From the IBDP History Paper 3 HL exam:
This essay received 10/20 from the IBO
With examiner comments:
This essay received 7/20 from the IBO:
Revision Notes:
Outline:
Reform in Russia always followed military defeat, as it did in the 1980s.
A. Tolstoy fought in the Russian army in the Caucasus against the Chechens and against “the West” when Britain and France attacked Russia in the Crimean War in 1856. The humiliating defeat in the Crimea led to serf revolts and general unrest.
1. The young Emperor Alexander II (tsar from 1855–1881) realized that if the peasants were not freed from above, they would soon free themselves from below and that Russia needed to catch up with the West.
2. The most important reform was emancipation of the serfs in 1861, but this presented a huge problem:
Liberating the serfs risked the destruction of the basis of the entire regime.
3. The nobility as a land-owning class was vital to the monarchy, and to take away their serfs might ruin them economically.
4. The final scheme was cunning. All personal serfdom was abolished, and the peasants were to receive land from the landlords and pay them for it. The state advanced the money to the landlords and recovered it from the peasants in 49 annual sums known as redemption payments.
5. The peasants got a raw deal. The average holding was tiny (less than 10 acres), and redemption
payments were high.
6. The peasant commune now had legal responsibility for those payments, which was a way of
reinforcing the mir and preventing anarchy at the base of society by slowing movement to towns.
7. Another reform affected Tolstoy’s position, the introduction of the zemstvo, a local assembly that
functioned as a body of provincial self-government in Russia from 1864 to 1917. Each district elected representatives, who had control over education, public health, roads, and aid to agriculture and commerce. The district zemstvos elected committees and delegates to the provincial assemblies, which in turn, elected an executive committee for the province.
8. The local nobles, such as Tolstoy, could represent themselves for the first time. Tolstoy was, first and foremost, a noble landlord.
1. War and Peace was written in the years 1863 to 1869, the years of the emancipation of the serfs and other reforms. On his estate, Tolstoy had to face the consequences.
2. War and Peace tells the story of the Russian struggle against the Napoleonic Empire between 1805
and 1815. Though the book is set in a period 60 years earlier, the reform era of the 1860s plays an important, if not obvious, part in it. Tolstoy became more and more hostile to artificial and abstract plans for reform, especially those imported from the West.
3. Tolstoy belonged to the so-called Slavophile side in the debate on modernization and reform. He believed in the unique communal principles of Russian peasant life.
4. The Russian people defeated the West in the form of Napoleon and his army, as portrayed in War and Peace, but Tolstoy believed that they must also reject Western-style schemes, plans, and models.
Sample Essay: Problems in Russia in the 1800s and Alexander II’s Reforms
When Tsar Nicholas I passed away in 1855, he left the country in a state some may describe as a national entropy. There were numerous problems, which were now Alexander II’s (Nicholas I’s eldest son and successor) to resolve. This essay will venture to concern itself with the difficulties encountered within the Russian military as well as social, economic and political predicaments which arose or had already emerged during/before the era of “the Liberator”. Furthermore it will examine the course of action undertaken by the Tsar in an effort to rectify the unfavourable circumstances.
A matter of great significance in the 19th century was the military. This was not only a substantial fraction of Russia, but that of any functional country in Europe at the time. One grave dysfunction of the Russian army was the fact that it consisted predominantly of serfs (=peasants) which had been sold to the army by their owners.1 In the early 1850s, the army consisted of around 900,000 regular soldiers, with a percentage of around 80% - 95% being peasants.2 This can be and evidently was detrimental to the general efficiency of a military force, as the majority of soldiers are likely to lack true enthusiasm and devotion. Before the emancipation, serfs were given no true reason to fight for their country. Their government treated them as property and failed to grant them any freedom or adequate reward for their labour, so naturally it was in their interest to see this system collapse. It is therefore plausible to proclaim an extensive demotivation within the army. With intentions of removing this injustice and henceforth creating a more spirited and forceful army, Alexander II had introduced conscription to all classes by 1870.3 Young men from all social stratums were now being compulsorily enlisted. As a result of this sudden abundance of soldiers, the service time could be reduced from 25 years to 15 years and training/education for soldiers was widely improved by, for example, investing more in the facilities.4 Military tax was raised by the Zemstvo as well as the Duma in order to support this by providing the financial means needed for these improvements.5
A further weighty hindrance was the ratio of leader to obstacle. Alexander II was often left in a quandary as he was only one man facing the problems of a nation. One man could not travel the land by horse and carriage, personally collecting taxes from each individual commune. He could not simply pursue all criminals on the run and bring them to justice. Essentially it was important for the Tsar to have an assemblage of staff members to handle these affairs. This issue was widely resolved with the initiation of the Zemstvo in 1864.6 This was a form of local government which consisted of a representative council and of an executive board. All social classes were now permitted to take part in the voting process and hence even peasants were represented in the councils. The Zemstva were primarily in charge of collecting tax money, settling land issues as well as local legal disputes. In essence, they were the local representatives of a main national legislature.7
An inconvenient aspect of Russia’s financial state of affairs was the eminent prevalence of corruption. At one point in time it was legal for government officials to use the means of the state for their own asset, this form of bureaucracy was known as the ‘Kormlenie’.8 In 1715 however, as officials began to receive fixed salaries, inducement became a crime. Though the Kormlenie made various reappearances followed by disappearances throughout the reigns of several Tsars, its illegality was eventually finalized by Alexander II in 1864.9 Nevertheless, the allocations of tax money were not conspicuous to the Russian citizen.10 Generally Russian state finances were a nebulous matter, which made it effortless for anyone who is presented with the opportunity to use governmental funds for their own benefit. Eventually the Tsar gave rise to a more transparent national budget.11 The tax payer was now more or less correctly informed of how the money was being utilized.12 This is crucial to a functioning relationship between government and tax payer, seeing as the ill informed citizen is likely to question and eventually resist or challenge the system. This national budget transparency did not include the Tsar, however.
Perhaps one of the most eminent difficulties in Russia during the 19th century was the social division. One third of the countries population in 1855 comprised agricultural workers. These peasants (about 80% of the total population) were either owned by landlords or by the state. Essentially the gentry had absolute supremacy over peasantry.13 This comes to show that the vast preponderance of Russians were living in burdensome, strenuous circumstances and had no actual quality of life. The labor on the seemingly boundless fields was arduous and unsafe and the majority of money and harvest had to be relinquished. There was no gain for the peasants, so they were bound to begin questioning and eventually resisting. This was a scenario which had to be avoided by all means, seeing as a revolt of the serfdom (80% of the population!) would result in substantial economic difficulties. In an effort to create better living conditions and thereby prevent this from taking place, Alexander II signed the ‘Emancipation Edict’ in 1861.14 This essentially allowed peasants to own their own agricultural land. They were granted freedom of choice regarding what they wanted to do and be where they wanted to be at any given time, so in essence they were no longer owned. Though it sounds far more humanitarian on paper than slavery, it didn’t really change much as far as the lifestyle of the peasantry is concerned. They were still forced to work the same type of labour in order to make a living. In addition, they were forced to live in communes (also known as Mir) in order to make tax collection an easier affair.15 The nobles now received the majority of tax money in order to compensate for the new-found shortage of slaves. Peasants families were issued a piece of arable land according to the amount of children in the family. If a child died, the land was reallocated to another family.16 Whether or or not the emancipation of serfs in 1855 was truly in the interest of the peasants, is presently still controversial amongst historians.17
In conclusion, the problems of sheer size of the country in combination with the major social divisions were a sizeable responsibility for the Tsar to tackle, though generally the reforms of Alexander II can be viewed as a success toward modernizing Russia. Though the above were not the only reforms lead into action by the Tsar, they were definitely substantial in shaping Russia as we know it today.
1 http://www.fsmitha.com/h3/h47-ru.htm 2 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imperial_Russian_Army 3 Notes 4 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conscription_in_Russia 5 http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-12428.html 6 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Russia_%281855%E2%80%931892%29 7 Video shown in class 8 http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/257 9 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corruption_in_Russia 10 Notes 11 Notes 12 http://www.pgexchange.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=158&Itemid=153 13 Textbook, p. 16-17 14 https://sites.google.com/site/ibhistoryrussia/syllabus-overview---imperial-russia/alexander-ii 15 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Obshchina 16 http://historyofrussia.org/emancipation-of-the-serfs/ 17 http://heathenhistory.co.uk/russia/forums/topic/does-alexander-the-iind-deserve-the-title-tsar-liberator/
International Baccalaureate
Extended Essay
History
Compare and Contrast the Reforms of
Tsars Alexander II and Alexander III of Russia in connection with the
peasantry.
Abstract
“Compare and contrast the reforms of Tsars
Alexander II and Alexander III of Russia in connection with the peasantry”.
As a result
of these two very distinguished rules, the sentence above shall be the
objective of this essay and a conclusion will be reached by taking into
consideration the reforms - social, constitutional and military - that each of
the Tsars integrated into the Russian society during their reign. The time
frame in reference to these reforms is between 1855, when Alexander II began
his rule, until Alexander III’s death and consequently the end of his reign in
1894.
By exploring
the similarities and differences between the reigns of Alexander II and
Alexander III, this essay aims to identify which of the two Tsars’ reforms
would have provided the more favourable outcome as regards the suppression of
the insurrectionist peasant class.
This is an
important topic to investigate because it provides some of the background and
reasons why the peasant class eventually became disgruntled with the Tsarist
rule and attempted a revolution. This topic would be worth considering for anyone
interested in examining the aforementioned causal links as well as
investigating the reasons behind Alexander III’s noticeably distinctive rule.
This essay
intends to gather information regarding any events during the lives of both
Alexander II and Alexander III, which might have had an influence on their
later dealings with the peasantry as well as what kind of beliefs the two may
have held. Furthermore, it shall also find information concerning their social
reforms (education, politics, and military) so that a compare and contrast
method may be utilized in order to determine which of the two Tsars had the
more efficient way of handling the peasant class. This information will be
gathered using a collection of literature written
on or around the topic. Such as: Russia in the Age of Alexander II, Tolstoy and
Dostoevsky, Russia, 1855-1991: From Tsars to Commissars, Russia
1848-1917 and by also looking at first hand accounts
quoted/referenced within.
Compare
and Contrast the attitudes of Tsars Alexander II and Alexander III of Russia
towards the peasantry.
Introduction:
‘Like father
like son’. This is an expression that one hears a lot in everyday life and finds
quite often to be true, anecdotally speaking. However, if this is to be the
case, then why was Alexander II known as “a great reformer” and Alexander III known as
“a great reactionary”? By extension, were both
Tsars equally admired or disliked; or did their policies and methods of ruling
create distinctions between the two? In line with these thoughts, this essay
would like to compare and contrast the reigns of Tsar Alexander II (1855 - 1881) and his son Tsar Alexander
III (1881 - 1894)
of Russia.
The approach
will be to look at different aspects of reforms (social, military and
political) of each Tsar and to determine wherein the similarities lie and the
differences in order to ascertain which had most effective attitude towards the
peasantry. The level of effectiveness here is calculated by examining the
intent of each reform based on intent, namely, how closely the outcome mirrored
the design of the initial concept and whether or not that worked to fuel or
subdue the revolutionary attitude becoming ever more prevalent during the late
1800s.
For each
section, this essay will consider first the reforms of Alexander II, then
Alexander III, followed by a third paragraph in which the effectiveness of the
reforms will be compared. Thereafter it will be stated which Tsar had the most
effective reform(s) in that particular branch of social policies and thus the
better attitude toward the peasantry.
The thesis,
therefore, is that it is in the opinion of this essay that Tsar Alexander III
had the more successful and effective reign as regards his ability to quell
social unrest amongst the peasant class.
The Social Reforms of
Alexander II and Alexander III
Alexander
II:
In 1863, Alexander II
brought about important education reforms, which entitled universities to a
much greater level of autonomy in
their affairs. In addition to this, there was the Elementary School Statute of
1864, which was instituted to aid in the combat against high illiteracy rates
among the serfs, or peasants. Women were even given the opportunity to receive
enough education to pursue careers as teachers and in 1878, the Bestuzhev
higher learning courses for women was created and saw a very positive response
judging by the number of applicants. This
was a move in the direction of change as, before this educational reform was
implemented, the system of education had come under extreme oppression and
surveillance from Nicholas I. There was even a high demand for these
schools by the peasants, however, that demand did not have as much to do with
the new reforms, as Alexander would have liked. It
actually originated from the peasants’ knowledge that being capable of reading
and writing meant serving a shorter term of service in the military as well as quenching
their thirst for salvation through the reading of holy books.
Despite
this, historian David Saunders still makes the remark that the liberal policies
of the government made the schools into “powder kegs” and teaching lectures
“appeared to be serving not only academic and economic purposes but also the
promotion of political instability.” Therefore
Saunders believed that although the reform did much to ameliorate the standard
of education throughout the nation, it seemed also that it was precipitating
feelings of political turbulence.
Alexander III:
Whereas
Alexander II’s reforms enabled almost everyone to receive primary schooling,
relaxed censorship laws and encouraged children to attend school and
university, Alexander III did the opposite, imposing on Russia a level of
“bureaucratic and police-rule more intense than the country had ever known,” seen
at first with the enactment of the “Statute Concerning Measures for the
Protection of State Security and the Social Order” decree, which was initially
intended to only be in operation for a short while but continued until 1917 and
subjected the entire nation to “regulations similar to martial law”. After Alexander II’s assassination in 1881,
the state received the power from the Second State Duma to pursue
revolutionaries, meaning that at any time they could declare a section of the
country under “extraordinary protection.”
This entailed banning public gatherings,
closing schools and universities and charging individuals for political crimes
and holding them in prison without trail, regardless of whether they were
guilty or not. This went directly against one of Alexander II’s legal reforms
in which Russians were offered the chance to have a fair trail for
the first time in November 1864. Restrictive Press Laws were set up in 1881;
education came under close government control, striving to limit opposition and
revolutionary ideas to the best of their ability. School fees were increased in
order to keep those of lower class—those suspected to be most involved with the
revolutionaries—away from any kind of formal education. The peasants were at
first reluctant to rise against the Tsar but in the long run, these new social
forces began to highlight contradictions in society, leading to social unrest
amongst the peasants.
Seeing
as the point behind both of these reforms was the same—to stamp out any insurgents
or insurgent ideas—the lack of revolutionary disturbances and the peaceful
reign of Alexander III clearly shows that his repression of opposition had been
successful. Therefore, it is in the opinion of this essay that this venture of
snuffing out opposition fulfilled its full intent and was more effective than
the reforms implemented by Alexander II.
The Constitutional Reforms of Alexander II and
Alexander III:
Alexander II:
Having to
face the aftermath of the Crimean war and the ‘backwards’ label it consequently
handed Russia, Alexander II was thrown into a different political and social
climate to the one experienced by his father, Nicholas I. Therefore, he found
that in order to do all he could to prevent peasant uprisings due to social
unrest, he had to implement many new reforms, the most famous of which was the
Emancipation Edict of 1861. This
notion was more than welcomed by the over twenty-two million serfs and other
liberal intellectuals in Russia but heavily opposed by the landowners. There
were even 647 peasant riots in the first four months following the publication
of the Edict.
However,
though the serfs were now free, they found themselves still having to buy or
rent land from their former masters. The areas granted to the serfs were often
too small and landlords charged inflated prices, leaving millions in hopeless
poverty and debt, which did not in any way help with the much needed
transformation of the serfs into a prosperous new class of consumers. In addition, according to historian
Orlando Figes, “any government trying to change the basic system of property
owning throughout the entire country is taking the risk of becoming deeply
unpopular, especially with the people whose land their expropriating… the serfs
were property. ‘Property’-owning meant serfs and land.”
The
full intent of the Emancipation Reform was not realized in that it had two main
objectives: proclaim the emancipation of serfs on private estates as well as
the domestic serfs and grant them full rights as citizens, meaning they could
now own property and a business. However, Alexander II’s reform had only
succeeded in alienating the principle classes in Russia - he was unable to earn
the gratitude of the peasants and simultaneously lost the devotion of the
nobility.
Alexander III:
Alexander
III did not use such moderate methods as his father. As a result of his
father’s assassination by The People’s Will he resorted
to his conservative instincts, instilled in him through his education by his
tutor Pobedonostsev, a
conservative, and soon ceased all proposed constitutions, perhaps acting on the
advice he had been receiving from Pobedonostsev even prior to his father’s death.
Like his father, Alexander III was also focusing a large amount of his time and
energy on dealing with the peasantry, but that is where the similarities end.
Despite the fact that both men were trying to bring about peace within their
nation, their methods were poles apart.
Alexander
II was attempting to do so through appeasement because he knew it was “better
to begin abolishing serfdom from above than to wait for it to begin to abolish
itself from below.”. In
contrast, Alexander III’s main interest at the time was the suppression of the
very rapidly growing opposition groups, dubbed ‘Populists’,
whom of which had a proclivity for terrorism and assassination. In
1887, in an effort to revive the opposition, an attempt was made on the Tsar’s
life but failed
and as the efficiency of the Okhrana,
political police,
increased, opposition died down for the time being.
Between 1881 and 1894, Alexander III and his government added conservative
alterations to Alexander II’s reforms. For example, Land Captains were
introduced in 1889 and consisted solely of nobility.
These Land Captains had total authority in local administration and had the
power to override the zemstva.
Changes in the way the voting system functioned reduced the peasant
self-government,
giving them less power with which to protest or use against Alexander III. Alexander’s
policy of Land Captains was so effective in its intent that former serfs feared
that he might go as far to reinstitute serfdom. He did not ever take such
action, however, in 1893 he banned peasants from leaving the mir,
thereby gaining full control of their freedom to move around. Alexander III had
almost all but completely done away with his father’s emancipation reforms by
now, and achieving much better results.
The Military Reforms of Alexander II and
Alexander III:
Alexander II:
On
January 1st, 1847, Alexander II began the universal military conscription.
Every man over twenty was made liable to conscription,
irrespective of his social class, if medically able to do so. Harsh
corporate punishments and the branding of soldiers were done away with in an
effort to improve the professionalism of the officer corps. All members of the
military who lacked an elementary education were to receive it. Alexander II
even set up reserve soldiers. Those who joined the army were also given shorter
sentences, which meant that joining was no longer a ‘life sentence.’ Six years
service for conscripts, followed by nine years in the reserve and five spent in
the militia was now the requirements instead of 25 years. As a
result, the military reserve was raised from 210,000 to 553,000 by 1870.
The second main military reform implemented by Alexander II was to improve the competency of the soldiers. Count Dmitry Milyutin, Minister of War, was in charge of the far-reaching military reforms that changed the face of the Russian army during Alexander II’s reign[39]. Milyutin created a more civilized and efficient army through his reforms. The
training and discipline of the soldiers no longer made up of brutal mistreatment,
such as flogging or ‘running the gauntlet’ and
he effectuated military cadet schools and colleges in order for the officers to
be well trained.
The intent of Alexander’s military reforms were to expand the Russian army and
strengthen it after their brutally embarrassing defeat in the Crimea and
without a doubt this is exactly what he was able to accomplish.
The
peasantry reacted positively to this, no longer feeling that they were being
forced into a life-long sentence when joining the army. They were also
contented with the fact that nobles were no longer exempt from conscription.
Alexander III:
Alexander
III’s military reforms were very similar to those of his father if not exactly
the same. When it came to that aspects of their nation, they both wanted the
same thing—a strong military that would be ready and able to fight and defend
Russia should the need present itself. This was one area in which the
similarities in their reforms can be seen. Alexander III continued to do away
with the barbaric forms of punishment used in the army and to replace them with
more productive methods. He also managed avoided any foreign wars from 1881-1894,
rightly earning himself the title ‘The Peacemaker’.
This period of peace allowed the army to continue to grow and gain new skills
through the cadet training schools implemented by Milyutin during Alexander
II’s reign. There was also ample opportunity now for Russia to move towards
industrialization.
The
peasants, still experiencing a bitter aftertaste of the Crimean war, would most
likely have been very please with this. And they would have been able to be a
part of their country’s regrowth into the strong force it had been prior to
1853 when the war began.
Conclusion:
The aim of
this essay was to closely examine a few of the reforms of Russian Tsars
Alexander II and Alexander III in order to determine which of the two men had
the better and more effective rule. The idea was to do this by considering how
well Tsarist oppression was either simply subdued or completely eradicated. It
is safe to say that while neither of them managed to do the latter, Alexander
III was the palpable victor in this regard. Despite Alexander II’s endeavors to
please as many factions of Russia as possible, the best description of his
ventures is with the modern day aphorism: “You can please some of the people
some of the time, but you can’t please all of the people all of the time.” And
it was true in his case; he either had the gentry at his every beck and call or
he had the support of the peasants, but never both; the new freedom granted
through his reforms lead to unrealistic expectations of the Tsar and when these
were not being met, opposition began to peak again. Alexander
III lacked the support of these two principle groups as well, however, that was
never his intention. After his father’s assassination, he had grown fearful of
terrorist groups
- so much so that he resided in Gatchina instead of the Winter Palace - and did
all in his power to crush their rebellion.
When
one completely dissects the reforms made by both men, a mutual goal can be
clearly seen - avert an insurgency of the peasantry. And though it is
debatable that without Alexander II there would have been no foundation for his
son to build upon, if one does choose to take that side of the argument then
the fact that Alexander II was assassinated by the very people whom he had
tried to help, irrespective of the immediate results of his reforms, would
render the argument that Alexander II provided a basis for a peaceful and successful
rule for Alexander III void.
Bibliography:
Works cited:
Books:
I.
Peter Oxley, Oxford Advanced History: Russia: 1855
- 1991, From Tsars to Commissars (Oxford University Press, 2001)
II.
Olga Bain, University Autonomy: Higher Education In
Russia Since Perestroika (Taylor & Francis, May 1, 2003)
III.
Nicholas Valentine Riasanovsky, Nicholas I and
Official Nationality in Russia, 1825-55 (University of California Press,
1959)
IV.
William Mills Todd III, Literature and Society in
Imperial Russia, 1800 - 1914 (Stanford University Press, 1978
V.
David
Saunders, Russia in the age of reaction and reform 1801 - 1881
(Longmann, 1992)
VI.
Michael Kort, The Soviet Colossus: History and
Aftermath (M.E Sharpe, Jan 1, 2001)
VII.
Jonathan Bromley, Russia 1848 - 1917(Heinemann,
2002)
VIII.
Roxanne Easley, The Emancipation of the Serfs in
Russia: Peace Arbitrators and the Development of Civil Society (Taylor
& Francis, Aug. 15, 2008)
IX.
Junius P. Rodriguez, The Historical Encyclopedia of
World Slavery (ABC-CLIO, Jan 1, 1997)
X.
Walter Moss, Russia in the Age of Alexander II,
Tolstoy and Dostoevsky (Anthem Press, Jan. 1, 2002)
XI.
Sally Waller, History for the IB Diploma: Imperial
Russia, Revolutions and the Emergence of the Soviet State 1853 - 1924 (Cambridge
University Press)
XII.
J.N. Westwood,
Russia Against Japan, 1904 -1905: A New Look at the Russo-Japanese War
(SUNY Press, 1986)
Electronic sources:
II.
Bragg, Melvyn: Figes, Orlando; Catriona, Kelly;
Lieven, Dominic, Tsar Alexander II’s Assassination, BBC: In Our Time,
Jan. 6th, 2005 (podcast)
Appendix:
A letter to the future
Alexander III, 4th December, 1879, from the Procurator of the Holy Synod, K. P
Pobedonostsev:
“All
the officials and learned men here sicken my heart, as if I were in the company
of half-wits or perverted baboons. I hear from all sides that trite, deceitful
and accursed word: constitution… But I also meet and talk with some
Russian men… Their hearts are seized with
fear; above all else they fear that basic evil, a constitution. Among the
common people everywhere the thought is spreading; better a Russian revolution
and ugly turmoil than a constitution. The former could soon be repressed, with
order restored throughout the land; the latter is poison to the entire
organization.”
Footnotes:
[1] Peter Oxley, Oxford Advanced History: Russia: 1855 - 1991, From Tsars to Commissars (Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 51 [2] Ibid. [3] [3] John Etty, Primary Sources in Russian (First and Best in Education, 2009), p. 6 [4] Ibid. p. 45 [5] Olga Bain, University Autonomy: Higher Education In Russia Since Perestroika (Taylor & Francis, May 1, 2003) [6] Russian Federation - History and background [7] Nicholas Valentine Riasanovsky, Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia, 1825-55 (University of California Press, 1959), pgs. 213-218 [8] William Mills Todd III, Literature and Society in Imperial Russia, 1800 - 1914 (Stanford University Press, 1978), p. 123 [9] Ibid. [10] David Saunders, Russia in the age of reaction and reform 1801 - 1881 (Longmann, 1992), p. 251 [11] Michael Kort, The Soviet Colossus: History and Aftermath (M.E Sharpe, Jan 1, 2001), p. 24 [12] Michael Kort, The Soviet Colossus: History and Aftermath (M.E Sharpe, Jan 1, 2001), p. 24 [13] Marshall Shatz, Judith E. Zimmerman, Landmarks (M.E Sharpe, Jan 1, 1994), p. 112 [14] Peter Oxley, Oxford Advanced History: Russia: 1855 - 1991, From Tsars to Commissars (Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 44 [15] Jonathan Bromley, Russia 1848 - 1917(Heinemann, 2002), p. 32 [16]Bragg, Melvyn: Figes, Orlando; Catriona, Kelly; Lieven, Dominic, Tsar Alexander II’s Assassination, BBC: In Our Time, Jan. 6th, 2005 [17] Ibid. p. 176 [18] Roxanne Easley, The Emancipation of the Serfs in Russia: Peace Arbitrators and the Development of Civil Society (Taylor & Francis, Aug. 15, 2008) [19] Peter Oxley, Oxford Advanced History: Russia: 1855 - 1991, From Tsars to Commissars (Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 27 [20] Junius P. Rodriguez, The Historical Encyclopedia of World Slavery (ABC-CLIO, Jan 1, 1997), p. 561 [21] Bragg, Melvyn: Figes, Orlando; Catriona, Kelly; Lieven, Dominic, Tsar Alexander II’s Assassination, BBC: In Our Time, Jan. 6th, 2005 [22] Peter Oxley, Oxford Advanced History: Russia: 1855 - 1991, From Tsars to Commissars (Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 27 [23] Ibid. p. 37 [24] Ibid. p. 43 [25] See Appendix: A letter to Alexander III [26] Peter Oxley, Oxford Advanced History: Russia: 1855 - 1991, From Tsars to Commissars (Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 26 [27] Ibid. p. 52 [28] Ibid. [29] Jonathan Bromley, Russia 1848 - 1917(Heinemann, 2002), pgs. 79, 80 [30] Michael Kort, The Soviet Colossus: History and Aftermath (M.E Sharpe, Jan 1, 2001), pg. 24 [31] Ibid. p. 43 [32] Ibid. 26 p. 44 [33] Ibid. 26 p. 45 [34] Ibid. 26 [35] Ibid. 26 [36] Walter Moss, Russia in the Age of Alexander II, Tolstoy and Dostoevsky (Anthem Press, Jan. 1, 2002), p. 154 [37] Peter Oxley, Oxford Advanced History: Russia: 1855 - 1991, From Tsars to Commissars (Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 29 [38] Ibid. [39] Ibid. 36. [40] Sally Waller, History for the IB Diploma: Imperial Russia, Revolutions and the Emergence of the Soviet State 1853 - 1924 (Cambridge University Press), p. 46 [41] Ibid. [42] Ibid. [43] Ibid. 37. [44] Ibid. 40, p. 46 [45]Michael Kort, The Soviet Colossus: History and Aftermath (M.E Sharpe, Jan 1, 2001), pg. 25 [46] J.N. Westwood, Russia Against Japan, 1904 -1905: A New Look at the Russo-Japanese War (SUNY Press, 1986), p. 3 [47] Ibid. 45. [48] Peter Oxley, Oxford Advanced History: Russia: 1855 - 1991, From Tsars to Commissars (Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 33 [49] Sally Waller, History for the IB Diploma: Imperial Russia, Revolutions and the Emergence of the Soviet State 1853 - 1924 (Cambridge University Press), p. 76 [50] Peter Oxley, Oxford Advanced History: Russia: 1855 - 1991, From Tsars to Commissars (Oxford University Press, 2001)
