Was Stalin involved in Kirov´s murder?
EXAMPLE ONE
PLAN OF INVESTIGATION
This investigation intends to answer the question Was Stalin involved in Kirov´s murder? To do so, it will use a variety of sources ranging from Russian old book as well as new books. Historians such as Robert Service and Bruno Ullam, I will try to find an answer to find whether Stalin was or not involved in Kirov’s assassination. Since many historians have hesitated for years for an answer, I would then get evidences for a reasonable answer. This essay will have a non-concrete answer to the question to Kirov’s murder but it will have a range of sources which being analysed would give me enough evidences to answer it based on what I have researched. TO do this I would have to look at the background of the three characters: Stalin, Kirov and Nikolaev in order to understand any discordance between them which could have leaded to the murder itself.
WORD COUNT: 151
SUMMARY
On the 1st of December of 1934 at 4:30 pm, Kirov was shot outside his office in the former Smolny Institute by ex-party member Leonid Vasilievich Nikolae[1]. Kirov was younger than Stalin and “Kirov was to acquire a posthumous reputation as a political moderate in the Politburo”[2] and Stalin saw him as a threat and became aware of Kirov’s powerful opposition and influence by 1932. At a congress in 1934, “Kirov in fact polled just under 300 votes more than Stalin received”[3] .When Stalin realized that he was being criticized by his opponents he tried to make a law against that and Kirov disagreed with him and so did the people which voted and supported Kirov. Furthermore, Kirov in 1934 wanted the people who had been imprisoned to be released and again, people supported Kirov and not Stalin. It was obvious that Kirov was getting in front of all Stalin’s plans and wills and wouldn’t let him do what he wanted and therefore Kirov was angering Stalin. After the assassination, it was Stalin who personally took charge of the investigation, which is very suspicious because he could have manipulated the information. Also the guards who were meant to be at Kirov’s door, had suddenly disappeared, which is too much a consequence. His assassination created loads of disputes and investigations because he was a very likely successor of Stalin. Kirov’s enigmatic death is still nowadays still a mystery but many agree and state the obvious, Stalin had for sure something to do.
Stalin could have been behind this murder because all the relatives from Kirov were killed or exiled after or before his death. Once Stalin had gotten rid of Kirov it is when all the trials and purges started, Stalin started attacking his opponents. This was easier for him now that Kirov was gone, because he was the one who always went against him and got the votes away from the people. This seems like Kirov was his first victim, and the murder which would give him a free pathway to the other victims and opponents.
No one, not even Trotsky who had been exiled by Stalin, said that it had been Stalin who was behind Kirov’s murder. Also Stalin saw this assassination as a conspiracy against him and thought that it had been his enemies who wanted to implicate him in the murder. Another of the evidences that defends Stalin’s innocence is that Yagoda himself stated that he had planned the assassination and Stalin had not taken part of this. Also, there are rumors that say that since Nikolaev‘s ex-wife was Kirov’s secretary, he had the idea that they had an affair and thus he killed Kirov for that.
So the possible theories for the murder of Sergei Kirov are that Nikolaev could have just done it because he wanted revenge from Kirov’s possible affair with his ex-wife. The NKVD planned this and thus used Nikolaev as the “shooter”, and Stalin had no dispute of any kind with Kirov and had nothing to do with the assassination; or Stalin organized the whole event because he wanted to gain more power and by getting rid of Kirov.
WORD COUNT: 557
ANALYSIS
Adam Bruno Ullam, in his book Stalin and his era, pronounces that it “was organized in accordance with a decision of the ‘Block of rights and Trotskyites’”[4] . This then opposes the idea that it had anything to do with Stalin, and that it had a Marxist approach. This is because if it had been the Trotskyites who did it then Stalin had nothing to do because they were opponents. Also, Ullam says that this part of this terrorist attack was organized by Yagoda, the chief of the NKVD. Stalin would have never used Yagoda for this, as he did not trust him because Yagoda protected some opponents from Stalin. So the relationship between Stalin and Yadoga was never good as they did not trust each other and so it was not very possible that Stalin would have given such a terrible and delicate mission to someone like Yagoda. This therefore does not implicate Stalin in Kirov’s murder because if it is true that Yagoda organized the crime, then it is not likely that Stalin would have gotten involved as they did not have a good relationship.
In contrast with Ullam, Robert Conquest in his book Stalin says that Stalin used the assassination of Kirov to say it was the cause of the 1937-38 terror. As the death of Kirov happened, Stalin used it as an excuse of when the terror started, and also he began to take his opponents by his “own hands”, killed or exiled. But for some writers like Martin McCauley in his book Stalin and Stalinism, he mentions that governors like Stalin can be good politicians and good figures of the twentieth century, but that does not mean that they can be good men. This then retaliates that Stalin was very capable of doing such a horrible thing, like the murder of Kirov because it did not mean that because he was such a great leader that he could not do such things.
Akimov, a graduate of the Aviation department expressed his view about the assassination of Kirov saying: “Kirov’s murder wasn’t connected to Trotskyists; that’s all nonsense”[5]. Like Robert Conquest, Akimov is another of the people who say that the Trotskyites were involved but does not show an opinion whether Stalin was involved or not.
The Pravda on the 5th December of 1934 said that Borisov, Kirov’s bodyguard and possibly the best witness was killed in a car accident the day when he had to be interrogated by Stalin. This is very suspicious, and suggests me that it was perhaps Stalin who “ordered” this assassination so that very valuable witnesses were vanished away. [6]
Historians like Robert conquest, Amy Knight and others, support the idea by evidences and circumstances of the day Kirov’s were murdered that Stalin had been implicated in it. Stalin right after Kirov’s assassination decided to take part in the investigation, this could have done in order for him to manipulate the documents, something which Russia had done for ages, especially with the Secret police. Also the death of the bodyguard of Kirov right before he had an interview with Stalin is also very suspicious, it suggests that Stalin also planned this murder because he didn’t want any possible very vital witnesses like Borisnov.
WORD COUNT: 562
EVALUATION
I chose the book Stalin by Robert Conquest because he is a very well-known American historian about mostly Russia history and agrees that Stalin was involved in Kirov’s assassination. He states that Stalin not only sanctioned Kirov's assassination, but used it as a justification for the terror that culminated in 1937 and 1938[7]. His opinion is quite relevant to my research question of whether Stalin was or not involved in Kirov’s assassination because he is a very considerable historian in Russian history. However his opinions are not the most important ones as he is not Russian and did not live in Russia during Kirov’s assassination but he did live during the time it happened. Nevertheless, as I said before, he is a very significant historian and his opinion is not vital but is to be very considered as he is a specialist on Russian history and knows quite a lot about Communism as when he was in University he joined the Communist Party. His theory that Stalin was involved in Kirov’s murder and then used it as an excuse for the Purges, makes sense because Stalin did use it as an excuse for introducing new laws which said that political crime was illegal and that conspirators against Kirov would be murdered[8]. So Robert Conquest’s book was very helpful to answer this question because it gave me the point of view which is most accepted by most historians like Amy Knight and it is also a very realistic point of view.
Ullam a Polish famous writer who wrote the book Stalin: the man and his era, argues that if it was the case that Stalin wanted to get rid of Kirov, then why would he have done it this way[9]. The analysis that this writer makes through his book is a very significant as he disagrees with Robert Conquest and the theory that Stalin was involved in Kirov’s murder. His theory recognizes the obvious point that Stalin and Yagoda had a very bad relationship and thus Stalin was not very likely to have entrusted him for such a terrible mission[10], which was to take care of Kirov’s assassination. This book explains that it was too dangerous to instruct someone who you do not trust for a murder. This book makes you realize about the other point of view of this story, and so it is very valuable. Also the purpose of this book is to not only show what everyone thinks about the story and what is most obvious according to the situation by that time; it is to show the other part of the story which not many people might have known. This is that Stalin and Yagoda did not have a good relationship and that Stalin did not trust him because Yagoda did not obey Stalin’s orders sometimes. This source also argues that Stalin fired Yagoda after the assassination of Kirov happened, so Ulam suggests that it could have been that Stalin made him do this mission in order to have reasons to fire him on top of his other reasons to kill Kirov. Altogether, this book by Bruno Ulam suggests that Stalin had a genius plan to at the same time get rid of two people he disliked: Yagoda and Kirov. HE charged Yagoda for the assassination of Kirov and then blamed the assassination of Yagoda, and thus he got rid of the two.
WORD COUNT: 598
CONCLUSION
After reading all those books and other useful sources about Stalin’s involvement in Kirov’s assassination and the assassination itself to answer my question of whether Stalin was or not involved in Kirov’s assassination, I come to the conclusion that Stalin was involved. I come to this conclusion because of the books from Conquest and Ulam. Conquest defends the theory that it was Stalin who planned the assassination and Ulam disagrees by saying that it was too much of a risk to do so, but then suggests that Stalin could have thought of charging this to Yagoda just to get rid of both. This last theory makes sense to the whole event. Stalin did not trust Yagoda and was probably not happy with him. Furthermore, Stalin was indeed training Yezhov to be the next Commissar of the NKVD0, and so he just wanted to get a justification to fire Yagoda. So Stalin ordered him to kill Kirov and then pretending that he cared so much about his comrade Kirov fired Yagoda. It is a very well-planned strategy where it can be said that “you kill two birds in one shot”.
WORD COUNT: 189
Bibliography:
BOOKS:
In off the red, Ken Marks, page 178 Robert Conquest, The Great Terror, page 37 Stalin, Robert Service, page 314 Stalin , Man and his era, Adam Bruno Ullam Stalin as a way of life, ( document 47) page 136 Stalin and the Kirov Murder, Robert Conquest
WEBSITES:
"Repression and Terror." Ibiblio - The Public's Library and Digital Archive. Web. 13 Dec. 2011. .
http://www.nytimes.com/books/first/k/knight-kirov.html
[1] Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 37 [2] Stalin, Robert Service, page 314 first paragraph [3] In off the red, Ken Marks, page 178 [4] Stalin , Man and his era, Adam Bruno Ullam [5] Stalin as a way of life, document 47 page 136 [6] http://www.nytimes.com/books/first/k/knight-kirov.html [7] Stalin and the Kirov Murder, Robert Conquest [8] http://www.ibiblio.org/expo/soviet.exhibit/repress.html [9] Ullam, Stalin: the man and his era page 385 [10] Ullam, Stalin: the man and his era page 385
EXAMPLE TWO
To What Extent Was Stalin Responsible For The Murder of Sergei Kirov?
A. Plan of investigation
In investigating Stalin’s complicity in Kirov’s murder, Stalin's possible motives and the relationship between the two will be investigated. Pertinent evidence surrounding the act of assassination will be examined through the use of historiographical analysis from prominent historians from different perspectives and countries. This investigation will not be limited to particular historians or books, but will be focused, on Amy Knight and Grover Furr, with whom I have had personal correspondence. The choice of these historians, stems from their different approaches to the topic, their different conclusions on the topic and their different contextual grounding in writing their respective books. This investigation will not entertain any other theories behind Kirov’s assassination, and instead will focus entirely on Stalin’s culpability.
B. Summary of evidence
Stalin’s daughter wrote, “[my father] liked him [Kirov] and was attached to him”. A.T. Rybin, the head of Stalin’s bodyguard wrote, “Stalin and Kirov were very close; Kirov was the only person with whom Stalin would take a steam bath naked.” Historian, Dmitri Volkogonov stated, “there was probably no other party figure for whom Stalin showed such care and affection.” Unlike Stalin, Kirov was an ethnic Russian who was considered more eloquent, charismatic and likeable. At the 17th party congress in January 1934, Stalin received 300 more negative votes than Kirov. Party leaders proposed Kirov taking over Stalin’s position, which Kirov refused to consider, and reported to Stalin. At the congress, Kirov publicly pushed for Stalin’s agenda of realignment of dissident party members to Stalinist policy. During the Ryutin affair, Kirov opposed Stalin's position with “particular force against the recourse to the death penalty,” as well as Stalin’s economic policy.
Days before Kirov’s assassination, Stalin ‘reportedly’ ordered NKVD Commisar, Genrikh Yagoda to replace Aleksandr Mdved with Grigory Yevdokmov, who wasn’t loyal to Kirov, at the helm of the Leningrad office of the NKVD involved in looking after Kirov’s security. Kirov overturned the order, at which point Stalin ‘reportedly’ ordered Kirov’s murder.
The assassin, Leonid Nikolayev suffered a poor and deprived childhood, suffering rickets, resulting in a weak and small stature, condemning him to poor health for the rest of his life. At the time of Nikolayev was 30 years old, unemployed, and married with two young children. He had been a member of the communist party since the age sixteen but unable to keep a steady job. He resented the communist party he felt he had dedicated his life to, and in Mathew Leone’s words was an “isolated loner full of rage against party bureaucracy.” He had written letters to both Kirov and Stalin venting his anger. In the winter of 1934 Nikolayev wrote in his diary, “The money has run out, we will borrow. Today my supper consists of two glasses of sour clotted milk.” In October 1934 he wrote, “I am now ready for anything and no one can stop me. I am making preparations like Zhenlinbov” [Alexander II's assassin].
At 4:30pm Kirov arrived at the Smolnyi and his personal bodyguard, Borisov, met him. He made his way to the third floor with Borisov trailing, where none of the guards assigned to that floor were on guard.. After turning the corner to his office, Nikolyev shot Kirov in the back of the neck with a Nagan revolver. After the assassination, Stalin immediately made his way to Leningrad to conduct the investigation. Stalin interrogated Nikolayev personally. Nikolayev’s diary was found containing the murder plot. Nikolayev was found guilty of the murder and executed days after the interrogation. Borisov, traveling in a truck full of NKVD agents, died in an incident on the way to his interrogation in which no one else was harmed.
On December 1st Stalin issued a law stating that suspected lawbreakers could be detained and tried without an attorney and executed immediately if convicted, with no chance to appeal. By December 4th thirty-nine people in Leningrad and twenty-two in Moscow were arrested as class enemies. ‘The Great Purge’ would follow in which thousands of party members implicated in a conspiracy to kill Kirov were executed.
During Khrushchev’s investigation in 1960-1961, the Soviet government concluded Stalin was not responsible.
C. Evaluation of Sources
‘The Murder of Sergei Kirov: History, Scholarship and the Anti-Stalin Paradigm’ by Grover Furr, Kettering Ohio, Erythrós and Media, 2013
Grover Furr is an American professor with an impressive command of the Russian language, a scholar of Russian literature and Soviet history he has published more than ten books on the period, in English and Russian. His understanding of Russian culture and language allows Furr greater insight into Russian archives and historiography on the Kirov murder. He is a supporter of Stalin and a Communist, allowing for a unique, provocative insight but opens him up to charges of bias with a hidden agenda to forward his own ideology. In response to this charge, he argues that it is taboo to not assume the worst of Stalin because of the legacy of the Cold War not only through Western hostility towards the USSR but Khrushchev’s own special commission which placed the blame for the murder at Stalin’s feet, compounding what he calls, "the anti-Stalin paradigm." This has resulted in him being ostracised from the historiographical community, as his views do not adhere to the “major officials” as he puts it.
‘Who Killed Kirov’ by Amy Knight, New York, Hill and Wang, 1999
Amy Knight has been described as “the West’s foremost expert on the NKVD/KGB.” Her book focuses on evidence specifically surrounding Kirov’s murder much like a lawyer making a case. This narrow scope is similar to my assessment and therefore makes it very valuable. Knight is an American historian, and therefore may be limited by the fact she is a western historian looking at Russian history. Grover Furr states in his email to me that Amy Knight is subject to the anti-Stalin paradigm; that is to say she has an inherent bias that had been indoctrinated into her by the anti-Soviet and anti-Stalin US media that would render her incapable of objectively studying Soviet history Despite this, she has dedicated her life to the study of Russian history culture and politics. In her books she has taken a generally negative view towards Stalin, which may have influenced her approach in her book, Who Killed Kirov, as well as her other scholarly works on the issue.
D. Analysis
The Kirov murder, “marked the approach of a sinister era” in which Stalin’s purges and repression killed thousands, even millions of people. It is hugely important to determine whether Stalin had played some part in the assassination of Kirov, especially in light of the somewhat suspect circumstances of his death.
The testimony of Stalin’s daughter and bodyguard show Stalin to be very close with Kirov. Volkogonov’s conclusion, drawn from his experiences interviewing people and studying documents about their relationship, reinforces the notion that Stalin and Kirov were close, making it less likely that Stalin would be willing to kill his friend, Kirov. These lack of motives on a personal level are contrasted Nikolayev’s personal resentment that would have had to act as a lone wolf. A squalid life of perceived mistreatment at the hands of the party and personal correspondence venting anger at Kirov, in addition to the dire straights he was in the months leading up to Kirov’s murder. Nikolayev had ample reason to murder Kirov of his own accord.
The case for Stalin’s involvement in Kirov’s murder starts with the real or perceived threat that Kirov posed to Stalin’s domination of the party. Kirov was an eloquent and charismatic ethnic Russian, as well as very likeable. Stalin did not posses these qualitiesand this became clear to Stalin and the whole party at the17th Party Congress in which Stalin received far more negative votes than Kirov. It is true, however, that this may have stemmed more from the swell of discontent over Stalin’s tightening grip on power than on Kirov’s strengths, but nevertheless framed Kirov as a potential competitor for power. This notion of competition from Kirov was reinforced by Kirov telling Stalin that members of the party had approached Kirov to usurp Stalin’s position as General Secretary, and although Kirov refused and reported it gave Stalin reason to be concerned. Again during the Ryutin affair, Kirov was seen to be challenging Stalin’s position, however, the extent to which Kirov deviated from Stalin’s policies during Ryutin affair is contestable with historians such as Arch Getty claiming he openly criticized Stalin’s policy, whereas Grover Furr claims his reaction was far more docile.
In the days leading up the murder of Kirov a series of suspect changes in the NKVD in Leningrad led Orlov to question whether Stalin had had some hand in these changes. The significance of these changes is that no guards where on third floor when Kirov arrived, a fact out of the ordinary and against procedure. If guards were on the floor they could have stopped Nikolayev. The problem with Orlov’s analysis is the orders to change the head of the NKVD in Leningrad came from Yagoda and it is Orlov’s assumption that Stalin had ordered Yagoda to do as he did. There is no factual evidence, only heresy, to support this, or that Yagoda or anyone inside the NKVD had any involvement in employing Nikolayev to kill Kirov. One action that can be put at the feet of Stalin is the 1st of December law. The repressive powers by December 4th allowed Stalin to arrest thirty-nine people in Leningrad and twenty-two in Moscow as class enemies in direct response to the Kirov Murder. The fact that this law was drafted in less than a day points to Stalin preparing this beforehand in anticipation of the murder. On the other hand Stalin could have been preparing a law like this and used Kirov’s murder as a opportunity to enact it, but did not have any part in the murder. The problem the claims shown, in this paragraph is that much of information to base this judgement on is “tenuous” as Furr claims and is based on testimony from unreliable sources with inconsistent stories and at some points downright fabrications.
In the immediate aftermath of Kirov’s murder Stalin, rapidly made his way to Leningrad to conduct the investigation himself. Volkagonov points to this as evidence of Stalin trying to cover-up his own complicity by controlling the investigation, but could also be seen as Stalin ensuring the validity of the investigation of his friends murder case. Because Nikolayev was executed only days after his interrogation it suggest that Stalin wanted to keep him quiet. In Stalin’s purges after the Kirov assassination most suspects where required to confess their guilt in front of show trials which often took place over long periods of time, but this did not happen to Nikolayev. Could Stalin have been trying to keep Nikolayev quiet, or is this yet another circumstantial piece of evidence? Moreover Borisov, Kirov’s personal bodyguard, was killed on the way to his interrogation in a truck full of NKVD agents; he was the only person injured in any way, further reinforcing the narrative that someone was trying to keep quiet the closest thing to possible to witnesses.
It appears that much of evidence implicating Stalin is circumstantial and based less on hard facts than hearsay and at times unreliable testimony. On the other hand, there is a great weight of circumstantial evidence to the extent that it is not hard to see why some believe this is more than a coincidence.
E. Conclusion
Stalin’s complicity in Kirov’s murder relies on circumstantial evidence and hearsay and if based in fact would appear to suggest a conspiracy that could involve Stalin. It is however not and I must therefore conclude that Khrushchev investigation stating no condemning evidence exists implicating Stalin in Kirov’s murder, is true. Nikolayev resented the party that he felt had failed him and in all likelihood acted alone. Nikolayev acting alone to kill Kirov is not my conclusion, as I cannot for certain say that this was not party conspiracy as Grover Furr argues in his book, or some other reason, but what I can say is that Stalin was not involved to any extent, given the current information.
F. Bibliography
"Kirov Murder." Message to Grover Furr. 12 Feb. 2014. E-mail.
Conquest, Robert. Stalin and the Kirov Murder. New York: Oxford Press, 1989.
Furr, Grover. The Murder of Sergei Kirov: History, Scholarship and the Anti-Stalin
Paradigm. Kettering, OH: Erythrós and Media, 2013.
Getty, J. Arch. Origins of the Great Purges. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985. p. 23.
Knight, Amy. Who Killed Kirov?. New York: Hill and Wang, 1999.
Lenoe, Mathew E. "Did Stalin Kill Kirov and Does It Matter?" Journal of Modern
History. Chicago: University of Chicago., n.d. 74. Print.
Lenoe, Matthew E. The Kirov Murder and Soviet History. New Haven: Yale UP, 2010.
Martin, Lloyd. ‘The Logic of Vladimir Putin’. The New York Times. June 22, 2011.
Nicolaevsky Boris. Power and the Soviet Elite: The Letter of an Old Bolshevik and Other Essays. London: Pall Mall Press, 1966.
Orlov, Alexander. The Secret History Of Stalin’s Crimes. New York: Random House, 1953.
Volkogonov, Dmitriĭ Antonovich. "Stalin and Kirov." Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991.
EXAMPLE THREE
Did Stalin order Kirov’s assassination?
Kirov’ s murder, sometimes called ‘The Murder of the Century’[31], was a significant event in Soviet history because it marked the beginning of ‘The Great Terror’ in 1930s[32]. Thousands of innocent people, mostly Party Members and Stalin’s opponents were charged with the crime and subsequently executed. Millions more were sent to concentration camps[33]. It is crucial to understand who and for what reasons chose to eliminate a member of the ruling elite. Stalin’s reaction to the killing was so rapid that it has been argued that he must have been prepared for this event.[34] As soon as he heard the news he ordered a train to Leningrad during which time he wrote down the ‘Law of December’, which stated that all the cases of accused of terrorism must be speeded up, that there should be an appeal and that the accused must be executed as soon as possible. [35] Indeed, Volkogonov was the first to point out that Stalin was in such haste that he did not even get this document signed by Kalinin, the Chairman of the Central Executive Committee[36]. It is difficult to imagine how such a document could have been prepared so quickly without considering the possible outcomes. Stalin must have thought about this well in advance.
[1] Haynes, John Earl; Klehr, Harvey (165) [2] Furr, Grover (73) [3] Knight, Amy (16) [4] Hough, Jerry F.; Fainsod, Merie (160) [5] Volkogonov, Dmitrii (205) [6] Payne, Stanley (107) [7] Zuehlke, Jeffrey (68) [8] Daniels, Robert Vincent (76) [9] Ibid (199-200) [10] Kirilina, Alla (151) [11] Conquest, Robert (37) [12] Lenoe, Matthew (Chapter 4) [13] Kirilina, Alla (194) [14] Lenoe, Matthew (Chapter 7) [15] Conquest, Robert (51) [16] Volkogonov, Dmitrii (208-209) [17] Conquest, Robert (38) [18] Volkogonov, Dmitrii (58-59) [19] Gruliow, Leo. (50.3) [20] Medvedev, Roy (65) [21] Gruliow, Leo. (50.3) [22] Ibid [23] Benn, David Wedgwood. (596–596) [24] Ibid [25] Ibid [26] Daniels, Robert Vincent (401) [27] Kuromiya, Hiroaki. (699-700) [28] Ibid [29] Ibid [30] Kuromiya, Hiroaki. (699-700) [31] Malia, Martin (157) [32] Lenoe, Matthew (Introduction) [33] Ibid [34] Volkogonov, Dmitrii (208) [35] Lenoe, Matthew (Chapter 7) [36] Volkogonov, Dmitrii (208) [37] Volkogonov, Dmitrii (206) [38] Hough, Fainsod (160) [39] Radzinsky, Ėdvard. (306) [40] Kirilina, Alla (220) [41] Lenoe, Matthew (Chapter 3) [42] Volkogonov, Dmitrii (208) [43] Kirilina, Alla (254) [44] Volkogonov, Dmitrii (277) [45] Ibid [46] Conquest, Robert (38) [47] Lenoe, Matthew (Chapter 11) [48] Rimmel, Lesley (481) [49] Ibid [50] Lenoe Mathew (Chapter 14) [51] Ibid [52] Lenoe, Matthew (Chapter 15) [53] Ibid
Did Stalin order Kirov’s assassination?
The focus of this investigation will be “Did Stalin order Kirov’s assassination?” and will primarily focus on historical evidence which gives reason that Stalin could potentially have ordered Kirov’s assassination.
Source: The Murder of Sergei Kirov by Grover Furr, published in 2013
Furr is an American professor at the Montclair State University in medieval English literature. Indeed, Furr had never formally studied History yet is mostly known for his many books on Stalin and his particular distinct view on him. This makes him valuable, because he has particular insight into the topic and has already done much research in this field, having enjoyed access to primary documents.
Despite his insight, he wrote as a revisionist, meaning that he could have been impacted by other historians and their viewpoint(s). Published so long after the event had allowed time for Furr to critically analyze other viewpoints of historians and evidence published so far.
At first glance, the purpose of the book is to show Stalin’s innocent in the Kirov’s assassination. The main purpose of Furr is really to criticize other historians for claiming Stalin’s guilt without “looking behind the scenes”[1]. Nevertheless, this is valuable, because he provides a different view of Kirov’s assassination and more importantly, Stalin’s involvement in it; what sets Furr apart is that he is one of very few historians who claim that Stalin has never killed a man.[2]
Source: Stalin and the Kirov Murder by Robert Conquest published in 1989
Conquest was a British-American historian who wrote some influential works on the Soviet Union. He was traditionally conservative, worked for Stanford and wrote many books on the Soviet Union and Stalin, examining the crimes committed by Stalin and, given that he is conservative, is particularly anti-Stalin[3].
Given that he was a long-time researcher at Stanford University on Stalinist topics such as the relation between Stalin and Kirov, the value is that he therefore has a lot of insight into personal documents and memorials, which further strengthened his knowledge about this topic. However, a limiting factor is that not all the Soviet documents he read were truthful and trustworthy.
The publication year of this source is valuable, for it suggests that the source, having been written after the collapse of the Soviet Union, is able to look at the Kirov assassination being aware of the politics and Stalin’s rage on the Soviet Union after his death, thus, in the big picture.
This book is of particular value given its focus on Stalin in relation to Kirov’s assassination, as well as his political differences with Kirov.
The purpose of this source is to primarily collect all prior historical research about the Kirov assassination, which supposes Stalin as the assassin which was limiting as it provided a one-sided argument and excludes all other suspects in the Kirov case except Stalin. Despite this, Conquest uses many historians like Medvedev to build a solid argument and though whom offer particular insight into different viewpoints and arguments. On the other hand, all historians used might not be reliable as they might be right or left winged and thus have a different perception of Stalin.
Section 2: Investigation
Kirov was murdered on the 1st December 1934 by an unknown assassin in the Smolny institutes. It is crucial, because not only was Kirov a threat to Stalin, but also what followed the aftermath of Kirov’s assassination was without doubt the “bloodiest round of Stalin’s terror and repression”.[4]
The view argued by Conquest is that Stalin ordered the assassination of Kirov, because Kirov was increasingly getting more public support than Stalin. In his book he exclaims, that it was in the atmosphere that a ‘Kirov line’ started to emerge as an alternative to Stalin’s’[5].
He refers to the 17th Party Congress and later the 17th Politburo Congress as being the two events where one could clearly see a Kirov line emerging.
At the 17th Party Congress (26th January - 10th February 1934) Kirov held a speech, which, argued by Conquest, received as much applause as one would give to Stalin” [6]. In his speech Kirov urged a policy of reconciliation, demanding that all those who opposed the government’s policy on collective farms and industrialization, should be released from prison.[7] Many applauded this policy, however Stalin did not. Stalin sought for people who were opposed to his government policies on collective farming and industrialization, to be prisoned or even secretly murdered.[8]
The aftermath of the 17th Party Congress was the 17th Politburo. The 17th Politburo (10th February 1934 - 22nd March 1939) was extremely crucial, because for the first time one could see the socio-political differences in ideologies between Stalin and Kirov. The candidates taking part in the 17th Politburo could vote for Kirov or Stalin and as we now know, Stalin received fewer votes than Kirov. Besides Conquest, other historians like Seligman Favorov and Barmine agree on this fact. [9] Stalin was furious that Kirov had more votes than him and, because he couldn’t stand this disgrace, he manipulated the votes so that he had plenty more votes than Kirov did [10].
With Kirov increasing his popularity, the troubles for Stalin to stay in power and maintain his strict policies grew. Therefore, Stalin had to find a solution to get rid of Kirov. Claimed by Conquest and agreed by Barmine and Knight, it was highly possible that Stalin ordered Nikolaev to assassin Kirov[11]. Conquest recalls that Nikolaev was once a member of the young Soviet Communist Party and therefore had the card to enter all rooms in the Smolny offices. However, Nikolaev was arrested on 15th October 1934 by the NKVP (three months before Kirov was found dead), because he was caught walking in and around the Smolny Institue, to which he was denied access to [12] . After Nikolayev’s arrest something still appeared to be odd. The fact that Nikolaev could, despite his suspension, still enter the Smolny Institue hints at an involvement of a second person from inside the party. Therefore, Khrushchev claimed that, “There are reasons for the suspicion that the killer of Kirov, Nikolayev, was assisted by someone from among the people whose duty it was protect the person of Kirov,” [13]. His assumption is built on the fact that all bodyguards were withdrawn from Kirov’s room and as Barmine argues, “On the 1st December of 1934, the usual guard post at the entrance to Kirov’s office was left unmanned” [14]. The reason for depicting Stalin as Nikolayev’s assistant is that he was the man responsible for the safety of Kirov and the presence of all bodyguards. Furthermore, Barmins claims, “with Stalin's alleged approval, the NKVD had previously withdrawn the remaining guards manning the security desk at Smolny” 10.
In conclusion, Conquests main argument is that Stalin ordered Nikolaev to assassin Kirov, because, for his means, Kirov was getting too popular and powerful. He picked Nikolaev out, because he was already comfortable with the insides of the Smolny Institutes and thus could make his way quickly in and out of the Institutes.
However, a very different view on Kirov’s assassination is offered by Furr who, unlike Conquest, doesn’t take Stalin as Kirov’s assassin and even claims his un-involvement[15]. His main argument is that Stalin certainly didn’t order to kill Kirov and that “he did everything that was possible to find the assassin of Kirov”. Furthermore, he argues that historians like Conquest and Knight only use evidence that fit into their theory and ignore everything else [16].
As argued by Furr, the most important detail ignored by Conquest was probably Khrushchev’s memoirs and primary documents linked to Khrushchev’s relation to Kirov’s assassination.[17] In the 1960 investigations he blamed Stalin for Kirov’s assassination, however, he had no evidence to support this and had to conclude Stalin’s un-involvement[18]. Due to his ‘failure’, Khrushchev than adopted the lone-gunman theory, claiming that Nikolaev alone was responsible for Kirovs murder[19].
Furr sees a big issue with the information published in most books about Kirov’s assassination, because these only show why Stalin could have murdered Kirov, but ignore the reasons Stalin had to not kill Kirov. He argues that, even if one claimed Stalin’s innocents of Kirov’s assassination, this would mean “throwing out the whole ‘anti-Stalin’ paradigm that has structured Soviet historiography in the West for 50 years” [20]. He concludes, that older historians and the people at that time tried to find the guilty Soviet – and Stalin, after his death, was found to be perfect for pushing all the blame on.
Another aspect that Furr argues, is that most of the primary document of the 1930s are still keep secret in Russia today[21]. He mentions that Conquest doesn’t even bother to talk about these documents, but that his claim is built only upon false evidence and assumptions he’s making. Unlike others, Furr calls the question to mind, if these primary documents could be the missing puzzle pieces[22]. This isn’t even considered by Conquest and thus he is in the wrong position to claim Stalin’s involvement in the Kirov assassination. Furr’s view gets supported by people like Liuskov, a member of the NKVD, who claims that, “Stalin had nothing to do with the assassination”. [23]
Furr is indeed supported by a minority of people in his view, however, these people and historians seem to be unpresented in most modern history books and deliberately, maybe purposely, ignored because their view disagrees to the Stalin paradigm.
Despite the view delivered by Furr, most modern historians agree that the chance of Stalin’s involvement in Kirov’s assassination was actually quite high and also very reasonable. Historians like Matthew E. Lenoe, who Conquest uses in his book, argue that, “One point that justifies Stalin’s involvement in the Kirov assassination is that he used the murder of Kirov as a justification for persecution of his enemies[24]”. His assumption is supported by more modern historians like J. Arch Getty and Oleg Naumov who also agree, that “he organized the assassination for this very purpose”[25]. Given the evidence and the many viewpoints of historians and famous political figures like Khrushchev that effectively argue and evaluate why Stalin is to blame for Kirov’s assassination , it seems like Stalin was involved in the Kirov assassination
Section C: Reflection
This investigation has allowed me to gain insight into the views of a variety of different historians regarding Stalin’s involvement in the Kirov assassination. I gained insight into the people of Sergei Kirov and Stalin, as well as the Soviet policies in 1934 to 1943. I had access to many documents of the Soviet archives and personal letters between members of the NKVD. Especially these documents have allowed me to travel back in time and reflected on the circumstances of Kirov’s assassination. I analysed the historians Conquest and Furr in detail, but found many other historians supporting or critiquing them. The viewpoints by these different historians has allowed me to gain more knowledge and insight into different perspectives and theories about why Kirov had to die in 1934. Many historians have provided me with two controversial theories; one being that Stalin was guilty in the Kirov murder and the other being that Stalin was totally uninvolved in Kirov’s assassination.
During researching and writing about this topic, I have developed skills, which are fundamental for historians in order to reach a justified conclusion. One important skill I have developed is weighting out different perspectives and reaching a conclusion that considers both sides of the argument.
However, the most difficult part in my investigation was that all too often we are swayed by famous historians and forget the not so famous historians. This is most notably seen when comparing Conquest and Furr, because Furr seems to be more popular and therefore receives more praises for his book. This is a problem, because other modern historians only look upon Conquests opinion, but ignore opinions like the one of Furr. The problem with this is, how do I determine how reliable a historian is and to what scale do historians only praise one another to support the same view.
The most crucial thing I learned during my investigation was, that Kirov was the man who would have pushed Stalin down. By eliminating Stalin, Kirov would have had the leading role in the Soviet Union and the regime would be under his politics. Therefore, I wonder, if Kirov, had he not been killed, could have prevented such an escalation in the 1930s and even the role of the Soviet Union during Cold War.
Bibliography:
Barmine, Alexandre. One Who Survived: The Life Story of a Russian under the Soviets. New York: Putnam, 1948. Print.
Chlevnjuk, Oleg V. Master of the House: Stalin and His Inner Circle. New Haven: Yale U, 2009. Print.
Conquest, Robert, and Udo Rennert. Stalin: Der Totale Wille Zur Macht: Biographie. MuÌnchen: List, 1991. Print.
Conquest, Robert. Stalin and the Kirov Murder. 200 Madison Avenue, New York: Pub, 1989. Print.
Furr, Grover. The Murder of Sergei Kirov: History, Scholarship and the Anti-Stalin Paradigm. Kettering, OH: Erythros and Media, 2013. Print.
Gaddis, John Lewis. We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History. Oxford: Clarendon, 1998. Print.
Getty, Arch, and Roberta T. Manning. Stalinist Terror: New Perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998. Print.
Getty J. Arch. Naumov Oleg V. The Road to Terror: Stalin Self-Destruction of the Bolsheviks, 1932-1939. Michigan, Inc., Grand Rapids, Michigan, Binghamton, New York: Pub, 1999. Print.
Getty, John A. Origins of the Great Purges: The Soviet Communist Party Reconsidered, 1933 - 1938. Cambridge: Cambridge U, 1994. Print.
Hoffman, Gabriella. "Professor Grover Furr Praises Stalin, Claims He Never Committed 'One Crime'." Frontpage Mag. N.p., 05 Nov. 2012. Web. 03 Feb. 2017.
Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich. Documents of the 22nd Congress of the CPSU. New York: Crosscurrents, 1961. Print.
Knight, Amy. Who Killed Kirov? The Kremlin’s Greatest Mystery. 19 Union Square West, New York: Pub, 1999. Print.
Lenoe, Matthew E., and Mikhail Prozumenshchikov. The Kirov Murder and Soviet History. New Haven: Yale UP, 2010. Print.
Orlov, Alexander. The Secret History of Stalin's Crimes. Melbourne: Jarrold, 1954. Print.
Radzinsky, Edvard. Stalin: The First In-depth Biography Based on Explosive New Documents from Russia'secret Archives. New York: Doubleday, 1996. Print.
Rimmel, Lesley A. "Volume 56, Issue 3." Another Kind of Fear: The Kirov Murder and the End of Bread Rationing in Leningrad. N.p.: n.p., 1997. 481-99. Print.
"Robert Conquest, Historian - Obituary." The Telegraph. Telegraph Media Group, 04 Aug. 2015. Web. 03 Jan. 2017.
Trotsky, Leon. The Kirov Assassination. N Y: Pioneer, 1956. Print.
FOOTNOTES: [1] Furr, Grover. Personal email, 28th October 2016. [2] Hoffman, Gabriella. "Professor Grover Furr Praises Stalin, Claims He Never Committed 'One Crime'." Frontpage Mag. [3] "Robert Conquest, Historian - Obituary." The Telegraph. Telegraph Media Group. [4] Khrushchev, N.S., On the Cult of the Individual and Its Consequences, London (1989) [5] Conquest, Stalin and the Kirov murder, page 23 [6] Getty and Manning, Stalinist Terror: New Perspectives, page 45 [7] Getty, Origins of the Great Purges, page 94 [8] Conquest, Stalin, page 150 [9] Vitalʹevich Khlevniuk and Seligman Favorov, Master of the House: Stalin and his Inner Circle, page 109 [10] Vitalʹevich Khlevniuk and Seligman Favorov, Master of the House: Stalin and his Inner Circle, page 109 [11] Barmine, One Who Survived, page 196 [12] Radzinsky, Stalin: The first in-depth biography based on explosive new documents from Russia’s secret archives, page 321 [13] Khrushchev, On the Cult of the Individual and Its Consequences, page 21 [14] Barmine, One Who Survived, pages 247-252 [15] Rimmel, Lesley A. "Volume 56, Issue 3." Another Kind of Fear: The Kirov Murder and the End of Bread Rationing in Leningrad. 1997. 481-99. [16] Furr, Grover. “The Murder of Sergei Kirov, page 405 [17] Furr, Grover. “The Murder of Sergei Kirov, page 409 [18] Furr, Grover. “Khrushchev’s Lied”, page 269 [19] Furr, Grover. “Khrushchev’s Lied”, page 270 [20] Furr, Grover. “The Murder of Sergei Kirov, page 407 [21] Furr, Grover. “The Murder of Sergei Kirov, page 397 [22] Furr, Grover. “The Murder of Sergei Kirov, page 408 [23] Rimmel, Lesley A. "Volume 56, Issue 3." Another Kind of Fear: The Kirov Murder and the End of Bread Rationing in Leningrad. N.p.: n.p., 1997. 481-99 [24] E. Lenoe, The Kirov Murder and Soviet History, page 127 [25] Getty, Origins of the Great Purges, pages 207-210
INTERNATIONAL BACCALAUREATE PROGRAM
IB HISTORY: Soviet Russia
Question:
Was Stalin responsible for Kirov’s murder in 1934?
Word count: 2196
Section 1: Identification and Evaluation of Sources
Research question: Was Stalin responsible for Kirov’s murder in 1934?
This investigation focuses on the events surrounding Sergei Kirov’s assassination on December 1, 1934, and the immediate aftermath that Stalin used to justify accelerated repression. In this IA, “responsible” is defined in two ways: (1) direct responsibility (ordering or knowingly enabling the killing), and (2) indirect responsibility (deliberate exploitation of the assassination or concealing involvement). To analyse Stalin’s involvement and responsibility, this IA uses two contrasting secondary historical works that represent different historiographical contexts and evidentiary bases: Robert Conquest’s The Great Terror: A Reassessment (Oxford University Press, 1990) and Oleg Khlevniuk’s Stalin: New Biography of a Dictator (2015). Both sources are particularly relevant for assessing what can and cannot be proven about Stalin’s involvement.
Source 1 (Secondary): Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment (1990)
Origin and purpose: Conquest is a Western historian forming his interpretation during the Cold War era, in which Soviet archival evidence was extremely limited. His purpose is to explain the nature of Stalinist repression for a wide range of audiences, and to argue Stalin’s central responsibility in the mechanism of terror, including the political significance of Kirov’s death.
Content and value: For my investigation, Conquest’s key value is his structured narrative linking Kirov’s growing political prominence and the security failures surrounding the assassination to an intentionalist argument that Stalin may have been involved or knowingly enabled the killing. Conquest is useful as he critically analyses available evidence into an interpretive argument about motives and patterns: Kirov’s murder appears as a turning point that enabled the Great Terror. This helps my IA evaluate why Stalin might have benefitted and how the murder served as a political function.
Limitations: Conquest’s main limitation is the evidential environment in which his argument was formed. Due to Soviet archives being largely closed when his interpretation developed, he relied on memoirs, press accounts, defectors’ testimony, and fragmented documentation, which are incomplete or difficult to verify. Therefore, the work is stronger at constructing plausibility than proving a documented direct order.
Source 2 (Secondary): Oleg Khlevniuk, Stalin: New Biography of a Dictator (2015)
Origin and purpose: Khlevniuk writes in the post-Soviet period, using party and security archives as his evidence. His purpose is to present an evidence-led biography that distinguishes between what documents reveal and what remains unknown.
Content and value: The source is valuable as it separates two issues central to the research question. It supports the claim that Stalin exploited Kirov’s murder (for example, through rapid political and legal measures that intensified repression), while noting that existing documents do not prove Stalin issued a direct order to kill Kirov. This strengthens the reliability of Khlevniuk’s conclusions and provides a benchmark for what can be asserted with documentary confidence.
Limitations: However, reliance on official archives also reveals limitations. Evidence and files may be incomplete, destroyed, or never created, meaning that the absence of written evidence cannot conclusively exclude direct involvement. In addition, a focus on central records may not capture suspicious local dynamics in Leningrad, where operational details and anomalies may not be fully documented in surviving documentation.
Together, both sources allow the investigation to weigh intentionalist suspicion against archival caution, producing a more precise judgement about Stalin’s responsibility and the limitations of historical proof.
Section 2: Investigation
On December 1, 1934, Leningrad’s party chief Sergei Kirov was assassinated in his office at the Smolny Institute. It became a major political turning point that the Stalinist leadership used to justify intensified repression in the months and years that followed. Kirov, the Leningrad Party boss who was well respected in the Communist Party, was shot by Leonid Nikolaev under mysterious circumstances (Conquest p.12). Stalin used the murder to justify mass repression, including executions and labour camp sentences (Conquest p.29).
This investigation analyses circumstantial indicators (motive, security anomalies, and witness treatment) against archival limitations and the findings of later investigations that did not produce documentary proof of a direct order. The question of whether Stalin himself organised the assassination of Kirov has sparked a wide historical debate. Similarly to Conquest, Lenoe argues that the Kirov case is a useful test of historical method as later narratives often outstrip what surviving documentation can confirm, making the boundary between inference and proof especially important (Lenoe p.353). However, historians such as Khlevniuk challenge this view, stating a lack of evidence, and rather suggesting that Kirov’s death may have been an opportunistic accident for Stalin. Through the use of Robert Conquest and Oleg Khlevniuk, this investigation evaluates how far the evidence supports direct responsibility versus political responsibility through exploitation.
Evidence for Stalin’s involvement
Kirov’s increased popularity in the 1930s is often interpreted by historians as a potential motive for Stalin, as it suggested a growing rival (Conquest p.33). At the 17th Party Congress in 1934, Kirov received just one less vote than Stalin in the Central Committee elections, which came as a shocking show of support, possibly alarming Stalin (Knight p.83). Some disputed testimonies claim that Stalin received significantly more negative votes than Kirov (Knight p.84), thus showing that the official results were rigged in Stalin’s favour. Because this claim rests on retrospective testimony rather than published records, it should be treated as suggestive rather than conclusive (Lenoe p.353). Even if voting data indicates popularity, popularity alone does not demonstrate a decision to assassinate; it only strengthens a motive argument.
Additionally, Kirov disagreed with Stalin on policy matters, such as adopting a more moderate approach toward oppositionists in Leningrad (Conquest p.32). Although these disagreements were limited, they have been used by historians to argue that Stalin could have viewed Kirov as politically inconvenient. Conquest and historians such as Knight argue that Stalin saw Kirov as a potential threat to his authority and had both the motive and opportunity to eliminate him (Conquest p.33).
The particular circumstances of Kirov’s assassination further arouse suspicion. In the immediate aftermath, the Soviet leadership approved emergency measures that accelerated procedures for “terrorist” cases; historians cite this as evidence the regime moved quickly to turn the assassination into a political instrument (Seventeen Moments, Murder of Kirov) (Knight p.112). In Leningrad, Kirov’s bodyguard was inexplicably absent and may have been diverted by NKVD officers (Knight p.115).
According to some accounts, Nikolaev had been detained by the NKVD a few weeks earlier due to him lingering near Kirov’s house with a loaded revolver, shortly afterwards was released, and had his revolver returned (Conquest p.40). This defies normal NKVD procedure and is therefore suspicious; however, it may also reflect local incompetence, or bureaucratic failure rather than a centrally directed plot. The aftermath raises the possibility of concealment or negligence, particularly regarding the treatment of key witnesses. The day after Kirov’s death, Mikhail Borisov (his chief bodyguard) died in a mysterious truck accident while in the custody of the NKVD (Conquest p.42). Conquest argues that Borisov’s “accident” suggests an NKVD attempt to silence him, and indeed several Leningrad NKVD officers who were involved in Kirov’s security were later shot during the purges (Conquest p.43–44).
Taken together, these points support a circumstantial case that the assassination was enabled within the NKVD; they do not prove Stalin ordered it. At most, these anomalies suggest either (a) facilitation by security officials, or (b) severe negligence later employed politically; so they support suspicion but cannot establish authorship. This distinction matters: even without proof of an order, Stalin could still be “responsible” through rapid exploitation and selective punishment.
Amy Knight supports this view, stating there is a “fairly convincing circumstantial case” linking Stalin to the crime, since NKVD officers would not have acted without Stalin’s consent and approval (Knight p.270). However, this relies on an assumption about NKVD hierarchy and cannot substitute for documentary proof; it is strongest as an inference, not confirmation.
Alexander Orlov, a former NKVD officer who defected in 1938, later testified that Stalin ordered Yagoda to arrange the assassination (Orlov p.123), implying the possibility of a political assassination. Orlov’s testimony must be treated cautiously: it can only carry major weight if corroborated by independent archival findings or consistent records; otherwise it remains suggestive.
Additionally, while there has been no “smoking gun” document, historians such as Conquest argue that the convergence of the above events is unlikely to be a coincidence. Stalin’s almost immediate takeover of the investigation and his use of the murder to justify the purges on real and imagined enemies implies that Kirov’s death fits too perfectly into Stalin’s political plans (Conquest p.39).
Lack of proof and alternatives
Despite the arguments above, multiple historians argue that the evidence of Stalin’s direct responsibility is circumstantial at best. Modern archival research, unavailable to early Cold War historians, has not uncovered any direct orders or explicit documents tying Stalin or the NKVD to the assassination of Kirov (Khlevniuk p.102). Khlevniuk adopts an agnostic position on direct involvement: “no materials were found to support Stalin’s or the NKVD’s participation in Kirov’s murder” (Khlevniuk p.104). He also notes that later investigations under Khrushchev and Gorbachev reviewed secret files and interrogated officials without producing definite documentary proof of Stalin’s direct role (Khlevniuk p.139). However, later investigations were also shaped by political priorities, so “no proof found” does not mean “no involvement” (Lenoe p.355).
In Khlevniuk’s assessment, some of the often-cited “evidence”, such as the claims of Congress voting or Stalin’s prior threats against Kirov, rests on hearsay or embellishments that archives do not support. He therefore treats commonly cited claims as unreliable where they lack archival support (Khlevniuk p.101). Khlevniuk and Fitzpatrick argue that Kirov remained a loyal Stalinist, undermining the motive that Stalin needed to remove serious rivals (Khlevniuk p.105) (Fitzpatrick p.66).
Moreover, revisionist historians argue that Stalin’s dictatorship, while violent, did not require his direct involvement in every crime, meaning certain events could have occurred independently of his planning (Getty p.195). Getty challenges the traditional narrative by suggesting that interpreting the Kirov affair as a Stalin-organised assassination may reflect Cold War-era assumptions rather than firm evidence (Getty p.207). He notes that “before the Cold War, no serious authority argued that Stalin was behind the assassination”, implying that later interpretations may have been influenced by political climate and the desire to portray Stalin in the harshest possible light. Getty’s point suggests that certainty about Stalin’s direct role may partly reflect Cold War framing. Although, the security anomalies still require explanation even if direct orders are not demonstrated. Getty’s intervention usefully warns against Cold War certainty, but it does not explain the operational anomalies, so it weakens claims of proof rather than eliminating suspicion.
Similarly, Fitzpatrick writes that “no solid proof exists that Stalin plotted (Kirov’s) death” (Fitzpatrick p.71). Getty and Fitzpatrick stress that surviving evidence does not conclusively link Stalin to ordering the murder, while noting that missing records mean absence of proof, not proof of absence (Fitzpatrick p.71).
Revisionists therefore leave open the possibility that the assassination may have been carried out by Nikolaev acting independently or by local officials without Stalin’s direct order. One often-noted alternative is that Nikolaev, an embittered ex-Party member, may have acted out of personal resentment or desperation. Lenoe notes that accounts of Nikolaev’s motives vary across later reconstructions, so a purely personal motive remains possible but cannot be confirmed with confidence (Lenoe p.355).
Conclusion
The debate surrounding Stalin’s role in Kirov’s assassination reflects the wider historiographical divide between the “totalitarian” and “revisionist” school. Conquest and other intentionalist historians emphasise Stalin’s authoritarian power and interpret suspicious circumstances, such as security failures, Nikolaev’s unexplained release, and the death of Borisov, as indications of Stalin’s direct involvement. In contrast, revisionists like Getty, Fitzpatrick and Khlevniuk stress the absence of definitive archival proof and caution against attributing intentionality where documentation is inconclusive.
Therefore, the evidence suggests that Stalin used Kirov’s murder for political purposes and to justify the rapid repression that followed. However, whether Stalin actively planned the assassination remains unresolved. Overall, the evidence strongly supports Stalin’s responsibility in exploiting the murder to accelerate repression, while direct orchestration remains plausible but unproven due to evidential gaps and limited surviving evidence.
Section 3: Reflection
This investigation has provided me with a clearer understanding of how historians work with limited sources which are often influenced by political decisions. I became aware of how origins and context strongly shape a source’s conclusion. Comparing Conquest’s Cold War interpretation with Khlevniuk’s post-archival analysis showed me how access to evidence and ideological environments can lead historians to different arguments.
A major challenge I encountered was dealing with gaps in the archival record. With key documents missing or destroyed, I had to recognise that historians often rely on circumstantial evidence and must be cautious when drawing conclusions. This made me aware of the difference between plausible interpretation and proven fact. For example, I had to decide how much weight to give to defector testimony and to suspicious security failures, and I learnt that these can suggest possibility, but do not confirm direct responsibility.
This experience helped me understand how easily events can be misinterpreted when evidence is incomplete. It highlighted that historians must make their level of certainty explicit, and be prepared for conclusions to change when new archival material becomes available. My conclusion also shifted as I weighed testimony against archival limits and adjusted my level of certainty accordingly.
Works Cited
Conquest, Robert. The Great Terror: A Reassessment. Oxford University Press, 1990. Accessed October 7, 2025.
Dewar, Hugo. “Murder Revisited: The Case of Sergei Mironovich Kirov” (1965). Marxists Internet Archive, December 5, 2017. https://marxists.architexturez.net/archive/dewar/1965/kirov.htm. Accessed October 14, 2025.
Fitzpatrick, Sheila. On Stalin’s Team: The Years of Living Dangerously in Soviet Politics. Princeton University Press, 2015.
Getty, J. Arch, et al. The Road to Terror: Stalin and the Self-Destruction of the Bolsheviks, 1932–1939. Yale University Press, 1999. JSTOR (2001). https://www.jstor.org/stable/2697527. Accessed December 13, 2025.
Getty, J. Arch. Origins of the Great Purges: The Soviet Communist Party Reconsidered, 1933–1938. Cambridge University Press, 1985.
Khlevniuk, Oleg. Stalin: New Biography of a Dictator. Translated by Nora Seligman Favorov. Yale University Press, 2015.
Knight, Amy W. Who Killed Kirov?: The Kremlin’s Greatest Mystery. Hill and Wang, 1999.
Lenoe, Matt. “Review: Did Stalin Kill Kirov and Does It Matter?” JSTOR, 2002. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/343411. Accessed December 8, 2025.
Orlov, Alexander. “The Secret History of Stalin’s Crimes.” JSTOR, 1954. https://www.jstor.org/stable/24355330. Accessed October 14, 2025.
Saxena, Ranja. “Murder of Kirov.” Seventeen Moments in Soviet History. https://soviethistory.msu.edu/1934/the-kirov-affair/the-kirov-affair-texts/murder-of-kirov/. Accessed December 13, 2025.
Thurston, Robert W. Life and Terror in Stalin’s Russia, 1934–1941. Yale University Press, 1996.
