Sample DP IAs on Fascist Italy

To What Extent can the GAP Members Behind the Via Rasella Attack be Considered Responsible for the Ardeatine Massacre?

Word Count: 2165

Via Rasella then and now. It was here on March 23, 1944, that the Gruppi di Azione Patriottica bombed members of the 11th company of the 3rd battalion of the Polizeiregiment "Bozen", a military unit of the German Ordnungspolizei recruited in the largely ethnic-German South Tyrol, during the de facto German annexation of the region. The attack killed 32 men and left roughly 110 wounded including two civilians. The attack angered Hitler so much that he ordered “an immediate reprisal to shake the world”, asking Kesselring, supreme commander of the German forces in Italy, to destroy the entire neighbourhood and to kill from thirty to fifty Italians for every dead German. Later that day, it was decided to execute ten Italians for each German. The reprisal took place on the following day at the Ardeatine Caves. Today, no plaque remembers the Via Rasella attack, in some aspects a crucial event for the history of the occupation and for the fight to liberate Italy. Some houses and a palace, at the crossing with Via del Boccaccio, still have plenty of bullet holes on their façades, reminding of the panic of the German soldiers, who opened fire all around, unable to understand where the attack came from and what was happening.

 

Identification and Evaluation of Two Sources (638 words) 

To What extent Can the men behind the Via Rasella Attack be considered responsible for the Ardeatine Massacre? This question has been subject to numerous debates, being regarded as one of the most evident emblems of Italy’s discord in the matter of historical memory.1 Here the dispute will focus on the view of the Vatican Church which strongly criticises the attack, labelling the men as criminals, and the political left who hail them instead as heroes who could have done nothing to stop the Massacre. 

Source 1: Osservatore Romano, 26 March 1944 

This article published only two days after the massacre by the Vatican Church has exceptional value as it offers the Church’s view of the attack, which was very powerful at the time and unarguably shaped the opinion of many Italians on this event. The article strongly condemns the attack, going as far as labelling the GAP members as irresponsible individuals who did not respect human life2. It was from this article that the widely accepted narrative of the GAP members being terrorists and responsible for the deaths of hundreds of innocent Italians originated. This article was also responsible for creation of the myth that the GAP members could have prevented the massacre had they turned themselves in to the Germans. Although this was later proven false, it is still crucial to take this source into consideration as much of the controversy and debates over this topic can be traced down to the publishing of this article. The main limitation of the source therefore is the bias it holds against the GAP members, as it begins with the very statement that victims were sacrificed due to the ‘culprits who escaped arrest’, leaving no room for debate despite not providing any evidence to support this claim. However, this could perhaps also be viewed as a value of the source, as such a powerful institution having about the culpability of the GAP members would reflect that of many Italians at the time, giving a clear picture of what the initial reaction to the attack was. Another important limitation of the source is undoubtedly the hasty manner with which the article was published, very much giving the impression that its only aim was to blame GAP members rather than providing any accurate and useful information. 

Source 2: Alessandro Portelli, L’ ordine è già stato eseguito 

Portelli’s book, published in 1999, offers a much more balanced and perhaps convincing argument based on hundreds of interviews of people who experienced the attack first hand, conducted by Portelli himself. The book tends to argue that the GAP members were in fact not completely responsible for the attack, exposing numerous myths which have been created through the years. Arguably the greatest value of this book to the investigation is its purpose, as it centred around questions such as “What was the significance of the Ardeatine Massacre?”3; this is of course very closely linked to the research question and therefore the book contains very relevant and accurate information which will be key for this investigation. However, this source does not come without its limitations, the first being Portelli’s political orientation, which he does not make secret in his book and even admits himself it inevitably influenced his opinion on the event. This is because the author is very strongly left wing, therefore he is unlikely to extensively criticise the actions of the GAP members who were also left wing, this without mentioning that he would strongly be opposed to the opinion of the Church. Another significant limitation to consider is the nature of the research conducted by Portelli, this is because the book is in great part based on oral accounts and interviews. Therefore, Portelli could have chosen to only include parts of the interviews which backed his claims or even slightly altered the words used by the people interviewed, changing the meaning to something more convenient to his argument.

Investigation (1158words)
The Via Rasella Attack took place on March 23,1944 in Rome, led by eleven members of the Patriotic Action Groups (GAP) against the 11th company of the 3rd battalion of the Polizei Regiment Bozen4, comprising 156 Germans marching through Via Rasella. It involved the explosion of a bomb placed by the GAP members in response to the occupation of Rome which left 32 men of the Regiment dead and 110 wounded including two Italian civilians, and is regarded as the direct cause of the Ardeatine Massacre, which saw the execution of 335 innocent Italians in German retaliation. Although the criminal nature of the Ardeatine Massacre has never been questioned, Italians remain divided on the nature of the Attack, and to what extent its orchestrators are responsible for the Massacre5. This controversy also portrays the antagonism between the Vatican Church and Communist ideals, whose mutual exclusiveness and “need for total and definite answers”6 has long divided Italians, and is therefore a key to understanding Italy’s society today. Therefore, this investigation will explore the controversy surrounding the Attack in an attempt to clear the GAP members’ name and put an end to a nearly century-long debate.
The Vatican’s argument was the first one to gain popularity and is still widely accepted today by most Italians, in great part due to the pivotal role played by the Church in Italian society. As asserted by Mario Fiorentini (one of those responsible for the attack) in an interview released in the 1990s, “in Rome, if you ask ten people about Via Rasella, three of them will probably support the GAP members, two of them will be undecided and the last five will be opposed to it”7. This seems justified when considering the GAP members are responsible, at the very least, to the extent that their actions were what ultimately triggered the German retaliation. This was made clear by the statement released by the Germans two days after the attack, stating that for each of the 32 Germans soldiers killed, ten Italians were to be executed8, in a reprisal directly under Hitler’s orders to ‘shake the world’9. This ultimately led the Church to claim that the men were ‘irresponsible’ and not respectful of human life10, as they should have contemplated the consequences of their actions before carrying out the attack, especially when considering that for several previous attacks which occurred in Rome, the Germans had answered with reprisals11. Although the church undoubtedly exaggerates the amount of blame which can be attributed to the GAP members, labelling the men as ‘irresponsible’ can certainly be justified when taking into account how little the possible repercussions of the attack were considered before it was carried out. It is for these reasons that the Church views the men as responsible for the Ardeatine Massacre, as they claim the 335 Italian lives could have been spared had the GAP members thought twice before attacking.
Critics from the left however argue that although the attack and subsequent massacre are clearly connected, they are separate events and should be judged accordingly12. Contrary to what is claimed by the Church, there had been several other occasions of violence against the Germans which did not result into a reprisal. Although there had also been other episodes where the Germans had punished the attacks of the Italians, none of them even came close to the size of the Ardeatine Massacre, the largest involving fourteen people killed on June 4 in the Storta Massacre13. Furthermore, none of the previous massacres had the Germans explicitly state that the killings were in response to an Italian attack14, making it impossible for the GAP members to predict the German reaction to Via Rasella. The unpredictability and brutality of the reprisal is what led Vittorio Foa (a founding fathers of the Italian Republic) to claim that “Jews were killed for being Jews, anti-fascists were killed just for what they thought and what they did, men who had nothing to do with it (the Attack) were killed just because they were numbers, needed to complete the order.”15 Such claims are supported when considering that the Germans’ true goal was not to punish the city for Via Rasella in particular, but for the resistance as a whole; Via Rasella was simply the excuse needed by the Germans. This was made clear by Kesselring himself (one of the German generals behind the Massacre) at his trial, who admitted that it was of little importance who was killed, but rather essential to send a message to the city to prevent future attacks16. Furthermore, it is striking that the Church chooses to focus not on the Germans who ultimately killed those 335 Italians, but rather the GAP members- although the attack might have given an excuse for the massacre to be carried out, in the end it was the criminal actions of the Nazis which caused it. GAP itself was incapable of stopping the massacre in any way, as Kesselring admitted, contrary to the myth spread by the Church, that the Germans never made any requests for its members to be arrested, found or to turn themselves in order to avoid the massacre17.
Further criticism from the left is aimed directly at the Church, particularly at Pope Pius XIII’s response to the attack. More specifically, in the book Death in Rome, Robert Katz claims that the Pope was aware of a possible German reprisal, and despite his power to potentially avoid it he decided to not speak out and rather attack the GAP members and left hundreds to be massacred in his own city18. This was allegedly motivated by Pius’ fear of a potential Communist uprising in Rome, leading him to condemn the actions of the GAP members in the Osservatore Romano, and use the massacre to his advantage in hope that it would eradicate further Communist resistance19. Despite the lack of sufficient evidence to definitively prove the Pope’s awareness of the reprisal due to the difficulty in accessing documents from the Vatican’s archives, the controversy has yet to extinguish today2021. If these claims were to be finally proved true, it would demonstrate that the Vatican's accusations towards the GAP members were entirely motivated by their own agenda, making such claims lose all credibility, offering an even stronger argument for the innocence of the GAP.
To conclude, the GAP members had no way to predict the German reaction to the attack and, although their actions were perhaps not thoroughly thought out and had very little military effectiveness, it was the Germans who slaughtered 335 Italians, not them. Therefore, contrary to popular belief, those responsible for the Via Rasella attack can only be considered responsible for the Ardeatine Massacre to the extent that it was their actions which were used as an excuse to trigger the killings, but does not justify full culpability for the deaths of the 335 Italians killed.

Reflection (369 words)
This investigation has enabled me to explore an important event in the history of my own country, which is still relevant today and extensively debated about.
The biggest challenge I faced in the investigation was the nature of my research question. Although I attempted to base all my claims and evaluation purely on facts, due to the answer to my question not being completely objective, there was room for a certain level of interpretation which was based on my morals and beliefs, or the ones of other historians. This taught me how history can be viewed and interpreted in different ways based on our values, and how this can make answering questions such as mine hard for historians.
Furthermore, this investigation educated me about the implications of oral history, and the values and limitations which come with it. For example, particularly striking in Portelli’s book, was how despite some of the witnesses who were interviewed did not remember the events correctly, rather than disregarding their accounts, Portelli used them to enrich the way we understand the past, by showing how it is perceived by those who experienced it, pointing out that the way events are remembered is just as important as the events themselves. This inevitably led me to question how much weight can be given to these accounts, and whether being able to reconstruct exactly what happened would have been more valuable to an historian, giving me an understanding of how facts and events are only one part of history and how this is a challenge faced by historians which I had not considered before.
Lastly, my investigation illustrated to me the intricate relationship between historical truth and legal truth. Throughout my research, I came across numerous trials regarding the Via Rasella Attack and the Ardeatine Massacre and the blame which can be attributed to the GAP members, which all came to different conclusions from the same historical facts. This made me realise how many “judicial truths” can originate from the one historical truth, which then become part of history themselves. Thus, leading me to question whether the law should be left out of historical investigations in order to avoid changing the way an event was originally perceived.

Bibliography
- Bettini, MIchele and Paolo Pezzini. “Guerra ai Civili”, Marsilio, May 9 1997.
- Bocca, Giorgio. Storia dell’ Italia Partigiana. Settembre 1943- Maggio 1945, Milano, Mondadori,
1996
- Federigo, Argentieri. I comunisti e via Rasella. L'attentato inspiegabile, in Corriere della Sera, La
Lettura, 12 May 2019.
- Foa, Vittorio. Introduzione a Mario Avagliano, Il partigiano Tevere. Il Generale Sabato Martelli
Castaldi dalla vie dell'aria alle Fosse Ardeatine, Avagliano, Cava dei Tirreni 1996.
- Katz, Robert. Morte a Roma. Il massacro delle Fosse Ardeatine, Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1996.
- Kesselring,Albert. testimony at the trial against generals von Mackensen and Mältzer, November 1946.
- “L’ordine è Già Stato Eseguito.” Donzelli Editore, 2019, www.donzelli.it/libro/9788860366030.
- Miccoli, Giovanni. See ex plurimis the important studies, I dilemmi e i silenzi di Pio
- XII. Vaticano, Seconda guerra mondiale e Shoah, Milano: Rizzoli, 2007
- Neri, Riccardo. Nuovo Progetto Storia, vol. 3 , La Nuova Italia, Firenze 1994.
-
- Resta, Giorgio and Vincenzo Zeno-Zencovich. “Judicial “Truth” and Historical “Truth” : The Case
of the Ardeatine Caves Massacre”, Jstor, Nov. 2013.
- Riccardi,Andrea. L'inverno più lungo. 1943-1944: Pio XII, gli ebrei e i nazisti a Roma, Rome-Bari:
Laterza, 2008.
- Sheehan Thomas. New York Review of Books, Jan. 22 1981.
- “Via Rasella Attack - Europe Remembers.” Europe Remembers, 2020 “Via Rasella Attack - Europe Remembers.” Europe Remembers, 2020 https://europeremembers.com/destination/via- rasella-attack/
- "23 marzo 1944: azione partigiana a Via Rasella". Controappuntoblog.org. 23 March 2012.

 History IA - 2021/2022
To what extent was Mussolini an ‘honest broker’ in the 1938 Munich Conference?
Word Count: 2200

SECTION A: SOURCE EVALUATION - 521 words

Source A: The Ciano Diaries, 1937 - 1943, curated by Renzo De Felice. Published in 1946, Galeazzo Ciano was the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1936 - 1943
 

Ciano’s diary covers the decisive years between January 1937 up to February 1943, in which he also added a postscript from prison in Verona a few days before his execution2, where he explains the purpose of his diaries. In this postscript Ciano claims that the purpose of his diaries is to “exclude any falsehood”, and declares that “not a single word of what he claims, is false or exaggerated or dictated by selfish resentment.”3 Nevertheless Eugenio di Rienzo in 1980, describes its reliability as “contaminated”, where dates, facts and chronological errors are prevalent4. Despite this, upon the translated publication in 19465, Sumner Welles considered it as one of “the most valuable historical document of our time” because of the deep insight in Hitler’s and Mussolini’s motives6. Such contrasting opinions make this source evaluation challenging, but given the lack of original documents from Mussolini’s time as dictator limiting evidence of political, economic and military actions made at the time, this source’s content and origin makes it highly valuable for this investigation which specifically assesses Mussolini’s Foreign Policy. Ciano himself as Mussolini’s son-in-law and Foreign Minister, recorded a series of diary entries leading up to and during the Munich conference, in which he himself was part of, therefore its current and present content and origin from Munich increases its value.Reading his diary it is clear to see that at the end of September, the atmosphere was indecisive and tense in the Italian government, around the matter of Czechoslovakia, as Mussolini himself shared with Ciano his doubts and thought upon the matter, all able to provide valuable insight to this investigation.
 

Source B: ‘Mussolini and the Second World War, 1933-1940’ published in 2003 by Robert Mallett, a lecturer of Modern History at the University of Birmingham

Published very recently, Mallett offers a post-revisionist review of Italian foreign policy on the origins of WWII. This is valuable to historians as it re-examines the controversial debate of Mussolini and Fascist Italy’s international conflict during the war. This book too offers a section on Mussolini’s involvement in Munich, which is often overseen when studying this conference in 1938. This detailed analysis of Mussolini in WWII, was filled with valuable detailed content of Italy’s army during the war and before, as well as the coexisting matters evolving during Munich elsewhere. Contrastingly, this book covers almost 7 years of Italian history leading up to and during World War II, therefore Munich itself was dedicated to a very small section and it is clear that the author is not an expert simply in Munich, which identifies as a limitation for this investigation. The origin of the book however shows different aspects as the author had privileged access to until now unseen archival materials and also interviewed Italian historians, professors and Foreign Ministers allowing him to assess more personal and cultural considerations8. The origin of this book, written by a British historian, may limit its reliability due to the language barrier between the author and the significant and numerous Italian people that helped his research. Overall, this source is valuable to this investigation as it offers the unusual perspective of Mussolini’s role in the Munich Conference, however to historians this source may not offer the real Italian perspective on WWII and the unfolding of the events.

SECTION B: INVESTIGATION - 1299 words
At 10 a.m. the morning of September 28th Mussolini accepted the role of mediator9 at the Munich Conference to help Britain negotiate with Hitler in hope of maintaining peace in Europe. The day before, British ambassador in Rome, Lord Perth, suggested that Mussolini be asked to act as a peace-maker10 and meet with Hitler, Chamberlain and Daladier with the purpose of carving Czechoslovakia to prevent a war. Steiner argues that Mussolini thus suddenly found himself in the position that he most coveted, to save Europe from war. This investigation will investigate if Mussolini was truly acting sincerely, and consider what possible motivations he would have had stemming from either militaristic, ideological or diplomatic considerations to benefit Italy’s foreign policy. This investigation offers a deeper understanding of Mussolini’s often disregarded role in the Munich Conference of 1938, and whether his involvement was driven by honest motivations.
Certainly Italy’s lack of military resources seemed to have been one of the most significant motivations for Mussolini to attend Munich and to have agreed to help Britain prevent war in 1938. On September 27th, the day before the Munich conference Ciano and the Italian general staff planned for Italy’s initial preparations for war11. Mallet on the other hand, highlights that at the time in 1938, Italy was militarily involved in the Spanish Civil war and years prior in the Abyssinian Crisis in 1934 too12. He then specified that these conflicts indicated that the Regio Esercito had the capacity of only fighting a defensive battle on the Alpine frontiers, and would be unable to carry out an offensive action in Europe13. Furthermore, the Regia Marina could not take major initiative in the case of superior enemy attacks, from powers such as Britain and France14. It seemed that at the time of the Munich Conference and following the request of Italy’s involvement, there were signs of considerable unease in Rome, particularly from Ciano.15 In fact, according to Ciano’s diary entry of September 20th, merely a week from the Munich conference, Berti had shared with him that the military seemed to be behind schedule due to troops fighting the Red Army showing signs of being tired and unable to carry on fighting16. It was clear that Ciano had no wish to get involved in a conflict over a question Italy had no interest in17. Additionally, Mussolini’s already dubious involvement in the Spanish Civil War did not seem to be paid off after two years, where it seemed possible that Franco might accept a negotiated peace, leaving the Italians with little to show for their effort18. Indeed, Ciano records that the Duce, already skeptical of Spain, believed that it would result in a loss of the 4 billion credits19. According to these claims it seemed that not only did Mussolini believe that Spain was not worth his men and resources, but he had no hopes of getting Franco’s support in any future war. Mussolini’s support to Britain to agree on an appeasement for Hitler, would have played in his favour of needing more time for rearmament, training troops and increasing military resource production. Mussolini, so full of clusters when war was far away, now became increasingly reluctant even to support Germany over Czechoslovakia20, knowing that Italy was not prepared for war21. Yet, in October 1938, the Italian masses were evincing anything but a militaristic urge as they rejoiced in the preservation of peace in their time22 and mussolini was willing to sacrifice his conflict-driven, aggressive policy.
Possibly Mussolini’s motivation did not lie behind military considerations at all and they were not honest either; during Munich, it seemed that Mussolini did not have direct interest in destroying Czechoslovakia, but he was pleased to join in on its dismemberment23, meaning that his motivations were ideological. As part of his Fascist Foreign Policy, following his discontent and resentment of the Treaty of Versailles, Czechoslovakia was a one of the ‘morgel states’ of the Versailles diplomacy, for Italy and Germany its destruction was the key to the Versailles arch24. In January 1924, France was the only major power to conclude an alliance with Czechoslovakia25. In fact, to Mussolini the Czech state represented French interests in southeast Europe, of a country with a taint of liberal internationalism that Mussolini detested26. Franco-Czech relations played a role in strengthening Mussolini’s discontent towards Czechoslovakia, already in 1935; when Czechoslovakia strongly supported the League of Nations in imposing sanctions against Italy after the Abyssinian Crisis27. Furthermore, according to Italian Intelligence, it seemed rebels when fighting in Abyssinia28. In addition, having turned down Ribbentrop’s idea of a full-blown military alliance in early May, the Duce came to view the burgeoning Czech crisis as offering him the opportunity to pursue his own aims in the Mediterranean29. There was no better cover for a sudden unexpected coup in the Mediterranean, when the focus Anglo-French policy and high-level discussions centered exclusively on Hitler and central Europe, which, if executed effectively by the fascist armed forces, might well deliver Tunisia, Egypt and Suez, and would compel Germany to fight on Italy’s side30. But ultimately, the italian forces never executed such a coup, however Mussolini’s unexpected turn-about over intervention seemed to have been the decisive factor for Hitler’s decision to cancel mobilitation31
Going further, what is often not considered are Mussolini’s motivations stemming from diplomatic interests for the future, by attempting to get closer to Britain and break Anglo-French relations, otherwise Italy would end itself against the powerful allies32. The Duce had begun his programme of separating the French and British enemies, through a series of agreements with only Britain. In April 1938, the Easter Accords between Italy and Britain were signed in Rome, facilitating further cooperations between the two powers, “to keep world order.”33 Ciano refers that the nature of these agreements emphasized on being Anti-French and was destined to accentuate French isolation34. Mussolini in this perspective thus was not a peacemaker or pacific dictator, which is what may have shocked France, given its optimism on establishing Italo-French accords. Now it appeared that Mussolini abruptly refused to agree to all French proposals, making it impossible to come to terms35. Mussolini aimed to drive a wedge between the Western democracies in an attempt to isolate France36. Imminent to the Munich Conference, Ciano quotes Mussolini saying that “If the conflict [would] arise in Germany, Prague, Paris and Moscow, [Italy] will remain neutral. If Great Britain intervenes, generalizing the conflict and adding an ideological character... Italy and fascism will be unable to remain neutral”37. This claim demonstrates how his aim was built upon the involvement of whether France and Britain were to come together in the same conflict, where their ideologies had a chance to merge against fascism. Ciano’s that Czechoslovakia, supported by France, offered military aid to the Ethiopian diary offers an insight on the inside discussions and opinions about France right before the Munich Conference on 28 September. Mussolini believed that any step from Blodel would be counterproductive38, therefore he ordered his diplomats to do something about France’s involvement to not take part in the Czechoslovakia crisis as a diplomatic move.
In conclusion such evidence discussed makes a short shift of Mussolini’s much debated role of ‘peacemaker’ at the Munich conference39. A series of considerations made up Mussolini’s motivation to get involved and be the ‘honest broker’, for example Italy's military stability being nonexistent and his ideological hatred towards Czechoslovakia. However, the biggest defining consideration for Mussolini’s intent to be the ‘honest broker’ at the Conference was motivated by his programme of breaking Anglo-French accords and agreements which could prove to be threatening in a distant future, rather than peace. His citizens cheered on Mussolini in great crowds from the Brenner to Rome as ‘the angel of peace’40 and for a short period of time, he was the ‘saviour of Europe’41.

SECTION C: REFLECTION - 379 words
One of the main issues faced in this investigation was the language translation. Though history resources and evidence are constantly being translated, it can easily play a role in miscommunication. Non-Italian historians may misuse, misinterpret and misunderstand the real purpose behind a certain decision or argument. For example, the leakage concerns from the British embassy in Rome were changed to say in the English versions the documents were “shown” to the Italians, whereas in the Italian version, Ciano describes the documents being flinched42. These slight changes among others, were found between the two versions, and for the purpose of this investigation and the value of my sources I tried to avoid mistranslations and translated the Italian version myself.
Another limitation I found throughout my research upon Mussolini’s war intents, was the lack of information and secondary sources around Mussolini’s role in WWII. At times this investigation seemed bigger than I expected, because even though Mussolini was a significant figure of WWII, sources about the leader’s intentions tended to focus on Hitler rather than smaller powers. For example, information about the intentions of Mussolini’s choice of signing accords with Britain, and not with France, were barely ever relevant in research papers. Possibly, documents and research from the time were purposely destroyed for exactly the purpose of hiding evidence for the future. This lack of information and research of Mussolini’s war intent, made it challenging to build my own conclusion of Mussolini's role and intent in Munich.
Furthermore, a less significant issue with this investigation is that during the war, Mussolini was seen as a peacemaker by many, since at the time Hitler was the center of attention as the evil figure. It seemed that, as I mentioned in my investigation, France and Britain did not have a problem with asking him to be mediator. However, as soon as the war was over this view of Mussolini drastically changed for the worse43. Therefore, this drastic change in views of the dictator, had a serious effect on the resources I found, as they were opposing completely, making it challenging to make an argument myself. Perhaps, he is given more credit than he deserved, however he was in power for more than 22 years which made him a successful leader to a country.

Bibliography
Books/Academic papers:
● A.J.P Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (1967)
● Bernard Wall, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), vol. 23, no. 4
(1947)
● Christian Goeschel, The Munich Crisis, politics and the people: Mussolini, Munich and the Italian
People (2021)
● David Vital, Czechoslovakia and the powers - September 1938 (1966)
● Emilio Gin, Speak of War and Prepare for War: Rome, 10 June 1940 (2016)
● Galeazzo Ciano, Ciano’s Diary 1937 - 1940 ( 1946)
● G. Bruce Strang, In Dubious Battle: Mussolini’s mentality and Italian foreign policy, 1936 - 1939
(2000)
● G. Bruce Strang, The Munich Crisis, 1938: War and Peace - Mussolini’s road to Munich (2005)
● Gaudens, Megaro, The American Historical Review: The Ciano Diaries (1948)
https://doi.org/10.2307/1841784.
● Richard J. B. Bosworth, Mussolini - Chapter 14: Crisis in Europe 1936 – 1938 (2001)
● Robert Mallet, Mussolini and the Second World War, 1933 - 1940 (2005)
● Zara Steiner, The Triumph of the Dark (2011)
Websites/Articles:
● Encyclopaedia Britannica: "Galeazzo Ciano, conte di Cortellazzo", 14 Mar. 2021,
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Galeazzo-Ciano-Conte-di-Cortellazzo.
● Paolo Mieli, Corriere della Sera: ‘Non fidatevi del Diario di Ciano, e una trappola tesa agli storici’,
(19 Nov. 2018)
https://www.corriere.it/cultura/18_novembre_18/ciano-diario-salerno-eugenio-di-rienzo-ae6cfc
fc-eb56-11e8-a3a7-d3b748828557.shtml
● Routledge World’s Who is Who, Who is Robert MALLET https://www.worldwhoswho.com/public/views/entry.html?id=sl2176226
     

See my personal page on Mussolini's Rome then and now