From Paper II--2002
Topic I: Causes, Practices and Effects of War
How far do you agree with the view of some recent historians that Chamberlain’s appeasement of Hitler at Munich was NOT a mistake?
Timed, in-class essay from outstanding former student who ended up getting a final grade of 7 in IBDP History (click to enlarge):
EXAMPLE 2
EXAMPLE 1
Appeasement
was the Catalyst to Nazi Germany’s Dominance
The 1930s brought with it a strong
yearning for peace after merely two decades before had been one of the most
devastating wars in the history of mankind. To attempt to avoid yet another
war, British foreign Minister Neville chamberlain laid out the doctrine of
appeasement, to preserve “peace for our time”. However, appeasement infallibly
did not ultimately stop WW2, but merely started it in 1939 and not 1938 or
1936. This essay will argue that the orthodox theories on the matter, although
somewhat valid, miss the mark and are incorrect to say that appeasement was the
right path. It will argue that appeasement built Germany up and weakened the
allies. This argument will be conveyed through three main points, these points
being a failure to do anything sooner, German Re-Militarization, and atrocious
British Foreign policy.
Aligning
with orthodox historians such as Sir John Simon it is not completely invalid to
believe that appeasement was the right and only thing to do. In a democracy it
is incredibly difficult to the rally the people to fight an offensive war
without the proper threat or motivation, and with the recent devastation of the
Great War, it is understandable that Chamberlain would want to avoid all
conflict and solve matters in peaceful ways. However, Churchill does argue that
the combine allied military strength that would have been sufficient as
expenditure was 3.3 Billion for
Germany to 2.2 Billion for France
and Britain and this does not include Czechoslovakia. In addition to this the
allies had just over 142 divisions
collectively in 1938 compared to Germany’s 47
active personally, and at the time held the Geographical advantage since Czechoslovakia had not yet been annexed
and Germany retained its population of 55 million instead of 68.5. This shows
that at the time Britain and its little entente would have been in a fine
position to wage war. In addition, we can be certain of the fact that
appeasement gave Germany the time to build up its military, navy and air force,
which would have been a contributing factor in Germany’s prowess in the early
stages of WW2. The U.K.’s decision
to allow Germany to take inch after inch, namely the conscription in 1935, Rhineland in 1936, and Austria/Sudetenland in 1938. This allowed Germany to build up their country in terms of
land, industry and manpower, it also gave Hitler the message that he would be
able to make aggressive moves without opposition and retribution, which allowed
him to continually gather advantages and prepare for a war that he would
ultimately start. The U.K. failed to notice that Germany’s increasingly
nationalistic policies would ultimately lead to them reclaiming all “German lands” and subsequently starting
another world war and according to AJP
Taylor, Chamberlain’s actions “made
war inevitable” in the sense that he was feeding “the crocodile”, building it up and expecting
it not to strike, and sit idly in its new found power. Chamberlain’s failure to stand up to Hitler,
and just say no was a main contributor in allowing Germany to become a powerhouse.
However, France in tangent with the U.K, also contributed by not reacting to
the militarization of the Rhineland in
1936. Lord Halifax attempted to justify this appeasement in his memoirs
through saying that it was merely the Germans walking in their backyard, yet
although this is true Chamberlain should have realized that Hitler, through his
Brinksmanship, was starting to mirror old aggressive and firm German (“Nationalistic and Imperialistc”)
policies heralded by the rise of Wilhelm
II as stated by AJP Taylor. Taylor was known to be anti-German, and so this statement
may lack credibility and overly portray Germany in a bad light. However, these
nationalistic policies outlined by Taylor became very clear when Hitler
demanded the annexation of both Austria and the Sudetenland, and eventually
Bohemia (“German Territories”). To be firm then, would have been the best
option, to recognize moving military forces into a demilitarized zone as an act
of aggression, would have justified taking due to course to not let Germany
take another inch.
Germany
in 1935 were allowed to break the
terms of the TOV by passing the conscription act, allowing Germany to recruit
its population into the military and surpass the 100,000 soldier limit that the
TOV had originally imposed on them, while also jumping from 32 aircraft in 1932 to 8,295 in 1939, a huge leap and again challenging
British air superiority. This was left
unpunished by any of the allies, which is extremely strange. Since Britain had
been one of the few countries to voluntarily
disarm after WW1, so it would have been fair and in the nation’s best
interests to keep Germany disarmed as well, as is outlined by R.J.Q Adams book on British Foreign policy. So to allow
Germany to rise to an extent where it could challenge the U.K militarily was a terrible mistake, and should have been corrected
rather than ignored. Another view portrayed by R.J.Q Adams showed the underlying reason for this mistake - namely that
no-one in the British Parliament was willing to risk a war challenging
Germany’s decision. A fact further demonstrating that the anti-war sentiment of
the time, would prevail against logical assertion. Appeasement, therefore, was
inefficient and self-detrimental to the U.K. and was the price paid for the
struggles that Chamberlain clearly
faced when forced to confront Hitler. A further decision, openly criticized by
many including Churchill, was the Anglo German naval agreement of June 1935, which allowed Germany to
fleet 35% of the British naval
tonnage. This was arguably one of the worst decisions of the time, allowing
Germany to build up its navy and actually rival British dominance in the Baltic and Northern sea since
Germany could concentrate its entire fleet in one area while the United Kingdom
had an empire to defend, and could not afford to move its entire navy to rival
Germany’s. Due to this principle of dividing and conquering, British guarantees
of independence and guarantees to aid Poland in March 1939 if Germany
attacked were useless, since the U.K. would not have been able to actually
mobilize forces through heavily defended German waters.
The Anglo-German naval agreement was damaging
to allied relations amongst other things, as it damaged the Stresa Front of 1935 and prompted France to doubt whether Britain really had
France’s best interest at heart, since Chamberlain
had “voluntarily untied Hitler’s hands” according to Adams, one of France’s biggest rivals. This sowed the seeds of mistrust between the Allies and allowed
the nationalistic and imperialist state of Germany to take advantage of its weakened and partitioned opponents. All of these errors considered, however,
perhaps the worst mistake of appeasement was the alienation of Russia. One of
the reasons the U.K. aided Germany and retracted many of the TOV clauses, was to
enable Germany be a Bulwark against the communist threat i.e. the Soviet Union.
This of course pushed Stalin and Russia far away from the allies and forced
them into an unlikely non-aggression pact with Germany, freeing Germany up to
wage war against the rest of Europe without having to worry about Russian opposition. With access to archive data, respected Historian David Faber argues that Chamberlain was thoroughly criticized for
allowing Hitler’s brinksmanship to go unpunished and argues that this was one
of the many reasons that Britain started to drift from France and Russia. On
the other hand, some Historians argue that Faber focuses far too much on minor
and almost insignificant events that don’t necessarily encompass the broad
appeasement sentiment of the time and focus on more niche and narrative situations to express his viewpoint. He also
seems emotionally disposed to disapproving of appeasement due to the fact that
his mother was a Czech woman adversely
affected by the Munich conference,
casting doubt on the objectivity of the sources. Yet overall British
appeasement policy did seem to alienate British allies, showing that it was not
the correct policy.
In conclusion even though popular
sentiment stood along with Chamberlain’s appeasement of Germany, it allowed Germany
to build its military up, gradually increase its industrial, territory and
manpower and rival the U.K. in the one area that Britain required superiority -
the navy. This set up the opportunity for Hitler to take advantage of the
U.K.’s relative weakness and the split between allied powers to dominate
Europe. Theoretically appeasement was a terrible course of action, it put the
U.K. and its allies in a terrible military position and pushed them further
apart. However the democratic nature of the U.K forced the country to condone
these issues and follow peaceful and appeasing actions rather than military
actions.
Dr. Seuss described an appeaser as a man “that
lives and talks… yet […] has no guts”, but this negative opinion of the Munich
agreement was not the popular view at the time of its signing, and the two
allied leaders who were involved, Chamberlain and Daladier, were hailed as
heroes upon their return from Munich. The view of the events of 1938 have
changed dramatically in recent times, with many modern historians viewing the
appeasement of Hitler as the wrong choice. This essay will contradict this view,
and argue that the appeasement of Hitler in 1938 was the best if not only
choice Chamberlain and Daladier had.
The main arguments made against appeasement
were that it ultimately failed in securing world peace, it showed Hitler that
Britain and France would not stand in the way of his quest for world
domination, and it gave Hitler time to prepare his country for war. As Jan Masaryk, the Czechoslovakian foreign
minister, said after the appeasement of 1938, “If you have sacrificed my nation
to preserve the peace of the world, I will be the first to applaud you. But if
not, gentlemen, God help your souls". This quote demonstrates the view of
the masses at the time, that the appeasement in Munich was done in the interest
of preserving peace in the world, however it failed exorbitantly quickly. Less
than a year later, Hitler invaded Bohemia and Moravia, this time he could not
excuse his actions as uniting the German peoples, this area of Czechoslovakia
was never part of Germany nor did it have a majority German population (like
the Sudetenland). As Cato (a group composed of Michael Foot, Frank Owen, and
Peter Howard) argued in their book Guilty Men it seemed ludicrous that the
British government could accept Hitler’s promise that the Sudetenland was the
last of his territorial demands, especially considering what he had written in
Mein Kampf 13 years prior. However, it was not this clear cut in actuality,
Hitler had stated that he was intending to ensure that the “German people [would]
become a single community”. Therefore, it seemed absolutely understandable that
this area of Czechoslovakia (with some areas containing more than 90% German
people) would be his final demand. With the gift of hindsight however, we can
see that this was not the case, and Hitler’s quest for the unity of the German
people was a façade. As the British and French governments gave all they had to
try and stop war in 1938, they showed Hitler they were weak and were not going
to stand in his way. This display of weakness began in 1936 when Hitler moved
troops into the Rhineland, France failed to retaliate showing Hitler that he
was free to break the Treaty of Versailles however he pleased. Following this,
Britain and Frances weakness during the Munich negotiations furthered this
opinion. On Chamberlain’s first visit to Munich, September 15th, he
claimed that there were no circumstances under which he would grant
self-determination for the Sudeten people, however just one day later
Chamberlain colluded with the French government to grant all Czech areas with
more than 50% German population to the Nazi government. This indecisiveness was
evidence that the British and French government were not willing to stand up to
Hitler, and he took it as further invitation to break the Treaty of Versailles.
In the time between the Munich agreement and the start of world war two, Hitler
increased his military power hugely, for example, the German air force built
almost 2,000 more planes during this period. However, this statement is
irrelevant, as this time was available to all nations, and the allied powers
arguably used it even more effectively, with Britain building almost 6,000 more
aircraft in this period. The arguments against appeasement certainly hold
weight, the Munich agreement perhaps provoked Hitler to war in 1939, but some
of the arguments against appeasement are not as strong as they may appear.
Appeasement in 1938 was certainly done with
the right intentions, with the memory of the “war to end all wars” fresh in the
minds of people all over the globe, the last thing anyone wanted was a repeat.
However, maybe there was even more merit to the Munich agreement than this, the
most popular arguments for the appeasement of Hitler were that it was the only
rational choice, it gave the allies undeniable reason to wage war against the
Nazis, and it gave Britain valuable time to prepare for what appeared to be a
much more prepared opponent. The Treaty of Versailles held self-determination
as one of its main principles, so surely if large German groups wished to join
back to Germany this should be permitted. Keeping this in mind, it seems quite
rational that the allied governments decided the Sudetenland could become part
of Germany. This is supported by historian Richard J Evans, who that
appeasement may have been the only feasible policy up to 1939, for much the
same reasons as already discussed. However, this only can be true if we accept
the allied nations ignorance of Hitler’s true intentions. With hindsight, it
was clear that Hitler was not saying as he wished to do, but it must be
accepted that at the time Chamberlain, and other leaders were unaware of this.
After the dreadful events of world war one, people were naturally reluctant to
wage another war which threatened to engulf the world once again, and whether
or not Churchill was right in saying that Britain possessed the man-power to
win a war in 1938, it does not seem that many would have been willing to fight
in this war. This is clearly evidenced by the Oxford Union 'King and Country'
debate in 1933, which concluded that the house would “not in any circumstances
fight for King and Country”. This shows evidence of the lack of conviction the
British people felt in relation to another war in the years leading up to
appeasement. Therefore, the caution exercised by the allied nations in Munich
in 1938 in far more understandable. However, once Hitler had torn up this
agreement (by sending troops into Bohemia and Moravia) the masses viewed action
against the Nazi government as the right choice, since it was clear that Hitler
was hell bent on war. After the events in Guernica, the allied powers were
suddenly made aware of the technological prowess Germany held. While Britain
had a large force, it was spread across the globe in Britain’s numerous
colonies, and would not have been ready for war in 1938, this year of
preparation gave Britain a huge opportunity, they would be able to consolidate
their forces, and boost production, especially in aircraft as was explained
previously. Overall, it seems that appeasement in 1938 was the only feasible
option, and while some people may argue that war should have been waged at this
time, Britain’s large military does not seem enough when contextualized against
the distaste for the war before appeasement.
To conclude, while the modern view may be
against the Munich agreement, there was nothing else Britain could have done
without risking a war they were not ready for. The extra year gave Britain a
chance to prepare for war, as well have confirming to the British people that
war must be waged against Nazi Germany.
EXAMPLE 3
The policy of appeasement between in 1938 was
one pursued in order to avoid an all-out confrontation with Nazi Germany.
Chamberlain’s decision to yield to German interests arguably postponed the
start of World War II to the date we know today (1st September,
1939) and significantly expanded the territorial extent of Nazi Germany into
Austria and Czechoslovakia. While it is sometimes argued that this policy gave
Britain more time to prepare for inevitable war with Germany, the same can be
said for Germany as well. It is commonly believed that appeasement was a
mistake, as Britain and France had the means to stop Germany earlier, while it
was still in a weaker position. This essay will therefore examine why
appeasement was not the ideal policy to follow, due to Britain not being consequential
enough in order to prevent war in the first place, as well as. However, this
essay will also look at how appeasement might have been the only feasible
policy, as Britain did everything in its power to stop war, no matter the
eventual outcome.
Chamberlain’s
appeasement was a flawed policy in the sense that it not consequential enough
in stopping the Germans earlier, even when Britain and France had the capacity
to do so. According to Duane C. Young, professor at De Montfort University, “it
was, at least early on, not at all necessary to appease Adolf Hitler. A more
forceful stance would have made him back down”. A key military force that
Britain was in possession of – and had the means of using against Germany
- was the Royal Air Force. While Germany
had begun to build its own Luftwaffe, the Royal Air Force was never really at
the mercy of it in 1938, nor during 1939 for that matter. Germany never
possessed any long-range bombers that could strategically endanger Britain and
France had 150,000 troops assembled at the Maginot line ready to strike against
the Germans if need be. However, Britain and France proceeded to take no
forceful and consequential actions against the Germans, in neither 1936, when
the Rhineland was occupied, nor in 1938 when Austria and Czechoslovakia were
annexed. In addition, William Shirer, in his The Rise and Fall of The Third Reich was confident that
Czechoslovakia would have been able to offer stiff resistance against the
Germans in his response to Chamberlain’s lenient stance in the Munich Agreement
of 1938. Czechoslovakia had excellent frontier-fortifications and was ready to
fight the Germans, in combination with a modern supply of Škoda tanks (upon
which German Panzer Is were based) and artillery. Shirer, similarly to Young,
believed that Britain and France had the sufficient military offensive and
defensive capabilities in pursuing a rapid and successful war with Germany, as
well as coming to Czechoslovakia’s aid. Shirer also believed that the Munich
agreement squandered Britain and France’s chances of ending Germany’s ambitions
earlier and quotes Churchill by saying that “Britain and France were in a much
worse position compared to Hitler’s Germany” as a result of the Munich
Agreement in 1938. Therefore, it is believed that even though Britain and
France had the significant and arguably superior military capabilities in
stopping Hitler and preventing a Munich Agreement in 1938, the policy of
appeasement made Britain weak and Germany stronger.
Secondly,
the Chamberlain’s decision to permit Germany’s expansionist ambitions in 1938
squandered the chances of an alliance with Joseph Stalin, who was upset by the
results of the Munich Agreement. The Soviet Union had a mutual military
assistance treaty with Czechoslovakia and was prepared to assist the Czechs
“under any circumstances, even in spite of Munich,” according to Boris
Ponomaryov and Andrei Gromyko, editors of the History of Soviet Foreign policy. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union
was excluded from the conference taking place on the 30th of
September, 1938 and allowed Germany free passage to annex Sudetenland and
later, all of Czechoslovakia. Alienating the USSR gave Stalin the idea that he
was betrayed by Britain and France, which caused a divide and was arguably a
significant factor in the eventual Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, where the USSR and
Nazi Germany signed a pact of non-aggression. No military assistance coming
from the USSR meant that Germany had virtually no Eastward pressure in taking
Poland in 1939, as well as overrunning Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark,
Norway and France in 1940; losses that could have been avoided if the Soviet
Union was made to be included in the conference and act as pressure against Nazi
Germany’s ambitions. Therefore, it was a fatal mistake to exclude the Soviet
Union from the Munich conference in 1938, as it allowed Germany to annex
Czechoslovakia without any complications and denied Britain and France a large
and important ally.
Lastly
however, it is also argued that the policy of appeasement was the only feasibly
policy in the stages before WW2 and that Britain did everything in its power to
stop war. AJP Taylor in his book The
Origins of the Second World War argued that appeasement was a policy
implemented by “men confronted with real problems, doing their best in the
circumstances of their time”. To further examine this notion, one must take
note that the prospect of war was extremely unpopular with the British public;
David Dutton, a British historian, notes that “there was a feeling that any
sensible politician would explore every avenue to avoid war before accepting
war was inevitable”. The British public was still haunted by the horrors of
World War I 20 years earlier and was not willing to make an enormous sacrifice
of its countrymen for the sake of a far-away country again. In this respect,
Neville Chamberlain represented the British people’s interests and based on a
rational assessment of foreign interests. Moreover, even though Stalin would
have been an important ally against Germany, it is important to note that he
was considered to be no better, if not worse than Hitler. Hitler was considered
to be the lesser of two evils, since Stalin’s regime represented one of
oppression and terror after the Bolshevik mass persecutions of Kulaks, the
Holodomor and other horrendous atrocities. In addition, even though Britain had
long-range bombers, they were simply too small in number to fly deep into
Germany for major bomber missions. In addition, prolonging the war until 1939
meant that Britain had the time to develop the lighter and more maneuverable
Spitfire, which would be a far better match against the Messerschmitt-109s,
rather than the older Hurricanes. In addition, in 1938, there was desperate
poverty in Britain as a result of the depression; Britain’s debt was 180% of
its GDP and 10% of the workforce was still unemployed. Chamberlain was faced
with a deeply troubled economy and needed to put the needs of the British
people first and not waste too many funds into war production over a far-away
country that no one knew about. In this respect, appeasement was the only
rational policy Neville Chamberlain could pursue.
In
conclusion, appeasement was a flawed policy in the sense that Britain and
France had the military capacity to strike against Germany up until 1938 and
could have very well forced Hitler to back down. In addition, Britain made a
grave mistake in excluding the Soviet Union from the Munich conference in 1938,
thereby losing an ally and receiving no aid consequentially at the outbreak of
war in 1939. However, it can also be said that Chamberlain simply acted in the
interest of the British people and that only hindsight makes us look critically
at Chamberlain’s actions. In reality, there was simply not much Britain could
do against Hitler’s inexhaustible demands.
How far do you agree with
the view of recent historians that Chamberlain's appeasement of Hitler at
Munich in 1938 was a mistake?
On
September 30, 1938, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, alongside Adolf
Hitler, Benito Mussolini and Edouard Daladier signed the Munich
Agreement, sealing the fate of Czechoslovakia, virtually handing over the
Sudetenland to Nazi Germany in the name of Peace. The document, which according
to Chamberlain had secured “peace in our time” was frequently praised as
realistic and statesmanlike in its day but condemned as being immoral, stupid
and foolish in ours. Revisionists A. J. P Taylor and R.A.C Parker critique
Chamberlains interventionism to have been the cause for global war, and wrongly
highlight the appeasement at Munich in 1938 as being
the mistake it most certainly was not.
Chamberlain’s
thought process at Munich and during his two other recent visits to Germany can
be understood. Yes, RAC Parker takes into account the first World War’s legacy which
lives on in Britain, and that the public opinion is undoubtedly against war, the
people remained terrified of Bombing. What Parker fails to
acknowledge is the immense pressure enacted upon Chamberlain and the British
Government and the economic, ideological and multinational factors which made
appeasement necessary. These being the harsh reparations imposed by Article
232-235 of the Versailles Treaty, the threat of the spread of communism and the
multinational failure to make the League of Nations work. With
this in the back of his mind Chamberlain went to Germany seeking nothing but
peace, and willing to gain an Ally against the main threat toward western
civilization in the 1930’s; the USSR. As can be seen from the transcript of
their conversation at Berchtesgaden 2 weeks prior to the Munich Agreement. Adolf
Hitler used Chamberlains readiness to make sacrifices for the greater good that
he had demonstrated in the years from 1935-1938 in his Appeasement policy, to
make the British Prime Minister bend to his will. “I am determined to settle it: I
do not care whether there is a world war or not: I am determined to settle it
and to settle it soon and I am prepared to risk a world war rather than allow this to drag on.” –Adolf Hitler.
With an opponent in negotiations like Hitler at his private mountain retreat
and a war unfit military at his back, Chamberlain had no choice but to appease
in order to avoid escalation. Still suffering the repercussions of the Great
depression, Britain did not have the
economic strength to counter Germany. Essentially this convinced Hitler of Britain's
weakness and encouraged him in further demands.
AJP Taylors book ‘The Origins of the Second World War’ justifies the necessity
of the Munich Agreement of 1938 as it allowed for the self determination of all
3 million Germans living in Sudetenland. He described it as ‘part of series of
‘accidents’ and Chamberlain was in various cases misguided’. Taylor adds to
this however, that the only the appeasement regarding Czechoslovakia was to be
tolerated by Britain. When Hitler annexed Austria during the “Anschluss” of 1938
it came as a shock to the allies at first, which later turned into acceptance.
And as Winston Churchill said: “Appeasement is feeding a crocodile and hoping
not to be eaten”. This repeated show of weakness from Chamberlain and all other
European countries further fed the crocodile that was Adolf Hitler and his
immense ego. To quote AJP Taylor, in signing the Munich Agreement Neville
Chamberlain “didn’t serve the world, but served his people first.”, which would
contradict Taylors previous claim concerning Chamberlains Interventionism. In
the years leading up to the second world war, Chamberlain got involved in
conflicts that didn’t concern Britain, for example, during the German annexation
of the Sudetenland. One would expect a Treaty-bound country such as France to
interfere, following the little Entente of 1920 and 1921. To this it also
should be noted that revisionist’s critique towards Chamberlains “regime” is
not unconditional. Even Taylor admitted that appeasement was ‘a triumph for all
that was best and enlightened in British life’, out of a retrospective point of
view. As for recent public opinion, Chamberlain is still not viewed in a very positive
light, while the war-mongering Winston Churchill was crowned in 2002 as the
Greatest Ever Briton.
The view AJP Taylor
represents is the more viable as it considers both perspectives; that of
Chamberlain under pressure looking over his shoulder for Stalin and that of a post WW2 Historian. He recognizes that
Hitler’s capabilities both militaristically and economically were being overestimated, forcing Chamberlain to
desperately buy time. It is difficult to disagree with RAC Parker and AJP
Taylor as I, being German, know all too well what consequences followed the
Munich Agreement. The Annexation of the Sudetenland triggered a chain reaction,
Poland, Austria, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Denmark, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Norway followed. But what was
Chamberlain to do? Any other course of action such as that moral force through
the collective pressure from the League could halt the expansion of the
aggressive powers would have resulted in war, as would a demonstration of power.
This failed in Japan (Manchuria) and Italy (Abyssinia), why should it have
worked then? Views of recent Historians condemning the Munich Agreement as a
mistake are to a certain extent justified, but Munich was, like the Treaty of
Versailles and the Weimar Constitution the more or less logical conclusion to
an unstable situation.
EXAMPLE 5
How far do you agree with the view of recent historians that
Chamberlain's appeasement of Hitler at Munich in 1938 was a mistake?
How far do you agree with the view of recent historians that
Chamberlain's appeasement of Hitler at Munich in 1938 was a mistake?
On September 30th
1938, the Prime Minister of Britain Neville Chamberlain signed the Munich Putsch.
An agreement stating that Germany is permitted to have a portion of the
Czechoslovakian territory which was inhabited by German speakers on the condition that these
two countries would consult each other on any other modifications to assure
peace. 79 years later, we investigate the view that Chamberlain’s appeasement
of Hitler in Munich 1938 was a mistake and I do not agree with this statement.
The main reasons for the appeasement was to give Britain more time to prepare
for a war, as well as the British people wanted to only peace, and finally
Czechoslovakia was already on the verge of being dominated by Germany.
Furthermore in
the year of 1938, Britain was in no shape to take on a war against Germany.
They could not handle the task of maintaining their monarchic empire and
fighting off Hitler, the odds were against them in every aspect. For example
looking at the military expenditures from 1933 to 1938 Germany was increasing
at a rapid rate ahead of Japan, United States and Britain. Whilst by 1938 she
had 7415 to Britain’s 1863 (in millions), this shows that the British were in
no state to fight being behind 5552 million dollars. Also in terms of military
aircraft, the German’s technology was well ahead of Britain too. At this time
Germany had approximately 3000 fighter and bomber planes compared to Britain’s
limp 1,700 combat fighters and bomber planes. However in hindsight fast forward
to 1942 the time given to Britain to rearm, they reached nearly 5000 aircrafts
whilst Germany had a slow 3,500 planes. Deeper into the point of the
appeasement not being a mistake is that the British people themselves wanted
peace not war. A british peace organization called Peace Pledge Union (PPU)
supported the appeasement of Hitler, with the belief that the this would cease
their aggression from the consequences of Treaty of Versailles. Although these
beliefs were seen to be too generous as they continued to protest that Germany
should be given control of mainland Europe including France along with the
Balkans. They stood true to their beliefs as in 1939 they began a campaign
against conscription in Britain and opposed legislation for air raid
precautions in 1938. This only reveals the truth feelings about war of the
British people. Ultimately, Czechoslovakia was already being taken over before
the appeasement, Chamberlain’s decision didn’t speed up the process of
occupation. He only gave permission as Hitler already annexed a portion of the
territory without any consulting. Chamberlain was aware of this as he wrote to
his sister “You
have only to look at the map to see that nothing we could do could possibly
save Czechoslovakia from being overrun by the Germans.” In the end
Czechoslovakia was given a choice to battle for their country on their own or
submit to Germany and they chose to submit.
To contrast there
are faults to Neville Chamberlain’s decision to appease Hitler in 1938. As you
investigate Chamberlain’s main critic Winston Churchill stated after Neville’s
homecoming “You were given
the choice between war and dishonour. You chose dishonour and you will have
war.” This quote resulted in being a reality as all the appeasement resulted in
Hitler’s expansion of his German empire. Not only did this help him, this
implanted the thought that he can get whatever he wants from Britain and
France. This attempt at peace showed Hitler that these two powers were afraid
of him and would not initially attack him. Also the quote above from Churchill
depicts the truth that the British people who believed they have done everything
possible to stop war had to accept that from this point onward the war was
inevitable. But this isn’t the only fault present with the appeasement,
although Czechoslovakia agreed to give their land to Germany because of their
desire for peace in the end their economy began to suffer as more than 350,000
Czechoslovakians were sent to be forced laborers for Germany and exploited
their economy by taking in consumer goods to Germany. This invasion of Czechoslovakia marked the
end of the appeasement as it showed Hitler was lying back in Munich. This fact
alone damaged Britain entirely as their credibility was stripped from them as
no one would trust them anymore for making such an naive decision, believing
Hitler would stop his motives just for peace among the powers. That being the
final major negative impact of the appeasement of Hitler, Britain was hurt the
most because what seemed like the only solution backfired in the worst way
possible.
To conclude, investigating the view
that Chamberlain’s appeasement of Hitler in Munich 1938 was a mistake. It is
quite simple to be a critic nearly a century later but taking into
consideration the circumstances back then in that time. The appeasement may
have been the only option as everything worked out due to other factors.
EXAMPLE 6
How far do you agree with the view of recent historians that
Chamberlain's appeasement of Hitler at Munich in 1938 was a mistake?
With the shadows of World War one still looming over Europe,
Chamberlin was aware that another war would not be supported by the people. With the aim of keeping the
peace between France, Germany and England, Chamberlin and Hitler created a
deal. Appeasement is defined as “to pacify or
placate (someone) by acceding to their demands”.
The appeasement included the so called Munich Agreement, in which France and
Britain gave Germany the Czechoslovakia controlled Sudetenland. At the time
over 80% of the population of the Sudetenland was from the former
Austria-Hungarian Empire, and by ethnic origin, German. Despite this, the Czechoslovakian
government did not agree, and were never consulted on the agreement. When the
Nazis marched into the Sudetenland they were welcomed as heroes by the
people. Despite the views of recent
historians there were both positive and negative affects to the actions taken
in 1938.
To
understand the opinions of historians both past and present one must first
understand why appeasement was considered necessary by those involved in making
the decisions and the affects that the deal had. Due to the events of 1938 to
1945 the word appeasement now carries a negative connotation to many people.
However, at the time there were many reasons as to why Chamberlin took the
approach to dealing with Hitler that he did. He knew the British people wanted
peace, and with Hitler threating war whenever Britain or France tried to deny
land he believed to be rightfully Germany a deal seemed, at the time, to be the
easiest way keep the peace. Weakening Germany, both economically and military,
was not in Frances or Britain’s interest as it was the only country that stood
between Western Europe and the growing power that was Russia. With the
appeasement being just as much a way to postpone war as it was to prevent it,
the extra time of peace in Europe allowed Britain to triple it defense
expenditure (from 512 million US dollars to 1,863 million US Dollars) in the
space of just 5 years. However, it was not just Britain that had the extra time
to prepare for war, this meant that Germany also had time to rearm within the
same time period, however Germany increased their expenditure by over 4000
times.
With
appeasement often being associated with the war that followed just a year
early. It is because of this that historian often combined the affects that
appeasement had with World war two however at the time. As historian David
Dutton argues “Faced with an impossible situation, Neville
Chamberlain performed better than anyone else would have done” although
he does not agree that what Chamberlain did at the time was correct he argues
that no one could have done any better. David Dutton was not alone in the view
against appeasement. AJP Taylor was in favor of England rearming and heavily criticized
the appeasement of Hitler. He believes that the only way to have dealt with
Hitler at the time was to create an alliance between England a Russia (an
Anglo-soviet alliance) this would have left Germany contained and given Hitler
less power to threaten either country.
The problem with this question is that recent historian have the
advantage of hindsight, something that Chamberlin obviously didn’t have at the
time. It is clear now that appeasement did not prevent a second world war but
rather that it only postponed it for a year. This therefore makes it easy to
see that the appeasement failed to prevent a war like Chamberlin hoped it would
however at the time it was up to Chamberlain to make a calculated risk. Although
not a historian Winston Churchill had a clear view on appeasement at the time.
He stated “that negotiation and appeasement were doomed to fail and that
war postponed would be more bloody than strength displayed” however he does not state what should have been done instead.
Knowing a war was inevitable if he did not appease Hitler Chamberlain had little
choice. Churchill is quick to critique what Chamberlain did but does not offer an
alternative that would have also prevented another war. Again this is backed by
what David Dutton said, at the time Chamberlain had little option whatever he
had done would have resulted in war or resulted in a negative outcome.
It is of common opinion of recent historians that the appeasement of
Hitler in 1938 was a mistake and ultimately was one of the main causes of World
War two. However, at the time when Churchill had to make the decision he did
not have the hindsight that recent historians have. This means that although
the decision may have been a mistake at the time he had little option and had
to act quickly to prevent angering what was, at the time, quite a strong power.
Although it was a mistake it was the best that could be done to prevent a war,
and although it was only a year this gave England the crucial time they needed
to prepare for a second war.
EXAMPLE 7
EXAMPLE 7
How far do you agree with the view of
recent historians that Chamberlain's appeasement of Hitler at Munich in 1938
was a mistake?
Neville Chamberlin
arrived in England after his third and last visit to Germany concerning the
Munich agreement he proudly announces that he has returned from Germany with
peace for our time, however only one year later the world’s most devastating
war broke out. The appeasement of Hitler was widely celebrated by the
population of the Western- European states what was not considered however was
that this agreement unrightfully deprived a sovereign state of some of their
national territory obviously enraging the population of Czechoslovakia. This
essay will examine the effects of appeasing Hitler in 1938.
After several
previous successes such as the invasion and remilitarization of the Rhineland,
the Anschluss of Austria, or the Anglo- German Naval Agreement the appeasement
of Hitler further boosted his self-confidence and strengthened his opinion that
he was able to do whatever he wanted to do. When Hitler invaded Poland on the
29th of September 1939 he was not expecting there to be resistance
from either France or Britain. This was due to the fact that these countries
had given in to Hitler on multiple occasions and he did not imagine that they
would stand up to Poland on this occasion. David Irving argues that after
France and England had let down their allied countries so many times Hitler
believed he was able to do whatever he wanted to in the future. The problem
with considering arguments presented by Irving is that he is known for
falsifying facts to match his argument and on top of that he was a holocaust
denier and tried to normalize Hitler. It is however obvious that concessions made
by the other European powers towards Hitler would have motivated him and given
him the impression that he would be able to do whatever he wanted. After France
had formed the Little Entente in 1921 with Czechoslovakia, Romania, and
Yugoslavia a Small Maginot line was also built in Czechoslovakia to protect
them from a possible invasion by the Germans. The fatal thing of this line was
that it had to be built in close proximity to the German border as it would
otherwise been of no use during an invasion. Thus when the Sudetenland was
given to Germany as part of the appeasement the Small Maginot line was also now
part of Germany. And so as part of the appeasement the Germans were not only
given new land but subsequently also an already built line of fortification
which almost ran for the entire length of the Czechoslovakian border. Not only
did they get one of the most modern fortifications but they also received one
of the largest arms producers at the time Skoda which was also located close to
the German border in Czechoslovakia. From this company they received 1,231
aircrafts which were more aircrafts than Britain produced in one year in 1935.
On top of that they received 810 tanks and about 700,000 other items of
military significance such as rifles and machine guns. In conclusion many
points can be brought up which make appeasement seem like a mistake especially
as it strengthened Hitler’s views of weak Brits but it also strengthened him
militarily.
The problem with
this question is that we are answering it today with the useful hindsight of
the events making everything which happened after 1933 seem like part of
Hitler’s plan to conquer the world however appeasement might have been the only
solution at the time. In 1919 Britain decided on a 10-year plan which assumed
that they would not engage in a major conflict during the next ten years. As
part of this policy the military expenditures were drastically cut so that the
economy would recover faster and equal prewar years earlier. With peace seeming
assured this policy was pursued by Winston Churchill until 1928 always
resetting the ’10-year clock’ back to zero. The effect was that during this
time the military was largely neglected and the equipment was largely no longer
up to date. In 1938 when Hitler started to stretch his fingers for
Czechoslovakia Britain feared that they would not be able to match the German
armed forces in the case of an escalation of the problem. Numbers suggest that
even in 1937 England believed in peace in the next years as Germany was
producing almost three times as many aircrafts as Britain was. The time that appeasement
gave Britain was used effectively as by 1939 Britain had caught up with their
air craft production as they were now only 300 aircrafts short of the German productions.
Richard Ovary argues that the British military overestimated Germanys and
underestimated Britain’s military potential as they still had military basis to
get back on, which Germany did not have. Historians say Britain’s military
position compared to Germanys was not better in 1939 compared to 1938. On the
other hand the year that appeasement gave the British reassured them as they
believed that they had caught up with the Germans and were now ready to
participate at a war. Especially the development of radar which was finished in
1939 significantly increased Britain’s opinion of a readiness for war. On top
of the military benefits which appeasement gave Britain it also convinced the
population that a war against fascist Germany was necessary. The government
doubted whether the electors would support a war as World War one was still in the
back of their minds and they would not go to war for a country which they were
not affiliated with. On top they saw what the Luftwaffe was able to do during
Guernica and were not convinced that they would be able to stand up to the
Luftwaffe. The peace pledge union a pacifist organization had was widely
supported by the population during 1938 and the government was convinced that
they would have no support in the case of a war. With the appeasement of Hitler
and him braking the agreement in 1939 the people were reassured that going to
war against Germany was necessary and that they had the means to do it.
In conclusion it
can be said that although appeasing Hitler reassured him and increased his
military power the year given to Britain due to appeasement reassured the
people and England was able to increase their military ultimately enabling Germany
to be defeated.
EXAMPLE 8
EXAMPLE 9
EXAMPLE 8
The problem with this question is that Britain
always appeased the enemy. The country had previously decided that they would
prefer to “Divide and Conquer” rather than use force, which has been their
domestic policy since the beginning of the 1930’s. Hence, Neville Chamberlain’s
actions on the 30th of September 1938 were not unexpected: to give
Hitler what he desires purely to gain a short-lived peace, “Peace in our time”.
Yet it still does not excuse the fact that the appeasement of Hitler resulted
in many consequences that lead to the almost defeat of the allies during World
War Two.
It is understandable as to why recent
historians view the appeasement in a positive fashion. There were advantages to
it, as argued by recent historian David Dutton, author of Reputations: Neville Chamberlain. The appeasement gave the British
time to rearm and prepare for the imminent war. Dutton argues that, “There was
really a feeling that the odds were against the potential of Britain being able
to prevail facing Germany…” Hence, the time was a necessity to change these
odds. Even though the country was suffering from the great depression since
1929, throughout the 1930’s the British had managed to enlarge their fleet, build
more aircrafts and increase their military expenditure. However, they were far
behind the rearmament of Germany. The extra year was a requirement if the
British were to stand a chance. Statistics show that the annual defence
expenditure of Britain rose from 1693 million dollars in 1938 to 1817 million
dollars in 1939. When compared to the statistics of Germany, 4000 million
dollars in 1938 and 4400 million dollars in 1939, it may seem pointless. Yet
one must consider the large military that Britain already had prior to the
1930’s. They had not been forced, through the Treaty of Versailles, to remove
all arms and most soldiers. Hence, they had the upper hand when this arms race
began, meaning that the appeasement was necessary for the British to continue to
improve their expenditure in order to have a fighting chance in the imminent
war. Another argument is that the British had no idea of what Hitler was
capable of. In an article for the Telegraph, Dutton argues that, “Chamberlain,
we are told, was duped into thinking Hitler a man of reason and compromise, a
man who could be trusted to keep agreements”. Hence, Chamberlain’s reasons of
thinking this were not unjustified. Before 1938, Hitler had managed to validate
his actions by claiming that he was acting for the protection and welfare of
German people around the world. For instance, when he annexed Austria he
claimed that the country was his responsibility to handle, and that it desired
to be German, seen in the results of the plebiscite where 99.79% of the vote
agreed to be annexed by Germany. The fact that the plebiscite may or may not
have been staged did nothing to damage the validity of Hitler’s claims. Therefore,
when Chamberlain flew to Berlin to meet the man himself, he had no reason to
believe that Hitler was capable of World Domination without any valid political
reasoning behind the act. In fact, the British were unconcerned about Hitler,
as there was a far greater and more unpredictable leader: Stalin. A blatant and
cruel man, the British had decided that Germany would be helpful as a barrier
against what they feared the most, which was communism. Hence, they had been
blind towards the Nazis for fear of the communists. While Dutton is a historian
known for his range and archival use, his book on Chamberlain was his first,
meaning that he had not yet acquired the skills of historians to keep the
information factually based rather than opinionated. Nevertheless, the points
he made are still valid. Hence, it is understandable given the evidence as to
why some recent historians believe that the appeasement was not a mistake.
However, Chamberlain’s appeasement of
Hitler allowed Hitler to believe that the British would never again interfere
in his political endeavours. He had first begun to think in this manner during
the invasion of the Rhineland in 1936, an action that broke both the 1918
Treaty of Versailles and the 1925 Locarno Treaty, yet brought on no retaliation
by either Britain or France. In fact, during the Anschluss of Austria in 1938
he clearly stated to Schuschnigg, chancellor of Austria, that, “England?
England will not move one finger”. The appeasement did nothing to help matters,
being a statement in writing of Britain’s consent for Hitler to actively take
Czechoslovakia, a country that Germany never had any ties with in the past. It
could even be argued that instead of prolonging the war, the appeasement
actually made it happen faster. Professor Jeffrey Record stated in his book Appeasement Reconsidered: Investigating the
Mythology of the 1930s, “With each act of appeasement, Hitler’s appetite
grew.” While this professor is known as one of the leading experts on military
strategy, he does not consider social or economic factors in his book, making his
knowledge of his topic limiting. Yet this does not make his undermine the
validity of his argument. Believing that Britain would not interfere, Hitler
decided to invade the entirety of Czechoslovakia on the 15th of
March 1939, even though the appeasement made it explicitly clear that he was only
supposed to invade the Sudentenland, where 3.5 million ethnic Germans lived. Britain
did nothing, knowing that their military support would not be substantial
enough to stop the Nazis. It was only after Germany invaded Poland did the
British act in retaliation, beginning what was to be known as the second world
war. Had Hitler not of had this mindset, he may perhaps have moved at a slower
rate towards world domination for worry of the great powers and their
retaliation.
The appeasement of Hitler also downplayed
Britain’s power. The fact that Chamberlain actively gave Hitler permission to
do what he desired, take Czechoslovakia, showed that the British were cowards
when it came to threats of war, preferring to work with rather than against the
enemy. This lack of courage displayed lost the country any respect that other
countries had towards them. However, the result of this was far worse: it lost
the allies Stalin. British historian Roger Moorhouse in his book The Devils' Alliance: Hitler's Pact with
Stalin, 1939-1941 argues this. He quotes Ivan Maisky, the veteran
ambassador in London, “We are tired of (Britain’s) good intentions, we can only
be convinced by (Britain’s) good deeds.” A man who always respected strength,
Stalin found that he could not agree with a country as cowardly as Britain.
Roger Moorhouse is a respected historian, whose views are properly backed up
with facts. However, according to fellow historian Richard J. Evans, Moorhouse
has a one-sided view concerning the consequences of the pact, focusing on the
horrors Stalin committed and ignoring the actions of the Nazis. Hence, he has
no perspective. And yet, the point he made in his book is still valid. Moorhouse
also argues that the lack of respect that Stalin had is also partly due to the fact
that British negotiations with Stalin had taken a considerably long time, due
to the Polish hatred for anything Communist and Britain’s lack of trust in the
political advantages of such an agreement. These negotiations proved to Stalin
that the British hated the communists. The appeasement was merely the final
straw for Stalin. Instead of turning to the allies, Stalin turned to his
greatest enemy Hitler for a political pact, as Stalin could at least find an
ample amount of determination in Hitler’s character. They ended up creating
what is now known as the Hitler-Stalin Pact on the 23rd of August, a
non-aggression agreement whereby the two would split up Eastern Europe and then
leave each other alone. This gave Hitler confidence to invade Poland on the 1st
of September, officially start the second world war, while knowing that the
USSR would not retaliate. Perhaps, had Chamberlain taken another course of
action in order to avoid war, such as agreeing with the soviet offer of
military force to aid in containing Hitler on the 15th August 1939, Stalin
would never have signed the pact with Hitler and the victory of the allies
would have been quicker and more effective.
Neville Chamberlain’s appeasement of Hitler has recently been seen as anything but a mistake, due to Britain’s military
disadvantage, Hitler’s prior justifications of his actions and the lack of a
better alternative. However, the consequences were far greater, causing Hitler
to believe that the British would not interfere, his concern regarding the
greater powers to vanish, and the USSR to make a pact with Hitler as Stalin
could no longer respect a country who would bow down to the enemy purely to
avoid a war. Therefore, the appeasement was a mistake, as it was a contributing
factor in the Allies near defeat in World War Two.EXAMPLE 9
How
far do you agree with the view of recent historians that Chamberlain’s
appeasement of Hitler at Munich in 1938 was a mistake?
One
cannot answer the question without a biased view, especially as this essay is
written in the shadow of Dachau concentration camp, as one knows the extent to
which Chamberlain's appeasement to “feed the crocodile” failed. The provision
of an answer to the question requires to challenge British policies that might
eradicate common sense, morality and expediency to reinforce the thesis of
Hitler’s unique war guilt. There is a wide discrepancy between recent
historians view that analyse whether the Munich agreement signed between the
victors of the First World War on 30 September 1938 really depicted “peace for our time”.
Therefore, this essay will try to provide a neutral perspective of analyzing
different historians and their views of whether Chamberlain’s simplified
political decision to quench Hitler’s insatiable thirst through the shameful
policy of appeasement was a mistake.
Although
appeasement was, at the time, justified through many political, social and
economic reasons towards aggression, it was in September 1939 when Hitler was
marching into Poland, widely considered as not only a failure to stop the
dictator but as the driven factor that precipitated the war. In July 1940 the
polemical book Guilty Men published
by a trio of left-wing writers, known as CATO, marked the beginning of a newly
shaped scholarly thinking about appeasement as the “deliberate surrender of
small nations in the face of Hitler’s blatant bullying” that was since then
supported from many historians, diplomats, journalists and common people. Furthermore, the Guilty Men argued that Chamberlain’s policy was a policy of poor
judgment and ineptitude in military planning and diplomatic relations, all
carried out under fear. It suggests that Chamberlain rejected any other
alternatives to appeasement, and that he knew exactly what he was doing. World
War One was no longer considered the “war to end all wars” but rather a policy
implanted to allow Britain to buy time. After the Munich Agreement,
Chamberlain revealed his dissatisfaction to his foreign secretary Lord Halifax,
as his argument was to hope for the best whilst simultaneously preparing for
the worst. However, this criticism published was hastily written with few
claims to historical scholarship and despite having no access to government
archives, made instant historical judgements. The polemic argued that the
appeasement was not a policy of fear but rather a policy of hope. However, this
is debatable as the policy was incontestably carried out in Britain with an
overall mood of fear, still existing after the First World War. Chamberlain was
aware of his empire's military weakness compared to a seemingly aggressive
Germany that had re-militarized and exceeded its pre-war economic level.
However, the question that must be asked, which forms a great part of CAO’s
argument, is why did Britain go to war after the invasion of Poland, not the
reoccupation of the Rhineland or the invasion of Czechoslovakia? Britain viewed
Germany as a growing threat as it was not the disarmed and democratic Germany
that the Treaty of Versailles had anticipated. Britain increasingly felt the
pacifistic desire for peace at any price as World War One killed nearly 1
million British soldiers and civilians; British leaders and citizens became
propagandists of peace. Chamberlain henceforth believed in negotiations with
Germany necessary to avoid war and open a new era of peaceful co-existence.
Horace Wilson, a British government official who was involved in appeasement
clarified that “Our policy was never designed to postpone war, or enable us to
enter war more unified. The aim of our appeasement was to avoid war altogether,
for all time”. As CATO argued, Chamberlain's policy had its foundations in its
desire to avoid any physical or conversational open confrontation with Hitler.
Secondly, although Guilty Men credited
the prime minister of supporting rearmament, they offered critique as they
claim that these efforts were too slow if Britain wanted to continue with
peaceful methods as Germany’s defense expenditure in 1938 was $7,415 whilst
Britain only spent $1,863. This was
mainly due to Britain's economic policy after the great depression to limit
expenditure in order to maintain economic stability. In addition, Britain, under
the Locarno Treaty (1925) and the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928), Britain committed
to European peace which leads to the perspective that appeasement bought
Britain time to rearm whilst simultaneously creating better relations with
Hitler. The prime minister believed that by addressing Germany’s legitimate
grievances it would prevent another unbearable world war. Internal sources of Guilty Men reveal that in March 1938 the
British Army’s Chiefs of Staff submitted a report to the Cabinet assessing
that, in face of war, Britain was not in military position to stop Hitler. However as other historians argue, CATO’s
publication is rather a simplistic portrayal with a black and white depiction
of rather complex issue, that did not allow to be accurately analyzed at the
time it was written. The polemic lacked a deeper analysis of the numerous
factors that plunged Britain into war due to the initial analysis that was
carried out after the fall of France explains their hasty judgments.
The view proposed by CATO was
challenged by AJP Taylor’s highly controversial The Origins of the Second World War in which he argues that under
the circumstances Chamberlain acted under, appeasement seemed like a rational
policy due to the British government firstly in the 1950s, granting access to
records and documents to historian’s. In the view of the British historian,
Chamberlain recognized the mistakes made by the peacemakers in the Treaty of
Versailles and sought with appeasement to solve this “doing their best in the
circumstances of their time”. Taylor blames the cause of the war to a greater
extent on guaranteeing Poland security and freedom in March 1939 instead of
appeasement as this left the decision of war in the hands of Poland. However,
he contradicts himself as he states that Hitler was far from wanting a war but
he rather took advantage of the mistakes of other leaders, exclaiming that
Chamberlain’s appeasement provided the potential for such action. Hitler’s
incessant demands forced Britain to reconsider its pacifistic post-war
position. Taylor argues that there was no ideal solution in dealing with
Hitler, his demands were not clear so appeasement was a rational policy,
however not perfect. The Munich agreement, which was doomed by many CATO
supporters as selfish and cynical, in Taylor’s view rather a “triumph for those
who preached equal justice between people” as Britain and France attempted to
solve the mistakes of the Treaty of Versailles with Germany by accepting the
policy of self-determination. Appeasement allowed Germany to gain a voice by
listening to Hitler’s demands which was a way to make up for the past, to lift
the weight the peace treaty had forced upon Germany’s shoulders. However,
Taylor seems to simplify British demands in the Munich agreement and ignore the
idea that it allowed breathing space for British military preparations. The
reality behind appeasement was that Britain had limited military capability and
therefore could not defeat Hitler militarily in 1938. In 1926 Hitler’s Mein Kampf successively revealed his
aims as a political figure, therefore one cannot trust Taylor’s argument that
Hitler’s actions were unexpected and that Chamberlain had no possibility of
knowing Hitler’s future plans. Everything that was written in this mean of
propaganda was achieved; the Anschluss to
Austria, the invasion of France and Poland, the extermination of ethnic
minorities, basically the general repudiation of the entire values and morals
put forward by the Treaty of Versailles that Hitler described as scandalous and
disgraceful were murdered. As Taylor demoted Hitler’s opportunistic actions as
day dreamings and that Hitler “exploited events far more than followed precise
coherent plan”, one must ask why two thirds of Germany’s economy was dedicated
for war as early as in 1933. Research into German archives from the early 1960s
onwards had uncovered documentary evidence of Hitler’s ambitions for world
domination, which might reflect upon the narrowness of Taylor’s sources.
However, Taylor’s approach must be acknowledged as Hitler is considered with
high moralistic judgement, therefore Chamberlain cannot be seen as the pure
reason to be blamed for the war, the French, Americans, Poles and Russians all
shared guilt. Taylor clarifies that
Hitler’s intentions were misunderstood, however one must ask if they had any
other choice than appeasement?
When President Roosevelt asked
Winston Churchill for suggestions about how one could name the second World
War, Churchill spoke the words that many historians after would accentuate,
“the Unnecessary War. There never was a war easier to stop”. Churchill,
although maybe not considered a historian, in his War Memoirs highlighted Chamberlain as foolish to not have
recognized German strength and the misuse of appeasement to mollify Nazi
Germany. The British historian, Robert Alexander Clarke Parker in his 1993 book
Chamberlain and Appeasement argues that Chamberlain was neither a fool nor
a coward, but rather misunderstood the nature of Nazi ambitions for expansion.
He defends Churchill’s arguments that in 1938 to 1939 Chamberlain should have
worked for a close relationship with France, around which a ‘grand alliance’ of
European states might have developed. This, as he suggested, could have
included the USSR, which had a vested interest in containing German expansion.
He furthermore argues that Chamberlain clung to appeasement long after it was
manifested not going to work and that his mistakes lie in his lack of realism
about German foreign policy whilst describing Chamberlain's policy as “arrogant,
not weak or timid”. Even
when this view waned in the post-Munich period and down to the onset of war, no
political faction of consequence offered any alternative German policy that
could hope to command a parliamentary majority. In 1999 the historian John
Charmley extended Parker's view in his
book Chamberlain and the Lost Peace. He
clarifies that Chamberlain’s political assumptions were neither naive nor
foolish and that they were supported and shared by many other leading
politicians and diplomats, which expands the simplistic view that Chamberlain's
appeasement was merely his mistake. Charmley emphasises on the missed
opportunities in the months and weeks before the outbreak of war that would
have secured a satisfactory resolution of the growing hostility between Britain
and Germany. He furthermore highlights the possibility that without
appeasement, employing a different more though through method, Britain could
have kept out of general war for another couple of years. However this seems
difficult when Germany was expanding its resources and materials far more than
the Empire or any other ally did.
However
the historian and journalist David Dutton who recently wrote a biography of
Chamberlain, claims that Chamberlain “sould not be praised, [and]not [be]
buried”. He argues that Chamberlain made mistakes as he overestimated his
ability to reach a settlement with Hitler and hang on the hope of averting war
for too long. However, his counterargument is that is doubtful if anyone else
would have done better. He recalls the pacifistic mindset of not only Britain
but the whole of Europe. Chamberlin, like all others, had been deeply scarred
by the memory of the first World War, and at that time, expert opinion
predicted that any future war would be worse as destruction from the air would
have added to the slaughter of the battlefield. Extrapolating from the Spanish
Civil War, it was estimated that the first few weeks of a German air assault
would bring half a million casualties. Britain, therefore, was “defenseless in
the face of the bomber”.
As William R Rock stated in his book British Appeasement in the 1930s, appeasement
“has since become one of the most controversial policies in the history of
international relations”. Therefore one cannot decide if Chamberlain's policy
was a mistake or not, as there were more reasons that provoked a war. Chamberlain, for the mistakes he made,
cannot be praised but should arguably be spared the humiliating criticisms that
do not reflect the situation he faced in the 1930s.
EXAMPLE 10
How far do you agree
with the view of recent historians that Chamberlain's appeasement of Hitler at
Munich in 1938 was a mistake?
Writing in the shadows of Brienner Straße, where Hitler,
Chamberlain, Deladier, and Mussolini all met in 1938 in what is now known as
the Munich Agreement that would provide “Peace in our time”, one can see that
the so called ‘peace’ would lead to the second great war only 11 months later.
This leaves us wondering whether the recent view of historians, that
Chamberlain’s appeasement of Hitler was a mistake, is plausible or not. This
essay will argue that Chamberlain’s appeasement was the best that he could do
at the time and that he earned the allies an extra year to prepare for the
upcoming war, which would help them in their victory over the Nazis.
When looking at recent historians who believe Chamberlain
made a mistake with appeasement, one can look at John Charmley to understand
why this view is so popular. Charmley argues that Britain should have remained
out of the war and let Hitler fight with Stalin instead. He believes that as a
result of this, the Soviets would have undoubtedly won, and by being weakened
from the war, would no longer pose a threat to the rest of Europe, and Britain
would have retained her Empire. Although Charmley makes a convincing argument
in faulting Chamberlain’s actions, he ignores the facts as this simply was not
true. When meeting with Churchill and Roosevelt in Tehran, Stalin stated that
“World War 2 was won with British intelligence, American steel, and Russian
blood.” This highlights that Russia could not have won the war entirely by
herself as their leader stated that they won the war with the help of the
British and Americans. For Stalin to make such a statement, his words must have
spoken the truth as he would have taken any measures to glorify his nation over
the others. However, the view of recent historians cannot be entirely
discredited as appeasement did come with its problems. As a result of the
Little Entente in 1921, France promised to protect Yugoslavia, Romania, and
Czechoslovakia from attack. With this assurance, Czechoslovakia hoped that
appeasement would lead to their land remaining independent, but as a result,
Sudetenland was given to Hitler and became the ground of Nazi Concentration
Camps such as Theresienstadt. This could have been prevented by Chamberlain, but
instead he had allowed in the Munich Agreement for Hitler to take this land
rather than go to war with the Germans in 1938. Despite this, Sudetenland, in a
1930 poll, was said to contain a population of greater than 80% Germans, making
Hitler feel as if he had the right to this land. As it had once belonged to the
Austro-Hungarian empire, it may appear that Hitler had no right in taking over
this land, especially as it had never originally been part of the German
empire. However, as a result of Anschluß, Austria was now part of Germany and
with 99.76% of the Austrian population voting in favour of being part of
Germany, Hitler would have a strong claim for Sudetenland especially with its
high percentage of Germans. All in all, the view of recent historians that
Chamberlain’s appeasement was a mistake is a view that somewhat lacks support
but it does raise certain questions as to what would have happened had he
started a war with Hitler in 1938.
Although recent historians may have argued that
Chamberlain’s appeasement was a mistake, it can be shown that appeasement was
not as bad as they make it out to be. First of all, Chamberlain was aware of
the dangers of Communist Russia. He wanted to ensure that Germany were strong
as this would allow them to act as a barrier between them and the Russians.
Therefore, Chamberlain was open to being peaceful and lenient on the Germans as
he trusted them more than he did Russia. However, the issue with this is that
if he continued to allow Germany to expand and become an even greater force in
Europe, it leaves the question of where and when they would stop. If
Chamberlain allowed for the Germans to continually expand and assert their
dominance in Europe, then there would be no stopping them from turning onto
Britain. The main benefit that came from appeasement, would be that it gave
Britain an extra year to prepare for a war. With this extra year, the British were
able to almost triple their military spending from pre Munich. This extra year
allowed the British to prepare for war and gave them a chance to fight when
they were ready to. On the other hand, by Chamberlain earning the British an
extra year to prepare for the war, he gave this opportunity to the Germans too.
By taking over Czechoslovakia, Germany gained an extra 1,231 aircrafts and 810
tanks, which made them as prepared for the war as the British. The issue with
Chamberlain gaining Britain the extra year is that they could have destroyed
the Germans in a war, had it taken place in 1938. Together, the British and the
French had 102 divisions and 1,350 tanks, compared to the Germans who only had
47 divisions and no tanks at all. Clearly, the British would have defeated the
Germans had they gone to war in 1938, but looking with hindsight, it can be
seen that the Allies won the war and that this extra year not only prepared the
army, but the people. Chamberlain would have remembered the butchery that took
place in the Great War and thought that another could potentially obliterate
civilisation. Chamberlain took the action that he believed would be best for
his people and when he stated that he agreed on “Peace in our time”, that is
exactly what he strived for. He knew that Hitler was greatly admired, having
been announced as Time’s ‘Man of the Year’ in 1938, and that the British people
would not have been supportive of a war against the Germans, as they would rather
compromise with Hitler in order for their nation to have a chance at peace than
a declaration of war. The citizens of Britain were still recovering from the
First World War and for Chamberlain to declare war within a year of being in
office, would have been a great risk and would have severely gone against the
interests of his people. As a result of this, it can be identified that counter
to what recent historians may believe, Chamberlain did not make a mistake by
appeasing Hitler in 1938.
In conclusion it can be seen that Chamberlain did the best that
he could have done in order to meet his people’s demands. He chose the peaceful
way out of the war and the view of recent historians, that his appeasement in
Munich was a mistake, is a view that ignores his responsibilities as the Prime
Minister of the nation with the most to lose.
EXAMPLE 11
Question: "How Far do you agree with the views of Modern Historians that Chamberlain's appeasement of Hitler in Munich 1938 was not a mistake?"
On the 30th of September 1938, Neville Chamberlain, signed the Munich agreement, handing over the Sudetenland, to Hitler. At the time, Chamberlain was treated as a Hero, the prime minister who avoided another war and supposedly created “peace for our time” as Chamberlain declared after arriving back in the UK. Contradicting Chamberlain’s claims, a year later, on September 1st 1939, Hitler invaded Poland and the second world war began. Historians question the benefit of Chamberlain’s appeasement of Hitler in Munich 1938 to postpone war. It gave Hitler extra time, and allowed him to further strengthen Germany. However others argue that this extra time, also allowed England to build up their defences and prepare for war. Whether the Munich agreement was a mistake or not, will be argued throughout the following essay.
On one hand, the 1 year period from 1938 to 1939, allowed the Germans to strengthen their military and prepare for war. When Britain signed the Munich agreement, Germany gained access to the Czechoslovakian resources. Czechoslovakia was left defenseless against Germany, and the Allies lost a great resource. Some of the weapons used to fight the French in WW2 were provided by the Czechs. Additionally the extra year provided allowed the Germans to increase their divisions from around 53 including Austria to 104 divisions in 1939. Germany also used the time given from 1938 to 1939 more efficiently and Britain. Not only did Germany almost double the amount of divisions in one year, they also managed to gain a treaty with the Soviet Union, who later turned out to be powerful allies.
On the other hand, even though Germany used the time between September 1938 to 1939, more efficiently, Britain's military in 1938 was not in a position to engage in war. Britain would only have been able to supply 2 poorly equipped divisions in September 1938. Britain's military was extremely weak due to the lack of funding. The 10-year-rule, put in place in 1919, prevented the British military from expanding based on the assumption that there would not be another war for at least 10 years. Therefore the Royal navy did not have enough destroyers, aircrafts and also lacked defences against air attack. Since the Navy is one of the most important defences of Britain's islands, it would have been foolish to go to war without a reasonably strong Navy. Additionally the British believed that the effects of bombing from Germany would have a lot more devastating effects than it did. It was believed that up to 500000 people would be killed, and the British government therefore decided that it would be important to build up their air force as defence. The British army had suffered greatly from the absence of funding as well and lacked modern equipment. Britain in 1938 also lacked the armament industry to supply these new weapons. Therefore the extra year benefited he British greatly as it allowed them to build up their almost non-existent army and prepare for the upcoming inevitable war.
Additionally, Chamberlain did not have the public support needed from his country to engage in a war. For a war to be successful, it is important to have morale. Morale boosts confidence and helps encourage people through a particularly tough time. As Chamberlain said himself, there is no point in starting a war over “a quarrel in a far away country between people of whom we know nothing”. The general public in 1938 still remembered the terrible effects of WW1 and did not want to engage in a war if not absolutely necessary. Without the public's approval, the war would have been a lost cause. As General Hermann Foertsch said “The final word regarding victory and defeat rests not on arms and equipment, or the way in which they are used, or even the principle of strategy and tactics, but on the morale of the toops”. At the time, people believed that “better Hitlerism than Communism” and did not think that the Nazis were such a big threat. When a year later, in 1939, Hitler officially violated the peace agreement, the British people had enough reason to go to war, uniting the country and boosting general morale which would be needed for the following 6 years.
Lastly, Britain lacked reliable allies. Up until 1938, France’s government had a reputation for disintegrating. France was financially unstable, had industrial troubles and was suspected of being in touch with the opposition. The US had been in isolation to the rest of the word, and Chamberlain disregarded them as timid isolationists. The USSR was a communist country and was therefore not to be trusted. Especially since Stalin had a reputation for being an unreasonable and untrustworthy dictator. If Britain had engaged in war in 1938, they would have lacked the allies and the support needed to defeat germany. Even though Britain still lacked allies close to the beginning of WW2, Hitlers invasion of Poland, scared countries such as Poland, Romania and Greece into seeking and anti Nazi alliance with England. At the beginning of WW2 the main allies consisted of Poland, Britain and France. Up until Germany's advances on Poland, nobody really saw Hitler as an immediate threat and the allyships that supported England in 1939 would not have been there.
In conclusion, the Munich agreement gave Britain the time needed to prepare for war. Without the one year time period Britain would not have been ready for war. They would have lacked resources, public morale and allies. Even though Germany used their time more efficiently, Britain was not in a position to engage in war in 1938, and would have lost even if they had started a war then. I therefore agree with modern Historians views and believe that the Munich agreement was not a mistake.
On the 30th of September 1938, Neville Chamberlain, signed the Munich agreement, handing over the Sudetenland, to Hitler. At the time, Chamberlain was treated as a Hero, the prime minister who avoided another war and supposedly created “peace for our time” as Chamberlain declared after arriving back in the UK. Contradicting Chamberlain’s claims, a year later, on September 1st 1939, Hitler invaded Poland and the second world war began. Historians question the benefit of Chamberlain’s appeasement of Hitler in Munich 1938 to postpone war. It gave Hitler extra time, and allowed him to further strengthen Germany. However others argue that this extra time, also allowed England to build up their defences and prepare for war. Whether the Munich agreement was a mistake or not, will be argued throughout the following essay.
On one hand, the 1 year period from 1938 to 1939, allowed the Germans to strengthen their military and prepare for war. When Britain signed the Munich agreement, Germany gained access to the Czechoslovakian resources. Czechoslovakia was left defenseless against Germany, and the Allies lost a great resource. Some of the weapons used to fight the French in WW2 were provided by the Czechs. Additionally the extra year provided allowed the Germans to increase their divisions from around 53 including Austria to 104 divisions in 1939. Germany also used the time given from 1938 to 1939 more efficiently and Britain. Not only did Germany almost double the amount of divisions in one year, they also managed to gain a treaty with the Soviet Union, who later turned out to be powerful allies.
On the other hand, even though Germany used the time between September 1938 to 1939, more efficiently, Britain's military in 1938 was not in a position to engage in war. Britain would only have been able to supply 2 poorly equipped divisions in September 1938. Britain's military was extremely weak due to the lack of funding. The 10-year-rule, put in place in 1919, prevented the British military from expanding based on the assumption that there would not be another war for at least 10 years. Therefore the Royal navy did not have enough destroyers, aircrafts and also lacked defences against air attack. Since the Navy is one of the most important defences of Britain's islands, it would have been foolish to go to war without a reasonably strong Navy. Additionally the British believed that the effects of bombing from Germany would have a lot more devastating effects than it did. It was believed that up to 500000 people would be killed, and the British government therefore decided that it would be important to build up their air force as defence. The British army had suffered greatly from the absence of funding as well and lacked modern equipment. Britain in 1938 also lacked the armament industry to supply these new weapons. Therefore the extra year benefited he British greatly as it allowed them to build up their almost non-existent army and prepare for the upcoming inevitable war.
Additionally, Chamberlain did not have the public support needed from his country to engage in a war. For a war to be successful, it is important to have morale. Morale boosts confidence and helps encourage people through a particularly tough time. As Chamberlain said himself, there is no point in starting a war over “a quarrel in a far away country between people of whom we know nothing”. The general public in 1938 still remembered the terrible effects of WW1 and did not want to engage in a war if not absolutely necessary. Without the public's approval, the war would have been a lost cause. As General Hermann Foertsch said “The final word regarding victory and defeat rests not on arms and equipment, or the way in which they are used, or even the principle of strategy and tactics, but on the morale of the toops”. At the time, people believed that “better Hitlerism than Communism” and did not think that the Nazis were such a big threat. When a year later, in 1939, Hitler officially violated the peace agreement, the British people had enough reason to go to war, uniting the country and boosting general morale which would be needed for the following 6 years.
Lastly, Britain lacked reliable allies. Up until 1938, France’s government had a reputation for disintegrating. France was financially unstable, had industrial troubles and was suspected of being in touch with the opposition. The US had been in isolation to the rest of the word, and Chamberlain disregarded them as timid isolationists. The USSR was a communist country and was therefore not to be trusted. Especially since Stalin had a reputation for being an unreasonable and untrustworthy dictator. If Britain had engaged in war in 1938, they would have lacked the allies and the support needed to defeat germany. Even though Britain still lacked allies close to the beginning of WW2, Hitlers invasion of Poland, scared countries such as Poland, Romania and Greece into seeking and anti Nazi alliance with England. At the beginning of WW2 the main allies consisted of Poland, Britain and France. Up until Germany's advances on Poland, nobody really saw Hitler as an immediate threat and the allyships that supported England in 1939 would not have been there.
In conclusion, the Munich agreement gave Britain the time needed to prepare for war. Without the one year time period Britain would not have been ready for war. They would have lacked resources, public morale and allies. Even though Germany used their time more efficiently, Britain was not in a position to engage in war in 1938, and would have lost even if they had started a war then. I therefore agree with modern Historians views and believe that the Munich agreement was not a mistake.
