Did Churchill have prior knowledge that Coventry was going to be bombed?
Word Count: 2200
On
the night of November 14th, 1940, the city of Coventry was heavily
bombed by the Luftwaffe.1 The brutal attack resulted in a firestorm
which destroyed industries, homes, and the famous Coventry cathedral. 2
After the raid, an estimated 507 civilians were dead, with over 400
seriously injured.3 In the 1970’s British war information was
declassified and the revelation that the Allies had been able to crack
the enigma code early in the war led to discussion as to whether the
government had advance warning of the attack4. The different
perspectives regarding this revelation are one side claiming that
Churchill had no prior knowledge of the attack, such as prominent
historian Martin Gilbert in his source Coventry, What Really Happened,
whilst others claim that Churchill had advance warning of the attack,
and sacrificed the city to protect the enigma code, the most notable
supporter of this theory being F.W Winterbotham in The Ultra Secret.
This essay will analyse and investigate Winterbotham and Gilbert’s
sources to answer the question: Did Churchill have prior knowledge that
Coventry was going to be bombed?
Section A
Source 1:
The Ultra Secret, by Group Captain F.W Winterbotham. First Published in
1974. The first major work published to accuse Churchill of prior
knowledge of the attack.
Although flawed, the Ultra
Secret is the first piece to accuse Churchill of prior knowledge of the
attack and is thus suitable to consult when investigating the myth.
Winterbotham claims the British had prior knowledge of the German plans
to attack Coventry yet chose not to act lest the Germans realise that
they had cracked the enigma code.5 Upon its release, the British
government sought legal action against the publication, possibly
indicating the contents must have been important if the government
wished to restrict distribution. The purpose of the source is to argue
that the allies were using the enigma code to predict German operations,
thus providing focus on the topic of investigation. However, whilst
Winterbotham was a highly ranked group captain present at Bletchley, it
is striking how many facts he gets wrong. He states in his preface that
he “had no access to official records”7 during writing which limits the
factual evidence included. He describes Ultra as decisive for in Allied
victory8, whilst making other errors. Kahn writes “The American
solutions of the Japanese diplomatic and naval cryptosystems had nothing
to do with the breaking of Enigma.”9 Despite the source’s limitations,
it is still -even today- a highly controversial account.
Source 2:
Martin Gilbert’s article, Coventry: What Really happened? Published in the quarterly publication Finest Hour 141, Winter 2008-2009. Focuses on countering Winterbotham’s argument and defending Churchill.
Described
as “one of the world’s most prolific historians”10 Gilbert was Winston
Churchill’s official biographer11, succeeding Randolph Churchill to
filter Churchill’s documents into a multi-volume biography, allowing him
access to less readily available files. The source’s purpose is to
counter Winterbotham’s points, defending Churchill from the claims that
he allowed Coventry’s destruction, stating that “Enigma had revealed a
raid in prospect, but not the target”13. Gilbert adds value by directly
focusing on countering Winterbotham’s arguments. For those specifically
investigating this event, it provides detail such as exact dates and
times. The contents are often cited to other sources, allowing the
reader to branch off and investigate further and the author also
provides value as a respected historian who can research and write an
unbiased piece. However, someone who spent so long writing about
Churchill may feel that by defending his subject, he is defending
himself as Gilbert even states he “corresponded with many hundreds of
Churchill’s contemporaries, and came to know a good number of them as
friends”14. Although Gilbert may have been Churchill’s official
biographer, his job was simply to filter his documents into a concise
account. Churchill could have lied in his documents, and Gilbert is
hardly in a position to know Churchill’s actions behind closed doors,
especially since Churchill died before enigma was revealed to the
public, meaning that Gilbert has to fill blanks that Churchill may have
left.
Section B
Such is the notoriety of the Coventry bombing myth, that it has recently been made into a play by Alan Pollock. Titled One Night in November, the piece tells the story of a Bletchley park worker torn between telling the truth about cracking the enigma code to save the woman he loves, or to remain silent for the greater good15, displaying the significance and durability of this myth. Section B will further analyse Winterbotham and Gilbert’s sources along with additional evidence to argue that Churchill had no advance warning of the Coventry bombing. Winterbotham claims that Churchill had advance warning of the Coventry bombing due to a decrypted message that passed through Bletchley Park. The message came through on the 14th of November at 3 p.m., mere hours before the raid was due to begin16. In the message, Winterbotham claims that “instead of a city with a code name, Coventry was spelt out”17. He then mentions that he passed the message on to Churchill’s secretary, as Churchill was in a meeting18. Brown maintains a similar story to Winterbotham, claiming that Churchill had knowledge of an upcoming attack on Coventry, but states the message was received on the 12th of November, two days in advance19. Brown’s suggested time would have given Churchill a longer period in which to take counter measures against the German attack, but the large discrepancy in his time compared to Winterbotham’s makes his story questionable, which may be due to the fact that on November 12th a message was intercepted at Bletchley, with three encoded names for three separate cities – ‘umbrella’ for Birmingham, ‘all one price’ for Wolverhampton and ‘corn’, which later turned out to be Coventry, but wasn’t decrypted at the time20. Brown has worked off of what has been proven as fact, but incorporated Winterbotham’s claims about a decoded city name.
Singh
agrees that the Allies had cracked the enigma code, stating that it was
crucial in Allied interception of U-boats, and the arena of war in
North Africa21. He does not mention Coventry specifically; however, he
implies that Churchill had advance warning of events taking place around
the time of the bombing and mentions that Churchill and his advisors
were careful with how they responded to these messages22. Additionally,
Singh writes that The Ultra Secret was a necessary piece of literature
that commended the work of the cryptanalysts at Bletchley Park,
supporting Winterbotham and his work. 23 Therefore, there is a
possibility that Churchill may have had advance warning about Coventry,
due to the decoded message at Bletchley park, and Winterbotham’s
subsequent call to Downing Street.
However, Gilbert argues that
Churchill had no definitive advance warning of the Coventry bombing. He
claims that decrypts made it clear there would be a large raid on a
British city a few days prior to the November 14th attack24. However,
the target and general location of the raid was not specified. With no
definitive location provided, it would have been impossible for
Churchill to make a decision as to which city should be defended, and
the intelligence department was already guessing as to what the other
locations were25. With no substantial evidence to suggest that this
third city was Coventry, it is unreasonable to assume that Churchill
could have known that this city was the target of the raid. Aside from
the first two letters of corn and Coventry being the same, there is
little to connect them, and even when the ‘c’ of corn is replaced with a
‘k’ for a German spelling, it translates to grain or kernel26, which
may suggest a more agricultural target -not the highly industrial
Coventry. Other aspects of the message also prove Churchill could not
have known Coventry was the target. The codename for the raid -
moonlight sonata- suggested a full moon, which fell on the 15th to the
20th, whilst Coventry was bombed on the night of the 14th. Dr Jones
-who was present at Downing Street on the evening of Winterbotham’s
supposed telephone call- recalls that there were no calls made to the
building, and that he travelled “home that night wondering where the
raid would be”28. Jones was at Downing Street to collect decryption
files and was a crucial figure in the decryption department during
the war.29 If a call had come through with such a crucial message, then
surely someone as trusted and involved with codebreaking as Jones would
have been notified, which makes Winterbotham’s claim dubious.
Additionally, Colville claims that it was not Ultra that revealed the
location of the raid, and that Churchill and Downing Street only knew
the location of the imminent raid once German navigational beams
intersected over Coventry.
Colville
was present at Downing street on the night, and as Churchill’s private
secretary, he would have been informed of Winterbotham’s phone call, if
he were not the one to receive it himself31. Earlier information came
from less reliable sources. On November 9th, a German pilot was captured
and interrogated, resulting in him providing information regarding a
raid on either Coventry or Birmingham between the 15th and the 20th of
November32. Although the pilot’s information proved to be mostly
accurate with hindsight, there was no way of knowing at the time whether
he was being truthful, or whether he was lying to throw the British off
the scent33. It is also unlikely that one pilot would have the plans to
an upcoming raid almost a week in advance, since fluctuating weather
and the bombing of airfields in occupied territory would also mean that
plans would be susceptible to change34, therefore, it was logical that
Churchill and the interrogators did not believe the pilot’s claims.
Another report on potential targets arrived on Churchill’s desk on the
14th naming the Thames valley, Central and Greater London, or the Essex
or Kent coasts as likely targets for the raid. The information itself
was obtained by the Air Intelligence Service, a trusted source which
would have swayed Churchill’s judgement and convinced him that southern
Britain was the target. Information obtained at a later date was more
reliable, as the British could intercept German radio beams, and roughly
predict the targets of raids35. Churchill would have known of this
technology, and if he read a report estimating these targets in a
similar location, then it would have been unlikely for him not to
believe it.
The
vast amount of information that was provided to Churchill in such a
short period of time would have made it exceptionally difficult to
establish which city was the target of the upcoming raid and to decide
upon a course of action. After the analysis of multiple sources and
further investigation, it can be concluded that Winston Churchill did
not have advance warning that Coventry was going to be bombed. Although
Winterbotham and Brown make similar claims, there are serious errors in
their stories, and a clear lack of agreement. This is seen through the
supposed times at which the message came through. Although Gilbert
occasionally makes claims that could play into the myth, such as the
enemy pilot providing future targets, it is understandable why the
pilot’s credibility was questioned. There were also better-informed
people advising Churchill otherwise and the other clues that may have
made Coventry the obvious target were too vague. Therefore, it is highly
likely that Churchill had no definitive advance warning that Coventry
would be bombed.
Reflection
Throughout
this investigation, I encountered a variety of challenges that have
allowed me to develop as a history student. I found it odd to be
researching whether a man I have grown up knowing as a hero and a widely
respected historical figure was actually responsible for the death of
hundreds of innocents. This revision of history to find new faults in
previously worshipped figures may be necessary at times, as new
information can provide a more accurate perspective, however, if we
continue the revision of history, then eventually there will no longer
be anyone who is exempt from criticism. All historical figures have made
mistakes, and many are deeply flawed, yet we choose to spotlight
certain ones to knock them off their pedestals. In this case the real
enemy should be Hitler, who condemned the bombing, instead of Churchill
who couldn’t have known for sure whether it was coming or not. There
were also other events taking place at the time that will have been more
pressing for Churchill to address, as he was thrust into the position
of Prime Minister following Neville Chamberlain’s death, even receiving
files on potential raids when leaving Chamberlain’s funeral36. Another
aspect that was a barrier to obtaining valid information was that fact
that the Coventry bombing has become an urban myth. When an event
becomes so notorious, rumours and opinions often end up being framed as
truth, which can distort the facts surrounding the event, making
research difficult. In an age of fake news and conspiracy theories, it
is nothing new for a leader or prominent figure to be accused of such
horrific actions, and their defenders to be accused of bias. Which
current events and figures will become the victims of such lies or myths
in the future, and how many or these events are currently unknown to
us, 36 Gilbert, Martin. “Coventry: What really Happened.” Finest Hour
141. 2008. Sourced from:
https://winstonchurchill.org/resources/myths/coventry-what-really-happened/
due to be revealed? It provokes thought onto the malleability of
history and how our current views and opinions shape our opinion of the
past.
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