History Internal Assessment
How close was the Nazi regime to the creation of the atomic bomb? (April 1938-1945)
Word Count: 2198
Section A: Identification and Evaluation of Sources
Using the following two sources, the question "How close was the Nazi regime to the creation of the atomic bomb? (April 1939-1945)" will be investigated. The first source, Rainer Karlsch's Hitler's Bomb is a secondary source providing a new thesis that the Germans did have and test nuclear weapons, while the second source, the Farm Hall Transcripts is a primary source crucial to understanding German scientists' motivation.
Source A: Hitler's Bomb, Rainer Karlsch, March 2005
Published in German in 2005, Hitler's Bomb presents Karlsch's revisionist thesis that Nazi Germany may have tested tactical nuclear devices in the final months of World War II. Karlsch's purpose is to challenge the established view that the Nazis never came close to creating an atomic weapon, drawing on newly opened Soviet and German archives as well as physical soil analyses. As revealed in my own investigation, these novel sources and tests, particularly soil samples in Thuringia, support Karlsch's claim of Nazi-era nuclear detonation sites, valuable to this investigation because it integrates underutilised Soviet records and archival documents that had previously been inaccessible. During my research, Karlsch's evidence, for example the reports of SS-supervised tests in March 1945, provided a counterpoint to traditional historiography, which generally asserts that Nazi Germany's atomic programme never progressed beyond theory. By consulting Karlsch's book, I obtained specific leads about possible nuclear tests in Rugen and Thuringia, which helped shape the "Thuringia Nuclear Tests" section of my essay. However, the controversial nature of Karlsch's conclusions poses significant limitations. Critics such as Manfred Popp question his reliance on circumstantial evidence rather than definitive proof of a nuclear chain reaction. Although Hitler's Bomb offers compelling archival data, the author's interpretation may be overstated or reflect a bias to support a revisionist viewpoint. In personal correspondence, Karlsch revisited claims about the soil sample analysis methods, admitting that some results may have been inconclusive.
Source B: The Farm Hall Transcripts, British Government, August 6-7 1945
The Farm Hall Transcripts are primary-source records of secretly taped conversations among top German nuclear scientists who were detained at Farm Hall, after Germany's surrender. The purpose behind these recordings was to gauge how far the Germans had progressed on an atomic bomb and to understand their level of scientific knowledge and intent. The British government later released partial transcripts, though some portions may have been redacted. For my investigation, the Farm Hall recordings were valuable as they provided uncensored insight into the attitudes, motivations, and technical understanding of German scientists immediately after World War II. Specifically, statements by Weizsacker and Heisenberg about not being "100% anxious" to build the bomb influenced my "Lack of Intent" argument. Their admissions also helped contextualise other sources, such as Karlsch's evidence of alleged nuclear testing, by contrasting more public or propaganda-driven claims with these private conversations. The Transcripts' limitations are that the British government may have edited or selectively released these tapes, raising questions about potential censorship or missing context. Moreover, self-justification by the scientists must be considered as some may have minimised their efforts or knowledge to avoid postwar culpability. For instance, Heisenberg's claim "We were not 100% anxious to do it" could reflect genuine reluctance, or it could serve as a justification after the war ended. In my own analysis, I acknowledged these possible biases by contrasting the Transcripts' statements with other available archival sources (for example, Heereswaffenamt documents) rather than taking any single quote at face value.
Section B: Investigation
Introduction
In August 1943, J. Robert Oppenheimer wrote, "It is possible that by the end of this year, the Germans will have enough material accumulated to make a large number of gadgets [atomic bombs], which they will release at the same time on England, Russia, and this country." With the spotlight on the Manhattan Project due to the success of the film Oppenheimer, one question has been largely overlooked: how close were the Nazis to developing an atomic bomb? Rainer Karlsch's 2005 book reveals new evidence suggesting they were much closer than previously believed. Understanding this topic in the present is crucial for grasping both the historical significance of Nazi scientific advancements and the broader implications for atomic weapons today. This essay will explore two perspectives: one that the Nazis had and tested nuclear weapons, and another that they were still far from full development. Ultimately, it will argue that despite being closer than previously thought, it would have been impossible for the Nazis to achieve a functioning atomic bomb.
The Argument for the Nazi Atomic Bomb
Two main arguments support the existence of a Nazi atomic bomb: documents like the 1941 patents and 1942 Heereswaffenamt Report show Nazi scientists had the knowledge to develop it, and the March 1945 Thuringia tests suggest these weapons were built and tested.
Germany had the knowledge and willingness to create the atomic bomb. In 2005, documents from the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute of Physics in Berlin were discovered in Russian archives. Some argue that these documents provide evidence that the Nazi regime had nuclear weapons. One of these documents is the 1941 plutonium bomb patent, authored by German scientist Weizsacker, a member of the Uranium Club. The patent indicates that German scientists were not only investigating uranium-based nuclear weapons but were also pursuing plutonium as a viable bomb material. The patent states, "With regard to energy per unit weight, this explosive would be around ten million times greater than any other [existing explosive] and comparable only to pure uranium 235." This suggests that the Germans had a clear understanding of the potential impact of nuclear weapons. Weizsacker also noted that "The production of element 94 [plutonium] in practically useful amounts is best done with the 'uranium machine' [nuclear reactor]. It is especially advantageous—and this is the main benefit of the invention—that the element 94 produced can easily be separated from uranium chemically." The patent also included an annotated schematic of a nuclear weapon, which predicted a bomb requiring 5 kg of plutonium. This estimate proved to be quite accurate, as just four years later, the atomic bombs dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima contained 6.2 kg of plutonium-239. Thus, all this shows that German scientists understood both the military applications and the scientific properties of atomic bombs. This is supported by the Heereswaffenamt Report, a February 1942 report by anonymous German army officials detailing the progress of the Uranium Project. The report highlights that pure uranium-235, which comprises only 0.7% of natural uranium, could serve as a nuclear explosive a million times stronger than conventional bombs. It also stated that a nuclear reactor could produce plutonium with similar explosive power, estimating a critical mass of 10-100 kg, comparable to the Allies' 1941 estimates of 2-100 kg, as noted in the Smyth Report. This report highlights the accurate knowledge German scientists had of the creation of the atomic bomb as far back as February 1942. Both the patent and the Heereswaffenamt Report are key in proving that the Germans had the scientific knowledge to create an atomic bomb, challenging the earlier belief that they lacked this understanding. These documents suggest that, with sufficient resources, the Uranium Project could have produced a bomb. This supports the second argument: the Thuringia tests of March 1945, which indicate that the Uranium Project applied this knowledge to build and test a nuclear weapon.
The Thuringia tests of March 1945, under SS supervision, prove the existence of the Nazi atomic bomb. The tests reportedly resulted in the deaths of several hundred prisoners of war, providing physical evidence of fission-based explosions. Eyewitnesses investigated by the Stasi described severe radiation symptoms such as "nosebleeds, headaches, and nausea", which were consistent with exposure to the radioactive metal. Crucially, these accounts were confirmed by a senior German intelligence officer working for the Soviet military intelligence service, GRU, who reported on the transfer of nuclear scientists, along with completed bombs, from Berlin in early 1945. Finally, as recently as 2005 several renowned German physics institutes analysed soil samples from the alleged test area and confirmed the presence of cesium-137 and cobalt-60 isotopes, suggesting the aftermath of a nuclear detonation.
The Impossibility of a Nazi Atomic Bomb: Lack of Intent and Key Resources
However, contrary to Karlsch's thesis, it would not have been possible for the Germans to have built a nuclear weapon from 1939-1945 due to two significant factors: the lack of intent among key German scientists and the country's insufficient resources.
The strongest argument against the existence of the Nazi nuclear bomb is that many leading German scientists did not want to build it. This is evident in the July 3 1945 Farm Hall Transcripts, where Heisenberg and Weizsacker, key members of the Uranverein, candidly admitted that the German atomic bomb project failed. Weizsacker remarked "I believe that the reason we didn't do it was because all the physicists didn't want to do it, on principle. If we had all wanted Germany to win the war we would have succeeded." Heisenberg echoed this sentiment, saying "We were not 100% anxious to do it," and Weizsacker concluded, "We must admit that we did not want to succeed." This suggests that while the Nazis had access to the requisite knowledge, as Karlsch proves, their scientists did not fully commit to the atomic bomb project. This perspective has been supported by later works such as Robert Jungk's 1957 book Brighter than a Thousand Suns, where Heisenberg claimed he deliberately slowed progress on the bomb. While this argument has been criticised by historians and scientists like Niels Bohr, who met with Heisenberg in 1941 and rejected Heisenberg's account of sabotaging the project, this argument is still crucial in proving that the Nazis did not have the atomic bomb, as they admit in the Farm Hall Transcripts, due to their unwillingness to create it.
The second argument proving the Nazis were far from creating the atomic bomb was that Germany simply lacked the resources to build it. One of the key issues was the loss of talented scientists. Jewish physicists, such as Lisa Meitner and Albert Einstein, who played a critical role in the discovery of nuclear fission, fled Nazi persecution, leaving Germany with a severe lack of qualified scientists. Many of these scientists, such as Meitner, emigrated to the US or Britain, where they joined the Manhattan Project. This exodus of talent crippled Germany's ability to develop the bomb, highlighting just how far they were from testing a working nuclear weapon. Moreover, the logistical and infrastructural limitations of Nazi Germany made it nearly impossible to achieve a functional nuclear weapon. The Uranverein project was scattered across various institutions, and internal competition between scientists, such as Werner Heisenberg and Kurt Diebner, hampered cooperation. This decentralisation prevented the kind of concentrated effort seen in the Manhattan Project, where resources were pooled efficiently. Furthermore, Germany's inability to produce essential materials severely hindered the project. For example, heavy water, crucial for nuclear reactors, was only available from the Venmork plant in Nazi-occupied Norway. This supply line was disrupted by Allied sabotage in 1943, with Norwegian commandos destroying the heavy water production facilities. As a result, Germany lost access to a critical component of their atomic programme. According to historian Dan Kurzman, "the elimination of German heavy-water production in Norway was the main factor in our failure to achieve a self-sustaining atomic reaction before the war ended." Finally, the German government failed to allocate the necessary financial and industrial resources to the atomic project. While the United States devoted vast amounts of manpower and funding to the Manhattan Project, employing 500,000 workers and spending 2 billion dollars (equivalent to 24 billion dollars today), Nazi Germany's nuclear programme had fewer than 1,000 scientists and received only 8 million Reichsmarks (about 24 million dollars today). This massive disparity in resources made it impossible for the Nazis to catch up with the Allies in the nuclear arms race. All this shows that contrary to Karlsch's view, the Nazis were far from creating a functional atomic bomb due to their sheer lack of cooperation and resources.
Conclusion
In conclusion, whilst the Nazis were closer to developing an atomic bomb than initially believed, they never succeeded in creating one. The scientific knowledge was evident in documents like the plutonium bomb patent and the Heereswaffenamt Report, and the 1945 Thuringia tests suggest progress. However, critical factors such as the lack of intent among key German scientists and the insufficient resources, including the loss of talent, limited infrastructure, and inadequate funding, made it impossible for Nazi Germany to achieve a functional atomic bomb during World War II.
Section C: Reflection
To explore my chosen topic academically and historically, I employed common historical methods, utilising a diverse range of sources, including primary documents, books, journal articles, and dissertations. I evaluated these sources using the OPCVL method to assess their credibility and relevance to my investigation.
Through this research, I delved into the lesser-explored history of the Nazi atomic bomb project. I learned how to analyse and synthesise contradictory accounts to form my own conclusions. For instance, Karlsch's and David Irving's books presented vastly different views on how close the Nazis came to developing an atomic bomb. By carefully reading both arguments and examining their sources, I formed a more balanced opinion between their perspectives.
Additionally, I discovered that historians can revise their views over time. My personal correspondence with Rainer Karlsch revealed that he had reconsidered parts of his book, particularly regarding the methods used to test soil samples. I also experienced the challenges historians face in accessing sources, as I was denied access to original Nazi reports on the Uranium Project at the Max Planck Institute. This highlighted how historians' conclusions can be shaped by the availability of sources.
Finally, I had to confront the ethical dilemmas posed by some of the secondary sources I used. David Irving wrote the most in-depth account of the German atomic bomb process, but his reputation as a Holocaust denier and Hitler apologist required me to scrutinise his claims with caution. I had to balance my critical evaluation of his work with my personal moral reservations about engaging with such a source.
Appendix
Appendix 1. Taken from: New light on Hitler's bomb – Physics World. Physics World, 1 June 2005, https://physicsworld.com/a/new-light-on-hitlers-bomb/. Accessed 11 February 2024.
Appendix 2: Heereswaffenamt. Energiegewinnung aus Uran, Ergebnisse der vom Heereswaffenamt Veranlassten Forschungsarbeiten zur Nutzbarmachung von Atomkernenergien, Herausgegeben Anlasslich der Zweiten Tagung der Arbeitsgemeinschaft vom 26. Bis 28. February 1942 in Berlin. (1942).
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