Was the sinking of the French Navy at the Battle of Mers-el-Kebir militarily justifiable?
May 2012
Plan of Investigation
The Battle of Mers-el-Kébir of July 3 rd 1940 was the first military engagement between Britain and
France since Waterloo 1 , staged by the former to prevent the French Navy from being taken over by the
Germans. This investigation seeks to determine was the sinking of the French Navy at the Battle of
Mers-el-Kebir justifiable from a military standpoint? To do so, the British situation when left to
fight alone against Germany will be examined through contemporary sources such as LIFE magazine
to gauge popular reaction at the time, as well as Churchill’s own justification for ordering the attack
from his Nobel-prize winning memoirs. This will be questioned by focusing on both the details and
omissions found in his work, as well as recent works by British historian Warren Tute and France’s
only biographer of Hitler, Francois Delpla, to provide commentary from both sides of the Channel.
(146)
Summary of Evidence
The Battle of Mers-el-Kebir, part of Operation Catapult, was set on July 3 rd 1940 at 17h 57 2 . Described by Churchill as “a hateful decision, the most unnatural and painful” in which he had ever faced 3 , this event saw the Royal Navy attack and destroy most of the French Fleet, having been allies two weeks before, killing 1,297 sailors and wounding 351 4 . British ships that were involved under the control of Vice-Admiral Comerville were the battle cruiser Hood, the battleships Valiant and Resolution, the aircraft carrier Ark Royal, three cruisers and many destroyers called ‘Force H’ 5 . The French lost their modern battle cruiser Dunkerque and two old battleships Bretagne and Provence 6 . Battle cruiser Strasbourg and aircraft carrier Commandant Teste and five other destroyers managed to escape the British force encircling them and sail to Toulon 7 . During World War II the French Navy was the fourth biggest after Britain, the United States and Japan 8 . The French navy was holding the balance of power in the world and if it was added to the Italian, Japanese and German fleet then it would threaten the United States and Great Britain 9 . The Operation was decided by Winston Churchill and accepted by De Gaulle, Free French General in Britain 10 . Contrary to Churchill telling the Commons ‘that the War Cabinet never hesitated’, it took a week of indecision for the War Cabinet to initiate the battle by regarding alternatives like buying the French fleet or asking the Americans to purchase them 11 .
After France signed the Armistice, which demanded that all French ships should be disarmed in German and Italian ports 12 , Britain was alone to fight and as Churchill said ‘the safety of Great Britain and the British Empire is powerfully, though not decisively, affected by what happens to the French fleet’ 13 . Therefore Britain was resolved to fight alone and if necessary for years 14 . The British first gave five choices to the French in order for them to keep their ships safe: either sail with the British and continue fighting, or sail with reduced crews under the control of a British port, or sail the ships with the British to some French port in the West Indies (Martinique) where they would be demilitarised or entrusted to the United states and remain safe until the end of the War and lastly sink their own ships. If none of these choices were made, then the British would use whatever force to prevent the French ships from falling into German or Italian hands 15 . The French naval commander, Admiral Darlan, immediately refused the terms and said that the French Navy would never fall into German hands and that it was contrary to French naval agreements and French honour 16 . Therefore on the 3 rd of July, British sailors sank most of the French Fleet at Mers-el- Kebir, to show that the British would go ‘to proceed to all extremities’ to continue survive against Germany and get support from American by getting fifty old destroyers 17 . (505)
Evaluation
Warren Tute’s The Deadly Stroke was primarily written, as he states at the end of his book, to try and pay a small tribute to those who suffered and those who died during the Battle of Mers-el-Kebir 18 . All facts and conversations in this book were from French and British official and semi-official documents, making it a valuable source to use because most of the information is taken from different viewpoints from the diaries of Dr. Goebbels to French records. Tute’s book is focused primarily on the Battle and he describes with details the lack of communication and sinking of the fleet. This however does limit a broader understanding of the background and of the relationship between the British and the French. This book also focuses on only two main people: British negotiator Holland and the French admiral of the four battleships based in Oran whilst ignoring the marines also involved in this tragedy. However this allows Tute to describe the complicated series of negotiations and consequences during Mers-el-Kebir. Tute is a British author and his book is written from a distinctly British point of view, which may influence his end conclusion that the order of this battle was justified 19 .
François Delpla’s book Mers-el-Kebir, 3 juillet 1940-L’Angleterre rentre en guerre on the other hand states that Churchill never wanted this operation to end by force as it did and it was therefore unnecessary. This book did not have a precise purpose other than to inform people of the reason behind the Battle to prevent a victory to Hitler and push Roosevelt to fight his enemies 20 . Delpla gives his readers a wide bibliography with both primary and secondary sources, but also from the British archives. His book was published recently in 2010 and shows that more research and information were able compared to 1972 for Tute. Also Delpla has written the only French biography of Hitler, and is a recognized author that research for many decades on the Second World War and in particular, 1940 21 . Both sources are quite valuable, even though they are not primary sources because few books have been published in English and French about this event despite it being one of ‘Churchill’s deadliest decision’ 22 , and having as much details about it is quite remarkable especially when the French people are embarrassed about this very difficult subject given the alliance of the two countries. (400)
Analysis
In its historical context, the Battle of Mers-el-Kebir was an irresponsible, capricious event for Delpla; however it was a last chance to avoid the triumph of Hitler and make the United States decide about their opponents. The sinking of the French Fleet was viewed with surprise for everyone in the world, as Britain and France had been allies just two weeks previously 23 and fought out of fear of German expansion and anxious for American support. The battle of Mers el Kebir could be interpreted, as American historian Raico Ralph believes, as a relevant minor incident 24 , or a desperate solution from Britain to gain American aid.
Churchill thought that the battle of Mers-el-Kebir was crucial for Britain to win the war because it persuaded America to give them fifty old destroyers in order to stop German armada to cross the Channel 25 . It also showed the world that Britain would do anything and fight, even destroy its former ally. The War Cabinet thought the battle was a necessity because it did not trust Hitler, who said in Article 8 of the Armistice, that the Germans and the Italians would not use the French Fleet at their own advantage 26 . However Goebbels in his diaries said that Hitler was willing to break Article 8 if the French did not look after the Fleet 27 , which justifies Churchill’s distrust towards Hitler while asking, “what the value of Hitler’s words?”is. The British knew that if the French Fleet fell into Italian or German hands, it could crush both the British and the Americans and therefore Churchill tried to “threaten” 29 President Roosevelt in giving them support. However Roosevelt thought that it was pointless and pledged to Americans that the United States would stay isolated from Europe’s problems. Roosevelt was also planning an election and therefore only thought about winning the vote 30 .
Like most Americans including his ambassador to the UK, Roosevelt believed that Britain would be forced to sue for peace 31 . Therefore the British had no choice but to neutralise the French fleet, in order to keep the balance of power in the world and show the Americans that they were determined to fight 32 . In America, most people were probably puzzled about Britain sinking French ships because they had being allies and had led conjoined operations, and thus should have dissuaded Roosevelt to give aid to Britain. But two months after the attack Roosevelt gave Churchill the fifty boats requested and therefore Operation Catapult was justified militarily by showing that the British were fighting for freedom. It was not the Battle of Mers-el-Kebir that caused President Roosevelt to give aid to Britain, as Britain now looked like a “strategic write-off” 33 . A letter was sent to him from Ambassador Lothian 34 , one day after the attack, in which Lothian states that Roosevelt had known about the attack well before 35 . Therefore Roosevelt knew of Operation Catapult before it was initiated and thus proves that the American ships might not have been given due to the Battle, but to shield themselves from Germany. The ships were given two months after the attack 36 ; hence the sinking of the French fleet did not provoke the Americans to suddenly decide to interfere in European affairs. The British were not the only ones worried about the French fleet as the Americans also thought that if taken the French fleet with Germany and Italy could destroy the United States. Therefore a want for security could have instigated Roosevelt to help Britain defeat Germany. Lastly the British gave France four choices, but all would have to break the armistice and France could not afford it, because it would lead Germany to invade the whole country. Yet Hitler was only emphasizing on submarine warfare and did not have the manpower to take more battleships 37 , thus trust and better communication could have been used to prevent the sinking of the navy, instead of being perturbed about Nazi Germany. The French, as they did in Toulon in 1942 38 , could have sabotaged the ships to prevent German control. Thus the Operation was not justified because the United States might have still sent extra ships to Britain for protection and defeated Hitler to protect European civilisation. (708)
Conclusion
To some extent the Battle of Mers-el-Kebir was justified militarily because it showed to the Americans that Britain was determined to fight. The sinking of the French Navy probably played a major role in persuading Roosevelt to offer those destroyers and creating a strong and potent alliance between America and Britain. However Roosevelt knew about the operation before it took place and therefore the Battle did not trigger the War Cabinet of the United States to help the British, but it was the threat from Germany and Italy if the French Fleet was taken. The tragedy of Mers-el-Kebir would probably not have been necessary for Britain to win the war against the Germans, but it was a barrier of protection and to try to intimidate Hitler that Britain would do anything to win the war. Nevertheless the Battle of Mers-el-Kebir shows a lack of trust and communication between Britain and France, which caused the attack in Algeria and not the militaristic aid from America. Thus I think that the sinking of the French Navy at the Battle of Mers-el-Kebir was not entirely justified as it only provided protection to both the British and the Americans. (195)
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