IBDP example of Internal Assessment
How Significant was Fidel Castro’s Role in the Missile Crisis of 1962?
A.Plan of Investigation
The investigation assesses the significance of Fidel Castro in the Missile Crisis of 1962. In order to evaluate Castro’s significance, the investigation evaluates his role in each stage of the Crisis in reference to other participants of the event; Castro’s role is investigated in the initial days of the Crisis, during the shooting down of the American U-2 plane, and in the resolution of the Crisis. Memoirs and oral history are mostly used to evaluate Castro’s significance. Two of the sources used in the essay, Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis and the Soviet Collapse compiled by James Blight, Allyn Bruce and David Welsh and Cuban documents, “The Mikoyan-Castro Talks, 4-5 November 1962: the Cuban Version,” are then evaluated for their origins, purposes, values and limitations.
The investigation does not assess the difference in ideologies (communist versus imperialism or capitalism) of the nations involved nor does the investigation assess opinions other than those of United States, Soviet Union, and Cuba.
B. Summary of Evidence
Prior to the Missile Crisis, Castro-American relationships were already strained by the Bay of Pigs in 1961 in which American funded counterrevolutionary Cubans to invade Cuba and overthrow Castro.1 The counterrevolutionary failed, pushing Castro into an alliance with communist Soviet Union and leaving Castro wary of American designs in Cuba.2 Castro’s fears were confirmed in early 1962 when his intelligence service noticed signs of U.S. activities related to what was later uncovered to be Operation Mongoose, another American invasion to overthrow Castro.3 Thus, “it was under these circumstances that [Cuban officials] informed the Soviet Union that [they] were concerned about a direct invasion of Cuba by the United States and that [they] were thinking about how to step up [their] country’s ability to resist an attack”.4 In response, Soviet President Khrushchev conceived the plan of protecting Cuban sovereignty by “installing missile with nuclear warheads in Cuba without letting the United States find out until it was too late do anything about them.”5 Castro accepted Khrushchev’s proposal6 and the Soviet Union began deploying nuclear arms.
For America, the Crisis began in mid October 1962 when American intelligence
discovered Russian nuclear missile in Cuba. For most of the world, the Crisis began on 22
October 1962 when American President Kennedy revealed in a televised broadcast that U.S.
“surveillance of the Soviet military build-up on the island of Cuba” had uncovered “as series
of offensive missile sites” in preparation for no other purpose “than to provide a nuclear strike
capability against the Western Hemisphere.”7 After Kennedy’s broadcast, the American
President called for a naval blockade of Cuba8 and used diplomatic negotiations with
Khrushchev to come to an agreement in the removal of the weapons. During negotiations,
several incidents occurred which heightened tensions and seemed to bring the world one step
closer to nuclear holocaust. One of the incidents is the shooting down of the U.S. U-2 airplane
on 27 October 1962 causing the death of Major Rudolf Anderson Jr.9 At the time the United
States and the Soviet Union believed that it was Castro who ordered Cuban antiaircraft
artillery to fire at low-flying U.S. planes on the morning of 27 October.’10 After further
analysis, it is clear that it was a Soviet soldier, not Cuban, who shot the plane. Although
Castro ordered Cuban antiaircraft artillery to fire, there is no evidence that he ordered Soviet artillery to fire. Instead, what is most likely to have happened was that the Soviet officers in
Cuba identified so closely with the Cuban government’s cause that their field commander
gave the order to shoot at the U-2, thinking as an ally supporting comrades in war.11 Another
incident is Castro’s letter to Khrushchev recommending that the Soviet Union should launch a
first-strike nuclear attack on the United States.12 This outlandish recommendation shocked
Khrushchev, leaving him with the impression that Castro “was a young and hotheaded man”
one who was “inexperienced as a statesman.” 13
The Crisis drew to a close when both great powers found a mutual solution outlined in a
message sent by Khrushchev on 26 October 1962, and in Kennedy’s response of 27 October;
the two men agreed that if the Soviets would withdraw their offensive weapons from Cuba
under United Nations supervision, the U.S. would remove its naval blockade of the island and
pledge not to invade Cuba.14 The Crisis came to an end on 28 October 1962 when Radio
Moscow announced Khrushchev’s “new order to dismantle the weapons... and to crate them
and return them to the Soviet Union.”15 Throughout the negotiation period, neither Castro not
a Cuban representative took part, leaving the issue to be “entirely one between the United
States and the Soviet Union.”16 So, Khrushchev’s announcement on the radio not only
shocked Castro but also humiliated him for his exclusion from the negotiations.’
C. Evaluation of Sources
Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis and the Soviet Collapse compiled by James G. Blight, Allyn J. Bruce and David A. Welsh is an in-depth “report” on the Havana conference in 1992 hosted by Castro to discuss Cuba’s specific role during the Crisis. Cuba on the Brink was written with the purpose to “greatly enlarge the number of ‘participants’ in the Havana conference by supplying context sufficient for our readers to ‘be there’ vicariously.”18 The book’s values lies in the fact that it provides a new Cuban perspective on the Crisis that has often been disregarded. As well, since Castro hosted the conference, the reader is exposed to Castro’s own interpretation and evaluation of Cuba’s significance. Its limitations is that the Havana conference is dependent on “critical oral history19”; considering that the conference occurred thirty years after the Crisis, it is doubtful that the recollections of the veteran participants have not been altered either subconsciously or for the purpose of conforming to political pressures.
C. Evaluation of Sources
Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis and the Soviet Collapse compiled by James G. Blight, Allyn J. Bruce and David A. Welsh is an in-depth “report” on the Havana conference in 1992 hosted by Castro to discuss Cuba’s specific role during the Crisis. Cuba on the Brink was written with the purpose to “greatly enlarge the number of ‘participants’ in the Havana conference by supplying context sufficient for our readers to ‘be there’ vicariously.”18 The book’s values lies in the fact that it provides a new Cuban perspective on the Crisis that has often been disregarded. As well, since Castro hosted the conference, the reader is exposed to Castro’s own interpretation and evaluation of Cuba’s significance. Its limitations is that the Havana conference is dependent on “critical oral history19”; considering that the conference occurred thirty years after the Crisis, it is doubtful that the recollections of the veteran participants have not been altered either subconsciously or for the purpose of conforming to political pressures.
Whereas Cuba on the Brink is based on discussion thirty years after the Crisis, “The
Mikoyan-Castro Talks, 4-5 November 1962: the Cuban Version” is a record of conversations
between Castro and Soviet envoy Mikoyan in the immediate aftermath of Khrushchev’s
acceptance of Kennedy’s demand that Soviet nuclear missiles be withdrawn from Cuba.
These conversations, which occurred on 4-5 November 1962, were obtained form Philip
Brenner, Cuba specialist, who provided them to the Cold War International History Project
and were translated form Spanish by Carlos Osorio. Cuba’s release of these documents
provide a valuable source since these records are primary documents recorded immediately
after the event and expose the hurt and betrayal felt by Castro over Khrushchev’s decision to
withdraw. As well, since this is a conversation between a Soviet and a Cuban, the historian
can notice the different interpretations of each country. These Cuban documents are limited as
they were translated awkwardly and both documents are transcriptions of memo notes taken
during a speech and do not seem to have been corrected. However, these Cuba documents can
be compared against the Russian version of the Mikoyan-Castro Talks released prior to the
Cuban version. Thus, assuming that both versions are independent from one another, the
historian can compare the versions to one another for accuracy and biases.
D. Analysis
Castro’s significance in the Crisis can either justify or discredit American interference in Cuban internal affairs. Prior to the event, the international society was willing to accept American attempts to overthrow Castro since Americans were portrayed as heroes while Castro seemed to be a fanatical socialist.20 But, if Castro was merely a pawn between U.S. and Soviet Union, Castro improves his international reputation making it difficult for future “heroic” American interference in Cuba.
In the initial days, Castro’s role seems to be significant for two reasons: one, he consented to Khrushchev’s plan and two; nuclear arms were sent for the sole interest of preserving Castro’s socialist regime. However, Castro’s role may be more limited since it is unlikely that Khrushchev’s missiles were sent solely to protect Cuba. Is more likely that Khrushchev wanted to equalize the “balance of power” and redress the strategic imbalance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union Before the Crisis, the American had surrounded the Soviet Union with military bases in Turkey21; sending missiles to Cuba would give the United States “a little of their own medicine...it was high time America learned what it feels like to have her own land and her own people threatened.”22 Furthermore, Khrushchev’s and Kennedy’s secret deal later on in the Crisis that Khrushchev would remove missiles from Cuba if Kennedy would remove Jupiters from Turkey give credibility to the possibility that despite Khrushchev’s altruistic claims, it is more plausible that his actions of 1962 were reflective of the Soviet Union’s own interests rather than Castro’s.
During late October 1962, Castro’s role is often directly related to the shooting down of the U.S. U-2 airplane. Khrushchev blames Castro, writing, “Castro ordered our antiaircraft officers to shoot down a U-2 reconnaissance plane.”23 If Khrushchev’s claim is true, then Castro played a significant role in the Crisis since the shooting down anticipated the end of diplomatic U.S. negotiations and the start of nuclear warfare. Yet, since new evidence indicate that is it more likely that Soviet officers shot down the plane without Castro’s orders, Castro should neither be blamed nor be given significance for the shooting down of the U-2 plane. As well, Castro’s role is also associated with his recommendation that the Soviet should launch a nuclear attack on the United States. Actually, Castro’s apparent eagerness for nuclear war may be his greatest significance in the Crisis since his willingness to use aggression ironically convinced Khrushchev of the importance of maintaining world peace and contributed to the Soviet decision to yield to the United States.24
Castro’s significance in the Crisis can either justify or discredit American interference in Cuban internal affairs. Prior to the event, the international society was willing to accept American attempts to overthrow Castro since Americans were portrayed as heroes while Castro seemed to be a fanatical socialist.20 But, if Castro was merely a pawn between U.S. and Soviet Union, Castro improves his international reputation making it difficult for future “heroic” American interference in Cuba.
In the initial days, Castro’s role seems to be significant for two reasons: one, he consented to Khrushchev’s plan and two; nuclear arms were sent for the sole interest of preserving Castro’s socialist regime. However, Castro’s role may be more limited since it is unlikely that Khrushchev’s missiles were sent solely to protect Cuba. Is more likely that Khrushchev wanted to equalize the “balance of power” and redress the strategic imbalance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union Before the Crisis, the American had surrounded the Soviet Union with military bases in Turkey21; sending missiles to Cuba would give the United States “a little of their own medicine...it was high time America learned what it feels like to have her own land and her own people threatened.”22 Furthermore, Khrushchev’s and Kennedy’s secret deal later on in the Crisis that Khrushchev would remove missiles from Cuba if Kennedy would remove Jupiters from Turkey give credibility to the possibility that despite Khrushchev’s altruistic claims, it is more plausible that his actions of 1962 were reflective of the Soviet Union’s own interests rather than Castro’s.
During late October 1962, Castro’s role is often directly related to the shooting down of the U.S. U-2 airplane. Khrushchev blames Castro, writing, “Castro ordered our antiaircraft officers to shoot down a U-2 reconnaissance plane.”23 If Khrushchev’s claim is true, then Castro played a significant role in the Crisis since the shooting down anticipated the end of diplomatic U.S. negotiations and the start of nuclear warfare. Yet, since new evidence indicate that is it more likely that Soviet officers shot down the plane without Castro’s orders, Castro should neither be blamed nor be given significance for the shooting down of the U-2 plane. As well, Castro’s role is also associated with his recommendation that the Soviet should launch a nuclear attack on the United States. Actually, Castro’s apparent eagerness for nuclear war may be his greatest significance in the Crisis since his willingness to use aggression ironically convinced Khrushchev of the importance of maintaining world peace and contributed to the Soviet decision to yield to the United States.24
Overall, the clearest indication of Castro’s importance to the Crisis lies in his lack of
participation in the Soviet-American negotiations. Castro did not realize that Khrushchev had
conceded to remove all soviet offensive weapons from Cuba until he heard Khrushchev’s
announcement on the radio. His exclusion from the negotiations was no error on the Soviet-
American’s behalf, but a sign of his political insignificance in the Crisis.
For many U.S. government decision makers at the time of the crisis most have agreed that Cuba was just a locale for a U.S.- Soviet confrontation. Ex U.S. Ambassador to Cuba (1959-60) Philip W. Bonsal declares that the Missile Crisis cannot truly be classified under Cuban American relation since “the issue was entirely one between the United States and the Soviet Union.”25 He states that although the confrontation could have eliminated Castro, “the exercise had little to do with him.”26
For many U.S. government decision makers at the time of the crisis most have agreed that Cuba was just a locale for a U.S.- Soviet confrontation. Ex U.S. Ambassador to Cuba (1959-60) Philip W. Bonsal declares that the Missile Crisis cannot truly be classified under Cuban American relation since “the issue was entirely one between the United States and the Soviet Union.”25 He states that although the confrontation could have eliminated Castro, “the exercise had little to do with him.”26
On the other hand, Khrushchev writes in his memoirs that Castro did indeed play a
significant role in the Crisis. He bluntly announces that Castro was solely responsible for the
shooting of the U-2 plane27 and that Castro encouraged the Soviet Union to “launch a
preemptive strike against the United States.”28 However, in view of contradicting sources and
Khrushchev’s tendency to make declarations without details and factual evidence, it is
unlikely that Castro’s role was as significant as claimed.
E. Conclusion
During each and every stage of the Crisis, Castro’s role is overshadowed by that of the Soviet Union’s and the United States. In the beginning, it was Khrushchev, not Castro, who initiated the deployment of nuclear arms; and Castro’s’ relation with the U-2 shooting is little more than a misunderstanding on the part of the Soviet soldiers. As argued by Bonsal, the Missile Crisis was entirely between the Soviet Union and the United States. This view can be justified when we consider the possibility that Khrushchev may have sent his missiles for reasons other than for Castro’s defense and when we are faced with Castro’s obvious exclusion from the Crisis negotiations. Castro’s “role” in the Crisis, if he has one at all, is that he unintentionally helped convinced Khrushchev to concede to Kennedy’s demands. As Castro himself declares, “I cannot take the credit for the resolution of the crisis...the major role belongs to Khrushchev who caused that crisis by his stubbornness, and then resolved it.”29
Word Count: 1989
1 Nikita S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes. Trans and ed. Jerrold L. Schechter with Yacheslav V. Luchkov. (Boston: Little Brow, 1990) 171.
2 Philip Brenner and James G. Blight, “The Crisis and Cuban-Soviet Relations: Fidel Castro’s Secret 1968 Speech,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin. No. 5 (Spring 1995).
3 James G. Blight et al. Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis and the Soviet Collapse. (New York: Pantheon, 1993) 19.
19 Critical oral history is the synthesis of recollections of participants with declassified documentation and the analyses of historians.
E. Conclusion
During each and every stage of the Crisis, Castro’s role is overshadowed by that of the Soviet Union’s and the United States. In the beginning, it was Khrushchev, not Castro, who initiated the deployment of nuclear arms; and Castro’s’ relation with the U-2 shooting is little more than a misunderstanding on the part of the Soviet soldiers. As argued by Bonsal, the Missile Crisis was entirely between the Soviet Union and the United States. This view can be justified when we consider the possibility that Khrushchev may have sent his missiles for reasons other than for Castro’s defense and when we are faced with Castro’s obvious exclusion from the Crisis negotiations. Castro’s “role” in the Crisis, if he has one at all, is that he unintentionally helped convinced Khrushchev to concede to Kennedy’s demands. As Castro himself declares, “I cannot take the credit for the resolution of the crisis...the major role belongs to Khrushchev who caused that crisis by his stubbornness, and then resolved it.”29
Word Count: 1989
1 Nikita S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes. Trans and ed. Jerrold L. Schechter with Yacheslav V. Luchkov. (Boston: Little Brow, 1990) 171.
2 Philip Brenner and James G. Blight, “The Crisis and Cuban-Soviet Relations: Fidel Castro’s Secret 1968 Speech,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin. No. 5 (Spring 1995).
3 James G. Blight et al. Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis and the Soviet Collapse. (New York: Pantheon, 1993) 19.
4 Blight, 19.
5 Nikita S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers. Ed. and trans. Strobe Talbott. (Boston: Little Brow, 1970) 493.
6 Khrushchev, Glasnost. 171.
7 Anatoli I. Gribkov and William Y. Smith, Operation ANADYR: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis. (Chicago: Edition Q, 1994) 1.
8 Ibid, 28. 9 Ibid, 66. 10 Ibid, 67.
5 Nikita S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers. Ed. and trans. Strobe Talbott. (Boston: Little Brow, 1970) 493.
6 Khrushchev, Glasnost. 171.
7 Anatoli I. Gribkov and William Y. Smith, Operation ANADYR: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis. (Chicago: Edition Q, 1994) 1.
8 Ibid, 28. 9 Ibid, 66. 10 Ibid, 67.
11 Blight, xi.
12 Ibid, 474-491.
13 Khrushchev, Glasnost. 178.
14 Wayne S. Smith, The Closest of Enemies: A Personal and Diplomatic Account of U.S.-Cuban
Relations Since 1957. (New York: Norton, 1987) 81. 15 Blight, 472.
16 Philip W. Bonsal, Cuba, Castro and the United States. (London: U of Pittsburgh P, 1971) 187.
17 “The Mikoyan-Castro Talks, 4-5 November 1962: The Cuban Version,” Cold War International
18 Blight, 10.
12 Ibid, 474-491.
13 Khrushchev, Glasnost. 178.
14 Wayne S. Smith, The Closest of Enemies: A Personal and Diplomatic Account of U.S.-Cuban
Relations Since 1957. (New York: Norton, 1987) 81. 15 Blight, 472.
16 Philip W. Bonsal, Cuba, Castro and the United States. (London: U of Pittsburgh P, 1971) 187.
17 “The Mikoyan-Castro Talks, 4-5 November 1962: The Cuban Version,” Cold War International
19 Critical oral history is the synthesis of recollections of participants with declassified documentation and the analyses of historians.
20 Blight, 178,
21 Anatoli, 11.
22 Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers. 494.
21 Anatoli, 11.
22 Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers. 494.
23 Khrushchev, Glasnost. 178,
24 Ibid, 177.
25 Bonsal, 187.
26 Ibid.
25 Bonsal, 187.
26 Ibid.
27 Khrushchev, Glasnost, 178.
28 Ibid, 177.
29 Georgy Shakhnazarov, “Fidel Castro, Glasnost, and the Caribbean Crisis,” Cold War
28 Ibid, 177.
29 Georgy Shakhnazarov, “Fidel Castro, Glasnost, and the Caribbean Crisis,” Cold War
F. Bibliography
Blight James G., Bruce J. Allyn and David A. Welsh. Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile
Crisis and the Soviet Collapse. New York: Pantheon, 1993.
Bonsal, Philip W. Cuba, Castro and the United States. London: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971.
Brenner, Philip and James G. Blight. “The Crisis and Cuban Soviet Relations: Fidel Castro’s Secret 1968 Speech,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin. No. 5 (Spring 1995)
Gribkov, Anatoli I. And William Y. Smith. Operation ANADYR: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis. Chicago: Edition Q, 1994.
Khrushchev, Nikita S. Khrushchev Remembers. Ed. and trans. Strobe Talbott. Boston: Little Brow, 1970
---.Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes. Trans and ed. Jerrold L. Schechter with Yacheslav V. Luchkov. Boston: Little Brow , 1990.
“The Mikoyan-Castro Talks, 4-5 November 1962: The Cuban Version.” Cold War International History Project Bulletin. Nos. 8-9 (Winter 1996/1997).
Shakhnazarov, Georgy. “Fidel Castro, Glasnost, and the Caribbean Crisis,” Cold War International History project Bulletin. No. 5 (Spring 1995)
Smith, Wayne S. The Closest of Enemies: A personal and Diplomatic Account of U.S.-Cuban Relations Since 1957. New York: Norton, 1987,
Bonsal, Philip W. Cuba, Castro and the United States. London: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971.
Brenner, Philip and James G. Blight. “The Crisis and Cuban Soviet Relations: Fidel Castro’s Secret 1968 Speech,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin. No. 5 (Spring 1995)
Gribkov, Anatoli I. And William Y. Smith. Operation ANADYR: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis. Chicago: Edition Q, 1994.
Khrushchev, Nikita S. Khrushchev Remembers. Ed. and trans. Strobe Talbott. Boston: Little Brow, 1970
---.Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes. Trans and ed. Jerrold L. Schechter with Yacheslav V. Luchkov. Boston: Little Brow , 1990.
“The Mikoyan-Castro Talks, 4-5 November 1962: The Cuban Version.” Cold War International History Project Bulletin. Nos. 8-9 (Winter 1996/1997).
Shakhnazarov, Georgy. “Fidel Castro, Glasnost, and the Caribbean Crisis,” Cold War International History project Bulletin. No. 5 (Spring 1995)
Smith, Wayne S. The Closest of Enemies: A personal and Diplomatic Account of U.S.-Cuban Relations Since 1957. New York: Norton, 1987,
IBDP Extended Essay in History
7 Minutes to Midnight: Kennedy's resolution to the Cuban Missile Crisis
How did Kennedy's implementation of the naval blockade and his subsequent negotiations influence the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis and what were the long term implications?
Introduction
Rationale
To what extent did John F. Kennedy's diplomatic strategies contribute to the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962? Now that the Cold War has disappeared into history, we can say authoritatively that the world came closest to blowing itself up during thirteen days in October 1962. The Doomsday Clock addresses the likelihood of a human-made global catastrophe (by nuclear annihilation) with midnight ultimately signifying the extinction of mankind as we know it. The clock, being updated every so often to represent international atmospheric changes, was set at seven minutes to midnight during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Modernly, the inaccuracy of such calculation is apparent, with public access to archives allowing documents such as exchanged letters between Khrushchev and Kennedy to be viewed, and further, displaying the instability looming over the situation. The reality of the situation was far more dire than seven minutes before midnight as Schlesinger alludes to in his initial quote, in fact this event was the only event in US history to have the president confirm the DEFCON level at 2 - the highest ever recorded to this day. The crisis erupted within the White House at 8:45 AM on October 16th, 1962, when President John F. Kennedy was alerted by his National Security Advisor, McGeorge Bundy, that US aircraft surveying Cuba found Soviet construction sites some 90 miles off the coast of Key West, Florida. These sites seemed to house that of military weaponry. Within three days, Kennedy would be conversing with Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, who referred to the Soviet aid as solely defensive. Kennedy's response addressed that if there were any offensive aid sent to Cuba, it would imbalance the trust set between the major powers, referring to his public warning sent on September 4, earlier that year. The briefing essentially warned the Soviets that in the case they introduce significant nuclear weaponry into Cuba, there would be the gravest of consequences. On October 23, Kennedy quarantined all of Cuba from receiving foreign aid, slowing the spread of nuclear weaponry. The following day brought a response from Khrushchev, in which he compared the quarantine to that of an ultimatum, wishing to intimidate the USSR, and thus, spiral the major powers into further conflict. On the 26th, Khrushchev offered Kennedy a deal, the USSR would remove all nuclear artillery so long as the US stopped interfering with trade (lift the quarantine) on Cuba, and would not invade the territory. Of course, this deal was predated by multiple events in which the US intercepted Soviet shipments and searched them for any contraband military supplies. Kennedy responded to Khrushchev, optimistic about a resolution. Moscow sent another letter on the 27th, adding another clause to their predating letter, in which the US was to initiate the removal of American nuclear artillery from Turkey to validate their agreement. The night of the 27th, Robert Kennedy met with Soviet representative, Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, and further negotiated the withdrawal of both powers' nuclear arms, concluding the crisis. Establishing the extent of credit which can be attributed to Kennedy's diplomatic strategies during the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis will further allow historians to develop a thorough impression upon his influence on foreign affairs and effectiveness as president. It is imperative that historians investigate this crisis as it was not only a prominent event within his presidency, but additionally debated as the basis of his assassination, with speculations surrounding Lee Harvey Oswald's positive views towards the Castro regime.
Methodology
This paper discusses Kennedy's implementation of the naval blockade, subsequent negotiations, and their long-term impacts. Such is achieved through a comparative study, examining the diplomatic attributions of Kennedy and their overall impact on the crisis, analysing their strengths and weaknesses. Each section will further evaluate 3 main diplomatic strategies enacted by Kennedy, using primary audio recordings and written documents from museums such as the JFK Library and secondary books from cold war historians such as Max Hastings and Serhii Plokhy. The specifics towards Hastings is that he is known for his thorough research within cold war politics and his critical analysis, whereas the specifics towards Plokhy is not only his credentials, being an esteemed Harvard professor, but additionally his background allowing him to interpret soviet archives. To conclude, such research will determine the final answer towards the research question: How did Kennedy's implementation of the naval blockade and his subsequent negotiations influence the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis and what were the long term implications?
Analysis
Kennedy's predecessors
Understanding the Cuban Missile Crisis and Kennedy's diplomatic resolutions to such lies within the comprehension of tension which clouded the time period. The Cold War was a period in time in which two main powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, fought over global ideological presence; using propaganda, espionage, and technological advancements to boost their impact upon the world. This affair predated Kennedy's inauguration, with various diplomatic procedures being presented to pacify the worldwide conflict. Harry S. Truman enacted a major example of such, the Truman Doctrine. Intended as a policy committing the United States to the containment of Communist expansion beyond eastern Europe, the Truman Doctrine was meant to delay the growing tension, whereas many see it formalising the Cold War. As the US-USSR rivalry continued, Dwight Eisenhower, the 34th president, further acted upon diplomacy. An experienced figure of foreign affairs, Eisenhower approached presidency as a means to cure the uncontrollable geo-political instability surrounding the globe, he was able to terminate the Korean war through an armistice, and encouraged west Germany to join NATO in the 1955 North Atlantic Treaty. Through his retention of communism in Korea and Germany, Eisenhower further irritated the USSR, growing tensions substantially. Additionally, Eisenhower introduced the New Look defence policy, a policy relying on the development of nuclear artillery, noted as a dangerous game of brinkmanship, one that involved convincing your enemy of your willingness to use nuclear weapons. This policy, as seen through the lens of Dulles, threatened the USSR with nuclear annihilation, further composing the storyline of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Moreover, the United States' paranoia of communism grew closer to home, with Cuba's newest Prime Minister, Fidel Castro, aligning with Russian leader, Nikita Khrushchev. Eisenhower, once recognising the alliance, initiated the Bay of Pigs Invasion, hoping to overthrow Marxist-Leninist Castro, which would later be a failed attempt. Now it was time for Kennedy to unravel the tensions diplomatically, as with soviet aid, Communism was closer to home than simply 1,212 miles, in fact it was 13 minutes.
Kennedy's naval blockade and subsequent negotiations greatly influenced the resolution
Kennedy's diplomatic attributions to the crisis echoed within his public statement on the 28th. Mr Chairman, both of our countries have great unfinished tasks and I know that your people as well as those of the United States can ask for nothing better than to pursue them free from the fear of war. This document, marking the conclusion of the crisis, reiterated his hope for an end to the arms race, a construction of peace, and a bright future. However, it is the diplomatic strategies provided by Kennedy, which allowed historians such as Max Hastings to consider Kennedy's diplomatic resolution during the crisis to be the pivotal moments in which launched Kennedy into being considered a great leader.
Kennedy prioritised negotiations
Kennedy immediately began his pursuit of negotiations through his summoning of 14 close advisors upon the revelation of the crisis. This committee, or what would later be referred to as ExComm, included figures such as defence secretary Robert McNamara, attorney general Robert F. Kennedy, and soon, republican lawyer John McCloy. With such notable figures, ExComm's discussions not only housed that of military tactics, but additionally diplomacy and its complexities. ExComm quickly became the backbone for internal discussions upon the crisis, its values being in its confidentiality and critical analysis. Such allowed Kennedy to premeditate upon the actions he would take in retaliation of the threat without the worry of press, underdeveloped strategies and distorted discussions a larger crowd might encourage. A notable attribute of ExComm was its ability to conceal information relating to the crisis, a characteristic Kennedy was adamant about. In the years prior to and during his presidency, the Truman doctrine reflected the top priority of the United States during the Cold War, to contain the spread of communism. Now with Soviet troops occupying territory some 90 miles from Key West, Kennedy understood the foretold consequences if word was to ever spread. Panic would consume the masses, Soviets would be able to anticipate the United States responses, and the leverage Kennedy held upon negotiations would drop. Confidentiality further opened negotiations especially towards the conclusion of the crisis such as within Khrushchev's proposal given the night of the 27th. We are willing to remove from Cuba the means which you regard as offensive. Your representatives will make a declaration to the effect that the United States will remove its analogous means from Turkey. Khrushchev's proposal, initiated after the implementation of the naval blockade, asked Kennedy to remove missiles within Turkey, although this would breach an earlier agreement the United States pledged to NATO in 1952, a joint defence and cooperation. This agreement was administered to show the United States support of their NATO allies, especially those who were directly impacted by the USSR's dominance. Although most missiles within Turkey had been deemed obsolete by 1962 - due to their outdated technology - Khrushchev's resolution nonetheless would not have been possible without security between negotiations as Kennedy's fear was in the backlash of his people. Overall, Kennedy's commitment towards diplomacy is prevalent within his prioritisation of negotiations. Through ExComm's heightened evaluation and analysis, Kennedy was able to strategise, anticipating the various effects of his choices, and revealing a diplomatic course of action. His adamancy on classifying meetings and concealing the crisis, further strengthened US negotiation tactics, allowing Kennedy to disarm Turkey without stress being put upon him by his country. Moreover, his implementation of the naval blockade allowed Kennedy to directly bring Khrushchev with the terms of communicative measures, a crucial point within any resolution. Both of these variables reveal his diplomatic ability and its heightened influence towards peaceful negotiations, ultimately facilitating resolution.
The naval blockade
Kennedy's physical presence within the crisis additionally must be noted. Not only was he able to discuss strategies successfully, but deploy them sufficiently. One of his prominent diplomatic strategies was that of the naval blockade. On October 20th, 1962, upon the advisory of ExComm, Kennedy finalised plans to deploy 20 destroyers, 8 aircraft carriers, and various other vessels to set Cuba in a quarantine-like state. With all vessels blocking Cuba, this allowed the moderation of Soviet aid received in Cuban territory, significantly reducing the pace at which the Soviets could re-arm Cuba sufficiently. Furthermore, any Soviet ships which had altered course from the quarantine zone, faced delays within shipments, further halting the aid. The blockade's values are within its solely defensive approach and its ability to open negotiations between the superpowers. Upon the vision of Maxwell Taylor, an esteemed and decorated general who attended ExComm's meetings, Kennedy's intervention with the blockade insisted on negotiations without arms, successfully opening talking points between the US and USSR in an effort to find a resolution. With Khrushchev's aid failing to reach Cuban ports, tension arose between Cuban-Soviet relations. Castro, infuriated with the United States, urged the USSR in his letter to Khrushchev on the 26th to fight the United States upon their imminent invasion of Cuba. Eliminate this danger forever, in an act of the most legitimate self-defence. Although Khrushchev did not wish to align with that position, he saw avoiding nuclear war to be best of interest towards any future USSR operations. Since Kennedy's blockade was by all means solely defensive, resembling Gromyko's argument concluded on the 18th, addressing Soviet aid on Cuba, Kennedy's blockade was by all means non-aggressive. This meant if retaliation were to arise, presented by either the Soviets or Cubans, it would be seen as an aggressive provocation of the American army, having them become the instigators to any consequences. Khrushchev, noting such, knew that his next actions must be diplomatic if he wanted to save face. The blockade pressured Khrushchev, and he soon responded to the president, seeking discussions to enable resolution. Thus, diplomacy nurtured through both sides of the predicament, a direct effect of Kennedy's actions. All in all, Kennedy's implication of the blockade allowed further control over escalations in the crisis. The United States was able to monitor and reject Soviet aid from reaching Cuban territory, subsequently limiting the amount of assembled artillery against the US. Additionally, its obstruction of Soviet machinery encouraged discussions between the powers. Both attributions led towards the conclusion of the crisis, with resolution statements being drafted by Khrushchev on the 26th.
Long-term impact
The influence of Kennedy continued even once the crisis was resolved. His diplomatic approach became standard, reflecting the possibilities open to those who take a step back and evaluate before striking. Subsequently, American-Soviet relations improved communication, strengthening the tolerance of one another. The impacts went further than communication with nuclear arms control agreements between powers preventing tension between major powers and allowing a baseline of trust to develop. Communication styles were altered immediately after the conflict, with the red telephone, an international line between Moscow and Washington being implemented. This confidential line aided future discussions, reduced the risks of misunderstandings, and further allowed both powers to maintain their reputations during diplomatic communications. Encouraging powers to communicate, the red telephone directly aided further Cold War topics, such as the following 1967 Arab-Israeli war or the Six-Day War, where president Lyndon B. Johnson notified Brezhnev through the line about a US fleet entering Mediterranean waters, and how it meant no aggression towards the Soviets and their stance in the war. These exchanges sufficiently avoided any miscommunications between the powers, placing an understanding of trust between the powers. Furthermore, the red telephone also accommodated communications over the nuclear arms race. Connecting the superpowers easily allowed for a finalisation of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, a treaty aimed to intercept the arms race, regulating the testing sites of nuclear artillery for the US, UK, and USSR, banning any testing within the atmosphere, outer-space, and underwater. Controlling the efforts of nuclear arms sufficiently. Five years later, the same hotline hosted negotiations amongst the Non-Proliferation Treaty, a treaty organised to promote disarmament through the prevention of nuclear weaponry spread. Both successful themselves, arguably would not have been without the availability of the red telephone. The line, although altered throughout the years through breakthroughs in technology - such as its leap into satellite communications in 1971 - has been maintained, with each generation of leaders. Some reports even manage to sustain 44th President Barack Obama utilising the international line to warn Vladimir Putin against interfering within the 2016 election. This can be attributed to the work of Kennedy's diplomacy, encouraging discussion and peace-oriented talking points.
Kennedy's naval blockade and subsequent negotiations minorly influenced the resolution
However, it is imperative to present another aspect towards each of these arguments, their weaknesses. The difficulty of evaluating Kennedy's actions and their impact lies within the uncertainty which riddled each diplomatic success. Even Curtis LeMay, the Air Force Chief of Staff noted this uncertainty, within his quote The blockade and political action, I see leading into war. I don't see any other solution. It will lead right into war. This is almost as bad as the appeasement at Munich. LeMay not only reveals the internal uncertainty of ExComm, but additionally leaves critics theorising the resolution to be that of luck, arguing new perspectives by questioning what if to every approach Kennedy took. Focusing on the uncertainty within Kennedy's actions, this theory can be validated through the president's priorities, the responses of the naval blockade, and the negative long-term impacts.
Kennedy's priorities
How did Kennedy's implementation of the naval blockade and his subsequent negotiations influence the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis and what were the long term implications?
Introduction
Rationale
To what extent did John F. Kennedy's diplomatic strategies contribute to the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962? Now that the Cold War has disappeared into history, we can say authoritatively that the world came closest to blowing itself up during thirteen days in October 1962. The Doomsday Clock addresses the likelihood of a human-made global catastrophe (by nuclear annihilation) with midnight ultimately signifying the extinction of mankind as we know it. The clock, being updated every so often to represent international atmospheric changes, was set at seven minutes to midnight during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Modernly, the inaccuracy of such calculation is apparent, with public access to archives allowing documents such as exchanged letters between Khrushchev and Kennedy to be viewed, and further, displaying the instability looming over the situation. The reality of the situation was far more dire than seven minutes before midnight as Schlesinger alludes to in his initial quote, in fact this event was the only event in US history to have the president confirm the DEFCON level at 2 - the highest ever recorded to this day. The crisis erupted within the White House at 8:45 AM on October 16th, 1962, when President John F. Kennedy was alerted by his National Security Advisor, McGeorge Bundy, that US aircraft surveying Cuba found Soviet construction sites some 90 miles off the coast of Key West, Florida. These sites seemed to house that of military weaponry. Within three days, Kennedy would be conversing with Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, who referred to the Soviet aid as solely defensive. Kennedy's response addressed that if there were any offensive aid sent to Cuba, it would imbalance the trust set between the major powers, referring to his public warning sent on September 4, earlier that year. The briefing essentially warned the Soviets that in the case they introduce significant nuclear weaponry into Cuba, there would be the gravest of consequences. On October 23, Kennedy quarantined all of Cuba from receiving foreign aid, slowing the spread of nuclear weaponry. The following day brought a response from Khrushchev, in which he compared the quarantine to that of an ultimatum, wishing to intimidate the USSR, and thus, spiral the major powers into further conflict. On the 26th, Khrushchev offered Kennedy a deal, the USSR would remove all nuclear artillery so long as the US stopped interfering with trade (lift the quarantine) on Cuba, and would not invade the territory. Of course, this deal was predated by multiple events in which the US intercepted Soviet shipments and searched them for any contraband military supplies. Kennedy responded to Khrushchev, optimistic about a resolution. Moscow sent another letter on the 27th, adding another clause to their predating letter, in which the US was to initiate the removal of American nuclear artillery from Turkey to validate their agreement. The night of the 27th, Robert Kennedy met with Soviet representative, Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, and further negotiated the withdrawal of both powers' nuclear arms, concluding the crisis. Establishing the extent of credit which can be attributed to Kennedy's diplomatic strategies during the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis will further allow historians to develop a thorough impression upon his influence on foreign affairs and effectiveness as president. It is imperative that historians investigate this crisis as it was not only a prominent event within his presidency, but additionally debated as the basis of his assassination, with speculations surrounding Lee Harvey Oswald's positive views towards the Castro regime.
Methodology
This paper discusses Kennedy's implementation of the naval blockade, subsequent negotiations, and their long-term impacts. Such is achieved through a comparative study, examining the diplomatic attributions of Kennedy and their overall impact on the crisis, analysing their strengths and weaknesses. Each section will further evaluate 3 main diplomatic strategies enacted by Kennedy, using primary audio recordings and written documents from museums such as the JFK Library and secondary books from cold war historians such as Max Hastings and Serhii Plokhy. The specifics towards Hastings is that he is known for his thorough research within cold war politics and his critical analysis, whereas the specifics towards Plokhy is not only his credentials, being an esteemed Harvard professor, but additionally his background allowing him to interpret soviet archives. To conclude, such research will determine the final answer towards the research question: How did Kennedy's implementation of the naval blockade and his subsequent negotiations influence the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis and what were the long term implications?
Analysis
Kennedy's predecessors
Understanding the Cuban Missile Crisis and Kennedy's diplomatic resolutions to such lies within the comprehension of tension which clouded the time period. The Cold War was a period in time in which two main powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, fought over global ideological presence; using propaganda, espionage, and technological advancements to boost their impact upon the world. This affair predated Kennedy's inauguration, with various diplomatic procedures being presented to pacify the worldwide conflict. Harry S. Truman enacted a major example of such, the Truman Doctrine. Intended as a policy committing the United States to the containment of Communist expansion beyond eastern Europe, the Truman Doctrine was meant to delay the growing tension, whereas many see it formalising the Cold War. As the US-USSR rivalry continued, Dwight Eisenhower, the 34th president, further acted upon diplomacy. An experienced figure of foreign affairs, Eisenhower approached presidency as a means to cure the uncontrollable geo-political instability surrounding the globe, he was able to terminate the Korean war through an armistice, and encouraged west Germany to join NATO in the 1955 North Atlantic Treaty. Through his retention of communism in Korea and Germany, Eisenhower further irritated the USSR, growing tensions substantially. Additionally, Eisenhower introduced the New Look defence policy, a policy relying on the development of nuclear artillery, noted as a dangerous game of brinkmanship, one that involved convincing your enemy of your willingness to use nuclear weapons. This policy, as seen through the lens of Dulles, threatened the USSR with nuclear annihilation, further composing the storyline of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Moreover, the United States' paranoia of communism grew closer to home, with Cuba's newest Prime Minister, Fidel Castro, aligning with Russian leader, Nikita Khrushchev. Eisenhower, once recognising the alliance, initiated the Bay of Pigs Invasion, hoping to overthrow Marxist-Leninist Castro, which would later be a failed attempt. Now it was time for Kennedy to unravel the tensions diplomatically, as with soviet aid, Communism was closer to home than simply 1,212 miles, in fact it was 13 minutes.
Kennedy's naval blockade and subsequent negotiations greatly influenced the resolution
Kennedy's diplomatic attributions to the crisis echoed within his public statement on the 28th. Mr Chairman, both of our countries have great unfinished tasks and I know that your people as well as those of the United States can ask for nothing better than to pursue them free from the fear of war. This document, marking the conclusion of the crisis, reiterated his hope for an end to the arms race, a construction of peace, and a bright future. However, it is the diplomatic strategies provided by Kennedy, which allowed historians such as Max Hastings to consider Kennedy's diplomatic resolution during the crisis to be the pivotal moments in which launched Kennedy into being considered a great leader.
Kennedy prioritised negotiations
Kennedy immediately began his pursuit of negotiations through his summoning of 14 close advisors upon the revelation of the crisis. This committee, or what would later be referred to as ExComm, included figures such as defence secretary Robert McNamara, attorney general Robert F. Kennedy, and soon, republican lawyer John McCloy. With such notable figures, ExComm's discussions not only housed that of military tactics, but additionally diplomacy and its complexities. ExComm quickly became the backbone for internal discussions upon the crisis, its values being in its confidentiality and critical analysis. Such allowed Kennedy to premeditate upon the actions he would take in retaliation of the threat without the worry of press, underdeveloped strategies and distorted discussions a larger crowd might encourage. A notable attribute of ExComm was its ability to conceal information relating to the crisis, a characteristic Kennedy was adamant about. In the years prior to and during his presidency, the Truman doctrine reflected the top priority of the United States during the Cold War, to contain the spread of communism. Now with Soviet troops occupying territory some 90 miles from Key West, Kennedy understood the foretold consequences if word was to ever spread. Panic would consume the masses, Soviets would be able to anticipate the United States responses, and the leverage Kennedy held upon negotiations would drop. Confidentiality further opened negotiations especially towards the conclusion of the crisis such as within Khrushchev's proposal given the night of the 27th. We are willing to remove from Cuba the means which you regard as offensive. Your representatives will make a declaration to the effect that the United States will remove its analogous means from Turkey. Khrushchev's proposal, initiated after the implementation of the naval blockade, asked Kennedy to remove missiles within Turkey, although this would breach an earlier agreement the United States pledged to NATO in 1952, a joint defence and cooperation. This agreement was administered to show the United States support of their NATO allies, especially those who were directly impacted by the USSR's dominance. Although most missiles within Turkey had been deemed obsolete by 1962 - due to their outdated technology - Khrushchev's resolution nonetheless would not have been possible without security between negotiations as Kennedy's fear was in the backlash of his people. Overall, Kennedy's commitment towards diplomacy is prevalent within his prioritisation of negotiations. Through ExComm's heightened evaluation and analysis, Kennedy was able to strategise, anticipating the various effects of his choices, and revealing a diplomatic course of action. His adamancy on classifying meetings and concealing the crisis, further strengthened US negotiation tactics, allowing Kennedy to disarm Turkey without stress being put upon him by his country. Moreover, his implementation of the naval blockade allowed Kennedy to directly bring Khrushchev with the terms of communicative measures, a crucial point within any resolution. Both of these variables reveal his diplomatic ability and its heightened influence towards peaceful negotiations, ultimately facilitating resolution.
The naval blockade
Kennedy's physical presence within the crisis additionally must be noted. Not only was he able to discuss strategies successfully, but deploy them sufficiently. One of his prominent diplomatic strategies was that of the naval blockade. On October 20th, 1962, upon the advisory of ExComm, Kennedy finalised plans to deploy 20 destroyers, 8 aircraft carriers, and various other vessels to set Cuba in a quarantine-like state. With all vessels blocking Cuba, this allowed the moderation of Soviet aid received in Cuban territory, significantly reducing the pace at which the Soviets could re-arm Cuba sufficiently. Furthermore, any Soviet ships which had altered course from the quarantine zone, faced delays within shipments, further halting the aid. The blockade's values are within its solely defensive approach and its ability to open negotiations between the superpowers. Upon the vision of Maxwell Taylor, an esteemed and decorated general who attended ExComm's meetings, Kennedy's intervention with the blockade insisted on negotiations without arms, successfully opening talking points between the US and USSR in an effort to find a resolution. With Khrushchev's aid failing to reach Cuban ports, tension arose between Cuban-Soviet relations. Castro, infuriated with the United States, urged the USSR in his letter to Khrushchev on the 26th to fight the United States upon their imminent invasion of Cuba. Eliminate this danger forever, in an act of the most legitimate self-defence. Although Khrushchev did not wish to align with that position, he saw avoiding nuclear war to be best of interest towards any future USSR operations. Since Kennedy's blockade was by all means solely defensive, resembling Gromyko's argument concluded on the 18th, addressing Soviet aid on Cuba, Kennedy's blockade was by all means non-aggressive. This meant if retaliation were to arise, presented by either the Soviets or Cubans, it would be seen as an aggressive provocation of the American army, having them become the instigators to any consequences. Khrushchev, noting such, knew that his next actions must be diplomatic if he wanted to save face. The blockade pressured Khrushchev, and he soon responded to the president, seeking discussions to enable resolution. Thus, diplomacy nurtured through both sides of the predicament, a direct effect of Kennedy's actions. All in all, Kennedy's implication of the blockade allowed further control over escalations in the crisis. The United States was able to monitor and reject Soviet aid from reaching Cuban territory, subsequently limiting the amount of assembled artillery against the US. Additionally, its obstruction of Soviet machinery encouraged discussions between the powers. Both attributions led towards the conclusion of the crisis, with resolution statements being drafted by Khrushchev on the 26th.
Long-term impact
The influence of Kennedy continued even once the crisis was resolved. His diplomatic approach became standard, reflecting the possibilities open to those who take a step back and evaluate before striking. Subsequently, American-Soviet relations improved communication, strengthening the tolerance of one another. The impacts went further than communication with nuclear arms control agreements between powers preventing tension between major powers and allowing a baseline of trust to develop. Communication styles were altered immediately after the conflict, with the red telephone, an international line between Moscow and Washington being implemented. This confidential line aided future discussions, reduced the risks of misunderstandings, and further allowed both powers to maintain their reputations during diplomatic communications. Encouraging powers to communicate, the red telephone directly aided further Cold War topics, such as the following 1967 Arab-Israeli war or the Six-Day War, where president Lyndon B. Johnson notified Brezhnev through the line about a US fleet entering Mediterranean waters, and how it meant no aggression towards the Soviets and their stance in the war. These exchanges sufficiently avoided any miscommunications between the powers, placing an understanding of trust between the powers. Furthermore, the red telephone also accommodated communications over the nuclear arms race. Connecting the superpowers easily allowed for a finalisation of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, a treaty aimed to intercept the arms race, regulating the testing sites of nuclear artillery for the US, UK, and USSR, banning any testing within the atmosphere, outer-space, and underwater. Controlling the efforts of nuclear arms sufficiently. Five years later, the same hotline hosted negotiations amongst the Non-Proliferation Treaty, a treaty organised to promote disarmament through the prevention of nuclear weaponry spread. Both successful themselves, arguably would not have been without the availability of the red telephone. The line, although altered throughout the years through breakthroughs in technology - such as its leap into satellite communications in 1971 - has been maintained, with each generation of leaders. Some reports even manage to sustain 44th President Barack Obama utilising the international line to warn Vladimir Putin against interfering within the 2016 election. This can be attributed to the work of Kennedy's diplomacy, encouraging discussion and peace-oriented talking points.
Kennedy's naval blockade and subsequent negotiations minorly influenced the resolution
However, it is imperative to present another aspect towards each of these arguments, their weaknesses. The difficulty of evaluating Kennedy's actions and their impact lies within the uncertainty which riddled each diplomatic success. Even Curtis LeMay, the Air Force Chief of Staff noted this uncertainty, within his quote The blockade and political action, I see leading into war. I don't see any other solution. It will lead right into war. This is almost as bad as the appeasement at Munich. LeMay not only reveals the internal uncertainty of ExComm, but additionally leaves critics theorising the resolution to be that of luck, arguing new perspectives by questioning what if to every approach Kennedy took. Focusing on the uncertainty within Kennedy's actions, this theory can be validated through the president's priorities, the responses of the naval blockade, and the negative long-term impacts.
Kennedy's priorities
It is theorised by Historian Serhii Plokhy within his 2021 book that Kennedy's focus had been more aggressive rather than diplomatic during the initial moments of the crisis. Plokhy highlights Kennedy's clouded perception of proceeding actions as his predecessor, Dwight Eisenhower, had recently talked against the Kennedy administration, calling him weak on foreign policy towards Latin America. In those eight years [the years the US was under the Eisenhower administration] we lost no inch of ground to tyranny, we accepted no compromise of pledged word or withdrawal from principle. No walls were built, no threatening foreign bases were established. With all eyes on him, Kennedy knew that he must enter the crisis reluctant to discuss diplomacy, as his new aim was show them we are not weak, an impulsive gamble. Concluding ExComm's first meeting, Kennedy reiterated the possible resolutions given to him, favouring the surgical strike. Such a strategy would deploy United States aircraft to bomb the sites, damaging all nuclear artillery. Although in theory the strike would bring minimal collateral damage, a strategy in that manner would have definitely provoked the USSR, allowing them to attack the US, pleading defensive measures, and soon initiate nuclear warfare. Kennedy, nonetheless, told his men to prepare for such, ordering his Joint Chiefs of staff to collect information upon not only a surgical strike, but additionally an invasion. Furthermore, his final agreements with Khrushchev consisted of opportunity cost, the economic theory in which an entity must decide the most favourable option between 2 or more choices, all at the cost of losing the other possibilities. Kennedy's opportunity cost left him favouring appeasement towards the USSR, rather than honouring a decade long agreement with NATO ally, Turkey. A case which may have avoided immediate conflict, compromised long-term NATO negotiations. Moreover, the breachment of the 1952 bilateral agreement with Turkey almost seems as though Kennedy's prioritizations towards the containment of communism were completely disregarded to save his own continent rather than countries directly provoked by it. Loosening the security between agreements, Kennedy gambled diplomacy with allies to appease the USSR, risking not only alliances, but American values set forth by the Truman Doctrine. Altogether, Kennedy's risk-taking behaviour towards the resolution left gaps between the American reputation. His impulsivity during the beginning of the crisis could have been dire to the United States, risking nuclear warfare, and his country. Similarly, his agreement with Khrushchev, although resolving the conflict, left his allies wary of the United States agenda, a risk which could have severed bonds between crucial allies.
The naval blockade
Although becoming one of Kennedy's prominent attributions within diplomacy, the naval blockade's enactment marked the most dangerous moment of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Its interception of Soviet artillery undoubtedly halted resources, however operations on previous shipments which made it to the mainland continued, swiftly preparing missiles of all ranges. The risk of provoking the USSR with such a strategy was immeasurable, with an American pilot already meeting his demise by the Soviets once flying over Cuba. It additionally directed the US military even closer towards the conflict, with USSR torpedoes lurking closer than ever, prepared to shoot at any moment. Provoking the USSR through such quarantine was a possibility which struck most. Immediately upon the intelligence of its enactment, Khrushchev published a statement in which he referenced the blockade to be that of an act of aggression, an ultimatum which would be further combatted through his order towards Soviet ships to proceed their route towards Cuba. This strained the overall feeling towards negotiations, with Khrushchev referring to the predicament as that of two forces pulling on the ends of the rope, with the knot of such rope being that of nuclear warfare. Such warfare would most likely begin with the Soviet submarines stationed around the island. Carrying that of single nuclear-tipped torpedoes, explosives which could each yield that of 15 kilotons, to compare such, that is approximately the same force as that of Hiroshima's Little Boy. Such drastic artillery would have surely devastated American troops, although this point is not merely a theory which arose after the crisis, but rather a true position Soviet general Vasily Arkhipov faced. As a flotilla commander aboard the B-59, Arkhipov was to order the vessels, this allowed him to use the nuclear-tipped torpedo at his own discretion. Tension grew as the US vessels initiated practice depth charges, an action in which the United States alerted any submarines to resurface, as was part of their blockade protocol. The submarine's commanding officer, Valentine Grigoryevich Savitsky, mistook the signal for an attack upon the Soviets, and ordered his men to prepare their missile for launch. Arkhipov overruled the order, as the lack of connection between the submarine and the USSR's intelligence left such a plan risky. When faced with depth charges near his submarine, Arkhipov's overruling of the launch order averted potential nuclear conflict, revealing the high-stake environment and miscalculative potential caused by the crisis post-blockade implementation. Overall, the blockade, although an indispensable attribute within the resolution of the crisis, as it opened conversation, was the force Khrushchev alluded to within his rope analogy, a tactic which was so risky, it was almost deadly.
Long-term impact
Although all following negotiations were closer than ever before, the rivalry between that of the US and USSR continued until 1991, when the USSR officially dissolved. Tensions guided by mistrust and suspicion led the powers to continue their arms race although they had signed treaties depicting their disapproval of such. Peaking again in the 1980s as Reagan proposed the Strategic Defence Initiative - a new technology which would combat nuclear strikes aimed towards the US - the arms race seemingly continued until the official dissolution of the USSR in December 1991. However, effects spread much farther than the arms race, it spread into any diplomacy composed of the US and Cuba. The arms race, although attempted to be sealed up through various treaties, continued as a direct result of Kennedy's blockade. Becoming dependent on the looming threat of military force within diplomatic negotiations rather than purely negotiation hosted room for a continued rivalry between the powers. This did not only continue within Kennedy's administration, with his successors depicting similar situations, such as the United States involvement in the Vietnam War when Lyndon B. Johnson sent American troops to oppose the looming threat of communist rule. Tensions continued adding up due to the enforcement of the military alongside diplomacy, and the Cold War stretched decades upon decades. Negative effects of Kennedy's resolution still ripple today between Cuba and the United States, as Americans are not only banned from travelling there, but additionally the mutual embargo leaves limited contact. With Kennedy's administration straining relations between the countries, tensions have continued between the US and Cuba, tearing families apart, and leaving ambiguity towards any future resolutions.
Conclusion
During such an intense era, Kennedy was faced with the crux of diplomacy with the Soviet Union, a long-time rival. Though it may seem easy to limit Kennedy's diplomatic attributions to their risks, as shown through the previous analysis, it is also imperative to recognise his ability to step back, and navigate around the crisis through diplomacy instead of drafting another invasion or aligning with the policies of his predecessors, a move which left the United States unscathed. It is even possible to see the Doomsday Clock's calculation to be somewhat accurate as Kennedy attempted his best to keep bloodshed at bay, and proved it publicly through his negotiation priorities, naval blockade, and the long-term impacts which followed. Kennedy's ability to form ExComm, securing strategies and confidentiality, allowed his judgement to shift from immediately ambushing towards a calmer, discussion-focused approach. Although rebuttals claim Kennedy dishonoured his NATO ally, Turkey, it must further be highlighted that the missiles set within Turkey were already decade old, and during this time period decades now marked the rate of advancement centuries used to. Furthermore, Kennedy attempted to honour the Truman Doctrine, containing communist aid from Cuba through his blockade, yes an aggressive approach, yet an effective approach, one that not only was a defensive measure, but one which made Khrushchev rethink - do I want to be at fault for a war? Consequently, Kennedy's impact upon relations between the US and USSR is undeniable. His diplomacy stretched upon decades to come, altering the art of negotiation as mankind knew it. The red telephone's operations upon not only inhibiting the use and production of nuclear weaponry, but additionally opening discussions as to relieve any tension between the powers which clouded the stressful period is astonishing, even when compared to the failures brought upon Kennedy's actions.
Bibliography
References
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The World on the Brink - John F. Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis. 13 Days in October, 2002. JFKlibrary.org, https://microsites.jfklibrary.org/cmc/reading.html. Accessed 3 June 2024.
The naval blockade
Although becoming one of Kennedy's prominent attributions within diplomacy, the naval blockade's enactment marked the most dangerous moment of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Its interception of Soviet artillery undoubtedly halted resources, however operations on previous shipments which made it to the mainland continued, swiftly preparing missiles of all ranges. The risk of provoking the USSR with such a strategy was immeasurable, with an American pilot already meeting his demise by the Soviets once flying over Cuba. It additionally directed the US military even closer towards the conflict, with USSR torpedoes lurking closer than ever, prepared to shoot at any moment. Provoking the USSR through such quarantine was a possibility which struck most. Immediately upon the intelligence of its enactment, Khrushchev published a statement in which he referenced the blockade to be that of an act of aggression, an ultimatum which would be further combatted through his order towards Soviet ships to proceed their route towards Cuba. This strained the overall feeling towards negotiations, with Khrushchev referring to the predicament as that of two forces pulling on the ends of the rope, with the knot of such rope being that of nuclear warfare. Such warfare would most likely begin with the Soviet submarines stationed around the island. Carrying that of single nuclear-tipped torpedoes, explosives which could each yield that of 15 kilotons, to compare such, that is approximately the same force as that of Hiroshima's Little Boy. Such drastic artillery would have surely devastated American troops, although this point is not merely a theory which arose after the crisis, but rather a true position Soviet general Vasily Arkhipov faced. As a flotilla commander aboard the B-59, Arkhipov was to order the vessels, this allowed him to use the nuclear-tipped torpedo at his own discretion. Tension grew as the US vessels initiated practice depth charges, an action in which the United States alerted any submarines to resurface, as was part of their blockade protocol. The submarine's commanding officer, Valentine Grigoryevich Savitsky, mistook the signal for an attack upon the Soviets, and ordered his men to prepare their missile for launch. Arkhipov overruled the order, as the lack of connection between the submarine and the USSR's intelligence left such a plan risky. When faced with depth charges near his submarine, Arkhipov's overruling of the launch order averted potential nuclear conflict, revealing the high-stake environment and miscalculative potential caused by the crisis post-blockade implementation. Overall, the blockade, although an indispensable attribute within the resolution of the crisis, as it opened conversation, was the force Khrushchev alluded to within his rope analogy, a tactic which was so risky, it was almost deadly.
Long-term impact
Although all following negotiations were closer than ever before, the rivalry between that of the US and USSR continued until 1991, when the USSR officially dissolved. Tensions guided by mistrust and suspicion led the powers to continue their arms race although they had signed treaties depicting their disapproval of such. Peaking again in the 1980s as Reagan proposed the Strategic Defence Initiative - a new technology which would combat nuclear strikes aimed towards the US - the arms race seemingly continued until the official dissolution of the USSR in December 1991. However, effects spread much farther than the arms race, it spread into any diplomacy composed of the US and Cuba. The arms race, although attempted to be sealed up through various treaties, continued as a direct result of Kennedy's blockade. Becoming dependent on the looming threat of military force within diplomatic negotiations rather than purely negotiation hosted room for a continued rivalry between the powers. This did not only continue within Kennedy's administration, with his successors depicting similar situations, such as the United States involvement in the Vietnam War when Lyndon B. Johnson sent American troops to oppose the looming threat of communist rule. Tensions continued adding up due to the enforcement of the military alongside diplomacy, and the Cold War stretched decades upon decades. Negative effects of Kennedy's resolution still ripple today between Cuba and the United States, as Americans are not only banned from travelling there, but additionally the mutual embargo leaves limited contact. With Kennedy's administration straining relations between the countries, tensions have continued between the US and Cuba, tearing families apart, and leaving ambiguity towards any future resolutions.
Conclusion
During such an intense era, Kennedy was faced with the crux of diplomacy with the Soviet Union, a long-time rival. Though it may seem easy to limit Kennedy's diplomatic attributions to their risks, as shown through the previous analysis, it is also imperative to recognise his ability to step back, and navigate around the crisis through diplomacy instead of drafting another invasion or aligning with the policies of his predecessors, a move which left the United States unscathed. It is even possible to see the Doomsday Clock's calculation to be somewhat accurate as Kennedy attempted his best to keep bloodshed at bay, and proved it publicly through his negotiation priorities, naval blockade, and the long-term impacts which followed. Kennedy's ability to form ExComm, securing strategies and confidentiality, allowed his judgement to shift from immediately ambushing towards a calmer, discussion-focused approach. Although rebuttals claim Kennedy dishonoured his NATO ally, Turkey, it must further be highlighted that the missiles set within Turkey were already decade old, and during this time period decades now marked the rate of advancement centuries used to. Furthermore, Kennedy attempted to honour the Truman Doctrine, containing communist aid from Cuba through his blockade, yes an aggressive approach, yet an effective approach, one that not only was a defensive measure, but one which made Khrushchev rethink - do I want to be at fault for a war? Consequently, Kennedy's impact upon relations between the US and USSR is undeniable. His diplomacy stretched upon decades to come, altering the art of negotiation as mankind knew it. The red telephone's operations upon not only inhibiting the use and production of nuclear weaponry, but additionally opening discussions as to relieve any tension between the powers which clouded the stressful period is astonishing, even when compared to the failures brought upon Kennedy's actions.
Bibliography
References
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Castro and the Cold War | American Experience. PBS, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/castro-and-cold-war/. Accessed 9 June 2024.
Coleman, David, and Cecil Stoughton. NSC ExComm Meetings, 1962-1963. History in Pieces, 2014, https://historyinpieces.com/research/meetings-excomm-executive-committee-national-security-council. Accessed 23 August 2024.
Dubreuil, Louis, et al., directors. The Cuban Missile Crisis. Entertain Me Productions Ltd, 2024. Youtube.com, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xgjw9FS0yYs. Accessed 3 June 2024.
Eisenhower and the Cold War, https://web-clear.unt.edu/course_projects/HIST2610/content/08_Unit_Eight/25_lesson_twenty-five/07_eisen_cld_wr.htm. Accessed 9 June 2024.
Hastings, Max. Abyss: The Cuban Missile Crisis 1962. HarperCollins Publishers Limited, 2023.
Hershberg, Jim, and Strobe Talbott. The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: Anatomy of a Controversy. The National Security Archive, 2002, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/moment.htm. Accessed 24 August 2024.
Khrushchev on Cuban Crisis 1962. The National Archives, https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/resources/cold-war-on-file/khrushchev-on-cuban-crisis-1962/. Accessed 10 June 2024.
LaFeber, Walter, and Tisch Distinguished University Professor and M U Noll Professor of History Emeritus Walter LaFeber. America, Russia, and the Cold War. McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 1987.
Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations - Office of the Historian. Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations - Office of the Historian, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/cuban-missile-crisis. Accessed 9 June 2024.
October 22, 1962 - President John F. Kennedy addresses the nation on the crisis in Cuba. YouTube, 13 October 2022, https://youtu.be/hZpbXdSJCBw. Accessed 9 June 2024.
Pach, Chester J. Dwight D. Eisenhower: Foreign Affairs. Miller Center, https://millercenter.org/president/eisenhower/foreign-affairs. Accessed 9 June 2024.
Plokhy, Serhii. Nuclear Folly: A New History of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Penguin Books, 2021.
President Kennedy and Vietnam, 1961-1963 - US involvement in the Vietnam War - Edexcel - GCSE History Revision - Edexcel. BBC, 2019, https://www.bbc.co.uk/bitesize/guides/zvmrr2p/revision/2. Accessed 23 August 2024.
Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Soviet Arms Buildup in Cuba. Teaching American History, https://teachingamericanhistory.org/document/speech-announcing-the-quarantine-against-cuba/. Accessed 9 June 2024.
Regent University of Science and Technology, Ghana. International Journal of Business Quantitative Economics and Applied Management Research. International Negotiation: The Cuban Missile Crisis Template for Social Change, vol. 1, no. 3, 2014, p. 30. archive.law.upenn.edu, https://archive.law.upenn.edu/live/files/5464-international-negotiation-the-cuban-missile-crisis. Accessed 23 August 2024.
Sherwin, Martin J. Inside JFK's Key Decisions During the Cuban Missile Crisis. Time, 16 October 2020, https://time.com/5899754/jfk-decisionmaking-cuban-missile-crisis/. Accessed 9 June 2024.
The Bay of Pigs. JFK Library, https://www.jfklibrary.org/learn/about-jfk/jfk-in-history/the-bay-of-pigs. Accessed 9 June 2024.
The World on the Brink - John F. Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis. 13 Days in October, 2002. JFKlibrary.org, https://microsites.jfklibrary.org/cmc/reading.html. Accessed 3 June 2024.
Extended Essay:
History Higher Level
To what extent did the 1959 Cuban revolution improve its economy?
Main essay: 3927 words
Abstract: 218 words
School: Bavarian International School
Abstract:
On the 1st of January 1959 the revolution officially began, marking a great change for all of Cuba as Fidel Castro and his rebels overthrew Fulgencio Batista. This essay aims to assess the effect of the revolution on the economy of Cuba in order to provide a brief model of how a communist government can affect its economy. My research question is to determine To what extent did the 1959 Cuban revolution improve its economy? in which I will be able to compare the effects of different economic policies under different governments. In order to do so, I will compare the government under Batista’s regime to the government immediately after Castro’s initiation of his new economic policies. This comparison will prove valuable as it enables us to see how Castro’s economic policies as a communist government worsened the economy. It is clear from my analysis that the 1959 Cuban revolution in fact destroyed the Cuban economy and prevented it from further improving itself. Castro’s first problem was his destruction of Batista’s diversification policies, which were in fact benefitting the Cuban economy. Secondly, Castro’s nationalisation policies led to the U.S. embargo ruining any chance of improving its export markets and hence led to Castro relying on a nation that prevented the need of improving its economy; the Soviet Union.
Introduction:
In Cuba, the economy has been a topic of hot debate ever since it came under communist control in 1959. The reason for the transformation was the communist revolution in the late 1950s. Almost 6 years after their first failed attempt, rebels led by Fidel Castro, overthrew the dictator Fulgencio Batista of Cuba on January 1, 1959. The Cuban revolution officially began on January 2, the day after Castro’s takeover, when he announced that “The revolution begins now” during a speech in Santiago de Cuba.[1] The new government viewed the improvement of the economy to be vital for the advancement of the country. Castro strived for radical economic reforms that would progress a nation “destroyed by poverty”[2] and develop it into an industrial power. The purpose of this essay is to evaluate to what extent did the 1959 Cuban revolution improve its economy? I will determine the effect of the revolution by analysing the different economic reforms and their impacts on the economy in comparison to the economy under Batista’s regime. This investigation continues to maintain its relevance in modern history as Cuba serves as a microcosm to all communist states. It is a valuable analysis of the effects of communist policies on a country’s economy.
Before the revolution, small local companies and foreign corporations centralised on “the cultivation of sugar, tobacco and tropical fruits”[3], the majority of which was exported to the neighbouring United States. Due to Cuba’s island geography, its industrial resources are very limited and it thus relies heavily on foreign trade. The main focus of the economy, and at the same time the country’s principal income, was based on the sugar industry and the export thereof. In 1950, over 80 per cent of Cuba’s income from exports derived from the sugar sector[4], with its trade limited to the United States through a mutual trade agreement. The government in power at that time, led by Fulgencio Batista, recognised the weaknesses of this dependency and began to diversify the economy.
Batista’s policies greatly began to benefit Cuba’s economy but after the 1959 revolution, Castro slowly brought the policies to an end, returning to its single crop dependency and causing the economy to again collapse. The “Cuban economy is in tatters back where it started as a one crop sugar producer”[5] The former leader, Batista had realised that Cuba’s dependency on its sugar trade limited its ability for further development. Cuba had diversified its economy by turning to new sectors such as tourism instead of just the sugar sector strengthening its position in the mid 1950s.
Due to Cuba’s new source of income before the revolution: tourism and hotel construction in the years 1952-1958 doubled with a total investment of more than 90 million dollars.[6] This large investment in the tourism sector improved Cuba’s tourism attraction immensely “with the creation of casinos for American tourists, causing Havana to become known as the Latin Las Vegas”. “For tropical beaches, open gambling and a throbbing night life, an estimated 350,000 visitors will have spent $35 million by the end of this year” stated the Time magazine in 1957. In a later Time magazine the article states “Tourism and new private U.S investment, which used to bring in $100 million a year, are reduced almost to zero” proving its value of providing the relevant information of Cuba’s economy but however being limited due to its subjectivity as an American magazine. In 1959 after the revolution, the President of Cuba, Manuel Urrutia ordered for casinos and bars to be shut down[7] ruining Cuba’s portrayal as a utopian travel destination for American tourists. This of course decreased the amount of tourists after 1959 meaning that although the policies of diversification were still in place, Cuba was no longer diversifying its economy through tourism, going back towards the direction of a single crop dependency. Along with the American tourists came a corrupt underground organisation known as the US Mafia. The Mafia set up multiple casinos, hotels, brothels and other tourist attractions around Cuba. In exchange for their government permission to do business in Cuba, the Mafia handed over a considerable cut of their profits to Batista, who invested it in the economy[8] again showing the benefits of the tourism sector in pre-revolutionary Cuba.
Along with tourism in the 1950s, Cuba used rice production as a new form of income, increasing its production from 118,000 in 1951 to 261,000 tons in 1957. Livestock also improved greatly during the 1950s from 4 million in 1952 to 5.8 million in 1959. Lastly, fish stock grew from an average of 8,300 metric tons per year from 1948 until 1952 to 22,600 metric tons in 1957.[9] The 1959 revolution did not initiate or lead to any new beneficial economic policies but slowly continued to improve due to the policies set in the time of Batista’s regime. Cuba’s industrial income also improved greatly during the 1950s due to the diversified economy. Cement increased from 1952 until 1957 by 56 per cent, rubber tyres by 66 per cent, electricity by 10.6 per cent and chemical fertilisers by 46 per cent.[10] The increased production of all these industrial sources along with the farming income progressed the amount of exports to other countries improving Cuba’s balance of payments. In comparison, Cuba’s poor balance of payments under Castro’s regime resulted from Castro’s “unwillingness to liberalise Cuba’s economy, diversify its export base, and its need to pay off debts owed to its Japanese, European, and Latin American trading partners”[11] proving the effect of diversification on the economy.
Goods purchased abroad before the revolution were divided up equally by giving 63 per cent towards the industry, 10 per cent for the new diversified agriculture and 13 per cent for transport.[12] To conclude, Cuba’s imports fell from 46 per cent in 1953-1954 to 38 per cent in 1957-1958[13] proving that during the late 1950s Cuba relied less on its sugar sector and other nations.
According to the source, Castro’s Cuba “Batista was the leading figure in Cuban Politics” and “fostered economic growth”[13] during his time in power. Charles Cary voices his opinion as an American historian on Batista’s time in power. His opinion is highly valuable as it gives an insight to what the United States believed but is again hindered by its negative view of Cuba as a communist state. His reforms to diversify Cuba’s economy were a huge success but lacked the sufficient time to prove its value. The revolution marked the end of diversification crushing the tourism industry and returning its former dependency on the sugar industry. The destruction of the newly diversified economy sector was the beginning of the end of Batista’s diversification policies and resulted in the modern day backwardness of the country.
Cuba is administered by a communist regime, with some key policies varying drastically from that of its economy. In 1959, shortly after Castro seized power, he went on to implement a vital element of a communist government: the nationalisation of the country’s free market, industry and private businesses. The state control of all sectors of the economy enabled the government to retain control over job and resource distribution in order to guarantee employment and money to the people.
In an interview between Castro and Lee Lockwood, Castro states his belief that “the internal market was limited by the quantity of men and women working in the country and by the salaries which they earned”[14] proving his aim to increase the number of jobs rather than follow previous company goals. His primary view on this matter is significantly valuable as it shows his motive and views on Batista’s economy. It is limited due to its publication showing that Castro may not necessarily be telling the truth but is still valuable as he is expressing his opinions. Making profitable revenue off the businesses was secondary to creating more jobs. The unavoidable problem with this policy was, that although the economy was overall able to employ more workers, the individual businesses were no longer able to make revenue. This was due to two factors. Firstly, an increased number of employees meant more salary spending. Secondly, when a business is nationalised, the extreme pressure of ever increasing profit is gone, as it is state owned. The resilience as well as the efficiency is thus involuntarily lowered. The government also added new businesses where it felt necessary. Those public businesses aimed to provide essential goods and services that wouldn’t be provided by the private sector, often resulting in deficit spending.
Besides the unavoidable consequences of nationalisation stated above, which lowered productivity and revenue, the nationalisation also proved to have another major complication. In 1960, the United States government refused Cuba refining Soviet crude oil and in response Castro nationalised refineries. The United States retaliated by declaring the U.S. embargo on Cuba resulting in the nationalisation of the remaining American investments. This consisted of “90 per cent of Cuba published in the United States and is valuable for its vast amount of statistics and overviews of Cuba but is limited with its subjective views on a communist state.
This meant the loss of almost the entire Cuban export market, as the U.S. made up 50 per cent of the sugar trade alone[17] along with 83 per cent of Cuba’s total exports.[18] As quoted in the Time Magazine, “The reds, do not, and apparently cannot, conduct the $1 billion two way trade in the range of goods that Cuba once enjoyed with the U.S.”
The financial aspect of the nationalisation policy incorporated the switch from Cuba’s former currency to ‘new-style pesos’. People were forced to hand over their money to local authorities that credited the amount to a government bank. However, this system was strictly regulated, as Castro set a withdrawal limit on the accounts, effectively controlling and optimising the money people were able to receive. Although Castro believed that this was necessary to ensure the equal wealth distribution among the Cuban people, the new currency dealt a crushing blow to the financial system, rendering the Cuban peso worth less than a fifth of its original value. “As the standard of living of the masses rose, the middle and upper classes lost much of their wealth, so much in fact that many well-to-do people began leaving Cuba”[19] as anyone who submitted more than 10,000 pesos had their money confiscated and redistributed 200 new-style-pesos. With the loss of the upper class, Cuba was consequently robbed of any opportunity for further development, as the country’s influential and intellectual people took with them “as much of their wealth as they could carry off”[20].
The goal of Castro’s nationalisation policy was the complete employment of Cuba’s work force. Although that particular goal was achieved, the policy brought no benefits for the economy. In fact, the policies brought about many effects that considerably worsened the economy and impeded its possibilities for growth and expansion. The nationalisation policy had three negative effects on the economy. Primarily, it decreased the unemployment rate, hence an increase in salary spending and a decrease in aiming to improve a business’s profit. Secondly, the U.S. embargo devastated Cuba’s tourism industry, lowered the amount exported affecting its balance of payments. Lastly, the nationalisation policy led to the upper class emigrating Cuba, causing the economy to have little chance of improving without the intellectual businessmen that previously improved Cuba’s economy. The loss of the upper class also made Cuba subject to America raids, which were funded and planned by the associations such as the Cuban-American National Foundation, made up of previous upper class residents of Cuba[21]. The nationalisation policy was not successful, as its negative effects heavily outweighed the potential benefits.
Another factor of the nationalisation of the Cuban economy and the US embargo was that Cuba then switched the vast majority of its foreign trade to the Soviet bloc. The overall trade with the Soviet bloc skyrocketed from 3 per cent in the years before the revolution[22] to over 85 per cent when Castro was in power[23]. With its main income and sources for employment gone, Cuba’s economy seemed ready to collapse. Luckily, however, the Soviet Union’s foreign policy mandated that any other communist country should receive aid where possible. In February 1960, Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan visited the city of Havana and signed a trade agreement with Castro[24]. The USSR agreed to buy the sugar in exchange for petroleum and raw materials for Cuba’s industry.
The change of trading partners was in no way beneficial for Cuba’s economy. While the U.S. was approximately only 200 miles away, the Soviet nation was thousands of miles away, which resulted in horrendous expenditures, as Cuba had to pay for transportation costs. Transporting goods from Cuban ports to the US was a matter of hours, while a convoy to Russia would take many weeks. This greatly increased the cost of transportation, as bigger ships and tremendous amounts of fuel were required to enable trade between the two nations. The distance between the two also heightened the chance of problems during transport, resulting in unreliable shipments. This had a disastrous effect on Cuba’s industry, as it frequently ran out of resources and had to wait for the convoys to arrive. The situation did not improve and put a lot of strain on Cuba during the transition from the U.S. to the USSR.
The switch also brought about another problem. The United States, seeing the effects of its embargo evaded, and its past investments now being used to support the Soviets, were furious. In 1959-1960, in an effort of retribution and denying the Soviets the possibility to use their investments, America sent military aircraft to bomb sugar mills, sugar cane fields and oil refineries, which were previously owned by U.S. businesses. Throughout many important provinces of Cuba, businesses were raided by Americans to take back anything they could.[25]
“Castro survives only because of a $500 million, Soviet supplied military machine and a subsistence-level economic dole amounting to about $1,000,000 a day.[26]” The previous quotation was stated in the Time magazine from an anonymous U.S. historian articulating his view that without the Soviet Union, Cuba would not have survived. His opinion is strong but represents the opinion of many other individuals and is in the same way limited by his American upbringing during the Cold War. The Soviet Union helped out Cuba in its time of need and saved it from economic collapse, which would have meant a quick end to Castro’s revolution. “The Soviets willingly responded to Castro’s request for economic aid, but at a price”[27]. The USSR started building missile sites for nuclear rockets on Cuban soil. This was not to defend Cuba but rather to threaten Russia’s archenemy, the United States. The missile sites were so close to the U.S. that Russia would have been able to reach Washington D.C. with the missiles stationed in Cuba. The United States soon found out about the existing missile sites and, seeing its capital as well as other major cities threatened, reacted swiftly. Although not intended by Russia, this incident would later become known as “The Cuban Missile Crisis” and the single one incident where the Cold War was about to escalate. On the 3rd of February 1962, the U.S. put up a complete naval blockade around Russia.[28] Intended to stop Russia from sending in more weapons and missiles, it also stopped any of Cuba’s trade. With the country so dependent on its commerce, the economy was struck hard. Poverty, hunger and disease spread, as trading ground came to a complete standstill. The economic blockade was not lifted until Russia agreed to demount its nuclear missiles in Cuba.
The revolution that caused this did not only fail to help the economy, but on the contrary even worsened its situation. The Cuban Missile Crisis, that Cuba felt obliged to agree to after accepting aid from the Soviet Union, not only caused misery and starvation in Cuba, but also threatened to drag it into a global armed conflict. In the grand scheme, little changed for the Cuban trade, as the Soviet Union merely attempted to replace the United States as a foreign trading partner. The economy, however, was worsened by their involvement in the Cold War conflict and their far distant trading partner.
Supporters of the regime argue that Castro improved Cuba’s economy by tackling its problem of seasonal unemployment, which has proven an insurmountable obstacle to previous governments. In the late 1950s and early 60s, Cuba still relied on the sugar trade to supply a source for reliable income. As sugarcane is a seasonal crop, Cuba was able to supply ample during its harvesting season, while facing a high layoff and unemployment rate during the rest of the year.
The high unemployment rate was Castro’s main concern that, if tackled, would guarantee him the support of the Cuban people. His answer was to follow in the footsteps of communism, and nationalise all businesses. As previously stated, nationalisation did not just aim to bring the economy under government control, but also provided more job opportunities, as revenue income became secondary. From 1937 until 1952, Cuban agricultural employees increased reaching a total sum of 353,600, but as Cuba began to diversify the numbers started to decrease in 1955 to 298,521 employees. He simply prioritised the diversification of the economy over the employment of the work force because he believed in his policies’ long-term success.
However, the increase in employment can be attributed to many other factors. Before Castro’s revolution, Batista already aimed to maintain a financially stable economy, through the gradual shift of the economic sectors, which would result in a delayed increase in employment. Secondly, although it is true that Castro created more job opportunities, his policy did in no way improve the economy. Cuba was now forced to invest extra capital into the businesses, as they no longer aimed to make a profit. Overall, Castro cannot be credited with the riddance of Cuba’s problem of seasonal unemployment, as his nationalisation plans obstructed the economy in the long run. The reason for the economic improvement was Batista’s previously implemented diversification policies.
It can be argued that Castro saved Cuba from its economic exploitation by the United States through his alliance with the Soviet Union. Before the 1959 revolution Cuba relied on the United States’ demand for sugar for a vast majority of its economic income. Although Cuba benefited from the US customer base that purchased a vast majority of Cuba’s sugar exports, it also limited the country’s export market for sugar. This was due to the 1934 Sugar Act that was passed by the US to secure its exclusivity of Cuba’s sugar exports[29]. Although it secured Cuba’s economy, the country was restricted from exporting sugar to other countries. It made Cuba entirely dependent on the United States as the country’s sugar sector was directly proportional to the need of the United States. Castro’s alliance with the Soviet Union broke Cuba’s dependency on the United States, and got rid of the restrictions on its economy.
However, this caused a major economic setback in the long run. Although the United States secured its exclusivity to the Cuban sugar trade, it aimed to expand Cuba’s economy in order to provide a greater, more reliable trading partner. American businessmen invested large amounts of capital and financial resources to develop Cuba’s economy. When Castro allied with the USSR, he effectively cut off US support for Cuba’s economic expansion. Unlike the US, however, the USSR did not rely on Cuban sugar exports, and did therefore not require Cuba’s economy to expand. Consequently, the development of the Cuban economy was halted in its tracks, and further development stunted. Evidence of Cuba’s economy being stunted is what we can see from Cuba today, a country with buildings and cars built latest in the 1950s.
Although the United States forced Cuba to make it the exclusive market of its sugar exports, this very fact aided in the expansion of the Cuban economy. As the increasing US demand for sugar required an expanding Cuban economy, large amounts of US capital were invested to guarantee this. In contrast, the USSR did not rely on Cuba’s sugar exports, and thus viewed Cuban economic development as unnecessary. Cuba is now considered a third world country as it has not advanced its economy significantly since the U.S. embargo, verifying its need of the United States as a trading partner in order to continue improving its economy. As previously stated, it was not only the United States Cuba suffered from not trading with but also all OAS members. The reliance on the Soviet Union not only stagnated Cuba’s economy but diminished it to what it still is this day.
Conclusion:
The 1959 Cuban Revolution had an overall negative impact on the country’s already unstable economy. The previous leader, Batista, had begun to diversify the economy through the expansion of the tourism industry as well as the development of various other industrial and economic sectors. The effects of Castro’s policies destroyed this gradual improvement of the economy. The main cause for Cuba’s economic decline was Castro’s nationalisation policy that halted all of the development that was underway. Besides the obvious financial setbacks of this policy, it effectively terminated all trading relations with the US who set up a full-scale embargo on Cuba. This constituted the loss of a vast majority of the Cuban export market. The US further worsened Cuba’s situation by bombing and raiding former US businesses and forbidding any American tourists from visiting the island. This caused an immediate breakdown of the entire tourism sector that Cuba had heavily invested in over the past decades. With all economic sectors starting to falter, Castro returned the country to its former dependency on the sugar industry. This brought with it new problems of seasonal unemployment and a single crop dependency that allowed for little economic development. In order to evade an imminent economic failure, Castro signed a trade agreement with the USSR, who promised to exchange Cuba’s sugar for industrial resources. This, too, brought new problems with it, as Cuba was forced to pay large sums of money to surmount the immense distance between the two nations. The country was now fully dependent on the USSR, who pushed Cuba into the middle of the Cold War during the Cuban Missile Crisis. “All the Castro brothers have to celebrate… is survival”[30] stated the Economist recently. The Economist is a fairly reliable source originating from the United Kingdom who has the necessary information on Cuba’s economy with fairly little subjective views on whether or not it was a failure. The quotation from the Economist shows a brief overview that the journalist believes Cuba’s economy has done nothing but survived.
The modern day implications of Castro’s revolution are vast. The US embargo continues to undermine Cuba’s tourism industry and trading opportunity. After the fall of the USSR, Cuba now relies on smaller, unreliable trading partners. Its decade long dependence on USSR aid left the country without the need and possibility for advancement and has rendered it a backwards third world country. Castro’s revolution was detrimental to not only every sector of Cuba’s economy but, in the long term, to the country itself.
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Pressman, Jeremy (2001). "September Statements, October Missiles, November Elections: Domestic Politics, Foreign-Policy Making, and the Cuban Missile Crisis". Security Studies 10 (3): 80–114. doi:10.1080/09636410108429438. Russell, Bertrand (1963). Unarmed Victory. London: Allen & Unwin. ISBN 0-04-327024-7. Stern, Sheldon M. (2003). Averting 'the Final Failure': John F. Kennedy and the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis Meetings. Stanford nuclear age series. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-0-8047-4846-9. Stern, Sheldon M. (2005). The Week the World Stood Still: Inside the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis. Stanford nuclear age series. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-0-8047-5077-6. Stern, Sheldon M. (2012). The Cuban Missile Crisis in American Memory: Myths versus Reality. Stanford nuclear age series. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press. Trahair, Richard C. S.; Miller, Robert L. (2009). Encyclopedia of Cold War Espionage, Spies, and Secret Operations. New York: Enigma Books. ISBN 978-1-929631-75-9. Matthews, Joe (October 2012). "Cuban missile crisis: The other, secret one". BBC. Historiography Allison, Graham T. (September 1969). "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis". American Political Science Review 63 (3): 689–718. JSTOR 1954423. Dorn, A. Walter; Pauk, Robert (April 2009). "Unsung Mediator: U Thant and the Cuban Missile Crisis". Diplomatic History 33 (2): 261–292. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7709.2008.00762.x. Garthoff, Raymond L. (Spring 2004). "Foreign Intelligence and the Historiography of the Cold War". Journal of Cold War Studies (Project MUSE) 6 (2): 21–56. doi:10.1162/152039704773254759. ISSN 1520-3972. Gibson, David R. (2011). "Avoiding Catastrophe: The Interactional Production of Possibility during the Cuban Missile Crisis". The American Journal of Sociology 117 (2): 361–419. JSTOR 10.1086/661761. Jones, John A.; Jones, Virginia H. (Spring 2005). "Through the Eye of the Needle: Five Perspectives on the Cuban Missile Crisis". Rhetoric & Public Affairs (Project MUSE) 8 (1): 133–144. doi:10.1353/rap.2005.0044. Jones, Milo; Silberzahn, Philppe (2013). Constructing Cassandra, Reframing Intelligence Failure at the CIA, 1947–2001. Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-0804793360.Chapter Five, pages 135 to 191. Lebow, Richard Ned (October 1990). "Domestic Politics and the Cuban Missile Crisis: The Traditional and Revisionist Interpretations Reevaluated". Diplomatic History 14 (4): 471–492. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7709.1990.tb00103.x. Primary sources Chang, Laurence; Kornbluh, Peter, eds. (1998). "Introduction". The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: A National Security Archive Documents Reader (2nd ed.). New York: New Press. ISBN 978-1-56584-474-2. "Cuban Missile Crisis". JFK in History. John F. Kennedy Library. "Cuban Missile Crisis 1962". Presidential Recordings Program. Miller Center of Public Affairs, University of Virginia. 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