Lecture One: The Century's Initial Catastrophe
The Second World
War consumed fifty-five million lives and reshaped international politics,
marking the emergence of the United States and Soviet Union as superpowers
whilst setting the stage for the Cold War. This conflict was the single largest
event in human history, stretching around the globe and leaving no continent
untouched. It fundamentally altered the international system, leading to
Europe's decline in geopolitical and economic significance and the rollback of
European colonial empires. The rise of national liberation movements in the
"Third World" during the 1950s and 1960s can be traced directly to
the war's aftermath. Additionally, World War II marked the origins of the
welfare state in Europe.
We need to examine
both macro-events and the experiences of workers, soldiers, and civilians by
exploring the war's origins, economic factors, and its impact on culture and
society. I remember Studs Terkel's characterisation of World
War II as the last "good war," whilst acknowledging that many have
lost sense of the conflict's grim realities. He aims to recapture these by
examining "the full range of human experiences associated with the war,
both those of its leaders and of the millions who suffered its
consequences."
The war's origins
lay in the First World War's conclusion. The sudden armistice of 1918 created
various problems, particularly as German people had been led to believe their
spring offensive would bring victory. The absence of foreign troops on German
soil at the armistice convinced many Germans that the Army had been
"stabbed in the back" by domestic enemies. The army blamed Germany's
surrender on the republican government and leading political parties,
undermining the new regime's legitimacy from its inception. The Treaty of
Versailles aimed to weaken Germany and provide collective security for France
and Eastern Europe's new nations. Germany lost substantial territory: eastern
regions including mineral-rich Silesia went to Poland; Memel was transferred to
Lithuania; Alsace-Lorraine returned to France; a Polish corridor was
established between Germany proper and Prussia; and the Saar would be
administered by the League of Nations for fifteen years. The loss of Silesia
was particularly devastating as it contained vital coal and iron ore deposits
essential to German industry. The Polish Corridor not only separated East
Prussia from the rest of Germany but also placed the German city of Danzig
under League of Nations control as a "Free City." The Rhineland was
to be permanently demilitarised, creating a buffer zone between Germany and
France.
Germany also lost its overseas colonies and was required to pay huge war reparations, justified by a "war guilt clause" that Germans found particularly humiliating.
The Treaty restricted Germany's armaments and troop levels: the army was limited
to 100,000 men, forbidden tanks and aircraft, whilst the navy was restricted to
six battleships and prohibited from building submarines. These military
restrictions were designed to prevent Germany from ever again threatening
European peace, but instead fostered deep resentment.
Problems with Versailles arose immediately. Germans saw it as a "dictated peace,"
particularly resenting reparations and war guilt provisions. The U.S. Senate
failed to ratify the Treaty or approve Anglo-American guarantees to France,
beginning America's withdrawal into isolationism. Britain, wary of being drawn
into new continental conflict, distanced itself from France and sought
accommodation with Germany. Italy was embittered over not receiving new
territories in the Adriatic and North Africa. Russia, not invited to
Versailles, saw the new Bolshevik regime's distrust of Western powers grow.
These failures in the post-war settlement laid the groundwork for the
catastrophe that would follow two decades later.
Lecture Two: Hitler's Challenge to the International System, 1933-1936
During the 1920s,
the Versailles settlement's problems remained manageable. France, aware it
would have to maintain the settlement virtually alone, established military
alliances with East European "successor" states. In 1924, Germany
embarked on a "policy of fulfilment," making good-faith efforts to
fulfil Versailles terms to demonstrate their unreasonableness. Germany began
reintegrating into the European collective security system, with the
Kellogg-Briand Non-aggression Pact of 1928 signalling the high-water mark of
post-war cooperation. The United States became somewhat more active in aiding
Europe's economic recovery through the Dawes Plan, which extended financial aid
from private sources to Germany.
The Great
Depression imposed tremendous strains on Germany and the European international
system. The Wall Street Crash of 1929 brought massive unemployment and business
failures in Germany. Growing resentment and political polarisation fuelled the
rise of Hitler's Nazi Party between 1930 and 1933. The Nazis relentlessly
attacked the Weimar government and other political parties, promising to
restore Germany to its rightful place in Europe and the world. Hitler demanded
revision of the Treaty of Versailles, exploiting widespread German resentment
of the settlement.
Hitler's aggressive
foreign policy operated on two levels: geopolitical and ideological. His
geopolitical goals were to destroy the Treaty of Versailles, attain Lebensraum
in the east for the German Volk, ensure Germany's economic self-sufficiency,
and create a Greater German Reich to dominate the European continent. His
ideological goal was to unleash a crusade against "Judeo-Bolshevism"
to ensure the racial purity of his Reich. Hitler knew that attainment of these
goals would require war. The concept of Lebensraum drew on nineteenth-century German
geopolitical thinking but was radicalised by Hitler's racial theories. He
envisioned German settlers colonising Eastern Europe after displacing or
enslaving the Slavic populations, whom he considered racially inferior.
In class we detail
Hitler's systematic destruction of Versailles Treaty remnants. In 1933, he
withdrew Germany from the Disarmament Conference and League of Nations. The
withdrawal was calculated to occur simultaneously, maximising diplomatic
impact. In 1934, he signed a ten-year non-aggression pact with Poland, thereby
undermining the French alliance system. This move confused Western observers
who expected German hostility toward Poland over the corridor issue. In March 1935,
Hitler announced Germany was rebuilding its Luftwaffe, ostensibly as a
defensive action. The rearmament programme had actually begun secretly in 1933,
with civilian aviation schools training future military pilots. When Western
powers failed to react to the Luftwaffe announcement, he announced the
following week that Germany would rebuild its army through conscription,
increasing it from 100,000 to 550,000 men. Hitler justified each move with
appeals to national sovereignty and equality, exploiting Western guilt about
Versailles's harshness.
The Anglo-German
Naval Agreement of June 1935 horrified the French, demonstrating that Britain
had abandoned the Versailles settlement and reached its own accommodation with
Hitler. The agreement allowed Germany to build a navy 35% the size of
Britain's, effectively legitimising German rearmament. In March 1936, German
troops entered the Rhineland; its remilitarisation closed off France's direct
access to Germany. The operation involved only 30,000 troops, and Hitler had
ordered them to withdraw if France responded militarily—but French paralysis
emboldened him to pursue further aggressive moves. The 1936 Berlin Olympics
strengthened Germany's and Hitler's prestige internationally, providing a
propaganda showcase for the Nazi regime. This ideological dimension
distinguished Hitler's foreign policy from that of traditional German
conservatives, who might have been satisfied with revising Versailles's
territorial provisions.
Lecture Three: The Failure of the International System
Divided responses
by West European powers to the German challenge explain the failure of the
post-Versailles international system. In 1936, Hitler introduced a four-year
plan to ensure German economic self-sufficiency. For the next two years, he
constantly asserted his desire for peace and justice whilst secretly preparing
for war. During the 1930s, France was politically polarised between left and
right, economically weakened by the Depression, and psychologically scarred by
the First World War's casualties. It cast about for allies to face a revived
Germany but lacked political consensus to confront the German challenge. France
adopted an overly defensive, static, and reactive "Maginot
mentality," believing that fortifications could deter German aggression.
French military
planners failed to extend the Maginot line along the French-Belgian frontier
for several reasons: Belgium's neutrality made joint planning difficult, the
terrain was considered unsuitable for fortifications, and costs were
prohibitive. This gap would prove fatal in 1940. France and Britain failed to
respond effectively to signs of aggressive German intent. Distrusting Britain's
reliability as an ally after the Naval Agreement, France developed an uneasy
relationship during the middle 1930s with the Soviet Union, which feared a
possible German-Polish axis directed eastward.
In 1935, Stalin
agreed to defend Czechoslovakia against external assault if France also
honoured its treaty obligations to Czechoslovakia. However, Poland and Romania
refused to allow Soviet troops transit rights, making the agreement practically
worthless. France also considered an alliance with Mussolini, who feared German
intentions regarding Austria and the Balkans. Possibilities for British and
French cooperation with Italy against Germany were destroyed by Mussolini's
invasion of Ethiopia in late 1935 and his intervention in the Spanish Civil War
in 1936. The following year, Italy allied with Germany, forming the Rome-Berlin
Axis.
The 1937 Hossbach
Memorandum, recorded by Hitler's adjutant and which was the subject of a
students IBDP IA, revealed Hitler instructing his generals to prepare for a
move into Eastern Europe that would bring Germany into conflict with France. He
envisioned war by 1943-45 at the latest, when German rearmament would peak
relative to its enemies. Meanwhile, he removed top German officials who had
expressed reservations about aggressive operations in the East, including War
Minister Werner von Blomberg and Army Commander Werner von Fritsch,
consolidating his own control over top positions in the German armed forces.
In class we analyse
the Austrian crisis of February and March 1938. Austrian chancellor Kurt von
Schuschnigg sought British and French guarantees of Austria's sovereignty,
attempting to preserve independence against increasing Nazi pressure. These
efforts upset Hitler when they became known to him. German ambassador Franz von
Papen suggested a meeting between Schuschnigg and Hitler at the "Eagle's
Nest" in the Bavarian Alps. Hitler browbeat Schuschnigg for hours,
demanding that Austrian Nazis be given key government positions. Having
sidestepped Hitler's demands that he cede control of Austria's foreign policy,
Schuschnigg returned to Vienna and announced plans for a plebiscite on Austrian
independence.
After Schuschnigg
refused Hitler's ultimatum to cancel the plebiscite, Hitler ordered German
troops to cross the Austrian frontier. He announced the Anschluss, justifying
it through national self-determination of peoples. The international community
issued only mild protests, with Mussolini acquiescing despite earlier
opposition to German expansion southward. In summer 1938, ethnic Germans in
Czechoslovakia's Sudetenland region demanded a "return to the Reich."
The Czech government mobilised its well-equipped army to resist. Mussolini and
Chamberlain intervened to prolong peace. Mussolini feared being dragged into
war over Sudetenland. French weakness and American isolationism convinced
Chamberlain to appease Germany. Czechoslovakia's fate was sealed at Munich in
September 1938.
Lecture Four: The Coming of War
Chamberlain
received a hero's welcome returning from Munich, his efforts to save European
peace greeted by general relief. Intent on preserving peace, he had made all
allowable concessions to Hitler. He was convinced the United States was
unreliable, France weak, and the British army incapable of continental
operations. Many believed World War I occurred because European leaders hadn't
taken all possible steps to preserve peace. Chamberlain feared another war
would subordinate Britain to the United States economically and politically. He
sincerely believed Hitler's protestations of peaceful intent, taking at face
value the Führer's claims that the Sudetenland represented his last territorial
demand in Europe.
Hitler drew
different conclusions from Munich. The Western powers appeared weak and lacking
the will to fight. Their acquiescence to his demands convinced him that Britain
and France would not risk war to defend Eastern European states. Stalin also
concluded the West was weak, interpreting their behaviour as an attempt to
direct German expansion eastward toward the Soviet Union. Angry that the Soviet
Union had been excluded from Munich deliberations despite its treaty
obligations to Czechoslovakia, Stalin began reconsidering Soviet foreign
policy.
Until 1938,
elements within the German army had acted to restrain Hitler's aggressive
impulses. Nervous about fighting the well-equipped Czech army with its strong
fortifications, certain members of the army high command, including Chief of
Staff Ludwig Beck, conspired to overthrow Hitler if he ordered an invasion of
Czechoslovakia. The conspiracy involved arresting Hitler and establishing a
military government. However, the conspiracy dissolved after Munich, as
Hitler's bloodless victory vindicated his judgment against the generals'
caution.
Asserting the need
to quell Czech-Slovak ethnic tensions, Hitler occupied the remainder of
Czechoslovakia on March 15, 1939. German troops marched into Prague whilst
Slovakia became a German puppet state. This move shattered the Munich agreement
and could not be justified through national self-determination—it was naked
aggression against a non-German population. The occupation shocked Western
opinion. Chamberlain, feeling personally betrayed by Hitler, underwent a
dramatic policy reversal. Britain joined France in extending security
guarantees to Poland, promising military assistance if Polish independence were
threatened. In March 1939, Hitler seized Memel from Lithuania. As Childers
notes, "the veil had dropped"—Hitler's true intentions were now
unmistakable.
France and Britain
belatedly sought to bring the Soviet Union into the European collective
security system during spring and summer 1939. However, negotiations proceeded
slowly. Chamberlain and the British foreign policy establishment deeply
distrusted Stalin, viewing communism as potentially more dangerous than
fascism. Britain and France believed the Soviet Union was militarily weak
following Stalin's devastating purges of the Red Army officer corps in 1937-38,
which had eliminated most experienced commanders.
The
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact's announcement on August 23, 1939, stunned the world.
The agreement between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union made no ideological
sense—they were sworn enemies, with Hitler having built his movement on
anti-Bolshevism. Hitler sought to avoid a two-front war following his planned
invasion of Poland, believing the Pact would deter Britain from honouring its
guarantee. Stalin hoped to buy time to rebuild Soviet military strength whilst
directing German aggression westward. The Pact's secret protocols divided
Eastern Europe into German and Soviet spheres, with the Soviet Union gaining
eastern Poland, the Baltic states, and Bessarabia. The Hitler-Stalin Pact made
European war inevitable by removing Hitler's fear of Soviet intervention.
Hitler hadn't intended to fight in the West in autumn 1939, expecting Britain
and France to abandon Poland as they had Czechoslovakia. After he refused
Chamberlain's ultimatum to withdraw from Poland, war began on September 3,
1939.
Lecture Five: Blitzkrieg
Blitzkrieg
represented more than military innovation—it served Nazi Germany's political,
economic and strategic objectives. The military elements included armoured
divisions, motorised infantry, and close air support, designed to avoid the
static trench warfare Germany experienced between 1914 and 1918. General Heinz
Guderian, appalled by Verdun's slaughter during World War I, developed the
strategy. He adopted ideas about aggressive armoured warfare from British
military thinkers, especially J.F.C. Fuller and B.H. Liddell Hart, whose
theories found little support in their own country. Hitler embraced Guderian's
ideas enthusiastically, though the German high command remained sceptical about
abandoning traditional infantry-based tactics. Lightning war against
diplomatically isolated adversaries could be conducted without full
mobilisation of Germany's society and economy. This suited Hitler's domestic
political needs, avoiding the home-front privations that had undermined German
morale in 1918. A policy of armaments in breadth rather than depth would allow
rapid build-up and deployment of forces. Lightning campaigns would substitute
for sustained military efforts, for which Germany in late 1939 lacked the
economic resources and raw materials.
The strategy's
components were revolutionary for their time. Tanks would lead attacks,
followed by motorised infantry in tracked personnel carriers, then massed
infantry. The Luftwaffe would first achieve air superiority by destroying enemy
air forces on the ground, disrupt enemy communications and command structures,
then provide close air support to attacking ground units. Dive-bombers would
serve as "flying artillery," terrorising enemy troops and civilians.
This approach provided the movement, speed, and flexibility conspicuously
lacking during the First World War's bloody stalemates.
Britain and
France's declaration of war following the Polish invasion didn't match Hitler's
expectations. He had anticipated another Munich-style capitulation, not a
general European war. Their reaction raised the prospect of a two-front war for
which Germany wasn't ready. The German public reacted with notable lack of
enthusiasm to news of the invasion. Hitler's popularity had previously rested
on achieving foreign policy goals without war—restoring German pride and
territory through diplomatic coups. The sight of troops marching to war revived
memories of 1914-18's casualties.
Poland's fate was
sealed from the beginning. "Case White" proceeded according to plan
despite Poland's brave resistance. Poland was vastly outmatched: Germany
deployed 1.5 million troops against Poland's 1 million, 2,500 tanks against
180, and 2,000 aircraft against 420. German troops reached Warsaw's outskirts
by September 8, 1939. The Polish army fought tenaciously despite massive aerial
bombardment that targeted civilians as well as military formations. Warsaw
endured devastating air raids as the Luftwaffe tested terror bombing tactics
later used against Rotterdam and London.
Soviet troops
crossed Poland's eastern frontier on September 17, 1939, implementing the
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact's secret protocols. Caught between two massive armies,
Polish forces disintegrated. Many escaping Poles travelled to Britain via
Romania and France, where they formed Europe's largest army-in-exile,
eventually contributing significantly to the Allied war effort. Polish pilots
would distinguish themselves in the Battle of Britain, whilst Polish forces
fought in North Africa, Italy, and Northwest Europe.
A crucial Polish
contribution came from mathematicians who had broken the German Enigma cipher
machine. Polish intelligence had been working on Enigma since 1932, and
mathematician Marian Rejewski had reconstructed the machine's internal wiring.
Just before Poland's fall, the Poles provided their Enigma research to British
and French intelligence. This breakthrough would prove invaluable, particularly
in the Battle of the Atlantic where reading U-boat communications saved
countless Allied ships and lives.
The war's first
phase ended by October 1939, followed by a strange lull in the West lasting
until spring 1940. This "Phony War" or "Sitzkrieg" saw
French troops manning the Maginot Line whilst Germans faced them across the
frontier, with virtually no fighting. Hitler launched peace initiatives between
November 1939 and February 1940, hoping to avoid a two-front war by persuading
Britain and France to accept the conquest of Poland as a fait accompli.
These overtures found no receptive audience in London or Paris.
Meanwhile, the
Russo-Finnish War erupted in November 1939. Stalin, fearing Finland might fall
under German influence and threaten Leningrad, demanded territorial concessions
including parts of the Karelian Peninsula. When Finland refused, Soviet forces
attacked on November 30. The Finns resisted with remarkable skill and tenacity
despite being vastly outnumbered—the Soviet Union deployed nearly one million
troops against Finland's 200,000. Finnish ski troops, operating in familiar
terrain during the harsh winter, inflicted devastating casualties on Soviet
forces unprepared for winter warfare.
The Red Army's poor
performance reinforced international perceptions of Soviet military weakness
following Stalin's purges. Soviet troops, poorly led and equipped, suffered
approximately 200,000 casualties compared to 25,000 Finnish losses. Although
the Soviets ultimately prevailed through sheer weight of numbers, forcing
Finland to cede territory in March 1940, the conflict exposed serious
deficiencies in Soviet military doctrine, training, and leadership. These
weaknesses encouraged Hitler's later decision to invade the Soviet Union,
convincing him that one more Blitzkrieg campaign could destroy the "rotten
structure" of the Soviet state.
Lecture Six: The German Offensive in the West
The "Phony
War" ended abruptly in April 1940 when Germany launched preemptive
assaults on Denmark and Norway. Denmark fell within hours on April 9, its small
military overwhelmed before resistance could be organised. Norway proved more
difficult, with British and French forces attempting to intervene. German
paratroopers seized key airfields whilst the Kriegsmarine transported troops
despite Royal Navy superiority. The Norwegian campaign demonstrated German
operational boldness and Allied indecision. By June, Germany controlled Norway,
securing Swedish iron ore supplies and naval bases for attacking British
shipping.
Having secured his
northern flank, Hitler prepared to invade the Low Countries and France. The
Allies possessed virtual parity with Germany in troops and armour—France alone
had more tanks than Germany, many technically superior to German models.
However, British and French preparations proved woefully inadequate. Their
military strategy remained defensive, shaped by the Great War's casualties.
French military thinking emphasised methodical battles and continuous fronts,
rejecting the mobile warfare concepts Germany had embraced. The "Maginot
mentality" prioritised static fortifications over operational flexibility.
Naval power
remained central to British planning during the inter-war period. Having
suffered economically during World War I, Britain reluctantly rearmed during
the 1930s. Greater resources went to the Royal Air Force than the army, with
Britain among the first countries developing strategic bombing capability. The
RAF also developed new fighters—Hurricanes and Spitfires—to defend against
continental attack. However, the British Expeditionary Force sent to France
remained small and poorly equipped compared to 1914's standards.
Although Allied
military strength appeared adequate numerically, serious problems existed
beneath the surface. The French army lacked unified command, with rivalry
between generals and confusion about chain of command. The government of the
French Third Republic lacked political cohesion, with deep divisions between
left and right paralysing decision-making. French society remained traumatised
by the First World War's losses—1.4 million dead from a population of 40
million—creating a defensive mentality that permeated military planning.
The French high
command under Maurice Gamelin anticipated a German attack through Belgium,
reprising the 1914 Schlieffen Plan. The "Gamelin Plan" called for
Allied forces to advance into Belgium once Germany attacked, meeting the
Germans on Belgian soil rather than French territory. This plan had obvious
flaws: it required Allied forces to abandon prepared positions and advance into
unfamiliar terrain. Gamelin ignored intelligence indicating German armoured
formations massing opposite the Ardennes Forest, dismissing the region as
impassable for tanks.
Germany attacked
Belgium and Holland simultaneously on May 10, 1940. As the Germans hoped,
British and French forces moved into Belgium according to plan. Then three
German Panzer corps, led by Guderian and Erwin Rommel, smashed through the
Ardennes behind Allied lines. The French had left this sector lightly defended,
believing the terrain impossible for armoured operations. German engineers
worked miracles getting tanks through forest roads, achieving complete tactical
surprise. By May 13, German forces had crossed the Meuse River at Sedan,
tearing a massive gap in Allied lines.
German armoured
spearheads raced across northern France during May 1940, reaching the Channel
coast by May 20 and cutting off Allied armies in Belgium. The speed of advance
astonished even German commanders—Guderian and Rommel frequently outran their
supply lines and higher headquarters' ability to control operations. French
command structures collapsed under the strain of Blitzkrieg warfare.
Communications broke down, reserves were committed piecemeal, and panic spread
through rear areas. The British Expeditionary Force, along with French and
Belgian troops, found itself trapped in a shrinking pocket around Dunkirk,
facing annihilation.
Lecture Seven: "Their Finest Hour": Britain Alone
Britain faced a
desperate situation in summer 1940, standing alone against Germany after
France's collapse. German troops controlled the entire European coastline from
Norway to the Spanish border, with the Wehrmacht poised for a cross-channel
invasion. "Operation Sea Lion," the German invasion plan, called for
landings along England's southern coast in late summer or early fall. Britain
lacked allies—France had fallen, the United States remained neutral, and the
Soviet Union was Germany's de facto ally through the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.
Churchill and
British military leaders developed a strategy based on three elements:
strategic bombing of Germany, naval blockade, and supporting anti-Nazi
resistance movements on the continent. British officials saw strategic bombing
as their only viable offensive option, though Bomber Command remained small and
ineffective in 1940. The Special Operations Executive was established in July
1940 to "set Europe ablaze" through sabotage and resistance
operations, though it would take years to develop effective networks. British
hopes for a naval blockade drew on memories of 1916-18's successful starvation
of Germany, but this proved ineffective whilst Germany received resources from
the Soviet Union and conquered territories.
The Royal Navy
faced an agonising decision regarding the French fleet. Churchill feared these
modern warships might fall into German hands, tilting the naval balance. On
July 3, 1940, British forces attacked the French fleet at Mers-el-Kébir,
Algeria, sinking or damaging several capital ships and killing 1,297 French
sailors. This action poisoned Anglo-French relations but demonstrated British
determination to continue fighting. The Royal Navy's primary task remained
keeping sea lanes open despite the U-boat threat, which would intensify as
Germany gained French Atlantic ports.
In June 1940,
Britain shipped its gold reserves and negotiable securities to Canada,
preparing for possible evacuation of the government if invasion succeeded. The
army had abandoned most heavy equipment at Dunkirk—Britain possessed fewer than
100 tanks and limited artillery. Local Defence Volunteers (later the Home
Guard) drilled with shotguns and improvised weapons. Everything depended on the
Royal Air Force maintaining air superiority to prevent German landings.
Hitler had made no
advance plans for invading Britain, assuming London would negotiate after
France's fall. When Churchill rejected peace overtures, the German high command
faced unprecedented challenges. Unlike previous campaigns, Sea Lion required
cooperation between three services with incompatible requirements. The Army
wanted a broad front invasion across 200 miles of coastline to avoid
concentration of British defences. The Navy, with limited transport capacity
and fearing Royal Navy intervention, insisted on a narrow front near Dover.
Both services agreed that success required absolute air superiority.
The Luftwaffe faced
its own limitations. Designed for tactical support of ground forces, it lacked
heavy bombers for strategic operations. German fighters had limited range,
restricting operations to southeastern England. The Luftwaffe had lost 30% of
its strength during the French campaign and needed time to recover. German
intelligence underestimated British aircraft production and pilot training
programmes. Most critically, the Germans lacked experience in strategic air
campaigns and made crucial targeting errors.
Panic initially
gripped Britain as invasion seemed imminent. Road signs were removed, church
bells silenced (reserved for invasion warnings), and beaches lined with barbed
wire and mines. Gradually, confidence emerged as German difficulties became
apparent. The Royal Navy's strength, the RAF's growing effectiveness, and
intelligence revealing German improvisation bolstered morale. Churchill's
speeches articulated British defiance: "We shall fight on the beaches, we
shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the
streets, we shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender." By late
July, Britain had transformed from defeated nation to fortress island, ready to
contest German invasion attempts.
Lecture Eight: The Battle of Britain
Lecture Nine: Hitler Moves East
Operation
Barbarossa represented Hitler's greatest gamble and most cherished ambition.
The invasion of the Soviet Union would be the largest military operation in
human history, ultimately involving over 3.8 million Axis troops. Both
ideological obsession and strategic calculation shaped Hitler's decision. Since
writing Mein Kampf, he had identified the Soviet Union as Germany's ultimate
enemy, the centre of "Judeo-Bolshevism" that threatened Western
civilisation. The conquest would provide Lebensraum for German settlers whilst
enslaving or eliminating Slavic "sub-humans." Ukraine's grain and the
Caucasus's oil would ensure German economic self-sufficiency.
Hitler assumed
Britain was essentially defeated by 1940, no longer capable of continental
intervention. He calculated that Britain remained defiant only through hope of
eventual Soviet or American assistance. Crushing the Soviet Union would force
British capitulation whilst deterring American intervention. He dismissed the
Red Army as a "rotten structure" that would collapse when kicked.
Stalin's purges had eliminated 35,000 officers including most experienced
commanders. The Finnish War's debacle reinforced German contempt for Soviet
military capabilities. Hitler predicted victory within eight to ten weeks.
Planning for
Barbarossa began in July 1940, even as the Battle of Britain raged. Initial
debates focused on strategic objectives. Traditional military thinking favoured
driving directly for Moscow, the Soviet Union's political and communications
hub. Hitler insisted on broader goals: destroying the Red Army in western
Russia whilst seizing economic resources. Three army groups would attack
simultaneously. Army Group North would advance through the Baltic states toward
Leningrad. Army Group Centre would drive toward Moscow through Belorussia. Army
Group South would invade Ukraine, seizing its agricultural and industrial
wealth.
The invasion's
postponement from May 15 to June 22, 1941, generated historical controversy.
Some blame Mussolini's disastrous Greek adventure, requiring German
intervention in April 1941. Wehrmacht forces conquered Yugoslavia and Greece in
lightning campaigns, but supposedly lost crucial weeks. In reality, unusually
wet spring weather made eastern European roads impassable for mechanised
forces. The delay proved less significant than Germany's failure to prepare for
extended campaign. No winter equipment was issued—Hitler forbade such defeatist
preparations. The Wehrmacht would conquer Russia in summer uniforms.
Stalin's blindness
to German intentions remains history's great intelligence failures. Multiple
sources warned of impending attack: British intelligence, Soviet spies
including Richard Sorge in Tokyo, and German deserters provided detailed
information. Stalin dismissed all warnings as British provocations designed to
embroil him with Germany. He prohibited defensive preparations that might
appear provocative, ordering frontier units to avoid "provocations"
even as German reconnaissance flights penetrated Soviet airspace. Trainloads of
Soviet raw materials crossed into Germany until the invasion's final hours.
Barbarossa would be
an ideological war of annihilation. Hitler's directives abandoned all legal and
moral constraints. The "Commissar Order" mandated summary execution
of captured political officers. The "Barbarossa Decree" exempted German
soldiers from prosecution for crimes against Soviet civilians. Einsatzgruppen
mobile killing units would follow the armies, murdering Jews and Communist
officials. The Wehrmacht, not just the SS, participated enthusiastically in
these crimes. Army commanders issued orders denouncing
"Jewish-Bolshevik" enemies and calling for "ruthless"
measures against partisans and civilians.
The invasion began
at 3:15 AM on June 22, 1941. Three million German troops, joined by 600,000
allies, crossed the Soviet frontier. Complete tactical surprise was achieved
despite the massive build-up. The Luftwaffe destroyed 1,200 Soviet aircraft on
the first day, mostly on the ground. Panzer spearheads sliced through Soviet
defences whilst infantry eliminated surrounded pockets. Within days, entire
Soviet armies faced encirclement. German soldiers wrote home euphorically about
easy victory. Yet ominous signs appeared immediately: Soviet troops fought with
unexpected determination, often to the death rather than surrendering. The vast
distances swallowed German divisions. Most significantly, destroyed Soviet
units were replaced by fresh formations from the interior. The Red Army might
bend, but it refused to break.
Lecture Ten: The Germans Before Moscow
Lecture Eleven: The War in Asia
From the start of
Grade 11 we go through the evolution of Japanese foreign and military policy
between 1918 and 1937, examining Japanese designs on the Asian mainland
beginning with the Mukden incident in 1931. Japan emerged from the First World
War as the leading power in the Far East, seizing the Marshall, Mariana, and
Caroline Islands from Germany. At Versailles, Japan was awarded former German
concessions in China despite protests from the United States and China.
Japanese naval officers resented restrictions imposed on their fleet at the
Washington Naval Conference of 1921-1922, fuelling expansionist sentiment
within the military. Many in the
Japanese armed forces believed Japan's salvation lay in expansion, particularly
on the Asian mainland. Expansionists sought access to food, oil, and other raw
materials through military conquest. Military officers were increasingly
disgusted with Japan's corrupt civilian government. China appeared an
especially inviting target—Manchuria was rich in natural resources and seemed
ripe for the taking. Since 1905, influence in Manchuria had been split between
Japan and Russia.
The Mukden
"Incident" of 1931 led to Japanese seizure of Manchuria and creation
of the puppet state of Manchukuo in 1932. This operation underscored the
military's strong influence over the civilian government in Tokyo. Condemned by
the League of Nations, Japan withdrew from the League in 1932. The Chinese
central government was weak and divided; the Nanking government could not
respond effectively to Japanese aggression.
Japan engaged in
full war with China in July 1937. The Japanese Kwantung Army invaded northern
China from Manchukuo. The Soviet Union signed a non-aggression pact with China,
and the Soviets and Chinese Communists announced their intention to support Chiang
Kai-shek's forces defending China against the Japanese. In November 1937,
Japanese forces besieged the new Chinese capital, Nanking, which fell on
December 12.
The "Rape of
Nanking" in December 1937 and January 1938 provoked widespread
condemnation of Japan, especially in the United States where the "China
Lobby" was particularly strong. Some 200,000 Chinese civilians died in the
attack. The capital was moved to Chungking. Canton fell in October 1938. In
December 1938, the United States extended a $25 million loan to China. Armed
clashes with the Red Army on the Mongolian border in August 1939 sobered
Japanese military commanders about prospects for expansion to the north.
Tokyo faced a
strategic dilemma. The Japanese army favoured expansion north against the
Soviet Union, whilst the navy advocated expansion southward through Southeast
Asia and the Pacific, seizing colonial possessions of western European powers.
A compromise solution was reached, outlined in the "Fundamental Principles
of National Policy" of August 1936. Japan should extend its influence in
China and the South Seas gradually and by peaceful means. Both army and navy
would be strengthened to better resist the Russian army and U.S. navy. This
policy committed Japan to an arms race with the Soviet Union and United States
whilst calling for expansion into China.
The triumph of
Germany in the west in 1940 dramatically affected Japanese strategic thinking.
In July 1940, the civilian government was replaced by a more aggressive cabinet
pursuing alliance with Germany and the Axis powers. The new government was
determined to crush China and decided to push southward into Southeast Asia.
The new cabinet sought to silence domestic opposition. Japan faced continued
resistance in China during 1940 from Chiang and the Chinese Communists. Tojo
reasoned that a move south against Western colonial possessions would help
Japan subdue China by cutting off Chiang's external supplies whilst providing
needed raw materials for Japan. This planned push south required Japan to reach
a non-aggression pact with the Soviets and prepare for conflict with the United
States. War games conducted in May 1940 showed Japan could prevail in a short
conflict with the United States but might lose a long one. The war would be a
great strategic gamble.
Lecture Twelve: The Japanese Gamble
The situation in
East Asia deteriorated during 1941. Japan felt threatened by U.S. economic
sanctions and aid to China. Following Japan's demand in July 1940 that Britain
close the Burma Road, the United States imposed a limited embargo on the sale
of certain key goods to Japan. In late 1940, Tojo linked Japan with the Axis
powers in the "Tripartite Pact." Each member pledged to support the
others in a war against the United States. The United States offered to assist
the Dutch if they would cut off oil shipments to Japan, and it provided $70
million in new loans to China. In March 1941, the U.S. Congress passed
Lend-Lease and provided additional support for Chiang.
In April 1941,
Japan and the Soviet Union signed a non-aggression pact, indicating Japan had
chosen the southern strategy. Japan and the United States inched closer to
conflict. Roosevelt rejected Japanese proposals but prolonged negotiations in
spring 1941 to prevent Japan from attacking. Japan hoped to resolve differences
with the United States through negotiation but was prepared to use force if
necessary. Japanese threats to French Indochina, the Dutch East Indies, British
Malaya, and the American Philippines in July 1941 led the United States to
freeze Japanese assets. Great Britain and the Netherlands followed, and Japan
found itself cut off from 90 percent of its oil supplies.
Events moved
rapidly toward war in late 1941. In early September 1941, the Japanese
government decided it would be ready for war by late October. Minister of War
Tojo assumed power in October 1941. Diplomatic overtures continued. Japan
offered to withdraw from Indochina and parts of China if the United States
would not interfere with Sino-Japanese peace negotiations and if it would
normalise trade relations with Japan and support Japanese acquisition of Dutch
East Indies. The Japanese government set a secret deadline of November 25,
1941, for progress in the talks. Roosevelt knew this was an important date.
Because the U.S. government expected an attack, it was less interested in
negotiating. Although the American military position was weak, Roosevelt rejected
the Japanese proposals and demanded Japanese withdrawal from China. On November
26, 1941, a large Japanese carrier force set sail in the northern Pacific. Its
objective was the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbour.
We need to examine
the Japanese leadership's important decisions as they planned for war against
the United States. Japan's leaders believed they had three options: abandon
ambitions in the Pacific, Southeast Asia, and China; attempt compromise with
the United States and hope for concessions; or take military action. Japan had
two principal military options. It could strike European colonial possessions
in Southeast Asia but spare the Philippines to preserve peace with the United
States. Eventually Japan's leaders decided military action in Southeast Asia
would require an attack on the United States. Alternatively, Japan could strike
American positions in the Pacific, notably the Philippines and Pearl Harbour.
Admiral Yamamoto
argued that if Japan chose to fight the United States, it must strike a
crippling blow against the U.S. Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbour. This attack
would allow Japan to "run wild" for six months and secure control of
Southeast Asia and the western Pacific. Yamamoto's plan assumed the United
States would negotiate peace terms following the loss of its fleet and accept
Japanese dominance in East Asia. Yamamoto did not believe Japan would prevail
in a protracted conflict with the United States. His plan had several
components: Japan would launch simultaneous attacks on U.S. islands of Wake and
Guam; British Malaya, Burma, and Hong Kong; the Dutch East Indies; and the
American Philippines. The centrepiece would be a surprise attack on the U.S.
Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbour. The assault force would be centred on Japan's
aircraft carrier fleet. Japan had a very well-trained and equipped naval air
force. The element of surprise was essential. The attack force maintained
strict radio silence and followed a northern course well away from standard sea
lanes.
Lecture Thirteen: The Height of Japanese Power
Japanese forces
attacked Pearl Harbour on the morning of December 7, 1941. The attackers
achieved complete surprise, destroying much of the U.S. fleet and U.S. air
power. Japanese losses were minuscule. However, the victory was not complete.
The three American aircraft carriers were not at Pearl. Seven heavy cruisers
were also at sea. Only two battleships were wholly destroyed. The attackers
failed to hit American fuel depots. They did not destroy the U.S. submarine
base. Admiral Nagumo, who commanded the attack, was concerned to protect the Japanese
carriers and thus did not order a follow-up air assault. The United States
declared war on Japan on December 8, 1941.
There are several
reasons for the American defeat at Pearl Harbour and in the Philippines. Some
involved intelligence failures. Some historians have suggested that FDR had
advance knowledge of the attack, which he saw as an opportunity to involve the
United States actively in the war. There is no evidence that the U.S.
government knew Pearl Harbour had been targeted for attack. The U.S. government
had not yet broken the Japanese military code. It anticipated a Japanese attack
in Southeast Asia but not at Pearl Harbour. It was confident that Hawaii was
secure. Security breakdowns in the Pacific were also important. The initial
alert message was not taken seriously; the ships had no torpedo nets; and there
was no general alert. The conduct of Admiral Husband Kimmel and General Walter
Short was later criticised. The Japanese success was mainly attributable to a
brilliant plan carried out to perfection.
Admiral Yamamoto
had predicted that the Japanese could "run wild" for three or four
months following the Pearl Harbour attack. The Japanese steamrolled throughout
the western Pacific and Southeast Asia. Guam and Wake fell in December 1941.
Hong Kong was taken by Christmas. The sinking of HMS Prince of Wales and HMS
Repulse on December 10, 1941, gave Japan naval superiority in Southeast Asia.
The loss of Malaya and Singapore in February 1942 was a huge blow to Western
morale. The Japanese began to speak of creating a Greater East Asia
Co-Prosperity Sphere. Burma and the Netherlands East Indies fell in March 1942.
Britain had been pushed out of Southeast Asia, and its position in India was
threatened.
The Japanese also
attacked the Philippines, destroying U.S. air power at Clark Field. MacArthur
underestimated the Japanese and overestimated the local Allied force. U.S.
troops on Corregidor surrendered on May 5, 1942. U.S. troops on Bataan held out
until April 1942. In the Bataan "death march," 75,000 troops from the
U.S. garrison were marched 55 miles to a railhead. More than 7,000 died along
the way. Japan was dominant throughout Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific
in spring 1942. The Allies feared that Japan would move west toward India or
east toward U.S. possessions in the Pacific. Meanwhile in Europe, the Russian
counteroffensive before Moscow was stalled. German U-boats operated with
near-impunity off the U.S. coast. The German Navy sank many U.S. merchant ships
during the winter of 1941-1942.
Japan faced several
strategic options in spring 1942. The Japanese leadership considered three
competing offensive strategies. One involved a thrust westward into the Indian
Ocean and perhaps onward to link up with German forces in the Middle East. This
option most frightened the Allied leadership in early 1942. Another option was
a continued push south to seize New Guinea and perhaps Australia. A third
option was a strike against the last American outpost in the Pacific—Midway,
followed perhaps by an invasion of the Hawaiian Islands. Yamamoto argued that
Japan had to engage the U.S. fleet as early as possible, destroy U.S. naval
power in the Pacific, and force the United States into a negotiated settlement.
Lecture Fourteen: Turning the Tide in the Pacific: Midway and Guadalcanal
Instead of adopting
one strategy, Japan sampled from each. Japan considered seizing Madagascar from
France. Britain seized the island to keep Japan from taking it. Japan's advance
into the Indian Ocean—Churchill's and Roosevelt's nightmare—came to naught in
April 1942. Jimmy Doolittle's raid on Tokyo on April 18, 1942, underscored the
vulnerability of the home islands and prompted Yamamoto to plan a "ribbon
defence" across the Pacific by driving U.S. forces out of Midway and
Hawaii. The Japanese plan called for attacks in New Guinea and the Solomon
Islands to disrupt the supply flow to MacArthur in Australia.
U.S. and Japanese
naval forces clashed at the Battle of the Coral Sea on May 7-8, 1942. This was
the first great naval battle between aircraft carriers and the first in which
carrier-based aeroplanes inflicted all damage. The battle ended in a draw. Japan
withdrew without attempting a landing at Port Moresby. The United States
achieved its strategic goal of blocking the Japanese advance. The battle seemed
to end in an Allied victory.
Yamamoto hoped to
destroy the U.S. Pacific fleet to protect the home islands and prevent a
repetition of Doolittle's raid. Japanese forces would attack Midway to lure the
U.S. fleet out of Hawaii. The Japanese would follow up the Midway attack with a
major invasion front. They had huge superiority over the United States in ships
and aircraft. Due to intelligence provided by "Magic," the U.S.
carriers secretly relocated from Pearl Harbour to Midway. The stakes were very
high. If the Japanese succeeded, the U.S. position in the Pacific would be
untenable. Admiral Nagumo launched his air attack against Midway on June 4,
1942. Initially, the attack proceeded according to plan. As the Japanese
returned for a second strike, U.S. aircraft arrived.
The fortuitous U.S.
victory at Midway Island became known as the "Miracle of Midway." The
Japanese planes were preparing for a second assault on Midway on June 4, 1942,
when a U.S. air squadron appeared. The U.S. planes were shot down and the Japanese
carriers suffered no significant damage. One group of U.S. dive bombers had
gotten lost looking for the Japanese carriers. It later found and attacked them
at the worst possible moment for the Japanese; three of the four carriers were
sunk and the fourth severely damaged. Without the carriers and air cover, the
main Japanese force could not press the attack on Midway. The Battle of Midway
marked a key turning point in the U.S.-Japanese struggle. The outcome shifted
the naval balance in the Pacific. It marked the end of Japan's initiative on
the high seas. Henceforth the Imperial Navy would be on the defensive. Pearl Harbour
was secured for the United States.
The major turning
point on land came with the Battle of Guadalcanal, August 1942-February 1943.
U.S. forces attacked the Japanese airfield on Guadalcanal on August 7,
beginning a six-month epic struggle that proved to be the longest in the
Pacific war. The U.S. attack was intended to keep the Japanese from securing a
foothold in the Solomon Islands, located northeast of Australia. The fighting
involved seven naval battles and ten land battles. The brutal and vicious
fighting at Guadalcanal shaped the nature of combat between Japanese and
Americans in the Pacific. It marked the first U.S. experience of Japanese
suicide attacks. The jungle environment underscored the distinctiveness of
warfare in the Pacific theatre. Japanese and American propaganda helped to
enhance the brutality of the conflict. Sea battles off the coast—notably at
Savo Island in the central Solomons—were extremely costly to both sides.
Admiral Halsey took charge of the U.S. Fleet. Guadalcanal represented the first
defeat for Japan on land and marked a shift in momentum and initiative to the
United States.
Lecture Fifteen: The War in North Africa
The Mediterranean
Theatre was a sideshow for Hitler, but it loomed large in the strategic
thinking of the Western Allies. The role of North Africa in Hitler's strategic
approach to the war is fascinating, illuminating the problematic relationship
between Mussolini's Italy and Nazi Germany in military matters between 1940 and
1943. The Mediterranean Theatre was a sideshow for Hitler, who was mainly
concerned with subduing the Soviet Union. Hitler sought alliances with Spain,
Vichy France, and Italy to put pressure on British positions in the
Mediterranean, but without success. Neither Franco nor the Vichy regime nor
Mussolini was a reliable German military ally. Hitler avoided direct military
involvement in the Mediterranean.
Mussolini, by
contrast, had important ambitions in the Mediterranean. Perceiving British
weakness, he was determined to conquer Egypt and Greece and reestablish the
Roman Empire. He did not coordinate his actions with Hitler. Mussolini's
disastrous Egyptian campaign in 1940 prompted Hitler's intervention and the
creation of the Afrika Korps under the command of General Erwin Rommel. Rommel
forced the British back into Egypt but failed to dislodge them from Tobruk. By
late May the German offensive bogged down. Meanwhile, a pro-German coup in Iraq
led to British intervention in April 1941. British and Free French troops moved
into Syria in June 1941, where they fought Vichy troops.
Hitler's vision was
European rather than global. Even if he had been inclined to seize available
opportunities in North Africa and the Middle East, any effort to assert German
power there would have faced significant obstacles. Tripoli was very far from
Alexandria and had limited port facilities, both of which posed logistical
problems. Because only one east-west road ran along the North African coast, it
would have been hard to engage in broad flanking movements or move supplies.
Logistical and supply problems made it hard to sustain huge military operations;
much of the fighting went back and forth over the same territory. Britain's
ability to resupply its troops in Egypt swung the tide in its favour during
1942.
Montgomery and
Rommel fought a desert war during 1941 and 1942. Rommel pushed the British
forces westward toward Egypt, but the fighting deadlocked along the Egyptian
border in May 1942. By late June, German forces had pushed deep into Egypt.
Victory in the first battle of El Alamein in July 1942 seemed to be within
Rommel's reach, but he failed to sustain the offensive due to supply problems.
Meanwhile, British supplies poured into Egypt. In August 1942 Churchill
appointed Gen. Harold Alexander to command British forces in the North African
theatre, and he chose Gen. Bernard Montgomery to command the British Eighth
Army. At the second battle of El Alamein on October 23, 1942, Montgomery
attacked with huge superiority. Although the British suffered extensive
casualties, Hitler refused to reinforce Rommel. Finally, in November 1942
Rommel retreated back into Libya.
The Allied camp was
divided by conflicts over strategy. The Americans pressed for a cross-channel
invasion in 1942 or 1943 at the latest, and for strategic and political reasons
they resisted British interest in a Mediterranean strategy. American officials
feared that a North Africa operation would divert Allied strength from the
cross-channel invasion. They were wary of supporting British colonial
interests. They were concerned about a possible Russian collapse and heedful of
Stalin's demands for a second front. In March 1942 the Americans proposed
Operation Round-Up to build up forces in Britain for the cross-channel invasion,
and Operation Sledgehammer (a smaller landing in France during 1942) to mollify
the Russians.
The British
supported a cross-channel operation in principle but sought to delay it past
1942. They raised various practical objections to the U.S. plans. The
logistical base for the invasion was not yet prepared. Churchill was convinced
that Britain could not survive another major defeat. The British questioned the
battle-worthiness of American troops, who had not yet engaged in armed
conflict. The disastrous outcome of the small British raid at Dieppe in August
1942 convinced the British that they were not yet ready for a large-scale
invasion of the continent. Churchill advocated an invasion of French North
Africa while the buildup for the cross-channel operation moved forward.
Churchill and his staff emphasised the need to stretch German resources by attacking
around the periphery of Hitler's Fortress Europe—North Africa, Greece, and
Italy.
Churchill convinced
FDR that French North Africa was the only reasonable area for action during
1942. This operation, begun in November 1942, was code-named Operation Torch.
The British position carried the day and the Allied invasion of French North
Africa was launched. General Eisenhower was placed in command of Operation
Torch, but General Alexander and the British staff dominated planning. The
Allied forces would land in the west and then march eastward to Tunisia. Correctly
mistrustful of the odious DeGaulle, the Allies turned to Gen. Henri Giraud to
lead the free French forces. Although Allied forces bogged down in Tunisia,
squabbled among themselves, and suffered a serious defeat at the Kasserine
Pass, they amassed great strength by early 1943. Meanwhile, Hitler failed to
reinforce Rommel until it was too late. By March 1943 the Allies had driven the
Germans from North Africa. As the Americans had feared, however, the success of
Torch caused a delay in the cross-channel invasion of northern Europe.
Lecture Sixteen: War in the Mediterranean: The Invasions of Sicily and Italy
The Allied invasion
of Sicily on July 10, 1943, was code-named Operation Husky. The Sicilian
invasion—vehemently advocated by the British—was a logical extension of the
Allied victory in North Africa. As U.S. commanders had feared, it locked them
into a Mediterranean strategy for which they had little enthusiasm, and it
forced postponement of the cross-channel invasion. Eisenhower was again named
commander-in-chief, but British General Alexander remained actual field
commander. The Italians put up weak resistance to the Allied invaders, although
German forces under Kesselring resisted impressively. Mass surrenders of
Italian troops were common.
Generals Patton and
Montgomery raced toward Palermo. Patton won the race after German resistance
slowed Montgomery. Both generals subsequently raced toward Messina. Although
Patton became a hero in the United States, he was subsequently removed from
command for slapping two soldiers whom he had accused of cowardice. The Allied
victory in Sicily had important consequences. It drew the United States deeper
into Churchill's Mediterranean strategy. Churchill renewed his emphasis on the
"soft underbelly" of Europe—Italy, the Balkans, and Turkey. The
Americans remained sceptical about this Mediterranean focus but had no
alternative plans. The collapse of Sicily and the prospect of an Allied
invasion of Italy led to Mussolini's fall from power on July 24, 1943. A new
government headed by Marshal Badoglio took power in Rome, while the Germans
installed Mussolini as head of a puppet state in northern Italy.
The Italian
campaign began with the Allied invasion of mainland Italy on September 3, 1943.
Bowing to U.S. demands, General Badoglio's government surrendered. Hitler
rushed troops to northern Italy and the area around Rome under General
Kesselring. The Allies launched a three-pronged assault. British forces under
Montgomery crossed the Straits of Messina and landed in the "toe" of
Italy. Another British force stormed ashore at Taranto. U.S. and British troops
under General Mark Clark landed south of Naples at Salerno. The near-failure of
the U.S. landing reinforced doubts about the ability of American troops to make
amphibious landings—and about the upcoming cross-channel invasion.
Italy proved to be
anything but a "soft underbelly." The British seized the Italian air
base at Foggia. The harsh Italian terrain worked to the advantage of the German
defenders. The fighting in Italy was among the most arduous experienced in the
war. In late 1943 the slow Allied advance halted at the "Gustav Line"
some 100 miles south of Rome. The front stabilised in January 1944, making it
possible theoretically for the Allies to shift troops from Italy to Britain for
the cross-channel invasion. In an effort to break the deadlock in Italy, Allied
troops made an amphibious landing at Anzio (30 miles south of Rome) on January
22, 1944. The American invasion force failed to drive inland rapidly and seal
off the Germans in southern Italy; the Americans were again bogged down.
In February, Allied
planes bombed the monastery of Monte Cassino. After several months of fierce
German resistance, Polish troops finally captured Monte Cassino in May 1944. At
about the same time, American forces broke out of Anzio. Instead of driving east
to cut off the German retreat from the Gustav Line, Allied troops moved north
to liberate Rome on June 4, 1944. Kesselring did not contest the city but
instead withdrew north to the "Gothic Line." The Italian campaign had
important implications. It held down twenty German divisions. Allied progress
was slow, costly, and destructive. The campaign did not satisfy Stalin's demand
for a second front against the Axis. Detractors were convinced that the Italian
operations delayed the cross-channel invasion. Could a major cross-channel
offensive have been launched in 1943? As the British argued, German submarines
in the channel still posed a major threat in 1943; the Allies lacked available
landing craft and troops; and U.S. troops lacked combat experience. But sufficient
landing craft and ships were available in the Pacific, and German defences in
northern Europe were stronger in 1944 than in 1943. German submarine strength
and lack of Allied air superiority probably precluded a cross-channel invasion
during 1943.
Lecture Seventeen: Stalingrad: The Turning Point on the Eastern Front
In the spring of
1942 the Germans launched a new offensive against Stalingrad. Having abandoned
earlier efforts to take Leningrad and Moscow, Hitler adopted new objectives.
German forces would drive to the south of Kiev, seize the Caucasus oil fields,
and take Stalingrad. The Soviets appeared highly vulnerable. They had fewer
tanks in 1942 than they had possessed in 1941. The Red Army was absolutely
exhausted, and its best units remained positioned in front of Moscow. At first,
the German offensive was highly successful. The Germans defeated the Soviets at
Kharkov in May. The main German offensive began on June 28, 1942. Stalin
remained convinced that Moscow was the Germans' main target. The Germans
reached Sebastopol in July.
Although Stalingrad
was not yet secure, Hitler ordered a drive into the Caucasus. The drive by
Germany's first panzer division proceeded with great speed into September. The
Germans penetrated deep into Russia; the invasion force split, with part
heading toward the Grozny oil field and the other toward the Black Sea. The
euphoric Germans underestimated the Soviets. The German drive slowed in late
September and October as resistance by Russian defenders and local forces
(e.g., the Chechens) stiffened. The Germans faced mounting problems. Their
front was now more than 500 miles long, and their supply lines were 1,300 miles
long. Resistance activities behind the German lines were mounting. Concerned
about the slow pace of the offensive, Hitler fired General Halder as chief of
staff in November 1942.
The Germans and
Soviets fought a ferocious battle for Stalingrad. The Germans had to take
Stalingrad in order to block Soviet troop movements to the South. The task was
left to General von Paulus's 6th Army. German troops entered the northern
suburbs and reached the Volga on August 22. The next day the Germans launched a
terror air raid on Stalingrad with incendiary bombs. The Russians appeared to
be trapped. Russian resistance was fierce as the battle acquired enormous
symbolic significance. The Germans were determined to take the city and the
Russians to hold it at all costs. The two sides waged a ferocious battle of
attrition. The fighting proceeded street by street, block by block, and house
by house. The city was reduced to rubble, and movement was measured in metres.
By early November, the Germans held 90 percent of the city.
General Zhukov, the
saviour of Moscow, took command in the South and planned a counterattack.
Zhukov deliberately kept reinforcements of the city to a minimum as he massed
Russian troops to the north and south of Stalingrad. All preparations for the
counterattack were kept under tight security. Zhukov unleashed the
counterattack on November 19. The attack came on the northern and southern
flanks, catching the Germans off-guard. On November 23, the two Russian
spearheads linked up 45 miles away from Stalingrad, encircling the entire
German 6th Army and one corps of the 4th Panzer army.
Hitler refused
Paulus's request for permission to break out of Stalingrad. He ordered General
Manstein to fight through to Stalingrad, but the effort failed. Doomed,
Paulus's 6th Army was ordered to fight to the last man. Paulus held out until
February 2, 1943, then surrendered. The battle for Stalingrad had important
implications. It was a catastrophic defeat for the Germans. Two hundred
thousand troops were lost, and 90,000 were captured. The summer offensive of
1942, concluding at Stalingrad, marked the end of German initiative on the
eastern front. After Stalingrad, Germany remained on the defensive. Zhukov
emerged as the leading Soviet commander.
Lecture Eighteen: Eisenhower and Operation Overlord
Allied planners
faced many difficult choices as they prepared the cross-channel invasion.
President Roosevelt chose Gen. Dwight Eisenhower to be supreme commander. The
British and Soviets had preferred Gen. George C. Marshall, and Marshall himself
had wanted the assignment. FDR decided that he could not spare Marshall's
presence in Washington. Gen. Bernard Montgomery was chosen to be ground
commander and in charge of the actual operational planning of the invasion.
The Allies decided
that the invasion force would land in Normandy. The Germans knew that the
invasion was afoot, but they did not know where and when it would take place.
Although Pas-de-Calais offered the shortest route to the Ruhr, which was the
Allies' ultimate target, the Normandy ports would better accommodate the
invasion force. An American force under Gen. Omar Bradley would land on the
eastern end of the Normandy coast and advance on Cherbourg, while a British
force would seize Caen. Paratroopers from the 82nd and 101st airborne divisions
would land the night before, and seaborne troops would land at daybreak.
There were serious
disagreements within the German high command over how to prepare for the
invasion. Hitler knew that the Ruhr was the Allies' ultimate target, and so he
decided to strengthen his western defences. His calculations were largely
political. If the invasion failed, another attempt would not be made for at
least a year, and in the meantime the Soviets might make a separate peace with
Germany. Although Hitler expected the landing to occur in Normandy, both Rommel
and Rundstedt expected the invasion force to land in the Pas-de-Calais. The
latter was the worst-case scenario, and thus it was adopted as the basis for
German defensive planning. Rommel argued for stopping the invasion force on the
beaches, while Rundstedt favoured a mobile defence that would launch a vigorous
counterattack after the Allied forces had landed and the main invasion force
had been identified.
The Allies tried to
convince the Germans that the main landing would come at the Pas-de-Calais. A
"dummy" camp under the command of Gen. George Patton was constructed
near Dover, directly across the channel from Calais. Deceptive Allied radio traffic
suggested that the landing would occur in Norway. The Allies learned through
Ultra that the Germans had believed the deception.
Weather conditions
dictated that the invasion would have to occur in late spring or early summer.
Eisenhower chose June 4, 1944, as D-Day. The Allied Expeditionary Force assault
waves were loaded up on the evening of June 3. However, a storm developed on
June 4, and the weather on June 5 was terrible. Eisenhower faced a tremendously
hard decision about whether to proceed. If he decided to postpone the invasion,
the tide and light conditions would not be right again until June 19. Air
support was questionable if the weather was bad. Eisenhower also had to
consider the morale of his troops, who had already boarded the ships. The
element of surprise might be lost with postponement.
At 21:30 on June 4,
Eisenhower's weather officer predicted a 36-hour break in the storm on June
5-6. Eisenhower decided to proceed. He issued an inspirational message to the
invasion force: "You are about to embark on a great crusade. . . ."
He drafted a second statement in which he accepted full responsibility in the
event of failure.
Lecture Nineteen: D-Day to Paris
The seaborne invasion force was preceded by Allied paratroopers who dropped into France the previous night. On June 5, Eisenhower visited troops of the 101st Airborne, of whom some 80 percent were expected to become casualties. These troops carried a daunting amount of equipment. Most pilots of the C-47s were going into combat for the first time; their planes were neither armoured nor armed. The planes formed a 300-mile "V" formation. At first they maintained an extremely tight formation while crossing the Channel, despite no radio communications. They dispersed, however, after they hit a cloud bank.Very few paratroopers of the 82nd and 101st units were actually dropped where they should have been. Some were mistakenly dropped at sea; some were dropped at a too-low altitude; some were dropped into flooded fields and drowned. Due to this dispersal, the Germans received reports of invading paratroopers from all across Normandy. Meanwhile, the French resistance began to cut German communications. Both factors caused the German response to be slow. The seaborne invasion force landed in Normandy early on D-Day. Strategic surprise was achieved at Normandy, especially due to the poor weather. Rundstedt and the high command were still convinced that the Normandy landing was a diversion and that the main invasion would come in the Pas-de-Calais. Hitler was not awakened with the news, and the key Panzer units were delayed for several hours. The German response was slowed by poor intelligence, the role of the French resistance, and the inability to move troops rapidly to the front. The Allied landings at Juno, Sword, and Utah beaches were successful. U.S. troops were pinned down for hours on Omaha beach. They broke out and moved inland only late in the day. The success of the D-Day landings had not been a foregone conclusion. The Normandy landings were merely the prelude to a long and murderous campaign in Normandy and later for France. The breakout of Allied troops from Normandy went very slowly. By July 1, almost 1 million Allied troops had landed. The impenetrable hedgerows made fighting particularly difficult. Montgomery was slowed by tenacious German defences at Caen, which did not fall until July 18. The breakout of Patton's Third Army in July opened the war of movement. Allied forces trapped an entire German army group in the Falaise Pocket, where the fighting and destruction were particularly intense. The landing of a second invasion force in mid-August 1944 presaged a debate among Allied commanders over the liberation of Paris. Eisenhower wanted to bypass the city, which had little strategic importance and would only slow the Allied advance. De Gaulle wanted his Free French forces to liberate Paris before the Communist Parisian resistance did. Eisenhower relented on August 22 and ordered Gen. Leclerc to advance on Paris. The Parisian resistance rose anyway, and Hitler ordered the city's destruction. The liberation of Paris was the final chapter in the battle for France. By September, Allied armies were advancing on Germany, and the outcome of the war in Europe was no longer in doubt. Lecture Twenty: Operation Market Garden and the Battle of the Bulge
The success of the battle for France raised new strategic choices for Allied commanders. After the fall of Paris, Germany appeared beaten. The Allies debated the best way to break into Germany and bring the war to a conclusion in 1944. Montgomery urged a single-thrust strategy aimed at taking the Ruhr. Eisenhower advocated a broad front strategy. Various problems beset the Allied armies. The Allies faced a troop shortage. The British were at the limit of their manpower reserves, and the United States was stretched by the demands of a two-theatre war. The Allies also suffered from overconfidence and faulty intelligence in late 1944. They were convinced that Germany was on the brink of defeat; Allied intelligence underestimated German potential in the west. The Allied armies also faced enormous logistical problems. Advancing troops were outrunning their supplies. A port closer to the front—Antwerp—was desperately needed. Although Antwerp fell in September, Hitler remained in control of the Scheldt estuary, which made the port useless.Operation Market Garden was planned for September 1944. Montgomery advanced a daring plan to jump the Rhine in Holland, thereby outflanking the Siegfried line to the north. The goals of the operation were to cross the last river barrier that guarded Germany, outflank the northernmost fortifications of the West Wall, and threaten Germany's V-2 launching sites in Holland. The Allies faced formidable problems. They had to cross numerous rivers and canals and seize many bridges. They suffered again from overconfidence, expecting to brush aside two defending German armoured divisions. The Allied forces moved very slowly. Operation Market Garden ended as an abysmal failure. The defeat of the Allies meant no Rhine crossing in 1944. Meanwhile, Patton and the Americans bogged down in Lorraine. The First Army took Aachen on October 21. Nevertheless, Allied progress was slow in late 1944 and victory remained elusive. Hitler struck back with the Ardennes offensive in December 1944. He hoped that one last dramatic stroke in the west would split the Allies between Montgomery in the north and the Americans further south. The German high command, meanwhile, sought to find defensible positions behind the Rhine. They worried that Hitler's plan would weaken Germany's position in the east and consume its last troop reserves. The plan called for smashing the Allies in the Ardennes Forest, then making a massive armoured drive for Antwerp, then driving a wedge between the Allied armies and destroying them piecemeal. The Allies assumed that the Ardennes was impenetrable, especially in winter. German radio silence meant that Ultra was of little use to the Allies. Despite telltale German troop movements, the Allies were still caught off guard. They continued to exhibit fatal overconfidence. Hitler's Operation "Autumn Fog" commenced on December 16, 1944. It caught the overmatched Americans completely by surprise and unprepared. Allied air power was neutralised by bad weather for more than a week. The German drive created a huge bulge in the American lines. American prisoners were massacred at Malmedy. Despite being surrounded by Germans, isolated U.S. units held out at the key road junctions of Saint Vith and Bastogne. Patton's army finally broke the siege of Bastogne on December 26. When the weather cleared, the Americans rallied their air power and halted the German offensive by the end of January. The Battle of the Bulge further weakened the German army. Hitler had sacrificed his last reserves and best armour on an essentially doomed enterprise. German troops were caught west of the Rhine. The battle gravely weakened the German position in the east on the eve of a massive Russian offensive in Poland in January 1945. The failure of the Ardennes offensive represented the last gasp of the Third Reich.
Lecture Twenty-One: The Race for Berlin
Following the failure of the Ardennes offensive, Germany faced inevitable defeat on multiple fronts. In January 1945, the Red Army launched a massive offensive in Poland, smashing through German defences and racing toward the Reich's eastern borders. Marshal Zhukov's forces crossed the Vistula River and captured Warsaw on January 17, whilst Marshal Konev's armies drove through southern Poland toward Silesia. The speed of the Soviet advance stunned even Stalin—by early February, Soviet forces stood only forty miles from Berlin. In the west, Allied armies recovered from the Battle of the Bulge and resumed their advance toward the Rhine. The first major breakthrough came in March when American forces captured the Ludendorff Bridge at Remagen intact, establishing a bridgehead on the Rhine's eastern bank. Within weeks, multiple Allied armies had crossed Germany's last major natural barrier. Patton's Third Army swept through southern Germany whilst Montgomery's forces advanced through the north. German resistance, though occasionally fierce, could no longer halt the Allied tide. A crucial strategic debate emerged within the Allied high command about the war's final phase. The British, particularly Montgomery, advocated a concentrated thrust toward Berlin, arguing that capturing Hitler's capital would end the war quickly and prevent the Soviets from dominating central Europe. The Americans, led by Eisenhower, preferred a broad-front strategy that would destroy remaining German forces and prevent the creation of a Nazi redoubt in southern Germany. Eisenhower's decision to halt at the Elbe River and leave Berlin to the Soviets reflected both military pragmatism and political naivety about post-war implications. The race for Berlin became a purely Soviet affair. Stalin, determined to capture the Nazi capital, pitted his marshals against each other in competition for glory. Zhukov's First Belorussian Front and Konev's First Ukrainian Front launched their final assault on April 16, 1945. The battle for Berlin proved extraordinarily brutal—Soviet forces faced fanatical resistance from SS units, Hitler Youth, and Volkssturm militia defending every street and building. Soviet artillery reduced entire city blocks to rubble whilst tank battles raged in the streets. Hitler, ensconced in his Führerbunker beneath the Reich Chancellery, lived in an increasingly delusional state. He issued impossible orders to non-existent armies and spoke of miracle weapons that would reverse Germany's fortunes. As Soviet forces closed in on the government quarter, Hitler married his longtime companion Eva Braun on April 29. The following day, with Soviet troops only blocks away, Hitler committed suicide. Goebbels and his wife poisoned their six children before taking their own lives. On May 2, Berlin's garrison surrendered. Germany's unconditional surrender followed swiftly. Admiral Dönitz, whom Hitler had designated as his successor, authorised the surrender of all German forces. On May 7, General Jodl signed the surrender documents at Eisenhower's headquarters in Reims. Stalin insisted on a second ceremony in Berlin on May 8, where Field Marshal Keitel signed before Soviet representatives. The war in Europe was over. The cost had been staggering—the Soviet Union alone had lost 27 million people, whilst Germany lost over 7 million. Europe lay in ruins, its cities destroyed, its economy shattered, its population traumatised by the most destructive conflict in human history.
Lecture Twenty-Two: The War in the Pacific, 1943-1945
Following victories
at Midway and Guadalcanal, American forces embarked on a two-pronged advance
across the Pacific. General MacArthur's Southwest Pacific forces moved along
New Guinea's northern coast toward the Philippines, whilst Admiral Nimitz's
Central Pacific forces island-hopped through the Gilberts, Marshalls, and
Marianas. This strategy bypassed strongly defended Japanese positions, leaving
them to "wither on the vine" without supplies or reinforcements. The
approach proved devastatingly effective, though each island assault exacted a
terrible price.
The island
campaigns revealed the Pacific War's brutal nature. At Tarawa in November 1943,
Marines suffered 3,000 casualties in seventy-six hours capturing a tiny atoll.
The Japanese garrison of 4,500 fought virtually to the last man—only seventeen
surrendered. Saipan in June 1944 witnessed even greater horrors. As American
forces advanced, thousands of Japanese civilians committed suicide by jumping
from cliffs rather than surrender. Japanese military culture, emphasising death
before dishonour, combined with propaganda about American atrocities to create
a dynamic of mutual annihilation.
The Battle of the
Philippine Sea in June 1944 effectively destroyed Japanese naval aviation.
American pilots shot down over 300 Japanese aircraft whilst losing only 30, a
slaughter they dubbed the "Great Marianas Turkey Shoot." The loss of
trained pilots proved irreplaceable—Japan's remaining carriers became hollow
shells without effective air groups. The capture of the Marianas provided bases
for B-29 Superfortresses to begin strategic bombing of Japan itself. MacArthur's return
to the Philippines in October 1944 triggered the war's largest naval battle at
Leyte Gulf. The Japanese Navy committed its remaining strength in a complex
operation involving multiple task forces and decoy carriers. The battle saw the
first organised kamikaze attacks, as Japanese pilots deliberately crashed their
aircraft into American ships. Though tactically inconclusive in some respects,
Leyte Gulf eliminated the Imperial Navy as an effective fighting force. The
Philippines campaign dragged on for months, with Manila's liberation in
February 1945 resulting in 100,000 civilian deaths.
The battles for Iwo
Jima and Okinawa in early 1945 demonstrated the costs of invading Japan's inner
defences. At Iwo Jima, 21,000 Japanese defenders inflicted 26,000 American
casualties before being annihilated. The island's volcanic ash negated the
effects of naval bombardment, whilst elaborate tunnel systems allowed Japanese
forces to appear behind American lines repeatedly. Okinawa proved even
bloodier—82 days of combat resulted in 50,000 American casualties and over
100,000 Japanese military deaths. Worse, 150,000 Okinawan civilians perished,
many forced to commit suicide by Japanese forces.
These campaigns
profoundly influenced American planning for Operation Downfall, the invasion of
Japan. Extrapolating from Iwo Jima and Okinawa, planners estimated one million
American casualties for the two-phase operation. Japanese preparations included
5,000 kamikaze aircraft, suicide submarines, and the mobilisation of the entire
civilian population. The Japanese military's "Ketsu-Go" plan
envisioned making the invasion so costly that America would accept a negotiated
peace preserving the imperial system. Meanwhile, B-29s firebombed Japanese
cities—the March 9-10, 1945 raid on Tokyo killed over 100,000 people in a
single night. Japan's wooden cities proved terrifyingly vulnerable to
incendiary attack, yet the government showed no signs of surrender. This
context shaped the decision to employ atomic weapons, though debates about
alternatives and moral implications continue to this day.
Lecture Twenty-Three: The Atomic Bomb and the Surrender of Japan
The Manhattan
Project represented the war's most closely guarded secret and greatest
scientific undertaking. Initiated in 1942 following warnings from refugee
physicists about German atomic research, the project eventually employed over
130,000 people and cost $2 billion (equivalent to $30 billion today). Under the
scientific direction of J. Robert Oppenheimer and military command of General
Leslie Groves, scientists at Los Alamos, New Mexico, designed two different
weapons—a uranium bomb called "Little Boy" and a plutonium implosion
device called "Fat Man."
The first atomic
test at Alamogordo, New Mexico, on July 16, 1945, exceeded expectations. The
explosion yielded 20 kilotons, vaporising the steel tower and turning desert
sand to glass. Oppenheimer later recalled thinking of Hindu scripture:
"Now I am become Death, the destroyer of worlds." The test occurred
during the Potsdam Conference, where Truman, having succeeded Roosevelt in
April, met with Stalin and Churchill (later replaced by Attlee). Truman's
cryptic mention of a "new weapon of unusual destructive force" hardly
surprised Stalin, whose spies had penetrated the Manhattan Project.
The decision to use
atomic weapons reflected multiple considerations. Military leaders, scarred by
Japanese fanaticism at Iwo Jima and Okinawa, dreaded invading Japan.
Intelligence indicated Japan was mobilising its entire population—even children
were training with bamboo spears. The Soviet Union's promised entry into the
Pacific War offered help but also threatened post-war complications. Some
historians argue that demonstrating American atomic power to the Soviets
influenced Truman's decision. Others emphasise racism, wartime hatred, and
revenge for Pearl Harbour. Most likely, the overriding factor was the desire to
end the war quickly and avoid massive casualties on both sides.
On August 6, 1945,
the Enola Gay dropped Little Boy on Hiroshima. The explosion killed 80,000
people instantly and destroyed 90% of the city. Survivors described a brilliant
flash followed by a crushing blast wave and intense heat that melted skin.
Black radioactive rain fell hours later. Many who initially survived died from
radiation sickness in following weeks. Yet Japan's Supreme War Council remained
deadlocked about surrender. Three days later, before Japanese leaders fully
grasped Hiroshima's destruction, Fat Man devastated Nagasaki, killing 40,000
immediately.
Emperor Hirohito's
intervention broke the deadlock. On August 14, he took the unprecedented step
of directly addressing the Japanese people by radio, announcing acceptance of
Allied terms. His oblique language—Japan would "endure the unendurable"—avoided
the word surrender. Even then, military fanatics attempted a coup to prevent
the broadcast. The formal surrender ceremony on September 2, 1945, aboard the
USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay, ended the war. MacArthur's magnanimous speech
emphasised reconciliation rather than revenge.
The atomic bomb's
legacy remains profoundly controversial. It ended the war and likely saved
hundreds of thousands of American and millions of Japanese lives that would
have been lost in an invasion. Yet it introduced a weapon capable of destroying
civilisation itself. The nuclear age had begun, fundamentally altering
international relations and human consciousness. Survivors in Hiroshima and
Nagasaki suffered radiation effects for decades. The moral questions
raised—whether deliberately targeting civilians can ever be justified, whether
demonstration bombs should have been tried first, whether Japan would have
surrendered anyway—continue to provoke debate. What remains clear is that the
atomic bomb's use marked both an ending and a beginning, closing history's most
destructive war whilst opening an era of unprecedented peril.
Lecture Twenty-Four: The Holocaust
The Holocaust
stands as history's most systematic genocide, the deliberate murder of six
million Jews and millions of others deemed "undesirable" by the Nazi
regime. We can trace its origins to Hitler's pathological antisemitism,
articulated in Mein Kampf and countless speeches. Hitler viewed history through
a racial lens, portraying Jews as parasites undermining Aryan civilisation.
This wasn't traditional religious antisemitism but a biological racism that
defined Jews as a separate, inferior race threatening German racial purity.
The persecution
escalated gradually. The 1935 Nuremberg Laws stripped Jews of citizenship and
prohibited marriages between Jews and "Aryans." Kristallnacht in
November 1938 saw synagogues burned and Jewish businesses destroyed across
Germany. Yet even these outrages paled before what followed. The war's outbreak
removed all restraints—Hitler spoke of the coming conflict as enabling
"the annihilation of the Jewish race in Europe." The conquest of
Poland brought 3 million Jews under Nazi control, concentrated in ghettos where
starvation and disease killed thousands.
Operation
Barbarossa marked the transition to systematic mass murder. Einsatzgruppen
mobile killing units followed the Wehrmacht into the Soviet Union with explicit
orders to kill all Jews. These units, comprising SS, police, and local
collaborators, conducted massive shooting operations. At Babi Yar outside Kiev,
33,771 Jews were murdered in two days. Similar massacres occurred across
Eastern Europe. By winter 1941-42, over one million Jews had been shot. The
psychological toll on the killers led to a search for more
"efficient" methods.
The Wannsee
Conference of January 1942 coordinated the "Final Solution"—the plan
to murder all European Jews. SS bureaucrats discussed logistics of deportation
and murder with chilling banality. The death camp system evolved from earlier
experiments with gas vans and euthanasia programmes. Six major extermination
camps operated in occupied Poland: Auschwitz-Birkenau, Treblinka, Belzec,
Sobibor, Chelmno, and Majdanek. These factories of death perfected mass murder
using Zyklon B gas. At Auschwitz's peak, 6,000 people were murdered daily.
The Holocaust's
implementation required vast collaboration. Railway officials scheduled
deportation trains, businesses used slave labour, academics provided racial
"science," and ordinary citizens participated in or acquiesced to
persecution. Some nations, particularly Denmark and Bulgaria, protected their
Jewish populations. Individuals like Raoul Wallenberg and Oskar Schindler saved
thousands. Yet rescue efforts remained tragically limited. Allied governments,
despite knowledge of the genocide by 1942, refused to bomb rail lines to the
camps or significantly increase refugee quotas.
The human dimension
defies comprehension. Families torn apart at selection ramps, children murdered
upon arrival, the systematic dehumanisation designed to ease the killers' task.
Survivors described the complete inversion of moral order—doctors conducting
lethal experiments, mothers forced to choose which child would live. The Nazis
also murdered Roma and Sinti (Gypsies), Soviet prisoners of war, Polish
intellectuals, disabled individuals, Jehovah's Witnesses, and homosexuals. The
liberation of the camps in 1945 revealed the full horror to a disbelieving
world. Bergen-Belsen, Buchenwald, Dachau—names that became synonymous with
evil. The Nuremberg Trials established legal precedents for prosecuting
genocide, though many perpetrators escaped justice. The Holocaust fundamentally
challenged assumptions about human nature, progress, and civilisation itself.
Its legacy includes the State of Israel, international human rights law, and
the imperative to remember. "Never Again" became the rallying cry,
though subsequent genocides have shown humanity's failure to fully learn
history's most terrible lesson.
Lecture Twenty-Five: The Costs of War
World War II exacted a toll beyond human comprehension. Fifty-five million dead represents not mere statistics but individual tragedies multiplied beyond measure. The Soviet Union suffered most grievously—27 million deaths, including 8.7 million soldiers and over 18 million civilians. Entire generations of men vanished. In Belarus, one in four people died. Poland lost six million, half of them Jews murdered in the Holocaust. Germany lost 7 million, Japan 3 million. Even countries spared invasion suffered terribly—Britain lost 450,000, the United States 405,000. The war's demographic impact reshaped societies. The Soviet Union faced a massive gender imbalance—millions of women would never marry. In Germany, the "rubble women" cleared destroyed cities whilst awaiting husbands who would never return. Millions of orphans grew up without parents. The psychological trauma—what we now recognise as PTSD—affected countless veterans and civilians. Survivors of bombing, occupation, and concentration camps carried invisible wounds throughout their lives. Entire societies grappled with collective trauma that influenced politics and culture for generations. Physical destruction defied precedent. Warsaw was systematically demolished—85% destroyed. The bombing of Dresden created a firestorm that incinerated 25,000 people. Soviet scorched-earth tactics and German demolitions left vast areas uninhabitable. In the Soviet Union, 1,700 towns, 70,000 villages, and 32,000 factories were destroyed. Japan's cities were reduced to ashes by firebombing. Infrastructure across Europe and Asia—railways, bridges, ports, power plants—required years to rebuild. Agricultural disruption caused widespread famine. In Bengal, three million died from war-related famine in 1943. The war's economic costs transformed global relationships. Britain, though victorious, emerged bankrupt and dependent on American aid. The United States, its homeland untouched, became the world's dominant economic power, producing half of global GDP by 1945. The Bretton Woods system established the dollar as the global reserve currency. The Marshall Plan poured $13 billion into European reconstruction, cementing American influence. The Soviet Union, despite devastating losses, emerged as a superpower through sheer force of will and ruthless mobilisation. Population displacement reached unprecedented scales. Twelve million ethnic Germans were expelled from Eastern Europe in history's largest forced migration. Millions of Soviet citizens who had been slave labourers or prisoners of war faced persecution upon return—Stalin viewed surrender as treason. Jewish survivors found their communities destroyed, leading many to emigrate to Palestine or America. Displaced persons camps housed millions for years after the war. National boundaries shifted dramatically—Poland moved 200 miles westward, Germany was divided, and Eastern Europe fell under Soviet domination. The war accelerated social change. Women's massive participation in war work challenged traditional gender roles, though most countries pushed women back to domestic spheres post-war. Colonial soldiers' service undermined racial hierarchies—how could Britain and France claim civilising missions whilst depending on colonial troops? The war discredited fascism and militarism whilst elevating democracy and human rights, at least rhetorically. Technology advanced rapidly—radar, computers, jet engines, antibiotics, and nuclear power emerged from wartime research. The war created the modern world—the UN, the Cold War, decolonisation, the welfare state, and European integration all stemmed from the conflict's aftermath. Its costs, measured in lives lost, cities destroyed, and innocence shattered, would shape human consciousness permanently.
