IBDP Paper 1 Exam: Move to Global War

SPECIMEN PAPER: The move to global war
Read sources A to D carefully and answer the questions that follow. The sources and questions relate to the following aspect of the syllabus: Japanese expansion in East Asia (1931–1941): Events.

Source A  
The first three articles of the Three Power/Tripartite Pact agreed between Germany, Italy and Japan in Berlin on 27 September 1940.

The governments of Germany, Italy and Japan have agreed as follows:
Article one: Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of Germany and Italy in establishment of a new order in Europe.
Article two: Germany and Italy recognize and respect the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new order in greater East Asia.
Article three: Germany, Italy and Japan agree to cooperate in their efforts. They further agree to assist one another with all political, economic and military means when one of the three contracting powers is attacked by a power at present not involved in the European war or in the Chinese–Japanese conflict.

Source B  
Akira Iriye, a professor of History, writing in an academic book, The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific (1987).

By September 1940, Britain could be assured of continued American support, and the United States had already implemented some of its embargoes against Japan. Under the circumstances, there would have been no way in which an Axis pact would cause the Anglo-American powers to soften their stand.
On the contrary, the pact could be expected to give them added resolve to stand firm. This is exactly what happened.
Japanese and German negotiators were fully aware of the developing ties between America and Britain, and for this very reason they hoped their alliance would serve to check and reduce the effectiveness
of American intervention. By then, as Matsuoka [the Japanese Foreign Minister] explained at the
time, it was becoming obvious that the United States was steadily involving itself not only in European but in Asian-Pacific affairs as well. It was tying itself not just to the British in the Atlantic but to the Commonwealth in Asia and the Pacific. The United States, in fact, would establish itself as a global power, with its influence in the Atlantic, Canada, the Western hemisphere, the Pacific Ocean and Asia.
It followed, then, that it would be an American-led coalition that Japan had to confront and be prepared to fight. It would no longer be China in isolation, but China assisted by the Soviet Union, Britain, and especially the United States.

Source C  
Ian Kershaw, a professor of Modern History, writing in an academic book,Fateful Choices: Ten Decisions that Changed the World, 1940–1941 (2007).

The American response quickly revealed the folly of Matsuoka’s claim – that the Tripartite [Three Power] Pact would serve as a deterrent. Instead, it merely confirmed American views that Japan was a belligerent [warlike], bullying, imperialist force in the Far East, an Asian equivalent of Nazi Germany, and had to be stopped. Such views seemed confirmed by the entry of Japanese troops into French Indochina on 23 September 1940. The essential purpose of the Tripartite Pact, from the Japanese perspective, was to deter the United States from intervening to prevent the southern advance seen as necessary to ensure Japan’s control of raw materials and, therefore, her future economic and political security.
The gamble in the pact was self-evident. What if the United States did not regard the pact as a deterrent, but as a provocation? What if the effect was to reinforce the determination to prevent Japanese expansion by threatening the lifeline of oil supplies? But from a Japanese perspective at
the time, the gamble had to be taken. To take it held great dangers, but also the potential of enormous rewards. Not to take it meant long-term domination by the Anglo-American powers. It meant, too, that the China War had been in vain. The need for boldness, not caution, carried the day in such a mentality.

Source D  
Harold “Mick” Armstrong, a cartoonist, depicts Japan announcing a “new order” in greater East Asia in a cartoon published in the Australian newspaper The Argus (1940).

Questions for Section C
9. (a) What, according to Source B, were the effects for Britain of the signing of the Three
Power/Tripartite Pact? [3] (b) What is the message conveyed by Source D? [2]
10. With reference to its origin, purpose and content, analyse the value and limitations of
Source A for an historian studying the Three Power/Tripartite Pact (September 1940). [4]
11. Compare and contrast what Sources B and C reveal about the significance of the Three Power/Tripartite Pact. [6]
12. Using the sources and your own knowledge, evaluate the consequences of the Three Power/Tripartite Pact for Japan, China and the US up to the end of 1941. [9]

May 2017

The sources and questions relate to Case study 1: Japanese expansion in East Asia (1931–1941) – Responses: International response, including US initiatives and increasing tensions between the US and Japan.

Source I 
 Andrew Gordon, a US historian, writing in the book A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present (2003).
When Japan moved into northern Indochina, the US responded with a gradually expanding export embargo. This provoked some sections of the Japanese military to argue for a pre-emptive strike against the United States and its allies. Japan followed this by extending their hold over Indochina, gaining Vichy permission to occupy the entire peninsula in July 1941 [‘Vichy’ refers to the government of the French state between 1940 and 1944]. The agreement left Japan as the virtual ruler of the French colony.
The Americans countered this advance with a strong and threatening move. Roosevelt immediately pulled together an international embargo that cut off all foreign oil supplies to Japan. He also offered military supplies to China. Without oil Japan could not sustain its military or economy. It faced a difficult choice. It could agree to American conditions for lifting the embargo by retreating completely from China. Or it could take control of the Southeast Asian oil fields by force and negotiate for a ceasefire from that strengthened position.
For a time, it pursued both courses. Japanese diplomats sought in vain to negotiate a formula for a partial retreat in China that might satisfy both their own reluctant army and the United States.
The Japanese military, meanwhile, drew up plans for an attack that might force the Western powers to recognize its hegemony in Asia.

Source J 
Osami Nagano, Chief of the Japanese Naval General Staff, speaking at the Imperial Conference, 6 September 1941.

Based on the assumption that a peaceful solution has not been found and war is inevitable, the Empire’s oil supply, as well as the stockpiles of many other important war materials, is being used up day by day with the result that the national defence power is gradually diminishing. If this deplorable situation is left unchecked, I believe that, after a lapse of some time, the nation’s strength will diminish.
On the other hand, the defence of military installations and key points of Britain, the United States and other countries in the Far East, as well as military preparations of these nations, particularly those of the United States, are being strengthened so quickly that by next year we will find it difficult to oppose them. Therefore, wasting time now could be disastrous for the Empire. I believe that it is imperative [essential] for the Empire that it should first make the fullest preparations and lose no time in carrying out positive operations with firm determination, in order that it can find a way out of the difficult situation.

Source K 
Chihiro Hosoya, a Japanese professor of history, writing in the article “Miscalculations in Deterrent Policy: US-Japanese Relations, 1938–1941”, for the academic publication Journal of Peace Research (1968).

According to a US public opinion survey of late September [1941], the number of Americans favouring strong action against Japan had greatly increased. Furthermore, Roosevelt stated on 12 October that the United States would not be intimidated. The Tripartite Pact had worsened relations with the United States. Japanese army officers demanded an acceleration of southern expansion. Even before the Tripartite Pact, Japan had demanded permission to move troops into southern Indochina and did so on 28 July. The Japanese pressures on Indochina led the US government to freeze Japanese assets in the United States and to impose an embargo against Japan. Officers in the Japanese navy were resolved to go to war because of the oil embargo. They were anxious about the existing supply of oil turning the Japanese navy into a “paper navy” [powerless navy].

Source L
David Low, a cartoonist, depicts Japanese expansion in the cartoon “Enough in the tank to get to that filling station?” in the British newspaper The Evening Standard (8 August 1941). The sign on the side of the building is “Dutch E. [East] Indies and on the vehicle it is “Jap. [Japanese] Oil Reserves.

9. (a) What, according to Source K, were the factors contributing to tensions between Japan and the US? [3]
(b) What does Source L suggest about Japanese expansion? [2]
10. With reference to its origin, purpose and content, analyse the value and limitations of Source K
for an historian studying the tensions between the US and Japan. [4]
11. Compare and contrast what Sources I and J reveal about the increasing tensions between the US and Japan. [6]
12. “Mutual fear led to increasing tensions between the US and Japan.” Using the sources and your own knowledge, to what extent do you agree with this statement? [9]

November 2017

The sources and questions relate to Case study 1: Japanese expansion in East Asia (1931–1941) — Causes of expansion: The impact of Japanese nationalism and militarism on foreign policy.

Source I 
An extract from a Japanese government statement, “The Fundamental Principles of National Policy” (August 1936).
(1) Japan must strive to eradicate [eliminate] the aggressive policies of the great powers ...
(3) ... in order to promote Manchukuo’s healthy development and to stabilize Japan-Manchukuo national defense, the threat from the north, the Soviet Union, must be eliminated; in order to promote our economic development, we must prepare against Great Britain and the United States and bring about close collaboration between Japan, Manchukuo, and China. In the execution of this policy, Japan must pay due attention to friendly relations with other powers.
(4) Japan plans to promote her racial and economic development in the South Seas, especially in the outlying South Seas area. She plans to extend her strength by moderate and peaceful means without arousing other powers. In this way, concurrently with the firm establishment of Manchukuo, Japan must expect full development and strengthening of her national power.
[Source: Republished with permission of Taylor & Francis Group LLc Books, from Japan: a Documentary History, David J. Lu, 1996; permission conveyed through Copyright Clearance Center, Inc]

Source J 
William Beasley, a professor of the history of the Far East, writing in the academic book Japanese Imperialism, 1894–1945 (1987).

Central to the basic propositions was the intention that Japan ... must establish cordial [friendly] relations with the peoples of the area founded on the principles of co-existence and co-prosperity. It would also undertake economic expansion on its own account by creating a strong coalition between Japan, Manchukuo and China and by extending its interests in South-East Asia in gradual and peaceful ways. There were some conditions. The army must be given forces in Korea and Kwantung [Guandong] sufficient to deal with any attack from Soviet Russia. The navy must have a fleet capable of maintaining ascendancy in the west Pacific against that of the United States.
Sino-Japanese [Chinese-Japanese] cooperation, designed to detach Nanking [Nanjing] from its communist affiliations [links], though highly desirable must not be allowed to stand in the way of treating north China as a “special region” to be brought into close relationship with Japan and Manchukuo.
It was, for example, to provide strategic materials, in order to strengthen their defences against the Soviet Union. As to the south, a gradual and peaceful approach was intended to avert fears in countries of the area concerning Japanese aims ...
From the point of view of the ministers in Tokyo, none of this was meant to bring about territorial expansion. They still thought in terms of informal empire, that is, of securing an increase in Japan’s privileges through pressure exerted on Asian governments, including that of China.
[Source: JAPANESE IMPERIALISM, 1894-1945 by Beasley (1987) p.202. By permission of Oxford University Press]

Source K 
Hans van de Ven, a professor of modern Chinese history, writing in the academic book War and Nationalism in China: 1925–1945 (2003).

By 1933, Japan’s military strategy aimed at defending itself against the Soviet Union, China and the British and American navies. Massive investment programmes in the heavy, chemical, and machinery industries followed to give Japan the industrial base to sustain itself in time of war, and also of course to deal with the problems of the Depression. In 1936, Japan stepped up its military expenditures when a new cabinet accepted the build-up of national strength as Japan’s highest priority ...
Japan therefore developed a strategic doctrine aimed at defending Japan by aggressive offensive operations of limited duration, to be concluded before its major enemies could concentrate their forces in East Asia. To defeat China before such a war was part of this strategy. Worried about war with the Soviet Union and the Western powers, the “removal of China”, as the aggressive General Tojo stated in a telegram from Manchuria to Tokyo in early 1937, would eliminate “an important menace from our rear” and release forces for service on more critical fronts. If the military build-up and the political influence of the army in Japanese politics were causes for worry in China, so were the expansionist tendencies of the Kwantung [Guandong] Army in Manchuria.
[Source: From: War and Nationalism in China: 1925–1945, Hans van de Ven, 2003, Routledge, reproduced by permission of Taylor & Francis Books UK.]

Source LJohn Bernard Partridge, an illustrator and cartoonist, depicts Japan threatening China in an untitled cartoon for the British magazine Punch (21 July 1937). Note: The word on the tail is Manchukuo.
Chinese dragon: I say, do be careful with that sword! If you try to cut off my head I shall really have to appeal to the League again.
[Source: PUNCH Magazine Cartoon Archives www.punch.co.uk]

9. (a) What, according to Source I, were the challenges facing Japanese national policy? [3] (b) What does Source L suggest about Sino-Japanese [Chinese-Japanese] relations
in 1937? [2]
10. With reference to its origin, purpose and content, analyse the value and limitations of
Source I for an historian studying Japanese foreign policy in East Asia. [4]
11. Compare and contrast what Sources J and K reveal about Japanese foreign policy aims in
East Asia. [6]
12. Using the sources and your own knowledge, to what extent do you agree with the suggestion
that Japanese foreign policy aims up to 1937 were to be achieved through “gradual and
peaceful ways” (Source J)? [9]

 May 2018

The sources and questions relate to case study 1: Japanese expansion in East Asia (1931–1941) — Causes of expansion: political instability in China.

Source I

Jonathan D Spence, an historian, writing in the academic book The Search for Modern China (1999).

The outbreak of full-scale war with Japan in 1937 ended any chance that Jiang Jieshi might have had of creating a strong and centralized nation-state. Within a year, the Japanese deprived the Guomindang [the Nationalists] of all the major Chinese industrial centers and the most fertile farmland. Jiang’s new wartime base, Chongqing, became a symbolic center for national resistance to the Japanese, but it was a poor place from which to launch any kind of counterattack. Similarly, the Communist forces were isolated in Shaanxi province, one of the poorest areas in China, with no industrial capacity. It was not clear if the Communists would be able to survive there, and certainly it seemed an unpromising location from which to spread the revolution.
For the first years of the war, the dream of national unity was kept alive by the nominal [in name only] alliance of the Nationalist and Communist forces in a united front. Communists muted [reduced the focus on] their land reform practices and moderated their rhetoric [propaganda], while the Guomindang tried to undertake economic and administrative reforms that would strengthen China in the long term. But by early 1941 the two parties were once again engaging in armed clashes with each other.

Source J 
Chang-tai Hung, a professor of humanities, writing in the specialist history book War and Popular Culture: Resistance in Modern China, 1937–1945 (1994).

The outbreak of full-scale war with Japan in 1937 dealt a devastating blow to the Nationalist [Guomindang] government’s efforts to recentralize its authority and revive the economy. It also ended Jiang Jieshi’s chance of crushing the Communist forces, who were isolated in the barren and sparsely populated Shaanxi province. The war displaced the Nationalists from their traditional power base in the urban and industrial centers, and forced them to move to the interior. At the same time, it provided an ideal opportunity for the Communists to expand their influence in north China and become a true contender for national power.
For many Chinese resisters, the clash with Japan turned out to be a unifying force. The Marco Polo Bridge became a compelling symbol of China’s unity. Resisters looked at war as an antidote to chaos. Despite some progress made toward economic growth and political integration by the Nationalist government on the eve of the war, the country was still largely fragmented. Regional militarists remained a serious threat to the government, and the armed conflict between the Nationalists and the Communists persisted. Political instability bred fear and fueled great discontent in society.

Source K 
Jiang Jieshi, head of the Chinese Nationalist [Guomindang] government between 1928 and 1949, in a speech at an Officers Training Camp (July 1934).
This speech was not published until July 1937.

Now let us look at our own condition. How do we stand? Have we fulfilled the necessary conditions for resisting the enemy? We ourselves can answer that question simply and sadly in one brief sentence: “We have made no preparations whatsoever.” Not only materially are we unprepared, not only have we not organized our resources, but we are not even unified in thought and spirit. I make bold to say that if we were now to be involved in a war with Japan, groups opposed to the Government would be sure to take advantage of the situation to create trouble. This alone would be sufficient to seal our fate. Even before the enemy’s actual attack, internally there would be chaos. In such circumstances how could we possibly resist the enemy? How could we revive our race and nation? How could we ensure that our children would continue to enjoy the glorious heritage of five thousand years? From the military point
of view we have not the qualifications at present for an independent state; we are not fit to be called a modern nation. So naturally we cannot resist Japan, but must suffer at her hands.

Source L
Cai Ruohong, a cartoonist and member of the Chinese League of Left-Wing Artists, depicts a handshake between the Chinese Communist Party (left) and the Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomindang) (right) in the cartoon “A Sacred Handshake” (c1937). The figure in the centre of the picture is a caricature representing Japan.

9. (a) What, according to Source J, were the challenges faced by the Nationalist [Guomindang] government of China as a result of the outbreak of war with Japan in 1937? [3]
(b) What does Source L suggest about the relations between the Chinese Communist Party and the Nationalist Party [Guomindang] in 1937? [2]
10. With reference to its origin, purpose and content, analyse the value and limitations of Source K for an historian studying political instability in China between 1931 and 1941. [4]
11. Compare and contrast what Sources I and J reveal about political instability in China up to 1941. [6]
12. Using the sources and your own knowledge, discuss the view that Japanese aggression furthered political instability in China between 1931 and 1941. [9]

November 2018

Read sources I to L and answer questions 9 to 12. The sources and questions relate to case study 1: Japanese expansion in East Asia (1931–1941) — Responses: League of Nations and the Lytton Report.
Source I 
The Lytton Report (4 September 1932).

Without declaration of war, a large area of what was indisputably Chinese territory has been forcibly seized and occupied by the armed forces of Japan and has, in consequence of this operation,
been separated from and declared independent of the rest of China. The steps by which this was accomplished are claimed by Japan to have been consistent with the obligations of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Kellogg–Briand Pact and the Nine-Power Treaty of Washington, all of which were designed to prevent action of this kind ... The justification has been that all the military operations have been legitimate acts of self-defence, the right of which is implicit in all the multilateral treaties mentioned above, and was not taken away by any of the resolutions of the Council of the League. Further, the administration which has been substituted for that of China in Manchuria is justified on the grounds that its establishment was the act of the local population, who spontaneously asserted their independence, severed all connection with China and established their own government. Such a genuine independence movement, it is claimed, is not prohibited by any international treaty or by any of the resolutions of the Council of the League of Nations.
[Source: The Lytton Report (4 September 1932). Copyright United Nations Archives at Geneva.]

Source J 
Chokyuro Kadono, a leading Japanese businessman and commentator, who had significant interests in Manchuria and China, writing in the article “A Businessman’s View of the Lytton Report” in the Japanese magazine Gaiko Jiho (November 1932).

As has been officially declared by the Imperial Government more than once, Japan has no territorial ambitions in Manchuria. Japan has given formal recognition to Manchuria as an independent state [Manchukuo], assuring it full opportunity for growth and organization ... At the same time, Japan hopes thereby to rescue Manchukuo from the destruction caused by China’s internal disorders and give it opportunity to attain free development, so that it may be able to play its part in easing the world’s economic difficulty by offering a very safe and valuable market in the Far East. This aspect of Japan’s policy should have been quite clear to the Lytton Commission. But unfortunately, the Lytton Report makes an altogether inadequate estimate of Manchuria’s economic value, and entirely fails to do justice to the previously mentioned motive of Japan in recognizing Manchukuo ... Japan is fully prepared, in view of the position she rightly occupies among the nations of the world, to do her best to support China in her work of unification and reconstruction to the end that peace may thereby be assured in the Far East. This aspect of Japan’s policy should have been quite clear to the Lytton Commission.
[Source: adapted from A businessman’s view of the Lytton Report, Chokiuro Kadono, published in The Herald of Asia, Tokyo October 1932; http://digitalrepository.trincoll.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1083&context=moore]

Source K 
Ryōichi Tobe, a professor of the history of modern Japan, writing in the chapter “The Manchurian Incident to the Second Sino–Japanese War” in the Japan–China Joint History Research Report (2011).

The Guangdong [Kwantung] Army continued its advance into Chinese territory ... To serve as head
of the new state, the Japanese took the deposed Chinese emperor Puyi out of Tianjin under cover of riots that the Japanese staged in the city and brought him to Manchuria. Japan’s position that it acted in self-defence to protect its own interests thus began to lose credibility, and the League of Nations grew increasingly suspicious. On October 24 [1931], the League Council voted for the withdrawal of Japanese troops by a specific deadline, but Japan’s opposition alone defeated the resolution. Finally, with Japan’s agreement, the League Council decided on December 10 to send a commission to the scene to investigate, and deferred any decision until the investigation was completed ... the [resulting] Lytton Report refused to recognize the Guangdong Army’s actions following the Manchurian Incident as legitimate self-defence, nor did it accept the claim that Manchukuo had been born from a spontaneous independence movement.
[Source: adapted from Japan-China Joint History Research Report March 2011: The Manchurian Incident to the Second Sino-Japanese War, by Tobe Ryōichi. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/pdfs/jcjhrr_mch_en1.pdf.]

Source L
 Bernard Partridge, a cartoonist, depicts the response of the League of Nations to the Manchurian crisis in the cartoon “The Command Courteous” for the British magazine Punch (12 October 1932). The wording on the woman’s cap is “League of Nations”, on the newspaper, “Lytton Report”, on the dog, “Japan” and the bone, “Manchuria”. The caption is “League of Nations, ‘Good dog—drop it!’”. 

Read sources I to L in the source booklet and answer questions 9 to 12. The sources and questions relate to case study 1: Japanese expansion in East Asia (1931–1941) — Responses: League of Nations and the Lytton Report.

9. (a) What, according to Source J, was Japan’s attitude toward Manchuria/Manchukuo and
China? [3]
(b) What does Source L suggest about the position of Japan and the League of Nations regarding the Manchurian crisis? [2]
10. With reference to its origin, purpose and content, analyse the value and limitations of Source J for an historian studying Japan’s response to the Lytton Report in the early 1930s. [4]
11. Compare and contrast what Sources I and K reveal about Japanese actions in China. [6]
12. Using the sources and your own knowledge, discuss the view that the ineffectual response of the League of Nations was the main factor in encouraging Japanese expansion in China. [9]

May 2019

Read sources I to L and answer questions 9 to 12. The sources and questions relate to case study 2: German and Italian expansion (1933–1940) — Responses: international response to German aggression (1933–1938).

Source I 
Notes for the British Cabinet on conversations held in Berlin between John Simon, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and Adolf Hitler, German Chancellor and Führer (March 1935).

John Simon thanked the Chancellor for the opportunity he had had of meeting him and for the way in which the British Ministers had been welcomed. But, observing the rule of frankness to the end, he must say that the British Ministers felt somewhat disappointed that it had not been possible to get a larger measure of agreement. They regretted that such difficulties were thought to exist on the German side in connection with some of the matters discussed. He did not regret having come to Berlin. He was sure that this meeting was the best way of continuing this investigation into the various points of view. What he regretted was that they had not been able to do more in the direction of promoting the general agreement which he was sure both sides wanted.
It showed that these things were more difficult and complicated than many believed them to be from a distance...
Hitler was also grateful to the British Government for the loyal efforts they had made in the matter of the Saar vote, and for all the other matters on which they had adopted such a loyal and generous attitude to Germany.

Source J
Bernard Partridge, a cartoonist, depicts Adolf Hitler and John Simon in the cartoon “Prosit!” [Cheers!] in the British satirical magazine Punch (27 March 1935).
The wording on the tankard is “Conscription” and in the caption it is:
Herr Hitler: “The more we arm together the peacefuller [more peaceful] we’ll be!”
Sir John Simon: “Well—er—up to a certain point—and in certain cases— provisionally—perhaps.”

 Source K 
Christian Leitz, an historian specializing in the Third Reich, writing in the academic book Nazi Foreign Policy, 1933–1941. The Road to Global War (2004).

Hitler’s quest to rearm Germany continued unopposed. During Anglo–French talks in London at the beginning of February (1935), Germany’s rearmament had received the blessing of the two West European powers even though they still hoped to convince Germany to join a multilateral Locarno-style pact guaranteeing the borders of Germany’s East European neighbours.
Hitler’s answer to these conciliatory approaches came quickly. He removed one of the major limitations of the Versailles Treaty and, on 16 March 1935, increased the size of Germany’s armed forces to 300,000 troops. This time, however, France, Britain and Italy seemed keen to react more firmly to the worrying growth in Germany’s strength. At Stresa in April, an attempt was made to establish a common front against Germany’s increasing attempts to revise [post-war settlements].
However, the reaction of the three former allies remained meek [feeble]. To the delight of the Nazi regime, the common front against Germany was both short lived and of limited impact. By June, Britain broke with Stresa when it agreed to a bilateral naval agreement with Germany.

[Source: reproduced from NAZI FOREIGN POLICY 1933 – 1941, 1st Edition by Christian Leitz, published by Routledge. © Routledge Christian Leitz, reproduced by arrangement with Taylor & Francis Books UK.]

Source L 
Henri Lichtenberger, a university lecturer, writing in the academic book The Third Reich (1937).

Confronted by the German desire for naval rearmament, England [Britain], after a brief suggestion of displeasure, quickly decided to come to terms. British leaders believed that the best way to safeguard this primary English [British] interest would be to conclude a direct and separate agreement with Germany which would set a maximum limit to German armaments acceptable to both countries. In agreeing to this transaction Germany not only received the right to begin, with English consent, an important programme of naval construction, but also potentially caused further disagreement among the signatories of the Versailles Treaty.
The naval agreement signed in London on June 18, 1935 between England and Germany aroused great concern in France. It was the occasion for outbursts in the press and for diplomatic manoeuvres intended to moderate the disagreement which had unexpectedly developed between the two allied
nations, and hold together the Entente which was considered valuable. It was nevertheless obvious that by his bold initiative, Hitler had scored an amazing success which also strengthened his prestige in Germany. He had won the right to rearm officially both on land and on sea and this was accomplished without a violent break with France.

9. (a) What, according to Source I, were the conclusions reported to the British government regarding the March 1935 meeting in Berlin? [3]
(b) What does Source J suggest about Anglo-German relations in 1935? [2

10. With reference to its origin, purpose and content, analyse the value and limitations of Source I for an historian studying the international response to German aggression. [4]

11. Compare and contrast what Sources K and L reveal about the attitudes towards German foreign policy under Hitler. [6]

12. Using the sources and your own knowledge, discuss the effectiveness of the international response to German aggression between 1933 and 1938. [9]