IB History Internal Assessment
To what extent was the 1934 seizure of power by Kārlis Ulmanis motivated by a genuine desire to fix political instability in Latvia?
Word Count: 2200
Section 1: Identification and evaluation of sources
This study will investigate the question: To what extent was the 1934 seizure of power by Kārlis Ulmanis motivated by a genuine desire to fix political instability in Latvia? The 1934 coup ended to parliamentary democracy in Latvia, displaying how it was an authoritarian state long before the annexation by the Soviet Union in 1940. However, it is crucial to investigate whether Ulmanis’ decision was borne out of a need to gain personal power or to fix political unrest, as it shaped Latvia’s national identity in the years before Soviet occupation.
Diary of Vilhelms Munters, Secretary General of the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (May 15-17, 1934)
The source’s purpose is to detail the chronology and inner workings of the coup, offering Munters’ perspective into Ulmanis’ mindset and actions during the event. Its origin is valuable as it is one of the few primary documents available about the coup and was written by a close associate of Ulmanis, providing historians with a perspective from the coup’s instigators. As a private document intended for internal use, it offers a more candid perspective than official statements, geared less towards propaganda and persuasion and more towards motivations and plans for the coup. The document is limited by its informal nature, hindering historiographical understanding as information is selective and one-sided, and must be assessed as such. The diary first mentions that on May 15th, “The building is full with soldiers”1, conveying the organized nature of the coup due to the presence of extensive military support. This shows support of a planned revolution from Latvian political actors besides Ulmanis, supporting that he acted in the interests of the state alongside internal supporters. However, the source fails to mention the extent of military power present, hindering a comprehensive understanding of broader social support and whether his policies were supported by the Latvian people or if he seized power for his own gain. On May 15, Munters described a meeting with the Saeima (the Latvian parliament) as “end[ing] calmly and quickly”2 because they were unaware of Ulmanis’ plans to disintegrate it. They perhaps regarded Ulmanis as a trusted political ally, supporting the notion that Ulmanis acted in his own self-interest as he did not attempt to negotiate with the Saeima or reform Latvia democratically. On May 16, “Some socialists were dismissed”3, highlighting selective political repression directly after the coup, suggesting motive more about removing opponents than stabilizing the government.
‘Ultimate Freedom- No Choice: The Culture of Authoritarianism in Latvia’ by Deniss Hanvos and Valdis Tēraudkalns; Translated from Latvian
The 2013 book, diligently cited with domestic sources, offers a holistic perspective of Ulmanis’ coup. Published 79 years after the events, the authors incorporate ample primary sources, untainted by Soviet biases, with the purpose of providing a valuable, holistic analysis of Ulmanis’ motives for seizing power. They analyse the role of ideology, the Latvian parliamentary system, and Ulmanis, using an objective lens associated with the lessened emotions of historical hindsight. The wide scope compares Ulmanis’ reign to the “Cruel policies”4 of the Nazi regime, Mussolini5, and authoritarian Baltic states to contextualize the rule of the lesser-known leader and understand his potential motives. Particularly relevant to this paper is the first chapter, ‘Prehistory of the Coup, Its Context’6, where Hanovs’ and Tēraudkalns’ assess Latvia’s political climate, elucidating whether Ulmanis’ claims of fixing Latvia’s collapsing government were valid. This is valuable as it forms the basis of two of my three core arguments, providing long and short-term context. However, the purpose of the source is to inform readers about authoritarian rule in Latvia from 1934 to 1940. The broad time period limits the analysis as information regarding the coup has less depth, not directly linking to the research question. Moreover, both authors present an anti-authoritarian tone, lacking focus on Ulmanis’ personal motives and centering on the culture surrounding him, with more analysis on the ‘political instability’ angle of the research question, leading to an imbalance. Nevertheless, the presence of two authors creates a diverse, inherently peer-reviewed work with analysis from both Hanovs and Tēraudkalns. They specialize in Baltic and cultural studies, respectively, expertise directly relevant to the 1934 coup in Latvia. Hence, they offer a culture-centric perspective important for nuanced analysis.
Section 2: Investigation
Upon staging a bloodless coup for rule over Latvia in 1934, Kārlis Ulmanis claimed that it was “called for by the actual political situation”7 necessary for the nation’s stability. However, modern-day discourse has caused re-evaluation of this narrative. In his seminal 2011 book, Ščerbinskis notes three main interpretations of the coup among historians: broader socio-economic context, genuine short-term government unrest, and Ulmanis’s long-term desire for power8. This distinction provides a framework for the analysis. Hence, this investigation will argue that whilst contextual factors such as Latvia’s state of mistrust and collapse may have assisted in catalysing the coup, primary documents and contemporary historiographies have revealed that Ulmanis exaggerated these claims in the self-interest of gaining authoritarian power on May 15, 1934.
Before investigating the short-term factors, an examination of the wider socioeconomic context of Latvia’s political climate is crucial to understanding why there was governmental reform in 1934. Jēkabsons argues that civilians and politicians were hesitant to embrace democracy after experiencing the Russian Empire9, and were reluctant to repeat its system in Latvia. Ščerbinskis argues the “Zeitgeist phenomena”10 as a foreign determinant; authoritarian rule was becoming a trend in Europe during the early 1930s and may have led more Latvians to embrace Ulamanis’ regime. If both Ulmanis and the public were in support of a governmental system that would improve Latvia’s political situation, this may have motivated him to implement his regime under the incentive to help the people. Latvia’s Baltic neighbor, Lithuania, had established authoritarian rule in 192611 under Smetona, followed by Estonia in 193412 under Konstantin Päts. Sandwiched between these nations and influenced by other European autocrats such as Hitler and Mussolini13, Malte Rolf suggests Ulmanis was highly inspired by the political culture that surrounded him, and wanted Latvian prosperity as observed in other European autocracies. In fact, Rolf noted similarities in Ulmanis’s domestic and foreign policies with other authoritarian European states, suggesting a strong correlation between Europe’s climate and Ulmanis’s actions14. Moreover, Latvia was recovering from the great depression in 193015, where “all sectors of Latvian economy and society were affected”16. This may have contributed to domestic unrest, as the stagnant government did nothing to support the economy and society, causing Ulmanis to react to these factors and implement authoritarian rule as a way to replicate the policies of other authoritarian states.
Having addressed the context, the conventional narrative by Ulmanis posits that critical short-term issues with the Latvian parliament made it necessary for him to revolt and take power. While this portrayal has faced criticism by historians such as Ščerbinskis and Krūmiņš, many of its aspects nevertheless hold merit as relevant factors and deserve consideration. The Latvian Saeima was characterized by many small parties, resulting in infighting and minimal progress being made in parliament17. This is exemplified by the 1928 parliamentary elections, where 128 candidates applied to the Saeima, with only 28% gaining representation18. This pattern led to a government that had “gone to seed”19, continuing until the 1934 coup, which suggests the need for governmental reform. However, its validity is questionable as under Ulmanis’ authoritarian rule, there would be even less government representation, contributing to further unrest. Additionally, genuine instability in Latvia was characterized by far-right unions, such as the illegal Pērkonkrusts [Thunder Cross]20, of which Ulmanis was allegedly afraid would plan their own coup21. Naturally, this would have created vast political unrest due to the sudden change in ruling of an unpopular party. However, by staging his own coup, Ulmanis threatened to create the same issues that he accused the Pērkonkrusts of creating. In his diary, Munters noted that “Pērkonkrusts are all old people”22, underscoring their ideology as outdated and unpreferred; it is worth noting that this was the perspective given by someone opposed to Pērkonkrusts and may have exaggerated the opposition to this group without evidence. Nevertheless, such notions support the idea of an unstable political climate before the coup and a genuine threat that Ulmanis felt the need to fix.
Whilst political unrest in 1934 was evident, it is commonly neglected that Ulmanis had been planning to obtain power much earlier than May of 1934, falsifying his claims of fixing the recent instability that plagued the nation. By April of 1934, Ulmanis was already communicating with the head of German intelligence, Ernst Muzinger, relaying the “possibility [of] an authoritarian system led by him”23, thus revealing the coup as a premeditated plan of power acquisition. This source is crucial in understanding Ulamnis’ motive as it not only shows genuine plans to overthrow the government, but an interest in autocratic leadership “led by him”, suggesting reasons of personal gain. Jēkabsons claims that Ulmanis began contemplating the coup’s organization in the early 1930s, beginning to plan more realistically in 193324. This is supported by Ščerbinskis’ analysis of primary sources, which indicate that Ulmanis intended to perform a coup multiple times, beginning on 18 November 193325. Hence, he argues a long-term, consistently planned takeover of the Latvian government, even before political unrest came to Ulmanis’ claimed tipping point in May of 1934. Moreover, as noted by Munters in his diary, the dismissal of “some socialists”26 conveys how Ulmanis vanquished any political powers he considered adversarial in the hopes of maintaining his power. This is supported by the fact that upon consolidating power on May 16th, Ulmanis had around “500 political opponents"27 arrested and sent to a concentration camp, reinforcing his need to consolidate individual power and eliminate opposition, not improve the political climate. Additionally, his so-called ‘personality cult’28 and charismatic persona served as driving evidence for his desire to be Latvia’s leader for personal gain, and positively impacted his consolidation of power as he claimed to free Latvia from multi-party chaos. The establishment of his title as ‘Vadonis’29 (leader) of Latvia presents Ulmanis as corrupted by self-centred motives, as he prioritized gaining support for himself but not necessarily his improved way of governing. By combining “the State with his personality”30 after taking power, Ulmanis revealed his desire to lead a nation with him at the forefront, using propaganda to gain the support of the people and create a nation for himself.
Ultimately, Ulmanis’ reasoning for establishing rule in Latvia in 1934 to fix political instability has been challenged by historians such as Jēkabsons and Ščerbinskis, who claim his desire to become the authoritarian leader of the state overshadowed any governmental disgruntlement. Although the presence of long-term civil unrest and parliamentary instability are indisputable factors in the lead-up to authoritarian statesmanship, this investigation has highlighted Ulmanis’ persistent and aggressive thirst for power, one which could only be quenched with total rule over the nation.
Section 3: Reflection
The acquisition of sufficient secondary and primary sources was a challenge as the historiography surrounding Latvia is already limited, oftentimes overshadowed by its neighbour, Russia, highlighting the difficulties historians face in performing holistic research. The source issue is magnified by the general historiographical deficits of Eastern Europe in comparison with the West; countries like Latvia were trapped within the borders of Soviet territory, viewed by the rest of the world as unsettling, leading to a lack of attention by historians. Whilst Munters’ diary entries provided valuable insight into the inner workings of the coup, they were one of the only publications relevant to my question and credible enough for this IA. Even so, the inherent bias that Munters had towards Ulmanis as a supporter of his is recognized as a limitation of the source, and overcome by comparing Munters’ recollection of events with secondary analysis of the coup to ensure cohesiveness. Common sources, evaluated and discarded in early research, included recent Latvian news articles lacking in credibility, analysis, and depth. I overcame this by exploring the bibliographies of the few sources I had and using them to widen my collection of research. Particularly useful was Jēkabsons’ work ‘Coup D’Etat in Latvia in 1964 and Reactions Abroad’, as its extensive bibliography led me to key historians used, such as Ščerbinskis. Whilst I did not end up with an abundance of research on the topic, making it difficult to formulate holistic research, a few well-chosen sources proved enough for meaningful analysis. The limited number of sources, paired with the specificity of my research question, helped me focus on Ulmanis’ motives, as there was relatively little ‘distracting’ information that would cause me to stray from the topic.
Another issue raised by this study is the potential oversimplification of sources. Throughout my investigation, I realized just how important the phrase ‘to what extent’ is in history; although I concluded that Ulmanis acted mainly in self-interest, there is no doubt that the political climate leading to 1934 was pertinent to Ulmanis’ decision to stage the coup. After reading Ščerbinskis, for example, I was able to structure my analysis to allow for multiple perspectives on Ulmanis’s motives for a more nuanced argument. Originally, my research question was exploring which motive Ulmanis had for the coup, not allowing for more than one perspective to be true, limiting and oversimplifying my research. However, as supported by Hanovs’s and Teraudkalns’s work, Ulmanis’s motives cannot be singularly summarized, and evaluating this source made me realize that the research question should be made more flexible, so I could reach a more nuanced and realistic conclusion.
Bibliography
Hanovs, Deniss, and Valdis Tēraudkalns. 2013. Ultimate Freedom – No Choice: The Culture of Authoritarianism in Latvia, 1934–1940. Leiden: Brill.
Jēkabsons, Ēriks. 2024. “Coup D’etat in Latvia in 1964 and Reactions Abroad.” Zapiski Historyczne, (June), 62-92.
Kott, Matthew. 2015. “Latvia’s Pērkonkrusts: Anti-German National Socialism in a Facistogenic Milieu.” Facism, (November), 169-193.
Krēsliņš, Uldis. 2018. “15 May 1934 Coup D’état In Latvia: Regularity Of Development Of The Existing Parliamentary System Or A Breakthrough Called By The Actual Situation. The View Of The Usa Legation In Latvia.” Latvijas Vēstures Institūta Žurnāls 3:73-87.
Munters, Vilhelms. 1934. “Dienasgrāmata [diary entry] 15-17 May 1934.” Latvijas Vēstnieks. https://www.vestnesis.lv/ta/id/22081.
Oppermann, Paula. 2024. “The World Economic Crisis. Jewish Experiences and Responses in Latvi.” Journal of the Fondazione CDEC 26 (2).
Rogainis, Janis. 1971. “The Emergence Of An Authoritarian Regime In Latvia, 1932-1934.” Lithuanian Quarterly Journal Of Arts And Sciences 17 (Fall).
Rolf, Malte. 2009. Sovetskie massovye prazdniki. Moscow: ROSSPEN.
Ščerbinskis, Valters. 2011. “Leaders, Divided Society and Crisis. The Coup d’État of 1934 in Latvia, its Causes and Consequences.” Forgotten Pages of Baltic History, 187-209.
Ščerbinskis, Valters, and Ēriks Jēkabsons. 2012. 1934. gada 15. maija apvērsums: cēloņi, norise un sekas, Apvērsums. 1934. gada 15. maija notikumi avotos un pētījumos, 26.
My comments/grading for this IA:
Section A 5/6
Question clearly stated and two appropriate, relevant sources selected. For first source, origin and purpose are accurately identified and the evaluation links these to value for investigating Ulmanis’s actions and implied motives during time in question in the content. For second source origin, purpose, and content used to explain relevance through political and cultural context. Evaluation is detailed overall, but maybe consistently enough for 6.
Section B 11/15
Generally clear and organised, with line of argument that moves from context to short-term instability to longer-term intent. Evidence from range of sources is used to support the argument, including both primary reference and multiple historians. Critical analysis is shown such as when weighing instability claims against evidence of planning and consolidation of power. Analysis though sometimes under-developed with some claims relying on historians’ assertions rather than being tested, but may be harsh and essay argues to a reasoned conclusion.
Section C 3 /4
Reflection is focused on historians’ methods and challenges, with explicit links to the investigation through discussion of limited historiography, source availability, and dealing with bias in Munters’s diary by comparison with secondary analysis. Shows clear awareness of how selection, scarcity, and perspective affect conclusions. Felt some points expressed in general terms and concentrate on process instead of explaining what these issues revealed about historical method and its limits in this specific IA.
