil.
Lecture Thirty: The War’s End—Emotions of the Armistice
On 11 November
1918, the armistice silenced the Western Front, unleashing a torrent of
emotions, as Professor Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius describes: “a tidal wave of
different emotions: grief, anger, loss, relief, exaltation, and furious desire
for revenge.” He argues that the ceasefire, signed at five A.M. in a railway
carriage at Compiègne, near Paris, stirred contrasting reactions. For the
defeated, particularly Germans, despair and disbelief dominated, as many,
swayed by propaganda, struggled to accept defeat, with their armies still on
foreign soil. He notes, “Many Germans were psychologically unprepared for the
news,” fostering a “Stab in the Back” legend blaming internal betrayal. The
Allies experienced mixed feelings; Liulevicius observes, “In the front lines of
the trenches, the mood was one of quiet exhaustion,” yet in London, “riotous
celebrations broke out,” and in Paris, crowds paraded, carrying Allied soldiers
aloft. Central and Eastern Europe celebrated new independence, with Poland
marking 11 November as its independence day, though ongoing conflicts in these
regions showed the war’s persistence, as he states: “The war did not end
everywhere.” The armistice’s terms, designed to cripple German military
revival, demanded withdrawal from occupied territories, Rhineland
demilitarisation, and reparations, with the naval blockade continuing.
Liulevicius emphasises the German delegation’s hope for a lenient “Wilson
Peace” based on Wilson’s Fourteen Points, but harsh terms bred resentment. A
devastating Spanish influenza pandemic, killing an estimated 50 million,
compounded the war’s horrors, emerging in Kansas in 1918 and spreading via
troop movements. He questions why its memory faded, asking, “Did the tragedy of
the war overshadow this disaster?” The war’s toll was immense: Germany lost
nearly 2 million, France 1.5 million, Britain nearly a million, and 20 million
were wounded, many permanently disabled. Liulevicius underscores the societal
impact, noting, “Every dead soldier left behind families and relationships
shattered.” Economic costs reached $337 billion, and confidence in progress
waned. He argues that lingering hatreds, especially French demands for German
punishment, hindered reconciliation, setting a volatile stage for peace
negotiations. The professor concludes that the armistice, while halting
fighting, left unresolved tensions, as “hatreds built up over the last years of
war would impede a peace settlement.”
Lecture Thirty-One: Toppled Thrones—The Collapse of Empires
The Great War’s end precipitated the
collapse of four empires—Russian, German, Austro-Hungarian, and
Ottoman—reshaping Europe’s political map. He asserts, “Total war had led to
total defeat,” with republics replacing dynasties and nine new states emerging:
Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, Austria, Czechoslovakia,
and Yugoslavia. He emphasises that these states arose from rapid nationalist
movements, not solely from the Paris Peace Conference, stating, “Facts unfolded
on the ground with astonishing speed.” In Germany, naval mutinies and revolts
sparked a revolution in November 1918. The professor notes, “Kaiser Wilhelm II
abdicated and fled to exile in Holland,” and Social Democrat Friedrich Ebert
assumed power, declaring a democratic republic on 9 November. However, chaos
ensued, with local councils, a socialist Bavarian republic, and the Spartakus
movement challenging stability. He observes, “A civil war atmosphere pervaded
the streets,” as the government allied with brutal Freikorps mercenaries to
suppress revolts. Liulevicius argues that the Weimar Republic’s association
with defeat, reinforced by the “Stab in the Back” legend, undermined its
legitimacy, as Ebert’s claim that troops returned “undefeated in the
battlefield” fuelled confusion. The Habsburg Empire dissolved along ethnic
lines; Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia declared independence on 28 and 29 October
1918, respectively, driven by national committees. Hungary split from Austria
on 16 October, becoming a republic under Michael Karolyi, while Austria,
reduced to 7 million people, was declared independent on 12 November. The
professor stresses, “The Danube basin was now torn apart,” leaving five million
Germans as minorities. The Ottoman Empire retained only its Turkish core, with
Mustafa Kemal’s nationalist movement resisting Allied occupation. In Eastern
Europe, Poland’s independence on 11 November, championed by figures like
Pilsudski, marked a “baptism by fire for national freedom,” though border
disputes persisted. The Baltic republics and Finland also gained fragile
independence. Liulevicius argues that these transformations, while liberating
for some, created vulnerabilities, as “new independence for nationalities in
Central and Eastern Europe also made for a different perception of the war.” He
concludes that the unresolved question of replacing these imperial structures
sowed seeds for future conflict, with nationalism and democratic ideals driving
both opportunity and instability.
Lecture Thirty-Two: The Versailles Treaty and Paris Settlement
The 1919 Paris Peace Conference, opening on 18
January, grappled with contradictory aims: reconciliation versus punishment and
restoring versus abolishing the prewar balance of power. He states, “The peace settlements
ending the First World War were beset with contradictions.” The conference
produced five treaties with defeated powers, but the Versailles Treaty with
Germany was central, embodying compromises yet meeting major Allied demands. He
notes, “The Versailles Treaty, centerpiece of the Settlement, was carved out
with compromises and dissatisfactions aplenty.” Germany lost 13 percent of its
territory, including Alsace-Lorraine and the Polish Corridor, and 10 percent of
its population. Its army was capped at 100,000 volunteers, with no air force or
submarines, and the Rhineland was demilitarised. The professor highlights
Article 231, the “War Guilt Clause,” which forced Germany to accept blame,
stating, “Germany was to accept the blame for the war.” Reparations, later set
at $32 billion, sparked outrage, as Germans, expecting a “Wilson Peace,” faced
a “Diktat” with no negotiation, leading to protests like the scuttling of the
German fleet at Scapa Flow. Liulevicius observes, “Across nearly the entire
political spectrum, German rejection of the terms was unanimous.” Other
treaties—Saint-Germain, Trianon, Neuilly, and Sèvres—dismembered Austria,
Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Ottoman Empire, respectively, though Sèvres was
rejected by Turkish nationalists. He argues that Wilson’s League of Nations,
established in Geneva in 1920, was a key achievement, but its failure loomed as
the U.S. Senate rejected the treaty, noting, “The United States rejected the
Versailles Treaty and with it the League of Nations Covenant.” The professor
emphasises clashing Allied priorities: Clemenceau’s focus on French security,
Lloyd George’s imperial interests, and Wilson’s idealism for
self-determination. However, colonial peoples like Ho Chi Minh were ignored,
and German minorities faced unresolved issues. Liulevicius argues, “Minority
questions remained,” undermining self-determination. France, tasked with
enforcing the treaty, felt isolated, as he describes it, “holding the tail of
the tiger.” The settlement’s economic disruption and failure to satisfy all
parties, including Italy’s “mutilated victory,” sowed discontent. He concludes
that the Versailles Treaty’s paradoxes—balancing reconciliation with
punishment—left unresolved issues, as “debate continues on whether it was too
harsh or not harsh enough,” setting the stage for future European tensions.
Lecture Thirty-Three: Aftershocks—Reds, Whites, and Nationalists
The First World War’s end didn't bring peace
but unleashed ideological conflicts, particularly in Eastern Europe,
foreshadowing the Cold War. He states, “The First World War in fact did not end
neatly on November 11, 1918,” as aftershocks pitted “Reds” (communists) against
“Whites” (counter-revolutionaries) and nationalists against each other. In
Russia, a brutal civil war from 1917 to 1920 killed 7–10 million, with
Bolsheviks under Trotsky’s Red Army prevailing over diverse White forces,
including monarchists and democrats. The professor notes, “Bolshevik
discipline, organisation, and determination won out,” establishing the Soviet
Union in 1922. Allied interventions failed, and the Comintern, founded in 1919,
aimed to export revolution, as he quotes Trotsky: “General Staff of the World
Revolution.” Communist uprisings in Finland, Germany, and Hungary failed; in
Berlin, the Spartakus revolt was crushed, and in Hungary, Béla Kun’s Soviet
state collapsed by August 1919. Liulevicius observes, “Such revolts, though
unsuccessful, stirred fears among Europe’s middle classes.” In Germany,
Freikorps mercenaries, numbering 200,000–400,000, suppressed revolts with
violence, some later joining Nazi death squads. He highlights their Baltic
rampage, noting, “The Baltic republics regarded their fight against the
freebooters as wars of independence.” The Polish-Soviet War saw Poland’s
advance into Ukraine halted by Soviet counterattacks, culminating in the
“Miracle on the Vistula” in 1920. The professor argues that these conflicts
revealed “a new level of ideological violence,” with ethnic and nationalist
clashes complicating self-determination in mixed-population areas. In Hungary,
Admiral Horthy’s White Terror followed Kun’s regime, while in Turkey, Mustafa
Kemal’s nationalists rejected the Treaty of Sèvres, leading to the 1923 Treaty
of Lausanne and forced population exchanges. Liulevicius notes, “Massacres and
ethnic cleansing took place,” despite international supervision. In Ireland,
the 1918–1921 War of Independence led to the Irish Free State, followed by
civil war. He argues that these aftershocks, often forgotten, contributed to
Europe’s slide toward another war, as “the brutalizing effects of the Great War
was a hinge of violence.” The professor concludes that the war’s legacy of
ideological and ethnic strife, with 20 million ethnic minorities and refugees,
set a volatile stage for future conflicts.
Lecture Thirty-Four: Monuments, Memory, and Myths
The Great War’s unprecedented scale sparked
intense debates over how to memorialise its losses, shaping collective memory
and myths. He states, “Attempts to deal with the many social and economic
repercussions of the war were inevitably accompanied by the question of how to
remember the war.” Physical scars, like Verdun’s unreconstructed villages,
posed questions about the future, as “the landscape itself was scarred.”
Monuments, from local soldier statues to the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier,
emerged amid debates over their message. The professor notes, “The notion of a
Tomb of the Unknown Soldier was crafted to memorialize the nameless
sacrifices,” with France burying an unidentified Verdun body under the Arc de
Triomphe in 1920. Verdun became sacred ground, with its Ossuary housing 130,000
remains and a mythologised trench symbolising defiance. In Germany, Totenburgen
and the Tannenberg monument reflected a different focus, as “most of the war
had been fought beyond Germany’s borders.” Liulevicius emphasises survivors’
trauma, stating, “Countless survivors of the war bore unspeakable memories,”
with every European family losing someone. Disabled veterans, including 250,000
British amputees, were visible reminders, and some facially mutilated soldiers
hid in secluded hospitals. Veterans’ organisations, like Germany’s nationalist
Stahlhelm and the American Legion, formed to assert their war’s meaning. The
professor argues that artists captured the war’s impact, as “only the
fragmented perspective of modernism could convey the experience.” Painters like
Otto Dix depicted mutilated veterans, while poets like Wilfred Owen expressed
disillusionment. He cites Paul Fussell’s view that the war altered language,
noting, “Words like ‘honor’ or ‘duty’ could never lose the ironic tinge.”
Conversely, Jay Winter argues for cultural continuities. Myths like Germany’s
“Stab in the Back” festered, endorsed by Nazis, while Italy’s “mutilated
victory” fuelled nationalist agitation, as “Gabriele D’Annunzio led a raid that
captured the contested port of Trieste.” The occult myth of the “return of the
dead” reflected coping mechanisms, and the “New Man” myth glorified a
militarised ethos. Liulevicius concludes that these efforts to memorialise the
war, while grappling with its trauma, shaped dangerous narratives, as “the
‘Stab in the Back’ legend continued to fester,” influencing future conflicts.
Lecture 35: The Rise of the Mass Dictatorships
Lecture 36: Legacies of the Great War
