Plan of investigation
Was
Winston Churchill to blame for the failings at Gallipoli? To
investigate this, the leadership of allied forces at Gallipoli at the
beginning of 1916 will be the main focus, specifically the significance
of Churchill to the failings of the campaign. Key sources such as the
Dardenelles Commission’s report of events entitled “Conclusions” and Dan
Van Der Vat’s The Dardenelles Disaster, selected because of the
author’s extensive knowledge of maritime history. Other sources written
by noted historians incorporating extensive research such as Ekins’s
Gallipoli, A Ridge too Far will be analysed and comparisons drawn to
understand the nature of the Gallipoli conflict and where the blame
lies.
Word Count: 107
Summary of evidence
On
the 31st August 1914 the First Lord of the admiralty, Winston Churchill
believed that Turkey would side with Germany and asked the Chief of the
British Imperial General Staff to draw up a plan to “Seize Gallipoli”.
This was the first inclination that Britain was hoping to open a second
front. It is argued that this move was designed to stop Germany from
buying oil from their allies to the south. However, Churchill never
mentions oil in his book World Crisis. It was thought that the Ottomans
would be unable to deal with the second front however they were
severely underestimated and prepared inadequately with limited numbers
and minimal resources . It was designed to put further strain on the
German lines because the Turkish army would need assistance causing the
German military to have to split again.
Admiral
Carden was the head of the British fleet anchored off the coast of the
Dardenelles; he warned Churchill that it wasn’t a sound plan , however
Churchill pushed forward. Leading to the 27th September 1914, a fleet of
British ships forced entrance in to the strait causing the Turkish to
close the strait to all ships, laid mines and switched off lighthouses .
However, now that the first assault had been made and the Turkish were
fortifying the area, the plan was rushed through the war office. They
again were halted when Carden became ill and Rear-Admiral Robeck was put
in charge.
Under the command of Robeck on the 3rd November 1914,
the British fleet opened fire on the Turkish forts . The next assaults
went well and the forts of Sedd-el-Bahr and Kum Kale fell. Hamilton and
a group of hastily gathered staff then went to the Dardenelles to try
to draw up a plan of attack by land these would involve English
Australian French and troops from New Zealand . On he 18th March 1915,
Eighteen French and British ships attacked the Dardenelles forts. The
attack failed resulting in the death of seven hundred sailors and the
loss of three ships . This was when the army finally stepped in lead by
Hamilton during this time the war council didn’t meet and wouldn’t meet
for 2 months . This resulted in further disaster however this is when
Churchill’s role ended and it was Hamilton that took over as the navy
had been exhausted and there was little they could do to support the
movement of troops along the beaches .
After
the failed attacks by the navy, the army where then deployed with
limited resources. Ian Hamilton was deployed to the region on 17th May
1915 however because of the “reconstruction of the government” which
meant that reinforcements were postponed for “six weeks” . When the
troops finally arrived Sir Hamilton was greeted by “troops who had never
been under fire”.
Carden
suggested that the troops should land immediately however it was
rejected by Hamilton as he stated “My knowledge of the Dardenelles was
nil; of the Turk nil” . Again showing how ill equipped he was to dealing
with the Turkish and the Dardenelles . At this stage the navy was still
operational in the area and Kitchener used this to reject the calls for
more resources to be deployed in the region. He asked for submarines
and the latest aircraft, which Kitchener responded with “Not One” .
Word Count: 560
Evaluation of Sources
Vat, Dan Van Der. The Dardanelles Disaster: Winston Churchill's Greatest Failure. London: Duckworth Overlook, 2009. Print.
Published
in 2010, Van der Vat provides a focused account of the event, using
Churchill as one of the major instigators of the disaster. It is
valuable because it is focused solely on Gallipoli. Van Der Vat is a
naval military historian so this is his area of the book covers grand
strategy and where it can conflict with tactical demands and short-term
goals. One concern is that Van Der Vat begins by describing Gallipoli
as “Churchill’s greatest failure” which leads one to question if he is
purely writing to justify his argument. Another concern is that the book
does not include a map which makes it difficult to follow the events
clearly, especially for one not acquainted with the area or strategic
considerations. The purpose of Van der Vat’s book was to inform readers
about what was happening and not provide a biased account. This is
valuable throughout the book as the author takes into consideration both
sides of the argument. A limitation of this is that no real conclusion
is established; however this allows the reader to create his or her own
opinions of the disaster.
The Final Report of Dardanelles Commission, British Dardanelles Commision,1917
The
official Dardenelles report titled “Conclusions” was published in 1917.
A benefit of the commissions report is that it includes an official map
of the area, which allows the reader to visualize the scale of the
operation. Another benefit is it is an official document of the events
therefore does not allow for interpretation and focuses on the facts of
Gallipoli. A limitation of the report was that Kitchener had recently
died; this meant that the report included little about Kitchener’s
failings at Gallipoli. The purpose of this source is to come to
conclusion on who was to blame for the failings at Gallipoli and to
inform the people of the events. The report does have evidence showing
that the expedition was poorly planned and that not enough consideration
was given. It focused on Churchill specifically and his decision to
attack Turkish ships without permission. Nevertheless the report is
limited because it doesn’t give a definitive answer to who was to blame.
It is a limitation because it does not provide judgement on the issues
and leaves some areas uncovered. Furthermore Van Der Vat spends the
majority of book exploring the history of Gallipoli where as only 100
pages actually focuses on the battle.
Word Count: 367
Analysis
Dan
Van Der Vat argues that “Churchill was a central figure in the
Dardenelles disaster of 1915” , highlighting how Churchill was involved
in the operation as well as the planning stages. Prior to Churchill’s
involvement in the situation there was a stalemate on the western
frontier and this was seen as many as a good opportunity to open up the
“underbelly of the Central Powers” . In the report it is stated, “
sufficient consideration was not given to the measures necessary to
carry out such an expedition with success” . This again places Churchill
in the limelight, as it was his responsibility along with others to
carry out the planning stages of the operation, which according to the
commission failed the soldiers deployed in the region.
Another
aspect which contributed to the failure at Gallipoli was the
disagreements between other nations such as Greece and Russia over how
they would split Constantinople. This was before the Greek government
was taken by a pro German regime; this again disrupted the plans for
Gallipoli. Another aspect, which is not mentioned in the official report
“Conclusion”, is that Kitchener didn’t want to take away any troops
away from the Western Front. This shows how blame may have been unduly
put on Churchill, as the British Government weren’t willing to put blame
on Kitchener because he had recently died. Due to the delays it allowed
the Turkish to enhance their defensive positions, it also meant that
German officers had time to take control of the situation. So arguably
the demise of the English fleet and soldiers can be contributed to the
slow planning of not only Churchill but also the foreign allies.
Churchill became involved at multiple levels during the operation, some
of which he should not have been, particularly politically when acting
beyond his powers to present “his Cabinet colleagues with faits
accomplis,” showing how he exceeded his designated role. The media also
played a significant role in highlighting how Churchill was failing.
Churchill’s colleagues leaking information about the fighting in
Gallipoli supported this. The fiasco at Gallipoli almost ended his
entire career as he was dismissed as Admiral of the navy .
There
were many issues with Churchill and the people he reported to, for
example Lord Kitchener. Kitchener told Churchill before the operation
that there were not enough troops available for the combined mission.
This is supported by the commissions report in which was stated
“resistance would be slight and advance rapid” . This was not the case
as the troops involved didn’t have the necessary support to fully fulfil
their role as they lacked the support from reinforcements or detailed
reconnaissance of the area. Additionally Churchill’s blunders were when
he ordered the navy to bombard the Turks giving “warning of a possible
attack” . This then lead to “great strengthening of Turkish defences” .
At this stage it is extremely hard to look beyond Churchill for the
failures at Gallipoli due to the lack of planning and overstepping in
political jurisdiction.
An
issue supported in both sources is the lack of planning made by officers
and especially Churchill. The commission stated, “the Turks were known
to be led by German officers” ; during the planning stages this should
have received much more attention. It became apparent that more
resources would be needed ; Churchill believed that these resources
would be forthcoming however the British government knew that they would
have to “limit their expenditure in the Western theatre of war” . This
condition was never fulfilled” showing how unprepared the allies were
for the additional front.
Churchill
may have been able to prepare for war in a more effective manner or
realized that it would have been better to put a halt to the mission all
together. Dan Van Der Vat also writes about the lack of contingency
plans that were available and that if the initial plan failed there was
very little to fall back on which again places the blame back on
Churchill.
Word Count: 667
Conclusion
This
paper has come to the conclusion that the main reason behind the
failings of Gallipoli was the lack of planning by Churchill. However
saying this one must take into consideration that others contributed to
the failings as well such as Lord Kitchener and Admiral Carden. With
regard to the planning of the operation this must fall solely on
Churchill because it was his lack of respect for the position and the
“hands on” approach that caused the rushed air about the operation. On
the other hand it can be argued that Churchill was made into a scapegoat
for what happened at Gallipoli. His allies such as Lord Asquith support
this and Lloyd George offered no support and in the case of Lord
Asquith even prevented him from speaking in his own defence, which was
the standard procedure.
The planning stage of the operation was
clearly not sufficient starting on the 31st of August until the invasion
on 27th of September. Not only was there not sufficient planning on how
to defeat the Turkish, the opposition was underestimated, when
Churchill wrote “a good army of 50,000 men and sea power” shows how the
British thought of the Turkish and how they could be defeated. The
failure to plan and provide sufficient support to the officers in charge
giving them to few men caused the failure of this operation. These two
roles were high on Churchill’s agenda, meaning that because both were
done poorly, Churchill must take responsibility for the failings at
Gallipoli.
Word Count: 252
