Was America’s enactment on the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution justified?
Extended Essay
Was the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Incident a Valid Basis for US Escalation in Vietnam?
IB Subject: History
Word Count: 3952
Research Question: To what extent was the Gulf of Tonkin Incident a valid basis for escalating US involvement in Vietnam in 1964, based on contemporaneous evidence?
Introduction
Overview
During the Cold War, a period of increased United States involvement in international conflict made Vietnam one of the most significant battlegrounds in its struggle against the Domino Theory [1] and the fear of communist ideology spreading through the East [1]. While the number of United States’ military advisors in Vietnam grew throughout the 1950’s and early 1960’s [4], troops were not permitted into the nation until President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the document that allowed the United States to fully intervene in the Vietnamese conflict: The Tonkin Gulf Resolution (See Appendix 1), following two alleged attacks on US ships in Vietnam’s Gulf of Tonkin (See Appendix 2) on August 2 and 4 [1]. The Resolution (August 7, 1964) allowed Johnson to take “all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the United States” [5], essentially providing the United States with a ‘blank cheque’ to wage war on North Vietnam, as the ‘necessary measures’ were deliberately not specified and allowed for all US aggression to be justified [1]. This led to Operation Rolling Thunder from 1965 to 1968, longer than any US air operation during World War II in Europe by three years [6], which marked the severity of US escalation in Vietnam and emphasized the destruction that occurred in the wake of Johnson’s resolution [1, 4]. It aimed to “prevent any further aggression” [7], painting North Vietnam as the aggressor in the situation and omitting the doubts that surrounded this claim at the time [4].
While the first attack was confirmed by the discovery of North Vietnamese shells on the deck of the Maddox [8], the second incident concerning the alleged attacks on both the Maddox and Turner Joy destroyers was already facing some scrutiny by the time of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution’s signing, which US policymakers in Washington were aware of [9]. Thus, the contemporaneous evidence that was available enables debate to be held on whether the Gulf of Tonkin reason and its limited credibility were justifiable enough to go to war with [4]. A prime example of the uncertainty surrounding the second attack occurred on August 4th at 14:08, when Admiral Ulysses Sharp Jr, in response to the validity of this attack, relayed to Washington: “Oh, no doubt about that […] I think. No doubt about that” [10]. Sharp’s pause, particularly distinct when listening to the recording, highlights the obvious hesitation felt by even high-ranking US officials present during the attack, his uncertainty questioning whether the information policymakers had about the attack was truly enough to justify full-scale intervention in Vietnam [4]. The suspicion and quick judgment of the Tonkin Gulf Incident, therefore, begs the question: To what extent was the Gulf of Tonkin Incident a valid basis for escalating US involvement in Vietnam in 1964, based on contemporaneous evidence? [4].
The ever-growing presence of manipulation of information in today’s political systems highlights the continued relevance of the chosen research question [4]. This can be seen with the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003; the nation was invaded under the pretext of having illegal weapons of mass destruction, a claim that turned out to be false [11]. Similar to Vietnam and the US in 1964, ideological differences and a buildup of military conflict [12] between Iraq and the US fueled the eventual invasion [4]. This event highlights the dangers of accepting truths without proper investigation and exemplifies how the research question and its implications remain as relevant today in 2025 as they were 61 years ago in 1964 [4]. Examining the justification that the United States provided for war in 1964 raises questions about what constitutes as evidence for large-scale conflict on a global level, and may cause re-evaluation of foreign involvement and policymaking [4].
Methodology
A challenge in researching the Tonkin Gulf Incident lies within the event’s historiography, as historians who have extensively researched the topic present a similar argument: United States officials knew more than they claimed about the August 4th attack, aware of the doubt surrounding the event [5]. By focusing on contemporaneous evidence, conclusions can be drawn from the number of people in Congress who were aware of the doubts at the time, and how Johnson's omission of information to members of Congress affected the support and justification of the resolution [5]. This will be examined by unclassified recordings of the incident, as doubts about the attacks were relayed to Johnson by McNamara and General Sharp from August 2-4 [5]. Another challenge is the balance of source origins; as the incident has predominantly US-based sources, it is difficult to provide a holistic view [5]. Vietnamese sources, such as maps and descriptions of vessel routes from the second attack, will be translated and compared with contemporaneous evidence from the US to gain insight into how each side of the conflict presented the events, how the accounts differed, and what this means when examining an event that has predominantly US-based sources and a resolution that was passed in the United States [5]. Comparing two charts of the movement of the USS Maddox on August 2, 1964, will allow for an investigation into how both sides present the event differently in order to manipulate its narrative [5]. Sources will be evaluated using OPCVL, prioritizing primary sources like the tapes for contextual reliability [5].
Publications such as the OAH Magazine of History and Edwin E Moïse’s 1996 Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War, which is regarded as the “authoritative work on the subject,” [13] as it was the first book to synthesise multiple evidence types (eg. interviews, government records), integrate Vietnamese sources into its analysis and offer the perspective that the second attack did not happen [2, 5]. This will be furthered by publications by Robert Hanyok and Neil Sheehan, exploring the military and political details, respectively, of the incident [5].
Analysis
US Foreign Policy Prior to the Gulf of Tonkin Incident
Whilst the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution may have directly stemmed from the attacks on August 2nd and 4th, the political context surrounding the United States and Vietnam before it provides alternative reasoning for why Johnson so readily escalated US involvement in Vietnam and felt the need to hastily draft a resolution to justify his actions [6].
In an environment surrounded by Cold War ideals, US policymakers were desperate to control communism in Vietnam [6]. McNamara and President Johnson expressed concern about the American people, noting in a 1964 meeting how Senator Richard Russell had reported that “The people don’t understand…We ought to … explain to them why South East Asia is important to us, as many of [Russell’s] constituents think it is not.” [6, 14]. It is unclear how many constituents Russell had as a senator of Georgia, and consequently, how many US citizens genuinely aligned with this statement, the political pressure Johnson was truly under remaining ambiguous due to the lack of clarity in the term ‘the American people’ [6]. Yet the quote still provides insight into a reason for Johnson's desire to escalate the conflict in Vietnam; he wanted to gain the support of the American public [6]. If presented with the belief that North Vietnam had attacked American troops, civilians would have a legitimate reason to start backing the war effort [6]. Public opinion polls in May and June of 1964 revealed 63% of Americans gave “no attention to developments in Vietnam” [15], the conflict never ranking among the nation’s top five concerns [6, 16]. This desire for prompt escalation in Vietnam as a reason for the passing of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution can further be evaluated in a meeting on June 10, 1964, when Robert McNamara stated to LBJ that “in the event of a dramatic event in Southeast Asia, we would go promptly for a Congressional Resolution” [6, 17]. This sheds light on the fact that the United States military was already preparing to go to war in Vietnam, suggesting that the Gulf of Tonkin Incident may have been a premeditated excuse to attack the North [6]. If so, the justification for passing the resolution becomes less credible, as the Gulf of Tonkin Incident was merely a scapegoat for plans shaped by the Cold War culture of 1964 [6].
Additionally, under the impression that North Vietnamese aggression was the root of troubles in the South, American policymakers engaged in, as described by Moïse, “very minor covert raids” [3] against North Vietnam [7]. Perhaps this was, as McNamara stated, to orchestrate a ‘dramatic event in Southeast Asia’ as a reason for war [7]. US policymakers presented these naval and air raids as South, Republic of Vietnam (RVN), raids only assisted by the US [7, 18]. This conveys how the US was initiating violence in Vietnam before the Tonkin Incident, seemingly trying to further pit North and South Vietnam against each other to justify intervention [7]. Furthermore, “The raids against the North Vietnamese coast were not really an RVN program carried out with American assistance; they could be better described as an American program carried out with RVN assistance.” [19], highlighting the fact that American policymakers were heavily provoking North Vietnam before the Tonkin Incident, initiating conflict through the RVN, before it was legal for them to fully intervene in the war [7]. Of these raids, an Operations Plan (OPLAN) 34A raid was completed on June 31, 1964, off the coast of North Vietnam when PTF (See Appendix 3) vessels attacked North Vietnamese posts on two islands (See Appendix 2) [7]. Hence, when the USS Maddox reported itself to be under attack from North Vietnamese naval vessels on August 2 [20], North Vietnamese forces may have believed they were protecting themselves from another OPLAN 34A-like raid [7]. Hence, although the Tonkin Gulf Resolution was justified due to alleged attacks on its navy vessels, other factors, such as aggressive US foreign policy with covert raids, came into play when North Vietnam struck back, inviting re-evaluation of the narrative of the August 2 attacks [7].
Contemporaneous Evidence from 2-4 August
The First Attack
The Tonkin Gulf incident began on the second of August 1964, as three North Vietnamese P-4 torpedo boats approached the Maddox [7]. American naval forces were the first to fire at the North Vietnamese torpedoes, yet this was not reported by the Johnson administration [7, 21]. This omission of information may have skewed US policymakers’ perception of events, supporting the narrative of North Vietnamese hostility and disallowing any notion of US aggression in the situation, ultimately not allowing for a fair judgment before the Resolution was passed [7]. Pro-US bias was cardinal in this event; shortly after the attack, North Vietnamese shells were found on the deck of the Maddox, North Vietnamese military action against the United States was confirmed [22], information once again being presented in favor of the US as North Vietnam was painted as the aggressor [7, 8]. Declassified recordings of conversations reveal crucial information about what information was available to US policymakers at the time of the resolution [8]. McNamara and Johnson revealed that they were “well aware of the connection” [23] between the August 2nd attack and the OPLAN 34A raid on June 31st [8]. This conversation was recorded on August 3rd, well before Congress passed the resolution; the source’s origin shows that Johnson was aware of how US actions may have been perceived by the North, shedding doubt on his statement that the attack was fully unprovoked [8]. However, the source’s content faces limitations, as after the call, it is unclear how much of Johnson and McNamara’s knowledge was actually passed on to policymakers in Washington, and if they also ignored this connection [8]. McNamara noted during the call that they had “four TP [McNamara means PT] boats from Vietnam…attack two islands,” and that “...with this destroyer in that same area, undoubtedly led [North Vietnamese forces] to connect the two events” , with the purpose of enlightening Johnson on the happenings in the Tonkin Gulf [8]. This shows that policymakers at the time, US President Lyndon B. Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, were aware of the implications of the OPLAN 34A raid and how this may have influenced the North Vietnamese attack on the Maddox [8]. However, on August 6 1964 in a congressional hearing, he omitted any knowledge of this connection , ultimately withholding the truth to make sure that the resolution was passed [8]. Visible patterns in McNamara’s character, such as omitting crucial information, support the notion that facts were deliberately hidden from Congress when approving the resolution [8]. Hence, while the evidence of the first attack remains accurate, although the aggressor in the situation remains unknown, there are discrepancies between US policymakers’ assumptions about the second attack and the actual timeline of events, revealed in both primary and secondary analysis [8].
When comparing US and Vietnamese accounts of the attack, small discrepancies in information reveal that the US narrative shaped the resolution, but this wasn’t the only account of what happened on August 2nd [8].
Figure 1: Vietnamese map of Naval Action on 2 August 1964
Vessels labelled “Tàu cua ta” are Vietnamese, and the vessel “Tàu cua dįch” is the Maddox. (Annotated by the author) [8, 9]
Figure 2: US map of Naval Action on 2 August 1964
The black line represents the path of the Maddox (Annotated by the author) [9]
This discrepancy illustrates potential propaganda used by North Vietnam and the US, cartographical errors highlighting the source’s purpose of shaping perceptions of the event, rather than objectively documenting it [9]. Nevertheless, Figure 1 remains valuable in showing how North Vietnam framed the August 2 attack; the Vietnamese map and description in the Encyclopedia claims that the Maddox was invading Vietnamese waters , perceived as a threat to the nation [9]. Furthermore, the maps have differing timestamps of the attack, where Figure 2 claims it occurred around 1600H, whilst the Vietnamese map shows this to be around 1500H [9]. This dissimilarity further highlights how official sources will differ and lose credibility in the pursuit of supporting their own narrative [9].
The inconsistencies between contemporaneous Vietnamese and American accounts of the August 2 attacks convey how both nations presented evidence to paint the other as an aggressor [9]. The separate timelines of events justify the resolution, but together highlight the limitations of working with contemporaneous sources that may have been hastily created with the intention of persuading [9].
The Second Attack
On August 4th, the second attack of the Gulf of Tonkin incident occurred, providing US policymakers with further reasoning to justify the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution [10]. The Maddox collected signals that three North Vietnamese torpedoes were ordered to enter its vicinity, and the United States Navy “concluded that it was an attack against [US vessels]” [10]. No reasoning was provided to back this claim, and the source shows US bias against North Vietnam, highlighting the snap judgments made by the Navy and consequently, policymakers [10]. The readiness of the US to engage in violence is reflective of the entire Gulf of Tonkin Resolution; once again, America took a defensive stance without verified information, resulting in a questionably justified conflict [10]. Within an hour of the report, Captain John J. Herrick reported that there was an imminent attack; both the Maddox and Turner Joy then received radar information of contacts that were soon lost and came at most 43 kilometers away from the destroyers [10]. This information provides little reason for US policymakers to blame the North Vietnamese for attacking the ships [10].
Hanyok argues that “the most important radar contact of the entire incident” is when one boat was detected by the Maddox, while the Turner Joy also detected an object on her radar; however, with a differing distance, speed, and position [10]. Yet, the US Navy reported these two radar-bound objects as having the same characteristics, showing blatant manipulation of information and a loss of objectivity when US policymakers analyzed the attacks [10]. While Hanyok’s claim that this radar incident was paramount to the Gulf of Tonkin situation is not supported by other secondary sources, it still provides a cohesive example of how the US perception of August 4 and the conclusions they came to can be debated [10]. This argument is furthered as the boat on the radar was over 1800 meters away, while the range for North Vietnamese torpedoes to successfully launch at an enemy vessel was 900 meters , rendering the possibility of the detected object having been a valid threat very unlikely [10].
Lastly, by the end of the night, Turner Joy had not detected any torpedoes on its radar, showing how the evidence from sonar technology given to policymakers at the time was inconclusive of any real threat on August 4th [10]. In addition, US forces were ordered to engage in hostile behavior with any North Vietnamese craft if they had “reasonable certainty” that there was an intended attack on them [10, 11]. This phrase is deliberately vague and open to interpretation, which may have assisted the US Navy when deciding to fire at North Vietnamese craft, even if presented with only dubious evidence of an attack on them [11]. Furthermore, Tonkin Gulf recordings highlight the uncertainty surrounding the second attack mere moments after it occurred, and showcase how Johnson deliberately ignored valid intelligence presented to him [11]. A recording reveals Captain Herrick of the Maddox reporting that “Freak weather effects on radar and overeager sonarmen may have accounted for many reports,” revealing the inconclusive evidence of the attacks, and confirming that officials present at the time of the attacks were doubting their legitimacy [11]. Herrick states that they ‘may’ have come to the wrong conclusions, using passive language and not asserting his opinions; this may have made it easier for Johnson to omit this fact and continue to validate the August 4 attack, avoiding accountability [11]. There were “no actual visual sightings [of North Vietnamese naval vessels] by Maddox.” [11]. This fact was known to US officials both in Vietnam and Washington and constituted evidence that the attack was invalid, yet the resolution was passed [11].
Figure 3: Naval Action on the Night of 4 August, 1964
US military and government officials' doubts about the validity of the attack provide insight into the fact that the Tonkin Gulf Incident as a whole may not have been a solid justification for escalating American involvement in Vietnam [11]. It shows that the political motives of policymakers at the time outweighed the declassification of the true happenings of the attacks [12]. Hanyok reinforces this, summarizing that the reports on the August 4th attacks were “deliberately skewed to support the notion that there had been an attack,” as available evidence was not presented to the Senate nor the public [12]. This notion is supported by Johnson’s clear Cold War ideologies and tendency to omit information from Congress [12]. However, this was stated in the conclusion of Hanyok’s paper, and he may have generalized his findings, showing a clear bias against Johnson and his policies throughout the article, leaving the statement open to debate [12].
Information Given to Policymakers
The doubt surrounding the August 4th attacks after the initial reports was not shared with all US policymakers in Washington , emphasizing the limited amount of facts that Congress actually had when scrutinizing the incident and providing reasoning for the justification of the resolution [12].
The narrative of August 2nd reported to Congress, in which the US took a defensive stance and faced North Vietnamese retaliation, sowed a genuine belief that the subsequent attacks on August 4th were also legitimate [12]. Since not all information regarding the attacks was shared with policymakers, it becomes clearer why they so easily accepted Johnson’s call for war in Vietnam [12]. Robert J Hanyok noted that “At the time, the Gulf of Tonkin incidents of August were not quite so controversial,” , offering the ideal narrative of the US government: that in both attacks, the destroyers had been in international waters and had undergone unprovoked attacks, with no evidence provided to dispute this fact and provide nuance and fairness to the situation [12].
While this essay analyses contemporaneous evidence from Vietnam and private conversations between US decision-makers, it is important to note that not all persons who approved the resolution were privy to this same information [12]. This may help clarify why the resolution was passed almost unanimously (see Appendix 4), as the facts presented by Johnson fit the ideologies that he supported at the time [12]. This is evident in their initial reports of the August 4th attacks, where Admiral Sharp reported that the Maddox had evaded ten North Vietnamese torpedoes, and that “it sounds to [him] that there are more boats than just three” [12, 13]. The source is an audio recording, in which there is no doubt in Sharp’s tone when relaying the alleged North Vietnamese threat to the Pentagon, suggesting that Sharp was overconfident and, in hindsight, not a reliable source, as his prediction turned out to be false [13]. Johnson chose to believe Sharp’s report as it endorsed his narrative, highlighting his dismissal of McNamara’s connections between OPLAN 34A and the attacks as this did not fit his chosen timeline of events [13].
Sheehan claims that the OPLAN 34A raids were used by Johnson to “trick the Senate” into allowing him to declare war on Vietnam, as he skewed information given to him regarding the attacks to create a narrative that defended the escalation of conflict in Vietnam [13]. The Senate may have voted under false pretenses, as not all true information was available to them before voting in favor of the resolution, the legitimacy of the resolution’s justification remaining undermined [13]. The choice of dismissing pertinent information is concerning, showing how Johnson manipulated evidence to ensure that Congress would support the Tonkin Gulf Resolution [13]. Due to the fact that many members of Congress were under the impression that both attacks were genuine, as they were not given all available evidence, the widespread support for the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution is understandable [13]. The evidence presented highlights discrepancies between external justification for the Tonkin Gulf resolution and internal doubts about the attacks, supporting the argument that information available to policymakers at the time was not enough to justify the violence later deployed against North Vietnam [13].
Conclusion
In closing, whilst the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution provided rationale, to some extent, for escalation, the inconclusive nature of the August attacks, coupled with policymakers' awareness of OPLAN 34A, suggests the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution cannot be justified based on 1964 evidence [13]. While the evidence of the first attack remains accurate, although the aggressor in the situation remains unknown, there are discrepancies between US policymakers’ assumptions about the second attack and the actual timeline of events, revealed in both primary and secondary analysis [13]. The political motives of Johnson likely outweighed available evidence and reasoning at the time of the attacks, leading to the Gulf of Tonkin Incident being used as a pretense for entering the Vietnam Conflict fully [2, 13]. The considerable number of sources originating from the United States in comparison to the limited number of Vietnamese ones may lead to a heavily American narrative of events [2]. However, as American policymakers were only given access to US sources, the rationale behind the Gulf of Tonkin resolution would likely stay the same, even with wider access to Vietnamese logs showing intentions at the time to provide a more holistic perspective for historians [2].
Endnotes
[1] George Herring, The Cold War and Vietnam, (OAH Magazine of History, 2004), 18-21 [2].
[4] Ronald H. Spector, “Vietnam War,” Encyclopaedia Britannica, last updated August 17, 2025 [2].
[5] National Archives, Tonkin Gulf Resolution, (Public Law 88-408, 1964) [2].
[6] Merle L. Pribbenow II, “Rolling Thunder and Linebacker Campaigns”, The Journal of American-East Asian Relations [2].
[7] National Archives, Tonkin Gulf Resolution [2].
[8] Errol Morris, The Fog of War, (Sony Classics, 2003) [2].
[9] John Prados, “40th Anniversary of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident,” August 04, 2004 [2, 14].
[10] Miller Center, Gulf of Tonkin Recordings (Miller Center, 1964) [14].
[11] Robert E. Kelley, “Twenty years ago in Iraq,” 09 March 2023 [14].
[12] Douglas Kellner, “Spectacle and Media Propaganda in the War on Iraq” [14].
[13] John Morello, “Deep Water, Dark Secrets: Reassessing the Historiography – Part 1” [14].
[2] Petra Feld, “Constructions of Identity in Autobiographical Writings” [14].
[14] Miller Center, Secret White House Tapes (Miller Center, 1964) [14].
[15] Mitchell Lerner, “Vietnam and the 1964 Election: A Defense of Lyndon Johnson” [14].
[16] Ibid [14].
[17] Johnson Library, 210. Summary Record of a Meeting (Johnson Library, 1964) [14].
[3] Edwin E Moïse, Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War, 2 [15].
[18] National Security Agency, The Gulf of Tonkin Incident: The DESOTO Patrols and OPLAN 34A [15].
[19] Edwin E Moïse, Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War, 5, 7 [15].
[20] The New York Times, “Chronology of Attack on the Maddox,” August 4, 1964 [15].
[21] Robert Hanyok, “Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish,” (2005):16 [15].
[22] Errol Morris, The Fog of War [15].
[23] John Prados, The White House Tapes: Eavesdropping on the President, 184 [15].
National Archives, Tonkin Gulf Resolution [15].
Prados, The White House Tapes: Eavesdropping on the President, 185 [15].
Ibid [16].
“Interview with Robert McNamara,” The George Washington University [16].
People's Army Publishing House, “Battle of the Maddox Ship (August 2, 1964)” [16].
“NH 96348 Tonkin Gulf Incident, August 1964,” Naval History and Heritage Command [16].
“The Gulf of Tonkin, the 1964 Incidents part II,” Naval History [16].
People's Army Publishing House, “Battle of the Maddox Ship (August 2, 1964)” [16].
Robert Hanyok, “Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish,” 22 [16].
Ibid [16].
Ibid [16].
Sharp and Burchinal, Adm Sharp to Gen Burchinal [16].
Herrick and Pacific Naval Headquarters, Capt Herrick and Honolulu [17].
Burchinal and Sharp, Gen Burchinal and Adm Sharp [17].
Marolda and Fitzgerald, United States Navy and the Vietnam Conflict [17].
Marolda and Fitzgerald, United States Navy and the Vietnam Conflict, 432 [17].
“Tonkin Gulf Incident, August 1964”, Ruhr-Universität Bochum [17].
Robert Hanyok, “Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish,” 49 [17].
Robert Hanyok, “Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish,” 3 [17].
Robert Hanyok, “Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish,” 1 [17].
E.W. Kenworthy, “Resolution Wins,” The New York Times [17].
Sharp and Burchinal, Admiral Sharp to General Burchinal [17].
Neil Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie, 379 [3].
National Archives, Tonkin Gulf Resolution [3, 21].
Andradé and Conboy, “The Secret Side of the Tonkin Gulf Incident” [3, 22].
Ibid [3, 22].
Ibid [3, 22].
United States Senate, Senate Roll Call Tally Sheet [3, 22].
“US Involvement in the Vietnam War,” Office of the Historian [3, 22].
Bibliography
Andradé, Dale, and Kenneth Conboy. 1999. “The Secret Side of the Tonkin Gulf Incident.” Naval Institute 13 (August) [3].
Burchinal, David, and Ulysses Sharp. 1964. Gen Burchinal to Adm Sharp at 1:29 PM EDT 4 Aug [3].
88th Congress. 1964. “Senate Roll Call Tally Sheet.” United States Senate [18].
Feld, Petra. 2006. “Constructions of Identity in Autobiographical Writings of Vietnam Veterans.” [18].
The George Washington University. n.d. “Interview with Robert McNamara.” The National Security Archive [18].
Hanyok, Robert J. 2005. “Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish: The Gulf of Tonkin Mystery, 2-4 August 1964.” Cryptologic Quarterly, 1-55 [18].
Herring, George C. 2004. “The Cold War and Vietnam.” OAH Magazine of History 18 [18].
Johnson Library. 1964. “210. Summary Record of a Meeting.” [18].
Kelley, Robert E. 2023. “Twenty years ago in Iraq, ignoring the expert weapons inspectors proved to be a fatal mistake.” SIPRI [18].
Kellner, Douglas. 2004. “Spectacle and Media Propaganda in the War on Iraq.” [18].
Kenworthy, E. W. 1964. “Resolution Wins.” The New York Times, August 8, 1964 [18].
Lerner, Mitchell. 1995. “Vietnam and the 1964 Election: A Defense of Lyndon Johnson.” [19].
Marolda, Edward J., and Oscar P. Fitzgerald. 1986. United States Navy and the Vietnam Conflict [19].
Miller Center. 1964. “Secret White House Tapes.” [19].
Miller Center. n.d. “Gulf of Tonkin Recordings.” [19].
Moïse, Edwin E. 1996. Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War [19].
Morello, John. 2014. “Deep Water, Dark Secrets: Reassessing The Historiography – Part 1.” [19].
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National Security Agency. 1964. Transcript of Telephone Conversations 4-5 August [19].
National Security Agency. 2005. “The Gulf of Tonkin Incident: The DESOTO Patrols and OPLAN 34A.” [19].
Naval History and Heritage Command. 1964. NH 96348 Tonkin Gulf Incident, August 1964 [20].
Naval History and Heritage Command. 1968. “The Gulf of Tonkin, The 1964 Incidents Part II.” [20].
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Office of the Secretary of Defense. 2011. Pentagon Papers: United States - Vietnam Relations [20].
People's Army Publishing House. 2015. “Battle of the Maddox Ship (August 2, 1964)”. [20].
Prados, John. 2003. The White House Tapes: Eavesdropping on the President [20].
Prados, John. 2004. “40th Anniversary of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident.” [20].
Pribbenow II, Merle L. 2001. “Rolling Thunder and Linebacker Campaigns”. [20].
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Appendices
Appendix 1
A photocopy of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution . Signed by President Lyndon B. Johnson on August 10, 1964 [21].
Appendix 2
Map of the Gulf of Tonkin . Digital map depicting the location of the Gulf and the islands Hon Me and Hon Nieu [22].
Appendix 3
Nasty-Class Fast Patrol Boat (PTF) . 1964 photo of PFT, used in covert operations such as the OPLAN raids [22].
Appendix 4
Senate Roll Call Tally Sheet Regarding the Tonkin Gulf Resolution [22]. Passed unanimously by the House and had only two dissenting votes in the Senate [22, 23].
CANDIDATE NUMBER – gpz118
WORD COUNT – 3990
Introduction
The Gulf of Tonkin resolution was drafted in response to the Gulf of Tonkin incidents which occurred on the 2nd and 4th of August. The final incident that led to American retaliation on North Vietnam occurred on August 4th, in which two American destroyers (Turner Joy & Maddox) were subject to ‘imminent attacks’ after they received intelligence of incoming strikes from North Vietnamese submarines. John J. Herrick, the Captain of the Maddox, was at first hesitant to act on the threat, and instead retreated the ships further out to sea. However, only a few hours later, three North Vietnamese patrol boats began quickly approaching the ships, after which Captain Herrick ordered the ship’s guns to fire, resulting in one completely destroyed boat and the other two heavily damaged. The next day, both destroyers received intelligence that another attack was imminent, and at around 21:00 ICT Maddox reported spotting unidentified vessels, after which both destroyers engaged in high speed maneuvers to avoid confrontation. During this, Maddox reported multiple torpedo attacks as well as automatic weapon fire, which led to both ships returning fire at the “enemy”.1
Navy Commander James Stockdale, who had overseen the air defense of Maddox and was flying recognizance throughout the Gulf doubted the legitimacy of the attack, and stated; “Our destroyers were just shooting at phantom targets... There were no (North Vietnamese) boats there... There was nothing there but black water and American firepower.”2 Captain Herrick later too questioned what his crew had seen and reported, and believed the incoming missile reports to have been an error on behalf of the crew members.
However, by the time this opposing perspective was received government officials in Washington D.C. had already began moving towards retaliating, which included informing the press on the situation and telling the public of their intentions. By the 7th of August Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution signed by President Lyndon B. Johnson only days later. This marked the beginning of the United States’ involvement in Vietnam, as the resolution entailed increased military presence in Vietnam. Months later, the US officially launched Operation Rolling Thunder, which authorized large-scale bombing runs in North Vietnam and began deployment of American troops to directly combat the Viet Cong.
Although there were numerous factors that contributed to the drafting of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, the two consecutive ‘attacks’ on the Turner Joy and Maddox were the most significant, and as stated by Lyndon B. Johnson himself drove the US to finally take action on Vietnam after the numerous years of tension between the nations. This essay will study the two main schools of thought; the argument that the United States intentionally lied about or exaggerated the events that took place in the Gulf of Tonkin, or whether America’s actions were politically justified and the attacks weren’t faked or mispresented, meaning the US had valid reason to draft the resolution and increase their involvement in Vietnam.
Investigation
The First Attack – August 2nd, 1964 | USS Maddox
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| Map Chart of USS Maddox Patrol Route, 1964. |
The image above is a map chart depicting the patrol route of the USS Maddox and Turner Joy, dating from July 30th to August 2nd, 1964. On the 31st of July, the USS Maddox embarked into the Gulf of Tonkin on a path nearing the North-Vietnamese coast further North towards the Tanh Hóa province. The black dots situated on the progressing direction line represent her location on a date and time, which is outlined every 24 hours. On August 2nd the Maddox continued back South of the Gulf when it was claimed to have been attacked by 3 PT boats at 16:07. PT boats, short for patrol torpedo boats, were torpedo-armed attack vessels used by both North Vietnam and the United States during the conflict, due to their maneuverability and inexpensive production4. The Maddox engaged with gun crews firing heavy shells at the perusing boats, who responded with two missed torpedoes and the first boat, being the only one equipped with external weaponry opened fire with low-caliber guns at the destroyer. The Maddox promptly retreated South and contacted the nearby USS Ticonderoga, an American aircraft carrier that promptly deployed four F8 fighter jets with orders to “attack and destroy the PT boats”5. 2 of the 3 fleeing boats maneuvered evasively yet still suffering from heavy damages, whilst the last was left dead in the water engulfed in flames after the numerous firing runs carried out by the F8’s.
Contextual understanding of the USS Maddox’s actions
Opposers
of the resolution amongst the American public believed there was
malintent on the US side as the first shots fired in the confrontation
were by the destroyer. However, in response to the intel received from
the earlier SIGINT message, Captain Herrick “ordered gun crews to open
fire if the fast-approaching trio closed to within 10,000 yards of the
destroyer”6, as he was aware of North Vietnamese intent due to the
hostility towards the US following the OPLAN 34A raid on Hon Me. It is
important to analyse the smaller details of the conflict such as the
Captain’s orders to his crew, as they could provide information that can
help better understand the intentions of the countries involved. In a
discussion with an ex-naval officer Joseph A. Doyle, who served 9 years
in the US navy, I received perspective on US naval procedures and
operations that can help better contextualize the situation that
unfolded in the Gulf. Mr. Doyle mentions that in the context of naval
operations, 10,000 yards is a relatively short distance for two military
ships to be in from each other, and commonly US ships would set a much
larger distance to open fire in the interest of the crew’s safety, in
order to attack before the threat can get in a dangerous range. In the
context of the actual conflict involving the destroyer and the PT boats
the danger of the short distance becomes even more prominent, as 10,000 yards
was certainly in range for the Vietnamese boats’ torpedoes. Herrick’s
orders could therefore be perceived having been made with tremendous
caution, as the short proximity of the ordered firing distance implies
that Herrick was well aware of the political consequences that would
follow an engagement with the Vietnamese patrol boats, and was willing
to put himself and his crew at an increased risk to avoid conflict. This
is further supported by the numerous warning shots the USS Maddox gave
before attacking, giving the patrol boats plentiful time to avoid the
conflict.
Was the North Vietnamese attack on the USS Maddox justified?
The
two destroyers were not deployed with intent to ensure the safety of
the other ships or act as a threat to North Vietnam, but instead were
set to patrol for recognizance as a part of Operation Plan 34A. OPLAN
34A was a highly classified program that consisted of covert actions
against the DRV involving naval sabotage operations7, which primarily
consisted of South Vietnamese raids on DRV outposts that ran radar
transmitters and controlled communications with Viet Cong naval
supplies. These raids were crucial for South Vietnam’s coastal and
maritime control, however their forces suffered heavy casualties from
these operations and often resulted in raiders being captured or killed.
The United States, whilst not directly deploying units in aid of OPLAN
34A used their destroyers to intercept DRV signals (SIGINT gathering) in
DESOTO patrols, which were patrols with the tactical purpose to
intercept North Vietnamese communications to then relay it to South
Vietnam. An extremely sensitive document which was only declassified in
2005 outlined the orders to the DESOTO patrols: “Locate and identify all
coastal radar transmitters, note all navigation aids along the DVR’s
(Democratic Republic of Vietnam’s) coastline, and monitor the Vietnamese
junk fleet for a possible connection to DRV/Viet Cong maritime supply
and infiltration routes”8. The United States only ran recognizance, and
did not directly involve themselves with the operation as it would be
perceived as collusion with South Vietnam, which would have resulted in
substantial consequences and would have compromised numerous other
secret operations. However, the confidentiality of the United States’
involvement with OPLAN
34A was compromised on the night of July 30th, as the USS Maddox
continued its DESOTO patrols along the North Vietnamese coast when it
got caught in the vicinity of a South Vietnamese raid on the island of
Hon Me.
Following the attack, North Vietnam filed a complaint with
the International Control Commission that “The US and South Vietnamese
administrations sent two naval vessels to shell Hon Ngu and Hon Me
islands”, and deemed the DESOTO patrols having been an “enemy incursion
into the Gulf of Tonkin”9. The US justified the patrols as its assertion
of the right of freedom of the seas, however this premise was certainly
not supported by the US’ actions in the gulf. The Maddox’s patrol
course drove entirely through the coast of North Vietnam, which was not
confirmed to have been in international waters. Having said this, the
territorial laws were quite ambiguous, as each side perceived them
differently. The map above illustrates the conflicting territorial
claims that took place during the crisis, which is an important issue to
address as both sides used their differing claims to justify their
actions. Neither the Maddox nor the Turner Joy approached closer than 4
miles from the islands, or 8 miles from the mainland. The US assumed
that North Vietnams territorial waters only extended three miles; in
which case, no violations took place. However, if North Vietnam claimed
twelve miles, like China and the Soviet Union, then in the eyes of the
DRV there were indeed violations. Although North Vietnam did not appear
to have made any formal claims regarding the extent of their territorial
waters before August in 1964, a week before the Gulf incidents there
was a complaint on South Vietnamese warships violating North Vietnamese
territories, which were located about 9 miles off the mainland10. Whilst
the US did not seem to have been infringing on any established
territorial claims due to the lack thereof, the American ships were
still knowingly adding to the sensitivity of an already fragile
conflict. Additionally, America’s involvement with OPLAN 34A certainly
justifies the attacks, as they were supporting South Vietnamese raids on
DRV outposts that crippled their radar transmitters and naval
communications. Whilst the North Vietnamese attack on the USS Maddox may
not have been the optimum decision in the
interest of reducing political conflict, it was still justified as
America’s secret operations and collusion with South Vietnam imposed a
significant threat to North Vietnam.
Did the United States intentionally provoke the Gulf of Tonkin incident?
One
controversial yet not uncommon perspective entails the US having
purposely provoked North Vietnam with their hostile naval presence in
the Gulf, as a means to get further involved in Vietnam whilst avoiding
diplomatic backlash they most certainly would have received had Vietnam
not been ‘painted’ as an aggressive threat in need of control. An
example supporting this statement can be taken from the OPLAN
operations. As stated by military historian Robert J. Hanyok; “The OPLAN
reflected the current American strategy of escalation of the war
through graduated response. The U.S. established four levels of actions;
It began with harassment attacks and operations, whose cumulative
effect, though labeled "unspectacular," was to make Hanoi aware of them
to the extent it would allocate forces to counter them”11. US
involvement was to be kept minimal in the early stages of the OPLAN
operation, in order to achieve the “non-attribution” status in case
North Vietnam publicized the raids. Therefore, no Americans were allowed
to participate in the actual raids, and only provided external
support12. On August 1st, 1964, the naval intercept site in the
Philippines reported that a DRV naval base informed their naval units
(what is understood to have been one of the attacking PT boats) of the
Maddox’s patrols on the coast, and that it had been “decided to fight
the enemy tonight when you receive directing orders”13. Captain Herrick
of the USS Maddox was informed of the DRV communication, and was warned
of a potential attack. Herrick then immediately requested the Seventh
Fleet for the termination of the Desoto mission, that “if the
intelligence was correct, continuing was an unacceptable risk”14. He was
however overruled by admirals Moorer and Sharp, and ordered to resume
the operation. The behavior of the naval commanders and divide between
Captain Herrick
and his superior leaders of the operation further supports the premise
that the US intended on provoking a conflict with North Vietnam. An
attack on the Maddox would allow the US to dig its claws deeper into
Vietnam, whilst still holding a “non- attribution” status as further
involvement could be deemed necessary retaliation to the attack.
Throughout the night (after the original warning) DRV communications
were continuously monitored. Intercepted communist messages informed
that the North Vietnamese continued to track the destroyer. The next
morning, the DRV ordered numerous PT patrol boats to begin concentrating
towards the Maddox’s position, all of which supplied by the Soviet
Union and armed with 12.7mm machine guns and primed torpedoes. Having
received this intercepted information, the NSA sent a message to the
MACV and Commander 7th informing on the new intelligence and warning an
imminent attack. The Maddox, however, was not on the distribution of
this message, and never received these critical warnings before the
attack15. It was crucial for the United States to appear uninvolved, as
launching a campaign against North Vietnam without a justified cause
would be a political nightmare and would have yielded little public
support. In an interview on BBC’s War, Lies, and Audiotape, Historian
Frederik Logevall discussed the United States’ necessity to win public
opinion: “(President Lyndon B.) Johnson said in the spring of ’64; You
can have all the military power in the world, but if you can’t win the
thing politically then you’re not going to
succeed”16. It wasn’t only historians that were suspicious of America’s
intentions in the Gulf; many American politicians were similarly
skeptical.
 |
| New York Times Newsletter, September 19th 1964. |
International public being made aware of the United States’ true involvement in Vietnam with the OPLAN operations would result in serious political consequences for America. Public skepticism of the GoT incident can also be seen in The New York Times’s newsletter simply by its content; much of the article focuses on suspicion towards President Johnson and his actions in the gulf. Whilst this alone provides us with key information on the American political climate at the time, understanding the political context further supports the claim of American deceit in the Gulf; The New York Times was (and still is) a democratic newspaper. For them to publicly criticize and condemn President Johnson, who, not only was a democrat, but was also heavily endorsed by the NYT during his campaign, shows how skeptical and mistrusting even the ‘famously patriotic’ American public was of the US’s justification for their actions in the Gulf of Tonkin19.
The United States was well aware of how North Vietnam would react to their operations. On August 4th, two days after the attack, the CIA’s John McCone bluntly told President Johnson, “The North Vietnamese are reacting defensively to our attacks on their off-shore islands”20. In an archived audio tape of a conversation with President Johnson, secretary of defense McNamara discusses how their covert operations managed to successfully provoke a North Vietnamese reaction:
I think I should also, Mr. President, explain these covert operations. There's no question of what that has bearing on us. Friday night, as you probably know, we had four boats manned by Vietnamese or other nationals attack two islands. We probably shot up a radar station with a few other miscellaneous buildings and the following 24 hours after that with this destroyer in the same area undoubtedly led them to connect the two events. (see appendix 1)
Furthermore, what then later became the Gulf of Tonkin resolution was drafted by the Johnson administration in Honolulu two months before any incident took place21. It is almost implausible to fully confirm that the United States truly did intentionally provoke the incident on the 2nd of August, 1964. However, given the now accessible audio files of President Johnson’s conversations, the publicized OPLAN operations and aggregate support from historians, it can be said that the United States likely provoked the incident intentionally to further fuel its campaign against North Vietnam, by gaining public support and political immunity.
The Second Attack – August 4th, 1964 | Turner Joy
The August 4th Attack: Was it Faked?
Today
there are two main premises of the incident that are undisputed; The
first attack on the Maddox did occur, the second did not. We now know of
the misunderstanding that took place on the 4th of August with NSA
files called the Pentagon Papers (declassified in 2011) stating an
attack never took place, with the panic being a product of faulty radars
and poor communication. This information however is not necessarily new
or significant. The vital question here is; did the US fabricate the
event to justify their advances against North Vietnam? Or was it truly
just a negligent misunderstanding? With hundreds of classified files
from the NSA being released in the past few years, the overall consensus
leans towards the former; it was fabricated. While McNamara claimed the
SIGNIT intelligence intercepted North Vietnamese messages involving
planned attacks against the destroyer, we now know this is far from the
truth. Robert J. Hanyok, military historian who reviewed these
intercepted DRV messages, found that none of the Vietnamese boats were
ordered to attack the destroyers; they were simply given towing missions
to retrieve the destroyed PT boats from the prior incident on the 2nd.
“So in reality”, says Hanyok, “none of the boats named in the original
Marine warning participated in anything but salvage efforts”22.
Additionally, even if the incident was not fabricated, US officials were
still well aware that the attack never occurred long before drafting
the Gulf of Tonkin resolution (which the US said was the result of the
attack on August 4th). In a recently declassified file of the Pentagon
Papers from the office of the secretary of defense, Robert McNamara
notes how confirming evidence of the attack being nonexistent was
received before the US reprisal was launched (see appendix 2). This
meant that the US Congress, including President Johnson and secretary of
defense Robert McNamara, were well aware that there was indeed no attack
on the 4th of August, yet still sought to push their Gulf of Tonkin
resolution using the ‘phantom attack’ as a means of obtaining both
public and international support. Although the intercepted DRV messages
still indicate that the attack was indeed fabricated, the Pentagon
Papers still show that Congress would have used any means necessary to
adopt the resolution, whether by purposely ignoring evidence of the
attack having not occurred, or faking it all together.
Conclusion
The
events that took place in the Gulf of Tonkin can be compared to the
Gleiwitz incident that occurred in August 1939; a false flag operation
staged by Nazi Germany for a justification to invade Poland. This
investigation has sought to understand if the US had justified reason to
adopt the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. The evidence and arguments
considered has led me to the conclusion that America was, indeed, not
justified to adopt the resolution. This is supported by North Vietnam’s
attack on the USS Maddox being legitimate instance of defense, whereas
America’s patrols and retaliation were evidently planned to provoke a
reaction from the DRV. Furthermore, even if the attack was not
fabricated, US officials were well aware that the attack on August 4th
never occurred weeks before the resolution was presented, further
indicating that the US Congress wanted retribution against North Vietnam
to give President Johnson authority to enter Vietnam’s civil war.
As
described by Hanyok, the GoT incident reflected the American strategy
of escalation of the war through graduated response. The incident
happening over 50 years ago does not rob it from its value, as it gives
valuable insight on modern American politics. Like Barack Obama with
Syria, Lyndon B. Johnson was a president who felt “the fierce urgency of
now” to act on global dilemmas that conflict with the American
ideology. Historian Frederik Logevall quoting President Johnson, “I
don’t think we can win in Vietnam and I don’t think we can get out. You
can have all the military power in the world, but if you can’t win the
thing politically then you’re not going to succeed”23. Whilst we now
know the truth behind the Gulf of Tonkin incident, it makes us question
today’s conflicts that America is hiding behind. Fifty years later we know that the spark for the Vietnam war was a façade. Will it be another fifty before we know the truth about Iraq?
Bibliography
Archive on 4 - Wars, Lies and Audiotape - BBC Sounds.” BBC News, BBC, www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/play/b04c9lp4.
Dale Andrade and Kenneth Conboy. The Secret Side of the Tonkin Gulf Incident. Naval History (July/August 1999).
DD Guttenplan, “When Presidents Lie to Make a War”, The Guardian, August 2, 2014.
Gerald Kurland. The Gulf of Tonkin Incidents. (Charlotteville, New York: SamHar Press).
Jim and Sybil Stockdale. In Love and War. (New York: Harper and Row, 1984).
Joseph C. Goulden. The Truth is the First Casualty: The Gulf of Tonkin Affair – Illusion and
Reality. 10 Radio Hanoi, 28 July 1964 (New York, Rand McNally, 1969).
Kai Bird. The Color of Truth: McGeorge Bundy and William Bundy, Brothers in Arms: a
Biography. (Simon & Schuster, 2000).
Keresey, Dick. PT 105. (Annapolis, Maryland, U.S.A.: United States Naval Institute, 2003).
McNamara,
Robert. United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967: Study Prepared by
the Department of Defense. U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971.
“New York Times Endorsements Through the Ages.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 23 Sept. 2016.
NSA
Command Center Record of Events. "Possible Planned Attack by DRV Navy
on Desoto Patrol," B205/981-64, 020302Z August 1964; DIRNSA.
Edward Marolda and Oscar Fitzgerald. The United States Navy and the Vietnam Conflict, Vol.
2: From Military Assistance to Combat, 1959-1965. (Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical
Center, 1986).
Hanyok, Robert. Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish: The Gulf of Tonkin
Mystery, 2–4 August 1964. Cryptological Quarterly (Winter 2000/Spring 2001).
Paterson. The Truth About Tonkin. (U.S. Naval Institute, 1 Feb. 2008).
Robert Schulzinger. A Time for War: The United States and Vietnam 1941-1975. (Oxford
University Press, 1997).
“U.S.
DESTROYERS OPEN FIRE AGAIN IN TONKIN GULF; TARGETS VANISH; No American
Losses In Clash Off Coast of North Vietnam.” The New York Times, 19
Sept. 1964.
“What Really Happened in the Gulf of Tonkin in 1964?”
Public Radio International,
www.pri.org/stories/2017-09-14/what-really-happened-gulf-tonkin-1964.
Appendices
Appendix 124
Partial Audio Tape of Johnson & McNamara Transcript:
August, 1964
Washington D.C., United States
McNamara:
I think I should also, Mr. President, explain these covert operations.
There's no question of what that has bearing on us. Friday night, as you
probably know, we had four boats manned by Vietnamese or other
nationals attack two islands. We probably shot up a radar station with a
few other miscellaneous buildings and the following 24 hours after that
with this destroyer in the same area undoubtedly led them to connect
the two events.
Appendix 2
Declassified Pentagon Papers “Vietnam Task Force” Office of the Secretary of Defense:
Created: 1967
Declassified: 2011
The Pentagon, Virginia, United States
“While
there was some momentary uncertainty about the actuality of the second
attack on August 4th, confirming evidence of the attack was received
before the U.S. reprisal was launched.” – R.M.
Why did the US Intervene in the Vietnam War between 1946 and 1956?
Vietnam is about 9000 miles away from the USA, but what provoked the USA to determine to get involved in the civil war between the Vietnamese back in the 1940s-70s far away from them? Why did they intervene in the Vietnam War between 1954 and 1963? Actually, the answer is very simple. They were afraid of the spreading of the communism and wanted to stop it before it was too late.Militarily, following up by the defeat of French, the French was compelled to leave Vietnam which would leave a power void for Ho Chi Minh, a communist, to take over easily. In the Battle of Dien Bien Phu, 1954, 16,000 French troops were either killed or captured by the Viet Minh. It convinced the French government to leave Indochina as soon as possible. It was like handed the part of Vietnam which was under French's control to Communism, and the US would not allow it because of the Truman Doctrine--Containment. Also, the US was heavily involved in the French military financially, even the Viet Minh Supreme Commander, General Vo Nguyen Giap said during a interview in 1996, "We see the Dien Bien Phu victory as the victory [over] the French army and [over] the intervention of the Americans --because in the Dien Bien Phu campaign, 80 percent of the war expenditures were spent by the Americans...So the Dien Bien Phu defeat was a defeat for both the French and the Americans...When we received news of the Dien Bien Phu victory, everyone practically jumped up in the air, they were so happy about it." For both of the sake of containment and honour, the US intervened in that Civil War in 1954.
Internationally, the USA was very unhappy with the Geneva Agreement of 1954. It declared the ceasefire between the French and the Viet Minh, Laos and Cambodia became independent state and Vietnam was divided into north and south temporarily by the 17th parallel. An election would be held in two years which would unit the north and south again. The North was ruled by a communist and the south was ruled by a dictator. Between these two, the USA chose to support the dictator. However, the population of the North was already outnumbered the South's, and a lot of South Vietnamese supported Ho Chi Minh. The threat of Communism took over Vietnam increased dramatically. Thus, the US set its mind to help the South.Politically, President Eisenhower issued the 'Domino Theory' in 1954, which showed why the US thought that Vietnam must not become a Communist country. Eisenhower said, "You
have a row of dominoes set up. You knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly." The first domino was S. Vietnam, then Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Burma and India. It was just like the dominos of the Korean War, Korea, Japan, Philippines. That was why the US determined to get involved, because it could not afford the first domino to fall. As the Secretary of Defence at that time, Robert McNamara, said during a interview in June 1996 , "[The domino theory] was the primary factor motivating the actions of both the Kennedy and the Johnson administrations, without any qualification. It was put forward by President Eisenhower in 1954, very succinctly: If the West loses control of Vietnam, the security of the West will be in danger. "The dominoes will fall," in Eisenhower's words...The loss of Vietnam would trigger the loss of Southeast Asia, and conceivably even the loss of India, and would strengthen the Chinese and the Soviet position across the world, weakening the security of Western Europe and weakening the security of North America. This was the way we viewed it." This clearly shows the reason why the US intervened in the War, it was because of the fear to the accretion of the Communism.
From the political, military and international views, they all showed that the reason why the US intervened in the Vietnam War was because it was afraid of the spreading of the Communism and wanted to put a stop to it, contain it.
In front of the mMemorial to victory over American terror-bombing in Hanoi. 
The Vietnam War was a big time, money and efforts consuming war to the US. First of all, from the escalation of war (1945) till the withdrawal of the US (1975), it lasted for thirty years. In these years, the government could have focused on building a 'Great Society' as LBJ's slogan had said than fighting in a country on the other side of the world with no great reason. Secondly, the US spent 346.7 billions in the currency of 1990 for the Vietnam War (1964-1972). It was more than the expenditure for WWI or the Korean War, which were 196.5 billions and 263.9 billions respectively in the currency of 1990 . It showed how much the US was willing to pay for this war and how much it cared. However if this money could be spent on aiding the other in-needed countries or helping the people in the US, maybe it would be better. Lastly, the US spent more efforts in the Vietnam War than the Korean War. 8,744,000 US soldiers were in the Vietnam War, 47,410 of them were dead in the combat and the percentage of death is 0.7%, on the other hand, 5,720,000 US soldiers were in the Korean War, 33,741 of them died in the combat and the death percentage was 0.6%, it was slightly lower than the Vietnam War . The above data shows one of the reasons why there were such strong protests against the war in the US. The war was making their lives worse than what it could have been without the war.
On April 30, 1975, following the fall of Saigon, the capital of the South Vietnam, which united the country under Communist rule as the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the Vietnam War ended. Around two years earlier, March 1973, the last US personnel left Vietnam . Therefore, the Vietnam War to US ended as its last man left that country, but for the Vietnamese, it was the union of South and North that marked the end to the Vietnam War. There were many reasons why the US troops were leaving Vietnam, but mainly there were three, Nixon's 'Vietnamization', the anti-war movement that took place back in the homeland and the ceasefire agreement. Nixon introduced 'Vietnamization' during his presidency of the United States. This is a policy of "handing over the fighting of the Communists in the Vietnam War to the army of South Vietnam" so that the US troops could withdrawn. This turned South Vietnam into more of an army than a country, and that gave the photographers opportunities to show the American citizens back home what atrocities had been committed here and what a terrible stage those South Vietnamese were living in. This also helped the anti-war movement. Furthermore, the public concern over the usage of chemical weapons, like the napalm, was growing and they were not happy about the increasing in the US casualties. Moreover, "the war was costing the USA $2000 million per month in 1968." The money could be spent in improving the social problems and make all people's lives better in the US. It is like in a corporation, the manager has to make some choices which later on the shareholders are not pleased with, and they may in favour of the opportunity cost of that decision. The shareholders are now pressing the manager to correct the mistake. The people were asking the withdrawal of the US troops and finally the US and the North Vietnam reached an agreement and signed the ceasefire agreement. Thus, the reasons and how the Vietnam War ended for the US and the Vietnamese were different.Escalation of the US-Vietnam Conflict.
Outside the Hanoi Hilton.
Vietnam war was said the most controversial war in the US history. There were huge anti-war movements inside the country. Many students stood up against the war due to three main reasons, the newly available war coverage on television, the heightening American casualties and the war crimes committed against the Vietnamese. The Vietnam Conflict was the first ever war televised in color, nationwide without specific censorship from the government. The people were no longer persuaded by propagandas after seeing the horrible truth on the TV. A large number of the soldiers were conscripts, not volunteers, in Vietnam and not knowing what they've been fighting for. Those disillusioned with the war included students, intellectuals, liberal-minded politicians and returning US troops. Liberals attacked US policy in the war, radicals used the war to make denunciations of the entire US system. Tet offensive indicated that the war was not being won, intellectuals didn't understand why US was involved, people disliked the methods of warfare used by the US, which were all chemicals. The indiscriminate killing that resulted from Search and Destroy missions was critical, for example the My Lai massacre in 1968 where kids, women were killed. Heightening casualties, high expenditure, lack of resources to built a 'Great Society', it was mostly blacks fighting, thus said to be a racist government oppressing other ethnic groups. The growth of the anti-war movement was therefore caused by the combination of a range of factors.Why did US citizens change their opinion on the Vietnam War as it progressed?
The decline of support for the Vietnam War mainly started in 1968. Although antiwar movements in the United States had been occurring before, the Tet Offensive opened the eyes of countless people. General Westmoreland had assured the public that the war was going to come to a swift end soon, that there was "light at the end of the tunnel". But on January 30th 1968, the National Liberation Front and the People's Army of Vietnam attacked various major cities in South Vietnam including Saigon and the US embassy there. The goal of the Tet Offensive was to ignite and encourage the people of South Vietnam to overthrow their government and to put pressure on the US to withdraw their troops. Even though the Tet Offensive was a brutal military defeat for the communists, over half of their troops were killed; there were weighty effects on the reliability of the government. Americans were shocked. They now realized that if even the American Embassy wasn't a safe place to be, nowhere in South Vietnam was. Citizens of American began to question if the government knew what they were doing and if the Vietnam War was a war that could be won.
Mementos from the war against French imperialism
Tet Offensive : In 1968, the National Liberation Front and Vietcong launched a surprise attack against American and South Vietnamese forces on the eve of the lunar New Year's Day. This surprise attack is known as the Tet Offensive and many people viewed this as a turning point in the Vietnam War.
Militarily, the Tet Offensive showed the significance of Vietcong/Vietminh's military power and nowhere in South Vietnam was safe. On 31st of January 1968, the simultaneous attack the towns and cities in South Vietnam began and this went on for 3 days. Over 35 towns and cities including 13 provincial capitals were seized and shockingly, the US embassy in Saigon was invaded. The National Liberation Front and Vietcong sent more than 80,000 soldiers for the Tet Offensive and after 3days, more than half of its soldiers killed so they had to move back to North Vietnam to retreat itself. Although, Vietminh failed to remove the US troops out of Vietnam but, they showed their military power and it showed that nowhere in Vietnam was safe including the US embassy in Saigon.
Politically, the Tet Offensive made the Vietnam War more significant in US that it became one of the key issues in US politics during the presidential election year. The US politics were basically divided into two sides, the one for withdrawing troops out of Vietnam and the other for giving more support to the Vietnam War. In March 1968, one month after the Tet Offensive, the president Johnson announced that he wouldn't seek re-election, which left Robert Kennedy and Humphrey as a candidate for the Democratic side for the presidential election. Then in June 1968, Robert Kennedy was assassinated and McCarthy replaced his place. However, McCarthy failed to deliver his speech for his candidacy that Humphrey became the candidate for Democrats. On the other hand, Nixon was a candidate for the Republican side for the presidential election. Humphrey had an idea of continuing Johnson's policy of commitment to the war and Nixon had an idea of withdrawing troops out of Vietnam. Nixon won the election in November by a slight difference. The Tet Offensive made the Vietnam War so big issue that it became one of the most important topics in the US politics.
Socially, many people viewed the Tet Offensive as a sign showing that the US was actually losing the war. The US military have always reported that they were winning the war and in December 1967, Walt Rostow stated, "Their casualties are going up at a rate they cannot sustain ... I see light at the end of the tunnel.", but after the Tet Offensive, the public became skeptic about the reports from the US military because suddenly, it seemed like they were losing the war. So, more and more people were involved in the protest against the Vietnam War in the US.
Economically, the US gave more economic support to the Vietnam War after the Tet Offensive. After the Tet Offensive, the president Johnson raised the income tax to give more support to the Vietnam War. It was used to recover its military and to make its military power stronger. The US's involvement in Vietnam was now costing more than 66 million dollars a day which is a lot of money compared to before. (1960 - 180.3 million 1963 - 186.0 million 1966 - 792.2 million) Since the Tet Offensive increased the income tax, the poverty in the US was exacerbated.
Why did the US fail to save South Vietnam from Communism?
In front of Ho Chi Minh's mausoleum in Hanoi.
The US failed to save the South from Communism due to many interconnected reasons. America did not have the ordinary Vietnamese on their side, and like the French and Japanese before, they were seen as 'foreign occupiers'. Furthermore, America faced much controversy over the war within its own borders, and therefore was fighting a war unpopular to its own people and the people which they tried to 'save'. Militarily the US failed to stop guerilla warfare and committed many atrocities against the Vietnamese people. Ho Chi Minh (the leader of the North Vietnamese) on the other hand was a person supported by a lot of the Vietnamese (including many in the South), because he gave the people what they wanted, which were to rid the country of foreign occupiers once an for all, and to give the normal person land.
The biggest plausible reason the US's failure to save communism, was because the people were not on their side. Day after day more and more Vietnamese joined the North, and America was gradually left on its own. This was because America supported the Diem regime in South Vietnam, a catholic repressive government system, and a puppet state to America. For example the Diem regime refused to allow other religious practice other than Catholism. It seemed very obvious why America failed to gain the support of the people when they were allies with the government of Diem. Nowadays in Iraq (though not as big of a war as in Vietnam), a similar situation has occurred where the majority of the Iraqi people are against American occupation, mainly because of cultural reasons such as, religion, race, lifestyle etc. America could and probably would have had a much better chance of winning the Vietnam War if they had the support of the populous.
Since 1887 Vietnam was occupied by the French, the Japanese and finally the Americans. The Vietnamese people were tired of being ruled by people that did not share the same qualities as they did. For example their religion was significantly different from the US, America being predominately Christian and Vietnam being predominately Buddha. America was seen as an imperialist country, fighting only because they were much 'stronger'. A Vietnamese reporter named Lai Chou ling said that no matter how big America is, they will never be able to control the majority, for it is the majority that will eventually rid this country of its foreign occupiers. America couldn't have possibly saved the Vietnamese from communism simply because they didn't want to be saved, and much preferred living under the communist regime of the North. Furthermore another reason why they were seen as imperialists was because a lot of Vietnamese were forced to move away from their original home (home to where there parents, and grand parents were buried and so on). This further angered the Vietnamese because they did not have many options, only to abide by the rules of the country's new "leaders". The Vietnamese people simply couldn't care less if a communist regime from their own cultural ideas was in power, as long as it was not another rich foreign country fighting for what was clearly not theirs.
As the war progressed America faced similar hostility from the public at home. People were tired of seeing the war progress, a war that was unpopular with the Vietnamese people, a war that had no clear sign of ending, a war which imposed a drafting system (In which most were minority groups, and people who were not in college) where a lot of the more economically active families were able to escape the system, and finally a war where thousands of Americans died for what ended out to be no reason at all. Protesters outside the White House held signs up such as LBJ! LBJ! How many kids have you killed today? Moreover America's biggest anti-war protest took place in Washington DC where hundreds of thousands of people protested about many issues to do with the war (e.g. The drafting system, the pentagon papers, which in turn created a lot of the public cynicism towards the government, etc ) for days on end. With this sort of hostility faced at home and abroad it was only a matter of time before the US had no other option than to withdraw.
Militarily America simply was never trained for such an extensive guerilla war. Though the North was terribly out numbered and suffered many more casualties than America (Vietnamese casualties were (both North and South) over 2 million, and American casualties numbered 56,000). However even though the casualties were different by a big amount, most of the war was fought on ground by infantry units. America could only call in air strikes occasionally, and the jungle's rugged terrain made it impossible to use tanks to fight their battles. Furthermore America guerrilla tactics seemed unmatched to that of the Vietcong. Even America's elite soldiers, the Green Berets (today's equivalent of the Delta Force or the British SAS) were sent to help the South against the North, however their training in America proved non valuable against the guerrillas and eventually, were forced to pull out. Though the military of the US seemed impregnable against guerrilla attack forces, the sheer geography of rural Vietnam proved much different.
The US military, along with the help of the media, were very badly portrayed. After stories of how American troops reportedly raped all the women of a village and then killed the rest of its inhabitance leaked out, huge outrage all around the world was voiced. The British (who were against the Vietnam War) were appalled by this and questioned the American military infrastructure; wondering how such crimes could be committed especially when it was against the people they were there for in the First place. From a US military POV one could say that this was justifiable under the circumstances. This was because the villagers were "supposedly" supporting the North Vietnamese. However such claims true or false could not support this point of view simply because America is the so called bearer of freedom, and personal rights. Once these bad atrocities were made public, the Vietnam War was not supported within the US or in Vietnam.
Ho Chi Minh was the light at the end of the tunnel for the Vietnamese. He was seen by many as a popular, caring leader that gave the ordinary person what they had wanted from the beginning, a Vietnamese leader. Under his communist ideas he insured the ordinary person land (not just the select few). People were willing to fight and die for him, because it was an actual cause. Furthermore it was his popularity and guerilla tactics that saw him to victory.
In conclusion America clearly failed to save the South from Communist occupation. This was due to many reasons, many of which were triggered by the US. America was clearly the unpopular side in the war and could not over come the North because of the lack of support from the South. Even the American public, towards the later years of the war, were very against the American Government's objectives, and were seen as enemies of the State. Ho Chi Minh on the other hand was highly supported within Vietnam and thus these reasons state why Vietnam could not and would not be saved from Communism.
Why the US lost in Vietnam
The Vietnam War, America's longest war, had ended up in failure for the US. At that time, and until today, the US was the strongest nation on the planet and Vietnam was one of the poorest and a primary industrial country, where peasantry was in majority. The war, more officially, began from 1964 and ended in 1972 and the main reasons for losing the war was underestimation of VC, Ho Chin Minh Trail, Vietnamese people, protests back in the US, efficiency of US troops, cultural differences, and US casualties.
The US has underestimated Vietcong and the NLF. They had supply from the USSR and China, such as MiG fighters that shoot down more than 700 airplanes and the leader of VC, Ho Chi Minh, saw how Mao used the guerrilla tactics. In early 1968, the Tet offensive has proven that 'No Where', 'Nothing', 'No one' was safe in South Vietnam at 'Anytime'. It came to that Saigon, capital city of South Vietnam where had most of the US bases and the US embassy, had been attacked by Vietcong. Obviously the US had underestimated them. Nonetheless, they were not trained to fight in jungles against guerrillas, even Green Berets were not practical in this environment, thus they, militarily, had not much advantages. Not only the Ho Chi Minh Trail but Vietcong also had Cu Chi tunnel system which US troops never figured out.
North Vietnamese, and the local people supplied needs and ordnance to Vietcong, mainly from North Vietnam, through Ho Chi Minh trail. US airplanes have never stopped try bombing this trail but they've never succeeded and figure out where they are. They were not through high ways or big roads but through farmlands which could hardly been seen on airplanes. Also, it covered Cambodia, which made decisions even hard to make. When Nixon decided to bomb Cambodia, soon he realized it was a mistake by strong Cambodian defense and protests back in the US. Vietnamese, through this, had successfully supplied the Vietcong who are fighting in South Vietnam.
Back in the US, there were protests everywhere. Beginning from Johnson presidency, people doubted if the war was winning. They for the first time saw the TV broadcast from the battlefield and saw how people were killed. "LBJ LBJ how many people did you kill today" was one of their slogan. They've protested over economic issues, casualties, US tactics in Vietnam including Search and Destroy, Operation Ranch Hand, Air attacks etc. By 1970, the Peace Movement had support from all sections of society and no government could ignore it. It got attention from everybody when Security guards killed 4 protesting students in May 1970 at Kent State.
After informing US troops are withdrawing since 1968, those who left in Vietnam had low morale. There were deep questions about the efficiency of them. They started taking drugs, raping, not fighting much, counting the days until the tour was over.
One of the biggest difficulties was to find out the Vietcong amongst Vietnamese. It was hard and they introduced Strategic Helmets where they were kept in a specific area surrounded by the US troops. They had to leave their ancestors' tombs, farmlands, beliefs and houses. Coca Cola, chewing gum, ice creams could not buy off their losses.
By 1968, before the Offensive, US casualties was over 15,000 and keep increasing rapidly. Especially during the Tet Offensive, nearly 1500 US troops were killed every week. This made low morale and huge protests back in the US, which made the war even harder to fight.
With these causes, the US lost the war in Vietnam. There was fully mass back in the US, demonstrations, unstable politics beginning from resign of Johnson, assassination of two Kennedys, Martin Luther King Junior. In the end, US began withdrawing its troops from 1968~1972, began Vietnamisation, however, South Vietnam was taken over by Vietcong, they lost the war and failed to save another "Domino".
At the site of site of demagogue John McCain's crash in Hanoi.  |
| Wreckage of McCain plane, Hanoi, October 1967 |
After the death of the president, Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson was appointed president of the United States. Johnson felt that the U.S. should stay involved in Vietnam to prove the U.S. kept its commitments and could stop communism aggression. August 2, 1964 the USS Maddox was off the coast of North Vietnam in the Gulf of Tonkin, when in was fired upon by North Vietnam coastal gunboats. On August 4 the USS Maddox and USS Turner Joy both reported attacks from North Vietnam forces. Johnson decided to escalate the war. He ordered bombing of different North Vietnam targets. Congress soon authorized the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which gave the president authority “to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.” Johnson came up with a strategy to take control of Vietnam called Operation Rolling Thunder. The operation would consist of bombing of North Vietnam, more air power, and increase the number of ground troops. In June 1965, U.S. advisors were sent into combat. This would shift the U.S. “from helping the Vietnam people help themselves, to fighting a full-scale war on and over the land mass of Asia.”
There are many things people blame America’s defeat on. For one thing the North Vietnam and Vietcong armies were much stronger than anyone anticipated. Their guerilla warfare tactics was something the U.S. soldiers were not used to. The fact that there were no clear combat zones also made fighting confusing. The Vietcong also would dress as peasants to trick the soldiers before they would attack. This made it hard for soldiers to distinguish between the enemy and friendly civilians. The Vietcong was also fighting for a cause they were willing to fight to the death for. They had heroic determination and fighting spirit. The American soldiers on the other hand didn’t always have confidence in their goals, and some felt the war was unwinnable. There was no direct threat to their own country and there was no support from the general population. The soldiers were also angered by the government lies they had to witness. Those who returned from war joined the forefront of the antiwar movements. They began wearing peace symbols and other signs of their digression. The African Americans were especially opposed to fighting “a racist war, in a racist army, for a racist government.” Military discipline broke down, and “fragging” began. Fragging was when soldiers would attack their officers, usually by tossing fragments of grenades into the officers sleeping quarters. Some soldiers also openly refused their orders. The military also experienced financial corruption, theft, murder, and suicide. All these factors seriously hurt the U.S. army.
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| Beside the tank that liberated Saigon from American control |
The war also had effects on the economy. In the beginning the war spending increased the economy, but soon the cost of war caught up to the United States. The budget had to be expanded. The cost of living rose greatly between the years of 1965 to 1975. The spending of the war was about 150 billion dollars in all. Prices of goods had increased 16% by 1970. Inflation occurred wiping out almost all economic gains, and wages were lowered, leading to many strikes. President Johnson finally asked Congress for extra taxes to help pay for the war. Congress agreed as long as he cut domestic spending. By 1961, 25 billion dollars per year were being spent on the war effort. Business leaders thought it best to end the war than to cause more civil rights movements, strikes, and youth movements against the government.
