Problems in Russia in the 1800s and Alexander II’s Reforms

Revision Notes:

 Reform in Russia always followed military defeat, as it did in the 1980s.
A. Tolstoy fought in the Russian army in the Caucasus against the Chechens and against “the West” when Britain and France attacked Russia in the Crimean War in 1856. The humiliating defeat in the Crimea led to serf revolts and general unrest.
1. The young Emperor Alexander II (tsar from 1855–1881) realized that if the peasants were not freed from above, they would soon free themselves from below and that Russia needed to catch up with the West.

2. The most important reform was emancipation of the serfs in 1861, but this presented a huge problem:
Liberating the serfs risked the destruction of the basis of the entire regime.
3. The nobility as a land-owning class was vital to the monarchy, and to take away their serfs might ruin them economically.
4. The final scheme was cunning. All personal serfdom was abolished, and the peasants were to receive land from the landlords and pay them for it. The state advanced the money to the landlords and recovered it from the peasants in 49 annual sums known as redemption payments.
5. The peasants got a raw deal. The average holding was tiny (less than 10 acres), and redemption
payments were high.
6. The peasant commune now had legal responsibility for those payments, which was a way of
reinforcing the mir and preventing anarchy at the base of society by slowing movement to towns.
7. Another reform affected Tolstoy’s position, the introduction of the zemstvo, a local assembly that
functioned as a body of provincial self-government in Russia from 1864 to 1917. Each district elected representatives, who had control over education, public health, roads, and aid to agriculture and commerce. The district zemstvos elected committees and delegates to the provincial assemblies, which in turn, elected an executive committee for the province.
8. The local nobles, such as Tolstoy, could represent themselves for the first time. Tolstoy was, first and foremost, a noble landlord.
1. War and Peace was written in the years 1863 to 1869, the years of the emancipation of the serfs and other reforms. On his estate, Tolstoy had to face the consequences.
2. War and Peace tells the story of the Russian struggle against the Napoleonic Empire between 1805
and 1815. Though the book is set in a period 60 years earlier, the reform era of the 1860s plays an important, if not obvious, part in it. Tolstoy became more and more hostile to artificial and abstract plans for reform, especially those imported from the West.
3. Tolstoy belonged to the so-called Slavophile side in the debate on modernization and reform. He believed in the unique communal principles of Russian peasant life.
4. The Russian people defeated the West in the form of Napoleon and his army, as portrayed in War and Peace, but Tolstoy believed that they must also reject Western-style schemes, plans, and models.

Sample Essay: Problems in Russia in the 1800s and Alexander II’s Reforms

When Tsar Nicholas I passed away in 1855, he left the country in a state some may describe as a national entropy. There were numerous problems, which were now Alexander II’s (Nicholas I’s eldest son and successor) to resolve. This essay will venture to concern itself with the difficulties encountered within the Russian military as well as social, economic and political predicaments which arose or had already emerged during/before the era of “the Liberator”. Furthermore it will examine the course of action undertaken by the Tsar in an effort to rectify the unfavourable circumstances.

A matter of great significance in the 19th century was the military. This was not only a substantial fraction of Russia, but that of any functional country in Europe at the time. One grave dysfunction of the Russian army was the fact that it consisted predominantly of serfs (=peasants) which had been sold to the army by their owners.1 In the early 1850s, the army consisted of around 900,000 regular soldiers, with a percentage of around 80% - 95% being peasants.2 This can be and evidently was detrimental to the general efficiency of a military force, as the majority of soldiers are likely to lack true enthusiasm and devotion. Before the emancipation, serfs were given no true reason to fight for their country. Their government treated them as property and failed to grant them any freedom or adequate reward for their labour, so naturally it was in their interest to see this system collapse. It is therefore plausible to proclaim an extensive demotivation within the army. With intentions of removing this injustice and henceforth creating a more spirited and forceful army, Alexander II had introduced conscription to all classes by 1870.3 Young men from all social stratums were now being compulsorily enlisted. As a result of this sudden abundance of soldiers, the service time could be reduced from 25 years to 15 years and training/education for soldiers was widely improved by, for example, investing more in the facilities.4 Military tax was raised by the Zemstvo as well as the Duma in order to support this by providing the financial means needed for these improvements.5

A further weighty hindrance was the ratio of leader to obstacle. Alexander II was often left in a quandary as he was only one man facing the problems of a nation. One man could not travel the land by horse and carriage, personally collecting taxes from each individual commune. He could not simply pursue all criminals on the run and bring them to justice. Essentially it was important for the Tsar to have an assemblage of staff members to handle these affairs. This issue was widely resolved with the initiation of the Zemstvo in 1864.6 This was a form of local government which consisted of a representative council and of an executive board. All social classes were now permitted to take part in the voting process and hence even peasants were represented in the councils. The Zemstva were primarily in charge of collecting tax money, settling land issues as well as local legal disputes. In essence, they were the local representatives of a main national legislature.7

An inconvenient aspect of Russia’s financial state of affairs was the eminent prevalence of corruption. At one point in time it was legal for government officials to use the means of the state for their own asset, this form of bureaucracy was known as the ‘Kormlenie’.8 In 1715 however, as officials began to receive fixed salaries, inducement became a crime. Though the Kormlenie made various reappearances followed by disappearances throughout the reigns of several Tsars, its illegality was eventually finalized by Alexander II in 1864.9 Nevertheless, the allocations of tax money were not conspicuous to the Russian citizen.10 Generally Russian state finances were a nebulous matter, which made it effortless for anyone who is presented with the opportunity to use governmental funds for their own benefit. Eventually the Tsar gave rise to a more transparent national budget.11 The tax payer was now more or less correctly informed of how the money was being utilized.12 This is crucial to a functioning relationship between government and tax payer, seeing as the ill informed citizen is likely to question and eventually resist or challenge the system. This national budget transparency did not include the Tsar, however.

Perhaps one of the most eminent difficulties in Russia during the 19th century was the social division. One third of the countries population in 1855 comprised agricultural workers. These peasants (about 80% of the total population) were either owned by landlords or by the state. Essentially the gentry had absolute supremacy over peasantry.13 This comes to show that the vast preponderance of Russians were living in burdensome, strenuous circumstances and had no actual quality of life. The labor on the seemingly boundless fields was arduous and unsafe and the majority of money and harvest had to be relinquished. There was no gain for the peasants, so they were bound to begin questioning and eventually resisting. This was a scenario which had to be avoided by all means, seeing as a revolt of the serfdom (80% of the population!) would result in substantial economic difficulties. In an effort to create better living conditions and thereby prevent this from taking place, Alexander II signed the ‘Emancipation Edict’ in 1861.14 This essentially allowed peasants to own their own agricultural land. They were granted freedom of choice regarding what they wanted to do and be where they wanted to be at any given time, so in essence they were no longer owned. Though it sounds far more humanitarian on paper than slavery, it didn’t really change much as far as the lifestyle of the peasantry is concerned. They were still forced to work the same type of labour in order to make a living. In addition, they were forced to live in communes (also known as Mir) in order to make tax collection an easier affair.15 The nobles now received the majority of tax money in order to compensate for the new-found shortage of slaves. Peasants families were issued a piece of arable land according to the amount of children in the family. If a child died, the land was reallocated to another family.16 Whether or or not the emancipation of serfs in 1855 was truly in the interest of the peasants, is presently still controversial amongst historians.17

In conclusion, the problems of sheer size of the country in combination with the major social divisions were a sizeable responsibility for the Tsar to tackle, though generally the reforms of Alexander II can be viewed as a success toward modernizing Russia. Though the above were not the only reforms lead into action by the Tsar, they were definitely substantial in shaping Russia as we know it today.

1 2 3 Notes 4 5 6 7 Video shown in class 8 9 10 Notes 11 Notes 12 13 Textbook, p. 16-17 14 15 16 17

International Baccalaureate

Extended Essay


Compare and Contrast the Reforms of Tsars Alexander II and Alexander III of Russia in connection with the peasantry.


Compare and contrast the reforms of Tsars Alexander II and Alexander III of Russia in connection with the peasantry”.

As a result of these two very distinguished rules, the sentence above shall be the objective of this essay and a conclusion will be reached by taking into consideration the reforms - social, constitutional and military - that each of the Tsars integrated into the Russian society during their reign. The time frame in reference to these reforms is between 1855, when Alexander II began his rule, until Alexander III’s death and consequently the end of his reign in 1894.

By exploring the similarities and differences between the reigns of Alexander II and Alexander III, this essay aims to identify which of the two Tsars’ reforms would have provided the more favourable outcome as regards the suppression of the insurrectionist peasant class.

This is an important topic to investigate because it provides some of the background and reasons why the peasant class eventually became disgruntled with the Tsarist rule and attempted a revolution. This topic would be worth considering for anyone interested in examining the aforementioned causal links as well as investigating the reasons behind Alexander III’s noticeably distinctive rule.

This essay intends to gather information regarding any events during the lives of both Alexander II and Alexander III, which might have had an influence on their later dealings with the peasantry as well as what kind of beliefs the two may have held. Furthermore, it shall also find information concerning their social reforms (education, politics, and military) so that a compare and contrast method may be utilized in order to determine which of the two Tsars had the more efficient way of handling the peasant class. This information will be gathered using a collection of literature written on or around the topic. Such as: Russia in the Age of Alexander II, Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, Russia, 1855-1991: From Tsars to Commissars, Russia 1848-1917 and by also looking at first hand accounts quoted/referenced within.

Compare and Contrast the attitudes of Tsars Alexander II and Alexander III of Russia towards the peasantry.


‘Like father like son’. This is an expression that one hears a lot in everyday life and finds quite often to be true, anecdotally speaking. However, if this is to be the case, then why was Alexander II known as “a great reformer”[1] and Alexander III known as “a great reactionary”[2]? By extension, were both Tsars equally admired or disliked; or did their policies and methods of ruling create distinctions between the two? In line with these thoughts, this essay would like to compare and contrast the reigns of Tsar Alexander II (1855 - 1881)[3] and his son Tsar Alexander III (1881 - 1894) [4] of Russia.

The approach will be to look at different aspects of reforms (social, military and political) of each Tsar and to determine wherein the similarities lie and the differences in order to ascertain which had most effective attitude towards the peasantry. The level of effectiveness here is calculated by examining the intent of each reform based on intent, namely, how closely the outcome mirrored the design of the initial concept and whether or not that worked to fuel or subdue the revolutionary attitude becoming ever more prevalent during the late 1800s.

For each section, this essay will consider first the reforms of Alexander II, then Alexander III, followed by a third paragraph in which the effectiveness of the reforms will be compared. Thereafter it will be stated which Tsar had the most effective reform(s) in that particular branch of social policies and thus the better attitude toward the peasantry.

The thesis, therefore, is that it is in the opinion of this essay that Tsar Alexander III had the more successful and effective reign as regards his ability to quell social unrest amongst the peasant class.

The Social Reforms of Alexander II and Alexander III

Alexander II:

In 1863, Alexander II brought about important education reforms, which entitled universities to a much greater level of autonomy[5] in their affairs. In addition to this, there was the Elementary School Statute of 1864, which was instituted to aid in the combat against high illiteracy rates among the serfs, or peasants. Women were even given the opportunity to receive enough education to pursue careers as teachers and in 1878, the Bestuzhev higher learning courses for women was created and saw a very positive response judging by the number of applicants[6]. This was a move in the direction of change as, before this educational reform was implemented, the system of education had come under extreme oppression and surveillance from Nicholas I[7]. There was even a high demand for these schools by the peasants, however, that demand did not have as much to do with the new reforms, as Alexander would have liked[8]. It actually originated from the peasants’ knowledge that being capable of reading and writing meant serving a shorter term of service in the military as well as quenching their thirst for salvation through the reading of holy books.[9]

Despite this, historian David Saunders still makes the remark that the liberal policies of the government made the schools into “powder kegs” and teaching lectures “appeared to be serving not only academic and economic purposes but also the promotion of political instability.”[10] Therefore Saunders believed that although the reform did much to ameliorate the standard of education throughout the nation, it seemed also that it was precipitating feelings of political turbulence.

Alexander III:

Whereas Alexander II’s reforms enabled almost everyone to receive primary schooling, relaxed censorship laws and encouraged children to attend school and university, Alexander III did the opposite, imposing on Russia a level of “bureaucratic and police-rule more intense than the country had ever known,”[11] seen at first with the enactment of the “Statute Concerning Measures for the Protection of State Security and the Social Order” decree, which was initially intended to only be in operation for a short while but continued until 1917 and subjected the entire nation to “regulations similar to martial law”.[12]  After Alexander II’s assassination in 1881, the state received the power from the Second State Duma to pursue revolutionaries, meaning that at any time they could declare a section of the country under “extraordinary protection.[13]” This entailed banning public gatherings[14], closing schools and universities and charging individuals for political crimes and holding them in prison without trail, regardless of whether they were guilty or not. This went directly against one of Alexander II’s legal reforms in which Russians were offered the chance to have a fair trail[15] for the first time in November 1864. Restrictive Press Laws were set up in 1881; education came under close government control, striving to limit opposition and revolutionary ideas to the best of their ability. School fees were increased in order to keep those of lower class—those suspected to be most involved with the revolutionaries—away from any kind of formal education. The peasants were at first reluctant to rise against the Tsar but in the long run, these new social forces began to highlight contradictions in society, leading to social unrest amongst the peasants[16].

Seeing as the point behind both of these reforms was the same—to stamp out any insurgents or insurgent ideas—the lack of revolutionary disturbances and the peaceful reign of Alexander III clearly shows that his repression of opposition had been successful. Therefore, it is in the opinion of this essay that this venture of snuffing out opposition fulfilled its full intent and was more effective than the reforms implemented by Alexander II.

The Constitutional Reforms of Alexander II and Alexander III:

Alexander II:

Having to face the aftermath of the Crimean war and the ‘backwards’ label it consequently handed Russia, Alexander II was thrown into a different political and social climate to the one experienced by his father, Nicholas I. Therefore, he found that in order to do all he could to prevent peasant uprisings due to social unrest, he had to implement many new reforms, the most famous of which was the Emancipation Edict of 1861[17]. This notion was more than welcomed by the over twenty-two million serfs and other liberal intellectuals in Russia but heavily opposed by the landowners[18]. There were even 647 peasant riots in the first four months following the publication of the Edict.[19]

However, though the serfs were now free, they found themselves still having to buy or rent land from their former masters. The areas granted to the serfs were often too small and landlords charged inflated prices, leaving millions in hopeless poverty and debt, which did not in any way help with the much needed transformation of the serfs into a prosperous new class of consumers.[20] In addition, according to historian Orlando Figes, “any government trying to change the basic system of property owning throughout the entire country is taking the risk of becoming deeply unpopular, especially with the people whose land their expropriating… the serfs were property. ‘Property’-owning meant serfs and land.”[21]

The full intent of the Emancipation Reform was not realized in that it had two main objectives: proclaim the emancipation of serfs on private estates as well as the domestic serfs and grant them full rights as citizens, meaning they could now own property and a business. However, Alexander II’s reform had only succeeded in alienating the principle classes in Russia - he was unable to earn the gratitude of the peasants and simultaneously lost the devotion of the nobility[22]. 

Alexander III:

Alexander III did not use such moderate methods as his father. As a result of his father’s assassination by The People’s Will[23] he resorted to his conservative instincts, instilled in him through his education by his tutor Pobedonostsev[24], a conservative, and soon ceased all proposed constitutions, perhaps acting on the advice he had been receiving from Pobedonostsev even prior to his father’s death[25]. Like his father, Alexander III was also focusing a large amount of his time and energy on dealing with the peasantry, but that is where the similarities end. Despite the fact that both men were trying to bring about peace within their nation, their methods were poles apart.

Alexander II was attempting to do so through appeasement because he knew it was “better to begin abolishing serfdom from above than to wait for it to begin to abolish itself from below.”[26]. In contrast, Alexander III’s main interest at the time was the suppression of the very rapidly growing opposition groups, dubbed ‘Populists’[27], whom of which had a proclivity for terrorism and assassination.[28] In 1887, in an effort to revive the opposition, an attempt was made on the Tsar’s life but failed[29] and as the efficiency of the Okhrana, political police[30], increased, opposition died down for the time being[31]. Between 1881 and 1894, Alexander III and his government added conservative alterations to Alexander II’s reforms. For example, Land Captains were introduced in 1889 and consisted solely of nobility[32]. These Land Captains had total authority in local administration and had the power to override the zemstva[33]. Changes in the way the voting system functioned reduced the peasant self-government[34], giving them less power with which to protest or use against Alexander III. Alexander’s policy of Land Captains was so effective in its intent that former serfs feared that he might go as far to reinstitute serfdom. He did not ever take such action, however, in 1893 he banned peasants from leaving the mir[35], thereby gaining full control of their freedom to move around. Alexander III had almost all but completely done away with his father’s emancipation reforms by now, and achieving much better results.

The Military Reforms of Alexander II and Alexander III:

Alexander II:

On January 1st, 1847, Alexander II began the universal military conscription. Every man over twenty was made liable to conscription[36], irrespective of his social class, if medically able to do so.  Harsh corporate punishments and the branding of soldiers were done away with in an effort to improve the professionalism of the officer corps. All members of the military who lacked an elementary education were to receive it. Alexander II even set up reserve soldiers. Those who joined the army were also given shorter sentences, which meant that joining was no longer a ‘life sentence.’ Six years service for conscripts, followed by nine years in the reserve and five spent in the militia was now the requirements instead of 25 years.[37] As a result, the military reserve was raised from 210,000 to 553,000 by 1870[38].

The second main military reform implemented by Alexander II was to improve the competency of the soldiers. Count Dmitry Milyutin, Minister of War, was in charge of the far-reaching military reforms that changed the face of the Russian army during Alexander II’s reign[39].  Milyutin created a more civilized and efficient army through his reforms[40]. The training and discipline of the soldiers no longer made up of brutal mistreatment, such as flogging or ‘running the gauntlet’[41] and he effectuated military cadet schools and colleges in order for the officers to be well trained.[42] The intent of Alexander’s military reforms were to expand the Russian army and strengthen it after their brutally embarrassing defeat in the Crimea[43] and without a doubt this is exactly what he was able to accomplish.  

The peasantry reacted positively to this, no longer feeling that they were being forced into a life-long sentence when joining the army. They were also contented with the fact that nobles were no longer exempt from conscription.[44]

Alexander III:

Alexander III’s military reforms were very similar to those of his father if not exactly the same. When it came to that aspects of their nation, they both wanted the same thing—a strong military that would be ready and able to fight and defend Russia should the need present itself. This was one area in which the similarities in their reforms can be seen. Alexander III continued to do away with the barbaric forms of punishment used in the army and to replace them with more productive methods. He also managed avoided any foreign wars from 1881-1894[45], rightly earning himself the title ‘The Peacemaker’[46]. This period of peace allowed the army to continue to grow and gain new skills through the cadet training schools implemented by Milyutin during Alexander II’s reign. There was also ample opportunity now for Russia to move towards industrialization.[47]

The peasants, still experiencing a bitter aftertaste of the Crimean war, would most likely have been very please with this. And they would have been able to be a part of their country’s regrowth into the strong force it had been prior to 1853 when the war began.


The aim of this essay was to closely examine a few of the reforms of Russian Tsars Alexander II and Alexander III in order to determine which of the two men had the better and more effective rule. The idea was to do this by considering how well Tsarist oppression was either simply subdued or completely eradicated. It is safe to say that while neither of them managed to do the latter, Alexander III was the palpable victor in this regard. Despite Alexander II’s endeavors to please as many factions of Russia as possible, the best description of his ventures is with the modern day aphorism: “You can please some of the people some of the time, but you can’t please all of the people all of the time.” And it was true in his case; he either had the gentry at his every beck and call or he had the support of the peasants, but never both; the new freedom granted through his reforms lead to unrealistic expectations of the Tsar and when these were not being met, opposition began to peak again[48]. Alexander III lacked the support of these two principle groups as well, however, that was never his intention. After his father’s assassination, he had grown fearful of terrorist groups[49] - so much so that he resided in Gatchina instead of the Winter Palace - and did all in his power to crush their rebellion.  

When one completely dissects the reforms made by both men, a mutual goal can be clearly seen - avert an insurgency of the peasantry. And though it is debatable that without Alexander II there would have been no foundation for his son to build upon, if one does choose to take that side of the argument then the fact that Alexander II was assassinated by the very people whom he had tried to help, irrespective of the immediate results of his reforms, would render the argument that Alexander II provided a basis for a peaceful and successful rule for Alexander III void.

(3,419 words)


Works cited:


                    I.      Peter Oxley, Oxford Advanced History: Russia: 1855 - 1991, From Tsars to Commissars (Oxford University Press, 2001)

                   II.      Olga Bain, University Autonomy: Higher Education In Russia Since Perestroika (Taylor & Francis, May 1, 2003)

                  III.      Nicholas Valentine Riasanovsky, Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia, 1825-55 (University of California Press, 1959)

                 IV.      William Mills Todd III, Literature and Society in Imperial Russia, 1800 - 1914 (Stanford University Press, 1978

                   V.        David Saunders, Russia in the age of reaction and reform 1801 - 1881 (Longmann, 1992)

                 VI.      Michael Kort, The Soviet Colossus: History and Aftermath (M.E Sharpe, Jan 1, 2001)

                VII.      Jonathan Bromley, Russia 1848 - 1917(Heinemann, 2002)

               VIII.      Roxanne Easley, The Emancipation of the Serfs in Russia: Peace Arbitrators and the Development of Civil Society (Taylor & Francis, Aug. 15, 2008)

                 IX.      Junius P. Rodriguez, The Historical Encyclopedia of World Slavery (ABC-CLIO, Jan 1, 1997)

                   X.      Walter Moss, Russia in the Age of Alexander II, Tolstoy and Dostoevsky (Anthem Press, Jan. 1, 2002)

                 XI.      Sally Waller, History for the IB Diploma: Imperial Russia, Revolutions and the Emergence of the Soviet State 1853 - 1924 (Cambridge University Press)

                XII.        J.N. Westwood, Russia Against Japan, 1904 -1905: A New Look at the Russo-Japanese War (SUNY Press, 1986)

Electronic sources:

                               I.         Russian Federation - History and background

                              II.         Bragg, Melvyn: Figes, Orlando; Catriona, Kelly; Lieven, Dominic, Tsar Alexander II’s Assassination, BBC: In Our Time, Jan. 6th, 2005 (podcast)


A letter to the future Alexander III, 4th December, 1879, from the Procurator of the Holy Synod, K. P Pobedonostsev[50]:

All the officials and learned men here sicken my heart, as if I were in the company of half-wits or perverted baboons. I hear from all sides that trite, deceitful and accursed word: constitution… But I also meet and talk with some

 Russian men… Their hearts are seized with fear; above all else they fear that basic evil, a constitution. Among the common people everywhere the thought is spreading; better a Russian revolution and ugly turmoil than a constitution. The former could soon be repressed, with order restored throughout the land; the latter is poison to the entire organization.”

[1] Peter Oxley, Oxford Advanced History: Russia: 1855 - 1991, From Tsars to Commissars (Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 51

[2] Ibid.  

[3] [3] John Etty, Primary Sources in Russian (First and Best in Education, 2009), p. 6

[4] Ibid. p. 45

[5] Olga Bain, University Autonomy: Higher Education In Russia Since Perestroika (Taylor & Francis, May 1, 2003)

[7] Nicholas Valentine Riasanovsky, Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia, 1825-55 (University of California Press, 1959), pgs. 213-218

[8] William Mills Todd III, Literature and Society in Imperial Russia, 1800 - 1914 (Stanford University Press, 1978), p. 123

[9] Ibid.

[10] David Saunders, Russia in the age of reaction and reform 1801 - 1881 (Longmann, 1992), p. 251

[11] Michael Kort, The Soviet Colossus: History and Aftermath (M.E Sharpe, Jan 1, 2001), p. 24

[12] Michael Kort, The Soviet Colossus: History and Aftermath (M.E Sharpe, Jan 1, 2001), p. 24

[13] Marshall Shatz, Judith E. Zimmerman, Landmarks (M.E Sharpe, Jan 1, 1994), p. 112

[14] Peter Oxley, Oxford Advanced History: Russia: 1855 - 1991, From Tsars to Commissars (Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 44

[15] Jonathan Bromley, Russia 1848 - 1917(Heinemann, 2002), p. 32

[16]Bragg, Melvyn: Figes, Orlando; Catriona, Kelly; Lieven, Dominic, Tsar Alexander II’s Assassination, BBC: In Our Time, Jan. 6th, 2005

[17] Ibid. p. 176

[18] Roxanne Easley, The Emancipation of the Serfs in Russia: Peace Arbitrators and the Development of Civil Society (Taylor & Francis, Aug. 15, 2008)

[19] Peter Oxley, Oxford Advanced History: Russia: 1855 - 1991, From Tsars to Commissars (Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 27

[20] Junius P. Rodriguez, The Historical Encyclopedia of World Slavery (ABC-CLIO, Jan 1, 1997), p. 561

[21] Bragg, Melvyn: Figes, Orlando; Catriona, Kelly; Lieven, Dominic, Tsar Alexander II’s Assassination, BBC: In Our Time, Jan. 6th, 2005

[22] Peter Oxley, Oxford Advanced History: Russia: 1855 - 1991, From Tsars to Commissars (Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 27

[23] Ibid. p. 37

[24] Ibid. p. 43

[25] See Appendix: A letter to Alexander III

[26] Peter Oxley, Oxford Advanced History: Russia: 1855 - 1991, From Tsars to Commissars (Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 26

[27] Ibid. p. 52

[28] Ibid.

[29] Jonathan Bromley, Russia 1848 - 1917(Heinemann, 2002), pgs. 79, 80

[30] Michael Kort, The Soviet Colossus: History and Aftermath (M.E Sharpe, Jan 1, 2001), pg. 24

[31] Ibid. p. 43

[32] Ibid. 26 p. 44

[33] Ibid. 26 p. 45

[34] Ibid. 26

[35] Ibid. 26

[36] Walter Moss, Russia in the Age of Alexander II, Tolstoy and Dostoevsky (Anthem Press, Jan. 1, 2002), p. 154

[37] Peter Oxley, Oxford Advanced History: Russia: 1855 - 1991, From Tsars to Commissars (Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 29

[38] Ibid.

[39] Ibid. 36.

[40] Sally Waller, History for the IB Diploma: Imperial Russia, Revolutions and the Emergence of the Soviet State 1853 - 1924 (Cambridge University Press), p. 46

[41] Ibid.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Ibid. 37.

[44] Ibid. 40, p. 46

[45]Michael Kort, The Soviet Colossus: History and Aftermath (M.E Sharpe, Jan 1, 2001), pg. 25

[46] J.N. Westwood, Russia Against Japan, 1904 -1905: A New Look at the Russo-Japanese War (SUNY Press, 1986), p. 3

[47] Ibid. 45.

[48] Peter Oxley, Oxford Advanced History: Russia: 1855 - 1991, From Tsars to Commissars (Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 33

[49] Sally Waller, History for the IB Diploma: Imperial Russia, Revolutions and the Emergence of the Soviet State 1853 - 1924 (Cambridge University Press), p. 76

[50] Peter Oxley, Oxford Advanced History: Russia: 1855 - 1991, From Tsars to Commissars (Oxford University Press, 2001)

A History of Russia: From Peter the Great to Gorbachev Part I Professor Mark D. Steinberg THE TEACHING COMPANY ® Mark D. Steinberg, Ph.D. Professor of History, Director of the Russian and East European Center, University of Illinois Mark Steinberg completed his undergraduate work at the University of California at Santa Cruz in 1978 and received his Ph.D. in European history at the University of California at Berkeley in 1987. He taught Russian and European history at the University of Oregon (1987), Harvard University (1987–1989), and Yale University (1989– 1996) before joining the faculty at the University of Illinois, at its main campus in Urbana-Champaign, in 1996. Since 1998, Professor Steinberg has also been the Director of the Russian and East European Center at Illinois, an interdisciplinary program designated by the Department of Education as a national resource center. Professor Steinberg has received many awards for his teaching, including the Sarai Ribicoff Prize for Teaching at Yale University (1993) and, at Illinois, the George and Gladys Queen Excellence in History Teaching Award (1998 and 2002) and the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences Award for Excellence in Undergraduate Teaching (2002). For his work as a scholar, he has received numerous prestigious fellowships, including from the International Research and Exchanges Board, the Social Science Research Council, the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies of the Smithsonian Institution, the Illinois Program for Research in the Humanities, and the National Endowment for the Humanities. In 2001, the University of Illinois gave him one of its highest honors and named him a University Scholar. Professor Steinberg has published many articles, delivered numerous papers at national and international conferences, given public lectures throughout the country, and served on several national professional committees and editorial boards. He specializes in the cultural, intellectual, and social history of Russia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. His first book, published in 1992, was a study of the relations among employers, managers, and workers in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, entitled Moral Communities. In 1994, Professor Steinberg co-edited Cultures in Flux, an influential collection of essays on Russian lower-class cultures. In 1995, he published, together with a Russian archivist, The Fall of the Romanovs, which examines the fate of the tsar and his family during the revolution and includes translations of documents from then recently opened Russian archives. In 2001, Professor Steinberg published Voices of Revolution, 1917, a study and collection of translated documents exploring the revolution through contemporary letters and other writings by ordinary Russians. His most recent book, Proletarian Imagination, published in 2002, explores poetry and other writings by lower-class Russians in the years before and after 1917, focusing on ideas about self, modern times, and the sacred. He is currently working on a collection of essays on religion in Russia, a revised textbook on Russian history, and a study of St. Petersburg in the late 1800s and early 1900s. Professor Steinberg is a native of San Francisco and is married to Jane Hedges, an editor and translator. Further information can be found at his Web site: ©2003 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership i Table of Contents A History of Russia: from Peter the Great to Gorbachev Part I Professor Biography............................................................................................i Course Scope.......................................................................................................1 Lecture One Lecture Two Lecture Three Lecture Four Lecture Five Lecture Six Lecture Seven Lecture Eight Lecture Nine Lecture Ten Lecture Eleven Lecture Twelve Timeline .............................................................................................................35 Glossary .............................................................................................................39 Understanding the Russian Past.................................2 The Russia of Peter the Great’s Childhood ...............4 Peter the Great’s Revolution......................................7 The Age of EmpressesCatherine the Great..........10 Social RebellionThe Pugachev Uprising .............13 Moral RebellionNikolai Novikov ........................16 Alexander IImagining Reform.............................19 The Decembrist Revolution .....................................22 Nicholas IOrthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality .....25 Alexander Pushkin, Russia’s National Poet ............27 The Birth of the Intelligentsia..................................30 WesternizersVissarion Belinskii..........................33 Please refer to Part II for the biographical notes and Part III for the annotated bibliography. ii ©2003 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership Scope: A History of Russia: From Peter the Great to Gorbachev After a discussion of background issues (geography, multi-ethnicity, the problem of backwardness, Europeanization), the course begins with politics and culture on the eve of Peter the Great’s efforts to transform his country, then looks at Peter and his reforms. Next, women’s rule in eighteenth-century Russia is examined, with a particular focus on the reigns of Elizabeth (Peter the Great’s daughter) and Catherine the Great. Turning toward society, two additional lectures on the eighteenth century follow: on the Pugachev uprising and the growing critique of autocratic despotism by educated Russians, especially the publisher and writer Nikolai Novikov. Lecture Seven begins the nineteenth century by returning to a focus on the state and the monarch: Paul I and especially Alexander I, who seriously discussed possible reform. We also look at the Decembrist rebellion, in which educated nobles took arms against the state to bring about social and political reform. Next, we consider Nicholas I and the ideas about power and order that inspired the Russian state at that time. Returning the gaze to society, the course then offers lectures on different intellectuals’ visions of change: the “national poet” Alexander Pushkin (whom we consider also for what his image as a symbol of the Russian nation tells us) and the full-fledged emergence of the “intelligentsia” in the 1830s and 1840s. Particular attention is paid to their ideas about Russia, the West, and the meanings of freedom. Lecture Thirteen begins the history of the Great Reforms under Alexander II, which sought to create a modern society in Russia though dramatic reform. We then examine dissident trends and the individuals associated with them: nihilism (including terrorism), populism, Marxism (including the emergence of Bolshevism). For a different voice, we look at the famous writer Lev Tolstoy, especially his life and his arguments about morality and conscience. Returning our gaze to official Russia, we highlight the lives, personalities, and outlooks of the last two tsars, Alexander III and his son Nicholas II. We then consider a decisive event in the reign of Nicholas: the strikes, demonstrations, and public demands that the tsarist government accept civil rights and democratic rule in Russia in 1905. To see Russia’s changes in larger perspective, we look at peasant life and culture in the late 1800s and early 1900s, life in the changing cities (especially for workers and the middle class) from the industrialization drive of the 1890s to the eve of World War I, and at aspects of what might be called fin-de-siècle culture: decadence in everyday life and in the arts, cultural iconoclasm, and the religious renaissance. Lecture Twenty-Five examines the Russian experience in World War I and the coming of revolution. It is followed with an examination of the Russian experience in the key months from the fall of the tsarist government in February to the coming to power of the Bolsheviks in October, then by a lecture on the Bolsheviks during their first year in power. The story of the Civil War comes next, followed by a discussion of the debates in the 1920s in the Soviet Union over how to overcome Russia’s backwardness and build socialism. Next, we look at Joseph Stalin’s biography and political personality, the era of radical industrialization and social transformation that he launched at the end of the 1920s, and the contradictory political, social, and cultural life of the 1930s (including the Great Terror). We turn then to the Soviet experience in World War II and to politics and the experiences of Soviet people during the decades after the war and before Gorbachev’s reforms. Continuing the theme of exploring dissent, we look at some of the various forms of alienation from, and resistance to, the Soviet system during the years before Gorbachev came to power (both everyday forms and open dissidence). Finally, we look at Mikhail Gorbachev’s recognition of the many problems of the system and his efforts to make Communism work though a policy of reform. The final lecture concludes with a consideration of the situation left in the wake of the collapse of Communism. ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 1 Lecture One Understanding the Russian Past Scope: This first lecture introduces the overall scope and plan of the course. The lecture explains the approach of the course, including its focus on human experience, ideas, and values and especially on the lives and thoughts of individuals, both notable and ordinary. Next, the lecture considers why the history of Russia is significant for us, and fascinating, both as a story of events that had great impact on modern world history and as a story of human experience. Finally, it outlines the chronological scope of the course, reviews the types of individuals to be considered (ranging from political rulers to ordinary men and women), and highlights the themes that weave these stories together (especially power and imagination). Outline I. This introductory lecture has three main purposes. A. First, I want to introduce the approach to the Russian past I am using in these lectures, especially my focus on individuals and ideas. B. Second, I would like to offer some thoughts about why it is important to study the history of Russia. C. Third, I would like to provide an outline of this course. II. Historians narrate the past. A. The past itself is immense, chaotic, and fragmentary. B. History tries to create some order and logic. C. These lectures focus, not only on what happened in the past and why, but on how people acted in the past and, especially, how they made sense of their lives. III. Russian history is important and compelling. A. Russia’s sheer size makes it important to understand. Note that this is a modern greatness, because as late as the early sixteenth century, Russia was still a relatively small nation. B. By the nineteenth century, Russia was a vast multinational empire that covered one-sixth of the earth’s land surface. It was also a great political and cultural force in the world. 1. In the early sixteenth century, the country was still politically fragmented and economically and culturally undeveloped. 2. Even many Russians were concerned that Russia was far behind Europe. 3. But, by the nineteenth century, Russia was clearly a European power and culture. 4. Travelers to Russia in the nineteenth century may have been appalled by the dictatorial power of the Russian monarchy and dismayed at the poverty of the majority of the people, but they also recognized that educated Russians were as sophisticated and European as themselves. C. Russia’s modern history is also important and compelling as a human story, though it is an often- contradictory story. 1. It is a story of people’s efforts to discern life’s fundamental meaning, as well as a story of their uncertainty and confusion. 2. It is a story of people’s efforts to create a society built on principles of right and justice, as well as a story of evil and injustice. 3. It is a story about human imagination and creativity, as well as a story of great tragedy. 4. Yet Russia is not “a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.” Although a dense and complex tale, it is compelling because we can understand it. IV. Before we begin, we should consider some of the people to be examined and some of themes and ideas that link these human stories together. 2 ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership A. B. First, the time frame of this course is modern Russia, from the childhood of Peter I (“the Great”) in the late seventeenth century to the rule of Mikhail Gorbachev at the end of the Communist era. Certain types of people are the focus of attention: 1. Political rulers (tsars, emperors, Communist Party leaders) are central figures in this story. 2. No less important are political rebels. 3. These lectures also introduce creative writers, poets, and artists. 4. Finally, we will explore the lives and thoughts of relatively ordinary people. C. One of the major themes is power. 1. We will explore how political rulers used state power and justified their authority. 2. We also look at the critical arguments made by peasant rebels, intellectuals, and dissidents. D. Another major theme is imagination. 1. Throughout Russian history, we see varied individuals and groups imagining and, often, trying to construct a different lifepolitically, socially, culturally, morallyfrom the one they were leading. 2. No less important is the reverse side of this spirit of imagination: widespread doubt and pessimism and the tragic failure of many of these visions. E. Another theme is Russia and the West. 1. Since Peter the Great’s time, Russians have struggled with their relationship to the West. 2. The West represented both a competing economic and political force (and model) and an influential source of ideas and culture. F. Happiness, and the pursuit of happiness, is yet another theme: From rulers to revolutionaries, Russians have often spoken of happiness as what they most sought for themselves and Russia. G. Morality and ethics form another theme. 1. The idea of an ethical society often motivated rulers who embarked on courses of reform. 2. Critics of the state used the idea of an ethical society as a mirror to show the corruption and evil of the status quo. H. A related theme is spirituality. 1. The influence of the Russian Orthodox Church has long been widespread in Russian life. 2. In addition, diverse individuals have believed that the material life alone would not ensure happiness or morality in the world. I. Finally, people’s everyday lives are a central part of this historical account. Essential Reading: Gregory Freeze, ed., Russia: A History (Oxford, 1997), chapter 1. Richard Pipes, Russia under the Old Regime, chapters 1–2. Nicholas Riasanovsky, A History of Russia, 6th ed. (Oxford, 2000), chapters 1–14. Supplementary Reading: Daniel Kaiser and Gary Marker, eds., Reinterpreting Russian History (York, 1994), chapters 1–8. Questions to Consider 1. Why have outside observers of Russia so often emphasized its “backwardness,” even savagery, and/or its inscrutability, as in Churchill’s famous description of Russia as “a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma”? 2. How does looking not only at the actions of rulers but also at their values and ideals and at the experiences and attitudes of ordinary people or intellectuals change how we understand the history of a country? ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 3 Lecture Two The Russia of Peter the Great’s Childhood Scope: This lecture explores Russian politics and culture on the eve of Peter the Great’s efforts to transform his country. In light of the image of Peter the Great as single-handedly bringing Russia into Western civilization, this lecture explores changes already underway by the end of the seventeenth century. We look at efforts to modernize state and law, at the ideology of Russian state power (especially the competing ideas of secular and sacred rulership), and at the Western sources of these ideas. The lecture then considers the Westernization of everyday Russian life, including the growing presence of foreigners in Russia and cultural changes in the lives of individual Russians. Finally, the lecture describes the influence of all these changes on Peter the Great’s childhood. Outline I. We shall first examine a story that borders on myth: that Peter the Great initiated modernization and Westernization in Russia. A. According to this story, Russia was a backward, Asiatic nation before Peter came to the throne at the end of the seventeenth century. B. After Peter, it is often said, Russia was fully on the path toward becoming a modern Western nation. C. Sometimes these stories about Peter’s revolutionary transformation of Russia were quite elaborate. 1. Leading Russians often declared that Peter was the “sculptor” who shaped modern Russia or even a god. 2. In the nineteenth century—a more scientific age—Peter was seen as a historical great man who had the power to alter the destiny of his country. D. These claims hold some truth. 1. But these images of Peter also expressed a certain idealism about where Russia should go, which led to a darkening of the images of where Russia had come from. 2. Russia, in reality, was not “a blank sheet of paper” when Peter came to power. Already when Peter was born in 1672, the country was changing in many ways. II. In the political sphere, Russian rulers and their officials tried to create the structures of a modern (if authoritarian) monarchical state. A. First, they tried to increase bureaucratic centralization, though the tsar remained powerful. 1. This meant reforming the existing system, in which personal rule over the state by the monarch was combined with personal rule over local society by noblemen. 2. Instead, the country was increasingly governed by bureaucratic offices and officials based in Moscow. B. No less important was the ongoing effort in the seventeenth century to establish orderly laws and structures, to systematize government and especially law. This culminated in one of the most important events of the seventeenth century: the enacting of a new comprehensive law code (ulozhenie) in 1649. C. To more fully understand Russian politics on the eve of Peter’s rule, we need to explore how people understood politics and power in the late seventeenth century. D. One place to look is at the symbols of power, at self-representations of authority. 1. When Peter the Great’s father, tsar Aleksei Romanov, came to the throne in 1645, he wore barmyornate brocade shoulder coverings, “The Life-Giving Cross,” and the Crown of Monomakh, and he carried the orb and scepter, the latter crowned with a double-headed eagle. 2. The message of these symbols is clear: They emphasize the ruler’s sacred authority and that his power was rooted in the whole of Christian history. III. These seventeenth-century ideas about the nature and legitimacy of the Russian monarchy, in particular, certain key ideas, would long remain influential. 4 ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership A. B. The tsar understood his power to be that of an “autocrat” and saw the system as an autocracy. Helping to define this notion were two basic ideas: 1. First, the ruler as a powerful secular force, as forceful, dynamic, even aggressive, though for the good of the nationa groznyi tsar (awesome and mighty). 2. Second, the ruler as sacred and loving (as a Christian monarch)as a tishaishii tsar (“gentle,” pious, saintly). C. Both ideas have their roots other than in Russia, of course. 1. 2. D. The 1. A. We should not forget that Western influences in Russia had a long history. 1. A large proportion of the ruling elites were not purely Slavic. 2. Once the Russian state accepted Christianity, the cultural influences of Byzantium became strong. 3. As early as the fifteenth century, Russian rulers were eager to establish to the world that they were European rulers. B. By the late seventeenth century, Western influence was becoming much more widespread and substantive. 1. Intellectual life was changing. 2. Huge numbers of foreigners came to Muscovy to live. By the time of tsar Aleksei (1645–1676), many foreigners had become permanent residents of Russia, and a special foreign settlement (nemetskaia sloboda) had been established in Moscow. C. All these changes affected the everyday lives of many Russians. 1. Many of Russia’s leading noblemen dressed in Western clothes, did not wear beards, had portraits painted, ate Western foods, and smoked. One such aristocrat was Vasilii Liutkin. 2. For the Russian elite, things were changing even before Peter the Great’s reforms, especially a growing sense that Russia was a part of Europe. V. Peter was born in 1672 into this vital, changing environment. A. Tsar Aleksei’s death in 1676 first brought Peter’s half-brother Fyodor to the throne and then, in 1682, Peter and his half-brother Ivan to power, though real control was in the hands of the regent Sophia. B. Peter’s childhood was a remarkably free one (especially during his years of virtual exile from the Kremlin between the ages of ten and seventeen). 1. Bored by life away from the Kremlin, Peter spent much time with soldiers and foreigners. 2. These two groups would remain important parts of his life and his rule. C. Peter loved the soldier’s life so much that he formed his own private play regiment when he was eleven. D. Peter’s interest in technical matters (especially building boats) led him to the foreign settlement in Moscow, and he also made friends with less than well-born Russians. E. He learned much about the world and about technical achievements from these foreigners. 1. His contact with them shaped his choice of Western dress and appearance. 2. Peter’s association with foreigners spurred him to study math and science, but these associates also taught him how to drink heavily and enjoy the charms of foreign women. F. Eventually, he would apply all of these energies and ideas to remaking Russia. Essential Reading: George Freeze, ed., Russia: A History (Oxford, 1997), chapters 2–3. Richard Pipes, Russia under the Old Regime, chapters 3–4. Nicholas Riasanovsky, A History of Russia, 6th ed. (Oxford, 2000), chapters 15–19. Ancient Rome was the referent for the mighty and secular ideal. Byzantine rulers were the referent for the pious and Christian ideal. relation between these two ideals was not simple. The two aspects were unified in that the sacred roots of power made the ruler all the more powerful, and the ruler’s power made him a more effective vicar of God. But there was also tension: The sacred sources of the tsar’s power potentially compromised his secular absolutism, for such a ruler must govern in accordance with the will of God and for the good of others. look beyond the halls of state power into the world of society and culture, where the connections with the larger world were especially pronounced. 2. IV. We now ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 5 Supplementary Reading: Michael Cherniavsky, “Khan or Basileus: An Aspect of Russian Medieval Political Theory,” Journal of the History of Ideas 20 (1959): 459–476. Daniel Kaiser and Gary Marker, eds., Reinterpreting Russian History (York, 1994), chapters 9–13. Richard Wortman, Scenarios of Power: Myth and Ceremony in the Russian Monarch (Princeton, 1995), vol. 1, chapter 1. Questions to Consider: 1. 2. What were the achievements and limitations in Russia’s turn to the West before Peter I’s reign? How did the Russian tsars traditionally think about their power? How do we reconcile their absolutism and even brutality with their professions of religious faith and desire to rule as Christian monarchs? 6 ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership Lecture Three Peter the Great’s Revolution Scope: This lecture looks at the reign of the ruler many say did more to create modern Russia than any other: Peter I (“the Great”). The lecture begins with Peter’s childhood and the period of his minority as tsar, a key period of contradictory possibilities in Russian history and one in which Peter developed his major interests and orientation to the world. The lecture then examines Peter’s personality: his energy and love of work but also his crudeness and cruelty. We then survey Peter’s major reforms, especially reform of government and mandated changes in society and culture. The lecture concludes by examining the vision of progress that motivated reform, especially the meaning of the West for Peter. Particular attention is paid to his reforms of cultural life and the creation of St. Petersburg as a new modern capital. Outline I. Peter’s first years were a time of tumult, contradiction, and possibility. A. At the age of ten, Peter became co-tsar of Russia (as Peter I). 1. He ruled together with his half-brother Ivan V. 2. Real power was in the hands of the regent Sophia (Peter’s elder half-sister). B. In 1689, when Peter was seventeen, Sophia was deposed when she tried to seize full control of the throne. C. A traditionalist reaction set in almost immediately. 1. Traditional religiosity was strongly encouraged. 2. All foreigners came under suspicion. D. Still, the forces of Westernization were alive and strong. 1. During this period, Peter spent more time than ever in the foreign settlement, and he insisted that those associated with him dress and behave in a Western manner. 2. Symbolically, Peter made it clear where he stood in the culture wars of the time: through his dress, his recreations, and his use of rituals. E. In many ways, the two tsars, Peter and Ivan, visibly symbolized the two choices Russia faced at the end of the seventeenth century. 1. The “pious” (if also not especially bright) Ivan V was to be seen walking about in his heavy, brocaded Muscovite robes. 2. Peter, by contrast, was dressed in European clothing and was seen riding and sailing, dashing between shipyard and military parade, and making it clear that he considered Russia’s traditional ways backward. F. After the death of his mother in 1694, Peter decided it was time to take control and to act in dramatic and public ways on his inclinations and values. II. To understand these inclinations and values, it is necessary to examine Peter’s personality. A. Peter was a physically huge (6 feet, 7 inches tall) and energetic man. 1. Like no Russian ruler before him, Peter was profoundly optimistic, positive, and active. 2. This was also a political idea: Peter believed that government had a positive, active role to play in a nation’s life. B. Not unrelated to his high level of energy, Peter was obsessed with physical work. 1. He loved making things: model boats, furniture, crockery. He also considered himself a good surgeon and dentist. 2. More significantly, as a young man, he traveled to Europe, where he learned a variety of industrial skills and techniques. C. At the same time, Peter’s public personality was marked by a great deal of personal crudeness. 1. He drank prodigiously (and insisted others do the same). 2. He reveled in noise, buffoonery, and horseplay, perhaps the most famous example being the rather bizarre institution known as the “All-Mad, All-Jesting, All-Drunken Assembly.” ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 7 3. Many interpretations have been offered to explain the Drunken Assembly, the most common being an attack on the Church by a modernizer and his supporters. 4. Equally important, however, was the social function of the Assembly: it facilitated camaraderie and bonding among Peter’s associates. D. Although Peter could be quite compassionate, he was often violent and cruel. 1. He carried a club with which he occasionally beat nobles, friends, and other members of his court when he felt this was needed. 2. More politically significant, Peter brutally suppressed dissent and was constantly involved in wars. III. Almost from the moment Peter came into real power, he showed himself to be an exceptionally energetic ruler. A. During his reign, there was continual territorial expansion through war. B. Peter sought to rationalize and centralize government and administration, creating new governing bodies and a new political police, reorganizing the empire geographically, and putting the Church under state control. C. Parallel to these administrative reforms were changes meant to transform society, including a single “Table of Ranks,” new civic organizations, industrial enterprises, a new tax system, and the structures of a Western intellectual life. IV. But what was Peter’s vision of progress? A. In part, Peter’s idea was technical, involving the regularization of laws and of the social structure. B. Yet, despite all his reforms, Peter was ruling in the Russian tradition. 1. He believed in and insisted on his all-powerful might as a ruler (his role as a groznyi tsar). 2. This is clearly evident in his preoccupation with things military: his constant wars and the widespread images of him as a conqueror. C. Nevertheless, it mattered to Peter that Russia be (and be perceived as) “civilized.” 1. Peter hated the cultural look of old Russia and did all he could to remove it, insisting on Western dress, appearance, and customs. 2. These changes were, in part, superficial, but they had a deeper meaning: Peter believed that external things affected what was inside a person and usefully conveyed particular ideas about the sort of society the state was creating. D. Peter’s greatest creation—St. Petersburg, the new capital he built on the northern swampland he won in a battle with the Swedes—provides a clear picture of his vision. 1. Petersburg was a symbol of modern, secular power, order, and rationality (imposed from above). 2. The rationality of Petersburg is evident in its physical layout: a city of lines, squares, grids, and triangles. 3. Other aspects of Petersburg’s design and architecture (such as squares and churches) also conveyed this ideal of control and order. 4. These were surface changes, but they were meant to convey to the world that that Russians were not savages and to teach Russians to think and act in a more civilized manner. E. As a result of his many reforms, Peter transformed the shape of Russian life. 1. Mikhail Pogodin, a noted Russian intellectual writing in the mid-nineteenth century, was one of many who were astonished by the impact Peter had on Russia. 2. Others prepared the way for these changes to occur, but it was Peter who took the first step. 3. Peter’s revolution was made possible by the Russian political system (including the absolutism of the Russian monarchical traditionbut none had ever used this power so boldly). Essential Reading: Lindsey Hughes, Peter the Great: A Biography (New Haven, 2002). Nicholas Riasanovsky, The Image of Peter the Great in Russian History and Thought (New York, 1985). 8 ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership Supplementary Reading: Paul Bushkovitch, Peter the Great (Oxford, 2001). Lindsey Hughes, Russia in the Age of Peter the Great (New Haven, 1998). Vasili Kliuchevsky, Peter the Great (New York, 1958). Richard Wortman, Scenarios of Power (Princeton, 1995), vol. 1, chapter 2. Questions to Consider: 1. Peter the Great sought to Europeanize Russia, but what aspects of European civilization did he admire and desire to import? 2. Did the reign of Peter the Great effect a “revolution from above” in Russian life, or were these only “reforms,” continuing earlier trends and preserving the fundamental Russianness of politics and social life? ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 9 Lecture Four The Age of EmpressesCatherine the Great Scope: This lecture explores women’s rule in eighteenth-century Russia, with a particular focus on the reigns of Elizabeth (Peter the Great’s daughter) and Catherine the Great. It examines the efforts of these rulers to continue the Westernizing reform of Russia: to rationalize government, develop the economy and culture, extend the empire, and under Catherine, encourage some measure of civic involvement. In order to understand the ideas inspiring these reforms, the lecture looks at the ethos of power in the reigns of Elizabeth and Catherine. For Elizabeth, we consider her “cult of happiness.” For Catherine, we look at the inspiration of Enlightenment ideas but also her insistence on the necessity of absolutism. The lecture concludes by examining the contradictory ways that Catherine culturally represented her own power. I. Outline After the death of Peter the Great in 1725, Russia was ruled by women for most of the rest of the century. A. From 1725–1727, Peter the Great’s second wife, Catherine I, ruled Russia. B. After Catherine I’s death, Peter the Great’s twelve-year-old grandson, Peter II, took the throne until his death three years later. C. From 1730–1740, the empress was Anna, the daughter of Ivan V. D. Just before Anna died, she chose as her successor a two-month-old baby, her great-nephew, Ivan VI, and she appointed her German lover, Ernst-Johann Biron, as regent. E. Within a few months, Ivan VI was replaced on the throne by Elizabeth, the daughter of Peter the Great and Catherine I, who ruled for twenty years, from 1741–1761. F. When Elizabeth died, she was replaced by her nephew Peter III, who ruled for only six months before he was overthrown by guard troops and replaced by his wife, Catherine II. G. Catherine II (Catherine the Great) ruled for thirty-four years, from 1762–1796. H. Women held imperial power in eighteenth-century Russia for a number of reasons. 1. Peter the Great decreed that the monarch could designate his own successor (male or female, noble or non-noble, blood relation or not). 2. There was a shortage of healthy, able, adult male successors. 3. Noblemen at court and the guards regiments enjoyed their growing power and believed that women would be more pliable and give them a greater voice at court. I. These women were not passive rulers, however. They had their own visions of power and did much to shape the Petrine tradition. Elizabeth I reigned from 1741 to 1761. II. 10 ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership A. B. C. Elizabeth I differed dramatically from her father, Peter the Great, in personality. 1. Beautiful and charming, Elizabeth was greatly admired. After the brutality and domination of Biron and the so-called German party, Elizabeth seemed to promise greater respect for Russians and the Russian elite. 2. Unlike her energetic and forceful father, though, Elizabeth was notoriously indolent and pleasure- loving. Despite these differences, Elizabeth did much to continue Peter’s legacy. 1. She resumed efforts to routinize and rationalize government institutions. 2. She encouraged cultural development (notably founding Moscow University). 3. She did much to stimulate the economy (such as abolishing customs barriers and encouraging entrepreneurship). 4. In foreign policy, Elizabeth continued to demonstrate that Russia was a European great power (especially by defeating Prussia as part of the Seven Years War and briefly occupying Berlin in 1760). But there were new elements appearing in this Petrine formula, which may be described as a feminine ideal of progress 1. Elizabeth I endeavored to bring a spirit of culturedness and beauty to Russia and to demonstrate to the world that Russia was not a savage land. 2. As a result, she built (or, in a few cases, totally rebuilt) some of Russia’s most elegant royal palaces, which were invariably designed by Italian architects. 3. Elizabeth promoted what might be called a “cult of happiness” in Russian public life. In this spirit, At the time of her coronation in 1742, Mikhail Lomonosov composed an ode in her honor. 4. One can see her more secular version of the traditionally religious ideal of the tishaishii tsar (the “most tender” loving tsar). 5. The succession of lovers in Elizabeth’s private life echoed this ideal of tenderness and her belief in the “cult of happiness.” III. These trends were further developed in the reign of Catherine II (called “Great” for her conquests in war and expansion of the empire). A. Catherine came to the throne after guards officers overthrew her husband, Peter III. 1. Peter III’s extreme pro-German orientation was considered intolerable. 2. The problem was not Peter’s foreign blood, but his foreign orientation and his obvious hatred of Russia, its Church, and its language. 3. Catherine II was technically even less Russian than Peter, being entirely German in ancestry, but understood that her authority depended on her presenting herself as serving and strengthening Russia. B. Catherine undertook numerous major reforms during her lengthy reign. 1. The first major reform was a codification of the laws, for which she convened, in 1767, a national “legislative commission.” 2. She restructured the central administration to make procedures and departments more efficient. 3. She accepted Peter III’s decision to end required state service for all nobles and to encourage them to become more active in local administration. 4. She enacted major reforms in local administration. 5. She promoted education and culture. 6. She worked to develop the economy. 7. She continued the expansion of the empire and the enhancement of Russia’s status as a great power. C. To understand these reforms, we need to look at how Catherine thought about the purposes of power. 1. In part, Catherine was inspired by Enlightenment ideas about the need for human freedom, equal rights, and democracy in the world. 2. At the same time, Catherine did not believe that Russia was ready for liberty or democracy and insisted on the value of autocracy as a source of order and progress. D. How can these two attitudes be reconciled? 1. Some historians, as well as some disappointed French philosophes, considered this to be hypocrisy. 2. Others have attributed these two views to a change of mind in response to aristocratic efforts to claim more power, greater knowledge of Russia’s problems, the threat of peasant rebellion, and the French Revolution. E. But it is useful to keep in mind the dual tradition of the Russian autocracy that saw the ruler as both groznyi and tishaishii. 1. In fact, this duality is clearly visible in how Catherine (and her advocates) represented her rule. 2. Catherine deliberately cultivated a masculine and belligerent image of herself as ruler (groznyi). 3. Catherine also cultivated the image of the eighteenth-century ideal of the female monarch: the tishaishii tsar modernized into the ideal of a virtuous ruler bringing happiness. 4. The tension in this duality would continue to plague later monarchs. Essential Reading: John Alexander, Catherine the Great: Life and Legend (New York, 1989). Isabel de Madariaga, Catherine the Great: A Short History (New Haven, 1990). ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 11 Supplementary Reading: Isabel de Madariaga, Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great (New Haven, 1981). Marc Raeff, Catherine the Great: A Profile (New York, 1972). George Vernadsky, Ralph Fisher, et al., eds., A Source Book for Russian History from Early Times to 1917 (New Haven, 1972), vol. 2, chapters 11–12. Richard Wortman, Scenarios of Power (Princeton, 1995), vol. 1, chapters 3–4. Questions to Consider: 1. 2. How did the empresses of the eighteenth century continue and change the legacy of Peter I? Was there a “feminine” aspect to their rule? What ideas inspired Catherine the Great? What sort of political and social order did she desire to create in Russia? 12 ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership Lecture Five Social RebellionThe Pugachev Uprising Scope: This lecture begins by considering the life of serfs in eighteenth-century Russia: the emergence and structures of serfdom, landlord paternalism, and serf communities. In the face of a fundamental lack of freedom, peasants found various ways to resist. After considering everyday forms of resistance to serfdom, as well as more violent forms of rebellion, the lecture focuses on the enormous uprising, during Catherine the Great’s reign, led by Emelian Pugachev. The lecture describes the growth of the movement and its main course. To understand the motives of the rebels, the lecture examines the discontents of the various groups of followers and looks closely at the ideas and language of its leaders. Outline I. In eighteenth-century Russia, most people were peasants, most peasants were serfs, and the institution of serfdom was more intense than ever. A. Serfdom evolved gradually during the Muscovite period. 1. It ensured a sufficient supply of peasant labor to work the land that the state granted to nobles in return for service. 2. Peasant mobility was restricted by law. 3. Serfs and other bound peasants were technically not slaves: They were bound, not to landlords, but to the landthough, in practice, there was little difference. B. By the eighteenth century, gentry landlords often treated peasants as slaves. 1. Estate owners considered peasants lazy and childlike, with a weak moral sense, and thus, in need of help and guidance from nobles. 2. This attitude resulted in a strongly paternalist relation to serfs, which could mean both brutal control and enlightened provision of schools and hospitals. 3. Still, all serfs were bound to the land and, thus, were not free. II. Peasants found many ways to cope with these conditions. A. They created a strong sense of community with the peasant commune (obshchina or mir). 1. Formally, the commune was the institution of the heads of households. 2. Landlords and the state found the commune convenient and allowed it a wide range of responsibilities. 3. The commune served the interests of both landlords and the state and protected the interests of peasants. B. Peasants were also deeply religious and found comfort and meaning from their faith. III. Most of the time, peasants coped with their hardships, but they also found reasons and ways to fight back. A. They engaged in small, quiet, daily acts of resistance. 1. When working estate lands, they would work in a lazy and sloppy manner. 2. They would engage in petty theft. 3. They were also culturally resistant, stubbornly holding on to religious beliefs and practices that their “betters” told them were backward and ignorant. B. Peasants also engaged in more substantial and open forms of protest. 1. There were collective protests, which often involved a group drafting a petition of complaint. 2. The most common form of open protest was flight, especially to the frontiers of the south and southeast, where many joined Cossack communities. 3. Arson was an anonymous and relatively safe form of protest. 4. Murder was another form of open protest. 5. Rarely, the peasants engaged in mass uprisings. ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 13 IV. In the eighteenth century, the most impressive of the peasant uprisings was led by Emelian Ivanovich Pugachev. A. In November 1772, Pugachev arrived among Cossacks and peasants settled around the Ural River and identified himself as tsar Peter III come to deliver them from oppression. 1. Pugachev was a disgruntled former Don Cossack, a military deserter, and at least a sympathizer with Old Belief. 2. The primary group to join his growing army were Cossacks, but many others joined up as well, including serfs, Old Believers, and non-Russian minorities. 3. By October 1773, numerous forts and settlements had fallen to his motley army, and he began a six- month siege of Orenburg. 4. His growing army then marched on toward the Volga River regionwith the goal of marching to St. Petersburg. 5. Thousands of peasants joined in the Volga region. 6. As the movement grew, it became increasingly violent. 7. The government and the elites of St. Petersburg and Moscow were terrified. 8. Once well-trained army troops arrived, the rebel army was defeated, and Pugachev was arrested and executed. B. To better understand this revolt, it is useful to recognize the reasons it took hold where it did. 1. The Volga valley and the Ural region had been frontiersplaces of escapebut noble landowners were increasingly beginning to establish estates there. 2. This region was also a center of religious dissidence, with numerous monasteries and hermitages of Old Believers. 3. Another group that responded to Pugachev’s appeals, factory serfs, were also more numerous here than elsewhere. 4. This region was home to ethnic minorities who had grievances against the central state, especially the Bashkirs. 5. Most important, the Cossacks of the Urals were under assault from the expanding central state. C. To understand this movement, we also need to examine its ideas and goals. 1. Printed proclamations by the movement’s leaders were quite specific about their goals: making all peasants into crown peasants, granting the use of all land without requiring rent or dues, ensuring exemption from taxes and recruitment, returning to old religious traditions. 2. The tone and language of these proclamations and speeches helped to make these appeals compelling. 3. This discourse has many interesting features: the concept of a tsar batiushka who loves and cares for his people; the idea that nobles should serve the state; the view of their leader as a wanderer, even as a type of Christ-like figure whose return promises deliverance. 4. This religious dimension is highly important. 5. In general, the discourse of this movement offered a heady mixture of millenarian images of judgment, punishment, and deliverance. 6. Throughout these appeals, one idea was frequently and clearly articulated: freedom. D. After reading these proclamations, Catherine II dismissed them with contempt. 1. As she saw it, Pugachev promised peasants “castles in the air.” 2. But history often shows that such dreams of revenge, deliverance, and freedom have the power to mobilize. Essential Reading: John Alexander, Emperor of the Cossacks: Pugachov and the Frontier Jacquerie of 1773–1775 (Lawrence, 1973). Paul Avrich, Russian Rebels, 1600–1800 (New York, 1972), chapter 4. Isabel de Madariaga, Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great (New Haven, 1981), chapter 16. Supplementary Reading: Peter Kolchin, Unfree Labor: American Slavery and Russian Serfdom (Cambridge, MA, 1987). Questions to Consider: 14 ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 1. How can one reconcile the intensification of serfdom with the advancing Westernization and enlightenment of Russia? 2. What ideals and goals inspired Pugachev and his followers? ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 15 Lecture Six Moral RebellionNikolai Novikov Scope: This lecture considers the first emergence of a critique of autocratic despotism in Russia by educated Russians. The lecture begins with an important context: the development of secular higher education for Russian elites and the emergence of an educated public and even of an intelligentsia. As an illustration of this development of an educated, critical, noble voice in Russia, the lecture focuses on the publisher and writer Nikolai Novikov, one of the most influential critics of autocracy in the late 1700s. After describing his biography, the lecture considers his ideas about his own class, the state, social reform, morality, and spirituality. The lecture looks at Russian Freemasonry as a source of ideas, subversive of the Russian status quo, about the human being and society. The lecture concludes with Novikov’s imprisonment by Catherine the Great and the suppression of his work. Still, his legacy was more important than his individual fate. I. Outline Eighteenth-century Russia saw the emergence of an educated elite, a force that both aided the state and criticized it, offered it new ideas and sometimes opposed it. II. A. B. C. The A. B. C. D. E. This development begins with the Russian nobility, who absorbed certain aspects of Western culture. The emergence of an educated elite was closely linked to the spread of secular higher education in Russia. 1. Simultaneously, there was a shift in emphasis from technical and professional training to an education that was more broadly liberal and humanist. 2. Ivan Betskoi, Catherine the Great’s education adviser, argued that the purpose of education was to provide educated, intelligent members of society by developing the whole person. What were some of the major consequences of this growth of an educated class in Russia? 1. A growing number of young Russians were inspired by the concept of the natural dignity and worth of the individual and were eager to be useful. 2. Closely related is the emergence of an intelligentsia, educated individuals who criticized the realities they encountered on the basis of high moral and philosophical ideas. 3. Another development nurtured by education was the emergence of a public sphere, an important domain in which individuals can come together to discuss matters of public concern and where free “public opinion” can be formed. life of Nikolai Novikov (1744–1818) clearly illustrates this development. Novikov began as a typical member of the elite: gentry background, education at Moscow University, service in the elite Izmailovskii Guard, appointment to the Legislative Committee. In 1769, Novikov retired from state service to devote himself to literary pursuits—as a publisher, printer, editor, and writer. He established a series of influential (and controversial) satirical journals. 1. Novikov criticized all sorts of vices in public and private life. 2. Landowners who boasted of their nobility but were cruel to their peasants and of no use to society were the main target of his criticism. 3. He also combined praise of Catherine the Great with lighthearted criticism. 4. Despite his jabs at her, Catherine continued to support his publishing work financially, especially his publication of historical documents and his efforts to translate Western classics. Although Novikov’s criticisms were some of the harshest condemnations of social abuses written during this period, his goal was to appeal to the consciences of his fellow Russian nobles, not to attack the system itself. Novikov’s social and political criticism was fundamentally ethical. 16 ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 1. 2. For the state, his ideal was a patriarchal ruler who was above any particular interests and who would unite the entire nation and serve the common good. The ideal nobles, in Novikov’s view, would act paternalistically toward their peasants, neither abusing nor exploiting them, and would care for and instruct them. 3. Novikov sought a moral rather than a social or political revolution. F. Like many of the educated and sensitive nobles of this time, Novikov was searching for answers and was unsure how far to press his criticisms. 1. When the Pugachev rebellion erupted, he saw the depth and ferocity of people’s anger, as well as the brutality of which both the peasants and the state were capable. 2. This convinced him of the futility of revolution. 3. At this point, in 1775, Novikov joined the growing Masonic movement in Russia. G. In Russia, as in Western Europe and North America, Freemasonry was quite popular among young, educated nobles in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 1. The Freemason was expected to develop his inner spiritual resources; this was his duty to himself. 2. At the same time, the Freemason had a duty to concern himself with the welfare and dignity of his fellow human beings. III. Novikov was inspired by the ideals of Freemasonry to redouble his efforts as publisher and journalist. A. In 1777, he began publishing the journal Morning Light, a serious philosophical and moral journal that tried to promote virtue. B. Its clear and profound message was that human beings are not miserable fallen creatures, but made in God’s image and, hence, equal in rights and dignity. C. Although not original, for these were the ideas that pervaded Enlightenment thinking and helped shaped the American Revolution, Novikov’s achievement was in spreading and popularizing this Enlightenment humanism among Russia’s growing educated class. D. Novikov’s work as an advocate of Enlightenment ideas was prodigious. 1. In 1779, he moved to Moscow to take over the lease of the Moscow University Press. 2. After Catherine II allowed private individuals to set up publishing houses in 1783, Novikov established his own printing and publishing firm. 3. He continued to edit and contribute to a number of journals. 4. He also actively promoted the book trade in Russia. 5. As a publisher, Novikov established the first series of children’s books. 6. In addition, during the 1787 famine, he helped to organize charitable famine relief. E. As the most visible figure in the development of independent cultural life and opinion in Russia, Novikov stood at the forefront of the emergence in Russia of a public sphere and an intelligentsia. F. Catherine the Great grew increasingly nervous about such independence, and she was suspicious of the Freemasons. 1. She wrote stories and brochures ridiculing the Masons (and Novikov) as obscurantist mystics. 2. After the French Revolution, she took more decisive action against Novikov and others: In 1792, Novikov was arrested and condemned to fifteen years’ imprisonment. G. Novikov emerged from prison four years later, amnestied at the beginning of Paul’s reign. Broken physically and financially, he sought comfort mainly in mysticism. H. Despite this sad ending for Novikov personally, he was part of a larger process that could not be stopped. 1. The emergence of a growing public sphere in Russia. 2. The development of an intelligentsia: critically minded, morally driven, serving their nation without being subservient to the state. Essential Reading: Isabel de Madariaga, Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great (New Haven, 1981), chapters 33–34. Supplementary Reading: Nikolai Novikov, “On Man’s High Estate,” in Russian Intellectual History: An Anthology (New York, 1966), pp. 62–67. W. Gareth Jones, Nikolay Novikov: Enlightener of Russia (Cambridge, 1984). Marc Raeff, The Origins of the Intelligentsia: The Eighteenth-Century Nobility (New York, 1966). ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 17 Questions to Consider: 1. 2. In what ways was state-sponsored higher education transforming Russian life? Why did Catherine the Great seek to silence voices such as Novikov’s? What made his arguments dangerous? 18 ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership Lecture Seven Alexander IImagining Reform Scope: This lecture begins with the reign of Paul Iimportant less for what Paul accomplished than for the symbolism of his authoritarianism and his efforts to undo reform and, especially, for the strong aristocratic rejection of these tsarist traditions. Overthrown and murdered, he was replaced by his son Alexander I. The lecture considers the high expectations surrounding Alexander’s accession, his important reforms, and his considerations of constitutional reform in Russia. At the same time, however, Alexander never delivered on this talk and even resisted certain efforts at reform. The lecture explores the contradictions in Alexander’s reign by examining his ideas about power: his sincere embrace of Enlightenment values, his love of military culture, his limited conception of constitutionalism, his belief in the necessity of power and order to ensure happiness. The lecture concludes by considering Alexander’s growing mysticism and doubt. Outline I. Anxieties about the dangers of too much reform became especially visible in the final reign of the eighteenth century: the brief rule of Catherine the Great’s son Paul I (ruled 1796–1801). A. Paul had little lasting impact on Russian politics, but the symbolism of his reign is significant for what it tells us about changes in Russia. B. Paul I sought to undo much of his mother’s work. 1. He signaled this by removing and reburying, with special honor, his murdered father, Peter III. 2. Deeply suspicious of independent social activity, Paul revoked the Charter of the Nobility and the Charter of Towns. 3. Greater militarization was his main ideal for Russian life. 4. To help ensure a martial spirit in Russian life, he made sure that women would never rule again by proclaiming a new law of succession that restored primogeniture in the male line. C. Paul endeavored to revive the tradition of the all-powerful, dominating autocrat, ruling according to personal will and whim (the groznyi tsar). This was especially visible in his personal style. 1. Paul had a short temper and a brutal manner. 2. Hating and fearing French influence, which he considered revolutionary, Paul banned French-style fashions. 3. He also banned foreign books, foreign travel, and even the use of certain foreign words. 4. Yet, at the same time, Paul was a religious man and saw himself as a Christian ruler and as a “father” to his people. D. Elite society, much changed, quickly made it clear that they would not accept these sorts of restrictions any longer. E. When Paul was murdered by palace guards in a coup in March 1801, the response among the Russian elite was often joyful. II. Within elite society, the accession of Alexander I (ruled 1801–1825) was met with widespread jubilation and high hopes. A. Alexander himself encouraged this admiration by explicitly promising to rule in the spirit of his grandmother, Catherine II, revering many of his father’s anti-reforms and embarking on his own course of reform. B. Alexander I is a complex ruler, difficult to interpret. 1. He has been variously called a “sphinx,” an “enigma,” even a “crowned Hamlet.” 2. Yet Alexander’s seeming contradictoriness and strangeness has much to do with the contradictory Russian political tradition that saw the tsar as both groznyi and tishaishii. C. Alexander I began his reign with a series of important reform efforts. 1. He established an “Unofficial Committee” to discuss major political and social reforms, including a constitution and the abolition of serfdom. 2. The central state apparatus, especially the Senate, was made stronger. ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 19 3. Inefficient colleges were replaced by more efficient and responsible ministries. 4. Legislation was enacted to mitigate some of the harshest conditions relating to serfs. 5. The economy was encouraged by allowing non-nobles to own estates. 6. New universities and schools were established. D. But despite the constant talk about constitutional reform, nothing was accomplished. 1. This failure to act had many possible explanations, including distraction with international affairs, political unrest in Europe, the influence of the conservative Austrian foreign minister Metternich, an unwillingness to alienate the nobility, and Alexander’s growing personal mysticism. 2. Alexander also vigorously opposed giving real legislative power to the Senate and expressed suspicion of anyone who might oppose his autocratic will. III. Alexander’s ideas about power offer a means of reconciling these two aspects of his policies. A. There are good reasons to see his enlightened talk as serious and sincere. 1. What we know about Alexander suggests that he took the teachings of the Enlightenment deeply to heart. 2. These ideals pervaded his education (which was personally overseen by his grandmother, Catherine the Great). 3. Alexander’s tutor, the Swiss philosopher Frederic-Cesar de la Harpe, further instructed him in the central values of the Enlightenmentespecially that a ruler should be guided by reason and care for his people and that society should respect the natural equality of human beings. 4. In his first public statements as ruler, Alexander tried to express his self-ideal as a virtuous and caring ruler, and official praise echoed these images. 5. All of this reflects—with modernized features—the old ideal of the tishaishii tsar, though in Enlightenment colors. B. There was another side to Alexander’s political personality: Like his father, he loved all things military. C. To reconcile these conflicting images of Alexander as “blessed angel” and “passionate soldier,” we need to explore his understanding of the key notion of a “constitution.” 1. For Alexander and associates, a constitution did not encompass the idea of a separation and balance of powers or a check on executive power. 2. Instead, Alexander’s notion of a constitution involved the idea of an orderly system of administration and law, a Rechtsstaat free from arbitrariness. 3. For him, this law-based but powerful autocracy was the key to the nation’s political happiness, a guarantor of order, and a dynamic force for change. IV. In the final years of Alexander’s reign, there were signs that he was losing confidence in this rationalistic faith that order will lead to happiness. A. Alexander began to express his growing doubts that humans can ever make the world a better place. B. These doubts were reinforced by his travels around Russia, where he witnessed firsthand the sufferings and backwardness of the mass of ordinary Russians. C. These doubts were further strengthened by his growing religious mysticism. D. A key moment in Alexander’s existential crisis was the horrible flood of 1824 in St. Petersburgwhich appeared to many as a symbol of the failure of rationalism, a symbol of the limited power of humans to control and improve the world. Essential Reading: Nicholas Riasanovsky, A History of Russia, 6th ed. (Oxford, 2000), chapter 25. Richard Wortman, Scenarios of Power (Princeton, 1995), vol. 1, chapters 6–8. Supplementary Reading: Allen McConnell, Tsar Alexander I: Paternalistic Reformer (New York, 1970). George Vernadsky, Ralph Fisher, et al., eds., A Source Book for Russian History (New Haven, 1972), chapter 13. 20 ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership Questions to Consider: 1. Describe Alexander I’s vision of civic and national happiness. Was this unrealistic? 2. How can one reconcile Alexander’s love of all things military with his contemporary idealization as a “blessed angel”? ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 21 Lecture Eight The Decembrist Revolution Scope: This lecture looks at the origins, history, and consequences of a remarkable event in Russian history: the unsuccessful armed uprising against autocracy by groups of educated nobles belonging to secret societies in December 1825. The lecture begins with the succession crisis after the death of Alexander I and describes the armed uprising that accompanied it and the suppression of the rebellion. It then examines the political programs of the rebels. In order to understand the underlying ideas and values more closely, the lecture looks in detail at a single individual, Nikolai Turgenev. The lecture considers his biography, his experiences in Western Europe, his association with other Russians troubled by their autocratic government and by serfdom, and his ideas for change. Particular attention is paid to the influence of Enlightenment ideas of humanism and rationalism, as well as Romantic ideas about the individual. Outline I. The Decembrist rebellion occurred in the midst of a succession crisis after the childless tsar Alexander I died unexpectedly in November 1825. A. There was considerable public confusion over who would take the throne. 1. In accordance with Paul’s law of succession, the public expected it to be Alexander’s eldest brother, Constantine. 2. But it was publicly announced that the new tsar would be Alexander’s youngest brother, Nicholas (because of Constantine’s morganatic marriage, though this reason was not announced). 3. Nicholas was widely viewed as a reactionary, whereas Constantine was thought to have more liberal, Westernizing views. 4. Taking advantage of the confusion, a group of liberal-minded aristocrats, members of the secret Northern Society in St. Petersburg, made plans to seize power. B. This “revolution” was to take place on Senate Square on December 14, 1825, the date set for swearing allegiance to the new emperor Nicholas. 1. But several of the leaders grew fearful and did not show up at the square. 2. This lack of leadership meant that on the square were a few officers who were either unwilling or unable to take command and a few thousand soldiers who knew little or nothing of their officers’ original plans. 3. The new tsar, Nicholas I, ordered troops to suppress the rebellion with force. 4. This rebellion had echoes in other parts of the country, especially in the Ukraine, where rebel troops led by the secret Southern Society were marching toward the capital. 5. The leaders were severely punished; 125 men were sentenced to hard labor or exile and 5 men were publicly executed. II. What did these rebels, all privileged young nobles and officers, want? A. As can be seen from their written programs, the Decembrists saw a strong state as essential for progress. 1. The “constitution,” written primarily by Nikita Murav’ev for the Northern Society, envisioned a Russia ruled by a hereditary monarch who would share power with an elected legislature. 2. Pavel Pestel’s “Russian Law” (Russkaia pravda) envisioned ten years of dictatorship followed by a centralized and authoritarian, although democratically elected, government. B. The 1. The Decembrists wanted to promote and ensure citizenship and the rights of individuals. 2 They insisted on basic civil rights: freedom of speech, press, religion, and assembly. 3. They also vehemently opposed serfdom. III. To appreciate the human meaning of the Decembrist movement, we look at one Decembrist, Nikolai Turgenev (1789–1871). A. Turgenev was one of the organizers of the Northern Society and of secret societies that preceded it, for which, in 1826, he was sentenced to decapitation, though he had left Russia the year before the uprising. 22 ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership point of this strong authority, however, was progressive change. B. Socially, Turgenev was exceptionally privileged. C. Nonetheless, Turgenev was profoundly discontented, frustrated, and angry. 1. One cause of this discontent was disappointment with Alexander I. 2. No less, like many young, educated Russians, he had begun to see the world differently and to expect more from it. D. To understand this perceptual transformation, one must remember that most of the future Decembrists had been to Western Europe. 1. Many had been officers in the Russian army as it marched westward through Europe after Napoleon’s defeat. 2. Turgenev experienced Europe as a student at the university in Göttingen (1808–1812). 3. But whether in Europe as soldiers or students, young Russians like Turgenev had similar experiences discovering ideas. 4. They also saw a freer and more prosperous life that was previously unknown to them. 5. Young, elite Russians like Turgenev were embarrassed by their country’s backwardness. E. In addition, the early years of the nineteenth century were a time of enormous intellectual and cultural ferment in Russia. 1. Education was expanded and more publications were available. 2. There were increasing opportunities to meet and discuss ideas. IV. In their modes of thinking, men like Turgenev were influenced by both the eighteenth-century Enlightenment and the Romanticism of the nineteenth century. A. They were humanists. 1. They despised the conservative view of man as an essentially evil, fallen creature, believing that every human being is endowed with reason and deserves a life of dignity and respect. 2. Thus, they hated serfdom. B. They were rationalists. 1. They believed that the world is malleable and must be transformed in accordance with the dictates of reason. 2. They saw the best hope for change in a strong state led by rational and wise leaders. C. They were also influenced by Romanticism. 1. They were nationalists who considered it their sacred mission to save Russia from its backwardness. 2. They had a typical Romantic view of the individual: They dreamed of a society in which everyone, including themselves, could realize their full potential as human beings. 3. They wanted to live their own lives for some higher purpose. D. The story of Decembrism in Russia involved the disappointment experienced by men like Turgenev in the face of the glaring contrast between what they felt ought to be and what was. 1. They believed in rationality and the rule of law, but they saw personal and arbitrary government. 2. They believed in the natural dignity of all human beings and the importance of personal self-fulfillment, but they saw the slavery of the majority and the restriction of the rights and freedoms of the elite. 3. They wanted Russia to be respected in the world, but they saw that their country was feared and often viewed with contempt. Essential Reading: Anatole Mazour, The First Russian Revolution, 1825 (Stanford, 1964). Supplementary Reading: Marc Raeff, The Decembrist Movement (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1966). Andrzej Walicki, A History of Russian Thought: From the Enlightenment to Marxism (Stanford, 1979), chapter 3. ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 23 Questions to Consider: 1. 2. Why was the notion of a strong stateeven a temporary dictatorshipcentral to the programs of the Decembrists? Did this contradict their ideas about individual rights and dignity? Compare the ideas and values of the Decembrists to Novikov’s criticisms of autocracy. 24 ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership Lecture Nine Nicholas IOrthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality Scope: This lecture looks at the rule of Nicholas I and the ideas about power and order that inspired the Russian state at that time. It looks first at Nicholas I’s image as one of the most reactionary rulers in modern Russian history, and the policies that shaped this view, but also at his image as majestic Jupiter. The lecture then considers more closely his political personality and beliefsboth his conservative values and his religious and moral ideals. Finally, the lecture explores the very important efforts during his reign to articulate an official ideology for the Russian state, with its guiding principles of Orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationality. We examine each of these as key ideas for understanding Russian state politics in the nineteenth century (and beyond). Outline I. In modern Russian politics, a certain pattern had begun to emerge: Westernizing reform often alternated with hesitation, conservatism, even reaction. A. Sometimes, we have seen, this is apparent in the alternation of regimes. B. But this hesitancy toward reform is no less often visible in the work of individual rulers, as we saw in the reigns of Catherine and Alexander, in particular. C. This pattern again becomes visible when Alexander’s younger brother, Nicholas, came to the throne. II. Contemporaries generally agreed that Nicholas I (ruled 1825–1855) was exceptionally ruthless as a man and as a ruler. A. B. C. D. E. F. III. The A. They spoke of his personal harshness, his outbursts of rage, his obsession with regimentation and militarismhis groznyi qualities. His desire for order had a positive (even progressive) side. 1. He completed a codification of the laws. 2. He regulated some aspects of the lives of state peasantsleading to some improvements in conditions, though also higher taxes. But his concern with order also had a harsher face. 1. Nicholas was determined to defend traditional monarchies (and traditional social orders) in Europe against the rising tide of democratic revolution. 2. He also implemented intense Russification policies throughout the empire (especially in Poland). 3. Under his rule, there was growing cultural repression: Only officially approved views were allowed in the classroom, censorship became more restrictive than ever before, even science was put under tighter controls. Many felt that Nicholas had created what amounted to a police state in Russia. 1. Nicholas established a special political police agency that was secretive and responsive to the personal will of the emperor (Third Department of His Majesty’s Own Chancery). 2. The purpose of the Third Department was broad, but two goals were clear: obtaining information and suppressing disorder. In the aftermath of the European revolutions of 1830 and 1848, Nicholas’s police state became increasingly rigid, especially as these upheavals convinced him that Russia had been spared precisely because he was so ruthless. Contemporaries who met Nicholas invariably commented not only on his brutality as a ruler but also on his imposing physical presence (he was 6 feet, 3 inches, tall). complexity of Nicholas’s political personality reveals complicated motives. First, there is evidence that Nicholas’s legendary ruthlessness and obsession with order reflected not confidence but fear that almost verged on panic. 1. He was obsessed with revolution, for example. 2. His obsession with regimentation, orderliness, neatness, and precision extended well beyond reason. ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 25 B. Nicholas had a deep religious faith; however, his religiosity was not the restless seeking for truth that occupied many educated Russians but a simple, unquestioning faith. C. Nicholas was known for his moral harshness, his inability to forgive. D. At the same time, Nicholas cultivated a public image as a family man. 1. Images of the tsar with his family were made widely available for the first time. 2. But this was not just a public image. Nicholas cultivated his own idyllic family life. E. All these aspects—religion, morality, family life—contribute to an image of the ruler as virtuousas a tishaishii tsar (loving and pious), as well as a groznyi tsar (awesome and mighty). IV. These years of Nicholas’s rule also saw the clearest articulation yet (especially by the Minister of Education, Sergei Uvarov) of an explicit ideology of Russian politics, embodied in three key principles: Orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationality. A. Orthodoxy (pravoslavie) was always listed first in this trinity of principles. 1. This assertion of religion was a reaction against the dominant convictions of the Age of Reason, as can be seen, for example, in the arguments against reliance on reason by the journalist and historian Mikhail Pogodin. 2. This philosophical position had practical and conservative implications for politics: Human society was not perfectible and earthly authority should be left in the hands of established rulers, whom God has sanctified and guides. 3. At the same time, these arguments assumed that authority must be in the spirit of God’s will. 1. 2. In what ways can the “reactionary” Nicholas I be seen as still continuing the legacy of reform of Peter I and Catherine II and in what ways was he trying to reverse their reforms? What is the importance of religion in Russian politics in the reign of Nicholas I and before? 26 ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership B. The 1. Autocratic rule was justified because power is willed by God. 2. Autocratic rule was viewed as absolutely necessary (as good). 3. In part, this was a negative argument: The strong hand of government was needed to keep order. 4. But this was also a positive political argument: Autocratic power was seen as the best means to ensure progress and happiness and the Russian polity seen as a “family” in which the tsar was the stern but benevolent father (tsar-batiushka). C. The (narodnost’). connection of all this to autocracy (samoderzhavie) is obvious. third component of official ideology is the most puzzling and often debated of the three: nationality 1. In part, this was simply the reverse side of autocracy: a view of the Russian people as loving and obedient subjects (“children”) of the tsar and the landlords. 2. These ideas had their roots in European thought of the day. A widespread Romantic ideal was that every nation has its unique genius; Russia’s genius, it was felt, was the unique bond of love and devotion between the people and the tsar. 3. Many Russians had already begun to feel that this was an archaic and dangerous ideal and not suitable for a modern state in the modern European world. Essential Reading: Nicholas Riasanovsky, A History of Russia, 6th ed. (Oxford, 2000), chapters 26–28. Richard Wortman, Scenarios of Power, (Princeton, 1995), vol. 1, chapters 9–13. Supplementary Reading: Bruce Lincoln, In the Vanguard of Reform: Russia’s Enlightened Bureaucrats, 1825–1861 (DeKalb, 1986). Nicholas Riasanovsky, Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia, 1825–1855 (Berkeley, 1959). Cynthia Whittaker, The Origins of Modern Russian Education: An Intellectual Biography of Count Sergei Uvarov, 1786–1855 (DeKalb, 1984). Questions to Consider: Lecture Ten Alexander Pushkin, Russia’s National Poet Scope: This lecture considers the life and the powerful myth of Alexander Pushkin, Russia’s most beloved writer. It begins with Pushkin’s life as both privileged insider and difficult outsideras aristocrat and African, as privileged government official and rebel poet. To more fully understand Pushkin and what his life tells us about Russia’s changing culture, the lecture looks at his personal style of living and writing, in particular, his spirit of serious play. Pushkin’s tragic death in a duel is then described, along with the growing cult around Pushkin that followed. The lecture concludes by considering the meaning of Pushkin as a symbol of the Russian nation and of what it means to be Russian. Outline I. Widely considered Russia’s national poeteven part of the definition of Russia itselfAlexander Pushkin (1799–1837) was both a privileged insider and a difficult outsider to Russian life. A. Born in Moscow in 1799, Pushkin’s aristocratic family could, on his father’s side, trace its lineage back for centuries to the old Muscovite nobility. B. By contrast, his maternal great-grandfather was Ibrahim Hannibal, said to be the son of an Abyssinian prince given by the Turkish sultan to Peter the Great. C. This African heritage, as well as his aristocratic lineage, was a part of Pushkin’s self-image. 1. Pushkin was taunted for his African heritage and features, which were sometimes a source of self- hatred. 2. But this African ancestry was also a source of pride for Pushkin in being an exotic outsider. In his novel-in-verse Evgenii Onegin, he writes of fleeing Russia “for my Africa.” D. The 1. Most obviously, he was a privileged insider. He was educated in St. Petersburg at the elite new lycée duality of being both insider and outsider was visible in Pushkin’s biography. directly attached to the emperor’s summer palace at Tsarskoe selo. 2. After graduating, he worked at a good but easy job in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and enjoyed the pleasures of life in the capital. 3. At the same time, Pushkin seemed to perceive himself as an outsider: He became associated with semi- legal literary and political societies and was close friends with many future Decembrists. 4. He even wrote some mildly political poems about liberty that circulated hand-to-hand and some pointed satirical epigrams. 5. Because of this daring, if modest, opposition, he was dismissed from the civil service and forced into what amounted to house arrest on his estate. 6. In response to the Decembrist rebellion, he wrote a sympathetic poem to the rebels in Siberian exile. E. In 1826, the new tsar, Nicholas I, pardoned Pushkin, but to ensure that he behaved, Nicholas became Pushkin’s personal censor. 1. Pushkin’s writings often praised Russia and its rulers, but he also continued to write politically critical poems. 2. Some of his greatest works—such as the epic poem about Peter the Great, “The Bronze Horseman”— were filled with warnings about the dangers of unbridled power and arrogant political will. F. One view of these contradictions (the old Soviet view) is that Pushkin was truly a rebel but had to pretend to be loyal to protect his freedom. I would suggest that he was both loyalist and rebel, just as he was both Russian and African, insider and outsider. II. To more fully understand Pushkin’s identity and his cultural place in his own time, we must examine his style of living and writing. A. Play was one of the highest values for Pushkin; it pervaded everything he did and, indeed, was part of the increasingly Westernized culture of nineteenth-century Russia. 1. At the lycée, Pushkin had the reputation for being creative but rather flighty. ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 27 2. As a government official in St. Petersburg, he reveled in the pleasures of high society, including gambling (which soon led him deeply into debt) and women. B. Pushkin’s literary writing reflected this culture of play, both in its subject matter (Evgenii Onegin, for example, begins with a loving description of the pleasures of city life) and in his versatile and protean style. C. But this was serious play: Pushkin worked hard to make his writings appear brilliant and easy. D. As early as 1825, some readers were complaining that he was not sufficiently high-minded and serious, and sales of his works declined in the early 1830s. III. When Pushkin died—suddenly and tragicallyhis reputation was transformed. A. B. C. IV. The A. B. C. D. By 1836, Pushkin’s situation had become quite difficult: His literary popularity was waning, his gambling debts were mounting, and he had continuing problems with the tsar. In addition, rumors were surfacing about a flirtation between his young wife and the young officer Georges d’Anthès. 1. Pushkin challenged d’Anthès to a duel, which was resolved when d’Anthès agreed to marry Pushkin’s sister-in-law. 2. When the flirtation continued, Pushkin sent d’Anthès’s father (the Dutch ambassador) an insulting letter, leading young d’Anthès to challenge Pushkin. 3. They fought on January 27, 1837Pushkin lost and died two days later of his injuries. Pushkin’s deathreminding people of what they had losttransformed his waning popularity into new enthusiasm. 1. When his body lay in state, thousands of people paid their respects, and some tried to take bits of his coat and pieces of his hair. 2. His books began to sell extremely well. 3. Such outpouring of emotion for a poetor any nongovernmental figurehad never occurred before, and the government grew fearful that this might turn into a political demonstration. 4. Newspapersdespite government warnings not to emphasize Pushkin’s importancedeclared Pushkin to be Russia’s “national glory” and his death, a national tragedy. cult of Pushkin as national symbol grew steadily This first signs of this mythic Pushkin had begun to emerge even before he died, when Nikolai Gogol spoke of Pushkin as a “national poet” possessing a Russianness that transcended class and time. A high point of the growing cult of Pushkin as symbol of the nation came in 1880 at the three-day celebration organized around the unveiling of a monument to Pushkin in Moscow. 1. This was the first major monument in Russia not dedicated to a political or military leader and built with public initiative and public funds. 2. Fedor Dostoevskii spoke at the unveiling, declaring Pushkin to be both uniquely Russian and a “universal man.” Throughout the twentieth century, Pushkin has been described as symbolizing all that is great in Russia. But what has Pushkin symbolized to so many? 1. Pure Russianness but also the entwining of Russian culture with other cultures. 2. Love of country and loyalty but also discontent and rebellion. 3. An intellect that was serious and earnest but also the culture of play and pleasure. 4. In other words, the contradictoriness that is so central to the meaning of Russian history. Essential Reading: Alexander Pushkin, Eugene Onegin and Other Poems (Everyman’s Library Pocket Poets) (New York, 1999). Victor Terras, A History of Russian Literature (New Haven, 1991), pp. 182–184, 204–216, 239–243. 28 ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership Supplementary Reading: David Bethea, Realizing Metaphors: Alexander Pushkin and the Life of the Poet (Madison, 1998). William Mills Todd, III, Fiction and Society in the Age of Pushkin: Ideology, Institutions and Narrative (Cambridge, MA, 1986). Abram Terts (Andrei Sinyavsky), Strolls with Pushkin (New Haven, 1993). Questions to Consider: 1. Compare Pushkin’s attitudes to those of Novikov and the Decembrists. Was there anything intellectually or ethically serious in his spirit of play? 2. What does the response to Pushkin’s death tell us about changes in Russian public life since the end of the eighteenth century? ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 29 Lecture Eleven The Birth of the Intelligentsia Scope: Focusing on the 1830s, this lecture looks at the emergence of one of the most important social and cultural groups in Russian history: the intelligentsia. The lecture defines this term and looks at common characteristics: a shared Romantic philosophical outlook and preoccupation with ideas but also a common Romantic temperament. The lecture then turns to the arguments of a single individual, Petr Chaadaev, whose ideas about Russia’s past and future shocked and inspired many educated Russians. We examine his brutal critique of Russia’s backwardness and his emerging argument that Russia’s future is necessarily connected to the West. The lecture concludes with the arguments made against Chaadaev by the Slavophiles, who believed Russia had a unique destiny in the world rooted in traditions of community and freedom that had been eroded by Russia’s Westernization since Peter I. Outline I. One of the most important developments of the nineteenth century, especially for discussions of Russia’s fate, was the emergence of the intelligentsia. A. The term intelligentsia meant not a social category (a class or occupational group) but a cultural category, such that intelligenty were defined by their particular way of looking at the world. 1. This culture was defined in opposition to a repressive and restrictive political and social order. 2. Intelligenty believed that they were fighting, not for themselves, but for others and for ideas. 3. Although ideas were central, the intelligentsia was also defined by its spirit, which had an element of religious fervor. B. The key period in which the Russian intelligentsia took shape as an organized movement was the 1830s and 1840s, which was also the time when the intelligentsia split into two main competing currents: “Westernizers” and “Slavophiles.” II. Although there were clear differences between these two groups, these should not be overstated. A. They almost all knew one another personally, were from the same small social class (educated noblemen), and were even friends. B. More important, they shared certain essential beliefs and values and a certain sensibility. C. Both groups shared a common philosophical outlook. 1. 2. 3. D. The 1. 2. 3. III. In 1836, letter.” Westernizers and Slavophiles were both deeply influenced by German Romantic philosophers (especially Friedrich Schelling and Georg Wilhem Friedrich Hegel) and the belief that the world is “organic” and “whole.” Thus, truth was to be found, not by mechanical reasoning, but through instinct and the senses. These ideas were extremely important for the life of the Russian intelligentsia in the 1830s and 1840s: Individuals had to discover where they personally fit into this grand unified scheme and to discover Russia’s place in this totality. Westernizers and Slavophiles also shared a Romantic temperament. In part, this meant being emotional, enthusiastic, and dreamy. This also meant being excited about poetry, nature, friendship, and romantic love. Most of all, these young men were fervent about abstract ideas. into this impassioned intellectual and emotional milieu came Petr Chaadaev’s “first philosophical 30 ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership A. B. C. It would be difficult to exaggerate the agitation that this letter provoked. This response was partly to Chaadaev’s tone and style, which was full of bitterness and anguish. Most important, though, was that Chaadaev addressed the question of Russia’s historical nature and destiny as a nation. 1. 2. He offered an audacious explication of the emptiness of Russia’s national culture. Unlike a normal civilization that develops and evolves over time, Russia was like time’s orphan. D. E. IV. The A. B. C. D. E. F. G. 3. For Chaadaev, Russia’s unique position on the boundaries of Asia and Europe gave it a special possibility in the world. 4. But Russia’s fate, he worried, was to fail to be either East or West and to fail to be original. Chaadaev’s arguments provoked varying reactions from different groups. 1. The government declared Chaadaev mad and placed him under house arrest. 2. Most intellectuals rejected his evident despair but drew different conclusions depending on their attitudes to Russia’s Westernization. Chaadaev’s own response is also of interest. 1. In 1837, he wrote “Apology of a Madman” 2. Here, he began to reconsider Russia’s backwardness as an advantage: Because Russia has no history, reason is given a freer hand. Slavophiles were among Chaadaev’s most virulent critics. Although they shared Chaadaev’s Romantic view of history as the source of nationhood, they saw in Russia’s past the history that Chaadaev did not see. To demonstrate this history, they studied and collected folklore and popular culture. The Slavophiles agreed that some Russians were indeed “homeless nomads,” but these were only the Westernized Russians, not the common people who preserved national traditions. A communal spirit was the most important of these preserved popular traditions. 1. The Slavophiles called this spirit sobornost’. 2. This means a society existing as a community, united by free will on the basis of shared values. 3. This idea was at the heart of all Slavophile thinking about Russia and its future. This idea is most fully explored in the works of Aleksei Khomiakov, who believed that Russia embodied the values of sobornost’ like no other nation. 1. The particular character of Russian religion (Eastern Orthodoxy) was seen to nurture this communal spirit. 2. The Orthodox Church did not agree and forbade the publication of Khomiakov’s works. The Holy Synod saw the idea of sobornost’ as placing too much emphasis on faith and will and too little on the institutions of the Church. 3. Slavophiles also pointed to certain secular customs, especially the peasant commune, as sustaining the traditions of “communal social life.” The Slavophile ideal lay backward in history, not ahead; it was a traditional, conservative ideology. But the Slavophiles were also radicals who were critical of the status quo. 1. They believed that the Petrine autocracy had steadily eaten away at the cultural features that made Russia great. 2. For the Slavophiles, the only salvation was to return to Russia’s true roots: religious, collectivist, and free. 3. But this meant that the Slavophiles opposed much of the existing political and social order, including serfdom, the lack of civil rights, the death penalty, and government intrusion into private life. 4. Thus, in many ways, the Slavophiles were not conservatives at all but idealistic visionaries and even radicals who found a better future in a partly imagined past. Essential Reading: Andrzej Walicki, A History of Russian Thought from the Enlightenment to Marxism (Stanford, 1979), chapters 5–6. Supplementary Reading: James Edie, James Scanlan, and Mary-Barbara Zeldin, Russian Philosophy (Chicago, 1965), vol. 1, pp. 101–269. Philip Pomper, The Russian Revolutionary Intelligentsia (Arlington Heights, IL, 1970), chapter 3. Andrzej Walicki, The Slavophile Controversy: History of a Conservative Utopia in Nineteenth-Century Russian Thought (Oxford, 1975). ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 31 Questions to Consider: 1. 2. Do you agree with Chaadaev that Westernization meant the loss of Russia’s connection to history? Why did he first see this as a disaster, then as an opportunity? What are the implications of the Slavophiles’ key idea sobornost’ for their vision of Russia’s future? 32 ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership Lecture Twelve WesternizersVissarion Belinskii Scope: This lecture considers the personalities and ideas of the Westernizers, the main critics of the Slavophiles. The focus is on the life and ideas of a single exemplary Westernizer intelligent: Vissarion Belinskii. The lecture considers his social origins and education; the passion with which he, and other Russian intelligenty, struggled to find the meaning of life; and his passion for ideas. In particular, the lecture explores the evolution of his thought about burning questions of the day: God and evil, the nature of humanity, and the value of the individual human being. The lecture also explores Belinskii’s ideas, influenced by Western thought, about the dignity and rights of the individual and how these moral and philosophical ideas were used to critique serfdom, autocracy, and social injustice. The lecture concludes with a comparison of Westernizers and Slavophiles around the question of the individual person. Outline I. The larger of the two main movements in the emerging Russian intelligentsia was the Westernizers. A. Whereas the Slavophiles formed a relatively coherent intellectual trend, the Westernizers were more diffuse and varied. B. What united them was the belief that Russia’s only hope—its only future—lay in joining the civilization of the West. II. A remarkable individual who exemplified this emerging intelligentsia is Vissarion Belinskii (1811–1848). A. B. C. D. III. In a A. B. Unlike most of the other radicals of the 1830s and 1840s, who tended to be from the gentry, Belinskii was the son of a country doctor. 1. Later, many young radicals would come from the raznochintsy (people of various ranks—that is, not from any of the traditional estates: peasants, nobles, clergy). 2. Their origins mattered, for the raznochintsy stood sociologically apart from the traditional order, which encouraged them to imagine a society in which they had a proper place. 3. The fact that Belinskii was relatively underprivileged meant that he was less prepared intellectually than other leading intelligenty (for example, he could not read German). 4. But he made up for his educational deficits in emotional commitment and fervor. The essence of his intellectual style was embodied in the idea: “to think, to feel, to understand and to suffer are one and the same thing.” 1. These sentiments were true to the Romantic ideal that real understanding comes, not from reason, but from intuitive insight. 2. This combination of thinking and feeling pervaded Belinskii’s life. 3. Alexander Herzen, one of the leading Westernizers, tells of Belinskii’s passion for honest conviction. 4. Belinskii was never lighthearted, and his search for “truth” was unrelenting, as recalled by his friend the writer Ivan Turgenev, who participated in a discussion with Belinskii over God’s existence. To understand the culture of the entire intelligentsia, it is important to pay attention to this style and manner. All of this earnest passion was directed at ideas, but what were these ideas? letter written just before his death, Belinskii noted three stages of his thought: God, humanity, man. Belinskii resolved the eternal question of the existence of evil in a world supposedly created by a good and omnipotent God (theodicy) by deciding that there can be no God. His second major intellectual struggle was how could one explain human evil? 1. Like other young, educated Russians of his generation, Belinskii was enamored with German idealistic philosophy, especially with the works of Schelling and Hegel, who argued that everything that exists in the world is an embodiment of the totality of all thingsof a higher harmony. 2. Belinskii concluded that the correct philosophical response was to recognize that all is as it should be. 3. Belinskii interpreted Hegel’s notion that “all that is real is rational” in a conservative way. ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 33 4. Belinskii did not deny the evil of the real world, but he tried to philosophically accept this world. 5. After little more than a year, Belinskii found this intellectual position unbearable. 6. He escaped from this “reconciliation with reality” by relying on moral thought and feeling. C. Belinskii now emphasized an ethical idea that was central to the emerging thought of the intelligentsia: the individual human being. 1. A key term here is lichnost’ (the individual person, the human personality, the self). 2. Armed with this idea, Belinskii challenged much conventional philosophical thinking. 3. He also constructed a critique of the world around himhe criticized autocracy, serfdom, poverty, prostitution, drunkenness, wife-beating, and other evils of everyday Russian life D. In 1847, in a letter Belinskii wrote to the writer Nikolai Gogol, we find the most famous and influential example of this social and moral criticism of the existing world. 1. Gogol had become famous as a writer of fiction in which he exposed the widespread corruption in Russian political and social life and expressed sympathy for the poor and downtrodden. 2. In 1847, Gogol shocked the Russian public by publishing Selected Passages from a Correspondence with Friends, in which he bluntly declared that national regeneration would come about through personal, inward transformation and submission to all established authority. 3. Belinskii responded, with moral outrage, that what Russia needed was for the people to awaken to their sense of human dignity and for there to be rights and laws that protected the person. 4. The dignity of the human person was the sole categorical imperative for Belinskii and the basis for needed political, social, and cultural change in Russia. E. Belinskii’s writings on literature were inseparable from these moral judgments. 1. What Belinskii required most of a work of literature was “truth.” 2. For Belinskii, truth meant a probing portrayal of real life and a commitment to moral truth. 3. The backwardness and oppressiveness of Russian life, he argued, made literature and its moral and critical mission especially important. IV. Rather than their attitudes toward the West or Russia, it was this idea of lichnost’ (of the dignity of each individual) that truly divided Slavophiles from Westernizers. A. The Slavophiles idealized a world in which people were all bonded together in a natural community (sobornost’). B. The Westernizers idealized the individual and were concerned above all with the individual’s rights and dignity in society C. For many Westernizing intelligenty, this was a liberal idea, but it was also a socialist one, for socialism was seen as a social ideal meant to promote the individual. Essential Reading: Isaiah Berlin, Russian Thinkers (New York, 1995or earlier editions). Supplementary Reading: James Edie, James Scanlan, and Mary-Barbara Zeldin, Russian Philosophy (Chicago, 1965), vol. 1, Book 3. Alexander Herzen, My Past and Thoughts (Berkeley, 1999). Nicholas Riasanovsky, A Parting of the Ways: Government and the Educated Public in Russia, 1801–1855. Questions to Consider: 1. 2. Why were Russian intelligenty so passionate (some would say obsessed) about philosophical ideas? What were Belinskii’s (and Westernizers’) attitudes toward the individual person? Is this similar to Western notions of individuality? 34 ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership Note: Names of rulers are printed in bold. Timeline 1613 .................................. Founding of Romanov dynasty with election of Mikhail as tsar by notables 1645–1676........................Reign of tsar Aleksei, father of Peter I 1649..................................First law code (Ulozhenie) 1652..................................Establishment of foreigners’ settlement (nemetskaia sloboda) in Moscow 1653 .................................. Church reforms begin (leading to schism in 1666) 1676–1682........................Tsar Fedor 1682–1689 ........................ Peter I and his half-brother Ivan V rule as co-tsars; Sofia is regent 1689–1725........................Peter I reigns as tsar; major reforms and Westernization 1721..................................Peter named emperor and “the Great” 1697–1698........................Peter’s “grand embassy” to Holland and England 1700–1721........................Northern War between Russia and Sweden 1703..................................Founding of St. Petersburg 1710..................................Conquest of the Baltic region 1722 .................................. Table of Ranks requires all nobles to earn rank through state service 1724..................................Establishment of Academy of Sciences 1725–1727........................Rule of Peter’s second wife, Catherine I 1727–1730........................Rule of Peter I’s grandson (through his first wife) Peter II 1730–1740 ........................ Anna, daughter of Ivan V, rules, abolishing the powerful Privy Council and reasserting autocracy 1736–1739........................Russo-Turkish War 1740–1741 ........................ Reign of the infant Ivan VI (grandnephew of Anna) with mother as regent 1741–1761........................Reign of Elizabeth, daughter of Peter I and Catherine I 1761–1762 ........................ Peter III; emancipates nobility from mandatory state service 1762–1796........................Catherine II the Great (wife of Peter III) 1767..................................Legislative Commission formed to consider reform, guided by Catherine II’s “Instructions” (nakaz) 1768–1774........................Russo-Turkish War 1772..................................First Partition of Poland (complete 1794–1795) 1773–1775........................Pugachev rebellion 1777..................................Nikolai Novikov begins publishing philosophical and moral journal, Morning Light 1785..................................Charter of the Nobility; Charter of the Towns 1787–1792........................Russo-Turkish War 1792..................................Arrest and suppression of Novikov 1796–1801........................Paul I (Catherine’s son); tries to undo many of Catherine’s reforms ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 35 1797..................................Law restores succession to throne by eldest son 1801–1825........................Alexander I; much discussion of reform 1805..................................Russia participates in war against Napoleon 1809..................................Acquisition of Finland 1810..................................Establishment of State Council, appointed advisory body composed of Russia’s oldest aristocratic families 1812..................................Napoleon invades Russia; Battle of Borodino; burning of Moscow; French retreat 1814..................................Victorious Russian troops enter Paris 1816 .................................. Formation of the secret political society the Union of Salvation among discontented young nobles (succeeded by the Union of Welfare and the Northern and Southern Societies) 1824..................................Serious flood in St. Petersburg 1825..................................Decembrist revolt in the wake of the death of Alexander I 1825–1855........................Nicholas I (brother of Alexander I) 1826..................................Hanging of five aristocratic leaders of the Decembrist revolt 1835..................................First modern law code (Svod zakonov) 1836 .................................. Publication of the first of Petr Chaadaev’s Philosophical Letters (written in 1829) 1847..................................Vissarion Belinskii writes famous letter to the writer Gogol 1853–1856........................Crimean War; defeat sparks talk of major reform 1855–1881........................Alexander II; the Great Reforms 1857–1862........................Herzen’s journal Kolokol (The Bell) published in London 1861..................................Emancipation of the serfs 1863 .................................. University reform; publication of Nikolai Chernyshevskii’s radical novel What Is to Be Done? 1864 .................................. Establishment of local self-government (zemstvo); reform of the judicial system and of elementary education 1865 .................................. Reform of censorship 1865–1885........................Conquest of Central Asia 1866..................................Assassination attempt on Alexander II 1869..................................Publication of Lev Tolstoy’s War and Peace; separate Women’s universities authorized 1869–1870........................Publication of Petr Lavrov’s Historical Letters 1870 .................................. Reform of city government 1874..................................Culmination of military reform; populist “To the People” movement 1876–1879........................Populist organization Land and Freedom 1877–1878........................Russo-Turkish War in the Balkans 1878..................................Religious transformation of the writer Lev Tolstoi 1879 .................................. Land and Freedom splits into terrorist organization, People’s Will, and propaganda- oriented Black Repartition 36 ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 1880..................................Count Loris-Melikov’s “political spring” and plans to establish a consultative national assembly; Vladimir Solov’ev lectures on “Godmanhood” at St. Petersburg University 1881..................................Assassination of Alexander II by member of People’s Will 1881–1894........................Alexander III 1881–1884........................Counter-reforms; “temporary regulations” created conditions of virtual martial law 1881–1882........................Anti-Jewish pogroms, along with laws restricting Jewish settlement and employment 1891–1892 ........................ Famine 1891–1904........................Building of Trans-Siberian Railway 1892–1903........................Sergei Witte serves as Minister of Finance 1894–1917........................Nicholas II 1895 .................................. Formation of Marxist St. Petersburg Union of Struggle for the Liberation of the Working Class 1898..................................Founding of Russian Social-Democratic Workers’ Party 1901..................................Formation of populist Socialist Revolutionary Party; Tolstoi excommunicated for his religious views 1902 .................................Publication of Vladimir Lenin’s “What Is to Be Done?,” the foundation text of Bolshevism 1903..................................Split in Russian Social-Democratic Workers’ Party into Bolsheviks and Mensheviks 1904–1905........................Russo-Japanese War 1904..................................Formation of first liberal party, the Union of Liberation 1905..................................Revolution of 1905: Bloody Sunday (January 9); mass strikes; October Manifesto promises political reform and civil rights; December insurrections 1906 .................................. Fundamental laws; first State Duma elected, critical of government, so closed; Prime Minister Stolypin’s land reforms and policies of repression 1907 .................................. Second State Duma, also critical of government; government closes Duma and revises electoral law before allowing new elections 1912..................................Revival of labor unrest; legal publication begins of Bolshevik and Menshevik newspapers 1914..................................Outbreak of World War I 1916..................................Assassination of Rasputin 1917..................................February Revolution; establishment of Provisional Government and Petrograd Soviet of Workers and Soldier’s Deputies; abdication of Nicholas II; Bolsheviks come to power and establish one-party government 1917–1924 ........................ Vladimir Lenin, chairman of Council of People’s Commissars and de facto leader of Politburo of Communist Party 1918 .................................. Treaty of Brest-Litovsk removes Russia from war 1918–1921........................Civil war; independence of Poland, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Ukraine, and Armenia 1921..................................Anti-Bolshevik Revolt at Kronstadt naval base near Petrograd 1921..................................Tenth Party Congress and promulgation of New Economic Policy ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 37 1921–1922 ........................ Famine 1924..................................Death of V. I. Lenin; Petrograd renamed Leningrad 1920s ................................ Debates and power struggles, out of which Stalin emerges as supreme party leader 1922–1953........................Iosif Stalin general secretary of the Communist Party 1928..................................Beginning of first Five-Year Plan 1930..................................Mass collectivization of agriculture begins 1932–1933 .......................Famine 1936–1939........................Purges, show trials, and “great terror” 1939..................................Nazi-Soviet pact 1940 ................................. Annexation of Baltic states and war with Finland 1941..................................Nazi Germany invades USSR 1941–1953........................Stalin also head of state (Chairman of Council of People’s Commissars) 1941–1944........................Siege of Leningrad 1944–1945........................Soviet armies move into Eastern Europe and Germany 1953..................................Death of Stalin 1953–1964........................Nikita Khrushchev first secretary of the Communist Party 1956..................................Khrushchev’s “secret speech” denouncing Stalin delivered at Twentieth Party Congress 1962 .................................. Publication of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich 1962..................................Cuban missile crisis 1964 .................................. Nikita Khrushchev removed from power 1964–1982........................Leonid Brezhnev first secretary (later renamed general secretary) of Communist Party 1974 .................................. Solzhenitsyn deported from Soviet Union 1975..................................Andrei Sakharov awarded Nobel Peace Prize 1979–1989........................Soviet war in Afghanistan 1980..................................Andrei Sakharov exiled to Gor’kii 1982–1984........................Iurii Andropov general secretary of the Communist Party 1984–1985........................Konstantin Chernenko general secretary of the Communist Party 1985–1991........................Mikhail Gorbachev general secretary of the Communist Party, beginning policy of restructuring and allowing greater freedom 1989..................................Opening of new elected Congress of People’s Deputies of USSR 1990..................................Russian Federation declares sovereignty; Boris Yeltsin elected first Russian president; Gorbachev becomes president of USSR 1991..................................Attempted coup against Gorbachev by conservative Communists; Boris Yeltsin elected president of Russian Federation; declarations of independence by many Soviet states; USSR dissolved 38 ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership Glossary Autocracy (samoderzhavie). Meaning literally and in its original sense, self-sustained or independent power, the term increasingly referred to the absolute authority of the Russian tsars, who were known as autocrats. Adapted in the fifteenth century from Byzantine ideas of imperial authority, it signified that there was no higher earthly authority than the Russian ruler. Bolsheviks. Members of a wing of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers’ Party, which, led by Lenin, took control of the government in Russia in October 1917. The group originated at the party’s second congress in 1903 when Lenin’s followers, insisting that party membership be restricted to professional revolutionaries, won a temporary majority on the party’s central committee and on the editorial board of its newspaper, Iskra. They assumed the name Bolsheviks (“those of the majority”) and called their opponents the Mensheviks (“those of the minority”). The Bolsheviks insisted on a highly centralized, disciplined, professional party flexible enough to act boldly when the historical situation warranted. The Bolsheviks became a de facto independent party after 1912 and were renamed the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in 1918. Boyars. Old Russian aristocrats who were the dominant social group in medieval Russian society and state administration. The social and political importance of the boyars declined in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Peter I abolished the rank and title of boyar, although the term was sometimes used archaically to refer to old aristocratic families. Cheka (ChK, VChK, Vecheka). The All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for the Struggle against Counterrevolution and Sabotage. Established 7 (20) December 1917, its role combined fighting banditry, looting, and financial corruption with the tasks of a political police. During 1918, a network of provincial and district Chekas was established. During the civil war, the Cheka was the primary organ of the “red terror.” It was replaced by the OGPU and, in later years, by the NKVD and the KGB. Council of People’s Commissars. See Sovnarkom. Duma. A national representative assembly established in 1906. Empowered to initiate and approve legislation, though limited in its authority. Day-to-day political power remained in the hands of the ministers, whom the tsar appointed and who were not responsible to the Duma. The tsar could veto legislation, as could the parliamentary upper house of notables, the State Council, half of whose members were appointed by the tsar. Much of the budget (especially military and foreign policy) was not under the Duma’s control. In 1907, the voting law was changed to reduce representation by the peasantry, urban workers, and national minorities and to increase that of the gentry. Glasnost’. A Russian word that literally means openness, making things public and visible, this term was used to define Russian state policies of reform in two periods. During the Great Reforms of Alexander II, the policy of glasnost’ involved open discussions of the coming reforms, a new system of jury trials open to the public, and censorship reform. Under Mikhail Gorbachev, the policy of glasnost’ meant a greater freedom of information and of public discussion about problems in Soviet life, both past and present. Groznyi. A Russian term, used to describe the traits of Russian rulers, meaning awesome, stern, severe, formidable, terrible, menacing, or dread. Ivan the Terrible (Ivan Groznyi, whose name is sometimes translated as Ivan the Dread) was titled with this term, but it was also used to refer to other powerful Russian tsars. It indicated the tsar’s might and awesome power, traditional traits of the ideal ruler in the Russian political tradition. See also tishaishii. Gulag. A Russian acronym standing for the Main Directorate for Corrective Labor Camps (Glavnoe upravlenie ispravitel’no-trudovykh lagerei). In the Soviet Union, this was the name of a department of the NKVD, the Soviet political police, responsible between 1934 and 1955 for the administration of corrective labor camps and prisons. Many political prisoners were sent to these camps and often died there, especially in the Stalinist years. After the department was renamed, the term continued to be used to refer to the Soviet prison camp system generally. Intelligentsia. A Russian term, now widely used in other languages, denoting a class of people devoted to critical thought and intellectual activity. Arising in the early nineteenth century, though the term itself came into regular use only in the 1860s, the Russian intelligentsia was not so much a social category (a class or occupational group) as a cultural one. It indicated not merely an educated person or a professional, nor even all people who shared an interest in ideas. An intelligentthe singular (pronounced with a hard “g”)was a person distinguished by a particular intellectual orientation: a stance in opposition to a repressive and restrictive political and social order, commitment ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 39 to serving others (especially “the people”), commitment to the cause of “truth,” and a spirit of mission and consecration to a cause. Kolkhoz. An acronym for the Russian kollektivnoe khoziaistvo, meaning collective farm. These began to emerge in the 1920s, but were most widespread after Stalin’s forced collectivization in the early 1930s. Kruzhki (singular, kruzhok). A Russian word meaning circles. Formed among students, intellectuals, political radicals, workers, dissidents, and others, kruzhki were informal, and sometimes illegal, gatherings where ideas were discussed and information and opinions were shared. They were most important for the intelligentsia in the nineteenth century and dissidents in the late Soviet period. Kulak. Literally meaning “fist,” this Russian term of contempt was popularly used by peasants to describe relatively well-to-do farmers, traders, millers, and others. In 1929, on the eve of massive forced collectivization of the peasantry, Stalin decreed “liquidation of kulaks as a class.” Many richer farmersand many who were not so wealthywere violently expropriated and often arrested and sent to prison or into exile. Lichnost’. A Russian term meaning person, personality, individual, or self, this term denoted not simply the individual or a person, but a person’s inward human essence, which made each person naturally deserving of respect and freedom. This concept was especially widespread among Russia’s intelligentsiafrom Novikov to Soviet dissidentsamong whom it had become an article of faith that one of the most essential and fundamental rights was “the right to live as a human being” and that a just social and political order was one that promoted the freedom and dignity of the human person. Mensheviks. Members of the non-Leninist wing of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers’ Party, which evolved into a separate party. It originated when a dispute over party membership requirements arose at the 1903 congress of the Social-Democratic Party. One group, led by Iulii Martov, opposed Lenin’s plan for a party restricted to professional revolutionaries and called for a more open mass party. They disagreed with the Bolsheviks’ emphasis on the vanguard role of a highly centralized party of professional revolutionaries. They also believed that Russia first needed a liberal democratic revolution, which the proletariat could not and should not dominate, before the preconditions could be established for building socialism. Hence, in 1917, they were willing to work with the bourgeois Left in the Provisional Government to establish a democratic but not socialist society. After 1917, they attempted to form a legal opposition but were suppressed. Many went into exile. See also Bolsheviks. Mir or obshchina. Russian terms for the traditional peasant commune in Russia, which lasted until collectivization in 1930. This institution of the heads of households of a rural community (often a village but sometimes several small settlements combined) served both peasant interests and those of landlords and the stateespecially after emancipationthough a variety of functions: collecting taxes, managing community law and order and punishment, dealing with outsiders, organizing field work, and periodically redistributing peasant plots to ensure that the size of the plot was appropriate to family needs and capacities. The peasant commune was much romanticized by populists as a sign of natural peasant socialism. Narod. A Russian term meaning the common peopleespecially peasantsbut also the nation. For most educated Russians (including government officials), from the late eighteenth century until at least the 1940s, to talk about the common people was to talk about Russia’s essential nature and identity as a nation. Nationality (narodnost’). One of the three key terms, along with autocracy and Orthodoxy, in the statement of Russian autocratic political ideology that was first made explicit in the 1830s. The concept of nationality referred to the distinctive character and personality of the Russian nation, especially as manifested in its common people (narod). Above all, this meant the Russian people’s devoted love of autocratic authority. NEP. In 1921, Lenin initiated the New Economic Policy, which lasted until the end of the 1920s. A departure from the radically centralizing policies of the civil war, which tried to create a socialist economy by central directive, the NEP era can be seen (and was seen by various people) as either a temporary retreat or an original strategy for building socialism through gradualism, education, and a mixed economy. This latter view was strongly associated with Nikolai Bukharin. Under NEP, peasants were allowed to market grain and other products, and private retail trade and small-scale industry was restored (creating a class of small traders and manufacturers known as Nepmen). The state retained control of heavy industry, transport, banking, and foreign trade. Many workers and radicals were discontented with what they saw as the social and ideological compromises of NEP. 40 ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership Nomenklatura. A Russian term for the list of government and managerial elites appointed by higher party and state organs during the later Soviet years. The term was often used as a shorthand to refer to the whole class of privileged Soviet officials. Obshchina. See mir. Okhrana. A Russian acronym for okhrannoe otdelenie, or security department, the Okhrana was the political police in late Imperial Russia. Established in 1881 after the assassination of Alexander II, its task was to maintain the security of the state and suppress revolutionary activities. It was disbanded in 1917. Orthodoxy (pravoslavie). The majority religion of Russia, Russian Orthodoxy is a branch of the Eastern Orthodox Church. Introduced from Byzantium, it became the official religion of Russia by state decree in 988. The Russian term pravoslavie (which means the correct way to worship and glorify God) underscores the central importance in Russian Christianity of liturgy, ritual, and prayer. Perestroika. A Russian word meaning restructuring, perestroika was a policy under Mikhail Gorbachev of political and economic renewal of the socialist system. An attempt to make Soviet socialism work, it involved economic reforms that would encourage greater initiative and responsiveness to the market to revitalize a stagnant economy. It also involved political reforms, especially multicandidate elections, that would encourage more public engagement and, it was hoped, overcome widespread political disenchantment and even cynicism. Politburo. Acronym for Political Bureau, this was the supreme policy-making body of the Communist party. In 1919, in place of a single Central Committee, three new bureaus were created alongside an expanded Central Committee: the policy-making Politburo, headed by Lenin; the administrative Organizational Bureau (Orgburo); and the supporting Secretariat. Because the Secretariat planned the agenda, provided all documentation for debate, and transmitted Politburo decisions to the lower echelons, the general secretary of the party (later called first secretary) became, after Lenin’s death, the Politburo’s most influential member and, hence, the Soviet leader. Populism (narodnichestvo). The predominant ideology on the Russian Left from the 1870s until the 1890s, when many were attracted to Marxism, though it remained a strong influence through the 1917 revolution. Nineteenth- century populists believed that capitalism would not improve the lives of the common people and that Russia had a special historical opportunity to avoid the evils of capitalism and create a socialist society because of the unique Russian peasant commune with its traditions of collective ownership and collective responsibility. No less important, populists were characterized by a strong moral passion for justice. In the 1870s, populists differed over strategy and tactics (especially on the question of terrorism) and formed different groups, notably People’s Will (Narodnaia volia), which favored terror, and Black Repartition (Chernyi peredel), which focused more on education and propaganda. The Socialist Revolutionary party, which formed in 1901, was heir to these populist traditions. In the elections to the Constituent Assembly in November 1917, the SRs won a plurality of votes, revealing strong support among peasants. Pravda. A Russian word meaning truth, law, and justice. The term was used by Decembrists in the early 1800s as the title for one of their programs for the political and social reform of Russia. In 1912, Pravda was chosen as the name of the Bolshevik party newspaper. Rechtsstaat. A German concept, widely discussed as an goal in nineteenth-century Russia, especially during the reign of Alexander I, to denote a state in which the rule of law predominates rather than the personal will of the monarch or his officials. Samizdat. A Russian term, an abbreviation of self-publishing house (samoizdatel’stvo), created by Soviet dissidents, especially in the 1960s and after, to refer to unofficial texts, ranging from poetry to works of history, reproduced by hand or on individual typewriters, often using carbon paper, and passed from hand to hand. A related form, sometimes called tamizdat (literally, published “there” [tam]), were publications printed in Western Europe and the United States, then smuggled back into the country. Slavophiles (slavianofily). Members of an intellectual movement, primarily from the 1830s through the 1850s, that wanted Russia’s future development to be based on values and institutions derived from the country’s history before the Westernizing reforms of Peter the Great. They believed that these national traditions, especially a communal spirit, still survived most strongly among the common people. A central principle was the ideal of sobornost’. Although they looked to the past for inspiration, they were not conservative. They criticized much of the existing ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 41 political and social order in Russia, in particular, serfdom and the lack of civil rights and liberties. See also Westernizers. Sobornost’. The central ideal of the Slavophiles, most fully elaborated by Aleksei Khomiakov. Usually translated as “conciliarity,” sobornost’ is more accurately (if loosely) translated as “spiritual community.” It is the ideal of a society existing as a community (in natural, harmonious relationships), united by free will on the basis of shared Christian values. Soviets. Councils of deputies elected by urban workers and soldiers, but also including representatives of leftist parties, trade unions, and other organizations. Ranged in scale from neighborhood soviets in large cities to citywide and regional soviets. First established during the 1905 revolution, they arose again in Petrograd in February 1917, followed by most Russian cities. The Petrograd Soviet, which shared the Tauride Palace with the Provisional Government and, especially, its Executive Committee, functioned as a national representative of workers and soldiers. The First All-Russian Congress of Soviets, in early June 1917, established the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of Soviets (VTsIK), which functioned in the same way. After October 1917, the Congress of Soviets, and the VTsIK between sessions, was formally the supreme organ of state power. Sovnarkom (Sovet narodnykh komissarov). Council of People’s Commissars. Established 26 October (8 November) 1917, replacing the Council of Ministers of the tsarist and Provisional governments. Headed by Vladimir Lenin until his death in 1924. The Sovnarkom was the executive and administrative branch of the Soviet government, formally subordinate to the legislative authority of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of Soviets, though in practice, the dominant structure of state power. Stakhanovism. A campaign for increasing industrial production through a mixture of labor enthusiasm and more efficient work. Begun in 1935, it was named for Aleksei Stakhanov, a coal miner in the Donets basin, whose team increased its daily output sevenfold by organizing a more efficient division of labor and by working with increased intensity. Stakhanovites were offered higher pay and other privileges. Tishaishii. A Russian term used to describe the traits of Russian rulers, literally meaning most quiet or most gentle. Officially, it was the epithet applied to tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich, Peter the Great’s father, but it was used to refer to other tsars as well. In the Russian political tradition, it expressed the ideas of religious piety and love for the people that were considered some of the ideal traits of the ruler. See also groznyi. Tsar. The title of the Russian monarch starting with Ivan IV (“the Terrible”) in 1547. Before then, Russian rulers had been called grand princes. Peter the Great renamed the ruler emperor, but tsar was still commonly used. Adapted from the Latin title Caesar, the term identified the Russian ruler as an emperor and was one of many symbols of authority borrowed from Rome and Byzantium. Tsar is often spelled czar in English, though this does not follow modern transliteration systems. Tsar-batiushka. A Russian term meaning tsar-father. This was a popular expression of affection used especially by peasants to express their love of the tsar and their certainty that he cared for and protected them. Westernizers (zapadniki). Members of an intellectual movement, primarily from the 1830s through the 1850s, that emphasized Russia’s common historic destiny with the West, as opposed to Slavophiles, who looked to Russia’s traditions before Westernization for inspiration. Leading Westernizers included Alexander Herzen and Vissarion Belinskii. A central principle for them was the individual person (lichnost’) and his or her natural rights and dignity. Many Westernizers became socialists, seeing in socialism the most advanced Western ideas and the best means of promoting the welfare and happiness of the individual. Zemstvos. Provincial rural assemblies established in 1864. Representatives were elected by the local population; peasants were included, but their representation was weighted so that larger landowners would be predominant. Also included members appointed by the state. Hired professionals, often liberal in their politics, played an increasingly large role. Responsible for education, road building, health care, and improvement of agricultural techniques, the zemstvos became organizing centers for Russian liberalism and sources of demands for a more representative national government. Zhenotdel. The Women’s Department of the Central Committee of the Russian (later Soviet) Communist Party existed from 1919 until it was closed by Stalin in 1930. It was designed to mobilize women to improve their lives, focusing on issues of child care, public health, education, literacy, housing, and the family, including the problem of male alcoholism and wife and child abuse. The Zhenotdel promoted public laundries, bath houses, and cafeterias to 42 ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership alleviate the burdens of individual housework. The program of the Zhenotdel derived from the fundamental socialist ideal of social equality. ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 43 A History of Russia: From Peter the Great to Gorbachev Part II Professor Mark D. Steinberg THE TEACHING COMPANY ® Mark D. Steinberg, Ph.D. Professor of History, Director of the Russian and East European Center, University of Illinois Mark Steinberg completed his undergraduate work at the University of California at Santa Cruz in 1978 and received his Ph.D. in European history at the University of California at Berkeley in 1987. He taught Russian and European history at the University of Oregon (1987), Harvard University (1987–1989), and Yale University (1989– 1996) before joining the faculty at the University of Illinois, at its main campus in Urbana-Champaign, in 1996. Since 1998, Professor Steinberg has also been the Director of the Russian and East European Center at Illinois, an interdisciplinary program designated by the Department of Education as a national resource center. Professor Steinberg has received many awards for his teaching, including the Sarai Ribicoff Prize for Teaching at Yale University (1993) and, at Illinois, the George and Gladys Queen Excellence in History Teaching Award (1998 and 2002) and the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences Award for Excellence in Undergraduate Teaching (2002). For his work as a scholar, he has received numerous prestigious fellowships, including from the International Research and Exchanges Board, the Social Science Research Council, the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies of the Smithsonian Institution, the Illinois Program for Research in the Humanities, and the National Endowment for the Humanities. In 2001, the University of Illinois gave him one of its highest honors and named him a University Scholar. Professor Steinberg has published many articles, delivered numerous papers at national and international conferences, given public lectures throughout the country, and served on several national professional committees and editorial boards. He specializes in the cultural, intellectual, and social history of Russia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. His first book, published in 1992, was a study of the relations among employers, managers, and workers in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, entitled Moral Communities. In 1994, Professor Steinberg co-edited Cultures in Flux, an influential collection of essays on Russian lower-class cultures. In 1995, he published, together with a Russian archivist, The Fall of the Romanovs, which examines the fate of the tsar and his family during the revolution and includes translations of documents from then recently opened Russian archives. In 2001, Professor Steinberg published Voices of Revolution, 1917, a study and collection of translated documents exploring the revolution through contemporary letters and other writings by ordinary Russians. His most recent book, Proletarian Imagination, published in 2002, explores poetry and other writings by lower-class Russians in the years before and after 1917, focusing on ideas about self, modern times, and the sacred. He is currently working on a collection of essays on religion in Russia, a revised textbook on Russian history, and a study of St. Petersburg in the late 1800s and early 1900s. Professor Steinberg is a native of San Francisco and is married to Jane Hedges, an editor and translator. Further information can be found at his Web site: ©2003 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership i Table of Contents A History of Russia: From Peter the Great to Gorbachev Part II Professor Biography............................................................................................i Course Scope.......................................................................................................1 Lecture Thirteen Lecture Fourteen Lecture Fifteen Lecture Sixteen Lecture Seventeen Lecture Eighteen Lecture Nineteen Lecture Twenty Lecture Twenty-One Lecture Twenty-Two Lecture Twenty-Three Alexander II and the Great Reforms..........................2 “Nihilists” ..................................................................5 Populists and Marxists...............................................8 Paths to RevolutionLenin and Martov .................11 Lev Tolstoy..............................................................14 The Reign of Alexander III .....................................17 Nicholas II, the Last Tsar.........................................19 The Revolution of 1905 ...........................................21 Peasant Life and Culture..........................................24 The Modern City and Its Discontents ......................26 Fin-de-Siècle CultureDecadence and Iconoclasm........................................................28 Fin-de-Siècle CultureThe Religious Renaissance .............................................................30 Lecture Twenty-Four Biographical Notes............................................................................................33 Please refer to Part I for the timeline and glossary and Part III for the annotated bibliography. ii ©2003 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership Scope: A History of Russia: From Peter the Great to Gorbachev After a discussion of background issues (geography, multi-ethnicity, the problem of backwardness, Europeanization), the course begins with politics and culture on the eve of Peter the Great’s efforts to transform his country, then looks at Peter and his reforms. Next, women’s rule in eighteenth-century Russia is examined, with a particular focus on the reigns of Elizabeth (Peter the Great’s daughter) and Catherine the Great. Turning toward society, two additional lectures on the eighteenth century follow: on the Pugachev uprising and the growing critique of autocratic despotism by educated Russians, especially the publisher and writer Nikolai Novikov. Lecture Seven begins the nineteenth century by returning to a focus on the state and the monarch: Paul I and especially Alexander I, who seriously discussed possible reform. We also look at the Decembrist rebellion, in which educated nobles took arms against the state to bring about social and political reform. Next, we consider Nicholas I and the ideas about power and order that inspired the Russian state at that time. Returning the gaze to society, the course then offers lectures on different intellectuals’ visions of change: the “national poet” Alexander Pushkin (whom we consider also for what his image as a symbol of the Russian nation tells us) and the full-fledged emergence of the “intelligentsia” in the 1830s and 1840s. Particular attention is paid to their ideas about Russia, the West, and the meanings of freedom. Lecture Thirteen begins the history of the Great Reforms under Alexander II, which sought to create a modern society in Russia though dramatic reform. We then examine dissident trends and the individuals associated with them: nihilism (including terrorism), populism, Marxism (including the emergence of Bolshevism). For a different voice, we look at the famous writer Lev Tolstoy, especially his life and his arguments about morality and conscience. Returning our gaze to official Russia, we highlight the lives, personalities, and outlooks of the last two tsars, Alexander III and his son Nicholas II. We then consider a decisive event in the reign of Nicholas: the strikes, demonstrations, and public demands that the tsarist government accept civil rights and democratic rule in Russia in 1905. To see Russia’s changes in larger perspective, we look at peasant life and culture in the late 1800s and early 1900s, life in the changing cities (especially for workers and the middle class) from the industrialization drive of the 1890s to the eve of World War I, and at aspects of what might be called fin-de-siècle culture: decadence in everyday life and in the arts, cultural iconoclasm, and the religious renaissance. Lecture Twenty-Five examines the Russian experience in World War I and the coming of revolution. It is followed with an examination of the Russian experience in the key months from the fall of the tsarist government in February to the coming to power of the Bolsheviks in October, then by a lecture on the Bolsheviks during their first year in power. The story of the Civil War comes next, followed by a discussion of the debates in the 1920s in the Soviet Union over how to overcome Russia’s backwardness and build socialism. Next, we look at Joseph Stalin’s biography and political personality, the era of radical industrialization and social transformation that he launched at the end of the 1920s, and the contradictory political, social, and cultural life of the 1930s (including the Great Terror). We turn then to the Soviet experience in World War II and to politics and the experiences of Soviet people during the decades after the war and before Gorbachev’s reforms. Continuing the theme of exploring dissent, we look at some of the various forms of alienation from, and resistance to, the Soviet system during the years before Gorbachev came to power (both everyday forms and open dissidence). Finally, we look at Mikhail Gorbachev’s recognition of the many problems of the system and his efforts to make Communism work though a policy of reform. The final lecture concludes with a consideration of the situation left in the wake of the collapse of Communism. ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 1 Lecture Thirteen Alexander II and the Great Reforms Scope: This lecture considers the efforts by the state, under Alexander II, to create a modern society in Russia through dramatic reform but also the state’s anxiety about reform. The lecture begins with the catastrophic failure in the Crimean War and the death of Nicholas I. Made painfully aware by the war of Russia’s backwardness, the new tsar embarked on a major series of reforms: abolition of serfdom and the reform of major institutions. Asking what the purposes and meaning of these reforms were, the lecture first considers the political personality of Alexander II, especially the persistent desire to balance power and progress, order and change. These contradictory goals are seen reflected in the reforms. The lecture concludes with a discussion of the political crisis at the end of Alexander II’s reign—including failure in war, the rise of terrorism, and peasant unrest—and plans for further reform, cut short by the assassination of the tsar himself. Outline I. By the mid-1800s, generations of Russians had been talking about the need for various reforms. A. The desire was for what might be called “modernizing reforms” that would strengthen the state and the country and bring Russia more into accord with the values seen throughout Europe as “civilized.” B. Yet the fear of change repeatedly caused the government to pull back from reformist causes. 1. We saw these anxieties during the reigns of Catherine II and Alexander I. 2. Although Nicholas I recognized the need for reform, even the abolition of serfdom, his fear of the risks was greater than ever. II. Two events changed this calculus of risk and benefit: the death of Nicholas I in 1855 and the Crimean War. A. Liberals and radicals were happy about the death of Nicholas I; even many conservatives had found his reign to be stifling. B. Russia’s defeat in the Crimean War (1854–1856) made the country’s backwardness clear. III. In 1855, Alexander II (1855–1871) inherited the throne and the failing war, quickly conceded defeat, and set out on a course of major reform. A. Serfdom was abolished in 1861 (to take effect in 1863). 1. Serf owners were in a state of shock and disbelief. 2. Serfs, after initial doubts and before later disappointment, were enthusiastic. B. In 1863, the university statute made universities more autonomous. C. Municipal reform in 1870, creating city councils, similarly increased self-government in the cities. D. In 1864, a much more open and regularized judicial system was created, along with a new a system of jury trials that were open to the public (in accordance with the new principle of glasnost’, or openness). E. In 1865, a reform of press laws replaced preliminary censorship with judicial punishment after the fact. F. The 1874 military reform restructured the army on a modern European model. IV. What did these dramatic and important reforms mean to the tsar and his advisers and to the larger society? 2 ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership A. B. C. Let us first examine the political personality of Alexander himself. 1. Every indication is that he was neither a bold reformer nor strongly attached to tradition for its own sake. 2. We can see a fair measure of ambivalence and uncertainty in his policies: He chose ministers that were often opposed to one another, and his policies fluctuated between reform and efforts to limit the effects of reform. When we look closely at the reforms and statements by reformers, we see a unifying goal: strengthen the power of the country and the government, improve military preparedness, and enhance Russia’s authority as a strong, modern nation. This modernization had two sides. 1. On the one hand, we see the desire to create a state based on regular procedures and the rule of law and to free people to become active citizens. 2. On the other hand, we see a concern to preserve the power and security of the state that brought about these changes. 3. Taken together, the goal was to balance power and progress, order and change. V. To understand this balancing act, it is useful to look more closely at the reforms themselves. A. In the planning stages of the emancipation, we see this balance. 1. Discussions and decisions of the state were published and widely disseminated for discussion (glasnost’). 2. At the same time, Alexander ordered the police to monitor discussions, and overly critical voices were silenced. B. The 1. Freed serfs received land to prevent the danger of landlessness. 2. To maintain the strength of the gentry, landlords were allowed to keep a large part of the land. 3. Restrictions on movement made it difficult for peasants to leave the village without the permission of the commune. C. Other reforms show a similar balancing act. 1. In the zemstvo reform, although all social groups were to be involved, the participation was weighted to ensure that the landowners were predominant and government appointees were included. 2. Although the university statute made universities more autonomous, student rights to organize were ended and faculty members were prevented from being involved in public political activity. 3. Preliminary censorship was abolished for most books and journals under press reform, but punishments remained common against publishers and writers who criticized the government too directly or harshly. D. This attempt to combine reform with control over the consequences of reform proved counterproductive. 1. The liberal-minded, who wanted more, were frustrated by the limits. 2. Peasants were disappointed that they did not get all the land they worked, and they had to pay for the land they received. 3. At the same time, the success of the reforms helped to create groups with increasing independence, who would eventually challenge the status quo (such as members of zemstvos and city councils and the growing class of independent professionals). VI. In the years 1879–1881, a major political crisis erupted, partly as a result of the contradictions of reform. A. The failure of the Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878) provided the context and stimulus for crisis. 1. Russia actually won this Balkan war on the battlefield. 2. But Russia’s victory frightened Western European leaders, who forced Russia back to the bargaining table, where the spoils of victory were taken away. B. There was renewed peasant unrest in the late 1870s, caused by both disappointment over the results of the emancipation and immediate economic problems. C. The third element of the crisis was a growing terrorist movement by radical youths against officials and even the tsar. D. Facing a clear political crisis, the government intensified its characteristic approach: combine reform and repression. 1. The key figure in this new policy was Count Mikhail Loris-Melikov, minister of the interior and head of the Imperial Police Department. 2. Loris-Melikov saw his task as twofold: restoring order (with force when necessary) and introducing needed reforms. 3. He attempted to win the support of moderate public opinion by some modest immediate reforms and the more radical proposal that a consultative national assembly be established. 4. Loris-Melikov’s proposal was signed into law on March 1, 1881. 5. However, Alexander II was killed a few hours later by a bomb thrown by revolutionaries of the People’s Will. emancipation reform itself similarly tried to balance change and order. ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 3 6. Alexander III renounced Loris-Melikov’s plan. Essential Reading: W. Bruce Lincoln, The Great Reforms: Autocracy, Bureaucracy, and the Politics of Change in Imperial Russia (DeKalb, 1990). Supplementary Reading: Ben Eklof, John Bushnell, and Larissa Zakharova, eds., Russia’s Great Reforms, 1855–1881 (Bloomington, 1994). W. Bruce Lincoln, In the Vanguard of Reform: Russia’s Enlightened Bureaucrats, 1825–1861 (DeKalb, 1982). Richard Wortman, Scenarios of Power: Myth and Ceremony in the Russian Monarchy (Princeton, 2000), vol. 2, chapters 1–4. Questions to Consider: 1. 2. How important was the goal of democracy in Alexander II’s “Great Reforms”? What did democracy mean to these reformers, if anything? What ideas of “citizen” and “citizenship” were visible in the Great Reforms? 4 ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership Lecture Fourteen “Nihilists” Scope: This lecture returns to the continued growth of dissent by educated Russians. The focus is on something new: an organized student movement starting in the 1860s and the appearance of a new type of intelligent, the “nihilist,” whose criticisms of tradition seemed so uncompromising as to be a rejection of everything. The lecture looks at new conditions in the universities under Alexander II, then turns to the student movement. It explores student organizing, conflicts with authorities, and the emergence of terrorism beside strategies of education. The lecture seeks to understand what motivated these students by looking at a number of proclamations. It then turns to the influential ideas of Nikolai Chernyshevsky and considers the relative importance of scientific rationalism and moral passion in his ideas. The lecture concludes by looking at what might be called “nihilist style”—patterns of dress, manner, and lifestyle and what these tell us about the nihilists’ ideals and values. Outline I. The period of the Great Reforms during the 1860s brought an important new development in the history of the intelligentsia: an organized student movement and a new type of young, educated Russian—the “nihilist.” A. The reforms of Alexander II helped set the stage for this student movement. 1. Immediately after ascending the throne, Alexander II created freer conditions in Russia’s universities. 2. These reforms helped encourage increased enrollment (of men) and the social diversity of the student body (greater numbers of non-nobles). 3. In addition, people’s expectations were raised and their imaginations, stimulated. B. These freer conditions did not make the universities less dangerous, however. Instead, they now became centers of organized rebellion. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. C. It is 1. 2. Students organized mutual assistance societies, libraries, and newspapers and began holding mass meetings and even demonstrations. Once organized, they began to exercise their power within the university, especially by mobilizing against teachers they did not like. Sometimes, students directly confronted police, as in the violent clash between students and police in Kazan in 1857. In 1861, the government issued the restrictive “May Rules” to try to stem student activism. Students responded in the fall by staging illegal mass meetings, street demonstrations, and strikes; issuing manifestoes; and engaging in violent clashes with the police. important to recognize that this student movement was not isolated. Educated adults sympathized with and financially supported the students. The students, in turn, “accepted all this as a proper tribute for our behavior.” D. This movement continued throughout the 1860s. E. Although most of these students focused their efforts on self-education and the education of others, in the mid-1860s, a minority turned to terrorism. 1. By assassinating government officials, they hoped to inspire a revolution. 2. In 1866, Dmitrii Karakozov, a member of a Petersburg organization named “Hell,” attempted to assassinate Alexander II. 3. There would be many attempts on the tsar’s life before he was assassinated in 1881. 4. The result of these attacks, though, was often to inspire sympathy for the monarchy and contempt for revolutionaries. II. One way of discovering what motivated these young Russians is to examine some of the hundreds of manifestoes and pamphlets that appeared in 1861–1862. A. A relatively moderate statement was titled “Great Russia”it called for wider reforms, a constitution, and freedom for Poland. B. More radical was “To the Young Generation.” ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 5 1. It argued that the only vital forces in Russia were the peasants, the intelligentsia, and the students. 2. The monarchy, it said, should be replaced by a republic based on the peasant commune. 3. Though the nihilists’ economic ideal was vague, they favored some sort of socialist cooperative ownership and work. C. The most radical proposal was “Young Russia,” written in 1862 by Petr Zaichnevskii, who had been expelled from Moscow University. 1. Russia was to be a decentralized federation, with much local political authority. 2. Peasant communes and communally run factories were to organize production. 3. In addition, education was to be free, there was to be equality for women, and all nationalities were to have the right to secede from Russia if they wished. 4. The violent methods proposed and the arguments about elite leadership of the new order echoed French Jacobinism and foreshadowed Leninism. D. Proclamations like “Young Russia” not only alarmed the government, but also alienated liberal society. 1. This sense of alarm was reinforced by a series of suspicious fires in St. Petersburg in the early summer of 1862. 2. Many blamed the radical students. 3. Many considered one man, the radical journalist Nikolai Chernyshevskii, indirectly responsible. 4. In the hope of stopping the movement, Chernyshevskii was arrested in July 1862 and sentenced to prison and exile. III. Chernyshevskii’s ideas were quite influential and can help us understand the motivations and ideas of these students. A. He advocated the usual list of ideals that Russians were beginning to think of as socialism: communal economic forms, equality and emancipation of women, civil rights, and democratic government. B. The philosophical basis of his socialism was “rational egoism.” 1. The “egoism” stemmed from the belief that individual needs and individual happiness must form the basis for all morality and, hence, for society. 2. The “rational egoist” recognizes that everyone must be an egoist—and respects others’ needs as equal to his own. 3. In other words, the “rational egoist” sees that his self-interest lies in the well-being of all humankind and, thus, in cooperation, not competition. C. Thus, Chernyshevskii came to the same conclusions as Belinskii and other Westernizers in placing the individual at the center of concern. 1. But Chernyshevskii treated these ideals as a product of rationalism and utilitarianism, not moralism. 2. However, in many respects, Chernyshevskii and his followers were also inspired by a moral point of view. IV. To deepen this examination of these students, it is useful to consider their manner, style, and behavior. A. In their dress, male and female nihilists deliberately defied convention. B. Their manners were similarly defiant and uninhibited. C. Many young nihilists favored communal living, with, in theory, complete equality between classes and genders. D. Young nihilists were trying to become, following Chernyshevskii’s advice, “new people.” 1. Their efforts were fueled by reasoned thought. 2. However, their vision of change was also fed by moral passion, desire, and imagination. Essential Reading: Franco Venturi, The Roots of Revolution (London, 2001). 6 ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership Supplementary Reading: Nikolai Chernyshevsky, What Is to Be Done? (Ithaca, 1989). Abbott Gleason, Young Russia: The Genesis of Russian Radicalism in the 1860s (New York, 1980). Irina Paperno, Chernyshevsky and the Age of Realism: A Study in the Semiotics of Behavior (Stanford, 1988). Questions to Consider: 1. Did the “nihilists,” as this term was meant to suggest, reject all established beliefs and moral principles? 2. What were student radicals trying to accomplish with their alternative lifestyles? What does it mean to create a “new person”? ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 7 Lecture Fifteen Populists and Marxists Scope: This lecture examines two major intellectual and political movements that emerged in the final decades of the nineteenth century: populism (narodnichestvo) and Marxism. After considering the standard definitions of populism, the lecture looks more deeply at the guiding ideas and values by considering the writings of leading populist thinkers, especially Petr Lavrov, whose works reveal the centrality of moral vision and concern with human welfare and the individual person. The lecture next examines the famous “to the people” movement of the summer of 1874 and responses to its failure, including the rise of terrorism as a political and social strategy. The lecture concludes by considering the early history of Marxism in Russia and the reasons for its emergence as a response to disappointments with populism. Attention is focused on ideas about capitalism and the peasantry and on the deterministic logic of Marxism. I. II. Outline By the 1870s, nihilism gave way to what was termed “populism” (narodnichestvo). A. Populism became the dominant ideology on the Russian left, and even many liberals were influenced by its ideas. B. Populism’s popularity was one of many signs of the continuing and deepening “parting of the ways” between educated society and the monarchical state. What was Russian populism? 8 ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership A. B. C. The standard definition runs as follows: 1. Populists were devoted to serving the people. 2. They believed that only socialism would improve the lives of the common people. 3. They believed in Russia’s special historical opportunity to avoid the evils of capitalism. 4. They believed that political changes were secondary to the transformation of social and economic relations. These ideas had a remarkable power for many educated Russians. An example of the ideas that brought many young Russians to feelings of intellectual and sentimental rapture can be found in Petr Lavrov’s Historical Letters. 1. Lavrov was dissatisfied with Hegel, the most popular philosopher of the day, because Hegel did not provide an ideal of morality that might guide practical action. 2. For Lavrov, the principle of lichnost’ (the person, the self) was at the center of his practical philosophysocial relations and politics should promote individual welfare. 3. He also argued that it was the duty of “critically thinking individuals” to act on behalf of society as a whole. 4. Lavrov rejected the materialism and utilitarianism that had been dominant in the 1860s and, like Kant, insisted on the existence of natural moral truths: natural human personal dignity and the necessity of justice. V. V. Bervi-Flerovsky’s The Condition of the Working Class in Russia (1869) impressed people with its brutally frank picture of the sufferings of peasants and urban workers. Nikolai Mikhailovskii’s essay “What Is Progress?” (1870) showed that real progress advances human self- realization, in contrast to harmful capitalist “progress.” This message was reinforced in 1872 by the publication in Russia of the first volume of Karl Marx’s Capital, translated by two populists. None of these works placed any real emphasis on the idea that is usually seen as defining populism: a socialist society based on the peasant commune. D. E. F. G. 1. 2. 3. Censorship was partly to blame. Populism’s more essential concern, though, was a moral obsession with creating a moral society. Indeed, populism could be defined first and foremost as a moral philosophy, out of which emerged its notions of socialism. III. More than earlier dissenting movements, populism demanded practical action in society by critically thinking individuals. A. Populists organized libraries, gave lectures, and ran discussion circles for workers and peasants. B. In 1874, thousands of young people left the cities to “go to the people.” C. The message they carried was simple. 1. All the land should belong to the people, the economy should be organized collectively, and everyone should be free and equal. 2. Sometimes, they simply argued their views directly, openly challenging church, landlord, and tsar. 3. Many took a more indirect approach by translating their ideas into religious terms or telling stories in the style of peasant folktales but reflecting their new morality. D. Peasants had a mixed response. 1. Some individual peasants responded positively. 2. Usually, though, peasants were polite but unmoved. 3. Some peasants reacted with open hostility and handed students over to the police or even beat them up. E. Overall, the movement was a failure, especially in relation to expectations. 1. Peasants refused to believe criticisms against the tsar. 2. Student radicals also had trouble overcoming peasant fatalism and submissiveness. IV. Populists were initially divided over what to do in the wake of the “mad summer” of 1874, though gradually two answers emerged. A. One answer was to deepen educational efforts (“propaganda”). After 1879, this effort was associated with a group called Black Repartition (Chernyi peredel). B. Another answer was terror, which was associated after 1879 with the very popular People’s Will (Narodnaia volia). C. Historians have tried to explain the appeal of terrorism to many Russians at this time. 1. Given that the results of terrorism were obvious, it was a more satisfactory alternative to the fruitless efforts of previous years. 2. It reflected the growing belief that the peasants were ready to rebel. 3. It was a tactically effective way of showing people that the state (even the tsar himself) was not invulnerable. 4. It echoed government violence, especially, draconian punishments for relatively minor offenses. D. In their own statements, terrorists provided all these reasons, as well as suggesting other more deeply grounded motives. 1. Vera Zasulich—who shot the Governor-General of St. Petersburg—claimed that she acted to avenge the beating of a political prisoner she knew. 2. Sergei Kravchinskii, who stabbed to death the St. Petersburg chief of gendarmes, argued that he had to do this because the chief had trampled on the human dignity of others and thought himself above the law. 3. One might ask whether it is too farfetched to suggest that terror was paradoxically an ethical act? V. By the late 1880s and early 1890s, as many populists began to be troubled by the ineffectiveness of their efforts, increasing numbers began to declare themselves to be Marxists. A. This shift began among the exiled leaders of the populist movement. B. In addition, an increasing number of populist study circles began to declare that they were Marxist. C. In 1895, in St. Petersburg, two circles led by Vladimir Lenin and Iulii Martov combined to form “The Petersburg Union of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class.” 1. They also decided that the educational work of the past was inadequate and terrorism was counterproductive. 2. Their new tactic was known as “agitation.” 3. This led to growing attention among workers, but also police attention and arrests. D. In 1898, a congress in Minsk established the Russian Social-Democratic Workers’ Party. ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 9 E. In 1900, the socialist newspaper Iskra (The Spark) was printed in Europe with networks of party cells in Russia. VI. Why did Marxism have such an appeal among Russian intelligenty? A. A key problem was how to reconcile faith with reality. 1. Populism had taught that Russia could avoid the evils of capitalism, but by the early 1890s, signs of the growth of capitalism were everywhere. 2. Populism also taught that peasants were naturally revolutionary, but the passivity of the peasantry seemed unchanged. B. In addition, the government had effectively destroyed the populist movement by imprisoning or exiling most active revolutionaries. C. In these depressing times, Marxism gave idealistic revolutionaries new reasons to hope. 1. It turned the necessity of recognizing capitalism into a virtue: Capitalism was a necessary stage leading to socialism. 2. Marxism offered new hope for revolution by helping radicals see an alternative revolutionary class: workers 3. There was a certain deterministic logic to Marxism, and many Marxists found this comforting. 4. Others, however, considered this historical determinism too constraining and passive. Essential Reading: Franco Venturi, The Roots of Revolution (London, 2001). Supplementary Reading: Barbara Alpern Engel and Clifford Rosenthal, Five Sisters: Women against the Tsar (Boston, 1987). Leopold Haimson, The Russian Marxists and the Origins of Bolshevism (Boston, 1955), chapters 1–3. Peter Lavrov, Historical Letters (Berkeley, 1967). Andrzej Walicki, A History of Russian Thought: From the Enlightenment to Marxism (Stanford, 1979), chapters 12, 13, 18. Questions to Consider: 1. 2. How do Russian populist and later Marxist values and goals differ (or not) from liberal democratic ideals as we know them in the modern West? Why was terrorism known as “propaganda of the deed”? What is the logic behind attempts to justify political violence and murder? 10 ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership Lecture Sixteen Paths to RevolutionLenin and Martov Scope: This lecture looks closely at the two most influential Marxists: the leader of the Bolsheviks, Vladimir Lenin, and his rival, the leader of the Mensheviks, Iulii Martov. The lecture begins with the split in the Russian Social Democratic Workers’ Party in 1903 over the question of membership, then explores the significance of these differences. The biographies and personalities of each man are considered—Martov’s democratic and moral faith and Lenin’s political passion and intolerance of moralizing. The lecture then examines different views of two fundamental ideas. The first is democracy, which Martov and Lenin understood quite differently. The second idea is consciousness—how people were seen to develop political understanding. In Martov’s view, we see, Lenin seemed to distrust people as a matter of principle. The implications of these differences are considered. The lecture concludes by looking at Lenin’s more willing embrace of violence. Outline I. In 1903, the recently established Russian Social Democratic Workers’ Party—which sought to unite all Russian Marxists—held its second congress (in Western Europe, because the party was illegal). A. The various groups represented at the congress argued vehemently over many important issues, but the question that most divided them and that led to a permanent split in the party concerned the seemingly trivial question of membership. 1. Vladimir Ulianov—whose party nickname was Lenin—wished to limit party membership to active and regular participants in party organizations. 2. Iulii Tsederbaum—who used the name Martov—preferred a more inclusive definition of party member. B. Essential principles were at stake. 1. Lenin wanted a party that only included full-time revolutionariesa vanguardfollowing strict party discipline. 2. Martov favored an open, mass party. 3. Lenin lost the vote on this question but held a slight majority when electing the party leaders. II. Especially in his passion for justice, Martov was part of a tradition reaching well back in the history of the intelligentsia. A. Martov grew up as a Jew in Odessa in the 1870s and 1880s. 1. These were difficult times to be Jewish in Russia. 2. These years saw intense discrimination, as well as periodic anti-Jewish violence. B. Martov’s parents were relatively educated and liberal. C. In high school, Martov became obsessed with social, political, and moral questions. 1. The conservative curriculum provided few answers. 2. He sought truth elsewhere. D. In the 1880s, his family moved to St. Petersburg, where he became involved in the student movement. E. In time, he turned to Marxism. 1. This meant faith in the proletarian and in the natural course of history. 2. No less important, Martov was inspired by a vision of an end to inequality, injustice, and suffering. III. Lenin (Ulianov) was a quite different individual. A. In his early youth, Lenin was generally uninterested in political or social questions. 1. His father was a loyal provincial bureaucrat with vaguely liberal ideals. 2. The event that awakened Lenin to politics was the arrest, conviction, and public hanging of his older brother, Alexander, on charges of plotting the tsar’s execution as a member of the People’s Will. 3. Young Vladimir Ulianov was shocked and angered and began seeking to understand what motivated his brother. ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 11 4. In time, he decided that he, too, would become a revolutionary. B. People who knew Lenin were impressed by his intense passions. 1. He loved hunting and could spend a whole day racing through the woods in search of game. 2. He was obsessed with chess, which he could play from morning to night. 3. He was notoriously passionate about skating and mushroom collecting. 4. But most of all, he “raged” about politics. C. An early example of Lenin’s intense style is his polemic against the populists. 1. In part, he offered the standard Marxist critique of the populist faith that capitalism could be avoided in Russia. 2. But Lenin also made it clear that he despised the political moralizing so common to populist socialism. IV. Consider Lenin’s and Martov’s different notions of democracy—a term that dissenting Russians, from liberals to socialists, claimed to support. A. Martov was attracted to Marxism precisely for its democratic promise. 1. He believed in the value of political representation and civil freedoms as natural rights rooted in recognition of human dignity. 2. Martov also believed that this political democracy would need to be supplemented by social democracy. B. Lenin shared this embrace of social democracy, but he had a quite different view of political democracy. 1. He did not value political freedom and rights for their own sake. 2. For Lenin, political democracy had mainly an instrumental value. 3. He considered political democracy to be valuable as a situational and utilitarian value not as a universal and moral value. 4. One expression of this was his almost visceral hatred of liberals and liberalism. V. Related to these ideas about democracy is the more complex question of “consciousness”—how ordinary people came to recognize that their interests lay in struggle against autocracy and capitalism. 12 ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership A. B. C. D. E. F. Martov believed strongly in what might be called the consciousness-raising benefits of experience itself. 1. Everything about workers’ lives would lead them toward class consciousness and belief in socialism. 2. Workers needed organizational help and political education, but Martov had confidence in workers’ natural political evolution. 3. We see this view in practice during moments of upheaval, such as the 1905 revolution, when Mensheviks actively supported workers’ strikes and unions. Lenin was less sanguine about workers’ experience. 1. Lenin was deeply suspicious of the results of workers’ learning from experience alone (“spontaneity”). 2. As he argued in his “What Is to Be Done” (1902), workers, left to themselves, will never be able to see beyond the economic struggle and to understand that their interests lie in overthrowing the existing social system. The implications of Lenin’s views were considerable. 1. This logic led Lenin to insist that workers (as a class) not be allowed to lead their own movement. 2. The vanguard party, whose members were full-time revolutionaries, would provide the leadership role. 3. The idea that the party was the embodiment of the consciousness that the masses lacked was expressed symbolically in the title the Bolsheviks chose for their newspaper in 1912: Pravda (Truth). By contrast, the Mensheviks named their paper Rabochaia gazeta (Workers’ Paper). Martov had a simple and blunt view of Lenin’s ideas about consciousness and spontaneity: Lenin “did not trust people.” Another explanation focuses on the influence of the populists, who believed in the creative power of individuals to change history The heritage of the terrorist People’s Will was also evident in another typical aspect of Leninism. 1. 2. 3. Lenin and the Bolsheviks liked to portray themselves as tough-minded and “hard.” In turn, Lenin liked to portray the Mensheviks as “soft” and lacking in revolutionary spirit. After 1917, this willingness to use “plebian measures” would lead to some rather brutal policies. Essential Reading: Robert Service, Lenin: A Biography (Cambridge, 2000). Supplementary Reading: Israel Getzler, Martov: A Political Biography of a Russian Social Democrat (Cambridge, England, 1967). Leopold Haimson, The Russian Marxists and the Origins of Bolshevism (Boston, 1955). Robert C. Tucker, ed., The Lenin Anthology (New York, 1975), part 1. Questions to Consider: 1. How did Lenin and Martov differently value liberal democratic goals, such as free speech, freedom of assembly and organization, and democratic elections? 2. Why did Lenin so distrust “spontaneity”? ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 13 Lecture Seventeen Lev Tolstoy Scope: This lecture looks at one of the most remarkable men in modern Russian life, notable both as a famous writer and as a public voice of morality and conscience. It considers the stages of his life: privileged and dissipated aristocrat, celebrated novelist, and religious and moral prophet. To understand the connections among these stages, the lecture explores Tolstoy’s search for the meaning of life and for a morality that could guide both personal life and that of his country and the world. Tolstoy’s preoccupation, in his life and his writings, with self-perfection and the search for truth is examined. Next, the lecture looks at his pursuit of simplicity and a natural life and considers his critique of individualism. Finally, the lecture examines his religious views, which resulted in his excommunication. The lecture concludes by looking at Tolstoy’s continual uncertainties and his final abandonment of home and family and tragic death on the road. Outline I. Both idolized as a saint and reviled as a false prophet, Lev Nikolaevich Tolstoy (1828–1910) was a great literary figure, as well as a major voice in Russia’s public life. A. Russians have traditionally believed that writers should do more than entertain; they should also speak the truth and serve as witnesses to good and evil in the world. B. But even in this tradition, Tolstoy was unique, as no other Russian writer generated a civic movement that took his name. C. In many respects, Tolstoy’s life seemed to echo some of the hagiographic traditions in Russia of a saint’s life. II. Superficially, Tolstoy’s life seems to have had three major periods. A. The first is a youth filled with privilege and typical aristocratic dissipation. 1. Tolstoy was born in 1828 into a wealthy family of hereditary landed aristocrats. 2. His early life was fairly typical of his class: He was educated at the family estate of Iasnaia poliana, then attended Kazan University for three years before dropping out and returning to his estates in 1847. 3. During the next few years, he led a rather dissipated life in Moscow and Petersburg. 4. In 1851, Tolstoy joined the army as an officer and fought in the Crimean War, though he also began to write fiction. 5. In 1856, he quit the army to devote himself to writing. B. The second period of Tolstoy’s life was that of the great novelist, the author of War and Peace, Anna Karenina, and other famous works. C. The third period of his life seems quite different from the first two. 1. Around 1878, Tolstoy experienced a religious crisis that resulted in his “conversion” to a truer Christianity. 2. In his own everyday life, he tried to exemplify the ideals of simplicity and nonviolence. 3. During the final years of his life, he considered becoming a hermit or a pilgrim. 4. In 1910, he fled his estate, his family, and the world, dying while on the road. III. This simple story focuses on the external aspects of Tolstoy’s life and exaggerates the breaks in his life. The deeper story is more complicated. 14 ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership A. B. Tolstoy was obsessed with self-perfection and the search for truth during most of his life. 1. We see this, for example, already in the 1840s, in the preoccupation with self-perfection in his diary. 2. His diaries are also filled with rules. Tolstoy’s search for self-understanding and moral perfection pervaded his literary works, as well. 1. In his first major literary publication, the trilogy Childhood, Boyhood, Youth, Tolstoy psychologically analyzed his own developing consciousness. 2. In the major work of his middle period, War and Peace (first draft completed in 1869), the themes of self-examination and self-perfection are even more evident. 3. Several characters in War and Peace undertake journeys of self-discovery, notably the most autobiographical figure, Pierre Bezukhov. 4. At the end of his psychological and moral journey, Bezukhov meets the peasant Platon Karataev, who exemplifies many of the principles of life that Tolstoy would embrace in the 1880s. 5. Nevertheless, Bezukhov remains uncertain about whether he has found the truth. IV. From very early on, Tolstoy idealized simplicity. A. He strongly believed that human beings were born innocent but were ruined by the institutions of civilization. 1. Western education, he argued, ruined people’s natural innocence by blinding them to the deepest truths. 2. But these truths can be perceived by those whose innocence is still intact (children and peasants). B. Tolstoy’s educational efforts on his own estate were connected to these ideas. 1. He organized a school for peasant boys where basic skills were taught. 2. But he also sought to preserve children’s natural intelligence and will to learn, as well as their naturally harmonious relations with nature and other people. C. These ideas are visible in most of Tolstoy’s work. V. Another major theme in Tolstoy’s writing is his advocacy of the need for self-renunciation, his anti- individualism. A. Most of Tolstoy’s great novels make a case against the autonomous individual. B. In War and Peace, Tolstoy tries to demonstrate that even “great men,” such as Napoleon, are powerless to affect the movement of history. C. In Anna Karenina, Anna’s two selves engage in an ultimately tragic struggle that leaves her with nothing but her individuality, which leads her to commit suicide. VI. Tolstoy’s many ideas led him to think in new ways about religion, for which the Russian Orthodox Church excommunicated him in 1901. A. For Tolstoy, official Christianity was deeply flawed. 1. It masked, crushed, and perverted the real meanings of life. 2. In his view, the universal truths that were at the heart of Christianity were hidden behind ritual and mysticism. B. Tolstoy argued that the real greatness of Jesus Christ was that he could see through the falsehoods of civilization. C. The whole of true Christianity, for Tolstoy, was expressed in the Sermon on the Mount, which instructs people to refrain from actions that their nature tells them are wrong. D. Inspired by this ethical reading of Christianity, Tolstoy rejected much that the established Orthodox Church held sacred. 1. He rejected most of the theology of the church. 2. He rejected the need for priests, sacraments, and liturgy. 3. He even began rewriting the Gospels to remove everything that was mystical and supernatural. VII. Uncertainty, doubt, and contradiction remained in Tolstoy’s thought A. His arguments were often contradictory. 1. Although he famously argued for quietism (nonresistance to evil), he also insisted that evil must be criticized and fought. 2. He combined a belief in learning from the simple people with the conviction that they must be taught to see the truth. 3. He combined a belief in natural absolute truths with recognition that their verity could never be demonstrated. 4. He believed in faith but disdained blind unquestioning faith. ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 15 B. Tolstoy never stopped asking questions and struggling to find certainty. 1. In the end, the uncertainty that plagued him led to his final tragic journey. 2. Yet the heart of his genius lay in his uncertainty and contradictions. Essential Reading: Henri Troyat, Tolstoy (New York, 1967). Isaiah Berlin, “The Hedgehog and the Fox” and “Tolstoy and Enlightenment,” in Russian Thinkers (New York, 1995). Supplementary Reading: Lev Tolstoy, Childhood, Boyhood, and Youth; War and Peace; Anna Karenina; Resurrection. Questions to Consider: 1. 2. What did Tolstoy mean when he argued that children and peasants were closest to understanding the greatest truths? Can we see in Tolstoy’s great novels the roots of his later religious and moral advocacy? 16 ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership Lecture Eighteen The Reign of Alexander III Scope: This lecture examines policies and ideas during the reign of Alexander III. It begins with a look at Alexander III’s “counter-reforms,” especially his efforts to limit civic liberalization, but also at his efforts to stimulate economic progress. To understand the ideas motivating policy, the lecture examines Alexander’s efforts to revive traditional forms and return to the past, evident in his personal style, the construction of old Russian-style churches, and the articulation of a political philosophy of personal autocracy. The lecture suggests that behind the image of political confidence and certainty lay anxieties about the dangers of the modern world. We then turn to a discussion of the outlook and ideas of Alexander’s closest adviser, Konstantin Pobedonostsev. His personal and political influence is described, along with his conservative ideology: his critique of all constitutional or legal limitations on the monarch and his critique of the Great Reforms. The lecture next looks at Pobedonostsev’s pessimistic views of existence and his philosophical distrust of human beings. His views of family, Church, and the autocratic state as the only hope for Russia are considered. Outline I. The reign of Alexander III (ruled 1881–1894) has often been described as an “era of reaction.” A. To be fair, Alexander III was not entirely opposed to all change and reform. 1. Like all Russian rulers, he recognized the need for national progress to maintain and develop the strength of the nation and the state. 2. The reforms during his reign were almost entirely economic, including a peasants’ land bank, a gentry land bank, the abolition of the head tax, and efforts to stimulate industrial growth and modernization. B. But these positive reforms were overshadowed by the so-called counter-reforms. 1. The most important of these were the “Temporary Regulations” of 1881, which created conditions of virtual martial law. 2. The censorship code was strengthened to prevent and punish dissent. 3. University autonomy was ended in 1884. 4. To increase bureaucratic control over the zemstvos and the peasant communes, state-appointed “land captains” were introduced in 1889. 5. During the early 1890s, the government increased central control over the zemstvos. 6. Bureaucratic control over the municipal governments was also increased. 7. An aggressive policy of Russification and discrimination against national minorities (especially Jews) was enforced. II. Alexander III was engaged in a radical project: to save Russia from disorder by turning away from the path of continual Westernization laid down by so many of his predecessors. A. We see this turn to the Russian past even in Alexander’s visual appearance. B. Another symbolically important way Alexander sought to recall Russia’s ancient traditions was by constructing an intensely Muscovite-style church on the spot where his father, Alexander II, had been assassinated by a terrorist’s bomb. C. But Alexander’s turn to the past was most explicitly visible in his political beliefs. 1. Alexander believed deeply in the benefits of strong power. 2. The “Temporary Regulations” of 1881 exemplified this; they allowed the tsar to freely appoint governors with “extraordinary” discretionary power and gave state authorities a virtually free hand to punish dissent. 3. Minister of Finance Sergei Witte described Alexander as a “mountain of stone,” recalling the classic ideal of the groznyi tsar. 4. But Alexander also sought the stance of a traditional tishaishii tsar, as was visible in his religious faith, which he considered central to Russianness. D. Although Alexander exuded calm, imperturbable confidence, there is reason to think that his desire to turn Russia toward the past and away from reform also reflected fear and foreboding about change. ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 17 E. One sign of these anxieties was a remarkable turning away from public life in ruling circles. III. His closest adviser, Konstantin Pobedonostsev (1827–1907), provides one indication of these doubts and anxieties. A. During the final decades of tsarist rule, Pobedonostsev was one of the most powerful and influential intellectuals in Russia. 1. From 1880 to 1905, he was Chief Procurator (lay director) of the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church. 2. He also directly influenced the thinking of Russia’s last two tsars, serving as their tutor when they were young and as adviser when they were in power. B. Pobedonostsev opposed any constitutional or legal limitations on the power of the monarch. 1. The tone with which he condemned constitutionalism is as revealing as the fact itself. 2. In 1881, when Alexander III first came to power, Pobedonostsev shocked many ministers by condemning even the modestly liberal reforms of Alexander II. 3. One minister declared Pobedonostsev’s arguments to be “a negation of all that is at the foundation of European civilization.” 4. Philosophically, Pobedonostsev did indeed reject the main philosophical value of the European Enlightenment: the belief in reason. C. But more than philosophy lay behind Pobedonostsev’s conservatism. A primary motive for Pobedonostsev was fear: fear of modernity, fear of people, fear about the future. 1. Pobedonostsev’s outlook on life was pessimistic and misanthropic. 2. Like most nineteenth-century conservatives, Pobedonostsev had a dismal view of humanity. 3. Given these convictions about human nature, his view of the future encompassed only misery and error. D. Pobedonostsev saw only three institutions that might save Russia in these conditions: the family, the Orthodox Church, and the state. 1. For Pobedonostsev, the family’s job was to repress children’s evil instincts by teaching obedience. 2. The Church was expected to teach obedience and to provide the spiritual and ideological cement to hold society together and ensure stability. 3. The autocratic state was of the greatest importance, because it embodied the truth that men, not laws, must rule. 4. This was not a confident ideology. Although it emerged from a faith in tradition, it also arose from emotional and philosophical fear about the future and loathing for human nature. Essential Reading: Hans Rogger, Russia in the Age of Modernization and Revolution, 1881–1917 (London and New York, 1983), chapters 1–6. Supplementary Reading: Robert Byrnes, Pobedonostsev: His Life and Thought (Bloomington, 1968). Konstantin Pobedonostsev, Reflections of a Russian Statesman (Ann Arbor, 1965). Richard Wortman, Scenarios of Power (Princeton, 2000), vol. 2, chapters 5–8. Questions to Consider: 1. 2. What are the underlying ideas and purposes motivating Alexander III’s “counter-reforms”? Why was Pobedonostsev so vehemently opposed to any legal limitations on the authority of the monarch? 18 ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership Lecture Nineteen Nicholas II, the Last Tsar Scope: This lecture focuses on the personality, values, and ideas of Russia’s last monarch. Notwithstanding arguments that Nicholas had no interest in governance or ideas about rulership, the lecture explores his essential political philosophy. First, the lecture explores Nicholas II’s embrace of the tradition of autocratic authoritarianism, especially as reflected in his obsessions (personal and political) with order and discipline and in his love of military culture. Next, the lecture looks at Nicholas as tishaishii tsar: his public ritual enactments of the ideal of the tsar as united in love and harmony with his people and his deep religious belief that God acted through him. His relationship with Rasputin is viewed in the light of these beliefs and ideals. The lecture concludes with Nicholas II’s fatalism and the relationship of his values and ideals to his eventual fall. Outline I. To speak honestly and fairly about Nicholas II (ruled 1896–1917) is a difficult task. A. Nicholas II has often been described as a weak ruler, who focused more on family than politics. B. He has also been depicted as a narrow-minded tyrant who ruthlessly held onto power in an age of social change and rising democracy. C. Due to his brutal execution, along with his family, in the middle of the night in 1918, he has been portrayed him as a tragic figure, a martyr, even a saint. D. To avoid these simplifications and clichés, we need to try to understand Nicholas on his own terms, to explore his own ways of thinking about life and politics. E. Nicholas drew upon two large political-cultural traditions in formulating his ideas about rule. 1. The first of these sees the ruler as “awesome” in power and might—the tradition of the groznyi tsar. 2. The second mythic ideal sees the ruler as a sacred and divine figure, loving and conciliatory, who seeks unity with his people—the tradition of the tishaishii tsar. II. Like his father, Nicholas II was strongly attracted to the groznyi traditions of order and might. A. He was obsessed with order, regularity, and discipline. 1. His diary provides a documentary account of this ideal. 2. Nicholas tried to imbue his life with order: self-discipline, neatness, systematization. Anna Vyrubova, lady-in-waiting to his wife, described Nicholas as “the tidiest, most systematic of men.” 3. His deep attraction to military culture arose from this love of order. 4. Rituals of tradition, order, discipline, and military might provided Nicholas with a sense of “calm” and “pleasure” that he found deeply meaningful personally. B. These are matters of personality and personal values, but they also shaped Nicholas’s ideas about society and politics. 1. In his view, all people should be guided by the virtues of self-discipline, orderliness, and regularity. 2. He believed strongly that the autocratic order was the key to Russia’s might and stability and its progress and virtue as a nation. 3. His persistent rejection of appeals for political freedom and democracy reflected these views. III. But Nicholas also embraced the Russian tradition of the tishaishii tsar, of the tsar-batiushka (tsar-father). A. Nicholas II devoted much effort to expressing this ideal in publicly visible ways, and found in these public rituals confirmation of his faith. 1. In 1900, Nicholas started a new tradition of regularly celebrating Easter with his family in Moscow’s ancient Kremlin churches and cathedrals. 2. He often observed and admired peasants’ devotion to him as he traveled the country. 3. During Nicholas’s tour of the heartland to celebrate the tercentenary of the Romanov dynasty in 1913, he was deeply moved by what he viewed as signs of popular love of the autocracy. ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 19 4. The demonstrations on Palace Square at the beginning of World War I similarly impressed him with the people’s devotion. 5. Reflecting this faith in the union of ruler and people, Alexandra and her elder daughters served as nurses during the war. 6. Certain that his charismatic presence would inspire his people to victory, Nicholas assumed personal command of the army in 1915. B. Nicholas believed deeply in the divine source of his authority. 1. He was certain that God literally spoke and acted through him. 2. Nicholas found ever-increasing comfort in religious practice and faith. 3. Nicholas and Alexandra’s famous attraction to Grigorii Rasputin was connected to this faith. IV. Many of these stories about Nicholas as man and ruler may seem admirable and even charming, but they also form an essential part of the story of Nicholas’s fall from power. A. Many factors contributed to the overthrow of the tsarist order in 1917. 1. The devastating war with Germany and Austria was a major cause. 2. No less important were the growing desires in society for democratic change and social reform. 3. Meanwhile, the autocracy was retreating into an intractable faith in Russia’s ancient (and archaic) political ideal of a mystical bond between absolute tsar and loving people. B. Nicholas’s deep fatalism also contributed to his downfall. 1. For Nicholas, everything was ultimately God’s will. 2. This belief formed a leitmotif throughout his life: when he assumed the throne, when people were trampled to death during celebrations of his coronation in Moscow in 1896, during the revolutionary upheavals of 1905, and in 1917, when he was forced from power and Romanov rule ended. Essential Reading: Dominic Lieven, Nicholas II (New York, 1994). Supplementary Reading: Mark D. Steinberg and Vladimir Khrustalev, The Fall of the Romanovs: Political Dreams and Personal Struggles in a Time of Revolution (New Haven, 1995). Andrew Verner, The Crisis of Russian Autocracy: Nicholas II and the 1905 Revolution (Princeton, 1990). Richard Wortman, Scenarios of Power (Princeton, 2000), vol. 2, chapters 9–15. Questions to Consider: 1. 2. In the face of the steady modernization of Russian life, why did Nicholas II hold so firmly to the old traditions of autocratic authoritarianism and patriarchalism? Do you agree with the suggestion that one of the reasons the monarchy fell was Nicholas II’s insistence on preserving traditional forms of authority? Could his vision of authority have been compatible with a modern society? 20 ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership Lecture Twenty The Revolution of 1905 Scope: This lecture describes a key event in modern Russian history: the strikes, demonstrations, and public demands that the tsarist government accept civil rights and democratic rule in Russia. The lecture begins by exploring the growing liberal movement and its programs. Next, the growth of a socialist movement is described, as are the discontents of workers and peasants. The Russo-Japanese war and the government’s “political spring” of 1904 are viewed as stimulants to protest. The key events of the year are examined: Bloody Sunday, the upsurge in strikes and demands, the October general strike, the October manifesto, and the continuing but weakening protests that followed. The lecture concludes by considering the shape and meaning of the government’s reforms as these were elaborated in the following years. Outline I. In 1905, the autocracy confronted its greatest political challenge to date: a massive social and political revolution that was the most dramatic sign yet of the steady growth of opposition to traditional autocracy. A. Particularly important was the rise of liberalism since the turn of the century. 1. Liberal ideas in Russia can be traced back to the late eighteenth century. 2. Most liberals agreed on a common program: civil rights, rule of law, “four-tail” suffrage (universal, equal, direct, secret), parliamentary government, local self-government, and social reforms. B. Socialists were also becoming more organized. 1. The Russian Social Democratic Workers’ Party was growing. 2. The populist Socialist Revolutionary (SR) party arose in 1901. 3. Like the populists before them, the SRs had two faces: propaganda, which focused on education and organization, and terrorism. C. Discontent was increasing among peasants, who were unhappy with the settlement of the land issue and with their poverty. D. Dissatisfaction among the growing class of urban workers was on the rise. 1. Workers’ material situation in the city was often horrible. 2. But more was at stake than material change: As workers were exposed to new ideas and to the inequalities of city life, ideas about a more just society began to develop. 3. Since the 1890s, the strike movement had been growing, and workers were increasingly responsive to appeals by radicals. II. Into this increasingly dangerous situation entered two potentially explosive elements: war and reform. A. In early 1904, Japan, not without provocation, launched a war with Russia over control of Korea and Manchuria, during which Russia suffered a series of humiliating defeats. B. The government made another attempt at reform. 1. In August 1904, Socialist Revolutionaries assassinated one of the most reactionary men in the government: the Minister of Internal Affairs, Viacheslav von Plehve. 2. He was replaced by the relatively liberal Prince Dmitrii Sviatopolk-Mirskii, who initiated what came to be called a “political spring.” C. His initial steps, and promises of greater reform, encouraged more protest, first of all among liberals. 1. At meetings in various organizations, resolutions were passed calling for political reform. 2. The Union of Liberation staged a massive “banquet campaign.” 3. Liberal demands were much the same as they had been in the past: civil liberties, equality of citizens before the law, more local self-government, and an elected national assembly. D. This liberal campaign might have died out or been easily crushed by the government had it not been for the movement of workers and students in the streets, provoked by the shooting of workers bringing a petition to the Winter Palace on January 9, 1905 (“Bloody Sunday”). 1. In 1901, hoping to lead workers away from the radicals, the government established special legal labor organizations under the control of the secret police (the Okhrana). ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 21 2. A priest and police-agent named Georgii Gapon established one of these organizations in St. Petersburg in 1904. 3. In December 1904, Gapon’s organization decided to organize a massive march to convey workers’ grievances to the tsar himself. 4. On January 9, 1905, Father Gapon led tens of thousands of workers carrying pictures of the tsar, icons, and church banners in a march to the Winter Palace with a petition for Nicholas II. 5. The crowd was met by troops with orders to fire on the crowds approaching the palace. III. Bloody Sunday marked the beginning of the revolution. A. In the following weeks, everything the government had long feared came to pass: a mass strike movement, the rise of unions and soviets, endless demonstrations, growing political opposition. B. To calm the massive unrest that followed Bloody Sunday, the government granted mild concessions. 1. In February, Nicholas II promised to establish a consultative assembly—a Duma. 2. But unrest continued because most people wanted real legislative power and guaranteed civil rights. C. In early October, a massive general strike occurred. The political demands were the same everywhere: complete civil liberties and a constituent assembly to establish a new constitutional order. D. Although Nicholas later regretted his weakness, he made a further concession and signed the October Manifesto on October 17. 1. For the first time in Russian history, all Russians were guaranteed civil liberties and a Duma with legislative powers was promised. 2. Russia was to become a constitutional monarchy. E. Yet many in society still desired more (or did not trust the government’s promises). 1. Many workers and socialists condemned the Manifesto as inadequate and continued to protest. 2. Students continued to refuse to attend classes. 3. Soldiers and sailors occasionally rebelled. 4. In the border areas of the empire, national groups began to demand independence. 5. Peasants began to seize land. F. Many liberals found this popular movement frightening, splitting the united social front for democracy that had existed until then. 1. Some liberals shared the view that the Manifesto granted too little and too late. 2. More moderate liberals felt that the Manifesto had gone far enough and feared that further opposition would encourage dangerous social unrest. IV. Details of the promised political reforms were announced during 1906. A. These reforms represented a major attempt to include people in the formulation of policy. 1. Political parties were legalized. 2. Russian men from all classes were to be allowed to participate in elections to the Duma. 3. The Duma itself was given legislative authority. B. But the new Duma proved to be a frustrating reminder of the autocracy’s unwillingness to accept real political reform. 1. Voting laws were skewed in favor of classes the government considered most trustworthy: landowners and peasants. 2. The Duma’s legislative power was severely restricted. 3. The Duma’s competence was limited. C. The Duma continued to offer people a public voice and even some real power, but also to whet people’s appetites for true representation. D. Partial social reforms left workers and peasants dissatisfied. Essential Reading: Abraham Ascher, The Russian Revolution of 1905 (Stanford, 1988 and 1992), 2 volumes. 22 ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership Supplementary Reading: Gerald Surh, 1905 in St. Petersburg (Stanford, 1989). Laura Engelstein, Moscow, 1905 (Stanford, 1982). Questions to Consider: 1. Compare Nicholas II’s vision of the political relationship that ought to exist between government and people and the models articulated by liberals, students, worker protesters, and others during the 1905 revolution. 2. Did the Russian state become a constitutional monarchy after October 1905? ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 23 Lecture Twenty-One Peasant Life and Culture Scope: This lecture discusses the experiences, values, and ambitions of Russian peasants—the vast majority of the population—in the late 1800s and early 1900s. The lecture begins by considering common images of the Russian common people—as idealized embodiments of the moral and spiritual genius of the Russian nation or as backward savages. To understand the actual lives and cultural world of Russian peasants, the lecture focuses on several key themes. First, it looks at traditions of community in peasant life, especially as concerned with agriculture and law and order. Next, the lecture explores peasant religious traditions as means of understanding and coping with the world: the veneration of icons but also older traditions and the syncretism of Christian and pre-Christian forms. Peasant “land hunger” is next considered. Finally, the lecture explores signs of cultural change in the village: the growth of literacy and reading and the impact of migration to the cities. Outline I. Educated Russians were preoccupied with the Russian common folk, the narod. A. In Russia, from the late eighteenth century until at least the 1940s, to talk about the narod was to talk about Russia as a nation (part of the meaning of the word). B. Two large general images of the narod predominated. 1. In one image, the peasants embodied all the qualities that gave Russia its particular moral and spiritual greatness: egalitarianism, closeness to nature, folk wisdom, spirituality, personal dignity. 2. In the other image, the peasant is a dark savage, backward and ignorant. C. These images are parts of peasant reality, but a complete picture requires that we consider peasants from their own point of view, that we explore their values and ways of seeing the world. II. In certain areas of peasant life, traditional forms and values seemed especially strong. A. The idea of community was central to the way peasants looked at the world. 1. In all traditional villages, many important decisions continued to be made by an assembly composed of the heads of households within the “commune.” 2. The village commune enforced community moral norms and social order. 3. Individuals were less important than the community and its norms, and infractions of these norms were punished by public humiliation. 4. Peasants understood that this sense of community would help them survive in a harsh world. B. Religion was another important aspect of the peasants’ worldview. 1. Religion helped peasants understand and cope with a harsh world. 2. Although Russian peasants were Christians (mostly Eastern Orthodox but also Old Believers and members of schismatic “sects”), their Orthodoxy had its own forms, emphases, and adaptations. 3. Peasants saw the world as a place filled with powerful spirits and forces for both good and evil, but they also believed that they could understand and influence their world. 4. Icons were central to the life of Orthodox peasants as means of appealing to saints, Christ, and Mary for help. 5. Magic rites and incantations, holy water, and prayer supplemented the power of icons to heal and cure. 6. Peasants also turned to priests and monks, as well as wandering holy men, sorcerers, and magic healers. 7. Thus, for Russian peasants, religion was a rich combination of Christianity and older mystical and magical traditions. III. Discontent was also prevalent among the post-emancipation peasantry. 24 ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership A. B. Peasants were increasingly preoccupied with the need for more land. This “land hunger” arose from a number of factors. 1. 2. The emancipation gave peasants only part of the land they had formerly worked. Enormous growth in population had reduced the amount of land each family possessed. 3. Peasants also felt the need for more land because of the low productivity of the land they worked, which was caused by poor soil and a short growing season, the backwardness of the peasant economy, and the inefficiencies of communal agriculture. 4. Peasants believed that by right, the land should belong to those who work it. C. Had economic conditions for the peasants improved, it is possible that the dream of getting all the land might have fadedbut poverty kept these dreams alive. IV. Peasants were not living in an unchanging world aparton the contrary, their lives were entwined with the larger world and changed dramatically during the second half of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century. A. Schools proliferated. B. Literacy rose. C. The number of publications directed at common people increased significantly. 1. Numerous cheap newspapers and illustrated magazines reached common readers. 2. Many books, from science to adventure stories, also appeared. D. Many peasants (especially young men) left the countryside to go to work in the growing industrial cities. 1. Their lives in the cities encouraged new tastes that they often carried back to the village. 2. They also began to acquire (or at least to covet) material possessions. E. The 1. The value they placed on community competed with the idea of individual assertiveness. 2. Strong moral values existed alongside brutality. 3. Awe before a world filled with magical power vied with the peasants’ sense of their own power to cope or, perhaps, even to prosper. 4. An acceptance of suffering coexisted with dreams of change. Essential Reading: Olga Semyonova Tian-Shanskaia, Village Life in Late Tsarist Russia (Bloomington, 1993). Supplementary Reading: Jeffrey Burds, Peasant Dreams and Market Politics: Labor Migration and the Russian Village, 1861–1905 (Pittsburgh, 1998). Barbara Alpern Engel, Between the Fields and the City: Women, Work, and Family in Russia, 1861–1914 (Cambridge, England, 1995). Stephen Frank, Crime, Cultural Conflict, and Justice in Rural Russia, 1856–1914 (Berkeley, 1999). Stephen Frank and Mark Steinberg, eds., Cultures in Flux: Lower-Class Values, Practices, and Resistance in Late Imperial Russia (Princeton, 1994), introduction, chapters 1–5. Christine Worobec, Peasant Russia (DeKalb, 1995). Questions to Consider: 1. How can one explain the combination in peasant religion of Christian and pre-Christian traditions? Is this merely, as some have argued, the veneer of Christianity over essential paganism? Can we understand this combination more deeply from peasants’ own point of view? 2. How would you describe the peasant ideal of a good life? peasants’ mental world was complex, contradictory, and in flux. ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 25 Lecture Twenty-Two The Modern City and Its Discontents Scope: This lecture shifts attention to urban life and change from the 1890s to the eve of World War I. It begins by exploring the evidence of a flourishing public sphere: periodical press and book publication, voluntary associations, and sites of public entertainment. Paralleling this positive face of urban modernity was a darker side. Using stories in the popular press, we look at evidence of personal danger in the modern city, uncertain identities, hooliganism, murder, and suicide, and how these were interpreted. Next, the lecture examines modern urban life from the perspective of an urban worker. In particular, we focus on workers’ words: collective demands, memoirs and published essays, even poetry. At the center of much of this writing, we see, is concern with the individual personality and its fate in the modern city. Outline I. The idea of a public sphere is useful for understanding the development of urban life at the turn of the century and after. A. A public sphere is a social space between private life and the life of the state. 1. It is generally organized around various institutions. 2. People can participate in public life freely without repression or coercion. 3. It is a space where public opinions take shape and are expressed. 4. Many would argue that the public sphere is the essential foundation for a democratic society. B. Such a public sphere was flourishing in Russian cities in the late 1880s and especially after 1905. 1. The steady growth of the press in Russia contributed to this trend. 2. Voluntary civic organizations formed, including charities, service organizations, and business and professional societies. 3. There were also various forms of public entertainment where a diverse public could gather. C. Of course, none of this existed without some measure of resistance by the state. II. Modernity and a thriving public life created a city filled with opportunity, excitement, and possibility, but this was A. B. C. III. The A. also a landscape filled with danger and difficulties. Newspapers in such cities as Petersburg or Moscow provided much evidence that Russian life was moving in a healthy direction. 1. Stories about the spread of scientific knowledge and technical know-how appeared. 2. Tales of entrepreneurial success and of individual upward mobility were also published. 3. Other writers reported on the increasing role of AGRICULTURE Agrarian Party of Russia Agrarian Reforms Agriculture Babi Bunty Black Earth Chayanov, Alexander Vasilievich Collective Farm Collectivization of Agriculture Committees of the Village Poor Famine of 1891–1892 Famine of 1921–1922 Famine of 1932–1933 Famine of 1946 Food Goods Famine Grain Crisis of 1928 Grain Trade Kulaks Land Tenure, Soviet and Post-Soviet OUTLINE OF CONTENTS This topical outline was compiled by the editors to provide a general overview of the conceptual scheme of the Encyclopedia of Russian History. lxxxi OUTLINE OF CONTENTS Lysenko, Trofim Denisovich Machine Tractor Stations Moscow Agricultural Society Peasant Economy Peasantry Prodnalog Prodrazverstka Smychka Sovkhoz Three-Field System Twenty-Five Thousanders Virgin Lands Program Zagotovka ARCHITECTURE Banking System, Tsarist Barshchina Barsov, Alexander Alexandrovich Beard Tax Bednyaki Black Market Bukharin, Nikolai Ivanovich Bureaucracy, Economic Capitalism Caviar Central Bank of Russia Central Statistical Agency Chayanov, Alexander Vasilievich Chervonets Collective Farm Collectivization of Agriculture Command Administrative Economy Commanding Heights of the Economy Committee for the Management of the National Economy Communism Control Figures Cooperatives, Law on Cooperative Societies Corporation, Russian Council for Mutual Economic Assistance Crony Capitalism Decree on Land Denga Developed Socialism Dialectical Materialism Economic Growth, Extensive Economic Growth, Imperial Economic Growth, Intensive Economic Growth, Soviet Economic Reform Commission Economism Economy, Soviet and Post-Soviet Economy, Tsarist Edinonachalie Electricity Grid Enserfment Enterprise, Soviet Federal Property Fund Five-Hundred-Day Plan Five-Year Plans Foreign Dept Foreign Trade Free Economic Society Full Economic Accounting Funded Commodities Geneticists Gigantomania GKOs Admiralty Architecture Cathedral of Cathedral of Cathedral of Cathedral of Cathedral of Cathedral of Caves Monastery Gatchina Kirill-Beloozero Monastery Kremlin Christ the Savior St. Basil St. Sophia, Kiev St. Sophia, Novgorod the Archangel the Dormition Makary, Metropolitan Melnikov, Konstantin Stepanovich Museum, Hermitage Nationalism in the Arts Neoclassicism Peter and Paul Fortress Rastrelli, Bartolomeo Red Square Simonov Monastery Solovki Monastery Tithe Church, Kiev Tsarskoye Selo Winter Palace ECONOMICS Aeroflot Agriculture Alcohol Monopoly Altyn Apparat Assortment Plans Banking System, Soviet lxxxii ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY Glavki Gold Standard Goods Famine Gosbank Goskomstat Gosplan Grain Crisis of 1928 Grain Trade Grivna GUM Hard Budget Contraints Hayek, Friedrich Imports and Exports Index Number Relativity Indicative Planning Industrialization Industrialization, Rapid Industrialization, Soviet Input-Output Analysis Kantorovich, Leonid Vitaliyevich Khozraschet Khutor Kondratiev, Nikolai Dmitrievich Kopeck Kormlenie Kornai, Janos Kosygin Reforms Kritzman, Lev Natanovich Kulaks Labor Labor Books Labor Day Labor Theory of Value Land Tenure, Imperial Era Land Tenure, Soviet and Post-Soviet Lend Lease Liberman, Yevsei Grigorevich Machine Tractor Stations Mafia Capitalism Market Socialism Marxism Material Balances Material Product System Mercantilism Merchants Ministries, Economic Ministry of Foreign Trade Monetary Overhang Monetary System, Soviet Moscow Agricultural Society Nemchinov, Vasily Sergeyevich Net Material Product New Economic Policy New Statute of Commerce Novosibirsk Report Novozhilov, Viktor Valentinovich Obrok Obshchina Organized Crime Peasant Economy Perestroika Planners’ Preferences Postal System Preobrazhensky, Yevgeny Alexeyevich Primitive Socialist Accumulation Privatization Prodnalog Prodrazverstka Prostitution Production Sharing Agreement Rabkrin Railways Ratchet Effect Redemption Payments Repressed Inflation Ruble Ruble Control Ruble Zone Russian Federal Securities Commission Sberbank Scientific Socialism Scissors’ Crisis Second Economy Serednyaki Seven-Year Plan Serfdom Service State Shatalin, Stanislav Sergeyevich Shock Therapy Shockworkers Slavery Slutsky, Yevgeny Yevgenievich Smychka Socialism Socialism in One Country Soul Tax Soviet-German Trade Agreement of 1939 Sovkhoz State Capitalism State Enterprise, Law of the Stock Exchanges Stolypin, Peter Akradievich Stroibank Strumilin, Stanislav Gustavovich Subbotnik Subway Systems Taxes Tax, Turnover ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY lxxxiii OUTLINE OF CONTENTS OUTLINE OF CONTENTS Techpromfinplan Teleological Planning Three-Field System Tourism Trade Routes Trade Statutes of 1653 and 1667 Trade Unions Transition Economies Trans-Siberian Railway Trusts, Soviet Tugan-Baranovsky, Mikhail Ivanovich Twenty-Five Thousanders Union of Struggle for the Emancipation of Labor Value Subtraction Varga, Eugene Samuilovich Virgin Lands Program Vodka Virtual Economy Wages, Soviet War Communism War Economy Westernizers Workers Workers’ Control Workers’ Opposition World Revolution Zagotovka Zaslavskaya, Tatiana Ivanovna EDUCATION Academy of Arts Academy of Sciences Cantonists Communist Academy Communist Youth Organizations Education Ethnography, Russian and Soviet Fyodorov, Ivan Higher Party School Historiography Ilminsky, Nikolai Ivanovich Institute of Red Professors Klyuchevsky, Vasily Osipovich Krupskaya, Nadezhda Konstantinovna Language Laws Lazarev Institute Lomonosov, Mikhail Vasilievich Lunacharsky, Anatoly Vasilievich National Library of Russia Pirogov, Nikolai Ivanovich Primary Chronicle Rostovtsev, Mikhail Ivanovich Russian State Library Slavo-Greco-Latin Academy Smolny Institute Universities Uvarov, Sergei Semenovich FOREIGN RELATIONS Afghanistan, Relations with Austria, Relations with Bulgaria, Relations with Chechnya and Chechens China, Relations with Cold War Cuban Missile Crisis Cuba, Relations with Czechoslovakia, Relations with Foreign Policy France, Relations with Geneva Conventions Germany, Relations with Great Britain, Relations with Greece, Relations with Hungary, Relations with Iran, Relations with Iraq, Relations with Israel, Relations with Italy, Relations with Japan, Relations with KAL 007 Korea, Relations with League of Nations Montenegro, Relations with North Atlantic Treaty Organization Norway, Relations with Pakistan, Relations with Prussia, Relations with Romania, Relations with Security Council Serbia, Relations with Sweden, Relations with Turkey, Relations with United Nations United States, Relations with Vietnam, Relations with Yugoslavia, Relations with GOVERNMENT Apparat Article 6 of the 1977 Constitution lxxxiv ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY Cabinet of Ministers, Imperial Cabinet of Ministers, Soviet Central Committee Central Control Committee Commissar Constitution of 1918 Constitution of 1936 Constitution of 1977 Constitution of 1993 Congress of People’s Deputies Constituent Assembly Council of Ministers, Soviet Duma Federal Assembly General Secretary Governing Senate Guberniya Kremlin Local Government and Administration Main Political Directorate Ministry of the Interior Orgburo Plenum Politburo Political Party System Presidency Presidential Council Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Primary Party Organization Prime Minister Provisional Government Second Secretary Secretariat Soviet State Committees State Council Succession of Leadership, Soviet Supreme Soviet HISTORICAL EVENTS AND PEOPLE KIEVAN RUS AND MEDIEVAL ERA Alexander Mikhailovich Alexander Yaroslavich Alexei Mikhailovich Andrei Alexandrovich Andrusovo, Peace of Avvakum Petrovich Basil I Basil II Basil III Batu Khan Bolotnikov, Ivan Isayevich Boretskaya, Marfa Ivanovna Civil War of 1425–1450 Copper Riots Cyril of Turov Daniel, Metropolitan Dionisy Dmitry Alexandrovich Dmitry, False Dmitry Mikhailovich Dmitry of Uglich Enserfment Filaret Romanov, Patriarch Florence, Council of Fyodor Alexeyevich Fyodorov, Boris Grigorievich Fyodorov, Ivan Glinskaya, Yelena Vasilyevna Godunov, Boris Fyodorovich Golitsyn, Vasily Vasilievich Hilarion, Metropolitan Igor Ivan I Ivan II Ivan III Ivan IV Ivan V Izyaslav I Izyaslav Mstislavich Joakim, Patriarch Job, Patriarch Joseph of Volotsk, St. Khovanshchina Kotoshikhin, Grigory Karpovich Kulikovo Field, Battle of Kurbsky, Andrei Mikhailovich Kuritsyn, Fyodor Vasilevich Livonian War Makary, Metropolitan Matveyev, Artamon Sergeyevich Maxim the Greek, St. Medvedev, Sylvester Agafonikovich Minin, Kuzma Mniszech, Marina Morozov, Boris Ivanovich Morozova, Feodosya Prokopevna Mstislav Muscovy Nerchinsk, Treaty of Neronov, Ivan Nikitin, Afanasy Nikon, Patriarch Nil Sorsky, St. OUTLINE OF CONTENTS ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY lxxxv OUTLINE OF CONTENTS Normanist Controversy Oleg Olga Oprichnina Ordin-Nashchokin, Afanasy Lavrentievich Osorina, Yulianya Ustinovna Otrepev, Grigory Paleologue, Sophia Peasantry Polotsky, Simeon Pozharsky, Dmitry Mikhailovich Primary Chronicle Razin Rebellion Romanov, Mikhail Fyodorovich Rostislav Rublev, Andrei Rurik Rurikid Dynasty Serfdom Sergius, St. Shuisky, Vasily Ivanovich Simeon Smolensk War Sophia Stolbovo, Treaty of Svyatopolk I Svyatopolk II Svyatoslav I Svyatoslav II Theophanes the Greek Thirteen Years’ War Time of Troubles Ugra River, Battle of Ushakov, Simon Fyodorovich Vladimir Monomakh Vsevolod I Vsevolod III Winius, Andries Dionyszoon Yaropolk I Yaroslav Vladimirovich Yaroslav Vsevolodovich Yaroslav Yaroslavich Yermak Timofeyevich Yuri Danilovich Yuri Vladimirovich Yuri Vsevolodovich IMPERIAL ERA Alcohol Monopoly Alexander I Alexander II Alexander III Anna Ivanovna Archives Armand, Inessa Berlin, Congress of Bloody Sunday Bolshevism Bunin, Ivan Alexeyevich February Revolution Catherine I Catherine II Caucasian Wars Chukovsky, Kornei Ivanovich Elizabeth Famine of 1891–1892 Great Northern War Hrushevsky, Mikhail Sergeyevich Ivan V Ivan VI July Days of 1917 Kerensky, Alexander Fyodorovich Khomyakov, Alexei Stepanovich Kollontai, Alexandra Mikhailovna Kornilov Affair Leipzig, Battle of Lena Goldfields Massacre Lenin, Vladimir Ilich Lesnaya, Battle of Lobachevsky, Nikolai Ivanovich Lomonosov, Mikhail Vasilievich Makarov, Stepan Osipovich Makhno, Nestor Ivanovich Martov, Yuli Osipovich Menshikov, Alexander Danilovich Milyukov, Paul Nikolayevich Milyutin, Dmitry Alexeyevich Naryshkina, Natalia Kirillovna Nechayev, Sergei Geradievich Nekrasov, Nikolai Alexeyevich Nesselrode, Karl Robert Nijinsky, Vaslav Fomich Nicholas I Nicholas II October General Strike of 1905 October Revolution Odoyevsky, Vladimir Fyodorovich Ostrovsky, Alexander Nikolayevich Pallas, Peter-Simon Paul I Peter I Peter II Peter III Pisarev, Dmitry Ivanovich Pobedonostsev, Konstantin Pogodin, Mikhail Petrovich Pokrovsky, Mikhail Nikolayevich Polish Rebellion of 1863 lxxxvi ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY Poltava, Battle of Port Arthur, Siege of Potemkin Mutiny Propp, Vladimir Iakovlevich Protopopov, Alexander Dmitrievich Pruth River, Campaign and Treaty of Quadruple Alliance and Quintuple Alliance Revolution of 1905 Rimsky-Korsakov, Nikolai Andreyevich Rodzianko, Mikhail Vladimirovich Roerich, Nicholas Konstantinovich Romanov Dynasty Russo-Japanese War Russo-Persian Wars Seven Years’ War Tolstoy, Leo Nikolayevich Tourism Tsvetaeva, Marina Ivanovna Tukhachevsky, Mikhail Nikolayevich Witte, Sergei Yulievich World War I SOVIET ERA Adzhubei, Alexei Ivanovich Afghanistan, Relations with Aganbegyan, Abel Gezevich Agitprop Alcohol Monopoly Alexei II, Patriarch Aliyev, Heidar Allied Intervention Alliluyeva, Svetlana Iosifovna Andreyeva, Nina Alexandrovna Andropov, Yuri Vladimirovich Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty Anti-Comintern Pact Apparat Archives Armand, Inessa Arms Control Artek Article 6 of 1977 Constitution August 1991 Putsch Babel, Isaac Emmanuyelovich Babi Bunty Baikal-Amur Magistral Railway Bakatin, Vadim Viktorovich Bakhtin, Mikhail Mikhailovich Bely, Andrei Berlin Blockade Blok, Alexander Alexandrovich Bolshevism Bonner, Yelena Georgievna Brezhnev, Leonid Ilich Brodsky, Joseph Alexandrovich Brusilov, Alexei Alexeyevich Budenny, Semeon Mikhailovich Bukharin, Nikolai Ivanovich Bulgakov, Mikhail Afanasievich Bulganin, Nikolai Alexandrovich Bunin, Ivan Alexeyevich Chapayev, Vasily Ivanovich Chebrikov, Viktor Mikhailovich Chechnya and Chechens Chernenko, Konstantin Ustinovich Chernobyl Chernomyrdin, Viktor Stepanovich Chicherin, Georgy Vasilievich Chkalov, Valery Pavlovich Chubais, Anatoly Borisovich Chuikov, Vasily Ivanovich Chukovskaya, Lydia Korneyevna Chukovsky, Kornei Ivanovich Collectivization of Agriculture Civil War of 1917–1922 Cold War Cuban Missile Crisis Cultural Revolution Czechoslovakia, Invasion of De-Stalinization Denikin, Anton Ivanovich Deportations Dissident Movement Doctors’ Plot Dudayev, Dzhokhar Dzerzhinsky, Felix Edmundovich Ehrenburg, Ilya Grigorovich Eisenstein, Sergei Mikhailovich Ethiopian Civil War Famine of 1921–1922 Famine of 1932–1933 Famine of 1946 Frunze, Mikhail Vasilievich Gagarin, Yuri Alexeyevich Geneva Summit of 1985 Genoa Conference Genocide Ginzburg, Evgenia Semenovna Glasnost Goods Famine Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeyevich Grigorenko, Peter Grigorievich Grishin, Viktor Vasilievich Gromyko, Andrei Andreyevich Grossman, Vasily Semenovich Hayek, Friedrich Helsinki Accords Hrushevsky, Mikhail Sergeyevich ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY lxxxvii OUTLINE OF CONTENTS OUTLINE OF CONTENTS lxxxviii ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY Hungarian Revolution July Days of 1917 Kaganovich, Lazar Moyseyevich KAL 007 Kalinin, Mikhail Ivanovich Kamenev, Lev Borisovich Kaplan, Fanya Katyn Forest Massacre Kerensky, Alexander Fyodorovich Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeyevich Kirov, Sergei Mironovich Kolchak, Alexander Vasilievich Kollontai, Alexandra Mikhailovna Konev, Ivan Stepanovich Kornilov Affair Kosmodemyanskaya, Zoya Kosygin, Alexei Nikolayevich Kosygin Reforms Kovalev, Sergei Adamovich Kozlov, Frol Romanovich Krasnov, Pyotr Nikolayevich Kritzman, Lev Natanovich Kronstadt Uprising Krupskaya, Nadezhda Konstantinovna Kryuchkov, Vladimir Alexandrovich Kunayev, Dinmukhammed Akhmedovich Kursk, Battle of Kuybyshev, Valerian Vladimirovich Kuznetsov, Nikolai Gerasimovich Lend Lease Leningrad Affair Lenin, Vladimir Ilich Liberman, Yevsei Grigorevich Ligachev, Yegor Kuzmich Likhachev, Dmitry Sergeyevich Lotman, Yuri Mikhailovich Lukyanov, Anatoly Ivanovich Lunacharsky, Anatoly Vasilievich Lysenko, Trofim Denisovich Makhno, Nestor Ivanovich Malenkov, Georgy Maximilyanovich Malta Summit Mandelshtam, Nadezhda Yakovlevna Mandelshtam, Osip Emilievich Martov, Yuli Osipovich Mayakovsky, Vladimir Vladimirovich Medvedev, Roy Alexandrovich Medvedev, Zhores Alexandrovich Melnikov, Konstantin Stepanovich Meyerhold, Vsevolod Yemilievich Mikhalkov, Nikita Sergeyevich Mikoyan, Anastas Ivanovich Moiseyev, Mikhail Alexeyevich Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Moscow, Battle of Moscow Olympics of 1980 Myasoedov Affair Narva, Battles of Nijinsky, Vaslav Fomich Novocherkassk Uprising Novosibirsk Report October Revolution Ogarkov, Nikolai Vasilevich Operation Barbarossa Ordzhonikidze, Grigory Konstantinovich Orlova, Lyubov Petrovna Pasternak, Boris Leonidovich Pavliuchenko, Lyudmila Mikhailovna Perestroika Podgorny, Nikolai Viktorovich Pokrovsky, Mikhail Nikolayevich Ponomarev, Boris Kharitonovich Popov, Gavriil Kharitonovich Preobrazhensky, Yevgeny Alexeyevich Primakov, Yevgeny Maximovich Prokofiev, Sergei Sergeyevich Pugo, Boris Karlovich Purges, The Great Pytatakov, Georgy Leonidovich Rachmaninov, Sergei Vasilievich Radek, Karl Bernardovich Radzinsky, Edvard Stanislavich Raikin, Arkady Isaakovich Red Terror Refuseniks Reykjavik Summit Roerich, Nicholas Konstantinovich Rutskoi, Alexander Vladimirovich Rykov, Alexei Ivanovich Ryutin, Martemyan Sakharov, Andrei Dmitrievich Scissors Crisis Sergei, Patriarch Shakhty Trial Shatalin, Stanislav Sergeyevich Shcharansky, Anatoly Nikolayevich Shevardnadze, Eduard Amvrosievich Shlyapnikov, Alexander Gavrilovich Sholokhov, Mikhail Alexandrovich Shostakovich, Dmitri Dmitrievich Show Trials Simonov, Konstantin Mikhailovich Sinyavsky-Daniel Trial Skrypnyk, Mykola Oleksiiovych Solidarity Movement Solzhenitsyn, Alexander Isayevich Sorge, Richard Soviet-Finnish War Soviet-Polish War Spanish Civil War Stalingrad, Battle of Stalin, Josef Vissarionovich Stanislavsky, Konstantin Sergeyevich Starovoitova, Galina Vasilievna Strategic Defense Initiative Strumilin, Stanislav Gustavovich Suslov, Mikhail Andreyevich Tarkovsky, Andrei Arsenievich Thaw, The Tolstaya, Tatiana Nikitichna Tomsky, Mikhail Pavlovich Trotsky, Leon Davidovich Tsvetaeva, Marina Ivanovna Tourism Tukhachevsky, Mikhail Nikolayevich Tupolev, Andrei Nikolayevich U-2 Spy Plane Incident Ustinov, Dmitry Fedorovich Varga, Eugene Samuilovich Vavilov, Nikolai Ivanovich Volkogonov, Dmitry Antonovich Volsky, Arkady Ivanovich Voroshilov, Kliment Efremovich Voznesensky, Nikolai Alexeyevich Vyshinsky, Andrei Yanuarievich Vysotsky, Vladimir Semyonovich World War II Wrangel, Peter Nikolayevich Yagoda, Genrikh Grigorevich Yakovlev, Alexander Nikolayevich Yalta Conference Yanayev, Gennady Ivanovich Yesenin, Sergei Alexandrovich Yevtushenko, Yevgeny Alexandrovich Yezhov, Nikolai Ivanovich Yudenich, Nikolai Nikolayevich Zaslavskaya, Tatiana Ivanovna Zhdanov, Andrei Alexandrovich Zhirinovsky, Vladimir Volfovich Zhukov, Georgy Konstantinovich Zinoviev, Grigory Yevseyevich Zinoviev Letter POST-SOVIET ERA Aganbegyan, Abel Gezevich Alexei II, Patriarch Aliyev, Heidar Bakatin, Vadim Viktorovich Bonner, Yelena Georgievna Chechnya and Chechens Chernomyrdin, Viktor Stepanovich Chubais, Anatoly Borisovich Communist Party of the Russian Federation Democratization Dudayev, Dzhokhar Economy, Post-Soviet Federal Assembly Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeyevich Khasbulatov, Ruslan Imranovich Kozyrev, Andrei Vladimirovich Kravchuk, Leonid Makarovich Kursk Submarine Disaster Lebed, Alexander Ivanovich Lukashenko, Alexander Grigorievich Lukyanov, Anatoly Ivanovich Luzhkov, Yuri Mikhailovich Mikhalkov, Nikita Sergeyevich Moiseyev, Mikhail Alexeyevich Nemtsov, Boris Ivanovich October 1993 Events Persian Gulf War Presidency Primakov, Yevgeny Maximovich Putin, Vladimir Vladimirovich Referendum of April 1993 Referendum of December 1993 Referendum of March 1991 Russian Federation Shevardnadze, Eduard Amvrosievich Starovoitova, Galina Vasilievna Stepashin, Sergei Vadimovich Tolstaya, Tatiana Nikitichna Tourism Volsky, Arkady Ivanovich Yakovlev, Alexander Nikolayevich Yavlinsky, Grigory Alexeyevich Yeltsin, Boris Nikolayevich Zhirinovsky, Vladimir Volfovich Zyuganov, Gennady Andreyevich JOURNALISM Adzhubei, Alexei Ivanovich Aksakov, Ivan Sergeyevich Belinsky, Vissarion Grigorievich Censorship Chernyshevsky, Nikolai Gavrilovich Chronicle of Current Events Glavlit Intelligentsia Izvestiya Journalism Katkov, Mikhail Nikiforovich Mikhailovsky, Nikolai Konstantinovich Newspapers OUTLINE OF CONTENTS ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY lxxxix OUTLINE OF CONTENTS Novikov, Nikolai Ivanovich Okudzhava, Bulat Shalovich Pravda Saltykov-Shchedrin, Mikhail Yevgrafovich Samizdat Suvorin, Alexei Sergeyevich Sytin, Ivan Dmitrievich TASS Thick Journals Thin Journals Tur, Yevgenia LAW AND JUDICIARY Constitutional Court Cooperatives, Law on Court, High Arbitration Court, Supreme Emancipation Act Family Code of 1926 Family Code on Marriage, the Family, and Guardianship Family Laws of 1936 Fundamental Laws of 1906 Gulag Language Laws Law Code of 1649 Lefortovo Legal Systems Lubyanka Novgorod Judicial Charter Organized Crime Prisons Pskov Judicial Charter Russian Justice Shakhty Trial Show Trials Sinyavsky-Daniel Trial State Enterprise, Law of the State Security, Organs of Succession, Law on LITERATURE Chekhov, Anton Pavlovich Cultural Revolution Dostoyevsky, Fyodor Mikhailovich Folklore Gogol, Nikolai Vasilievich Golden Age of Russian Literature Goncharov, Ivan Alexandrovich Lermontov, Mikhail Yurievich Lubok Nekrasov, Nikolai Alexeyevich Odoyevsky, Vladimir Fyodorovich Pasternak, Boris Leonidovich Pisarev, Dmitry Ivanovich Propp, Vladimir Iakovlevich Pushkin, Alexander Sergeyevich Pushkin House Romanticism Russian Association of Proletarian Writers Science Fiction Silver Age Solzhenitsyn, Alexander Isayevich Thick Journals Thin Journals Tolstaya, Tatiana Nikitichna Tolstoy, Leo Nikolaevich Turgenev, Ivan Sergeyevich Tyutchev, Fyodor Ivanovich Union of Soviet Writers MILITARY Administration, Military Admiralty Alexeyev, Mikhail Vasilievich Allied Intervention Angolan Civil War Arms Control Baltic Fleet Baryatinsky, Alexander Ivanovich Black Sea Fleet Brusilov, Alexei Alexeyevich Budenny, Semeon Mikhailovich Chapayev, Vasily Ivanovich Chernyshev, Alexander Ivanovich Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers Cossacks Czechoslovak Corps Decembrist Movement and Rebellion Dedovshchina Denikin, Anton Ivanovich Donskoy, Dmitry Edinonachalie Frontier Fortifications Frunze, Mikhail Vasilievich Gordon, Patrick Leopold Grand Alliance Great Reforms Grigorenko, Peter Grigorievich Gromov, Boris Vsevolodovich Guards, Regiments of xc ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY Hague Peace Conferences KAL 007 Kaliningrad Kaufman, Konstantin Petrovich Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeyevich Kokoshin, Andrei Afanasievich Kolchak, Alexander Vasilievich Konev, Ivan Stepanovich Konstantin Nikolayevich Kornilov Affair Krasnov, Peter Nikolayevich Kuropatkin, Alexei Nikolayevich Kursk Submarine Disaster Kutuzov, Mikhail Ilarionovich Kuznetsov, Nikolai Gerasimovich Lay of Igor’s Campaign Lebed, Alexander Ivanovich Lend Lease Makarov, Stepan Osipovich Manifesto of 1763 Mazepa, Hetman Ivan Stepanovich Menshikov, Alexander Danilovich Military Art Military Doctrine Military Intelligence Military Reforms Military, Imperial Era Military, Soviet and Post-Soviet Military-Economic Planning Military-Industrial Complex Milyutin, Dmitry Alexeyevich Minin, Kuzma Moiseyev, Mikhail Alexeyevich Myasoyedov Affair Nakhimov, Paul Stepanovich Napoleon I Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 New Formation Regiments North Atlantic Treaty Organization Northern Convoys Northern Fleet Obruchev, Nikolai Nikolayevich October 1993 Events Ogarkov, Nikolai Vasilievich Operation Barbarossa Orlov, Grigory Grigorievich Pacific Fleet Pestel, Pavel Ivanovich Peter and Paul Fortress Peter I Peter III Polovtsy Pomestie Potemkin Mutiny Potsdam Conference Pozharsky, Dmitry Mikhailovich Preobrazhensky Guards Pugachev, Emelian Ivanovich Razin Rebellion Red Guards Reitern, Mikhail Khristoforovich Rumyantsev, Peter Alexandrovich Russo-Japanese War Russo-Persian Wars Russo-Turkish Wars Security Council Sevastopol Seven Years’ War Shamil Shaposhnikov, Boris Mikhailovich Sholokhov, Mikhail Alexandrovich Skobelev, Mikhail Dmitriyevich Sokolovsky, Vasily Danilovich Sorge, Richard State Defense Committee Stavka Stenka Razin Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties Strategic Defense Initiative Streltsy Suvorov, Alexander Vasilievich Three Emperors’ League Triyandafillov, Viktor Kiryakovich Tukhachevsky, Mikhail Nikolayevich U-2 Spy Plane Incident Varennikov, Valentin Ivanovich Vasilevsky, Alexander Mikhailovich Vlasov Movement Volkogonov, Dmitry Antonovich Voroshilov, Kliment Efremovich Voyevoda White Army Wrangel, Peter Nikolayevich Yalta Conference Yazov, Dmitry Timofeyevich Yermak Timofeyevich Yudenich, Nikolai Nikolayevich Zero-Option Zhukov, Georgy Konstantinovich BATTLES AND WARS Afghanistan, Relations with Antonov Uprising Austerlitz, Battle of Balaklava, Battle of Balkan Wars Borodino, Battle of Caucasian Wars ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY xci OUTLINE OF CONTENTS OUTLINE OF CONTENTS Chechnya and Chechens Chesme, Battle of Civil War of 1425–1450 Civil War of 1917–1922 Crimean War Czechoslovakia, Invasion of Ethiopian Civil War French War of 1812 Great Northern War Katyn Forest Massacre Khalkin-Gol, Battle of Korean War Kronstadt Uprising Kulikovo Field, Battle of Kursk, Battle of Leipzig, Battle of Lena Gold Fields Massacre Leningrad, Siege of Lesnaya, Battle of Livonian War Moscow, Battle of Navarino, Battle of Novocherkassk Uprising October 1993 Events October Revolution Operation Barbarossa Persian Gulf War Polish-Soviet War Poltava, Battle of Port Arthur, Siege of Pruth River, Campaign and Treaty of Potemkin Mutiny Revolution of 1905 Russo-Japanese War Russo-Persian Wars Russo-Turkish Wars Seven Years’ War Sinope, Battle of Smolensk War Spanish Civil War Stalingrad, Battle of Tannenberg, Battle of Thirteen Years’ War Tsushima, Battle of Ugra River, Battle of War of the Third Coalition World War I World War II MUSIC Balalaika Bylina Chastushka Cultural Revolution Folk Music Glinka, Mikhail Ivanovich Gypsymania Historical Songs Mighty Handful Music Odoyevsky, Vladimir Fyodorovich Okudzhava, Bulat Shalovich Opera Petrushka Prison Songs Prokofiev, Sergei Sergeyevich Rachmaninov, Sergei Vasilievich Rimsky-Korsakov, Nikolai Andreyevich Shostakovich, Dmitri Dmitrievich Stasov, Vladimir Vasilievich Stravinsky, Igor Fyodorovich Tchaikovsky, Peter Ilyich Vysotsky, Vladimir Semyonovich POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS Agrarian Party of Russia Bolshevism Borotbisty Bund, Jewish Civic Union Communist Communist Communist Communist Communist Congress of Constitutional Democratic Party Dashnaktsutiun Information Bureau International Party of the Russian Federation Party of the Soviet Union Youth Organizations Russian Communities Democratic Party Democratic Union Fatherland-All Russia Land and Freedom Party Left Opposition Left Socialist Revolutionaries Liberal Democratic Party Mensheviks Movement in Support of the Army Musavat Octobrist Party Old Believer Committee Our Home Is Russia Party Pamyat Party Congresses and Conferences xcii ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY People’s Control Committee People’s Party of Free Russia Rabbinical Commission Right Opposition Russia’s Democratic Choice Russian National Unity Party Social Democratic Party Social Democratic Workers Party Union of Right Forces United Opposition Unity (Medved) Party Vlasov Movement Women of Russia Bloc Workers’ Opposition Yabloko POLITICAL POLICY Abortion Policy Brezhnev Doctrine Censorship Democratization Deportations Enserfment Federalism Glasnost Language Laws Nationalities Policy, Soviet Nationalities Policy, Tsarist Passport System Perestroika Russification Science and Technology Policy Socialism Temporary Regulations REGIONS, NATIONS, AND NATIONALITIES Abkhazians Adyge Ajars Alash Orda Alaska Albanians, Caucasian Altai Armenia and Armenians Avars Azerbaijan and Azeris Balkars Bashkortostan and Bashkirs Basmachis Belarus and Belarusians Bessarabia Birobidzhan Bukhara Bukovina Bulgarians Buryats Carpatho-Rusyns Caucasus Central Asia Chechnya and Chechens Cherkess Chukchi Chuvash Cimmerians Crimea Crimean Khanate Crimean Tatars Dagestan Dargins Dolgans Dungan Estonia and Estonians Ethnography, Russian and Soviet Evenki Ferghana Valley Finland Finns and Karelians Gagauz Georgia and Georgians German Democratic Republic German Settlers Golden Horde Gnezdovo Greeks Gypsy Huns Immigration and Emigration Inorodtsy Jews Kabardians Kalmyks Karachai Karakalpaks Khakass Khanty Kievan Rus Komi Koreans Koryaks Kurds Kyrgyzstan and Kyrgyz Latvia and Latvians Lezgins OUTLINE OF CONTENTS ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY xciii OUTLINE OF CONTENTS Lithuania and Lithuanians Mansi Mari El and the Mari Meskhetian Turks Mingrelians Moldova and Moldovans Mordvins Muscovy Nagorno-Karabakh Nakhichevan Nation and Nationality Nenets Nogai Northern Peoples Osetins Poland Poles Russians Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Sakha and Yakuts Sami Sarmatians Sarts Scythians Svans Tajikistan and Tajiks Tatarstan and Tatars Turkestan Turkmenistan and Turkmen Tuva and Tuvinians Udmurts Ukraine and Ukrainians Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Uzbekistan and Uzbeks Cities Baku Bukhara Kaliningrad Khiva Moscow Novgorod the Great Sevastopol St. Petersburg Tashkent Tiflis Vilnius RELIGION Alexei I, Patriarch Alexei II, Patriarch Anthony Khrapovitsky, Metropolitan Anthony Vadkovsky, Metropolitan Armenian Apostolic Church Avvakum Petrovich Byzantium, Influence of Cantonists Cathedral of Christ the Savior Cathedral of St. Basil Cathedral of St. Sophia, Kiev Cathedral of St. Sophia, Novgorod Catholicism Christianization Church Council Church Council, Hundred Chapters Consistory Cyril of Turov Daniel, Metropolitan Diocese Dvoeverie Enlightenment, Impact of Episcopate Filaret Drozdov, Metropolitan Filaret Romanov, Patriarch Gapon, Georgy Apollonovich Georgian Orthodox Church Hagiography Hilarion, Metropolitan Holy Synod Icons Ilminsky, Nikolai Ivanovich Islam Jews Joakim, Patriarch Job, Patriarch Joseph of Volotsk, St. Kormchaya Kniga League of the Militant Godless Living Church Movement Makary, Metropolitan Maxim the Greek, St. Metropolitan Monasticism Neronov, Ivan Nikon, Patriarch Nil Sorsky, St. Novgorod, Archbishop of Old Believer Committee Old Believers Orthodoxy Paganism Patriarchate Petrov, Grigory Spiridonovich Pimen, Patriarch Platon (Levshin) Polotsky, Simeon xciv ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY Possessors and Non-Possessors Protestantism Rabbinical Commission Religion Russian Orthodox Church Saints Sectarianism Sergei, Patriarch Sergius, St. Service State Sinodik Soloviev, Vladimir Sergeyevich Sorokoust Spiritual Elders Stefan Yavorsky, Metropolitan Tikhon, Patriarch Tithe Church, Kiev Trinity St. Sergius Monastery Uniate Church Vladimir, St. Zealots of Piety RULERS 1362–1917 Donskoy, Dmitry Ivanovich (r. 1362–1389) Basil I (r. 1389–1425) Basil II (r. 1425–1462) Ivan III (r. 1462–1505) Basil III (r. 1505–1533) Ivan IV (r. 1533–1584) Fyodor Ivanovich (r. 1584–1598) Godunov, Boris Fyodorovich (r. 1598–1605) Fyodor II (r. 1605) Dmitry, False (r. 1605–1606) Shuisky, Vasily Ivanovich (r. 1606–1610) Romanov, Mikhail Fyodorov (r. 1613–1645) Alexei Mikhailovich (r. 1645–1676) Fyodor Alexeyevich (r. 1676–1682) Ivan V (r. 1682–1696) Peter I (Peter the Great) (r. 1682–1725) Catherine I (r. 1725–1727) Peter II (r. 1727–1730) Anna Ivanovna (r. 1730–1740) Ivan VI (r. 1740–1741) Elizabeth (r. 1741–1762) Peter III (r. 1762) Catherine II (r. 1762–1796) Paul I (r. 1796–1801) Alexander I (r. 1801–1825) Nicholas I (r. 1825–1855) Alexander II (r. 1855–1881) Alexander III (r. 1881–1894) Nicholas II (r. 1894–1917) SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY Academy of Sciences Atomic Energy Aviation Bering, Vitus Jonassen Chernobyl Electricity Grid Exploration Gagarin, Yuri Alexeyevich Imperial Russian Geographical Society Imperial Russian Technological Society International Space Station MIR Space Station Pallas, Peter-Simon Polar Explorers Science and Technology Policy Sikorsky, Igor Ivanovich Space Program Sputnik SOVIET GENERAL SECRETARIES AND RUSSIAN PRESIDENTS Lenin, Vladimir Ilich (1917–1924) Stalin, Josef Vissarionovich(1922–1953) Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeyevich (1953–1964) Brezhnev, Leonid Ilich (1964–1982) Andropov, Yuri Vladimirovich (1982–1984) Chernenko, Konstantin Ustinovich (1984–1985) Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeyevich (1985–1991) Yeltsin, Boris Nikolayevich (1991–1999) Putin, Vladimir Vladimirovich (elected 2000) TSARS, GRAND PRINCES, AND POLITICAL LEADERS Alexander I Alexander II Alexander III Alexander Mikhailovich Alexander Yaroslavich Alexei Mikhailovich Andrei Alexandrovich Andrei Yaroslavich OUTLINE OF CONTENTS ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY xcv OUTLINE OF CONTENTS Andrei Yurevich Anna Ivanovna Basil I Basil II Basil III Brezhnev, Leonid Ilich Catherine I Catherine II Chernomyrdin, Viktor Stepanovich Dmitry Alexandrovich Dmitry, False Dmitry Mikhailovich Donskoy, Dmitry Ivanovich Elizabeth Fyodor Alexeyevich Fyodor II Fyodor Ivanovich Godunov, Boris Fyodorovich Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeyevich Igor Ivan I Ivan II Ivan III Ivan IV Ivan V Ivan VI Izyaslav I Izyaslav Mstislavich Kasyanov, Mikhail Mikhailovich Kerensky, Alexander Fyodorovich Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeyevich Lebed, Alexander Ivanovich Lenin, Vladimir Ilich Luzhkov, Yuri Mikhailovich Mstislav Nemtsov, Boris Ivanovich Nicholas I Nicholas II Oleg Olga Paul I Peter I Peter II Peter III Primakov, Yevgeny Maximovich Putin, Vladimir Vladimirovich Romanov Dynasty Romanov, Mikhail Fyodorovich Rostislav Rurik Rurikid Dynasty Shuisky, Vasily Ivanovich Simeon Stalin, Josef Vissarionovich Stepashin, Sergei Vadimovich Svyatopolk I Svyatopolk II Svyatoslav I Svyatoslav II Trotsky, Leon Davidovich Tsar, Tsarina Vladimir Monomakh Vladimir, St. Vsevolod I Vsevolod III Yaropolk I Yaroslav Vladimirovich Yaroslav Vsevolodovich Yaroslav Yaroslavich Yeltsin, Boris Nikolayevich Yuri Danilovich Yuri Vladimirovich Yuri Vsevolodovich Zhirinovsky, Vladimir Volfovich Zyuganov, Gennady Andreyevich VISUAL ARTS, DRAMA, AND DANCE Academy of Arts Alexandrov, Grigory Alexandrovich Ballet Bauer, Yevgeny Frantsevich Bolshoi Theater Byzantium, Influence of Cabaret Chagall, Mark Chapayev, Vasily Ivanovich Chekhov, Anton Pavlovich Chernuhka Circus Constructivism Cultural Revolution Dunayevsky, Isaak Osipovich Eisenstein, Sergei Mikhailovich Fabergé, Peter Carl Futurism Glavlit Icons Kandinsky, Vassily Vassilievich Korsh Theater Kuleshov, Lev Vladimirovich Matryoshka Dolls Meyerhold, Vsevolod Yemilievich Mikhalkov, Nikita Sergeyevich Moscow Art Theater Moscow Baroque xcvi ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY Motion Pictures Museum, Hermitage Nationalism in the Arts Neoclassicism Nijinsky, Vaslav Fomich Orlova, Lyubov Petrovna Ostrovsky, Alexander Nikolayevich Palekh Painting Pavlova, Anna Matveyevna Photography Protazanov, Yakov Alexandrovic Repin, Ilya Yefimovich Rublev, Andrei Silver Age Tarkovsky, Andrei Arsenievich Theater ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY xcvii OUTLINE OF CONTENTS This page intentionally left blank ABKHAZIANS Abkhazians call themselves Apswa (plural Apswaa). Abkhazia (capital: Sukhum/Aqw’a) comprises 8,700 square kilometers (between lat. 43°35’–42°27’ N and long. 40°–42°08’ E) bordering the Black Sea, the Caucasus, Mingrelia, and Svanetia. The early Soviets’ drive to eradicate illiteracy saw Abkhaz attain literary status; like Circassian and Ubykh (extinct since 1992), Abkhaz is a northwest Caucasian language. Christianity arrived two centuries before its official introduction under Justinian sixth century. Sunni Islam spread with Ottoman Turkish influence from around 1500. Traditional paganism has never entirely disappeared, making adherence to either major religion relatively superficial, although within A Abkhazia most Abkhazians are nominally Christian. Life revolves around the extended family, morality (including respect for elders) being essentially determined by the dictates of custom (akjabz) and an ever-present sense of “Abkhazianness” (apswara). Local nobility fostered their offspring among the peasantry to cement societal relations— only captured foreigners served as slaves. English visitor James Bell noted in the 1830s that Abkhazians rendered this concept by their ethnonym for “Mingrelian” (agərwa). Milk-brotherhood was another social bond, symbolic establishment of which between two warring families could end vendettas. A semi-tropical climate with abundant water resources, forests, and mountain-pasturage dictated an economy based on animal husbandry, timber, and agriculture, with fruit, viticulture, and millet (yielding to maize in the nineteenth century) playing dominant roles; tea and tobacco gained importance in the twentieth century. Greece, Rome, Persia, Lazica, Byzantium, Genoa, Turkey, Russia, and Georgia have all influenced Abkhazian history. In the 780s Prince Leon II took advantage of Byzantium’s weakness to incorporate within his Abkhazian Kingdom most of western Georgia, this whole territory being styled “Abkhazia” until 975 when Bagrat’ III, inheriting Abkhazia maternally and Iberia (eastern Georgia) paternally, became first monarch of a united Georgia. This medieval kingdom disintegrated during the Mongol depredations (thirteenth to fifteenth centuries), and part of Abkhazia’s population (the Abazinians, who speak the divergent Abaza dialect and today number around 35,000) settled in the north Caucasus. The Chachbas 1 ABORTION POLICY An Abkhaz Army soldier stands in front of an armored personnel carrier in Kodori Gorge, October 2001. © REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS controlled Abkhazia, the Dadianis controlled Mingrelia, vying for dominance in the border regions; the current frontier along the River Ingur dates from the 1680s. Abkhazia became a Russian protectorate in 1810 but governed its own affairs until 1864 when, in the wake of imperial Russia’s crushing of North Caucasian resistance (1864) and again after the 1877–1878 Russo-Turkish War, most Abkhazians (along with most Circassians and all the Ubykhs) migrated to Ottoman lands. Soviet power was established in 1921; this Abkhazian SSR was recognized by Georgia, the two then contracting a treaty-alliance that lasted until Abkhazia’s 1931 demotion to an “autonomous republic” within Georgia. The Stalin years were characterized by forced (largely Mingrelian) immigration and suppression of the language and culture in an attempted Georgianization. Post-Soviet Georgian nationalism led to war in August 1992. Abkhazian victory in September 1993 resulted in the mass flight of most of the local Mingrelian population, numerically the largest group in prewar Abkhazia. The conflict remained unresolved as of the early twenty-first century. Abkhazia declared independence in October 1999 but remains unrecognized. There are roughly 100,000 Abkhazians in Abkhazia (or ex-Soviet territories) and up to 500,000 across the Near East, predominantly in Turkey, where the language is neither taught nor written. See also: CAUCASUS; CHERKESS; GEORGIA AND GEORGIANS; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST BIBLIOGRAPHY Benet, Sula. (1974). Abkhasians: The Long-Living People of the Caucasus. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Hewitt, George. (1993). “Abkhazia: A Problem of Identity and Ownership.” In Central Asian Survey 12(3): 267–323. Hewitt, George, ed. (1999). The Abkhazians: A Handbook. Richmond, UK: Curzon Press. Hewitt, George, and Khiba, Zaira. (1997). An Abkhaz Newspaper Reader. Kensington, MD: Dunwoody Press. B. GEORGE HEWITT ABORTION POLICY The Soviet Union was the first country in the world to legalize abortion, but its goal was to protect women’s health and promote motherhood, not to advance women’s rights. Abortion was a criminal offense punishable by exile or long prison sentences before the Bolshevik Revolution. As part of its effort to reform Russian society, the Soviet government legalized abortion in a decree issued November 18, 1920. Supporters of the decree believed legal abortions were a necessary evil to prevent women from turning to dangerous and unsanitary back-alley abortions. Their goal was not to protect a woman’s individual reproductive rights, but to preserve the health of the mother for the common good. Furthermore, the legalization only applied to abortions performed by trained medical personnel, and in 1924 a system was established that prioritized access to legal abortions according to class position and social vulnerability (unemployed and unmarried working women topped the list). 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY In 1936, the state recriminalized abortion in an attempt to increase the birth rate and to emphasize the value of motherhood. Although the policy shift temporarily reduced the number of abortions, in the long term repression failed to have the desired effect and abortion rates increased. Abortion was again legalized in 1955 on the premise that women had become sufficiently aware of the importance of their maternal roles. Despite the changes over time, Soviet abortion policy consistently focused on protecting women’s health and encouraging motherhood. A lack of alternative methods of contraception, however, ensured that Soviet women relied on abortion as their primary means to control reproduction throughout the Soviet period. See also: FAMILY CODE OF 1926; MARRIAGE AND FAMILY LIFE BIBLIOGRAPHY Buckley, Mary. (1989). Women and Ideology in the Soviet Union. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Goldman, Wendy Z. (1993). Women, the State, and Revolution: Soviet Family Policy and Social Life, 1917– 1936. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. SHARON A. KOWALSKY ACADEMY OF ARTS The idea of founding an Academy of Arts in St. Petersburg was first mooted by Peter the Great, but it was not until 1757, primarily on the initiative of Ivan Shuvalov, that the project was realized. Shuvalov, its first president, commissioned a large, neoclassical edifice on the banks of the Neva to house the institution, and in 1764 Catherine II gave it its first charter, based on that of the Académie de Peinture et de Sculpture, which had been established in Paris in 1648. Following the French example, the Academy developed a system of instruction in painting, sculpture, architecture, and the decorative arts that emphasized the study of old masters and the antique, and which prioritized subjects of historical significance. However, the Academy was not created primarily to fulfill state commissions, as had been the case in France, but aimed instead to professionalize practice in the visual arts. Students followed a regimented system, and all graduates who fulfilled the program were entitled to fourteenth rank in the civil service Table of Ranks. Those who won the major gold medal competition were also granted the opportunity to study abroad for three to six years with a travel scholarship from the Academy. Students were required to complete regular assignments, which, along with the Academy’s growing collection of casts, copies, and original works by western European artists, formed an invaluable teaching resource. In the nineteenth century, the role of the Academy changed as its activities became increasingly harnessed to state interests. Beginning in 1802, national monuments could only be erected with the approval of the Academy; this had the effect of casting it in the role of an official arbiter of taste. Nicholas I then took an active interest in the Academy’s affairs, appointing his favorites as professors and pronouncing on the direction that he felt the work of its students should follow. This growing association between the Academy and the court culminated with the appointment of Nicholas’s son-in-law Maximilian, Duke of Leuchtenberg, as president in 1843, after which the institution was continually headed by a member of the imperial family. By this time, the Academy was being criticized for the rigidity of its training program, particularly since the Moscow School of Painting, Sculpture and Architecture, though partially dependent on the Academy’s program, actively supported new trends in art. Opposition came to a head in 1863, when fourteen students led by the painter Ivan Kramskoy requested permission to choose their own subject for the annual gold medal competition. When this was refused, thirteen of them left, working initially in a commune known as the Artel. Subsequently they joined the Association of Traveling Art Exhibitions, a group of realist artists that dominated the artistic scene for the next twenty years. The Academy attempted to counter this threat by launching its own travelling exhibitions in 1886, and in 1893 effected a partial rapprochement with some of the realists, who joined its teaching staff. However, its position of authority had been irredeemably undermined. In the Soviet era, the Academy encompassed teaching institutes in various cities, including the Repin Institute in the original building in St. Petersburg. It became a bastion of Socialist Realism in the 1930s and 1940s, but it has since regained its status as a respected center for the study and practice of the fine arts. See also: EDUCATION; NATIONALISM IN THE ARTS; SOCIALIST REALISM ACADEMY OF ARTS ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY 3 ACADEMY OF SCIENCES BIBLIOGRAPHY Pevsner, Nicholas. (1940). Academies of Art: Past and Present. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Valkenier, Elizabeth. K. (1989). Russian Realist Art: The State and Society: The Peredvizhniki and Their Tradition. New York: Columbia University Press. ROSALIND P. BLAKESLEY ACADEMY OF SCIENCES Advised first by the philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz and then by his student Cristian Wolff, Peter the Great founded the Imperial Russian Academy of Sciences in 1725 on the model of the Paris and Berlin institutions of the same kind. All initial members of the new Academy were foreigners. The most outstanding member of the fledgling institution was Leonhard Euler, who in a short time was widely acclaimed as Europe’s leading mathematician. He was credited as the founder of a strong mathematical tradition in Russia. The new Academy was assigned two tasks: to initiate systematic work on the latest developments in science and to train the first Russian scientists. Small and fluid, the training component of the Academy became known as the first Russian secular institution of higher education. Mikhail Vasilievich Lomonosov was the first Russian scientist to become a member of the Academy and was living proof of Russia’s readiness to enter the challenging world of advanced science. Catherine II relied on the Academie Francaise as a model for the Imperial Russian Academy founded in 1783 with the primary task of improving the Russian literary language and preparing a Russian grammar and dictionary. Close relations between the two institutions were facilitated by the fact that a large number of the country’s leading scholars belonged to both academies. At this time, the Academy of Sciences increased appreciably the volume of its publications presented in the Russian language. In the eighteenth century, all presidents of the Academy of Sciences were aristocrats with close ties to the royal family but no interest in scholarship. In 1803, Alexander I granted the Academy a new charter that limited the choice of candidates for presidency to individuals with proven affinity with scientific scholarship. It also granted the Academy extended autonomy in administering its work and choosing individual and group research topics. Despite the unceasing threats to academic autonomy during the reign of Nicholas I (1825–1855), the Academy recorded substantial progress in contributions to science. Among the most eminent academicians were Karl von Baer, the founder of modern embryology; Frederick G. W. Struve, who not only founded the Pulkovo Astronomical Observatory but made it one of the world’s leading institutions of its kind; and Mikhail Vasilievich Ostrogradsky, who was credited by James Clerk Maxwell with contributing to the mathematical apparatus of electromagnetic theory. For a long time, the foreign members of the Academy formed a community isolated from Russia’s social and cultural dynamics. By the 1830s they manifested concrete and multiple signs of expanding and intensifying their Russian connections. Now they contributed articles on scientific themes to popular journals, gave lectures to organized groups, and took part in founding such naturalist societies as the Russian Geographical Society, fashioned on the model of similar organizations in the West. The publications of the Mineralogical Society and the Russian Geographical Society added to the list of scientific journals appealing to the growing public interest in science. In 1841 the Academy underwent a drastic organizational change: It absorbed the Imperial Russian Academy and made it one of its three departments. This move not only broadened the scholarly concerns of the Academy of Sciences but also strengthened the Russian share of membership. The Natural Science Departments continued to be dominated by foreign members. The era of Nicholas I ended on a sour note: Overreacting to the revolutionary waves in Western Europe in 1848, the government made it illegal for young Russians to attend Western universities in search of advanced scientific training. The Academy, which traditionally supervised the selection for foreign training, lost one of its prized functions. The government also abrogated Paragraph 33 of the 1836 charter, which stipulated that “scholarly books and journals, subscribed to by the Academy or full members of the Academy are not subject to censorship.” Russia’s defeat in the Crimean War in 1855 and 1856 created an atmosphere favoring liberal reforms of a large magnitude in both the political system and social relations. The emancipation of the serfs topped the list of changes that earned the 1860s the title of “The Epoch of Great Reforms.” 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY Scientists monitor the control desk at the Academy of Sciences Atomic Electric Station. © HULTON ARCHIVE The restive intelligentsia viewed science and its critical spirit as the safest path to lifting Russia on the scale of social, political, and economic progress. Among the new members of the Academy were several Russians whose scholarly reputations were firmly established in and outside Russia. The mathematician Pafnuty Lvovich Chebyshev’s contributions to number and probability theories made a strong impression on the Paris Academy of Sciences, which elected him an associé étranger. In addition to his many other contributions to chemistry, Nikolai Nikolayevich Zinin reduced aniline from nitrobenzene; this introduced the industrial production of paints. The historian Sergei Mikhailovich Soloviev, elected a member of the Academy in 1871, was deeply involved in writing his multivolume History of Russia since Ancient Times, a grand synthesis of the nation’s political, social, and cultural developments. The Academy established closer contact with university professors by allowing more space in its journals for their contributions. It also improved its public image through intensive involvement in the national festivities commemorating the centennial of Lomonosov’s death. On this occasion it published a number of books covering the multiple sides of Lomonosov’s scientific and literary activities. After the celebrations, Peter Pekarsky, a member of the Academy, wrote a two-volume history of his institution, based exclusively on the archival material and casting penetrating light on the early history of Russian science. For the first time, a Russian was appointed permanent secretary of the Academy, and annual reports were presented in the Russian language. The use of the Russian language in the Academy’s publications increased by the establishment of the journal Zapiski (Memoirs). In the early 1880s, the Academy became a target of public attacks provoked by its refusal to elect Dmitry Ivanovich Mendeleyev, the discoverer of the periodic law of elements, to its membership. The Academy was now referred to as a “German institution” and the novelist Fyodor Dostoyevsky went so far as to suggest the establishment of a Free Russian Academy supported by private endowments. The Mendeleyev incident helped bring an ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY 5 ACADEMY OF SCIENCES ACADEMY OF SCIENCES end to inviting foreign scholars to fill the vacant positions in the Academy. All distinguished university professors, the new members of the Academy provided a significant index of rapidly advancing Russian scholarship. At the end of the nineteenth century, the growing fields of science were represented by the neurophysiologist and expert on conditioned reflexes Ivan Petrovich Pavlov, the first Russian recipient of the Nobel Prize; the mathematicians Andrei Andreyevich Markov and Alexander Mikhailovich Lyapunov, who raised the theory of probability to new heights; Alexei Nikolayevich Krylov, an expert in naval architecture and the translator of Newton’s Principia; and Nikolai Yegorovich Zhukovsky, a pioneer in aerodynamics. The Academy welcomed the February Revolution in 1917, which brought an end to the autocratic system. The academician Vladimir Ivanovich Vernadsky was the moving spirit behind the law abolishing the multi-ramified system of censorship in all phases of written expression. The Academy acquired a new name—the Russian Academy of Sciences—and the geologist Alexander Petrovich Karpinsky became the first elected president. The organization of the first research institutes heralded the appearance of research focused on the burning questions of modern science. They quickly became the primary units of the Academy. The first institute concentrated on the use of physical methods in chemical analysis. At the end of Imperial Russia, the Academy had fourty-one full members. It had one of the country’s richest libraries, several museums, and a small number of underequipped laboratories. A solid majority of academicians worked in the humanities and the social sciences. This distribution was reversed under the Soviet system. The academicians were supported by a staff of specialists in individual fields and laboratory technicians. The Bolshevik victory in October 1917 brought two instant changes affecting the Academy. The new government reintroduced censorship that in some respects was more comprehensive and rigid than that of the tsarist era. It took some time, however, for the new system of censorship to become an effective system of ideological control, in part because of persisting ambiguity in the definition of its tasks. The new government acted quickly and resolutely in founding the Socialist Academy (in 1923 renamed the Communist Academy) with the primary task of preparing dialectical materialism—the Marxist philosophy of science—to serve as an ideological clearinghouse for scientific ideas. Its task was also to create the theoretical base of the social sciences and the humanities. The efficiency of the Socialist Academy, intended to be a competitor to the “conservative” Academy of Sciences, was drastically reduced by deep disagreements among Marxist theorists in interpreting the revolutionary waves in modem science. At this time, the Bolshevik government was not ready to engineer drastic changes in the Academy of Sciences. In 1925 the government gave financial support to the Academy of Sciences to celebrate the two hundredth anniversary of its founding, an event attended by a large contingent of Western scientists. Now renamed the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, the institution received the first government recognition as the country’s supreme scientific body. The next year, the Academy was given a new charter—the first since 1836—which made it an institution open to activities by such “public organizations” as the trade unions and proliferating Communist associations. The new charter abolished the traditional privilege of academicians to be the sole authority in selecting candidates for new members of the Academy. The process of making the Academy a typical Soviet institution was generally completed in 1929, with Stalin now at the helm of the government and the Communist Party. The first large-scale election of new members included a group of Marxists. Dialectical materialism was proclaimed the only philosophy admitted in the Academy—and in the country—and loyalty to the Communist Party (the so-called partynost, or “partyness”) prescribed behavior. A group of leading historians and an eminent mathematician were exiled to provincial towns. At the same time, the government approved the Academy’s proposal to admit students to work for higher degrees and to acquire research experience. Upon completion of their studies, most of these students were absorbed by the Academy’s research staff. Some advanced to the rank of full members of the Academy. The history of the Academy in the Stalin era (1929–1953) has two dominant characteristics. On the one hand, the Soviet government made vast financial investments in building the Academy into a gigantic network of institutes and laboratories, concentrating on both scientific research and train6 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY ing new cadres of scientists. On the other hand, Stalin encouraged and patronized Marxist philosophers in their mounting attacks on the leaders of the scientific community accused of violating the norms of Marxist theory. In the years of Stalin’s reign of terror in the late 1930s, a long line of Academy personnel landed in political prisons, from which many did not return. In 1936 the government abolished the Communist Academy and transferred its members to the Academy of Sciences, where they became part of the newly founded Department of Philosophy, the center of an intensified crusade against “idealism” in both Western and Soviet science. For a long time, “physical idealism,” as manifested in quantum mechanics and the theory of relativity, was the main target of Marxist attacks. Even in the peak years of Stalinist oppression, the Academy’s physicists—led by Abram Fyodorovich Ioffe, Vladimir Alexandrovich Fock, and Igor Yevgenievich Tamm—made bold efforts to resist philosophical interference with their science. Their basic arguments were that Marxist philosophers were not familiar with modern physics and were guilty of misinterpreting Marxist theory. At a later date, Nikolai Nikolayevich Semenov, a Nobel laureate, stated publicly that only by ignoring Marxist philosophers were the physicists able to add fresh ideas to their science. More general criticism of Marxist interference with science came from the academicians Ivan Petrovich Pavlov and Vladimir Ivanovich Vernadsky: They opposed the monopolistic position of Marxist philosophy. Physics and biology were the main scientific arena of Stalinist efforts to establish full ideological control over scientific thought. The two sciences, however, did not undergo the same treatment. In physics, Stalin encouraged Marxist philosophers to engage in relentless attacks on the residues of “idealism” in quantum mechanics and the theory of relativity, but refrained from interfering with the ongoing work in physics laboratories. The situation in biology was radically different. Here, Stalin not only encouraged a sustained ideological attack on genetics and its underlying “bourgeois” philosophy but played a decisive role in outlawing this science and abolishing its laboratories. Academicians Peter Leonidovich Kapitsa and Igor E. Tamm, experienced warriors against Stalinist adverse interference with the professional work of scientists, were among the leading scholars whose sustained criticism swayed the government ten years after Stalin’s death to abandon its stand against modern genetics. The process of the de-Stalinization of the Academy began soon after Stalin’s death in 1953. By the mid-1960s, there was no science in the outside world that was not recognized and closely followed in the Soviet Union. The Academy played the leading role in reestablishing sociology and the rich national tradition in social psychology dominated by the internationally recognized legacy of Lev Semenovich Vygotsky. At the same time, Marxist philosophers were encouraged to explore paths to a reconciliation with leading Western philosophies of science and to search for “the kernels of truth” in “bourgeois” thought. In the meantime, the Academy continued to grow at a rapid pace. In 1957 it established a string of research institutes in Novosibirsk—known as the Siberian Department or Akademgorodok (Academic Campus)—concentrating, among other activities, on the branches of mathematics related to the ongoing computer revolution, the latest developments in molecular biology, and the new methodological requirements of the social sciences, particularly economics. In 1971 the Department had fourtyfour research institutes, fifty laboratories, and a research staff of 5,600. It also supported a new university known for its high academic standards. A new complex of research institutes in nuclear physics was established in Dubna, and another group of institutes engaged in physico-chemical approaches to biological studies was built in Pushkino. A scientific center engaged in geophysical studies was established in 1964 in Krasnaya Pakhta. The scientific center in Noginsk concentrated on physical chemistry. The Academy also helped in guiding and coordinating the work of the Union-Republican academies. In 1974 the Academy had 237 full members and 439 corresponding members. In the same year the professional staff of the Academy numbered 39,354, including 29,726 with higher academic degrees. The Academy published 132 journals, a few intended to reach the general reading public. It continued the tradition of publishing collections of essays celebrating important events in national history or commemorating major contributors to science. One of the last and most memorable collections, published in 1979, marked the centennial of Einstein’s birth. The Academy produced voluminous literature on its own history. The Soviet period of the AcadENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY 7 ACADEMY OF SCIENCES ADMINISTRATION FOR ORGANIZED RECRUITMENT emy was presented in a glowing light with no place for a critical analysis of the underlying philosophy and internal organization of this gigantic institution. In 1991, with the dismemberment of the Soviet union, the name of the Russian Academy of Sciences was again made official. The new Academy brought an end to the monopoly of a single philosophy of science. See also: CENSORSHIP; COMMUNIST ACADEMY; SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY; UNIVERSITIES BIBLIOGRAPHY Graham, Loren R. (1967). The Soviet Academy of Sciences and the Communist Party. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Vucinich, Alexander. (1984). Empire of Knowledge. Berkeley: University of California Press. Vucinich, Alexander. (1963–1970). Science in Russian Culture. 2 vols. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. ALEXANDER VUCINICH ADMINISTRATION FOR ORGANIZED RECRUITMENT The Administration for Organized Recruitment (Russian acronym, Orgnabor) was a labor recruitment agency that existed in the USSR from 1931. Its essential feature was that the recruiting organization, not the potential employee, initiated the recruitment process. In the 1930s it was mainly concerned with the recruitment of peasants for seasonal and permanent work in nonagricultural jobs. During the New Economic Policy (NEP) the USSR had high unemployment, and relied on labor exchanges to bring supply and demand for labor into balance. It also had substantial numbers of peasants migrating to the towns in search of work, and substantial numbers of these peasants found seasonal employment away from their villages. With the abolition of unemployment in 1930, it was thought that there would be no further need for market economy instruments such as labor exchanges. Given the huge demand for labor in industry and construction, and the collectivization of agriculture, it nonetheless became necessary to establish a procedure for recruiting peasants from collective farms. Hence the creation, in 1931, of a new type of recruitment for the rapidly growing construction and industrial sectors: organized recruitment. In this new system, state-owned enterprises or administrative organizations such as the People’s Commissariats recruited a number of workers for regular or seasonal work by entering into an agreement with a collective farm, group of collective farms, or rural area. The Administration for Organized Recruitment offered a planned, socialist mechanism for placing workers where they were most needed, and was intended to replace the traditional practice of recruitment from among those peasants who happened to turn up at the factory gate. In many cases the new recruits were promised much better employment conditions than actually existed, which was one of the reasons for the high rate at which the newly recruited workers left their jobs. According to official statistics, 3.6 million people were recruited by Orgnabor in 1932, an average of 2.6 million per year between 1933 and 1937, 1.7 million in 1938, and 2.2 million in 1939. For many of the peasants concerned, the process was essentially an economic conscription. After 1946 the role of organized recruitment declined. In this later period, organized recruitment often concerned urban workers recruited for coal mining, construction, and as lumberjacks. In 1946 organized recruitment recruited 2.2 million people (mainly to coal mining, textiles, industrial and military construction, and forestry). Between 1947 and 1950, an average of about 0.6 million people were recruited per year, mainly to industrial and military construction, coal mining, and forestry. Organized recruitment remained at about 0.6 million per year between 1951 and 1955, but fell to only 0.1 million per year between 1966 and 1970. The administrative framework for organized recruitment varied. In the 1930s there were commissions for organized recruitment, but between 1953 and 1956, republican administrations (in the RSFSR and Ukraine chief administrations) for organized recruitment. In the late Soviet period organized recruitment was mainly administered by regional or local authorities. The program of organized recruitment experienced numerous problems, however, and was never the predominant form of labor recruitment in the USSR. Decisions by individual workers as to where they wanted to work were always more important. See also: COLLECTIVE FARM; LABOR; NEW ECONOMIC POLICY; SOVNARKOM 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY BIBLIOGRAPHY Barber, John. (1986). “The Development of Soviet Employment and Labour Policy, 1930–1941.” In Labour and Employment in the USSR, ed. David Lane. Brighton, UK: Wheatsheaf. Filtzer, Donald. (2002). Soviet Workers and Late Stalinism. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Dyker, David. (1981). “Planning and the Worker.” In The Soviet Worker, ed. Leonard Shapiro and Joseph Godson. London: Macmillan. Stalin, Joseph. (1955). “New Conditions—New Tasks in Economic Construction.” In Works, Vol. 13. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House. MICHAEL ELLMAN ADMINISTRATION, MILITARY The term militiary administration was used to identify both the techniques and system of state agencies involved in the management of the armed forces. Russian writers long distinguished between the agencies for military command and those for administration (management), and Soviet theorists added a distinction between those providing leadership of the armed forces as such, and those for overall leadership of the country’s defense. Whereas the latter involves participation by the political leadership in decision making, the former deal with the military professionals’ implementing of the resulting policies. And if the lines between command and management, and between the two types of leadership, sometimes blur in modern conditions, this was commonplace in the premodern periods of Russia’s history. The Kievan Rus druzhina—the warband surrounding a prince—provided an ad hoc administration to the ruler, a core around which a militia of commoners rallied and, in battle, the professional commanders for the commoners. When Rus splintered into local “appanages” in the late 1000s, the druzhina’s primitive administrative functions were absorbed by the puty (offices) of a princeling’s dvor, or “court,” while selected boyars, the descendants of the warband members, joined him in his duma (council) in peacetime and helped provide military leadership in wartime. Thus all command and military administrative functions remained concentrated in the ruler’s person, with no distinction between them or, indeed, between the civil and military spheres of state life. This system served Moscow’s grand dukes during the Mongol period. But as their realm expanded and became increasingly centralized, a reorganization was clearly necessary, especially after Ivan III (1462–1505) began creating an army based on a mounted dvoryane (gentry) militia, whose members served in return for pomestie land grants (or fiefs). The state’s more complex administrative needs were met by the creation of prikazy (chancheries), headed by civil servant dyaki (state secretaries). Of the prikazy, the Razryad most closely approximated a war ministry, but a host of others had specialized military (e.g., armaments, fortifications) or mixed civil-military (e.g., medical, communications) functions. The boyar aristocracy continued to advise their increasingly autocratic masters in the duma and to provide commanders for his armies or “hosts.” But the mestnichestvo (system of places), which aimed at preserving the social status of the boyar clans, also dictated assignment to military posts. Consequently, while Muscovite military administration initially gained in efficiency, wartime appointments to field armies often reflected social rather than military prowess. This problem finally was resolved by the destruction of the boyars’ genealogical records in 1682. Yet by that time the piecemeal reforms introduced by Romanov rulers after 1613 had brought the continuous creation of new, specialized prikazy that left the expanded but fragmented administrative system badly in need of modernization and another radical overhaul. This was provided by Peter I (r. 1689–1725), who founded both the modern Russian Empire and the Imperial Army. He created a European-style regular or standing army (and navy), based on conscription, to fight Sweden (1700–1721). “Leadership of defense” remained concentrated in the ruler and a series of military-court agencies, but in 1718 Peter assigned “leadership the armed forces” to a ramified central administration headed by the Military and Admiralty Colleges, each headed by a president and board, with provincial governors overseeing the local agencies. Despite bureaucratic inefficiency and constant modification, this system remained in place until Alexander I (r. 1801–1825) replaced it with more streamlined ministries, headed by ministers, in 1802. Those for the army and navy now led the armed forces The two ministers helped lead defense as members of a Council of Ministers, which worked with the State Council and other military-court bodies in peacetime, while an Imperial General Headquarters (Stavka) directed the armies in wartime. This system again ADMINISTRATION, MILITARY ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY 9 ADMIRALTY was streamlined by Alexander II (r. 1856–1881) and his war minister, Dmitry Milyutin. After 1864 his War Ministry comprised numerous specialized administrations or directorates, developed a professional General Staff, and headed a number of geographically and administratively defined, local military districts. But as before, overall leadership of defense was provided by the emperor and his court agencies. This situation remained in place even after the creation of a State Duma in 1905–1906, and seemingly ended only with the 1917 revolutions. Yet despite changes in terminology, a similar system reemerged during the civil war (1918–1921), after which the new Soviet Union recreated the network of territorial administrativemilitary districts, headed by People’s Commissariats (after 1945, Ministries) which, aided by a powerful General Staff, led the army and fleet. Instead of an emperor and his court, leadership in defense again was provided by some sort of peacetime Defense Council (or wartime Stavka), now dominated by the Communist Party’s leader through the Central Committee’s Secretariat and Politburo. See also: COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, SOVIET; MILITARY, IMPERIAL ERA; MILITARY, SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET; SOVNARKOM; STAVKA BIBLIOGRAPHY Derleth, James. (1991). “The Defense Council and the Evolution of the Soviet National Security Decisionmaking Apparatus.” In Russia and Eurasia Armed Forces Annual, Vol., 15:, ed. T. W. Karasik. Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International. Fuller, William C., Jr. (1985). Civil-Military Conflict in Imperial Russia, 1881–1914. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Hellie, Richard. (1971). Enserfment and Military Change in Muscovy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Keep, John L. H. (1985). Soldiers of the Tsar: Army and Society in Russia, 1462–1874. Oxford: Clarendon Press. DAVID R. JONES ADMIRALTY From the beginning, St. Petersburg’s docks and associated administrative building, collectively known as the Admiralty, had been an essential part of the city’s existence. The shipyard was built by Peter the Great in 1704, and in the 1730s Ivan Korobov added the central gate and golden spire. By 1806 plans submitted by Andreian Zakharov for reconstruction of the large, and by then, decrepit complex had been approved. Zakharov had attended the Academy of Arts in St. Petersburg and studied extensively in France and Italy. Although he died in 1811, long before the completion of the building in 1823, no significant changes were made in his design. In reconstructing Korobov’s partially destroyed Admiralty, Zakharov expanded the length of the facade from 300 meters to 375. In addition there were two perpendicular wings almost half that long extending to the river. From the perspective of the Neva River, the complex consisted of two pishaped buildings, one within the other. The inner building served the Admiralty dockyard, which it enclosed on three sides, while the outer contained The gilded Admiralty Tower rises above St. Petersburg. © CUCHI WHITE/CORBIS 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY administrative offices. The Admiralty end-blocks, facing the Neva River, are among the most successful neoclassical attempts to achieve a geometric purity of structure. The main facade, overlooking a large square (now a park), is marked in the center by a grand arch, flanked by statues of nymphs supporting a globe, sculpted by Feodosy Shchedrin. Above the arch, a sculpted frieze portrays Neptune handing Peter the Great the trident, symbol of power over the seas. The corners of the central tower support statues of Alexander the Great, Ajax, Achilles, and Pyrrhus. The tower culminates in a spire resting on an Ionic peristyle, the cornice of which supports twenty-eight allegorical and mythological statues representing the seasons, the elements, and the winds. The remarkable power of the Admiralty building derives from Zakharov’s ability to create visual accents for an immensely long facade. The simplicity of the surfaces provided the ideal background for large, rusticated arches and high-relief sculpture, thus converting a prosaic structure into a noble monument. See also: ARCHITECTURE; ST. PETERSBURG BIBLIOGRAPHY Brumfield, William Craft. (1993). A History of Russian Architecture. New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hamilton, George Heard. (1975). The Art and Architecture of Russia. Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books. WILLIAM CRAFT BRUMFIELD ADYGE The Adyge are the titular nationality of the Republic of Adygeia in the Russian Federation, which lies along the foothills of the northwestern Caucasus Range. In Soviet times, this was an autonomous okrug (district) within Krasnodar Krai, with its capital city of Maikop. The Adyge number 22 percent of the republic, which has 541,000 inhabitants, the remainder being largely Russians. There are considerable Adyge communities living just outside the republic in the Krasnodar Krai. The Adyge are primarily engaged in agriculture and forestry. Health resorts are also an important source of employment and revenue, as is tourism. The Adyge belong to the same ethnolinguistic family as the Cherkess and the Kabardians, who live in neighboring republics, and they speak various dialects of Western Circassian. Soviet nationalities policies established these three groups as separate peoples and languages, but historical memory and linguistic affinity, as well as postSoviet ethnic politics, perpetuate notions of ethnic continuity. An important element in this has been the contacts, since the break-up of the Soviet Union, with Adyge living in Turkey, Syria, Israel, Jordan, West Europe, and the United States. These are the descendants of migrants who left for the Ottoman Empire in the late nineteenth century, after the Russian conquest of the Caucasus. In the 1990s, a number of Adyge families from the diaspora migrated back and settled in Maikop, but integration remains somewhat fraught with social and legal problems. The Adyge are Muslim, although other religious influences, including Greek Orthodox Christianity and indigenous beliefs and rituals, can be discerned in cultural practices. As elsewhere, the Soviet state discouraged Islamic practice and identity among the Adyge, but supported cultural nationbuilding. In the post-Soviet period, the wars in Abkhazia (1992–1993) and Chechnya (1994–1997; 1999–2000) greatly affected Adyge politics, causing the Russian state to intermittently infuse the republic with resources to prevent the spreading of conflict. In another development, the Shapsoug, who belong to the same ethno-linguistic group and live on the Black Sea shores near the town of Sochi, are lobbying Moscow for their own administrative unit, and for political linkages with the Adygeia Republic. See also: ABKHAZIANS; CAUCASUS; CHECHNYA AND CHECHENS; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST; SHAMIL BIBLIOGRAPHY Baddeley, John F. (1908). The Russian Conquest of the Caucasus. London: Longmans, Green & Co. Borxup, Marie Bennigsen, ed. (1992). The North Caucasus Barrier: The Russian Advance towards the Muslim World. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Gammer, Moshe. (1994). Muslim Resistance to the Tsar: Shamil and the Conquest of Chechnia and Daghestan. London: Frank Cass. Jaimoukha, Amjad. (2001). The Circassians: A Handbook. New York: Palgrave. ADYGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY 11 ADZHUBEI, ALEXEI IVANOVICH Jersild, Austin. (2002). Orientalism and Empire: North Caucasus Mountain Peoples and the Georgian Frontier, 1854–1917. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press. Matveeva, Anna. (1999). The North Caucasus: Russia’s Fragile Borderland. London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs. SETENEY SHAMI ADZHUBEI, ALEXEI IVANOVICH (1924–1992), Nikita Khrushchev’s son-in-law, and a leading Soviet journalist. Alexei Adzhubei met Rada Khrushcheva at Moscow State University in 1947 and married her in August 1949, when Khrushchev was party boss of Ukraine. Adzhubei became chief editor of Komsomolskaya pravda in 1957 and then, in 1959, of the Soviet government newspaper, Izvestiya. In 1961 he was named a member of the party Central Committee. In addition, Adzhubei was a member of Khrushchev’s “Press Group,” which edited the leader’s speeches. He served as an informal adviser to his father-in-law on matters ranging from culture to foreign policy, and he accompanied Khrushchev on trips abroad including the United States (1959), Southeast Asia (1960), Paris (1960), and Austria (1961). Under Adzhubei, Komsomolskaya pravda sharply increased its circulation by adding feature articles and photographs, while Izvestiya reduced the amount of predictable political boiler plate, printed more letters from readers, and published boldly anti-Stalinist works such as Alexander Tvardovsky’s poem, “Tyorkin in the Other World.” In time, Adzhubei began acting as an unofficial emissary for Khrushchev, meeting with foreign leaders such as U.S. president John F. Kennedy and Pope John XXIII, sounding out their views, reporting back to his father-in-law, and writing up his interviews in Izvestiya. Thanks to his special position, Adzhubei was cultivated by other Soviet leaders, including some who eventually conspired to oust Khrushchev. When Khrushchev fell from power in October 1964, Adzhubei was denied the right to write under his own name and forced to live in obscurity until he was rehabilitated during the era of perestroika and glasnost in the late 1980s. See also: IZVESTIYA; JOURNALISM; KHRUSHCHEV, NIKITA SERGEYEVICH; PRAVDA BIBLIOGRAPHY Buzek, Antony. (1964). How the Communist Press Works. New York: Praeger. Khrushchev, Sergei N. (2000). Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. WILLIAM TAUBMAN AEROFLOT Aeroflot, literally “air fleet,” is the common name for the state airline of the Soviet Union. It was operated under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Civil Aviation. The airline was founded in 1928 as Dobroflot and was reorganized into Aeroflot in 1932. During Soviet times, Aeroflot was the world’s largest airline, with about 15 percent of all civil air traffic. The first ever nonstop transpolar flight (from Moscow to the United States in 1933) on the ANT-25 aircraft operated by Valery Chkalov, Georgy Baidukov, and Alexander Belyakov was a landmark in the history of the aviation. Aeroflot introduced commercial jet plane service on September 15, 1956, on a flight from Moscow to Irkutsk. Aeroflot developed the world’s first supersonic airliner, the TU-144. Its maiden flight took place on December 31, 1968, two months ahead of the Concorde. Regular supersonic cargo flights began in late 1975 and passenger flights in 1977. Supersonic service was suspended in 1978, after 102 flights. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Aeroflot was reorganized by the June 1992 resolution of the government of Russian Federation, becoming Aeroflot-Russian International Airlines. Another government resolution appointed Valery Okulov as its first general director in May 1997. Aeroflot-Russian International Airlines is a joint-stock company, with 51 percent of the stock owned by the government as of 2002 and the remaining 49 percent belonging to the employees. With over fourteen thousand employees, as of 2002 Aeroflot-Russian International Airlines was the world’s fourth largest commercial airline; with flights to 140 destinations in 94 countries, it provided 70 percent of all the international air transport performed by Russian airlines, and had 151 representatives abroad, as well as branches in the Russian Federation in Novosibirsk, 12 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY Khabarovsk, and St. Petersburg. The company’s fleet consisted in 2002 of 111 airplanes, including two Boeing-767-300s, eight Airbuses A-310-300, six long-range Iluyshin-96-300s, eighteen Iluyshin76TD cargo planes and one cargo DC-10/30F, and other jets, illustrating the diversification of aircraft in the post-Soviet period. See also: AVIATION BIBLIOGRAPHY Aeroflot: Russian International Airlines. (2003). Available at . PAUL R. GREGORY AFGHANISTAN, RELATIONS WITH Afghanistan has played a key role in the foreign policy history of both the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. During the nineteenth century, Russian and British intelligence and government officials vied for influence in the region, with the final delineation of spheres of influence being the Amu Darya river—north of that was considered Russian and south of that was British. During the Bolshevik Revolution and civil war, opposition forces in Central Asia used Afghanistan as a base of operation against Red Army units. Indeed, Afghanistan was a haven, and then a transit route, for those wanting to escape the Soviet Union at this time. After a series of treaties, Afghanistan became a neutral neighbor for the Soviet Union and relations focused largely on trade and economic development. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Soviet involvement in Afghanistan increased. Soviet assistance was almost equally divided between economic and military forms. Between 1956 and 1978, the Soviet Union gave $2.51 billion in aid to Afghanistan, compared to U.S. assistance of only $533 million. This was part of a larger Soviet strategy to increase their presence in South Asia, as the United States was seen as being more influential in Iran and Pakistan. Equally important, although commercial ties always remained modest, the Soviet Union used this relationship as a “positive example” for the rest of the developing world. The Sawr Revolution in April 1978 radically changed the Soviet presence in the region, as the new leaders—first Nur Muhammed Taraki and then Hafizulla Amin—debated the extent to which they wanted outside powers involved in the country. The leadership in Moscow feared that the Afghan government under Amin was going to drift out of the Soviet Union’s orbit, and began to put pressure on it to remain a loyal ally. Finally, as a measure to ensure full subordination, the Soviet Army invaded Afghanistan in December 1979. Amin was killed in the ensuing conflict, to be replaced by Babrak Karmal in 1980. The Brezhnev administration claimed that it sent troops into Afghanistan to help the current leadership stabilize the country. Within months, Soviet bases were established in a number of cities in the country and Afghanistan was effectively under Soviet occupation. Many states in the international community condemned the invasion and a majority of Western states boycotted the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow as a sign of protest. Within two years, opposition groups—often based on tribal or clan affiliations—began to increase their resistance efforts against the Soviet occupiers. Known collectively as the Mujahedeen, the opposition fought both Soviet units and those of the People’s Democratic Republic of Afghanistan army. Although the Mujahedeen fared poorly in the opening campaigns, increased training and support from outside powers, especially the United States, helped turn things around. By the mid1980s, it was apparent that the Soviet Union was bogged down in a guerrilla war that wore down both troop numbers and morale. By 1984, Soviet citizens were beginning to get frustrated with this “endless war.” The rise of Mikhail Gorbachev in the following year signaled a new phase in the conduct of the war, as he acknowledged that the Soviet Union ought to look at a way to end their participation in the conflict. Over the next two years, United Nations–mediated negotiations took place, which resulted in a peace settlement and the Soviet withdrawal from the country. The government was finally admitting casualty figures, which became difficult as fighting intensified in 1985 and 1986. By this time, there were between 90,000 and 104,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan at any one time. It was not until early 1989 that the last Soviet troops left Afghanistan. In all, the ten-year Afghan War cost the Soviet Union more than 15,000 killed and more than 460,000 wounded or incapacitated due to illnesses contracted while serving in the country (this was an amazing 73 percent of all forces AFGHANISTAN, RELATIONS WITH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY 13 AGANBEGYAN, ABEL GEZEVICH that served in the country). Such casualties severely damaged the country’s international reputation and internal morale. During this period of glasnost by the Gorbachev administration, it was commonplace for Soviet citizens to criticize the government’s war effort and the effect it had on returning veterans, the “Afghantsy.” Indeed, many observers compared the Soviet experience in Afghanistan with that of the United States in Vietnam. For the first several years after the Soviet withdrawal, the government of Najibullah, the Sovietsponsored leader of Afghanistan who succeeded Babrak Karmal, was able to maintain power. However, by 1992, the Mujahedeen forces ousted him and set up their own provisional government. These groups no longer had a single unifying cause (the removal of Soviet forces) to keep them together, and a civil war ensued. This lasted until 1996, at which time the Taliban were able to wrest control of most of the country. As a result of the United States–led “coalition of the willing” attacks in 2001–2002, Russia ironically became a more active player in the region. Following the al-Qaeda attacks in the United States, Afghanistan quickly came under attack for its support of that terrorist organization and its unwillingness to hand over top al-Qaeda officials. By the beginning of 2002, supportive of the U.S. effort, Afghanistan has been more active in assisting what it sees as the defense of its southern borders. For more than two decades, Afghanistan has remained a security problem for the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation. Therefore, Russia will undoubtedly continue to place importance on remaining politically involved in future developments in that country, although given its somber experience in the 1980s, it is doubtful that Russia will develop a military or security presence in the country any time soon. The Afghans are likewise mistrustful of Russian influences in the country. Even in the early twenty-first century, Afghanistan continued to feel the effects of the Soviet campaign in the country. As expected, U.S. troops toppled the Taliban regime and were in the process of establishing a more representative regime in Kabul. Russia, for its part, had seen 1.5 million Afghans killed in the ten-year war, most of whom were civilians. In addition, millions more citizens became refugees in Iran and Pakistan. Finally, hundreds of thousands of landmines remained in place to cause injuries and death on a near-daily basis. On a broader level, the economic and social disruption caused by the war, and the subsequent civil war and Taliban rule, had resulted in a country completely in ruins. Perhaps most telling for contemporary Russia is the fact that Afghanistan symbolizes defeat on several levels. It was a failed effort to export socialism to a neighboring state; it was a failure of the Soviet army to defeat an insurgency; it was a failure of confidence by the population in the political leadership; and it was a failure for the economy, as the war created a drain on an already-troubled economy. See also: BREZHNEV, LEONID, ILICH; GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH; MILITARY, SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET BIBLIOGRAPHY Dupree, Louis. (1980). Afghanistan. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Goodson, Larry P. (2001). Afghanistan’s Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban. Seattle: The University of Washington Press. Grau, Lester, ed. (2003). The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan, 2nd edition. New York: Frank Cass Publishers. Kaplan, Robert D. (2001). Soldiers of God: With Islamic Warriors in Afghanistan and Pakistan. New York: Vintage Books. Khan, Riaz. (1991). Untying the Afghan Knot: Negotiating Soviet Withdrawal. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Rashid, Ahmed. (2000). Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Roy, Olivier. (1986). Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan. London: Cambridge University Press. Rubin, Barnett. (1995). The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Sirdar Ikbal Ali Shah. (1982). Afghanistan of the Afghans. London: Octagon Press. Tapper, Richard. (1991). The Conflict of Tribe and State in Afghanistan. London: Croom Helm. ROGER KANGAS AGANBEGYAN, ABEL GEZEVICH (b. 1932), leading Soviet economist and organizer of economic research. Academician Abel Gezevich Aganbegyan began his professional career as a labor economist and was 14 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY an active member of the group of mathematical economists that emerged in the USSR in the 1960s. He was the Director of the Institute of Economics and the Organization of Industrial Production in Novosibirsk (1966–1985) and the creator and first editor of the lively journal EKO for many years the best economics journal in the USSR. In 1985 he returned to Moscow and was an important economic adviser to Mikhail Gorbachev. Aganbegyan seems to have played a major role in promoting the illfated acceleration (uskorenie) program of 1985–1986. Intended to speed up the national economic rate of growth, the policy mainly resulted in destabilizing the economy by sharply increasing investment in projects without any short-run returns. Aganbegyan was also involved in the preparation of the economic reform announced by Gorbachev in June 1987. This reform did not achieve its objectives but did contribute to the financial crisis and economic destabilization of 1989–1991. In 1990, Gorbachev requested that he produce a compromise economic program out of the rival Five-Hundred-Day Plan of Stanislav Shatalin and Grigory Yavlinsky on the one hand, and the government program of Leonid Abalkin and Nikolai Ryzhkov on the other. During perestroika Aganbegyan became rector of the Academy of the National Economy. He established a consulting firm and founded a bank, of which he served as CEO for five years, then honorary president. A property development deal he made with an Italian firm was a failure, leaving behind a halffinished building. See also: FIVE-HUNDRED-DAY PLAN; PERESTROIKA BIBLIOGRAPHY Aganbegyan, Abel. (1989). Inside Perestroika. New York: Harper & Row. Aslund, Anders. (1991). Gorbachev’s Struggle for Economic Reform, 2nd ed. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. MICHAEL ELLMAN AGITPROP Agitprop, the agitation (speech) and propaganda (print, film, and visual art) section of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, was established in August of 1920, under the direction of R. Katanian to coordinate the propaganda work of all Soviet institutions. Agitprop was originally divided into five subsections, the two most important being the agitation subsection, which directed propaganda campaigns and supervised local press, and the political education subsection, which developed curriculum for Party schools. The three remaining subsections were concerned with publishing Central Committee works, addressing problems with the distribution of propaganda in literature, and coordinating work among the parties of the national minorities. Agitprop, whose activities reached their fullest height during the Stalinist era, was one of the most important Central Committee sections by 1946. The role of Agitprop during the Brezhnev years and beyond included overseeing publishing, television, radio, and sports, directing agitation and propaganda work, guiding political education within the Party, and conducting cultural work with trade unions. Agitprop techniques, based on the political education of the immediate postrevolutionary period, were basically solidified in the 1920s. Early Agitprop in the cities included parades, spectacles, monumental sculpture, posters, kiosks, films, and agit-stations, located at major railroad stations, which had libraries of propaganda material, lecture halls, and theaters. These varied activities continued throughout the Soviet period. Agitation and propaganda were taken to the countryside during the civil war by agit-trains and agit-ships, a unique Bolshevik method for the political education of rural citizens and front-line troops. These modern conveyances functioned like moving posters with exterior decorations of heroic figures and folk art motifs accompanied by simple slogans. The trains and ships brought revolutionary leaflets, agitators, newsreels, and agitki (short propaganda films), among other items. Agit-trains were reinstituted during World War II to convey propaganda to forces at the front. After the civil war, and throughout the Soviet period, propaganda continued to be exported to the countryside via radio, traveling exhibitions, posters, literature, and film. Agitprop, like other Central Committee departments, had become relatively stable in its organization by 1948, and remained so until the collapse of the Soviet Union. See also: CENTRAL COMMITTEE; HIGHER PARTY SCHOOLS BIBLIOGRAPHY Kenez, Peter. (1986). The Birth of the Propaganda State: Soviet Methods of Mass Mobilization, 1917–1929. New York: Cambridge University Press. AGITPROP ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY 15 AGRARIAN PARTY OF RUSSIA Stites, Richard. (1995). Russian Popular Culture: Entertainment and Society Since 1900. New York: Cambridge University Press. K. ANDREA RUSNOCK AGRARIAN PARTY OF RUSSIA The Agrarian Party of Russia (APR) was established on February 26, 1993, on the initiative of the parliamentary fraction Agrarian Union, the Agrarian Union of Russia, the profsoyuz (trade union) of workers of the agro-industrial complex, and the All-Russian Congress of Kolkhozes. Its chair was Mikhail Lapshin, elected a couple weeks earlier as the vice-chair of the restored Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF). In the 1993 elections, the APR list, headed by the leader of the Agrarian fraction Mikhail Lapshin, profsoyuz leader Alexander Davydov, and vice-premier Alexander Zaveryukha, received 4.3 million votes (8.0%, fifth place) and twenty-one mandates in the federal district; sixteen candidates won in single-mandate districts. In 1995 the Agrarians entered the elections with a similar makeup, but a significant portion of the left-wing electorate consolidated around the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, and as a result, the Agrarians’ list only won 2.6 million votes (3.8%). In the single-mandate districts, the agrarians brought forth twenty candidates; this allowed them to form their own delegate group, with the addition of delegates from the CPRF dedicated to this task. In the 1999 elections, the APR leadership split over the issue of bloc formation. The majority, with chair Lapshin in the lead, joined the bloc Fatherland-All Russia (OVR); the others, including the leader of the parliamentary fraction Nikolai Kharintonov, went on the CPRF list. As a result of OVR’s low results, Lapshin’s supporters were unsuccessful in forming their group, and the communists with single-mandate candidates created the Agro-Industrial Group with Kharitonov at the head. In the regional elections, the APR entered in coalition with the CPRF, and had several serious victories to its credit, including the election of APR leader Lapshin as head of the small Republic of Altai, and head of the Agrarian Union Vasily Starodubtsev as governor in the industrial Tula Oblast (twice). At the time of registration in May 2002, the APR declared 42,000 members and fifty-five regional branches. While lacking potential as a selfsufficient entity, the APR was quite attractive to the Communist Party, and to the “ruling party,” by virtue of the provincial infrastructure, the popularity of the name, and the influence on the rural electorate, traditionally sympathetic toward the left. On the threshold of the 2003 elections, a struggle for control of the APR arose between the leftist Kharitonovtsy (Kharitonov was the head of the Agro-Industrial Union) and the pro-government Gordeyevtsy (Alexei Gordeyev was the leader of the Russian Agrarian Movement, founded in 2002), both sides trying to put an end to Lapshin’s extended leadership. See also: COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION BIBLIOGRAPHY McFaul, Michael. (2001). Russia’s Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. McFaul, Michael, and Markov, Sergei. (1993). The Troubled Birth of Russian Democracy: Parties, Personalities, and Programs. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press. Reddaway, Peter, and Glinski, Dmitri. (2001). The Tragedy of Russia’s Reforms: Market Bolshevism against Democracy. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press. NIKOLAI PETROV AGRARIAN REFORMS The concept of agrarian reform refers to changes implemented in the agricultural economy, changes designed broadly to improve agricultural performance and notably to contribute to the process of economic growth and economic development. The concept of reform implies changes to an existing system or policies, though the interpretation of change and the precise boundaries of the agricultural sector are general and broad. Thus characterized, agrarian reform has been a continuing and important component of the Russian economic experience. Moreover, the nature of agrarian reform has been closely associated with the differing stages of Russian economic development and with the role envisioned for the agrarian economy in the process of industrialization and modernization. 16 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY Russia has been an agrarian economy since its beginnings. For this reason, changes in the agrarian economy have been central to any discussion of economic growth and economic development in Russia. Beginning in the era of serfdom and the existence of a premodern agriculture, the focus has been on the nature of agrarian reform necessary to contribute to modernization. The nature of agrarian reform necessarily depends heavily on the time period considered. In the Russian case, a convenient turning point is 1861, the date of the Emancipation Act, the purpose of which was to eliminate serfdom. Prior to this date, the Russian rural economy was feudal in character, with serfs bound to their landlords, communal landholding, and periodic redistribution of land plots. Although the Emancipation Act was judicial more than economic in character, it nevertheless introduced a long period of agrarian reform through the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. During this period, there was gradual reallocation of land, although preservation of the village (mir) as a communal form of local decision making limited the extent to which the modernization of agriculture could take place. Peasant mobility was limited, a major reason for political instability in the early 1900s and the implementation of the Stolypin reforms, a series of changes designed to break the communal system, to change land usage, and to introduce individual peasant farming. The agrarian reform, prior to the Bolshevik revolution, has been the subject of controversy. The traditional agrarian crisis view has supported a negative view of the Russian rural economy, while the revisionist view argues that output and structural changes during the late tsarist era were directionally important for the ultimate development of a modern agricultural sector. It is perhaps ironic that by the 1920s and the period of the New Economic Policy (NEP), the rural economy would again be at the forefront of attention. Specifically, the focus would be the potential role of agriculture in Soviet economic development. After extensive discussion and experimentation during the NEP, Stalin forcibly changed the institutional arrangements on Soviet agriculture beginning in 1928. The introduction of the collective farms (the kohlkoz), the state farms (the sovkhoz) and the private subsidiary sector fundamentally changed the manner in which agriculture was organized. Markets were replaced by state control. Although these changes remained in effect through the end of the Soviet era, there were important changes made in the rural economy during the Soviet years. In effect, there was a continuing search for optimal organizational arrangements. This search led to important changes in the mechanization of agriculture (especially the introduction of the Machine Tractor Stations), the nature of land use (amalgamation of farms seeking scale advantages and the conversion of collective to state farms) and the relations between the state and the farm units in terms of deliveries, financing, and the like. Most important, in the latter years of the Soviet era, the focus became agro-industrial integration, an effort to reap the benefits of Western “agribusiness” types of arrangements for production and marketing of agricultural products. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the era of socialist agriculture and socialist agricultural policies came to an end. Much less attention was paid to the rural economy; it was not central to the Russian approach to transition, and yet agrarian reform was once again on the agenda. Throughout the 1990s, the emphasis has been the creation of a corporate (share) structure in farms and the conversion of these farms to various forms of private equity arrangements. However, given the very slow emergence of land reform, and specifically the slow development of a land market in Russia, fundamental change in the Russian rural economy continues to be at best very slow. See also: AGRICULTURE; ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOVIET; FREE ECONOMIC SOCIETY; NEW ECONOMIC POLICY PEASANT ECONOMY; SERFDOM BIBLIOGRAPHY Gregory, Paul R., and Stuart, Robert C. (2001). Russian and Soviet Economic Performance and Structure, 7th ed. New York: Addison Wesley Longman. Volin, Lazar. (1970). A Century of Russian Agriculture. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ROBERT C. STUART AGRICULTURE Agriculture is that sector of an economy concerned with the production of food and food products both for domestic use, in (industrial) production and (household) consumption, and for export to external markets. Although it is often difficult to define AGRICULTURE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY 17 AGRICULTURE Peasants sift grain in the village of Shari, 560 miles east of Moscow. © 2002 GETTY IMAGES the sectoral boundaries of agriculture with precision, agriculture is critical to the process of economic growth and economic development. Less developed economies are typically primarily agricultural in terms of output and resource usage and, appropriately, focus on institutions and policies that encourage the modernization of agriculture as a sector to support the growth of industry and services. As economic growth and development occur, the relative importance of the major producing sectors changes, usually with a declining relative importance for agriculture and a growing relative importance of industry and services. This means that, in the early stages of economic development, agriculture is an important sector in which productivity growth sustains the growth of output. This process involves the substitution of capital for labor and changes the role of agriculture itself as economic growth and development proceed. In the Russian case, the agricultural sector has always been surrounded by controversy. The reasons for this controversy are best understood within the context of the individual periods of Russian and Soviet economic growth and development, although there are common threads throughout. Not only are policies and institutions important, but ideology has played a major if not always constructive role in this essential sector. Prior to the legal end of serfdom in 1861, the Russian rural economy was organized on a communal basis (the mir). The premodern agriculture under this feudal-manorial system was characterized by limited mechanization, archaic modes of land usage, and the limited development of human capital. With the formal end of serfdom in Russia and the emergence of significant economic growth after 1880, attention focused on the extent to which a modern agriculture (emerging market institutions, market policies, investment in both human and physical capital, and so forth) was emerging in Russia and could therefore serve as the underpinning of industrialization. From an ideological 18 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY perspective, this would mean the development of capitalism. Two major schools of thought, the agrarian crisis view and the revisionist view, address this issue in different ways. The agrarian crisis view argues that backwardness was sustained prior to the Bolshevik revolution in 1917, while the revisionist view sees significantly greater change in the agricultural and other sectors. These interpretations have both been important for our understanding of the level of economic development in 1917, the ideological options available to Lenin and the Bolsheviks, and the subsequent discussions regarding agriculture during the New Economic Policy (NEP) period. The second important era in which agriculture became controversial in Russia is the NEP of the 1920s and its termination through mass collectivization. While the role of agriculture in Russian economic development was an issue of major importance in the 1920s, the implementation of collectivization by Josef Stalin in the late 1920s radically changed the institutional arrangements: It attempted to create a mechanism to support rapid industrialization, while at the same time imposing the ideology of collectivism. It has been argued that, from a strategic point of view, the policies and institutions established did not in fact finance Soviet industrialization. Worse, it has also been argued that the legacy of these institutions and related policies, and especially their manner of implementation, led to serious negative long-term consequences for the necessary but unachieved long-term growth of agricultural productivity. In these respects, collectivization has been viewed, in broad perspective, as a mistake. The third important era for Russian agriculture is the post-collectivization experience through the end of the 1980s. In spite of continuing attention to and controversy surrounding agriculture in this era, it is agreed that agricultural productivity declined from the 1950s through the 1980s to such a degree that significant grain imports became necessary beginning in the 1960s. Thus agriculture became increasingly expensive (an effect of poor productivity performance) and was artificially sustained by large state subsidies. From a structural point of view, agriculture in this era failed in the sense that agricultural productivity change could not support necessary structural change, a legacy that would await the reformers of the transition era. Finally, when the Soviet system collapsed and Russia faced economic transition to capitalism, agriculture as a sector was largely neglected. Whereas it was commonly predicted that agriculture would be a leading sector in transition economies, this was not the case in Russia. From a twenty-first-century perspective, it is evident that during transition agriculture has been a low-priority sector, one in which institutional change has been at best modest. Although markets have emerged and trade patterns have changed, the most fundamental element of market agriculture, namely the pursuit of private property rights along with appropriate institutional support, remains controversial and elusive. See also: AGRARIAN REFORMS; COLLECTIVE FARM; COLLECTIVIZATION OF AGRICULTURE; COUNTRY ESTATES; ECONOMIC GROWTH, IMPERIAL; ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOVIET; NEW ECONOMIC POLICY; PEASANT ECONOMY; SERFDOM; SOVKHOZ BIBLIOGRAPHY Gregory, Paul R., and Stuart, Robert C. (2001). Russian and Soviet Economic Performance and Structure, 7th ed. New York: Addison Wesley Longman. Volin, Lazar. (1970). A Century of Russian Agriculture. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ROBERT C. STUART AIGUN, TREATY OF The Treaty of Aigun (May 28, 1858) granted the expanding Russian Empire vast new territories in eastern Siberia at the expense of China, which had entered upon a period of decline. In the late 1840s, after more than a century of stable relations with China, governed by the Treaties of Nerchinsk (1689) and Kiakhta (1728), Russia renewed its eastward expansion under the leadership of Nikolai Muraviev, the governor-general of Eastern Siberia, and Count E. V. Putiatin and General Nikolai Ignatiev, both of whom were diplomatic envoys. The three men shared a vision of Russia as a Pacific power, and operated as quasi-independent agents of an imperial state in this era before modern transportation and communications. In the early 1850s, Russia sent a naval flotilla down the Amur River, established military settlements along its northern bank, and ignored Chinese protests. Focused on suppressing the Taiping rebellion that threatened the dynasty’s hold on power, Chinese officials greatly feared Russian military AIGUN, TREATY OF ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY 19 AJARS power, the strength of which they overestimated. When they failed to persuade the Russians to withdraw from territories they considered part of their own domain, the Chinese had no choice but to negotiate with Muraviev, who had threatened them with war. In accordance with Muraviev’s demands, the Treaty of Aigun established the Russo-Chinese boundary along the Amur, from the Argun River in the west to the Sea of Okhotsk in the east. Russia was accorded navigation rights on the Amur, Ussuri, and Sungari rivers along with China, but third countries were excluded, as Muraviev feared encroachment by the British Navy. Trade, which had been previously been restricted to one point along the border, was now permitted along its entire length. China viewed the Treaty of Aigun as a temporary concession to Russian military pressure, but Muraviev and St. Petersburg correctly understood it as a giant step in Russia’s rise as an AsiaPacific power. See also: CHINA, RELATIONS WITH; MURAVIEV, NIKITA BIBLIOGRAPHY Clubb, O. Edmund. (1971). China and Russia: The “Great Game.” New York: Columbia University Press. Mancall, Mark. (1971). Russia and China: Their Diplomatic Relations to 1728. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Paine, S. C. M. (1997). Imperial Rivals: Russia, China, and Their Disputed Frontier. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. Quested, Rosemary. (1984). Sino-Russian Relations: A Short History. Boston: George Allen & Unwin. Tien-fong Cheng. (1973). A History of Sino-Russian Relations. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1973. STEVEN I. LEVINE AJARS In 1913 Josef Stalin posed the question, “What is to be done with the Mingrelians, Abkhasians, Adjarians, Svanetians, Lezghians, and so forth, who speak different languages but do not possess a literature of their own?” Of the Ajars, however, who call themselves Ach’areli (plural Ach’arlebi), he more accurately observed, two paragraphs later, that they were a people “who speak the Georgian language but whose culture is Turkish and who profess the religion of Islam.” The Ajarian Autonomous Republic was established on July 16, 1921, as a result of Turkey ceding Batumi to Georgia, along with territory to its north, in accordance with the terms of the RussoTurkish Treaty of March 16, 1921. Ajaria (capital: Batumi) occupies 2,900 square kilometers in southwestern Georgia and borders the provinces of Guria, Meskheti, and (predominantly Armenian) Dzhavakheti; the Black Sea; and Turkey (Lazistan and the old Georgian region of Shavsheti). The last Soviet census (1989) showed 324,806 Ajar residents, constituting 82.8 percent of the autonomous republic’s population. The local dialect suggests both Laz and Turkish influence—Islam was introduced here and in other border regions to the east by the Ottoman Turks. Ajarians share with the Abkhazians, some of whom settled the area in latetsarist times, a subtropical microclimate with similar agriculture, although Ajaria held first place in the USSR for precipitation, with sea-facing slopes experiencing an annual rainfall of 2,500–2,800 millimeters. When Stalin deported to Central Asia the neighboring Meskhians (usually called “Meskhetian Turks,” though their precise ethnicity is disputed), Hemshins (Islamicized Armenians), and other Muslim peoples in the northern Caucasus in 1943 and 1944, the Ajars escaped this fate. The regional leader, Aslan Abashidze, appointed by Georgian president Zviad Gamsakhurdia in the dying years of Soviet rule, managed, in the turmoil that followed Georgia’s 1991 independence, to turn Ajaria into a personal fiefdom to the extent that central government writ was (as of January 2002) no longer running in what had by then effectively become an undeclared but de facto independent state. See also: CAUCASUS; GEORGIA AND GEORGIANS; ISLAM; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST BIBLIOGRAPHY Burdett, Anita L. P., ed. (1996). Caucasian Boundaries: Documents and Maps, 1802–1946. Slough, UK: Archive Editions. The Golden Fleece (Songs from Abkhazia and Adzharia). (1993). Leiden, Netherlands: Pan Records Ethnic Series. Stalin, Joseph. (1913). “Marxism and the National Question.” In his Marxism and the National and Colonial Question. London: Martin Lawrence. B. GEORGE HEWITT 20 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY AKHMATOVA, ANNA ANDREYEVNA AKAYEV, ASKAR AKAYEVICH (b. 1944), president of Kyrgyzstan who served in that post throughout the country’s first decade of independence. Askar Akayev was born in the Kyrgyz Soviet Republic (Kyrgyzia) and earned a doctor of sciences degree at the Leningrad Precision Mechanics and Optics Institute. He returned to Kyrgyzia in 1972, assuming a teaching post at the Politechnical Institute in Frunze (now Bishkek). He authored more than one hundred scientific works and articles on mathematics and computers, and in 1989 became president of the Kyrgyz Academy of Sciences. He also served as a department head for the Central Committee of the Kyrgyz Communist Party. As the Soviet Union began to break apart, he was elected to the presidency of the republic in 1990 by the republic’s legislature, and in 1991 Kyrgyzstan gained independence and Akayev was elected president in a popular election. In contrast to other post-Soviet states in Central Asia, whose leaders retained their power from Soviet times, Kyrgyzstan made an attempt to break with the Soviet past. In his first years in office, Akayev won international acclaim as a backer of political and economic liberalization, aiming to turn his country into the “Switzerland of Central Asia.” Akayev was reelected president in 1995 and in 2000. In the mid1990s, however, some called his democratic credentials into question as he launched campaigns against journalists, imprisoned political opponents, and pushed through constitutional amendments to augment the powers of the presidency. In 2000 elections he won 75 percent of the vote, but observers claimed these elections were marred by fraud. Throughout 2002 and 2003, he was the target of protesters in Kyrgyzstan, who blamed him for chronic corruption and mounting economic difficulties. Nonetheless, in February 2003 he won approval of more changes to the constitution that enhanced his powers still further and won support in a referendum to confirm his term of office until December 2005. After these events, critics charged that he had become much like the Central Asian dictators. While in office, Akayev has tried to assure inter-ethnic harmony in the country (30% of the population is ethnically Uzbek) and cracked down on small groups of Islamic militants. He has maintained good relations with Russia, and in 2001 ofKyrgyzstan president Askar Akayev. COURTESY OF THE EMBASSY OF KYRGYZSTAN fered air bases and other support to U.S. forces operating in Afghanistan. See also: KYRGYZSTAN AND KYRGYZ; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET BIBLIOGRAPHY Akayev, Askar. (2001). Kyrgyzstan: An Economy in Transition. Canberra: Asia-Pacific Press. Anderson, John. (1999). Kyrgyzstan, Central Asia’s Island of Democracy? Amsterdam: Harwood Academic. PAUL J. KUBICEK AKHMATOVA, ANNA ANDREYEVNA (1889–1966), leading Russian poet of the twentieth century; member of the Acmeist group. Anna Akhmatova (Anna Andreyevna Gorenko) was born on June 23, 1889, near Odessa, and grew ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY 21 AKHROMEYEV, SERGEI FYODOROVICH up in Tsarskoye Selo, the imperial summer residence, where Pushkin had attended the Lyceum. She studied law in Kiev, then literature in St. Petersburg. She married poet Nikolai Stepanovich Gumilev in 1910, and the couple visited western Europe on their honeymoon. She made a return visit to Paris in 1911, and Amedeo Modigliani, still an unknown artist at the time, painted sixteen portraits of her. In 1912, Akhmatova published her first collection of poetry, Vecher (Evening), and gave birth to her son Lev. The clarity, simplicity, and vivid details of her poetry amazed her contemporaries. For instance, in 1934, Marina Tsvetaeva praised Akhmato’s “Poem of the Last Meeting,” extolling the lines “I slipped my left-hand glove/Onto my right hand” as “unique, unrepeatable, inimitable.” Also in 1912, Gumilev founded the Poets’ Guild, a group whose opposition to the Symbolists led to the name “Acmeist,” from the Greek akme, “perfection.” The Acmeists, including Gumilev, Akhmatova, and Osip Mandelshtam, advocated simplicity, clarity, and precision over the vagueness and otherworldliness of the Symbolists. Akhmatova’s marriage with Gumilev was unhappy and ended in divorce. Her second collection, Chetki (Rosary), published in 1914, revolves around the decline of the relationship, her sense of repentance, and her identity as a poet. In her following collections, Belaya Staya (White Flock, 1917), Podorozhnik (Plantain, 1921), and Anno Domini (1922), Akhmatova assumed the role of poetic witness, responding to the chaos, poverty, and oppression surrounding the Revolution and civil war. In 1921, Gumilev was charged with conspiracy and executed. None of Akhmatova’s work was published in the Soviet Union between 1923 and 1940. Yet, unlike many of her contemporaries, Akhmatova refused to emigrate. Her view of emigration is reflected in her 1922 poem from Anno Domini, “I am not one of those who left the land.” Between 1935 and 1940 Akhmatova wrote the long poem Requiem, a lyrical masterpiece. Dedicated to the victims of Josef Stalin’s terror, and largely a maternal response to her son Lev’s arrest and imprisonment in 1937, it recalls the Symbolists in its use of religious allegory, but maintains directness and simplicity. Akhmatova’s next long poem, the complex, dense, polyphonic Poema bez geroya (Poem without a Hero, 1943) interprets the suicide of poet and officer Vsevolod Knyazev as a sign of the times. Some critics place it alongside Requiem as her finest work; others see it as the beginning of Akhmatova’s poetic decline. At the outbreak of World War II, Stalin briefly relaxed his stance toward writers, and Akhmatova was published selectively. In 1946, however, Andrei Zhdanov, secretary of the Central Committee, denounced her and expelled her from the Writers’ Union. In 1949, her son Lev was arrested again and exiled to Siberia. In a desperate and futile effort to secure his release, Akhmatova wrote a number of poems in praise of Stalin. She later requested the exclusion of these poems from her collected work. After Stalin’s death, Akhmatova was slowly “rehabilitated.” Publication of her work, including her essays and translations, resumed. She received international recognition, including an honorary degree from Oxford in 1965. She died on March 5, 1966, and is remembered as one of Russia’s most revered poets. See also: DISSIDENT MOVEMENT; GUMILEV, LEV NIKOLAYEVICH; GUMILEV, NIKOLAI STEPANOVICH; INTELLIGENTSIA; MANDELSHTAM, OSIP EMILIEVICH; PURGES, THE GREAT BIBLIOGRAPHY Akhmatova, Anna Andreevna. (1973). Poems of Akhmatova: Izbrannye Stikhi, ed. and tr. Stanley Kunitz and Max Hayward. Boston: Little, Brown. Akhmatova, Anna Andreevna. (1990). The Complete Poems of Anna Akhmatova, tr. Judith Hemschemeyer, ed. Roberta Reeder. Somerville, MA: Zephyr. Amert, Susan. (1992). In a Shattered Mirror: The Later Poetry of Anna Akhmatova. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Ketchian, Sonia. (1985). “Akhmatova, Anna Andreevna.” In Handbook of Russian Literature, ed. Victor Terras. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Leiter, Sharon. (1983). Akhmatova’s Petersburg. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. DIANA SENECHAL AKHROMEYEV, SERGEI FYODOROVICH (1923–1991), chief of the Soviet General Staff and first deputy minister of defense (1984–1988) and national security advisor to President Mikhail Gorbachev (1988–1991). 22 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev played a key role in ending the Cold War and the negotiation of key arms control agreements: the INF (Inter-Mediate Range Nuclear Forces) Treaty (1987) and the CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe) Treaty (1990) between NATO and Warsaw Treaty Organization member states. He also oversaw the Soviet military withdrawal from Afghanistan. According to Admiral William Crowe, his American counterpart, “He was a communist, a patriot and a soldier.” Dedicated to the rejuvenation of the Soviet system, Akhromeyev found that perestroika had unleashed deep conflicts within the USSR and undermined the system’s legitimacy. After playing a part in the unsuccessful coup of August 1991, he committed suicide in his Kremlin office. Born in 1923, Akhromeyev belonged to that cohort upon whom the burden of World War II fell most heavily. The war shaped both his career as a professional soldier and his understanding of the external threat to the Soviet regime. He enrolled in a naval school in Leningrad in 1940 and was in that city when the German invasion began. He served as an officer of naval infantry in 1942 at Stalingrad and fought with the Red Army from the Volga to Berlin. Akhromeyev advanced during the war to battalion command and joined the Communist Party in 1943. In the postwar years Akhromeyev rose to prominence in the Soviet Armed Forces and General Staff. In 1952 he graduated from the Military Academy of the Armor Forces. In 1967 he graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff. Thereafter, he held senior staff positions and served as head of a main directorate of the General Staff from 1974 to 1977 and then as first deputy chief of the General Staff from 1979 to 1984. As Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov’s deputy, Akhromeyev sought to recast the Soviet Armed Forces to meet the challenge of the revolution in military affairs, which involved the application of automated troop control, electronic warfare, and precision strikes to modern combined arms combat. See also: AFGHANISTAN, RELATIONS WITH; ARMS CONTROL; AUGUST 1991 PUTSCH; COLD WAR; MILITARY, SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET BIBLIOGRAPHY Herspring, Dale. (1990). The Soviet High Command, 1964–1989: Politics and Personalities. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Kipp, Jacob W., Bruce W. Menning, David M. Glantz, and Graham H. Turbiville, Jr. “Marshal Akhromeev’s Post-INF World” Journal of Soviet Military Studies 1(2):167–187. Odom, William E. (1998). The Collapse of the Soviet Military. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press Zisk, Kimberly Marten. (1993). Engaging the Enemy: Organization Theory and Soviet Military Innovation, 1955–1991. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. JACOB W. KIPP AKHUNDOV, MIRZA FATH ALI (1812–1878), celebrated Azerbaijani author, playwright, philosopher, and founder of modern literary criticism, who acquired fame primarily as the writer of European-inspired plays in the AzeriTurkish language. Akhundov was born in Shaki (Nukha), Azerbaijan, and initially was tutored for the Islamic clergy by his uncle Haji Alaksar. However, as a young man he gained an appreciation for the arts, especially literature. An encounter with famed Azerbaijani lyricist and philosopher Mirza Shafi Vazeh in 1832 is said to have profoundly influenced his career as a writer. In 1834, he relocated to Tbilisi, Georgia, where he worked as a translator in the Chancellery of the Viceroy of the Caucasus. Here he was further influenced in his social and political views through his acquaintance with exiled Russian intellectuals, including Alexander Bestuzhev-Marlinsky. Akhundov’s first published work was entitled “Oriental Poem” (1837), inspired by the death of famous Russian poet Alexander Sergeyevich Pushkin. However, his first significant literary activity emerged in the 1850s, through a series of comedies that satirized the flaws and absurdities of contemporary society, largely born of ignorance and superstition. These comedies were highly praised in international literary circles, and Akhundov was affectionately dubbed “The Tatar Moliere.” In 1859 Akhundov published his famous novel The Deceived Stars, thus laying the groundwork for realistic prose, providing models for a new genre in Azeri and Iranian literature. In his later work, such as Three Letters of the Indian Prince Kamal al Dovleh to His Friend, Iranian Prince Jalal al Dovleh, Akhundov’s writing evolved AKHUNDOV, MIRZA FATH ALI ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY 23 AKKERMAN, CONVENTION OF from benign satire to acerbic social commentary. At this stage, he demonstrated the typical leanings of the nineteenth-century intelligentsia toward the Enlightenment movement and its associated principles of education, political reform, and secularism. Akhundov’s secular views, a by-product of his agnostic beliefs, stemmed from disillusionment with his earlier studies in theology. He perceived Islam’s hold on all facets of society as an obstruction to learning. Although assaulting traditional institutions was seemingly his stock in trade, his biting satires were usually leavened with a message of optimism for the future. According to Tadeusz Swietochowski, noted scholar of Russian history, Akhundov believed that “the purpose of dramatic art was to improve peoples’ morals” and that the “theater was the appropriate vehicle for conveying the message to a largely illiterate public.” See also: AZERBAIJAN AND AZERIS; CAUCASUS; ENLIGHTENMENT, IMPACT OF BIBLIOGRAPHY Azeri Literature. (2003). “Mirza Faith Ali Akhundov.” . Swietockhowski, Tadeusz. (1995). Russia and Azerbaijan: A Borderland in Transition. New York: Columbia University Press. Swietockhowski, Tadeusz, and Collins, Brian. (1999). Historical Dictionary of Azerbaijan. New York: Scarecrow Press. GREGORY TWYMAN AKKERMAN, CONVENTION OF By the mid-1820s, the Balkans and the Black Sea basin festered with unresolved problems and differences, including recurring cycles both of popular insurrection and Turkish repression and of various Russian claims and Turkish counterclaims. Most blatantly, in violation of the Treaty of Bucharest (1812), Turkish troops had occupied the Danubian principalities, and the Porte had encroached on Serbian territorial possessions and autonomy. On March 17, 1826, Tsar Nicholas I issued an ultimatum demanding Turkish adherence to the Bucharest agreement, withdrawal of Turkish troops from Wallachia and Moldavia, and entry via plenipotentiaries into substantive negotiations. An overextended and weakened Sultan Mahmud agreed to negotiations beginning in July 1826 at Akkerman on the Dniester estuary. On October 7, 1826, the two sides agreed to the Akkerman Convention, the terms of which affirmed and extended the conditions of the earlier Bucharest Treaty. Accordingly, Turkey transferred to Russia several settlements on the Caucasus littoral of the Black Sea and agreed to Russian-approved boundaries on the Danube. Within eighteen months, Turkey was to settle claims against it by Russian subjects, permit Russian commercial vessels free use of Turkish territorial waters, and grant Russian merchants unhindered trade in Turkish territory. Within six months, Turkey was to reestablish autonomy within the Danubian principalities, with assurances that the rulers (hospodars) would come only from the local aristocracy and that their replacements would be subject to Russian approval. Strict limitations were imposed on Turkish police forces. Similarly, Serbia reverted to autonomous status within the Ottoman Empire. Alienated provinces were restored to Serbian administration, and all taxes on Serbians were to be combined into a single levy. In long-term perspective, the Akkerman Convention strengthened Russia’s hand in the Balkans, more strongly identified Russia as the protector of Balkan Slavs, and further contributed to Ottoman Turkish decline. See also: BUCHAREST, TREATY OF; SERBIA, RELATIONS WITH; TURKEY, RELATIONS WITH BIBLIOGRAPHY Jelavich, Barbara. (1974). St. Petersburg and Moscow: Tsarist and Soviet Foreign Policy, 1814–1974. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Seton-Watson, Hugh. (1967). The Russian Empire 1801–1917. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press. BRUCE W. MENNING AKSAKOV, IVAN SERGEYEVICH (1823–1886), Slavophile and Panslav ideologue and journalist. Son of the famous theater critic Sergei Timofeyevich Aksakov, Ivan Aksakov received his early education at home in the religious, patriotic, and literary atmosphere of the Aksakov family in Moscow. He attended the Imperial School of Ju24 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY risprudence in St. Petersburg, graduating in 1842. After a nine-year career in government service, Aksakov resigned to devote himself to the study of Russian popular life and the propagation of his Slavophile view of it. Troubles with the censorship plagued his early journalistic ventures: Moskovsky sbornik (Moscow Miscellany) (1852, 1856) and Russkaya beseda (Russian Conversation); his newspaper, Parus (Sail), was shut down in 1859 because of Aksakov’s outspoken defense of free speech. In his newspapers Den (Day) and Moskva (Moscow), Aksakov largely supported the reforms of the 1860s and 1870s, but his nationalism became increasingly strident, as the historical and critical publicism of the early Slavophiles gave way, in the freer atmosphere of the time, to simpler and more chauvinistic forms of nationalism, often directed at Poles, Germans, and Jews. In 1875 Aksakov became president of the Moscow Slavic Benevolent Committee, in which capacity he pressed passionately for a more aggressive Russian policy in the Balkans and promoted the creation of Russian volunteer forces to fight with the Serbs. He was devastated when the European powers forced Russia to moderate its Balkan gains in 1878. “Today,” Aksakov told the Slavic Benevolent Committee, “ we are burying Russian glory, Russian honor, and Russian conscience.” In the 1880s Aksakov’s chauvinism became more virulent. In his final journal, Rus (Old Russia), he alleged that he had discovered a worldwide Jewish conspiracy with headquarters in Paris. Aksakov’s increasing xenophobia has embarrassed Russians (and foreigners) attracted to the more courageous and generous aspects of his work, but the enormous crowds at his funeral suggest that his name was still a potent force among significant segments of the Russian public at the time of his death. See also: AKSAKOV, KONSTANTIN SERGEYEVICH; JOURNALISM; NATIONALISM IN TSARIST EMPIRE; PANSLAVISM; SLAVOPHILES BIBLIOGRAPHY Lukashevich, Stephen. (1965). Ivan Aksakov (1823–1886): A Study in Russian Thought and Politics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Riasanovsky, Nicholas. (1952). Russia and the West in the Teaching of the Slavophiles: A Study of Romantic Ideology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Walicki, Andrzej. (1975). The Slavophile Controversy: History of a Conservative Utopia in Nineteenth-Century Russian Thought. Oxford: Clarendon. ABBOTT GLEASON AKSAKOV, KONSTANTIN SERGEYEVICH (1817–1860), Slavophile ideologue and journalist. Konstantin Aksakov was a member of one of the most famous literary families in nineteenthcentury Russia. His father was the well-known theater critic and memoirist Sergei Aksakov; his brother, Ivan Aksakov, was an important publicist in the 1860s and 1870s. During his university years in the early 1830s, Konstantin Aksakov was a member of the Stankevich Circle, along with Mikhail Bakunin and Vissarion Belinsky. He underwent a period of apprenticeship to Hegel, but, like several other Slavophiles, was most influenced by his immediate family circle, which was the source of the communal values he was to espouse and the dramatic division in his thought between private and public. Toward the end of the 1830s Aksakov drew close to Yury Samarin, and both of them fell under the direct influence of Alexei Khomyakov. Aksakov’s Hegelianism proved a passing phase; he evolved into the most determinedly utopian and ideologically minded of all the early Slavophiles. A passionate critic of statist historical interpretations, Aksakov viewed Russian history as marked by a unique relationship between the state and what he called “the land” (zemlya). At one level the division referred simply to the allegedly limited jurisdiction of state power in pre-Petrine Russia over Russian society. At another level “the land” signified the timeless religious and moral truth of Christianity, while the state, however necessary for the preservation of “the land,” was external, soulless, and coercive. The Russian peasant’s communal existence had to be protected from the contagion of politics. Behind Aksakov’s static “Christian people’s utopia” lay the romantic hatred of social and political rationalism, a passion that animated all the early Slavophiles. Aksakov died suddenly in the Ionian Islands in the midst of a rare European trip. See also: AKSAKOV, IVAN SERGEYEVICH; KHOMYAKOV, ALEXEI STEPANOVICH; SLAVOPHILES AKSAKOV, KONSTANTIN SERGEYEVICH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY 25 ALASH ORDA BIBLIOGRAPHY Christoff, Peter. (1982). An Introduction to NineteenthCentury Russian Slavophilism, Vol. 3: K.S. Aksakov: A Study in Ideas. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Riasanovsky, Nicholas. (1952). Russia and the West in the Teaching of the Slavophiles. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Walicki, Andrzej. (1975). The Slavophile Controversy. Oxford: Clarendon. ABBOTT GLEASON ALASH ORDA Alash Orda is the autonomous Kazakh government established by the liberal-nationalist Alash party in December 1917. Alash was the mythical ancestor of the Kazakhs, and Alash Orda (Horde of Alash) long served as their traditional battle cry. His name was adopted by the Kazakh nationalist journal, Alash, that was published by secularist Kazakh intellectuals for twenty-two issues, from November 26, 1916, to May 25, 1917. Alash Orda then was taken as the name of a political party founded in March 1917 by a group of moderate, upper-class Kazakh nationalists. Among others, they included Ali Khan Bukeykhanov, Ahmed Baytursun, Mir Yakub Dulatov, Oldes Omerov, Magzhan Zhumabayev, H. Dosmohammedov, Mohammedzhan Tynyshbayev, and Abdul Hamid Zhuzhdybayev. Initially, the party’s program resembled that of the Russian Constitutional-Democrats (Kadets), but with a strong admixture of Russian Menshevik (Social Democrat) and Socialist-Revolutionary (SR) ideas. Despite later Soviet charges, it was relatively progressive on social issues and demanded the creation of an autonomous Kazakh region. This program was propagated in the newspaper Qazaq (Kazakh), published in Orenburg. The paper had a circulation of about eight thousand until it was closed by the Communists in March 1918. After March 1917, Alash Orda’s leaders dominated Kazakh politics. They convened a Second All-Kirgiz (Kazakh) Congress in Orenburg from December 18 through December 26, 1917. On December 23, this congress proclaimed the autonomy of the Kazakh steppes under two Alash Orda governments. One, centered at the village of Zhambeitu and encompassing the western region, was headed by Dosmohammedov. The second, headed by Ali Khan Bukeykhanov, governed the eastern region from Semipalatinsk. Both began as strongly anti-Communist and supported the anti-Soviet forces that were rallying around the Russian Constituent Assembly (Komuch): the Orenburg Cossacks and the Bashkirs of Zeki Velidi Togan. In time, however, the harsh minority policies of Siberia’s White Russian leader, Admiral Alexander Vasilievich Kolchak, alienated the Kazakh leaders. Alash Orda’s leaders then sought to achieve their goals by an alignment with Moscow. Accepting Mikhail Vasilievich Frunze’s November 1919 promise of amnesty, most Kazakh leaders recognized Soviet power on December 10, 1919. After further negotiations, the Kirgiz Revolutionary Committee (Revkom) formally abolished Alash Orda’s institutional network in March 1920. Many Alash leaders then joined the Communist Party and worked for Soviet Kazakhstan, only to perish during Stalin’s purges of the 1930s. After 1990 the name “Alash” reappeared, but as the title of a small Kazakh panTurkic and Pan-Islamic party and its journal. See also: CENTRAL ASIA; KAZAKHSTAN AND KAZAKHS; NATIONALISM IN THE SOVIET UNION BIBLIOGRAPHY Jackson, George, and Devlin, Robert, eds. (1989). Dictionary of the Russian Revolution. Westport, CT: Greenwood. Olcott, Martha Brill. (1995). The Kazakhs, 2nd ed. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Wheeler, Geoffrey. (1964). The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. DAVID R. JONES ALASKA Alaska is the largest state in the United States, equal to one-fifth of the country’s continental land mass. Situated in the extreme northwestern region of North America, it is separated from Russian Asia by the Bering Strait (51 miles; 82 kilometers). Commonly nicknamed “The Last Frontier” or “Land of the Midnight Sun,” the state’s official name derives from an Aleut word meaning “great land” or “that which the sea breaks against.” Alaska is replete with high-walled fjords and majestic mountains, with slow-moving glaciers and still-active volcanoes. The state is also home to Eskimos and the Aleut and Athabaskan Indians, as well as about fourteen thousand Tlingit, Tshimshian, and Haida 26 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY Cartoon ridiculing the U.S. decision to purchase Alaska from Russia. © BETTMANN/CORBIS people—comprising about 16 percent of the Alaskan population. (The term Eskimo is used for Alaskan natives, while Inuit is used for Eskimos living in Canada.) Inupiat and Yupik are the two main Eskimo groups. While the Inupiat speak Inupiaq and reside in the north and northwest parts of Alaska, the Yupik speak Yupik and live in the south and southwest. Juneau is the state’s capital, but Anchorage is the largest city. The first Russians to come to the Alaskan mainland and the Aleutian Islands were Alexei Chirikov (a Russian naval captain) and Vitus Bering (a Dane working for the Russians), who arrived in 1741. Tsar Peter the Great (1672–1725) encouraged the explorers, eager to gain the fur trade of Alaska and the markets of China. Hence, for half a century thereafter, intrepid frontiersmen and fur traders (promyshlenniki) ranged from the Kurile Islands to southeastern Alaska, often exploiting native seafaring skills to mine the rich supply of sea otter and seal pelts for the lucrative China trade. In 1784, one of these brave adventurers, Grigory Shelekhov (1747–1795), established the first colony in Alaska, encouraged by Tsarina Catherine II (the Great) (1729–1796). Missionaries soon followed the traders, beginning in 1794, aiming to convert souls to Christianity. The beneficial role of the Russian missions in Alaska is only beginning to be fully appreciated. Undoubtedly, some Russian imperialists used the missionary enterprise as an instrument in their own endeavors. However, as recently discovered documents in the U.S. Library of Congress show, the selfless work of some Russian Orthodox priests, such as Metropolitan Innokenty Veniaminov (1797–1879), not only promoted harmonious relations between Russians and Alaskans, but preserved the culture and languages of the Native Alaskans. Diplomatic relations between Russia and the United States, which began in 1808, were relatively cordial in the early 1800s. They were unhampered by the Monroe Doctrine, which warned that the American continent was no territory for future European colonization. Tsar Alexander I admired the American republic, and agreed in April 1824 to restrict Russia’s claims on the America continent to Alaska. American statesmen had attempted several times between 1834 and 1867 to purchase Alaska from Russia. On March 23, 1867, the expansionENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY 27 ALASKA ALBANIANS, CAUCASIAN ist-minded Secretary of State William H. Seward met with Russian minister to Washington Baron Edouard de Stoeckl and agreed on a price of $7,200,000. This translated into about 2.5 cents per acre for 586,400 square miles of territory, twice the size of Texas. Overextended geographically, the Russians were happy at the time to release the burden. However, the discovery of gold in 1896 and of the largest oil field in North America (near Prudhoe Bay) in 1968 may have caused second thoughts. See also: BERING, VITUS JONASSEN; DEZHNEV, SEMEN IVANOVICH; NORTHERN PEOPLES; UNITED STATES, RELATIONS WITH BIBLIOGRAPHY Bolkhovitinov, N. N., and Pierce, Richard A. (1996). Russian-American Relations and the Sale of Alaska, 1834–1867. Fairbanks: University of Alaska Press. Hoxie, Frederick E., and Mancall, Peter C. (2001). American Nations: Encounters in Indian Country, 1850 to the Present. New York: Routledge. Thomas, David Hurst. (200). Exploring Native North America. New York: Oxford University Press. JOHANNA GRANVILLE ALBANIANS, CAUCASIAN Albanians are an ancient people of southeastern Caucasia who originally inhabited the area of the modern republic of Azerbaijan north of the River Kur. In the late fourth century they acquired from Armenia the territory that now comprises the southern half of the republic. According to the Greek geographer Strabo (died c. 20 C.E.), the Albanians were a federation of twenty-six tribes, each originally having its own king, but by his time united under a single ruler. The people’s name for themselves is unknown, but the Greeks and Romans called their country Albania. The original capital of Albania was the city of Cabala or Cabalaca, north of the River Kur. In the fifth century, however, the capital was transferred to Partaw (now Barda), located south of the river. According to tradition, the Albanians converted to Christianity early in the fourth century. It is more likely, however, that this occurred in the early fifth century, when St. Mesrob Mashtots, inventor of the Armenian alphabet, devised one for the Albanians. Evidence of this alphabet was lost until 1938, when it was identified in an Armenian manuscript. All surviving Albanian literature was written in, not translated into, Armenian. The Persians terminated the Albanian monarchy in about 510, after which the country was ruled by an oligarchy of local princes that was headed by the Mihranid prince of Gardman. In 624, the Byzantine emperor Heraclius appointed the head of the Mihrani family as presiding prince of Albania. When the country was conquered by the Arabs in the seventh century and the last of the Mihranid presiding princes was assassinated in 822, the Albanian polity began to break up. Thereafter, the title “king of Albania” was claimed by one or another dynasty in Armenia or Georgia until well into the Mongol period. The city of Partaw was destroyed by Rus pirates in 944. The Albanians had their own church and its own catholicos, or supreme patriarch, who was subordinate to the patriarch of Armenia. The Albanian church endured until 1830, when it was suppressed after the Russian conquest. The Albanian ethnic group appears to survive as the Udins, a people living in northwestern Azerbaijan. Their Northeast Caucasian language (laced with Armenian) is classified as a member of the Lesguian group. Some Udins are Muslim; the rest belong to the Armenian Church. See also: ARMENIA AND ARMENIANS; AZERBAIJAN AND AZERIS; CAUCASUS BIBLIOGRAPHY Bais, Marco. (2001). Albania Caucasica. Milan: Mimesis. Daskhurantsi, Moses. (1961).History of the Caucasian Albanians. London: Oxford University Press. Moses of Khoren. (1978). History of the Armenians, tr. Robert W. Thomson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Toumanoff, Cyrille. (1963). Studies in Christian Caucasian History. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. ROBERT H. HEWSEN ALCOHOLISM Swedish researcher Magnus Huss first used the term “alcoholism” in 1849 to describe a variety of physical symptoms associated with drunkenness. By the 1860s, Russian medical experts built on 28 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY Huss’s theories, relying on models of alcoholism developed in French and German universities to conduct laboratory studies on the effects of alcohol on the body and mind. They adopted the term “alcoholism” (alkogolizm) as opposed to “drunkenness” (pyanstvo) to connote the phenomenon of disease, and determined that it mainly afflicted the lower classes. In 1896, at the urging of the Swiss-born physician and temperance advocate E. F. Erisman, the Twelfth International Congress of Physicians in Moscow established a special division on alcoholism as a medical problem. Within a year the Kazan Temperance Society established the first hospital for alcoholics in Kazan. In 1897, physician and temperance advocate A. M. Korovin founded a private hospital for alcoholics in Moscow, and in 1898 the Trusteeships of Popular Temperance opened an outpatient clinic. That same year, growing public concern over alcoholism led to the creation of the Special Commission on Alcoholism and the Means for Combating It. Headed by psychiatrist N. M. Nizhegorodtsev, the ninety-five members of the commission included physicians, psychiatrists, temperance advocates, academics, civil servants, a few clergy, and two government representatives. Classifying alcoholism as a mental illness, members of the commission blamed widespread alcoholism on the tsarist government, which relied heavily on liquor revenues and refused to improve the socioeconomic conditions of the lower classes. Although they accepted the definition of alcoholism as a disease, professionals could not agree on exactly what it was, what caused it, or how to cure it. These were topics of heated debate, and they could not be seriously discussed without critical analysis of the government’s social and economic policies. Hence, the range of opinions expressed in professional discourse over alcoholism reflected the fragmentation of middle-class ideologies near the end of the imperial period: the abstract civic values of liberalism and modernization as borrowed from the West; a powerful and persistent model of custodial statehood; and a pervasive culture of collectivism. With the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, definitions of alcoholism changed. Seeking Marxist interpretations for most social ills, Soviet health practitioners defined alcoholism as a petit bourgeois phenomenon, a holdover from the tsarist past. Working from the premise that illness could only be understood in its social context, they determined that alcoholism was a social disease influenced by factors such as illiteracy, poverty, and poor living conditions. In 1926 the director of the State Institute for Social Hygiene, A. V. Molkov, opened a department, headed by E. I. Deichman, for the sole purpose of studying alcoholism as a social disease. Within four years, however, the department was closed and the institute disbanded. By placing blame for alcoholism on social causes, Molkov, Deichman, and others were, in effect, criticizing the state’s social policies—a dangerous position in the Stalinist 1930s. In 1933 Josef Stalin announced that success was being achieved in the construction of socialism in the USSR; therefore, it was no longer plagued by petit bourgeois problems such as alcoholism. For the next fifty-two years, alcoholism did not officially exist in the Soviet Union. Consequently, all public discussion of alcoholism ended until 1985, when Mikhail S. Gorbachev launched a nationwide but ill-fated temperance campaign. See also: ALCOHOL MONOPOLY; VODKA BIBLIOGRAPHY Herlihy, Patricia. (2002). The Alcoholic Empire: Vodka and Politics in Late Imperial Russia. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Segal, Boris. (1987). Russian Drinking: Use and Abuse of Alcohol in Prerevolutionary Russia. New Brunswick, NJ: Publications Division, Rutgers Center of Alcohol Studies. Segal, Boris. (1990). The Drunken Society: Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism in the Soviet Union, a Comparative Study. New York: Hippocrene Books. White, Stephan. (1996). Russia Goes Dry: Alcohol, State, and Society. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. KATE TRANSCHEL ALCOHOL MONOPOLY Ever since the last quarter of the fifteenth century, Moscovite princes have exercised control over the production and sale of vodka. In 1553 Ivan IV (the Terrible) rewarded some of his administrative elite (oprichnina) for loyal service with the concession of owning kabaks or taverns. Even so, these tavern owners had to pay a fee for such concessions. Under Boris Godunov (1598–1605), the state exerted ALCOHOL MONOPOLY ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY 29 ALCOHOL MONOPOLY greater control over vodka, a monopoly that was codified in the 1649 Ulozhenie (code of laws). Disputes over the succession to the throne at the end of the seventeenth century loosened state control over vodka, but Peter I (the Great, r. 1682–1725) reasserted strict control over the state monopoly. Catherine II (the Great, r. 1762–1796) allowed the gentry to sell vodka to the state. Since the state did not have sufficient administrators to collect revenue from sales, merchants were allowed to purchase concessions that entitled them to a monopoly of vodka sales in a given area for a specified period of time. For this concession, merchants paid the state a fixed amount that was based on their anticipated sales. These tax-farmers (otkupshchiki) assured the state of steady revenue. The percentage of total revenue derived from vodka sales increased from 11 percent in 1724 to 30 per cent in 1795. Between 1798 and 1825, Tsars Paul I and Alexander I attempted to restore a state monopoly, but gentry and merchants, who profited from the tax-farming system, resisted their attempts. Under the tax-farming system, prices for vodka could be set high and the quality of the product was sometimes questionable. Complaining of adulteration and price gouging, some people in the late 1850s boycotted buying vodka and sacked distilleries. As part of the great reforms that accompanied the emancipation of the serfs, the tax-farming system was abolished in 1863, to be replaced by an excise system. By the late 1890s, it was estimated that about one-third of the excise taxes never reached the state treasury due to fraud. Alexander III called for the establishment of a state vodka monopoly (vinnaia monopoliia) in order to curb drunkenness. In 1893 his minister of finances, Sergei Witte, presented to the State Council a proposal for the establishment of the state vodka monopoly. He argued that if the state became the sole purchaser and seller of all spirits produced for the internal market, it could regulate the quality of vodka, as well as limit sales so that people would learn to drink in a regular but moderate fashion. Witte insisted that the monopoly was an attempt to reform the drinking habits of people and not to increase revenue. The result, however, was that the sale of vodka became the single greatest source of state revenue and also one of the largest industries in Russia. By 1902, when the state monopoly had taken hold, the state garnered 341 million rubles; by 1911, the sum reached 594 million. By 1914, vodka revenue comprised one-third of the state’s income. Established in 1894, the monopoly took effect in the eastern provinces of Orenburg, Perm, Samara, and Ufa in 1896. By July 1896, it was introduced in the southwest, to the provinces of Bessarabia, Volynia, Podolia, Kherson, Kiev, Chernigov, Poltava, Tavrida, and Ekaterinoslav. Seven provinces in Belarus and Lithuania had the monopoly by 1897, followed by ten provinces in the Kingdom of Poland and in St. Petersburg, spreading to cover all of European Russia and western Siberia by 1902 and a large part of eastern Siberia by 1904. The goal was to close down the taverns and restrict the sale of alcoholic beverages to state liquor stores. Restaurants would be allowed to serve alcoholic beverages, but state employees in government shops would handle most of the trade. The introduction of the monopoly caused a great deal of financial loss for tavern owners, many of whom were Jews. Because the state vodka was inexpensive and of uniformly pure quality, sales soared. Bootleggers, often women, bought vodka from state stores and resold it when the stores were closed. In 1895 the state created a temperance society, the Guardianship of Public Sobriety (Popechitel’stvo o narodnoi trezvosti), in part to demonstrate its interest in encouraging moderation in the consumption of alcohol. Composed primarily of government officials, with dignitaries as honorary members, the Guardianship received a small percentage of the vodka revenues from the state; these funds were intended for use in promoting moderation in drink. Most of the limited sums were used to produce entertainments, thus founding popular theater in Russia. Only a small amount was used for clinics to treat alcoholics. Private temperance societies harshly criticized the Guardianship for promoting moderation rather than strict abstinence, accusing it of hypocrisy and futility. With the mobilization of troops in August 1914, Nicholas II declared a prohibition on the consumption of vodka for the duration of the war. At first alcoholism was reduced, but peasants soon began to produce moonshine (samogon) on a massive scale. This moonshine, together with the lethal use of alcoholic substitutes, took its toll. The use of scarce grain for profitable moonshine also exacerbated food shortages in the cities. In St. Petersburg, food riots contributed to the abdication of Nicholas in February 1917. 30 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY The new Bolshevik regime was a strict adherent to prohibition until 1924, when prohibition was relaxed. A full state monopoly of vodka was reinstated in August 1925, largely for fiscal reasons. While Stalin officially discouraged drunkenness, in 1930 he gave orders to maximize vodka production in the middle of his First Five-Year Plan for rapid industrialization. The Soviet state maintained a monopoly on vodka. As soon as Mikhail Gorbachev became general secretary of the Communist Party in 1985, he began a major drive to eliminate alcoholism, primarily by limiting the hours and venues for the sale of vodka. This aggressive campaign contributed to Gorbachev’s unpopularity. After he launched his anti-alcohol drive, the Soviet government annually lost between 8 and 11 billion rubles (equivalent to 13 to 17 billion U.S. dollars, at the 1990 exchange rate) in liquor tax revenue. After Gorbachev’s fall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the state vodka monopoly was abolished in May 1992. Boris Yeltsin attempted to reinstate the monopoly in June 1993, but by that time floods of cheap vodka had been imported and many domestic factories had gone out of business. Although President Vladimir Putin issued an order in February 1996 acknowledging that Yeltsin’s attempt to reestablish the vodka monopoly in 1993 had failed, he has also tried to control and expand domestic production and sales of vodka. The tax code of January 1, 1999 imposed only a 5 percent excise tax on vodka in order to stimulate domestic consumption. By buying large numbers of shares in vodka distilleries, controlling their management, and attacking criminal elements in the business, Putin has attempted to reestablish state control over vodka. See also: ALCOHOLISM; TAXES; VODKA; WITTE, SERGEI YULIEVICH BIBLIOGRAPHY Christian, David. (1990). “Living Water”: Vodka and Russian Society on the Eve of Emancipation. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Herlihy, Patricia. (2002). The Alcoholic Empire: Vodka and Politics in Late Imperial Russia. New York: Oxford University Press. LeDonne, John. (1976). “Indirect Taxes in Catherine’s Russia II. The Liquor Monopoly.” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 24(2): 175–207. Pechenuk, Volodimir. (1980). “Temperance and Revenue Raising: The Goals of the Russian State Liquor Monopoly, 1894–1914.” New England Slavonic Journal 1: 35–48.. Sherwell, Arthur. (1915). The Russian Vodka Monopoly. London: White, Stephen. (1996). Russia Goes Dry: Alcohol, State, and Society. New York: Cambridge University Press. PATRICIA HERLIHY ALEXANDER I (1777–1825), emperor of Russia from 1801–1825, son of Emperor Paul I and Maria Fyodorovna, grandson of Empress Catherine the Great. CHILDHOOD AND EDUCATION When Alexander was a few months old, Catherine removed him from the care of his parents and brought him to her court, where she closely oversaw his education and upbringing. Together with his brother Konstantin Pavlovich, born in 1779, Alexander grew up amid the French cultural influences, numerous sexual intrigues, and enlightened political ideas of Catherine’s court. Catherine placed General Nikolai Ivanovich Saltykov in charge of Alexander’s education when he was six years old. Alexander’s religious education was entrusted to Andrei Samborsky, a Russian Orthodox priest who had lived in England, dressed like an Englishman, and scandalized Russian conservatives with his progressive ways. The most influential of Alexander’s tutors was Frederick Cesar LaHarpe, a prominent Swiss of republican principles who knew nothing of Russia. Alexander learned French, history, and political theory from LaHarpe. Through LaHarpe Alexander became acquainted with liberal political ideas of republican government, reform, and enlightened monarchy. In sharp contrast to the formative influences on Alexander emanating from his grandmother’s court were the influences of Gatchina, the court of Alexander’s parents. Alexander and Konstantin regularly visited their parents and eight younger siblings at Gatchina, where militarism and Prussian influence were dominant. Clothing and hair styles differed between the two courts, as did the entire tone of life. While Catherine’s court was dominated by endless social extravaganzas and discussion of ideas, Paul’s court focused on the minutiae of military drills and parade ground performance. ALEXANDER I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY 31 ALEXANDER I Tsar Alexander I. © MICHAEL NICHOLSON/CORBIS The atmosphere of Gatchina was set by Paul’s sudden bursts of rage and by a coarse barracks mentality. Alexander’s early life was made more complicated by the fact that Catherine, the present empress, and Paul, the future emperor, hated each other. Alexander was required to pass between these two courts and laugh at the insults which each of these powerful personages hurled at the other, while always remaining mindful of the fact that one presently held his fate in her hands and the other would determine his fate in the future. This complex situation may have contributed to Alexander’s internal contradictions, indecisiveness, and dissimulation as an adult. ALEXANDER’S MARRIED LIFE When Alexander was fifteen, Catherine arranged a marriage for him with fourteen-year-old Princess Louisa of Baden (the future Empress Elizabeth) who took the name Elizabeth Alexeyevna when she converted to Russian Orthodoxy prior to the marriage. Although Alexander’s youth prevented him from developing a passionate attachment to his wife, they became confidants and maintained a lukewarm relationship for the rest of their lives. Their relationship endured Alexander’s long-term liaison with his mistress, Maria Naryshkina, his flirtations with a number of noblewomen throughout Europe, and rumors of an affair between Alexander’s wife, Elizabeth, and his close friend and advisor, Adam Czartoryski. Czartoryski was reputed to be the father of the daughter born in 1799 to Elizabeth. Alexander and Elizabeth had no children who survived infancy. THE REIGN AND DEATH OF PAUL In November 1796, a few weeks before Alexander’s nineteenth birthday, Empress Catherine died. There is some evidence that Catherine intended to bypass her son Paul and name Alexander as her heir. However, no such official proclamation was made during Catherine’s lifetime, and Paul became the new emperor of Russia. Paul almost immediately began alienating the major power groups within Russia. He alienated liberal-minded Russians by imposing censorship and closing private printing presses. He alienated the military by switching to Prussianstyle uniforms, bypassing respected commanders, and issuing arbitrary commands. He alienated merchants and gentry by disrupting trade with Britain and thus hurting the Russian economy. Finally, he alienated the nobility by arbitrarily disgracing prominent noblemen and by ordering part of the Russian army to march to India. Not surprisingly, by March 1801 a plot had been hatched to remove Paul from the throne. The chief conspirators were Count Peter Pahlen, who was governor-general of St. Petersburg, General Leonty Bennigsen, and Platon Zubov—Empress Catherine’s last lover—along with his two brothers, Nicholas and Valerian. Alexander was aware of the conspiracy but believed, or told himself that he believed, that Paul would be forced to abdicate but would not be killed. Paul was killed in the scuffle of the takeover. On March 12, 1801, Alexander, accompanied by a burden of remorse and guilt for patricide that accompanied him for the rest of his life, became Emperor Alexander I. REFORM ATTEMPTS Alexander’s reign began with a burst of reforms and the hope for a substantial overhaul of Russian government and society. Alexander revoked the sentences of about twelve thousand people sentenced to prison or exile by Emperor Paul; he eased restrictions on foreign travel, reopened private printing houses, and lessened censorship. Four of 32 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY Alexander’s most liberal friends formed a Secret Committee to help the young emperor plan sweeping reforms for Russia. The committee consisted of Prince Adam Czartoryski, Count Paul Stroganov, Count Victor Kochubei, and Nikolai Novosiltsev. During the first few years of his reign, Alexander improved the status of the Senate, reorganized the government into eight departments, and established new universities at Dorpat, Kazan, Kharkov, and Vilna. He also increased funding for secondary schools. Alexander did not, however, end serfdom or grant Russia a constitution. This series of reforms was brought to an end by Russian involvement in the Napoleonic Wars. In 1807, following the Treaty of Tilsit, Mikhail Speransky became Alexander’s assistant, and emphasis was again placed on reform. With Speransky’s guidance, Alexander created an advisory Council of State. Speransky was also responsible for an elementary school reform law, a law requiring applicants for the higher ranks of state service to take a written examination, and reforms in taxation. In addition, Speransky created a proposal for reorganizing local government and for creating a national legislative assembly. Speransky’s reforms aroused a storm of criticism from Russian conservatives, especially members of the imperial family. Alexander dismissed Speransky in 1812 just prior to resuming the war against Napoleon. In his place Alexander chose Alexei Arakcheyev, an advisor with a much different outlook, to assist him for the remainder of his reign. NAPOLEONIC WARS The most momentous event of Alexander’s reign was Russia’s involvement in the Napoleonic Wars. Alexander began his reign by proclaiming Russian neutrality in the European conflict. However, during 1804 Russian public opinion became increasingly anti-French as a result of an incident in Baden—the homeland of Empress Elizabeth. The Duc d’Enghien, a member of the French royal family, was kidnapped from Baden, taken to France, and executed by the French government. Alexander and the Russian court were outraged by this act. The following year the Third Coalition was formed by Britain, Russia, and Austria. On December 2, 1805, Napoleon defeated a combined Russian and Austrian army at the Battle of Austerlitz. The Russians suffered approximately 26,000 casualties. After two major losses by their Prussian ally, the Russians were again resoundingly defeated at the Battle of Friedland in June 1807. This battle resulted in about 15,000 Russian casualties in one day. Following the defeat at Friedland, the Russians sued for peace. The terms of the resulting Treaty of Tilsit were worked out by Alexander and Napoleon while they met on a raft anchored in the Nieman River. According to the agreement, Russia and France became allies, and Russia agreed to participate in the Continental System, Napoleon’s blockade of British trade. A secondary Franco-Prussian treaty, also agreed upon at Tilsit, reduced Prussian territory, but perhaps saved Prussia. The Treaty of Tilsit was extremely unpopular with the Russian nobility, who suffered economically from the loss of exports to Britain. In addition, Russian and French foreign policy aims differed over the Near East, the Balkans, and Poland. By June 1812, the Tilsit agreement had broken down, and Napoleon’s army invaded Russia. Initially, the Russian forces were under the command of Generral Barclay de Tolley. The Russians suffered several defeats, including the loss of the city of Smolensk, as Napoleon’s forces moved deeper into Russia. Alexander then gave command of the Russian army to Field Marshal Mikhail Kutuzov. Kutuzov continued the policy of trading space for time and keeping the Russian army just out of reach of Napoleon’s forces. Finally, under pressure from Russian public opinion, which was critical of the continuous retreats, Kutuzov took a stand on September 7, 1812, at the village of Borodino, west of Moscow. The ensuing Battle of Borodino was one of the epic battles of European history. Napoleon’s forces numbering about 130,000, faced about 120,000 Russian troops. During the oneday battle some 42,000 Russian casualties occurred, with about 58,000 casualties among the Napoleonic forces. Each side claimed victory, although the Russian forces retreated and allowed Napoleon to enter Moscow unchallenged. Napoleon believed that the occupation of Moscow would bring an end to the war with Russia. Instead, Napoleon’s forces entered the city to find that most of Moscow’s inhabitants had fled and that Alexander refused to negotiate. To make matters worse, a few hours after the Napoleonic army arrived in Moscow, numerous fires broke out in the city, causing perhaps three-quarters of the city’s structures to burn down. Responsibility for the burning of Moscow has been disputed. Napoleon apparently believed that the fires were set on the orders of Count Fyodor Rostopchin, the governor-general of the city. The Russian public, on ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY 33 ALEXANDER I ALEXANDER I the other hand, blamed careless French looters. The burning of Moscow had the effect of creating a swell of Russian patriotism and solidifying the determination of the Russians to resist Napoleon’s forces. After little more than a month in occupation, faced with insufficient food and shelter, Napoleon abandoned the burned-out shell of Moscow and retreated westward. The Russian army was able to maneuver the Napoleonic forces into retreating along the same route by which they had entered Russia, thus ensuring that there would be little or no fodder available for the horses and a shortage of supplies for the men. The shortage of provisions, combined with the onslaught of winter and continued harassment by Cossacks and peasant guerillas, resulted in the destruction of Napoleon’s army without Kutuzov subjecting the Russian troops to another pitched battle. Alexander insisted upon continuing the war after the last French troops had left Russian soil. A new coalition was formed among Russia, Austria, and Prussia. Their combined forces defeated Napoleon at the Battle of Leipzig in October 1813. By March 1814, Russian troops were in Paris. Alexander played a central role in the diplomatic negotiations that determined the form of the Bourbon restoration in France and the initial disposition of Napoleon on Elba. Alexander was also a key figure at the Congress of Vienna where the boundaries of the European states were redrawn. HOLY ALLIANCE AND MYSTICISM In September 1815, Russia, Austria, and Prussia signed the Holy Alliance at Alexander’s urging. The Holy Alliance envisioned a Europe in which Christian principles would form the basis for international relations. Although the Holy Alliance had no practical effect, it provides a picture of Alexander’s state of mind at that time. Alexander had been a religious skeptic since his days as a student of Samborsky and LaHarpe. However, in November 1812, Alexander joined the Russian Bible Society headed by his friend Prince Alexander Golitsyn. The Russian Bible Society sought to translate and distribute Russian language scriptures. During 1814 Empress Elizabeth introduced Alexander to the mystic Johann JungStilling. However, Alexander’s immersion into mysticism began in earnest when he met Livonian Baroness Julie von Krudener in 1815. The height of her influence occurred in September 1815, when Alexander staged a massive review of Russian troops on the plain of Vertus in France. As part of the ceremony, seven altars were erected and a Te Deum was celebrated. The Holy Alliance was signed a few weeks later. Alexander lost interest in von Krudener when he returned to Russia late in 1815. MILITARY COLONIES AND LATTER YEARS Alexander relied increasingly on Arakcheyev to oversee the day-to-day business of running the Russian empire. Arakcheyev’s notable, though dubious, achievement was the creation of military colonies. The military colonies were an experiment in regimented agriculture. The underlying idea was to create a military reserve by organizing villages of peasant-soldiers who would be ready to fight when needed but who would also be self-supporting. The peasants were to wear uniforms, live precisely regimented lives in identical cottages, and farm their fields with parade ground precision. Individual preference was not taken into consideration when marriage partners were selected, and women were ordered to bear one child per year. Brutal penalties deterred deviations from the rules. The last years of Alexander’s reign were marred by uprisings in Arakcheyev’s military colonies and the rebellion of the Semenovsky Regiment. Alexander’s government became increasingly repressive. Censorship was intensified, tighter control was placed over the universities, and landlords were given more power over the fate of their serfs. Under the influence of Archimandrite Photius, Alexander moved away from mysticism and closer to the Russian Orthodox Church. Masonic lodges were closed, and the Russian Bible Society was blocked from its goal of distributing Bibles in Russian. The reign which had begun with the hope of liberal reforms had moved full circle and ended as a bastion of repression. In the fall of 1825 Alexander accompanied Empress Elizabeth to Taganrog when her doctors ordered her to leave St. Petersburg and move to a warmer climate. Alexander became ill on October 27 while touring the Crimea. He died on December 1, 1825, in Taganrog. Although Alexander’s body was returned to St. Petersburg for burial, the closed casket gave rise to rumors that Alexander had not died. A legend developed that a Siberian holy man by the name of Fyodor Kuzmich was Alexander living incognito. 34 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY See also: CATHERINE II; ELIZABETH; HOLY ALLIANCE; NAPOLEON I; PAUL I; SPERANSKY, MIKHAIL MIKHAILOVICH BIBLIOGRAPHY Grimstead, Patricia Kennedy. (1969). The Foreign Ministers of Alexander I: Political Attitudes and the Conduct of Russian Diplomacy, 1801–1825. Berkeley: University of California Press. Lincoln, W. Bruce. (1981). The Romanovs. New York: The Dial Press. Palmer, Alan. (1974). Alexander I, Tsar of War and Peace. New York: Harper and Row. Riasanovsky, Nicholas V. (1984). A History of Russia, 6th ed. New York: Oxford University Press. Troyat, Henri. (1982). Alexander of Russia, Napoleon’s Conqueror, tr. Joan Pinkham. New York: Dutton. JEAN K. BERGER ALEXANDER II (1818–1881), tsar and emperor of Russia from 1855 to 1881. Alexander Nicholayevich Romanov is largely remembered for two events—his decision to emancipate the serfs and his assassination at the hands of revolutionaries. That the same tsar who finally ended serfdom in Russia would become the only tsar to be assassinated by political terrorists illustrates the turbulence of his time and its contradictions. EDUCATION AND THE GREAT REFORMS Alexander was born in Moscow on April 17, 1818, the oldest son of Nicholas I. His education, unlike that of his father, prepared him for his eventual role as tsar from an early age. Initially his upbringing consisted primarily of military matters. Nicholas had his son named the head of a hussar regiment when Alexander was a few days old, and he received promotions throughout childhood. When he was six, Captain K. K. Merder, the head of a Moscow military school, became his first tutor. Merder was a career army man who combined a love for the military with a compassion for others. Both qualities attracted the tsarevich and shaped his outlook. Alexander also received instruction from Vasily Zhukovsky, the famous poet, who crafted a plan for education that stressed virtue and enlightenment. The young tsarevich Alexander II, the Tsar Liberator. © ARCHIVE PHOTOS, 530 WEST 25TH STREET, NEW YORK, NY 10001. made journeys throughout the Russian Empire and in Europe, and in 1837 he became the first emperor to visit Siberia, where he even met with Decembrists and petitioned his father to improve their conditions. During his trip to Europe in 1838 Alexander fell in love with a princess from the small German state of Hesse-Darmstadt. Although Nicholas I desired a better match for his son, Alexander married Maria Alexandrova in April 1841. They would have eight children, two of whom died young. Their third child, Alexander, was born in 1845 and eventually became the heir. Nicholas I included his son in both the symbolic and practical aspects of governing. Nicholas had not received training for his role and believed that he was unprepared for the responsibilities of a Russian autocrat. He did not want Alexander to have a similar experience, and he included his son in the frequent parades, military spectacles, and other symbolic aspects central to the Nicholavan political system. Alexander loved these events and he took pleasure in participating at the numerous exercises held by Nicholas I. In several important respects, this military culture shaped Alexander’s beliefs about ruling Russia. ALEXANDER II ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY 35 ALEXANDER II Alexander also became a member of imperial councils, supervised the operation of military schools, and even presided over State Council meetings when his father could not. In 1846, Nicholas named Alexander chairman of the Secret Committee on Peasant Affairs, where the tsarevich demonstrated support of the existing socio-political order. In short, Alexander grew up in a system that stressed the necessity of an autocrat for governing Russia and he learned to worship his father from an early age. His education and training gave no indication of the momentous decisions he would make as tsar. Few would have predicated the circumstances in which Alexander became emperor. Nicholas I died in 1855 amidst the disastrous Crimean War. Russia’s eventual loss was evident by the time of Nicholas’s death, and the defeat did much to undermine the entire Nicholaven system and its ideology of Official Nationality. Alexander had absorbed his father’s belief in the autocracy, but he was forced by the circumstances of war to adopt policies that would fundamentally change Russia and its political system. Alexander became emperor on February 19, 1855, a day that would reappear again during the course of his reign. His coronation as Russian Emperor took place in Moscow on August 26, 1856. Between these two dates Alexander grappled with the ongoing war, which went from bad to worse. Sevastopol, the fortified city in the Crimea that became the defining site of the war, fell on September 9, 1855. Alexander began peace negotiations and signed the resulting Treaty of Paris on March 30, 1856. Russia lost its naval rights in the Black Sea in addition to 500,000 soldiers lost fighting the war. The prestige of the Russian army, which had acquired almost mythical status since 1812, dissipated with defeat. The events of the first year of his reign forced Alexander’s hand—Crimea had demonstrated the necessity for reform, and Alexander acted. Immediately after the war, Alexander uttered the most famous words of his reign when he answered a group of Moscow nobles in 1856 who asked about his intention to free the serfs: “I cannot tell you that I totally oppose this; we live in an era in which this must eventually happen. I believe that you are of the same opinion as I; therefore, it will be much better if this takes place from above than from below.” Alexander’s words speak volumes about the way in which the tsar conceived of reform—it was a necessity, but it was better to enact change within the autocratic system. This blend of reform-mindedness with a simultaneous commitment to autocracy became the hallmark of the era that followed. Once he had decided on reform, Alexander II relied on the advice of his ministers and bureaucracies. Nevertheless, Alexander did much to end serfdom in Russia, an act his predecessors had failed to enact. The process of emancipation was a complicated and controversial affair. It began in 1856, when Alexander II formed a secret committee to elicit proposals for the reform and did not end until 1861, when the emancipation decree was issued on February 19. In between these two dates Alexander dealt with a great deal of debate, opposition, and compromise. Emancipation affected twenty million serfs and nearly thirty million state peasants, or 8 percent of the Russian population. By contrast, four million slaves were freed in the United States in 1863. Although the end result did not fully satisfy anyone, a fundamental break had been made in the economy and society of Russia. Even Alexander Herzen, who had labeled Nicholas I as a “snake that strangled Russia,” exclaimed: “Thou hast conquered, Galilean!” Because of Alexander’s role, he became known as the Tsar-Liberator. Once emancipation had been completed, Alexander proceeded to approve further reforms, often referred to by historians as the Great Reforms. The tsar himself did not participate as much in the changes that came after 1861, but Alexander appointed the men who would be responsible for drafting reforms and gave the final approval on the changes. Between 1864 and 1874 Alexander promulgated a new local government reform (creating the zemstvo), a new judicial reform, educational reforms, a relaxed censorship law, and a new military law. All were carried out in the new spirit of glasnost, or “giving voice,” that Alexander advocated. The tsar relied on officials who had been trained during his father’s years on the throne, and thus the reforms are also associated with the names of Nicholas Milyutin, Petr Valuev, Dmitry Milyutin, and other “enlightened bureaucrats.” Additionally, Russians from all walks of life debated the reforms and their specifics in an atmosphere that contrasted starkly with Nicholas I’s Russia. This new spirit brought with it a multitude of reactions and opinions. Alexander, a committed autocrat throughout the reform era, had to deal with rebellions and revolutionaries almost immediately after launching his reforms. These reactions were 36 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY a natural product of the more relaxed era and of the policies Alexander advocated, even if he did not foresee all of their consequences. In particular, Alexander’s decision to reform Russia helped to fuel a revolt in Poland, then a part of the Russian Empire. Polish nationalism in 1863 led to a Warsaw rebellion that demanded more freedoms. In the face of this opposition, Alexander reacted in the same manner as his father, brutally suppressing the revolt. Unlike his father, however, Alexander did not embark on a policy of Russification in other areas of the Empire, and even allowed the Finnish parliament to meet again in 1863 as a reward for loyalty to the empire. At home, the reform era only served to embolden Russians who wanted the country to engage in more radical changes. The educated public in the 1850s and 1860s openly debated the details of the Great Reforms and found many of them wanting. As a result of his policies, Alexander helped to spawn a politically radical movement that called for an end to autocracy. A group that called itself “Land and Liberty” formed in Russia’s universities and called for a more violent and total revolution among the Russian peasantry. A similar group known as the Organization made calls for radical change at the same time. On April 6, 1866, a member of this group, Dmitry Karakazov, fired six times at Alexander while he walked in the Summer Garden but spectacularly missed. Although the reform era was not officially over, 1866 marked a watershed in the life of Alexander II and his country. The tsar did not stay committed to the path of reform while the opposition that the era had unleashed only grew. LATER YEARS Alexander had let loose the forces that eventually killed him, but between 1866 and 1881 Russia experienced many more significant changes. Karakazov’s attempt on Alexander’s life came during a period of domestic turmoil for Alexander. The year before, the tsar’s eldest son, Nicholas, died at the age of twenty-two. Three months after the assassination attempt, Alexander began an affair with an eighteen-year old princess, Ekaterina Dolgorukaia, which lasted for the remainder of his life (he later married her). Responding to the growing revolutionary movement, Alexander increased the powers of the Third Section, the notorious secret police formed by Nicholas I. The reform era and the initial spirit associated with it had changed irrevocably by 1866 even if it had not run its course. Tsar Alexander II. © HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS Alexander began to concentrate on his role as emperor during the late 1860s and 1870s. In particular, he engaged in empire building and eventually warfare. He oversaw the Russian conquest of Central Asia that brought Turkestan, Tashkent, Samarkand, Khiva, and Kokand under Russian control. The gains in Central Asia came with a diplomatic cost, however. Expansion so near to the borders of India ensured that England looked on with increasing alarm at Russian imperialism, and during this period a “cold war” developed between the two powers. Russia also pursued a more aggressive stance toward the Ottoman Empire, in part fueled by the rise of pan-Slavism at home. When Orthodox subjects rebelled against Turkey in 1875, numerous Russians called on the tsar to aid their fellow Slavs. Alexander, reluctant at first, eventually gave in to public opinion, particularly after Ottoman forces in 1876 slaughtered nearly thirty thousand Bulgarians who had come to aid the insurgents. Russia declared war on April 12, 1877. Although Russia experienced some difficulty in defeating the Turks, particularly at the fortress of Plevna, the ALEXANDER II ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY 37 ALEXANDER III war was presented to the Russian public as an attempt to liberate Orthodox subjects from Muslim oppression. Alexander’s image as liberator featured prominently in the popular prints, press reports, and other accounts of the war. When Russian forces took Plevna in December 1877, they began a march to Istanbul that brought them to the gates of the Turkish capital. In the Caucasus, the final act took place on February 19, 1878, when Russian forces “liberated” the Turkish city of Erzerum. Russia and the Ottoman Empire signed the Treaty of San Stefano in March, which guaranteed massive Russian gains in the region. Alexander once more appeared to fulfill the role of Tsar-Liberator. Alarmed by these developments, the European powers, including Russia’s Prussian and Austrian allies, held an international conference in Berlin. Alexander saw most of his gains whittled away in an effort to prevent Russian hegemony in the Balkans. The resulting confusions helped to sow the seeds for the origins of World War I, but also provoked widespread disillusionment in Russia. Alexander considered the Berlin Treaty to be the worst moment in his career. Alexander’s domestic troubles only increased after 1878. The revolutionaries had not given up their opposition to the progress and scope of reform, and many Russian radicals began to focus their attention on the autocracy as the major impediment to future changes. A new Land and Freedom group emerged in the 1870s that called for all land to be given to the peasants and for a government that listened to “the will of the people.” By the end of the decade, the organization had split into two groups. The Black Repartition focused on the land question, while the People’s Will sought to establish a new political system in Russia by assassinating the tsar. After numerous attempts, they succeeded in their quest on March 1, 1881. As Alexander rode near the Catherine Canal, a bomb went off near the tsar’s carriage, injuring several people. Alexander stepped out to inspect the damage when a second bomb landed at his feet and exploded. He was carried to the Winter Palace, where he died from massive blood loss. Ironically, or perhaps fittingly, Alexander II was on his way to discuss the possibility of establishing a national assembly and a new constitution. This final reform would not be completed, and Alexander’s era ended with him. The tsar’s son and grandson, the future Alexander III and Nicholas II, were at the deathbed, and the sight of the autocrat dying as a result of his reforms would shape their respective rules. As Larissa Zakharova has concluded, the act of March 1 initiated the bloody trail to Russia’s tragic twentieth century. Alexander II’s tragedy became Russia’s. See also: BERLIN, CONGRESS OF; BLACK REPARTITION; CRIMEAN WAR; EMANCIPATION ACT; NICHOLAS I; PARIS, CONGRESS AND TREATY OF 1856; PEOPLE’S WILL, THE; RUSSO-TURKISH WARS; SERFDOM; ZEMSTVO BIBLIOGRAPHY Eklof, Ben; Bushnell, John; and Zakharova, Larissa, eds. (1994). Russia’s Great Reforms, 1855–1881. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Field, Daniel. (1976). The End of Serfdom: Nobility and Bureaucracy in Russia, 1855–1861. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Lincoln, W. Bruce. (1990). The Great Reforms: Autocracy, Bureaucracy, and the Politics of Change in Imperial Russia. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press. Moss, Walter. (2002). Russia in the Age of Alexander II, Tolstoy, and Dostoyevsky. London: Anthem Press. Mosse, Werner. (1962). Alexander II and the Modernization of Russia. NY: Collier. Rieber, Alfred. (1971). “Alexander II: A Revisionist View” Journal of Modern History. 43: 42–58. Tolstoy, Leo. (1995). Anna Karenina. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Wortman, Richard. (2000). Scnearios of Power: Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy, Vol. 2: From Alexander II to the Abdication of Nicholas II. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Zakharova, Larissa. (1996). “Emperor Alexander II, 1855–1881.” In The Emperors and Empresses of Russia: Rediscovering the Romanovs, ed. Donald Raleigh. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. STEPHEN M. NORRIS ALEXANDER III (1845–1894), Alexander Alexandrovich, emperor of Russia from March 1, 1881 to October 20, 1894. The second son of Alexander Nikolayevich (Alexander II), the heir to the Russian throne, the future Alexander III was born in the Winter Palace in St. Petersburg in February 1845. He was one of six brothers and was educated alongside Nicholas (b. 1843) who, after the death of Nicholas I in 1855, became the heir to the throne. One of the most im38 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY portant parts of their education was schooling in military matters. This was especially important for Alexander, who was expected to occupy his time with the army and never to have to undertake anything other than ceremonial duties. His situation changed dramatically in 1865 when Nicholas died from meningitis and Alexander became heir to his father, Alexander II. The prospect of the twentyyear-old Alexander becoming emperor horrified his tutors. He had been a dogged pupil, displaying no great spark of intelligence, and had shown no real maturity during his studies. But after his brother’s death, a major effort was made to enhance Alexander’s education to prepare him properly to become emperor. His contemporaries commented on his honesty and decency, but they also noted Alexander’s obstinacy and his reluctance to change his mind. For Alexander himself, his marriage in 1866 to the Danish princess Dagmar was more important than education. She had been engaged to his brother Nicholas before his death, and marriage to Alexander was seen by both sides as an “alliance,” rather than being a love-match. But the marriage turned out to be extremely happy and Maria Fyodorovna (as his wife was known in Russia) became an important support to her husband. Alexander was devoted to his family and enjoyed being with his five children: Nicholas (b.1868), George (b. 1871), Xenia (b. 1875), Mikhail (b. 1878), and Olga (b. 1882). An assassination attempt on Alexander II in 1866 brought home to the new heir to the throne the gravity of his status. He did not relish the prospect of becoming emperor, but nevertheless engaged in the official duties that were required of him with determination and interest. While his father was implementing the Great Reforms of the 1860s and 1870s, the heir to the throne was developing views that conflicted fundamentally with those of Alexander II. The young Alexander believed firmly in the dominance of the Russian autocracy and was deeply opposed to any attempt to weaken the autocrat’s grip on the country. He was especially keen to see Russian interests prevail across the empire and wanted severe treatment for national minority groups, such as the Poles, that tried to assert their autonomy. These views were reinforced by Alexander’s experience of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878. He argued strongly in favor of Russian intervention in support of the Slav population of the Ottoman Empire and fought alongside Russian troops. The war strengthened his belief in the danger of weak Tsar Alexander III. © ARCHIVO ICONOGRAFICO, S.A./CORBIS authority and this was especially relevant to Russia itself at the end of the 1870s. Terrorist activity was increasing and Alexander wrote in his diary of the “horrible and disgusting years” that Russia was going through. There were repeated attempts on the emperor’s life and, in March 1881, terrorists from the People’s Will group threw a bomb at Alexander II and succeeded in killing him. The emperor died, horribly injured, in the arms of his wife and son. The assassination of the Tsar-Liberator confirmed the new Alexander III in his deeply conservative views. He moved very swiftly to distance himself from the policies and ethos of his father. The new emperor showed no mercy toward his father’s killers, rejecting all appeals for clemency for them. In the immediate aftermath of the assassination, legislation was introduced giving the government wide use of emergency powers. At the time of his death, Alexander II had been about to approve the establishment of a national consultative assembly, but the new emperor very quickly made it clear that he would not permit limitations on autocratic rule, and the project was abandoned. The new emperor and his family moved out of St. ALEXANDER III ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY 39 ALEXANDER III Petersburg to live in the palace at Gatchina, a grim fortress-like building associated with Paul I. It was clear that the whole tone of Alexander III’s reign was to be different. Instead of the European-orientated reforms of Alexander II, the new emperor was determined to follow the “Russian path,” which he understood to be a forceful autocracy, proudly national in its actions and with the Orthodox Church providing a link between emperor and the people. Many of Alexander II’s ministers and advisers were rapidly removed from office and were replaced by men with impeccable conservative credentials. Prime amongst them were Konstantin Pobedonostsev, officially only procurator-general of the Holy Synod (the lay official who governed the Orthodox Church), but who played a key role in guiding policy across a wide range of areas, and Dmitry Tolstoy, minister of internal affairs for most of the 1880s. The non-Russian nationalities of the empire were subjected to cultural and administrative Russification. This was especially fierce in the Baltic provinces of the empire, where the use of the Russian language was made compulsory in the courts and in local government and where the local German-speaking university was compelled to provide teaching in Russian. This approach also included encouraging non-Orthodox peoples to convert to the Orthodox religion, sometimes by offering them incentives in the form of land grants. In Poland, most education had to be provided in Russian and the Roman Catholic Church could only exist under considerable restrictions. Alexander III and his ministers also tried to claw back some elements of the Great Reforms of the 1860s that had seemed to set Russia on the path toward a more open political system. The post of justice of the peace, established by the legal reform of 1864, was abolished in most of Russia in 1889 and its legal functions transferred to the new post of land captain. This official had very wide powers over the peasantry and was intended to strengthen the hold that the government had over its rural population. The land captain became a muchdisliked figure in much of peasant Russia. The government also limited the powers of the zemstvos that had been established in the 1860s. These elected local councils had been given responsibility for the provision of many local services and “zemstvo liberalism” had become a thorn in the side of the autocracy, as some local councils had pressed for the principle of representative government to be extended to national government. Alexander III acted to narrow the franchise for zemstvo elections and to restrict the amount of taxation that the zemstvo could levy. These moves were intended to neuter the zemstvo and reduce the influence they could have on the population, but Alexander never dared go so far as to actually abolish the local councils. This typified the problems facing Alexander III. While he wanted to return to the traditional ethos of Russian autocracy, he was forced to recognize that, in practical terms, he could not turn the clock back. The reforms of the 1860s had become so firmly embedded in Russian society that they could not simply be undone. All that the emperor could do was to ensure that the iron fist of autocracy was wielded as effectively as possible. Some of Alexander’s policies made matters more difficult for the autocracy. At the end of the 1880s, the government’s economic policies became oriented toward stimulating industrial growth. A major part in this was played by Sergei Witte, who had made his career in the railway industry before coming to work in government, and who became minister of finance in 1892. Witte deeply admired Alexander III and believed that Russia could be both an autocracy and a successful industrial power. The government, however, failed to recognize the social and political consequences of the industrial boom that Russia enjoyed during the 1890s and the new industrial working class began to flex its muscles and to demand better working conditions and political change. The emperor also had a personal interest in Russia’s foreign policy. His Danish wife helped him develop an instinctive distrust of Germany and the 1880s witnessed Russia’s gradual disengagement from its traditional alliance with Germany and Austria. There were important economic reasons for Russia’s new diplomatic direction: Industrial growth required investment from abroad and the most promising source of capital was France. In 1894 Russia and France signed an alliance that was to be significant both for its part in stimulating Russian industry and for the way in which it began the reshaping of Europe’s diplomatic map as the continent began to divide into the two groups that would sit on opposite sides during World War I. Alexander III did not live long enough to see the results of his work. Despite his large frame and apparent strength, he developed kidney disease and died at the age of forty-nine in October 1894. See also: AUTOCRACY; ALEXANDER II; INDUSTRIALIZATION; NICHOLAS I; RUSSO-TURKISH WARS; WITTE, SERGEI YULIEVICH 40 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY BIBLIOGRAPHY Chernukha, Valentina Chernukha. (1996). “Emperor Alexander III.” In The Emperors and Empresses of Russia: Rediscovering the Romanovs, ed. Donald Raleigh. New York: M.E. Sharpe. Zaionchkovskii, Petr. (1976). The Russian Autocracy under Alexander III. Gulf Breeze, FL: Oriental Research Partners PETER WALDRON ALEXANDER MIKHAILOVICH (1301–1339), prince of Tver and grand prince of Vladimir. Alexander Mikhailovich was the second son of Michael Yaroslavich. In 1326, after Khan Uzbek had executed Alexander’s elder brother Dmitry, Alexander became prince of Tver and received the patent for the grand princely throne of Vladimir. The Novgorodians also welcomed him as their prince. The following year Uzbek sent his cousin Chol-Khan to Tver, but the latter’s oppressive measures incited the citizens to revolt. Other towns joined them in massacring Tatar agents, troops, and merchants. In 1328 the khan therefore punished Alexander for the revolt of his subjects by making his rival for Vladimir, Ivan I Danilovich “Kalita” of Moscow, grand prince. The khan also gave him a large Tatar force with which he devastated Tver. Alexander sought refuge in Novgorod but on this occasion the townspeople turned him away. He fled to Pskov where the citizens, who were seeking independence from Novgorod, invited him to be their prince and refused to hand him over to the khan. Kalita, who was determined to destroy Tver as a political rival, had Metropolitan Feognost excommunicate Alexander and the people of Pskov. In 1329 Alexander fled to Lithuania in order to free Pskov from the Church’s ban. But after some two years he returned to Pskov, where he ruled until 1337. In that year the khan summoned him to the Golden Horde and reinstated him in Tver. Subsequently many boyars deserted him and fled to Moscow to help Kalita fight for the grand princely throne. In 1339 the khan summoned Alexander to Saray and executed him on October 22nd or 28th of that year. After Alexander’s death, Tver declined in importance, and the prince of Moscow became the most powerful ruler in northeast Russia. See also: GOLDEN HORDE; GRAND PRINCE; IVAN I; METROPOLITAN; NOVGOROD THE GREAT BIBLIOGRAPHY Fennell, John L. I. (1968). The Emergence of Moscow 1304–1359. London: Secker & Warburg. Martin, Janet. (1995). Medieval Russia 980–1584. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. MARTIN DIMNIK ALEXANDER YAROSLAVICH (1220–1263), known as Alexander Nevsky, prince of Novgorod, grand prince of Vladimir, grand prince of Kiev, and progenitor of the princes of Moscow. Born around 1220, Alexander was the grandson of Vsevolod Yurevich “Big Nest.” Between the years 1228 and 1233 he and his elder brother, Fyodor, ruled Novgorod in the name of their father Yaroslav of Pereyaslavl Zalessky. After Fyodor’s death in 1233, Alexander’s younger brother Andrei helped him to expand Novgorod’s lands and to increase the prince’s control over the town. In 1238 the Tatars invaded Suzdalia but bypassed Novgorod. Nevertheless, the town’s expansion into the neighboring Finnish lands was challenged by the Swedes and by German Knights (the Order of Livonian Swordbearers, joined later by the Teutonic Order). In 1240, when the Swedes marched against Novgorod, Alexander and a small force confronted the enemy at the river Neva and routed them. He thereby secured Novgorod’s outlet to the Baltic Sea and earned the sobriquet “Nevsky” (of the Neva). After his brilliant victory, he quarreled with the Novgorodians and withdrew to Pereyaslavl Zalessky. But less than a year later the Germans seized Pskov and threatened Novgorod’s commerce, therewith forcing the citizens to bring back Nevsky on his terms. He arrived in 1241 and began reclaiming Novgorod’s lost territories, including neighboring Pskov. He confronted the main force of Teutonic Knights on the frozen Lake Chud (Lake Peypus) where, on April 5, 1242, he defeated them in the famous “battle on the ice.” The next year the Knights and the Novgorodians concluded peace. This allowed Nevsky to continue asserting Novgorod’s jurisdiction over the Finns and to wage war against the encroaching Lithuanians. ALEXANDER YAROSLAVICH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY 41 ALEXANDRA FEDOROVNA After his father died in 1246, Nevsky visited Khan Batu in Saray who sent him to the Great Khan at Karakorum in Mongolia. He came home in 1249 as the grand prince of Kiev and of all Rus, including Novgorod, to which he returned. However, his younger brother Andrei received the patrimonial domain of Vladimir on the Klyazma. After Nevsky visited the Golden Horde in 1252, the khan sent a punitive force against Andrei because he had rebelled against the khan. The Tatars drove him out of Vladimir. Nevsky succeeded him and gained jurisdiction over Suzdalia and Novgorod. Because he was a subservient vassal, the khan let him centralize his control over the other towns of Suzdalia. He also served the khan faithfully by suppressing opposition to the khan’s policies, with the help of the Tatar army. Nevertheless, after the citizens of many towns rebelled against the Tatar census takers, Nevsky interceded, evidently successfully, on behalf of his people. In 1262, on his fourth visit to the Golden Horde, he fell ill. While returning home he became a monk and died at Gorodets on the Volga on November 14, 1263. Although Nevsky’s valor was generally admired, his collaboration with the Tatars was criticized by his contemporaries and by historians. Metropolitan Cyril, however, exonerated the prince in his “Life of Alexander Nevsky,” and the church canonized him during the reign of Tsar Ivan IV (the Terrible). See also: ANDREI YAROSLAVICH; BATU; GOLDEN HORDE; IVAN IV; KIEVAN RUS; NOVGOROD THE GREAT; VSEVOLOD III BIBLIOGRAPHY Fennell, John. (1983). The Crisis of Medieval Russia, 1200–1304. London: Longman. Martin, Janet. (1995). Medieval Russia, 980–1584. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Vernadsky, George. (1953). The Mongols and Russia. New Haven: Yale University Press. MARTIN DIMNIK ALEXANDRA FEDOROVNA (1872–1918), wife of Tsar Nicholas II and last empress of Russia. Alexandra Fedorovna Romanova was at the center of the political drama that led to the downfall of the Russian monarchy in 1917. A princess of the grand duchy of Hesse-Darmstadt in Germany and granddaughter of England’s Queen Victoria, she lost her mother and younger sister to diphtheria when she was still a child, and she responded to this loss by turning inward. This tendency toward isolation intensified after her 1894 marriage to Nicholas, when her principles came into conflict with the reality of Russian court life. Scandalized by the seeming decadence of the aristocracy, she withdrew from society, eliciting the scorn of the Russian social elite. Alexandra dedicated most of her time to her four daughters (Olga, Tatiana, Maria, and Anastasia) and her son, Alexei, who was born in 1904. Soon after the birth of this long-awaited male heir to the throne, it was discovered that Alexei had hemophilia. His illness became Alexandra’s primary concern. Grigory Yefimovich Rasputin, a self-styled holy man, managed to stop Alexei’s bleeding and thus became important to the royal family. Rasputin’s closeness to the ruling family led to speculation about his influence over political decisions and to disdain for the royal family among the educated layers of society. With the start of World War I, which pitted Russia against Germany, Alexandra’s German background further contributed to her unpopularity. Many accused her of heading a German faction in the government. Although these charges were groundless, they served to undermine the authority of the monarchy, thus helping pave the way for the February Revolution of 1917. The Bolsheviks brutally murdered the entire royal family in July 1918. The negative image of Alexandra shaped by her detractors has given way to more objective, though not always dispassionate, accounts of her life. She is most often portrayed as a tragic figure and as a dedicated wife and mother. In 1981, the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad canonized Alexandra, along with her family, for accepting death with faith in God and humility, and the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church followed suit in 2000. See also: ALEXEI NIKOLAYEVICH; NICHOLAS II; RASPUTIN, GRIGORY YEFIMOVICH; ROMANOV DYNASTY BIBLIOGRAPHY Kozlov, Vladimir A., and Khrustalev, Vladimir M., eds. (1997). The Last Diary of Tsaritsa Alexandra. New Haven: Yale University Press. 42 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY Massie, Robert K. (2000). Nicholas and Alexandra. New York: Ballantine Books. NICHOLAS GANSON ALEXANDROV, GRIGORY ALEXANDROVICH (1903–1983), pseudonym of Grigory A. Mormonenko, Soviet film director. The leading director of musical comedies in the Stalin era, Alexandrov began his artistic career as a costume and set designer for a provincial opera company. By 1921, he was a member of the Proletkult theater in Moscow, where he met Sergei Mikhailovich Eisenstein. Alexandrov served as assistant director on all of Eisenstein’s silent films and took part in an ill-fated trip to Hollywood and Mexico, which lasted from 1929 to 1932 and ended in Eisenstein’s disgrace and the entourage’s forced return home. After this debacle, Alexandrov found it prudent to strike out on his own as a film director. By returning to his artistic roots in musical theater, he found a way to work successfully within the strictures of Socialist Realism by adapting the conventions of the Hollywood musical comedy to Soviet realities. His films from this era were The Jolly Fellows (1934), The Circus (1936), Volga, Volga (1938), and The Shining Path (1940), all of which enjoyed great popularity with Soviet audiences at a time when entertainment was sorely needed. Central to the success of these movies were the cheerful songs by composer Isaak Dunaevsky’s and the comedic talents of Liubov Orlova, Alexandrov’s leading lady and wife. Alexandrov was a great favorite of Stalin’s, and was named People’s Artist of the USSR in 1948, the country’s highest award for artistic achievement. Although Alexandrov continued to direct feature films until 1960, his most notable post-war venture was the Cold War classic, Meeting on the Elba (1949). This film was quite a departure from his oeuvre of the 1930s. Alexandrov’s final two projects were tributes. He honored the mentor of his youth by restoring and reconstructing the fragments of Eisenstein’s Que Viva Mexico! (1979), and he commemorated his wife’s life and art in Liubov Orlova (1983). See also: EISENSTEIN, SERGEI MIKHAILOVICH; MOTION PICTURES; ORLOVA, LYUBOV PETROVNA; PROLETKULT; SOCIALIST REALISM BIBLIOGRAPHY Kenez, Peter. (2001). Cinema and Soviet Society from the Revolution to the Death of Stalin. London: I.B. Tauris. DENISE J. YOUNGBLOOD ALEXEI I, PATRIARCH (1877–1970), patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church from January 31, 1945, to April 17, 1970. Sergei Vladimirovich Simansky took monastic vows in 1902. He served as rector in several seminaries and was subsequently made a bishop. He became metropolitan in Leningrad in 1933 and endured the German siege of that city during World War II. According to eyewitness accounts of his situation in 1937, he anticipated arrest at any moment, for virtually all of his fellow priests had been seized by then. He celebrated the liturgy with the only deacon left in Leningrad, and even that coreligionist soon died. During the siege of the city he lived on the edge of starvation. The members of the cathedral choir were dying around him, and the choirmaster himself died in the middle of a church service. Alexei himself barely had the strength to clear a path to the cathedral through the snow in winter. Under war-time pressures, Stalin permitted the election of a patriarch, but the one chosen soon died. Alexei was elected in January 1945. He reopened a few seminaries and convents and consecrated some new bishops. Of the parishes that were still functioning at the time, most were in territories that had been recently annexed or reoccupied by the USSR. In fact, one could travel a thousand kilometers on the Trans-Siberian Railroad without passing a single working church. The later anti-religious campaign of communist general secretary Nikita Khrushchev resulted in the closing of almost half of those churches still functioning in the 1950s. Alexei reached out to Orthodox religious communities abroad. He was active in the World Peace movement, supporting Soviet positions. The Russian Church joined the World Council of Churches, and Alexei cultivated good relations with Western Protestants. He was criticized for his cooperation with the Soviet regime, but no doubt believed that ALEXEI I, PATRIARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY 43 ALEXEI II, PATRIARCH collaboration was necessary for the church’s survival. See also: LENIGRAD, SIEGE OF; PATRIARCHATE; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH BIBLIOGRAPHY Davis, Nathaniel. (1995). A Long Walk to Church. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. NATHANIEL DAVIS ALEXEI II, PATRIARCH (b. 1929), secular name Alexei Mikhailovich Ridiger, primate of the Russian Orthodox Church (1990– ). Born in Tallinn, of Russian and Baltic German extraction, Alexei graduated from the Leningrad Theological Seminary in 1949 and was ordained in 1950. In 1961 he was consecrated bishop of Estonia, and later appointed chancellor of the Moscow Patriarchate (1964). In 1986 he became metropolitan of Leningrad, and was elected patriarch on June 7, 1990. From his election to early 2003, over 13,000 parishes and 460 monasteries were established. A decade after his enthronement, nearly three-quarters of Russians considered themselves members of the church (although only 6% were active churchgoers), and the patriarch enjoyed high approval ratings as the perceived spokesman for Russia’s spiritual traditions. Alexei, a former USSR people’s deputy, envisioned a partnership between church and state to promote morality and the popular welfare. He met regularly with government officials to discuss policy, and signed agreements with ministries detailing plans for church-state cooperation in fields such as education. His archpastoral blessing of Boris Yeltsin after his 1991 election began a relationship between patriarch and president that continued under Vladimir Putin. Alexei saw the church as essential for preserving civil peace in society, and used his position to promote dialogue among various parties, gaining much credibility after trying to mediate the 1993 standoff between Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet. Alexei’s leadership was not without controversy. Some have voiced concerns that the church was too concerned with institutional status at the expense of pursuing genuine spiritual revival. Business ventures designed to raise funds for a cashstrapped church were called into question. Alexei was criticized for his role in promoting the 1997 legislation On Religious Freedom which placed limitations on the rights of nontraditional faiths. Allegations surfaced about KGB collaboration (under the codename Drozdov), something he consistently denied. He justified his Soviet-era conduct (one CPSU document described him as “most loyal”) as necessary to keep churches from closing down. Defenders note that he was removed as chancellor after appealing to Mikhail Gorbachev to reintroduce religious values into Soviet society. Alexei was outspoken in his determination to preserve the Moscow Patriarchate as a unified entity, eschewing the creation of independent churches in the former Soviet republics. Although most parishes in Ukraine remained affiliated to Moscow, two other Orthodox jurisdictions competed for the allegiance of the faithful. When the Estonian government turned to Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew to restore a church administration independent of Moscow’s authority, Alexei briefly broke communion with him (1996), but agreed to a settlement creating two jurisdictions in Estonia. The patriarch worked to preserve a balance between liberal and conservative views within the church. The Jubilee Bishops’ Council (2000) ratified a comprehensive social doctrine that laid out positions on many issues ranging from politics (offering a qualified endorsement of democracy) to bioethics. Compromises on other contentious questions (participation in the ecumenical movement, the canonization of Nicholas II, and so forth) were also reached. In the end, the council reaffirmed Alexei’s vision that the church should emerge as a leading and influential institution in post-Soviet Russian society. See also: PATRIARCHATE; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH BIBLIOGRAPHY Alimov, G., and Charodeyev, G. (1992). “Patriarch Aleksei II: ‘I Take Responsibility for All That Happened.’” Religion, State, and Society 20(2):241–246. Bourdeaux, Michael. (1992). “Patriarch Aleksei II: Between the Hammer and the Anvil.” Religion, State, and Society 20(2):231–236. Pospielovsky, Dimitry. (1998). The Orthodox Church in the History of Russia. Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press. NIKOLAS K. GVOSDEV 44 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY ALEXEI MIKHAILOVICH ALEXEI MIKHAILOVICH (1629–1676), the second Romanov tsar (r. 1645–1676) and the most significant figure in Russian history between the period of anarchy known as the “Time of Troubles” (smutnoye vremya) and the accession of his son, Peter I (the Great). The reign of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich was notable for a codification of Russian law that was to remain the standard until the nineteenth century, for the acquisition of Kiev and eastern Ukraine from Poland-Lithuania, and for church reforms. Alexei also laid the foundations for the modernization of the army, introduced elements of Western culture to the court, and, despite a series of wars and rebellions, strengthened the autocracy and the authority of central government. He anticipated directions his son Peter would take: He substituted ability and service for hereditary and precedent as qualifications for appointments and promotions; engaged Dutch shipwrights to lay down the first Russian flotilla (for service in the Caspian); and introduced other forms of Western technology and engaged many military and civil experts from the West. Not all of his initiatives succeeded, however. His attempt to seize the Baltic port of Riga was thwarted by the Swedes, and his flotilla based at Astrakhan was burned by rebels. Nevertheless Russia emerged as a great European power in his reign. REPUTATION AND ITS ORIGINS Despite his importance, Alexei’s reputation stands low in the estimation of historians. Earlier works, by Slavophiles, religious traditionalists, and those nostalgic for the old Russian values, depict him as pious, caring, ceremonious, occasionally angry, yet essentially spiritual, distracted from politics and policy-making. Vladimir Soloviev concluded that he was indecisive, afraid of confrontation, even sly. Vasily Klyuchevsky, Sergei Platonov, and most later historians, Russian and Western, also conclude that he was weak, dominated by favorites. This erroneous view derives from several sources: from the Petrine legend created by Peter’s acolytes and successors; from his soubriquet tishaysheyshy, the diplomatic title Serenissimus (Most Serene Highness), which was taken out of context to mean “quietest,” “gentlest,” and, metaphorically, even “most underhanded”; from the fact that the surviving papers from Alexei’s Private Office papers were not published until the first decades of the twentieth century (even though registered in the Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich holding symbols of Russian state power. THE ART ARCHIVE/RUSSIAN HISTORICAL MUSEUM MOSCOW/ DAGLI ORTI early eighteenth century by order of Peter himself) and were ignored by most historians thereafter. EDUCATION AND FORMATION Alexei was brought up as a prince and educated as a future ruler. In 1633 an experienced minister, Boris Ivanovich Morozov, soon to be promoted to the highest rank (boyar), and to membership of the tsar’s Council (duma), was given charge of the boy. He chose the tsarevich’s tutors, provided an entourage for him of about twenty boys of good family who were to wait on and play with him. The brightest of these, including Artamon Matveyev, who was to serve him as a minister, were also to share his lessons. Miniature weapons and a model ship figured prominently among his toys. Leisure included tobogganing and fencing, backgammon and chess. The tsarevich’s formal lessons began at the age of five with reading. Writing was introduced at seven, and music (church cantillation) at eight. Alexei also memorized prayers, learned Psalms and ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY 45 ALEXEI MIKHAILOVICH the Acts of the Apostles, and read Bible stories (chiefly Old Testament). Exemplary models were commended to him: the learned St. Abraham, the Patriotic St. Sergius, St. Alexis, who was credited with bringing stability to the Russian land, and the young Tsar Ivan IV (the Terrible), conqueror of the Tatar khanates of Kazan, Astrakhan, and Siberia. At nine his education became more secular and practical, as his tutors were seconded from government offices rather than the clergy. Morozov himself could explain the governmental machine, finance, and elements of statecraft. Books on mathematics, hydraulics, gunnery, foreign affairs, cosmography, and geography were borrowed from government departments. From the age of ten, Alexei was an unseen witness of the reception of ambassadors from east and west. At thirteen he made his first public appearance, sitting on an ivory throne beside his father at a formal reception; and thereafter he played a very visible role. This familiarized him with some of his future duties; it also reinforced his right to rule. The Romanov dynasty was new. Alexei would be the first to succeed. Hence the urgency, when his ailing father died in July 1645, with which oaths of loyalty were extracted from every courtier, bureaucrat, and soldier. Even so, the reign was to be difficult. FIRST YEARS AS TSAR Morozov headed the new government, taking personal charge of key departments; the coronation was fixed for November 1645 (late September O.S.), and a new program was drawn up, including army modernization and financial, administrative, and legal reform. The young tsar’s chief interest, however, was church reform. There were three reasons for giving this priority: 1. In Russia, as in the later Roman Empire, church and state were mutually supportive. The church acted as the ideological arm of the state, proclaimed its orders, helped administer rural areas, and provided prisons, welfare services, and resources when the state called for them. 2. Since Russia was the richest, most powerful state in the Orthodox communion, large Orthodox populations in neighboring Poland, which was Catholic, looked to it for support, and many churchmen in the Ottoman sphere, including the Balkans, came to Moscow for financial support and were therefore receptive to Moscow’s political influence. This gave the church some clout in foreign affairs. However, since Russian liturgical practice differed from that of other communities, Alexei thought it important to reform the liturgy to conform to the best Greek practice. (In doing so he was to take erroneous advice, but this was discovered too late.) 3. The rapid exploitation of Siberia had made up most of the economic damage of the Time of Troubles, but the legacy of social and moral dislocation was still evident. A program similar to that which the Hapsburg rulers had mounted in Central Europe to combat Protestantism and other forms of dissent had to be implemented if the increasingly militant Catholicism of Poland was to be countered, and pagan practices, still rife in Russia’s countryside, stamped out. The Moscow riots of 1648 underscored the urgency. The trigger was a tax on salt that, ironically, had only recently been rescinded, but as the movement grew, demands broadened. Alexei confronted the crowd twice, promising redress and pleading for Morozov’s life. Morozov was spirited away to the safety of a distant monastery, but the mob lynched two senior officials, looted many houses, and started fires. Some of the musketeer guards (streltsy) sympathized with the crowd, and seditious rumors spread to the effect that the tsar was merely a creature of his advisers. Alexei had to undertake to redress grievances and call an Assembly of the Land (zemskii sobor) before order could be restored (and the Musketeer Corps purged). The outcome was a law code (Ulozhenie) in 1649, which updated and consolidated the laws of Russia, recorded common law practices, and included elements of Roman Law and the Lithuanian Statute as well as Russian secular and canon law. Alexei was patently acquainted with its content, and he would subsequently refer to its principles, such as justice (the administration of the law) being “equal for all.” PATRIARCH NIKON AND THE RUSSIAN CHURCH In April 1652 when the Russian primate, Patriarch Joseph, died, Alexei had already decided on his successor. He had met Nikon, now in his early fifties and an impressive six feet, five inches tall, seven years before. He had since installed him as abbot of a Moscow monastery in his gift and thereafter met him regularly. He had subsequently proposed him 46 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY to the metropolitan see of Novgorod, the second most senior position in the Russian church. However, Nikon insisted on conditions for accepting nomination as patriarch. His demand that the tsar obey him in all matters relating to the church’s spiritual authority was not as unacceptable as might appear. Nikon had to impose discipline on laity and clergy alike, and the tsar felt a duty to give a lead, to demonstrate that patriarch and tsar were working in symphony. But Nikon’s second demand was more difficult. One way to improve observance and conformity was to create new saints and transfer their remains to Moscow in gripping public ceremonies. The new saints included two patriarchs who had suffered during the Polish intervention: Job, who had been imprisoned by the False Dmitry, and Hermogen, who had been starved to death by the Poles in 1612. But Nikon also insisted that the former metropolitan Philip, strangled on Tsar Ivan’s orders, be canonized and that Alexei express contrition in public for Ivan’s sin. Though Ivan was patently unbalanced in his later years, he was a model for Alexei, who set out to pursue Ivan’s strategic objectives. The “Prayer Letter” Alexei eventually gave Nikon to read aloud over Philip’s grave at Solovka was cleverly ambivalent. Often interpreted as a submission by the tsar to the church, it asserts that the acknowledgement of Ivan’s sin has earned him forgiveness, and is, in effect, a rehabilitation of Ivan. Nikon was duly installed as patriarch. The reforms went ahead. WAR WITH POLAND-LITHUANIA When the war over Ukraine began in 1654, Alexei joined his troops on campaign, leaving Nikon to act as regent in Moscow in his absence. The city of Smolensk was retaken, and Khmelnytsky, leader of the Ukrainian Cossack insurgents, whom Moscow had been supplying for some time, made formal submission to the tsar’s representative. Glittering success also attended the 1655 campaign. Operations were unaffected by an outbreak of bubonic plague in Moscow, with which Nikon coped efficiently. Most of Lithuania, including its capital Vilnius, fell to Russian troops that summer. This opened the road to the Baltic, and in 1656 the army moved on to besiege the Swedish port of Riga. But Riga held out, there was a Polish resurgence, and part of the Ukrainian elite abandoned their allegiance to the tsar. The war was to drag on for another decade, bringing chaos to Ukraine and mounting costs to Moscow. It also occasioned the breach with Nikon. To consolidate his rule of Ukrainian and Belarus territory, formerly under Poland, Alexei urgently needed to fill the vacant metropolitan see of Kiev. The last incumbent had died in 1657 (the same year as Khmelnytsky) but Nikon refused to sanction the appointment, arguing that Kiev came under the jurisdiction of the superior see of Constantinople. The tsar made his disapproval public. Nikon relinquished his duties but refused to resign, and the matter remained unresolved until 1666 when Nikon was impeached by a synod attended by the patriarchs of Alexandria and Antioch, the tsar acting as prosecutor. The synod found against Nikon and deposed him, but endorsed his liturgical reforms, which were unpopular with Avvakum and other Old Believers. However, Nikon had been set up as a scapegoat for the unpopular measures against Old Belief. Although Alexei failed to persuade Avvakum to conform, he retained the rebellious archpriest’s respect. The church was to remain at an uneasy peace for the remainder of the reign. Reforms occasioned by the demands of war included three significant developments. 1. The formation of the tsar’s Private Office. Staffed by able young bureaucrats, it kept the tsar closely and confidentially informed, intervened at the tsar’s behest in both government and church affairs, and supervised the conduct of the war, when necessary overriding generals, ministers, and provincial governors. Those who served in the Office often went on to occupy the highest posts; several entered the Duma. The Private Office became an effective instrument for personal, autocratic rule. 2. It hastened military modernization. The tsar regularly engaged foreign officers to drill Russian servicemen in the latest Western methods. Weaponry and artillery were improved and their production expanded. By the end of the reign, except for the traditional cavalry (still useful for steppe warfare), the army had been transformed. Aside from the crack musketeer guards, commanded by Artamon Matveyev, the musketeer corps was sidelined, and “regiments of new formation” became the core of the army. 3. Though the war provided economic stimulus, especially to mining, metallurgy, and textiles, it also occasioned insoluble financial problems. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY 47 ALEXEI MIKHAILOVICH ALEXEI NIKOLAYEVICH With expenditure soaring above income, and being short of specie, Alexei sanctioned the issue of copper coins instead of silver. Ukrainian servicemen, finding their pay would not buy them necessities of life, became rebellious; and, as inflation increased, dismay and anger infected the cities. A crowd from Moscow reached the tsar at his summer palace at Kolomenskoye. The rising was ruthlessly suppressed, but in 1663 the copper coinage was withdrawn, though other financial demands were to be made of the people. ECONOMIC POLICY Alexei was never to solve the fiscal problem, although he did adopt some positive economic policies. He improved productivity on his own estates; encouraged peasants to take profitable initiatives; sponsored trading expeditions to farthest Siberia, China, and India; protected the profitable trade with Persia; established a glass factory, encouraged prospectors, and brought in Western manufacturers as well as experts in military technology; and in 1667 introduced a new trade statute designed to protect Russian merchants from foreign competitors and from intrusive officialdom. Yet he also encouraged transit trade within Russia, helping develop a common Russian market. The year 1667, which saw the condemnation of Nikon, also saw the conclusion, at Andrusovo, of the long war with Poland. Under its terms Russia kept all Ukraine east of the Dnieper River and temporary control of Kiev (which soon became permanent). This was a huge accretion of territory, providing a launching pad for future expansion both westward and to the south. The cost had been heavy, but Poland had suffered more. Broken as a great power, it ceased to be a threat to Russia. Alexei had ensured that neither the hereditary nobility nor the church would impede the free exercise of autocratic, centralizing power. Both strategic policy and church reform directed Moscow’s attention westward. Alexei became interested in acquiring the crown of Catholic Poland and his eldest surviving son, Tsarevich Alexei, was taught Polish and Latin. The boy’s tutor, Simeon Polotsky, who was also the court poet, had been brought to Moscow with other bearers of Western learning and culture from occupied Belarus and Ukraine. Insulated from the mass of Russians, their influence was confined to court. Similarly, foreign servicemen and experts were confined to Moscow’s Foreign Suburb when off duty. Nevertheless they were the basis of Russia’s Westernization; and the tsar chose his second wife, Natalia Naryshkina, from the suburb. Their child, Peter, was to be reviled as the son of Nikon. But as Wuchter’s portrait of Alexei demonstrates, he was clearly Peter’s father, and in spirit as well as genetically. Through his policies of modernization, his church reforms, his introduction of Ukrainian learning (and hence elements of Catholic learning), Alexei had, wittingly and unwittingly, pierced Russia’s isolationism. But he was not to see all the fruits of this work. Worn down by three decades of political and military crises for which as autocrat he bore sole responsibility, Alexei died of renal and heart disease on January 29, 1676. See also: IVAN IV; LAW CODE OF 1649; MILITARY, IMPERIAL ERA; MOROZOV, BORIS IVANONVICH; NIKON, PATRIARCH; PETER I; ROMANOV DYNASTY; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH; THIRTEEN YEARS’ WAR; TIME OF TROUBLES BIBLIOGRAPHY Longworth, Philip. (1984). Alexis, Tsar of All the Russias. New York: Franklin Watts. Longworth, Philip. (1990). “The Emergence of Absolutism in Russia.” In Absolutism in Seventeenth Century Europe, ed. John Miller. London: Macmillan. Palmer, W. (1871–1876). The Patriarch and the Tsar, 6 vols. London: Trubner. PHILIP LONGWORTH ALEXEI NIKOLAYEVICH (1904–1918), last of the Romanov dynasty of Russia. Alexei Nikolayevich Romanov was the only son of Tsar Nicholas II and Empress Alexandra and the youngest member of Russia’s last royal family. The Romanovs’ elation over the birth of an heir to the throne quickly turned to worry, when doctors diagnosed Alexei with hemophilia, a hereditary disorder preventing the proper clotting of blood. Despite bouts of severe physical pain, Alexei was a happy and mischievous boy. Nonetheless, the unpredictable ebbs and flows in his condition dictated the mood of the tightly knit royal family. When Alexei was not well, melancholy reigned in the Romanov home. 48 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY Tsarevich Alexei Nikolayevich, age 11, and his mother, Tsarina Alexandra Fedorovna. © HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS After the doctors admitted that they could find no way to ease the boy’s suffering, Empress Alexandra turned to a Siberian peasant and selfstyled holy man, Grigory Yefimovich Rasputin. Rasputin somehow managed to temporarily stop Alexei’s hemorrhaging, thus gaining the trust of the tsar’s family. Believing Rasputin to be their son’s benefactor and clinging to hope for Alexei’s recovery, Nicholas and Alexandra rejected rumors of the mysterious peasant’s debauched lifestyle. Their patronage of Rasputin caused outrage in court circles and educated society, which contributed to the declining authority of the monarchy and its eventual collapse in 1917. In July 1918, just days before his fourteenth birthday, Alexei was murdered, along with his parents, four sisters, and several royal servants, by a Bolshevik firing squad. In 1981, the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad canonized Alexei, along with the rest of the royal family, for accepting ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY 49 ALEXEI NIKOLAYEVICH ALEXEI PETROVICH death with faith in God and humility. The Moscow Patriarchate canonized the royal family in 2000. See also: ALEXANDRA FEDOROVNA; NICHOLAS II; RASPUTIN, GRIGORY YEFIMOVICH; ROMANOVA, ANASTASIA NIKOLAYEVNA; ROMANOV DYNASTY BIBLIOGRAPHY Massie, Robert K. (2000). Nicholas and Alexandra. New York: Ballantine Books. NICHOLAS GANSON ALEXEI PETROVICH (1690–1718), tsarevich, son of Emperor Peter I of Russia and his first wife Yevdokia Lopukhina. Peter raised Alexei as his heir, making him study a modern curriculum with foreign tutors and taking him to visit battlefields and naval displays to teach him to “love everything that contributes to the glory and honor of the fatherland.” When Alexei was in his twenties, Peter entrusted him with important duties on the home front in the war against Sweden. Peter’s correspondence reveals little affection for Alexei, who in turn felt intimidated by his demanding and unconciliatory father (Peter had banished Alexei’s mother in 1699). Alexei was intelligent, devout, often sick, and indifferent to military affairs. In 1712 Peter married him off to the German princess Charlotte of Wolffenbüttel, whom he quickly abandoned for a peasant mistress. After the birth of Alexei’s son Peter (the future Peter II) in 1715, Peter accused Alexei of neglecting the common good and threatened to disinherit him: “Better a worthy stranger [on the throne] than my own unworthy son.” Under increasing pressure, in 1716 Alexei fled and took refuge with the Habsburg emperor, but in 1718 Peter lured him back home with the promise of a pardon, then disinherited him and demanded that he reveal all his “accomplices” in a plot to assassinate his father and seize the throne. Evidence emerged that Alexei hated Peter’s cherished projects and that some Russians from elite circles viewed him as an alternative. Tried by a special tribunal, Alexei confessed to treason under torture and was condemned to death, dying two days later following further torture. His fate and the witch hunt unleashed by his trial have disturbed even ardent admirers of Peter, who was willing to sacrifice his son for reasons of state. Soviet historians dismissed Alexei as a traitor, but he has been viewed more sympathetically since the 1990s. See also: PETER I; PETER II BIBLIOGRAPHY Bushkovitch, Paul. (2001). Peter the Great: The Struggle for Power, 1671–1725. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Hughes, Lindsey. (1998). Russia in the Age of Peter the Great. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. LINDSEY HUGHES ALEXEYEV, MIKHAIL VASILIEVICH (1857–1918), Imperial Russian general staff officer, commander, Stavka chief of staff and White Army leader. General-Adjutant Mikhail Alexeyev was born in Vyazma, the son of a noncommissioned officer who had fought at Sevastopol in the Crimean War, then attained officer rank. Alexeyev completed the Moscow Junker School (1876) and the Nicholas Academy of the General Staff (1890). He taught at the latter between 1898 and the Russo-Japanese War, in which he served at Sandepu and Mukden as chief of staff for the Third Manchurian Army. A believer in limited monarchy, Alexeyev rose in 1908 to become acting quartermaster general of the General Staff, then served from 1908 to 1912 as chief of staff of the Kiev Military District. Until 1911, Alexeyev continued to advise War Minister Vladimir Aleksandrovich Sukhomlinov on war planning. Alexeyev’s General Plan of Actions subsequently became a precursor for Mobilization Schedule 19A, the foundation for Russia’s entry into World War I. Alexeyev began the war as chief of staff of the Southwestern Front, then commanded the Northwestern Front in 1915 during its successful but costly withdrawal from the Polish salient. As Stavka chief of staff for Tsar Nicholas II after August 1915, Alekseyev functioned as de facto supreme commander, but was tainted in 1916 by the ill-conceived Naroch operation and by failure to support the more successful Brusilov Offensive. While maintaining contact with the liberal opposition, he left Stavka in December 1916 for reasons of health, then returned in March to June 1917 as 50 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY supreme commander. An ardent anti-Bolshevik between the two Russian revolutions of 1917, he fought against the disintegration of the army, even agreeing to serve temporarily as the army’s commander-in-chief after the Kornilov Affair of September 1917. Following the Bolshevik coup of November 1917, Alexeyev and Lavr Georgievich Kornilov became the military nucleus around which a White counterrevolutionary movement in the Don and Kuban organized the Volunteer Army. Alexeyev’s death in October 1918 at Yekaterinodar deprived the Whites of perhaps their most talented commander and planner. He left the legacy of a keen military professional who consistently rendered impressive service as commander and staff officer under extraordinarily challenging military and political circumstances. See also: KORNILOV AFFAIR; NICHOLAS II; STAVKA; WHITE ARMY; WORLD WAR I BIBLIOGRAPHY Wildman, Allan K. (1980, 1987). The End of the Russian Imperial Army. 2 vols. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. OLEG R. AIRAPETOV ALIYEV, HEIDAR (b. 1923), Soviet Azerbaijani statesman, president of Azerbaijan (1993– ). Heidar Alirza Oglu Aliyev was born in Nakhichevan, Azerbaijani SSR. Aliyev studied architecture and history in Baku. In 1944 he joined the KGB of Soviet Azerbaijan and became its director in 1967. In 1969 Aliyev became first secretary of the Communist Party (thus effective leader) of Soviet Azerbaijan. In 1982 he was invited to Moscow as a full member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Politburo and first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. He also served as a member of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for twenty years. Following Mikhail Gorbachev’s accession to power, Aliyev was forced to resign from his positions in the Party in 1986 and in the government in 1987. Aliyev resigned from the CPSU in July 1990 citing, among other reasons, his objections to the use of the Soviet army units against demonstrators in Baku earlier that year. He returned to Nakhichevan, where he relaunched his career as the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Nakhichevan and deputy chairman of the Azerbaijani Supreme Soviet. In 1993 he was asked by the embattled President Abulfaz Elchibey of independent Azerbaijan to return to Baku. By October 1993 Aliyev was elected president of Azerbaijan. He was reelected in 1998. Aliyev’s main priority as leader of independent Azerbaijan was to secure domestic stability and effective control and exploitation of the country’s hydrocarbon resources. Aliyev was able to neutralize unruly elements that threatened internal peace, as well as others who could challenge him politically, while pursuing a policy of selective political and economic liberalization. In foreign affairs Aliyev adopted a supple and pragmatic approach. He moderated his predecessor’s excessively pro-Turkish, anti-Russian, and anti-Iranian policies. Aliyev used the country’s hydrocarbon resources to increase Azerbaijan’s international stature and, working closely with Georgia, secured the West’s political support to balance Russia’s influence. Aliyev’s initial policy of continuing military operations in the Nagorno-Karabakh war caused further territorial losses to Armenian forces as well as a new wave of internally displaced persons. In 1994 he agreed to a cease-fire. Aliyev has supported the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s mediation efforts for a permanent solution to the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh as well as direct negotiations. His administration continues to be plagued by charges of authoritarianism, widespread corruption, and tampering with elections. Eight years into his administration, Aliyev’s main challenges—the problems of Karabakh, of succession, and of securing new major routes for the export of Caspian hydrocarbon resources—remain largely unresolved. See also: ARMENIA AND ARMENIANS; AZERBAIJAN AND AZERIS; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET BIBLIOGRAPHY Curtis, Glenn E. (1994). Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. Washington, DC: Library of Congress. Herzig, Edmond. (1999). The New Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs. ALIYEV, HEIDAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY 51 ALLIED INTERVENTION Swietochowski, Tadeusz. (1995). Russia and Azerbaijan: A Borderland in Transition. New York: Columbia University Press. GERARD J. LIBARIDIAN ALLIED INTERVENTION The Russian Revolution of 1917, occurring in the third year of World War I, initially inspired great hopes in the countries engaged in the brutal struggle against the Central Powers that was exacting so terrible a carnage and so enormous a financial drain. The prospect of a new ally, the United States, seemed bright, since a war without the Romanov autocracy as an ally could now be claimed to be truly one of democracy against the old order of Europe, of which Russia had been one of the bastions. Unfortunately, Russia was already severely weakened by the war, both on the battlefield and on the home front. It was left to the United States to provide direct aid and a moral presence, but time was running out, and opposition to the war, with its huge human sacrifices and economic burdens, was a persistent trend in the new “democratic” Russia. The inability of the Provisional Government, headed by Alexander Kerensky, to deal with the situation led to a victory of the left wing of the revolution in the form of a Bolshevik seizure of power in October 1917. This created a dilemma for the Allies, because the Bolsheviks were largely committed to ending the war. If the new Soviet government withdrew from the war, considerable German military forces would be shifted from the Eastern Front to the Western Front in 1918, thus nullifying the mounting American presence there. Opinion was sharply divided on a course of action. Some Allied agents in Russia believed that Bolshevik leaders could be persuaded to delay a peace or even to continue a military effort in return for desperately needed aid. Others advocated direct military intervention to maintain an Eastern Front, especially because of evidence that some units of the old Russian army remained intact and committed to continuing the war. American and British representatives in Russia, such as Raymond Robins and Robert Bruce Lockhart, campaigned for the former course, while influential political leaders urged direct military intervention, some maintaining that an American force of 100,000, could not only maintain a viable Eastern Front but also destroy the “communist threat.” The crisis came in March 1918 with the Soviet government’s negotiation of terms for a peace with Germany at Brest-Litovsk. Since there had been no forthright pledge of assistance, Vladimir Lenin felt that ratification of the treaty was necessary, but about the same time, due to deteriorating conditions in the major ports that contained large amounts of Allied supplies for Russia, detachments of marines from Allied warships in the harbors landed to safeguard personnel and reestablish order in the old port of Archangel on the White Sea, in the new one of Murmansk in March 1918, and at Vladivostok on the Pacific in April. Doing anything more at the time was precluded by the concentration of available men and supplies on the Western Front to stem a surprisingly successful German offensive. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk gave Germany access to a large part of the Russian Empire and to valuable military supplies, much of Allied origin. Moreover, a large number of liberated German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war were able to return to combat in the West or control large areas of Russia, such as Siberia. With the German offensive in the West stopped, but the Russian situation continuing to deteriorate, the Allies considered a more substantial military intervention. President Woodrow Wilson was reluctant to interfere in another country’s affairs, especially because it might result in dividing the old Russian Empire and its resources among the other Allies. But, in the interests of Allied harmony (and their commitment to a future League of Nations), he agreed in July 1918 to send American forces to northern Russia and Siberia. About 4,600 American troops, dubbed the Polar Bears, arrived in Murmansk and Archangel in August 1918, accompanied by a slightly larger British force and smaller Allied units (a total of about 12,000). The expeditionary force was under British command, much resented by the Americans throughout the campaign. Its mission was to protect the supplies in the ports, but also to secure lines of communication by water and rail into the interior. The latter resulted in a number of skirmishes with Red Army units during the winter of 1918 to 1919 and several casualties (though the influenza epidemic would claim many more). This intervention on Russian territory was supported by much of the local population, which was represented by a nonBolshevik but socialist soviet at Archangel, thus complicating the question of what kind of Russia the Allied forces were fighting for. The end of the war challenged the legitimacy of an Allied inter52 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY vention and provoked opposition among the troops there and at home. The opening of a Second Russian Front in Siberia was rather different, since it involved a more substantial American expeditionary force (around 9,000) under its own command and a much larger Japanese army of approximately 70,000, along with 4,000 Canadians and token “colonial” units of French, Italian, Chinese, and British. Their illdefined mission was to assist the transfer to the Western Front of a Czecho-Slovak Legion consisting of 60,000 former prisoners-of-war who supported the Allies, to protect munitions in and around Vladivostok, and to guard against one another’s imperialist ambitions. On the long way to the Western Front, the Czech Legion managed to seize most of the Trans-Siberian Railroad to prevent released German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners-of-war in the area from forming a “German front” in Siberia; and to provide aid to what at first seemed a viable anti-Bolshevik government centered in Omsk under the leadership of Admiral Alexander Kolchak. For the United States, limiting Japanese ambitions for a more permanent occupation was a major factor. In any event, the American commander, General William S. Graves, was under strict orders from Washington not only to avoid coming under the control of the larger Japanese army, but also to desist from direct hostility with any Russian military units, of which there were several of various political orientations. Most of the Allied expeditionary force remained in the vicinity of Vladivostok and at a few points along the Chinese Eastern and Trans-Siberian railroads until the decision to withdraw in May–June 1919. Another commitment of men, supplies, and financial assistance came to the south of Russia but only late in 1918, when the end of war allowed passage through the Straits into the Black Sea. The catalyst here was the existence of substantial White armies under Anton Denikin and his successor, General Peter Wrangel. In the spring and summer campaigns of 1919, these forces won control of extensive territory from the Bolsheviks with the support of about 60,000 French troops (mostly Senegalese and Algerians), smaller detachments of British soldiers with naval support, and an American destroyer squadron on the Black Sea. Divided command, low morale, vague political objectives, the skill and superiority of the Red Army, and, finally, Allied reluctance to provide major aid doomed their efforts. This “crusade” came to a dismal end in late 1920. Besides a direct but limited military presence in Russia, the interventionist powers provided financing, a misleading sense of permanent political and economic commitment to the White opposition, but also medical and food relief for large areas of the former Russian Empire. Allied intervention in Russia was doomed from the beginning by the small forces committed, their unclear mission and divided command, the low morale of the Allied soldiers and their Russian clients, the end of the war of which it was a part, and the superiority of Soviet military forces and management. Throughout, it seemed to many that the Allied interventionists were on the wrong side, defending those who wanted either to restore the old order or break up Russia into dependent states. To many Americans, for instance, the Japanese posed more of a threat to Siberia than did the Bolsheviks. In the aftermath, genuinely anti-Bolshevik Russians felt betrayed by the failure of the Allies to destroy their enemy, while the new Soviet power was born with an ingrained sense of hostility to the interventionist states, marking what could be claimed as the beginnings of the Cold War. An immediate tragedy was the exodus of desperate refuges from the former Russian Empire through the Black Sea and into Manchuria and China, seeking assistance from erstwhile allies who had failed to save the world for democracy. See also: BREST-LITOVSK PEACE; SIBERIA; UNITED STATES, RELATIONS WITH; WHITE ARMY; WORLD WAR I BIBLIOGRAPHY Carley, Michael J. (1983). Revolution and Intervention: The French Government and the Russian Civil War, 1917–1919. Kingston: McGill–Queen’s University Press. Foglesong, David S. (1995). America’s Secret War Against Bolshevism: U. S. Intervention in the Russian Civil War, 1917–1920. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Goldhurst, Richard. (1978). The Midnight War: The American Intervention in Russia, 1918–1920. New York: McGraw-Hill. Graves, William S. (1932). America’s Siberian Adventure, 1918–1920. New York: Jonathan Cape & Harrison Smith. Kennan, George F. (1958). The Decision to Intervene: The Prelude to Allied Intervention in the Bolshevik Revolution. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Saul, Norman E. (2001). War and Revolution: The United States and Russia, 1914–1921. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY 53 ALLIED INTERVENTION ALLILUYEVA, SVETLANA IOSIFOVNA Ullman, Richard H. (1961–73). Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917–1921. 3 vols. Princeton. NJ: Princeton University Press. Unterberger, Betty. (1956). America’s Siberian Expedition, 1918–1920. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Unterberger, Betty, ed. (2002). The United States and the Russian Civil War: The Betty Miller Unterberger Collection of Documents. Washington, DC: Scholarly Resources. NORMAN E. SAUL ALLILUYEVA, SVETLANA IOSIFOVNA (b. 1926), daughter of Soviet general secretary Josef Stalin and his second wife, Nadezhda Alliluyeva. The daughter of an old Georgian revolutionary friend, Sergo Alliluyev, Nadezhda Alliuyeva was sixteen when Stalin married her on March 24, 1919. In addition to Svetlana Iosifovna, she had one son in 1919, Vasily. Svetlana also had an older half-brother Yakov (Jacob), the son of Stalin’s first wife, Yekaterina Svanidze, a simple peasant girl, whom he married in June 1904 at the age of 25, but who died on April 10, 1907. Nadezhda Alliluyeva’s death in 1932, apparently a suicide following a quarrel with Stalin, deeply affected both her husband and her daughter. Morose, Stalin withdrew from Party comrades with whom he had socialized with his wife. Some believe her suicide contributed to his paranoid distrust of others. Svetlana was twenty-seven when Georgy Malenkov summoned her to Blizhny, the nickname for Stalin’s dacha at Kuntsevo, just outside of Moscow. In her first book, Twenty Letters to a Friend (1967), she poignantly described Stalin’s three-day death from a brain hemorrhage. “The last hours were nothing but a slow strangulation. The death agony was horrible. He literally choked to death as we watched.” Although she had lived apart from Stalin, who had always been “very remote” from her, she nevertheless experienced a “welling up of strong, contradictory emotions” and a “release from a burden that had been weighing on [her] heart and mind.” After her father’s death, Svetlana taught and translated texts in the Soviet Union. In late 1966, while in India to deposit the ashes of her late husband Brajesh Singh, she asked Ambassador Chester Bowles in the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi, India, for permission to defect to the United States. She left a grown son (Josef) and daughter (Katie) from two earlier marriages in the Soviet Union. Svetlana’s defection caused an international sensation. “I could not continue the same useless life which I had for fourteen years,” she told reporters on March 9, 1967. Settling in Locust Valley, New York, she wrote the abovementioned memoir describing the deaths of her two parents, and a second one two years later (Only One Year), in which she described her decision to defect. Upon becoming a U.S. citizen, she married an American architect, William Peters, in 1970 and had a daughter by him. After separating from Peters, she returned to the Soviet Union in 1984 and settled in Tbilisi. She again left the USSR in 1986 and returned to the United States, but then settled in England during the 1990s. See also: STALIN, JOSEF VISSARIONOVICH BIBLIOGRAPHY Alliluyeva, Anna Sergeevna, and Alliluyev, Sergei Yakovlich. (1968). The Alliluyev Memoirs: Recollections of Svetlana Stalina’s Maternal Aunt Anna Alliluyeva and her Grandfather Sergei Alliluyev, comp. David Tutaev. New York: Putnam. Clements, Barbara E. (1994). Daughters of Revolution: A History of Women in the USSR. Arlington Heights, IL: Harlan Davidson. Radzinskii, Edvard. (1996). Stalin: The First In-Depth Biography Based on Explosive New Documents from Russia’s Secret Archives. New York: Doubleday. Richardson, Rosamond. (1994). Stalin’s Shadow: Inside the Family of One of the Greatest Tyrants. New York: St. Martin’s. 54 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY ALMANAC See FEMINISM. ALTAI JOHANNA GRANVILLE The Altai people comprise an amalgamation of Turkic tribes who reside in the Altai Mountains and the Kuznetsk Alatau. Their origins lie with the earliest Turkic tribes (Uighurs, Kypchak-Kimaks, Yenisey Kyrgyz, Oguz, and others). In 550 C.E., the Tugyu Turks settled in the Altai Mountains along the headwaters of the Ob River and in the foothills of the Kuznetsk Alatau, where around 900 C.E. they formed the Kimak Tribal Union with the Kypchak Turks. From this union sprang the ethnonyms Kumanda, Teleut, and Telengit. In the seventh century, the Telengit lived with another would-be Altai tribe, the Telesy, on the Tunlo River in Mongolia, whence they both migrated to Tyva. By the eighth century they had gravitated to the Altai Mountains and eastern Kazakhstan. The Russians arrived in the 1700s and proceeded to sedentarize many of the nomadic Altai. The Soviet government gave the Altai nominal recognition with the establishment of the GornoAltai (Oirot) Autonomous Oblast in 1922. In 1991 it became the Altai Republic. In 1989 there were 70,800 Altai worldwide, 69,400 in Russia alone, and 59,100 in the Altai Republic. A few lived in Central Asia. The internal divisions among the Altai are distinguished ethnographically and dialectically. The northern group comprises the Tubulars who live on the left-bank of the Biya River and on the shores of Lake Teletskoye, the Chelkans who live along the Lebed River, and the Kumandas who live along the middle course of the Biya. Each of these tribes speaks an Altai dialect that belongs to the Eastern division of the Ural-Altaic language family. The southern groups, including the Altai-Kizhi, Telengits, Telesy, and Teleuts, live in the Katun River Basin and speak an Altai dialect closely related to the Kyrgyz language. Although the ethnogenesis of the southern Altai took place among the Oirot Mongols, consolidation of the northern groups and overall consolidation between the northern and southern Altai has been difficult. The Teleuts, for example, have long considered themselves distinctive and have sought separate recognition. In 1868 the Altai Church Mission tried, but failed, to establish an Altai written language based on Teleut, using the Cyrillic alphabet. In 1922, the Soviets succeeded in creating an Altai literary language, and, since 1930, the Altais have had their own publishing house. In spite of internal differences, Altai societies share certain general traits. They are highly patriarchal, for example: Women do domestic work, whereas men herd horses and dairy cows. Since the 1750s, most Altai have been Russian Orthodox, but a minority practices Lamaism and some practice shamanism. See also: CENTRAL ASIA; ETHNOGRAPHY, RUSSIAN AND SOVIET; KAZAKHSTAN AND KAZAKHS; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST BIBLIOGRAPHY Mote, Victor L. (1998). Siberia: Worlds Apart. Boulder, CO: Westview. Wixman, Ronald. (1984). The Peoples of the USSR: An Ethnographic Handbook. Arkmonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. VICTOR L. MOTE ALTYN Monetary unit used in Russia from the last quarter of the fourteenth century until the eighteenth century. The altyn’s first use was directly connected with the appearance of the denga, another monetary unit and coin that came into existence at the same time. Six dengi (pl.) equaled one altyn. The word altyn was a lexicological borrowing into Russian from Mongol, meaning “six.” From its origins, the altyn was mainly used in the central and eastern lands of Russia (Moscow, Ryazan, Tver), but spread to the lands of Novgorod and Pskov by the early sixteenth century. In the early eighteenth century, the altyn became synonymous with a silver coin that equaled about three kopeks. See also: DENGA; GRIVNA; KOPECK; RUBLE BIBLIOGRAPHY Spassky, Ivan Georgievich. (1967). The Russian Monetary System: A Historico-Numismatic Survey, tr. Z. I. Gorishina and rev. L. S. Forrer. Amsterdam: Jacques Schulman. ROMAN K. KOVALEV AMALRIK, ANDREI ALEXEYEVICH (1938–1980), Russian political activist, dissident, publicist, playwright, exiled to Siberia from 1965 to 1966 and imprisoned in labor camps from 1970 to 1976. Born in Moscow, Amalrik studied history at Moscow University; he was expelled in 1963 for a paper featuring unorthodox views on Kievan Rus. Amalrik wrote several absurdist plays such as Moya tetya zhivet v Volokolamske (My Aunt Lives in Volokolamsk), Vostok-Zapad (East-West), and Nos! Nos? No-s! (The Nose! The Nose? The No-se!), the AMALRIK, ANDREI ALEXEYEVICH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY 55 AMERICAN RELIEF ADMINISTRATION latter referring to Gogol’s famous short story. In 1965, Amalrik was arrested for lacking official employment (“parasitism”) and charges that his—yet unpublished—plays were “anti-Soviet and pornographic.” Exiled to Siberia for two and a half years, he was released in 1966 and subsequently described his experiences in Nezhelannoye puteshestvie v Sibir (Involuntary Journey to Siberia, 1970). Amalrik’s essay Prosushchestvuyet li Sovetsky Soyuz do 1984 goda? (Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?), an astute and prophetic analysis of Soviet society’s dim prospects for the future, brought him worldwide fame. It was completed in 1969, published the same year by the Herzen Foundation in Amsterdam, and translated into many languages. As a result, Amalrik was put on trial and sentenced to three years in Siberian camps, with another three years added in 1973. Protests in the West led to a commutation of the sentence from hard labor to exile and ultimately to permission to leave the Soviet Union in 1976. In the West, Amalrik was involved in numerous human rights initiatives. In 1980, Amalrik died in a car crash in Guadalajara, Spain. He was legally rehabilitated in 1991. See also: DISSIDENT MOVEMENT BIBLIOGRAPHY Keep, John. (1971). “Andrei Amalrik and 1984.” Russian Review 30:335–345. Svirski, Grigori. (1981). A History of Post-War Soviet Writing: The Literature of Moral Opposition. Ann Arbor: Ardis. PETER ROLLBERG AMERICAN RELIEF ADMINISTRATION As World War I ended, the United States helped many countries around the world recover from the effects of war through the American Relief Administration (ARA). Herbert Hoover headed the ARA and had opened numerous missions in Europe by 1919. The primary goal of the ARA was to provide food relief, but it also provided medical aid, relocation services, and much else. The ARA attempted to open a mission in Russia in 1919 and 1920, but they were unsuccessful because the Bolsheviks suspected that the Americans had intervened in the Russian Civil War. However, after the horrible famine of the winter of 1920 and 1921, and after writer Maxim Gorky petitioned Vladimir Lenin to provide relief, the new Soviet government recognized the need for the ARA in Russia. By the summer of 1921, the ARA director for Europe, Walter Lyman Brown, and Soviet assistant commissar of foreign affairs Maxim Litvinov reached an agreement for an ARA mission in Russia. One of the primary concerns for the Soviets was the potential for American political activity in Russia. Brown assured Litvinov that their mission was solely to save as many lives as possible, and he appointed Colonel William N. Haskell to head the ARA in Russia. The ARA opened kitchens in Petrograd and Moscow by September 1921, serving tens of thousands of children. The ARA spread into smaller cities and rural areas over the next several months, but in several places faced opposition from local village leaders and Communist Party officials. Most rural local committees consisted of a teacher and two or three other members who would serve the food to the children from the local schools. This fed the children, paid and fed the teacher, and continued some measure of education. In addition to feeding programs, the ARA employed thousands of starving and unemployed Russians to unload, transport, and distribute food to the most famine-stricken areas. The ARA also established a medical division that furnished medical supplies for hospitals, provided treatments to tens of thousands of people, and conducted sanitation inspections. It was estimated that the ARA provided about eight million vaccinations between 1921 and 1923. By the summer of 1922, disputes within the ARA administration in the United States and between the ARA and the Soviet government placed the mission’s future in doubt. Hoover and Haskell disagreed about the duration and tactics of the mission in Russia. In September 1922, the chairman of the All-Russian Famine Relief Committee, Lev Kamenev, announced that the ARA was no longer needed, despite the reports that showed many areas in worse condition than before. Over the next few months, the Soviet government urged the ARA to limit its operations, even though about two million children were added to those eligible for relief in 1922. Several leading Bolsheviks had taken a stronger anti-American stance during the course of the ARA operations, and Lenin was less integrally involved because of illness. The ARA was gradually marginalized and officially disbanded in July 1923, after nearly two years of work. The Soviet gov56 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY Villagers in Vaselienka, Samara, kneel in thanks to American Relief Administration inspector George N. McClintock. © UNDERWOOD&UNDERWOOD/CORBIS ernment took over feeding its own starving and undernourished population, while also trying to dispel the positive impression the ARA had left among the Russian population. See also: CIVIL WAR OF 1917–1922; FAMINE OF 1921–1922; UNITED STATES, RELATIONS WITH BIBLIOGRAPHY Fisher, H. H. (1927). The Famine in Soviet Russia 1919–1923: The Operations of the American Relief Administration. New York: Macmillan. Patenaude, Bertrand M. (2002). The Big Show in Bololand: The American Relief Expedition to Soviet Russia in the Famine of 1921. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Weissman, Benjamin M. (1974). Herbert Hoover and Famine Relief to Soviet Russia: 1921–1923. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press. WILLIAM BENTON WHISENHUNT ANARCHISM Anarchism, derived from the Greek word meaning “without rule,” rose to prominence in the nineteenth century and reached well into the twentieth century as a significant political force in Europe and Russia. Anarchists sought the overthrow of all forms of political rule in the name of a new society of voluntary federations of cooperative associations or syndicates. Anarchism also fought Marxism for revolutionary leadership. Russian anarchism, in particular, inspired anarchist movements in Russia and Europe. Three Russians were progenitors of modern anarchism: Mikhail Alexsandrovich Bakunin (1814–1876), Petr Alexeyevich Kropotkin (1842–1921), and Leo Nikolayevich Tolstoy (1828–1910). The three, however, were contrasting personalities, each taking different slants on anarchist doctrine. Bakunin ANARCHISM ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY 57 ANDREI ALEXANDROVICH was ever the firebrand of revolutionary violence in word and deed; Kropotkin the philosophical and scientific propounder of a society based on cooperation and mutual aid; and Tolstoy the proponent of a Christ-inspired anarchism of nonviolence and nonresistance to evil in the sense of not answering another’s evil with evil. Despite the wide intellectual influence of Kropotkin and Tolstoy, Bakunin epitomized the strategy of violence to end all political power. Bakunin put the brand on anarchism as a doctrine of violence. Kropotkin’s followers objected to anarchist factions in Russia that turned to violence and terrorism as their characteristic mode of operation. Among the names they assumed were the Black Banner Bearers, Anarchist Underground, Syndicalists, Makhayevists (followers of Makhaysky), and the Makhnovists (followers of Makhno in the Ukraine). In the wake of the 1917 revolution, Kropotkin returned to Russia from exile in Europe with high hopes for an anarchist future. Vladimir Lenin’s Bolsheviks soon dashed them. His funeral in 1921 was the last occasion in which the black flag of anarchism was raised in public in Sovietized Russia. The new regime executed anarchist leaders and destroyed their organizations. See also: BAKUNIN, MIKHAIL ALEXANDROVICH; KROPOTKIN, PETR ALEXEYEVICH; TOLSTOY, LEO NIKOLAYEVICH BIBLIOGRAPHY Avrich, Paul. (1967). The Russian Anarchists. Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press. CARL A. LINDEN ANDREI ALEXANDROVICH (d. 1304), prince of Gorodets and grand prince of Vladimir (1294–1304). Andrei Alexandrovich’s father, Alexander Yaroslavich “Nevsky,” gave him Gorodets; after his uncle, Grand Prince Vasily Yaroslavich, died, he also received Kostroma. In 1277, when Andrei’s elder brother, Grand Prince Dmitry, went to Novgorod, Andrei ingratiated himself to Khan Mangu Temir by campaigning with him in the Caucasus. In 1281 Andrei visited the Golden Horde, and Khan Tuda Mangu gave him troops to evict Dmitry from Vladimir. Andrei deposed his brother, but in 1282, after learning that Dmitry had returned from abroad and was assembling an army in his town of Pereyaslavl Zalessky, he was forced to ask the khan in Saray for reinforcements. Dmitry, meanwhile, solicited auxiliaries from Nogay, a rival khan, and defeated Andrei. The latter remained hostile. In 1293 he visited the Golden Horde again, and the khan despatched an army, which invaded Suzdalia and forced Dmitry to abdicate. After Dmitry died in 1294, Andrei became the grand prince of Vladimir. Soon afterward, a coalition of princes challenged his claim to Dmitry’s Pereyaslavl. In 1296 all the princes met in Vladimir and, after refusing to give Pereyaslavl to Andrei, concluded a fragile agreement. Thus, in 1299, when the Germans intensified their attacks against the Novgorodians, Andrei refused to send them help because he feared that if he did, the other princes would attack him. In 1300 they rejected his claim to Pereyaslavl at another meeting. Three years later, after appealing to the khan and failing yet again to get the town, he capitulated. Andrei died in Gorodets on July 27, 1304. See also: ALEXANDER YAROSLAVICH; GOLDEN HORDE; NOVGOROD THE GREAT BIBLIOGRAPHY Fennell, John. (1983). The Crisis of Medieval Russia 1200–1304. London: Longman. Martin, Janet. (1995). Medieval Russia 980–1584. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. MARTIN DIMNIK ANDREI YAROSLAVICH (d. 1264), grand prince of Vladimir (1249–1252) and progenitor of the princes of Suzdal. The third son of Yaroslav Vsevolodovich and grandson of Vsevolod Yurevich “Big Nest,” Andrei Yaroslavich survived the Tatar invasion of Suzdalia in 1238. Three years later the Novgorodians rejected him as their prince, but on April 5, 1242, he assisted his elder brother Alexander Yar “Nevsky” in defeating the Teutonic Knights at the famous “battle on the ice” on Lake Chud (Lake Peypus). There is no clear information about Andrei’s activities after their father died and their uncle Svyatoslav occupied Vladimir in 1247. Andrei may 58 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY have usurped Vladimir. In any case, he and Alexander went to Saray separately, evidently to settle the question of succession to Vladimir. But Khan Baty sent them to Mongolia, to the Great Khan in Karakorum. They returned in 1249, Alexander as the grand prince of Kiev and of all Rus, and Andrei as the grand prince of their patrimonial domain of Vladimir. In 1252 Andrei defiantly refused to visit Saray to renew his patent for Vladimir with the new great khan, Mongke, but Alexander went, evidently to obtain that patent for himself. The khan sent troops against Andrei, and they defeated him at Pereyaslavl Zalessky. After he fled to the Swedes, Alexander occupied Vladimir. Later, in 1255, Andrei returned to Suzdalia and was reconciled with Alexander, who gave him Suzdal and other towns. In 1258 he submissively accompanied Alexander to Saray, and in 1259 helped him enforce Tatar tax collecting in Novgorod. Andrei died in Suzdal in 1264. See also: ALEXANDER YAROSLAVICH; BATU; GOLDEN HORDE; VSEVOLOD III BIBLIOGRAPHY Fennell, John. (1973). “Andrej Yaroslavic and the Struggle for Power in 1252: An Investigation of the Sources.” Russia Mediaevalis 1:49–62. Fennell, John. (1983). The Crisis of Medieval Russia 1200–1304. London: Longman. MARTIN DIMNIK ANDREI YUREVICH (c. 1112–1174), known as Andrei Yurevich “Bogolyubsky,” prince of Suzdalia (Rostov, Suzdal, and Vladimir). Although historians disagree on Andrei Yurevich’s objectives, it is established that he defended the traditional order of succession to Kiev but chose to live in his patrimony of Vladimir, whose political, economic, cultural, and ecclesiastical importance he attempted to raise above that of Kiev. In 1149 Andrei’s father, Yuri Vladimirovich “Dolgoruky,” gave him Vyshgorod, located north of Kiev, and then transferred him to Turov, Pinsk, and Peresopnitsa. Two years later Andrei returned to Suzdalia. In 1155 Yuri gave him Vyshgorod once again, but Andrei returned soon afterward to Vladimir on the Klyazma. After Yuri died in Kiev in 1157, the citizens of Rostov, Suzdal, and Vladimir chose Andrei as their prince. He had autocratic ambitions for Suzdalia and, according to some, for all of Rus. He weakened the power of the veche (popular assembly), treated boyars like vassals, and, in 1161, evicted his brothers and two nephews from Suzdalia. Moreover, he spurned the powerful boyars of Rostov and Suzdal by making the smaller town of Vladimir his capital. He lived at nearby Bogolyubovo, after which he obtained his sobriquet “Bogolyubsky.” He beautified Vladimir by building its Assumption Cathedral, its Golden Gates modeled on those of Kiev, his palace at Bogolyubovo, and the Church of the Intercession of Our Lady on the river Nerl. He successfully expanded his domains into the lands of the Volga Bulgars and asserted his influence over Murom and Ryazan. However, Andrei failed to create an independent metropolitanate in Vladimir. In 1167 Rostislav Mstislavich of Kiev died, and Andrei became the senior and most eligible of the Monomashichi (descendants of Vladimir Monomakh, reign 1113–1125) to rule Kiev. Mstislav Izyaslavich of Volyn preempted Andrei’s bid for Kiev and appointed his son to Novgorod. Andrei saw Mstislav’s actions as a violation of the traditional order of succession to Kiev and as a challenge to his own interests in Novgorod. Thus in 1169 he sent a large coalition of princes to evict Mstislav. They fulfilled their mission and plundered Kiev in the process. Some historians argue that this event marked a turning point in the history of Rus; Kiev’s capture signaled its decline and Andrei’s attempt to subordinate it to Vladimir. Others argue that Andrei sought to recover the Kievan throne for the rightful Monomashich claimants because Kiev was the capital of the land, thereby affirming its importance even after it was plundered. Andrei broke tradition by not occupying Kiev in person. He appointed his brother, Gleb, to rule it in his stead. Even though Andrei was able to summon troops from Suzdalia, Novgorod, Murom, Ryazan, Polotsk, and Smolensk, he failed to assert his control over Kiev. Its citizens evidently poisoned Gleb. In 1173 Andrei ordered the Rostislavichi (descendants of Rostislav Mstislavich of Smolensk) to vacate Kiev, but later they succeeded in evicting his lieutenants and taking them captive. Andrei organized a second campaign with Svyatoslav Vsevolodovich of Chernigov, to whom he agreed to cede control of Kiev, but the coalition failed to take the city. While Andrei was waiting to receive approval from Svyatoslav to hand over Kiev to the ANDREI YUREVICH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY 59 ANDREYEV, LEONID NIKOLAYEVICH Rostislavichi, his boyars murdered him on June 29, 1174. See also: BOYAR; KIEVAN RUS; NOVGOROD THE GREAT BIBLIOGRAPHY Franklin, Simon, and Shepard, Jonathan. (1996). The Emergence of Rus 750–1200. London: Longman. Hurwitz, Ellen. (1980). Prince Andrej Bogoljubskij: The Man and the Myth. Florence: Licosa Editrice. Martin, Janet. (1995). Medieval Russia 980–1584. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Pelenski, Jaroslaw. (1998). The Contest for the Legacy of Kievan Rus’ (East European Monographs 377). New York: Columbia University Press. MARTIN DIMNIK ANDREYEV, LEONID NIKOLAYEVICH (1871–1919), Russian prose writer, playwright, and publicist whose works, internationally acclaimed in his lifetime, are infused with humanistic protest against social oppression and humiliation. Born on August 21, 1871, in the town of Oryol (Orel), Leonid Nikolayevich Andreyev studied law at St. Petersburg University and briefly practiced as a lawyer. A volume of stories, published in 1901 by Maxim Gorky’s “Znanie” enterprise, made him famous. After the death of his first wife in 1906 and the violent oppression of the anti-autocratic mutinies that occurred between 1905 and 1907, Andreyev entered a period of deep resignation, abandoning radical leftist ideas but failing to develop viable alternatives. His political confusion resonated with the liberal intelligentsia, for whose he became the most fashionable of authors in the 1910s. In Andreyev’s narratives, crass images of irrationality and hysteria are often blended with crude melodrama, yet they also reveal persistent social sensitivities. Thus, the short story “Krasnyi smekh” (“Red Laughter,” 1904) depicts the horror of war, whereas “Rasskaz o semi poveshennykh” (“The Seven Who Were Hanged,” 1908) attacks capital punishment while idealizing political terrorism. Andreyev’s plays, closely associated with Symbolism, caused scandals and enjoyed huge popularity. His unfinished novel Dnevnik Satany (Satan’s Diary, 1918) was inspired by the death of U.S. millionaire Alfred Vanderbilt on the Lusitania in 1915, and seeks to convey the doom of bourgeois society. In addition to his writing, Andreyev was also an accomplished color photographer and painter. He displayed pro-Russian patriotism in World War I, but welcomed the February Revolution of 1917. Later that year, he radically opposed the Bolshevik coup and emigrated to Finland. In his last essay, “S.O.S.” (1919), he called upon the president of the United States to intervene in Russia militarily. Andreyev died on September 12th of that same year. See also: GORKY, MAXIM; SILVER AGE BIBLIOGRAPHY Newcombe, Josephine. (1972). Leonid Andreyev. Letchworth, UK: Bradda Books. Woodward, James. (1969). Leonid Andreyev: A Study. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press. PETER ROLLBERG ANDREYEVA, NINA ALEXANDROVNA (b. 1938), teacher, author, political activist, and social critic. Born on October 12, 1938, in Leningrad, Nina Alexandrovna Andreyeva joined the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1966, and became a teacher of chemistry at the Leningrad Technical Institute in 1973. A self styled Stalinist and devotee of political order, she wrote an essay that defended many aspects of the Stalinist system, assailed reformists’ efforts to provide a more accurate picture of the history of the USSR, and implied that General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and his closest supporters were not real communists. Her essay “I Cannot Forsake My Principles” was published in the orthodox newspaper Sovetskaia Rossiya at a time when Gorbachev and Alexander Nikolayevich Yakovlev were abroad, and cited (without attribution) an orthodox report by the secretary of the Party’s Central Committee, Yegor Kuzmich Ligachev, in February 1988. Officials in the ideological department of the Central Committee evidently edited her original letter, and Ligachev reportedly ordered its dissemination throughout the party. Ligachev repeatedly denied responsibility for its publication. Orthodox party officials applauded the essay, whereas members of the liberal intelligentsia feared 60 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY that it represented a major defeat for the intellectual freedom supported by the general secretary. Gorbachev subsequently revealed that many members of the Politburo seemed to share Andreyeva’s views, and that he had to browbeat them into approving the publication of an official rejoinder. The published response appeared in Pravda on April 5, 1988, and was not nearly as forceful as its authors have claimed. In the aftermath of this discussion, the General Secretary at least temporarily tightened his own control over the Secretariat of the Central Committee. The entire episode may have contributed to his decision to reform the Secretariat in the fall of 1988. Andreyeva subsequently played a leadership role in the formation of orthodox communist organizations. She headed the organizing committee of the Bolshevik Platform of the CPSU that “expelled” Gorbachev from the party in September 1991. In November 1991, she became the general secretary of the small but militant All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. In October 1993, the party was temporarily suspended along with fifteen other organizations after President Yeltsin’s repression of the attempted coup against his regime. In May 1995 she was stripped of her post as the head of the St. Petersburg Central Committee of the party for “lack of revolutionary activity.” See also: CENTRAL COMMITTEE; COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION; GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH; LIGACHEV, YEGOR KUZMICH BIBLIOGRAPHY Brown, Archie. (1997). The Gorbachev Factor. New York: Cambridge University Press. McCauley, Martin. (1997). Who’s Who in Russia since 1990. New York: Routledge. Remnick, David. (1994). Lenin’s Tomb. New York: Random House. JONATHAN HARRIS ANDROPOV, YURI VLADIMIROVICH (1914–1984), general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (1982–1984). Yuri Andropov was born on June 15, 1914, in the southern Russian region of Stavropol. He rose rapidly through the ranks of the Young Communist League (Komsomol). During World War II he Official portrait of Yuri Andropov, CPSU general secretary, 1982–1984. © BETTMANN/CORBIS worked with the partisan movement in Karelia, and after the war he became second secretary of the regional Party organization. He was transferred to the Party apparatus in Moscow in 1951 and was the ambassador to Hungary at the time of the Soviet invasion in 1956. He played a key role in encouraging the invasion. In 1957 Andropov returned to Moscow to become head of the Central Committee’s Bloc Relations Department. There he inherited a group of some of the most progressive thinkers of the Brezhnev era, many of the leading advocates for change who were working within the system. This contributed later to Andropov’s reputation as a progressive thinker. He continued to oversee relations with other communist countries after he was promoted to Central Committee secretary in 1962. In 1967 he was appointed the head of the Committee on State Security (KGB) and a candidate member of ANDROPOV, YURI VLADIMIROVICH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY 61 ANDRUSOVO, PEACE OF the ruling Politburo. He was promoted to the rank of full Politburo member in 1971. As the head of the KGB, Andropov led active efforts against dissidents at home and enhanced the KGB collection efforts abroad. To be in a better position to succeed Leonid Brezhnev, Andropov gave up the chairmanship of the KGB in May 1982 and returned to the Central Committee as a senior member of the Secretariat. His chief rival in the succession struggle was Konstantin Chernenko, who was being actively promoted by Brezhnev. However, Chernenko lacked Andropov’s broad experience, and when Brezhnev died in November 1982, Andropov was elected general secretary by a plenum of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). In June 1983 he was elected chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet—the head of state. When Andropov was elevated to the head of the Party, there were great hopes that he would end the stagnation that had characterized the Brezhnev years and that he would reinvigorate the Party and its policies. From his years as head of the KGB, Andropov had an excellent perspective on the depth of the problems facing the Soviet Union. There was also an active effort to promote his image as a progressive thinker. During his very brief tenure as Party leader, Andropov was able to begin diverging from the norms of the Brezhnev era. This was a time of rapid personnel turnover. In addition to making key changes in the top Party leadership, he replaced a large number of ministers and regional party leaders with younger leaders. Most important, Andropov actively advanced the career of the youngest member of the Politburo, Agriculture Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, giving him broad authority and experience in the Party that helped pave the way for his ascent to Party leadership. All signs indicate that Andropov was hoping to make Gorbachev his successor. Andropov’s brief tenure was not sufficient to make a similar impact on policy. While he was much more open than Brezhnev in recognizing the country’s problems, particularly in the economic sphere, Andropov was cautious by nature and did not come to office with any plan for tackling them. He did, however, begin a serious discussion of the need for economic reform, spoke positively about economic innovation in Eastern Europe, and began to take some cautious steps to improve the situation. His regime is best remembered for the discipline campaign: an effort to enforce worker discipline, punishing workers who did not report for duty on time or were drinking on the job. He also introduced other minor reforms aimed at improving productivity. Andropov began to tackle the problem of corruption at higher levels and expelled two members of the Central Committee who had been close associates of Brezhnev. He also introduced somewhat greater openness in Party affairs, publishing accounts of the weekly Politburo meetings and deliberations of the CPSU plenum. These measures, together with his personnel moves, created a positive sense of cautious change, as well as a hope that the Soviet leadership would start to address the problems facing the country, now that it was aware of them. Probably the most notable event of Andropov’s tenure was the accidental shooting down by the Soviet military of a Korean Airlines plane that strayed into Soviet airspace in the Far East in September 1983. The contest to succeed Andropov appears to have been the main preoccupation of the party leadership following his election. Only three months into his tenure, Andropov’s health began to deteriorate sharply as a result of serious kidney problems, and he was regularly on dialysis for the rest of his life. He dropped out of sight in August 1983 and did not appear again in public. He died in February 1984. Andropov was not in office long enough for his protégé, Gorbachev, to gain the upper hand in the succession struggle, and he was succeeded by seventy-two-year-old Konstantin Chernenko, who was closely associated with the status quo of the Brezhnev era. See also: CHERNENKO, KONSTANTIN USTINOVICH; GENERAL SECRETARY; GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH; STATE SECURITY, ORGANS OF BIBLIOGRAPHY Brown, Archie. (1983). “Andropov: Discipline and Reform.” Problems of Communism 33(1):18–31. Medvedev, Zhores A. (1983). Andropov. New York: Norton. MARC D. ZLOTNIK ANDRUSOVO, PEACE OF The Peace of Andrusovo (1667) concluded a thirteenyear period of conflict between Muscovy, PolandLithuania, and Sweden, known as the Thirteen Year’s War (1654–1667). It marked the end of Poland-Lithuania’s attempts at eastward expansion, and divided the Ukraine into Polish (right 62 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY bank) and Russian (left bank) spheres of influence on either side of the Dnieper River. The treaty allowed Muscovy to maintain temporary hold over the two key cities of Smolensk (thirteen and a half years) and Kiev (two years); but Muscovy defied those provisions and retained these cities permanently, paying only a token indemnity to the Poles. The agreement at Andrusovo, though originally intended to be provisional, was confirmed by the so-called “Eternal Peace” of 1686. Thus, the treaty marked Muscovy’s ascendance over PolandLithuania in the region. The Peace of Andrusovo is significant in that it defined relations between Muscovy and PolandLithuania for much of the remainder of the century. Subsequent treaties extended, clarified, or confirmed the 1667 Peace of Andrusovo. Largely because of this treaty, Muscovy and Poland-Lithuania developed a mutual defensive stance against the Crimean Tatars and the Ottoman Empire in the south. It also affected how the two nations defined other aspects of their relationship, such as the status of Kiev, the Zaporozhian Cossacks, and of Orthodox populations in Polish-held territories. The creation of Polish and Russian spheres of influence had a far-reaching impact on their subject populations. The Poles pursued a policy of Polonization of Belarus, forbidding the use of the Belarussian language, and restricting the political involvement of the Orthodox believers. The Russians limited the power of the hetmans and returned the practice of serfdom to the Left Bank region. The divided Ukrainians sought to gain advantage by playing Muscovy, Poland, and the Ottomans against one another, with the result that continuous warfare reduced their population and destroyed their lands. Still, the division remained in effect and contributed to Muscovy’s predominance. See also: MUSCOVY; POLAND; THIRTEEN YEAR’S WAR W. M. REGER IV ANNA IVANOVNA (1693–1740), empress of Russia (1730–1740). Anna Ivanovna was a daughter of Peter the Great’s half-brother and co-ruler Ivan V. When Peter’s young grandson, Peter II, died unexpectedly the Romanov male line came to an end. The Supreme Privy Council faced the problem of deciding to which of the five female pretenders the Russian crown was to be passed. Two powerful aristocratic families, the Golitsyns and Dolgorukys, dominated the Council. They hoped to limit the powers of the autocratic monarch, a plan that required a docile and passive figure on the throne. Anna seemed to fit their needs perfectly. She was a widow in near impoverishment, wishing to escape her difficult circumstances in Courland (Latvia). The Council believed that given her essentially weak character and probable gratitude toward the Council for the offer of the crown, she would prove malleable enough to accept restrictions on her power. In a signed document Anna agreed not to make any decisions on war or peace, taxes, promotions, deprivation of titles and property, remarrying, appointment of an heir, or spending of state revenues without approval of the Supreme Privy Council. The Council had in effect executed a coup d’etat. Real power had moved from the autocrat to the oligarchy in the Council. As word began to spread about these conditions, lesser nobles began to form opposition against the Golitsyn and Dolgoruky conditions. These lesser nobles, dependent on the monarch for their positions, privileges, and material well-being, preferred the absolute power of a monarch, believed to be above petty personal interests, to what they considered to be the despotism of a small clique of aristocratic families. Anna entered Moscow on February 15, 1730. Taking advantage of the opposition among the nobles and Imperial Guards to the limiting of her power, at an audience she tore up the document she had signed after accepting petitions asking her to reclaim her autocratic power. Some historians regard this as a lost opportunity for Russia to break from its autocratic past. They believe that the granting of legal rights to the nobility as a whole would have led to dramatic changes in the sociopolitical structure, thereby removing many obstacles created by the autocratic system to Russia’s further economic and political development. In return for their support against the Council, these nobles pressed Anna for concessions and privileges that she eventually granted. She repealed the 1714 Law on Primogeniture, shortened military service, allowed entrance for nobles into the military at officer rank and gave them more control over their serfs. These moves represented the beginning of an upgrading of the Russian nobility’s status. ANNA IVANOVNA ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY 63 ANTHONY KHRAPOVITSKY, METROPOLITAN Anna had little inclination for ruling, preferring gossip, trivia, and matchmaking. Her lover from Courland, Count Ernst-Johann Biron, exercised a decisive influence on her. The great resentment Russians felt towards him and the other foreigners Anna placed in key posts and to whom she granted much patronage became a leitmotiv of her reign. This resentment, which continued after her reign, had other roots as well. As Russian identity among the upper classes began to solidify, the influx of foreigners, whose expertise was regarded as important for modernization, came to be seen as an affront to Russian dignity. The damaged belief in Russian superiority, combined with the frequently bad behaviour of foreigners, added to the complexity of this problem. Anna took several steps to consolidate her rule. She founded the powerful Izmailovsky Guards, whose head was a former lover. The intelligence service was reestablished, providing an effective mechanism for surveillance and control over society. Finally, in order to bypass the Supreme Privy Council, in 1731 Anna established a Cabinet of Ministers, which in reality governed the Empire. This was not a limitation on the autocratic power, since Anna willingly granted these powers to the Cabinet of Ministers and was able to take them back at will. Anna’s foreign policy reinforced the general line set by Peter and thereby set the tone for Russian foreign policy for the rest of the century. With Austria she fought the War of Polish Succession (1733–1735) to prevent the resurgence of French influence in Poland and to promote the election of a pro-Russian king, thereby adding to the security of the Empire’s western borders. Continuing Russia’s push southward to the Black Sea, Anna with Austrian support declared war on the Ottoman Empire. The war ended in 1739 with the defeat of the Crimean khanate, Russia’s regaining of Azov, and the understanding that St. Petersburg would deal decisively with rivals on Russia’s Black Sea coast. Anna failed, however, to gain the right to maintain a Russian fleet in the Black Sea, a recurring issue in Imperial Russian history. The policy of working with Austria in regard to Poland and the Ottoman Empire was adopted by Catherine II. Anna died on October 7, 1740. See also: AUTOCRACY; CABINET OF MINISTERS, IMPERIAL; NATIONALISM IN TSARIST EMPIRE; PETER I; RUSSOTURKISH WARS BIBLIOGRAPHY Dukes, Paul. (1982). The Making of Russian Absolutism 1613–1801. London: Longman. Kamenskii, Aleksandr. (1997). The Russian Empire in the Eighteenth Century, tr. David Griffiths. London: Sharpe. Lincoln, W. Bruce. (1981). The Romanovs: Autocrats of all the Russias. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. Longworth, Phillip. (1972). The Three Empresses: Catherine I, Anna, and Elizabeth of Russia. London: Constable. Raleigh, Donald, ed. (1996). The Emperors and Empresses of Russia: Rediscovering the Romanovs. London: Sharpe. ZHAND P. SHAKIBI ANTHONY KHRAPOVITSKY, METROPOLITAN (1863–1936), metropolitan of Kiev, theologian, church reformer, and leader of the Russian Orthodox Church in exile after the Russian revolution. Through early study of Dostoyevsky and Slavophilism, Anthony became convinced that faith and philosophy were closely intertwined. His Psychological Data in Favor of Free Will and Moral Responsibility (1887) extended this earlier insight, established his reputation as a theologian, and inspired many young men to become monastic missionaries so as to combat the rebellious ideas current in society and to relieve human suffering. To build the Kingdom of God in society, Anthony believed, the church must be free from dependence on the state (although he always remained a staunch monarchist in politics). In August 1917 he advanced his ideas on church reform at a council (sobor) of the Russian church. He argued that the church should be governed at the top by a patriarch and a council of bishops, a structure favored by many bishops in attendance. For a time it looked as if the council would elect Anthony as patriarch. In the first round of balloting, he was the most popular of the three finalists for the patriarchal office. However, the final selection by drawing lots resulted in the selection of Tikhon (Bellavin). In the confused political and religious turmoil in Ukraine during the last months of German occupation (World War I), Anthony became metropolitan of Kiev. During the civil war, he supported the losing side and was forced to leave Russia for a life of exile, first in Constantinople, then at Srem64 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY ski Karlovci in Yugoslavia. In 1920, as senior among the bishops who had left Russia, he took the lead in creating a Higher Church Administration and a Synod of the Russian Church in Constantinople. The next year, he convened a council in Yugoslavia that declared the new Synod as the central church authority in emigration, expressed its desire to see a restoration of monarchy in Russia, and proclaimed Anthony as “Vice Regent of the All-Russian Patriarch.” The new organization declared unconditional loyalty to Patriarch Tikhon, but came to fear that the patriarch was acting on behalf of the Communist government in Russia. In the two years following Patriarch Tikhon’s death in 1925, Anthony broke off relations with the Moscow patriarchate and declared the Synodal church in Yugoslavia to be the sole heir of the historic Orthodox church in Russia. His followers expected him to be elected patriarch of this fully autonomous church that claimed jurisdiction over the entire Russian diaspora. Such a claim caused a rupture in relations with Metropolitan Evlogy, whom Patriarch Tikhon had placed in charge of the Russian parishes in western Europe. Eventually, in 1931, the ecumenical patriarch Vasilios III intervened and permitted Evlogy to place the exarchate of the Russian church in western Europe under Constantinople’s jurisdiction. Anthony’s influence in the Orthodox emigration diminished thereafter. See also: RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH; TIKHON, PATRIARCH BIBLIOGRAPHY Antic’, Oxana (1988). “The Russian Orthodox Church Abroad.” In Eastern Christianity and Politics in the Twentieth Century, ed. Pedro Ramet. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. ROBERT L. NICHOLS ANTHONY VADKOVSKY, METROPOLITAN (1846–1912), metropolitan of St. Petersburg, moderate church reformer. Anthony began his career at the Kazan Theological Academy as a scholar and editor of the academy’s widely read journal Orthodox Interlocutor (Pravoslavny sobesednik). His scholarly life ended abruptly with the sudden illness and death of his wife and two children. He became a monk, thereby contributing to the notable revival in the 1880s of the “learned monasticism” that had characterized the church hierarchy in Russia before the Great Reforms of the 1860s. Anthony soon became rector of the St. Petersburg Theological Academy and bishop of Vyborg, vicar to the metropolitan of St. Petersburg. Some of Anthony’s favorite students at the academy subsequently became prominent churchmen: Sergei Stragorodsky, the future leader of the Russian church during the communist era, and Anthony Khrapovitsky, Sergei’s rival and leader of the Russian church in exile after 1920. While promoting monasticism, Anthony also sought to reform the monasteries, particularly those whose economic activities harmed the material welfare of the parish clergy. The parish clergy, he felt, must be accorded a more secure livelihood if they were to rescue the church’s failing parishes. Anthony used his influence as bishop to advance these reforms. In 1892 Anthony became the archbishop of a newly created Finnish diocese aimed at encouraging Russian patriotic feeling and devotion to the Russian Orthodox Church among the Finnish Orthodox population. When the revolutionary disturbances in 1905 generated a new law on religious toleration, Anthony, as ranking member of the Holy Synod, entered the broader struggle for church reform. He argued that the new law put the church at a disadvantage because other religious faiths were freed from state interference in their internal affairs in a way not permitted to Orthodoxy. These sentiments, transmitted to Nicholas II by Sergei Witte, chairman of the Council of Ministers, decisively advanced the popular reform movement that culminated in an all-Russian council (sobor) of the church and reestablishment of the patriarchate after the fall of the Russian monarchy in 1917. At the same time, fearing that the church might be swept into a political maelstrom, he warned against clerical participation in the newly forming political parties of post-1905 Russia. During these years, Anthony courageously, if ultimately unsuccessfully, resisted the harmful influence of Rasputin in church affairs, and there is some evidence to suggest that he tried to intervene personally with Nicholas II in order to quell Rasputin’s potential influence on the Tsarevich Alexis. Following Anthony’s death in 1912, Rasputin’s influence in the Holy Synod grew rapidly. See also: HOLY SYNOD; RASPUTIN, GRIGORY YEFIMOVICH; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH ANTHONY VADKOVSKY, METROPOLITAN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY 65 ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY BIBLIOGRAPHY Cunningham, James W. (1981). A Vanquished Hope: The Movement for Church Renewal in Russia, 1905–1906. Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press. Curtiss, John S. (1965 [1940]). Church and State in Russia: The Last Years of Empire, 1900–1917. New York: Octagon Books. Meyendorff, Fr. John. (1978). “Russian Bishops and Church Reform in 1905.” In Russian Orthodoxy under the Old Regime, eds. Robert L. Nichols and Theofanis G. Stavrou. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. ROBERT L. NICHOLS ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (usually referred to as “the ABM Treaty”) was signed by U.S. president Richard Nixon and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev in Moscow on May 26, 1972. It entered into force on October 3, 1972. Under its terms, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to limit sharply both development and deployment of ballistic missile defenses in order to constrain the arms race in strategic nuclear weapons and to enhance the stability of the strategic balance. The ABM Treaty was the principal achievement of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), which also produced an Interim Agreement limiting strategic offensive missiles, pending negotiation of a more comprehensive treaty limiting such weapons. The ABM Treaty was of indefinite duration, although it could be amended by mutual agreement and either party could withdraw at any time on six months’ notice. The ABM Treaty was the centerpiece of the Nixon-Brezhnev Moscow summit of 1972, and the SALT negotiation was seen as the icebreaker for a broader political détente, as well as a stabilizing element in strategic arms control. Strategic arms control and the ABM Treaty enjoyed wide support for most of the next two decades. This was true despite the prolonged and ultimately inconclusive efforts to reach agreement on a SALT II treaty on offensive arms. By the time Ronald Reagan became president in 1981, American concerns over the strategic balance had risen. In 1983 President Reagan announced a Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) to develop strategic antiballistic missile defense systems. Deployment, and even testing and development, of such a system would have required radical revision or abrogation of the ABM Treaty. In 1985 the Reagan administration announced a unilateral revised interpretation of the ABM Treaty loosening restrictions on testing new ABM technologies. This revised “broad interpretation” of the ABM Treaty was highly controversial and was never applied to actual testing; in 1994 it was officially repudiated by the Clinton administration. The SDI program greatly increased expenditures on U.S. ballistic missile defense research and development, but it did not lead to a deployable system. In the 1990s and afterward, following the end of the Cold War and agreed reductions in U.S. and Soviet strategic offensive arms, the United States renewed its pursuit of ballistic missile defense. On December 15, 2001, President George W. Bush officially gave notice that the United States was withdrawing from the ABM Treaty in six months. Discussions had been held with the Russians on possible amendments to the treaty, but the United States decided that it wished an open slate for development and deployment decisions and opted to withdraw. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty thus had a thirty-year life. The ABM Treaty alone had been unable to restrain a buildup in strategic offensive arms in the 1970s and 1980s, and it was less needed in the post–Cold War world, although many in the United States (and the Western allies, Russia, and China) had urged its retention. In any event, the ABM Treaty did contribute to greater certainty of mutual nuclear deterrence for nearly two decades of the Cold War, and even the fact of its successful negotiation had borne witness to the ability of the nuclear superpowers, even as adversaries, to agree on such a measure to reduce the dangers of the nuclear confrontation. See also: ARMS CONTROL; COLD WAR; STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TREATIES; STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE; UNITED STATES, RELATIONS WITH BIBLIOGRAPHY Garthoff, Raymond L. (1994). Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, rev. edition. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. Newhouse, John. (1973). Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 66 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY Smith, Gerard. (1980). Double Talk: The Story of SALT I. Garden City, NY: Doubleday. RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF ANTI-COMINTERN PACT The Anti-Comintern Pact was signed by Germany and Japan on November 25, 1936, and joined by Italy on November 6, 1937. Disguised as an effort to combat the influence of the Communist International (Comintern), the treaty was intended to serve as a military alliance aimed at the Soviet Union. In reality, the treaty did not result in any coordinated German-Japanese military action, but instead became the foundation for growing distrust and betrayal between the two fascist allies themselves. The text of the treaty was brief and to the point. It asserted that the Communist International was a threat to world peace and that the signatories planned to “keep each other informed concerning the activities” of the Comintern and cooperate in their mutual defense, and invited other nations to join their efforts. A Supplementary Protocol empowered Germany and Japan to “take stringent measures against those who at home or abroad work” for the Comintern, authorizing repressive measures against members of the Communist Party in Germany, Japan, or countries under their influence. Finally, both promised not to sign a separate agreement with the Soviet Union without the other being informed. Viscount Kintomo Mushakoji, the Japanese ambassador to Germany, and Joachim von Ribbentrop, German ambassador to London, signed the treaty. It went into force immediately and was valid for five years. The Anti-Comintern Pact threatened the USSR and seemed to be one more aspect of Germany’s aggressive policy. Nevertheless, the German and Japanese military staffs did not coordinate their actions, and each country pursued its own interests irrespective of the Anti-Comintern Pact. In 1939, while the Soviet army was defeating the Japanese military in Manchuria along the Mongolian border, Ribbentrop traveled to Moscow and negotiated the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, leaving the Japanese out of these deliberations. Japan could not trust Hitler. In 1941, again without notice, Germany invaded the USSR. Japan decided not to assist its ally in the Anti-Comintern Pact and eventually attacked the United States instead of the USSR. See also: COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL; GERMANY, RELATIONS WITH; NAZI-SOVIET PACT OF 1939; WORLD WAR II BIBLIOGRAPHY Department of State. (1943). Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan, 1931–1941, Vol. II.Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. Haslam, Jonathan. (1992). The Soviet Union and the Threat from the East, 1933–41: Moscow, Tokyo, and the Prelude to the Pacific War. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press. HAROLD J. GOLDBERG ANTI-PARTY GROUP The Anti-Party Group, so called by Nikita Khrushchev, whom it tried to oust from power in June 1957, was neither opposed to the Communist Party nor really a group. Rather, it consisted of three of Khrushchev’s main rivals in the party leadership, Georgy Malenkov, Vyacheslav Molotov, and Lazar Kaganovich, themselves hardly united except in their wish to oust Khrushchev, plus a diverse set of allies who supported them at the last minute: titular head of state Klimenty Voroshilov; chairman of the Council of Ministers Nikolai Bulganin; central economic administrators Mikhail Pervukhin and Maxim Saburov; and Dmitry Shepilov, Khrushchev’s protégé whom had he had recently promoted to foreign minister. When Josef Stalin died in March 1953, Malenkov seemed the heir apparent, but Molotov also appeared to be a contender for supreme power. Khrushchev joined with both of them to bring down secret police chief Lavrenty Beria, who was arrested in June 1953 and executed in December. Khrushchev turned next against Malenkov, who was demoted from prime minister to minister of electrification in February 1955, and then against Molotov, who was soon dropped as foreign minister. However, both Malenkov and Molotov were allowed to remain full members of the Party Presidium, leaving them in position to seek revenge against Khrushchev. ANTI-PARTY GROUP ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY 67 ANTONOV UPRISING The logic of power in the Kremlin, in which there was no formalized procedure for determining leadership succession, largely accounted for this struggle. So did certain policy differences: Molotov, Kaganovich, and Voroshilov were particularly dismayed by Khrushchev’s “secret speech” attacking Stalin at the Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956, as well as by the de-Stalinization process he began in domestic and foreign policy. Malenkov had seemed more open to reform during his stint as prime minister, but although his and Khrushchev’s skills could have complemented each other, personal animosity drove them apart. Despite choosing Bulganin to replace Malenkov as prime minister, Khrushchev disdained Bulganin. Pervukhin and Saburov felt threatened by Khrushchev’s proposed reorganization of economic administration, which jeopardized their jobs. Shepilov probably betrayed his patron because he thought Khrushchev was bound to lose. Including seven full members of the Presidium, the plotters constituted a majority. When they moved against Khrushchev on June 18, 1957, they counted on the Presidium’s practice of appointing its own leader, leaving the Party Central Committee to rubber-stamp the result. Instead, however, Khrushchev insisted that Central Committee itself, in which his supporters dominated, decide the issue. While Khrushchev and his enemies quarreled, the KGB (Committee on State Security) and the military ferried Central Committee members to Moscow for a plenum that took place from June 22 to 28. Khrushchev’s opponents had no chance once the plenum began. Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich were subjected to a barrage of charges about their complicity in Stalin’s terror, including details about Stalinist crimes that were not fully publicized until the late 1980s. Following the plenum, Molotov was exiled to Outer Mongolia as Soviet ambassador, Malenkov to northern Kazakhstan to direct a hydroelectric station, Kaganovich to a potash works in Perm Province, and Shepilov to head the Kyrgyz Institute of Economics. So as not to reveal how many had opposed him, Khrushchev delayed his punishment of the rest of the AntiParty Group: Bulganin remained prime minister until 1958; Voroshilov was not deposed as head of state until 1960. After the Twenty-second Party Congress in October 1961, in which Khrushchev intensified his all-out attack on Stalin and Stalinism, Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich were expelled from the Communist Party. See also: KHRUSHCHEV, NIKITA SERGEYEVICH; MALENKOV, GEORGY MAXIMILYANOVICH; MOLOTOV VYACHESLAV MIKHAILOVICH BIBLIOGRAPHY Linden, Carl A. (1966). Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Micunovic, Veljko. (1980). Moscow Diary, tr. David Floyd. New York: Doubleday. Resis, Albert, ed. (1993). Molotov Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics: Conversations with Felix Chuev. Chicago: I. R. Dee. Taubman, William. (2003). Khrushchev: The Man and His Era. New York: Norton. WILLIAM TAUBMAN ANTONOV UPRISING The Antonov Uprising (1920–1921) was a large, well-organized peasant revolt in the Tambov province of Central Russia. Part of the Green Movement, the uprising threatened Communist power in 1921 and was a major reason for the abandonment of War Communism. Alexander Antonov (1889–1922) was a Socialist Revolutionary (SR) whom the February Revolution rescued from a long prison sentence for robbing railroad station ticket offices. He returned to Tambov province in 1917 to become a district police official under the Provisional Government. He left this post in April 1918 and went underground, organizing an armed guerrilla group to resist the new Communist government. Increasingly severe food-procurement and conscription policies, along with a drought, pushed Tambov peasants into a spontaneous rebellion against the Communist government in August 1920. Seizing the opportunity, Antonov put himself at the head of the rebellion. He organized a territorially-based army divided into regiments, which he recruited from the many local World War I and civil war veterans. Local socialists created a strong network of local committees (STK—soiuz trudovogo krestian’stva, Union of the Working Peasantry) that created an alternative, noncommunist government in the province. While they fought the Communist government, they did have wider plans. Their program (which survives in various versions) called for an end to civil war, the convening of a freely 68 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY elected Constituent Assembly, land to the peasants, and workers’ control of industry. Initial attempts to suppress this rebellion were failures. The few troops in the province were unreliable, and often went over to the insurgents. By spring 1921 the insurgents controlled much of the countryside, had halted grain procurement, and threatened rail communications through the province. The central government responded with reforms and repression. Forced grain procurement and conscription were curtailed, removing the greatest irritants to the peasantry. The end of the Polish-Russian war enabled the Communist government to move fifty thousand troops to the province, including crack cavalry brigades, automobile detachments, airplanes, and artillery. By the end of July 1921 the insurgency was crushed. Its regiments were run to ground and annihilated by the larger, better-armed Red Army forces. The Cheka rooted out the STKs and shot or exiled thousands of insurgents. Antonov himself remained at large for another year, but died in a Cheka ambush on June 24, 1922. See also: CIVIL WAR OF 1917–1922; GREEN MOVEMENT; SOCIALIST REVOLUTIONARIES; WAR COMMUNISM BIBLIOGRAPHY DuGarm, A. Delano. (1997). “Peasant Wars in Tambov Province.” In The Bolsheviks in Russian Society, ed. Vladimir Brovkin. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Radkey, Oliver. (1976). The Unknown Civil War in Soviet Russia. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press. A. DELANO DUGARM APPANAGE ERA Most historians since the nineteenth century— Russian, Soviet, and Western—have used the phrase “appanage era” to designate the period between the collapse of Kievan Russia and the emergence of a centralized Russian state. It is dated from the Mongol conquest of Kievan Russia between 1237 and 1240 to either the accession of Ivan III (1462) or Basil III (1505), or to the beginning of the reign of Ivan IV (1533). It was characterized by the emergence of a multiplicity of independent principalities (udeli or appanages). Princes treated appanage holdings as private property, conveying them to their heirs by wills that divided the lands between all their sons. This practice meant that holdings were increasingly fragmented in each generation. As the principalities were weakened, internal conflict escalated and external attacks came not only from the Mongols, but also from Lithuanians, Germans, Poles, and Swedes. This tumultuous situation ended only as Moscow fashioned an autocracy capable of “gathering the Russian lands.” In the later twentieth century, a new interpretation of the age emerged. New, broadly based archeological evidence refuted the traditional view that Kiev itself was in economic decline from the mid-twelfth century, and suggested instead a general economic expansion. The new interpretation proposes that the eleven or twelve appanages that developed between 1150 and 1240 represented a rational division of labor and delegation of authority within the Rurikid dynasty, and that they were designed to respond to economic and political expansion. It maintains that the principalities should be understood as components of a dynastic realm, not as private property. As proof, it offers detailed evidence to argue that the frequent wars of the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries were fought to defend the principle of lateral succession developed in the Kievan period. It argues at length that this principle continued to underlie succession decisions and legitimacy issues to one degree or another during much of the Mongol period, and remained important as late as the civil wars of the second quarter of the fifteenth century. The interpretation also set a new initial date for the era— the mid 1100s—which has become increasingly accepted by scholars in the field, and a number of new publications since the late 1980s minimize the use of the term “appanage era,” but most still retain much of the traditional interpretation associated with it. See also: KIEVAN RUS; MUSCOVY; NOVGOROD THE GREAT; RURIKID DYNASTY BIBLIOGRAPHY Martin, Janet. (1995). Medieval Russia, 980–1584. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Miller, David B. (1986). “The Kievan Principality on the Eve of the Mongol Invasion: An Inquiry into Current Historical Research and Interpretation.” Harvard Ukrainian Studies 10:215–240. Pipes, Richard. (1974). Russia Under the Old Regime. New York: Scribners. ELVIRA M. WILBUR APPANAGE ERA ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY 69 APPARAT APPARAT An informal term used to describe a part or the whole of a bureaucratic structure, such as the Communist Party. The literal translation of apparat is apparatus. The Bolsheviks began as an underground movement, and, to survive, the party machine demanded solidarity and discipline. Members were known as apparatchiki, that is, men of the apparat, or as komitechiki, members of the underground committees. As time passed, the term came to refer to any part, or the whole, of the Soviet bureaucratic system. It was frequently used in later years as a term of denigration and contempt, as was the term apparatchik. See also: COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION BIBLIOGRAPHY Fainsod, Merle.(1961). How Russia is Ruled. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. JAMES R. MILLAR APRIL THESES Vladimir Ilich Lenin’s “April Theses” was one of the most influential and important documents of the Russian Revolution and Bolshevik history. The main ideas of Lenin’s April Theses were first delivered in speeches immediately after his arrival in Petrograd on April 16, 1917, and then formalized in a newspaper article (“The Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution”) in the Bolshevik newspaper Pravda on April 20. The Theses refused any support for the Provisional Government, attacked the Petrograd soviet (council) leadership’s policy of cooperation with the Provisional Government, and declared that the soviets should be the basis for a new, revolutionary government. This latter position soon aligned the Bolsheviks with popular sentiment, which by summer was demanding “all power to the soviets,” that is, a government based on the soviets. The Theses also called for immediate radical social and economic reforms and for transforming the international war into civil war. Although Lenin’s theses were too radical for the optimistic and cooperative mood of April, they positioned the Bolsheviks to benefit from the discontentment and disillusionment that summer and fall as the Provisional Government failed to solve the war, economic, and other issues. Lenin’s April Theses also called for a Bolshevik party congress to revise the party program and to change the party name to communist. Lenin’s ideas initially shocked most Bolsheviks as much as other political leaders, but Lenin soon brought the Bolshevik Party to accept them. The Theses, especially those calling for immediate passage into the next stage of revolution and a soviet-based government, significantly redefined Bolshevism. See also: FEBRUARY REVOLUTION; LENIN, VLADIMIR ILICH; OCTOBER REVOLUTION; PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT; SOVIET BIBLIOGRAPHY Harding, Neil. (1981). Lenin’s Political Thought: Theory and Practice in the Democratic Revolution. 2 vols. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Harding, Neil. (1996). Leninism. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Lenin, Vladimir Ilich. (1964). “The Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution.” In Collected Works, vol. 24. Moscow: Progress Publishers. Service, Robert. (1985–1994). Lenin: A Political Life. 3 vols. London: Macmillan. REX A. WADE ARCHITECTURE The architecture of medieval Rus, initially influenced by Byzantine architecture, developed a distinct set of styles between the eleventh and fourteenth centuries. As Moscow established its dominance and as contacts with western European culture increased in the late fifteenth century, Russian motifs began to blend with Western ones. By the eighteenth century the design of Russia’s public buildings followed Western styles. Rapid social change at the turn of the twentieth century and the establishment of Soviet power after 1917 generated new bursts of architectural experimentation. MEDIEVAL AND MUSCOVITE ARCHITECTURE (C. 1000–1700) Little is known of pre-Christian architecture among the eastern Slavs, but with the acceptance of Christianity by Grand Prince Vladimir of Kiev in 988, the construction of masonry churches spread throughout Rus. The largest and most complex of 70 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY these early churches was Kiev’s Cathedral of Divine Wisdom (1037–1050s), commissioned by Prince Yaroslav the Wise and built with the direction of Greek masters. The interior contained extensive mosaics as well as frescoes. Other major churches of this period include the Sophia Cathedral in Novgorod (1045–1052), the Cathedral of the Transfiguration of the Savior in Chernigov (1031–1050s), and the Cathedral of the Dormition at the Kiev Cave Monastery (1073–1078; destroyed in 1941). Regardless of size, the churches adhered to a plan known as the “inscribed cross”: a cuboid structure with a dome marking the intersection of the main aisles. The dome was elevated on a cylinder supported by the four main piers. The facades usually culminated in curved gables known as zakomary. In addition to Kiev, Novgorod, and neighboring cities, the third center of architecture in preMongol Rus was the Vladimir-Suzdal principality, whose limestone churches were distinguished by carved decoration and precision of design. Grand Prince Yury Dolgoruky commissioned the first of these churches, such as the Transfiguration in Pereslavl-Zalessky (1152–1157). His son Andrei Bogolyubsky began the great era of limestone building in this area with the Cathedral of the Dormition in Vladimir (1158–1160); his palace church at Bogolyubovo (1158–1165) of which only fragments remain; and the Church of the Intercession on the Nerl (1165). His successor, Vsevolod III, enlarged the Dormition Cathedral (1185–1189) and built the Cathedral of St. Dmitry in Vladimir (1194–1197), whose upper tier is covered with elaborate carving representing Biblical and secular motifs. After the Mongol invasion of 1237–1241, church construction sharply declined; but by the middle of the fourteenth century, masonry construction revived, particularly in Novgorod, with the support of wealthy merchants and neighborhood craft guilds. The Church of St. Theodore Stratilates on the Brook (1360–1361) and the Church of Transfiguration on Elijah Street (1374; frescoes by Theophanes the Greek) exemplified a distinct local style with steeply pitched roofs. Moscow also enjoyed an architectural revival in the construction of limestone churches, but not until the last quarter of the fifteenth century did the major churches of the Kremlin take shape under the direction of Italian masters imported by Ivan III. During the sixteenth century, Moscow’s brick churches displayed boldly inventive designs, also with Italian influence. The culmination of this period occurs in the most famous of Russian churches, the Intercession on the Moat, popularly known as Basil the Blessed (1555–1561). Built on what later became known as Red Square, in celebration of Ivan IV’s conquest of Kazan and Astrakhan, the structure consists of a central tent tower surrounded by eight tower churches. The latter part of the sixteenth century also witnessed the building of major brick fortresses, most notably the citadel at Smolensk (1595–1602) by Fyodor Kon. With the restoration of order after the Time of Troubles (1605–1612), the building of brick churches occurred on an unprecedented scale, especially during the reign of Alexei (1645–1676). THE IMPERIAL PERIOD (C. 1700–1917) The assimilation of Western architectural styles, which had begun in the late seventeenth century, increased radically during the reign of Peter I (1682–1725). In 1703 Peter founded St. Petersburg, which became the Russian capital in 1711. Western European architects Jean Baptiste Le Blond (1679–1719) and Domenico Trezzini (1670–1734) submitted plans for its development. At this stage Petersburg’s architecture owed much to the northern European baroque, particularly in Sweden and Holland. The stuccoed brick walls of the city’s baroque buildings were painted, with white trim for window surrounds and other details. Bartolomeo Francesco Rastrelli (1700–1771) defined the high baroque style during the reigns of Anna (1730–1740) and Elizabeth (1741–1762). Among his major projects are the Stroganov Palace (1752–1754), the final version of the Winter Palace (1754–1764), and the Smolny Convent with its Resurrection Cathedral (1748–1764). In addition Rastrelli greatly enlarged the existing imperial palaces at Peterhof (1746–1752) and Tsarskoye Selo (1748–1756). During the reign of Catherine the Great (1762–1796), imperial architecture moved from the baroque to neoclassicism. With the support of Catherine, a constellation of architects endowed the city during the second half of the eighteenth century with a grandeur inspired by classical Rome. Charles Cameron (ca.1740–1812), the leading proponent of neoclassicism, designed the palace at the imperial estate of Pavlovsk (1780–1796), a gift from Catherine to her son Grand Duke Paul. Andrei Voronikhin (1759–1814) created a still more obvious example of the Roman influence in his Cathedral of the Kazan Mother of God (1801–1811), ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY 71 ARCHITECTURE ARCHITECTURE with its sweeping colonnade reminiscent of the Basilica of Saint Peter in Rome. The reign of Alexander I (1801–1825) witnessed a new campaign to create an interconnecting system of architectural ensembles and public space throughout the center of Petersburg. The rebuilding of the Admiralty (1806–1823) by Andreyan Zakharov (1761–1811) reaffirmed that structure and its spire as dominant elements in the city plan. The culmination of the imperial design fell to Carlo Rossi (1776–1849), who created four major ensembles, including the General Staff Building and Arch (1819–1829), facing Palace Square. Neoclassicism in Moscow appeared primarily in houses and other institutions built by the nobility and wealthy merchants. Of particular note are mansions and churches designed by Matvei Kazakov (1738–1812). During the reign of Nicholas I (1825–1855), classical unity in Petersburg yielded to eclectic styles and innovations in construction engineering, both of which are evident in the final version of St. Isaac’s Cathedral (1818–1858) by Auguste Montferrand (1786–1858). Of special significance was the Russo-Byzantine style, supported by Nicholas I and implemented by Constantine Thon (1794–1881), builder of the Great Kremlin Palace (1838–1849). The major work in this style was Ton’s Church of Christ the Redeemer (1837–1883; destroyed in 1931 and rebuilt in the 1990s), created as a memorial to Russian valor in the 1812 war. By the 1870s there arose a new national style based on decorative elements from sixteenthand seventeenth-century Muscovy as well as on motifs from folk art and traditional wooden architecture. Major examples of the Russian style in Moscow include the Historical Museum (1874–1883), built on the north side of Red Square to a design by Vladimir Shervud (1833–1897); the Moscow City Duma (1890–1892) by Dmitry Chichagov (1835–1894); and the Upper Trading Rows (1889–1893) by Alexander Pomerantsev (1848–1918), assisted by the construction engineer Vladimir Shukhov (1853–1939). In Petersburg the Russian style was used by Alfred Parland (1845–1892) for the Church of the Resurrection of the Savior “on the Blood” (1883–1907). The “new style,” or style moderne, that arose in Russian architecture at the turn of the century emphasized the innovative use of materials such as glass, iron, and glazed brick in functional yet highly aesthetic designs. The style flourished in Moscow primarily, where its leading practitioner was Fyodor Shekhtel (1859–1926), architect for patrons among Moscow’s entrepreneurial elite, such as the Ryabushinskys. In Petersburg the style moderne appeared primarily in the design of apartment buildings. In contrast to their American contemporaries, Russian architects did not design large buildings with steel frames, but became experts at the use of reinforced concrete construction. SOVIET ARCHITECTURE (1917–1991) The economic chaos engendered in Russia by World War I proved catastrophic for building activity, and the ensuing revolution and civil war brought architecture to a standstill. With the recovery of the economy in the 1920s, bold new designs—often utopian in concept—brought Russia to the attention of modern architects throughout the world. Constructivism, the most productive modernist movement, included architects such as Moysei Ginzburg (1892–1946), Ilya Golosov (1883–1945), Grigory Barkhin (1880–1969), and the Vesnin brothers: Leonid (1880–1933), Viktor (1882–1950), and Alexander (1883–1959). Their designs, primarily in Moscow, set a standard for functional design in administrative and apartment buildings, as well as social institutions such as workers’ clubs. Another modernist active during the same period, but not a part of Constructivism, was Konstantin Stepanovich Melnikov (1890–1974), known for his bold designs for exposition pavilions and workers’ clubs. During the 1930s more conservative trends asserted themselves, as designs inspired by classical, Renaissance, and historical models received the party’s approval. After World War II architectural design became still more firmly locked in traditional, often highly ornate eclectic styles, epitomized by the postwar skyscrapers in Moscow and other Soviet cities. After 1953 pressing social needs, particularly in housing, led to a return to functionalism, heavily dependent on standardized designs and prefabricated components. With the demise of the communist system in Russia, the revival of private practice in architecture seems likely to change the face of the profession, even as new problems arise in zoning and resource allocation. WOODEN ARCHITECTURE Throughout Russian history wood has been used for almost every type of construction, from churches and fortress walls to peasant dwellings and grand 72 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY country villas. Fire and rot have destroyed most wooden structures from the distant past, and there is no extensive evidence that wooden structures appeared before the late sixteenth century. Yet the basic forms of wooden architecture are presumably rooted in age-old traditions. Remarkable for their construction logic, wooden churches also display elaborate configurations. One example is the Church of the Transfiguration at Kizhi (1714), whose pyramid of recessed levels supports twenty-two cupolas. Although such structures achieved great height, the church interior was usually limited by a much lower ceiling. Log houses also ranged from simple dwellings to large three-story structures peculiar to the far north, with space for the family as well as shelter for livestock during the winter. Wooden housing is still used extensively, not only in the Russian countryside, but also in provincial cities (particularly in Siberia and the Far East), where the houses often have plank siding and carved decorative elements. See also: KIEVAN RUS; MOSCOW; NOVGOROD THE GREAT; ST. PETERSBURG BIBLIOGRAPHY Brumfield, William Craft. (1991). The Origins of Modernism in Russian Architecture. Berkeley: University of California Press. Brumfield, William Craft. (1993). A History of Russian Architecture. New York: Cambridge University Press. Cracraft, James. (1988). The Petrine Revolution in Russian Architecture. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Hamilton, George Heard. (1983). The Art and Architecture of Russia. New York: Penguin Books. Khan-Magomedov, Selim O. (1987). Pioneers of Soviet Architecture. New York: Rizzoli. WILLIAM CRAFT BRUMFIELD ARCHIVES Research access to and knowledge about archives in the Russian Federation since 1991 have been key factors in the opening of historical and cultural inquiry in what had previously been a predominantly closed society. Yet the opening of archives would have had much less impact on society and history had in not been for the central attention given to archives under Soviet rule. And Russian archives would hardly be so rich in the early twenty-first century had it not been for the early manuscript repositories in the church and the long tradition of preserving the records of government and society in Russian lands. For example, the “Tsar’s Archive” of the sixteenth century paralleled archives of the government boards (prikazy) of the Muscovite state. Peter the Great’s General Regulation of 1720 decreed systematic management of state records. During the late nineteenth century, the Moscow Archive of the Ministry of Justice became the most important historical archive. Before the revolutions of 1917, however, most recent and current records were maintained by state agencies themselves, such as the various ministries, paralleled, for example, by the archive of the Holy Synod, the governing body of the Orthodox Church. The Imperial Archeographic Commission, provincial archival commissions, the Academy of Sciences, major libraries, and museums likewise contributed to the growth of archives and rich manuscript collections. The Bolshevik seizure of power in October 1917 had as revolutionary an impact on archives as it did on most other aspects of society and culture, and stands as the single most important turning point in the history of Russian archives. To be sure, the turmoil of the revolution and civil war years brought considerable disruption, and indeed destruction, to the archival and manuscript legacy. Yet it brought with it the most highly centralized state archival system and the most highly statedirected principles of preservation and management of documentary records that the world had ever seen. Deeply grounded in historical theory and committed to its own orthodoxy of historical interpretation, Marxism-Leninism as an ideology gave both extensive philosophical justification and crucial political importance to documentary control. As the highly centralized political system established firm rule over of state and society, the now famous archival decree of Vladimr Lenin (June 1, 1918) initiated total reorganization and state control of the entire archival legacy of the Russian Empire. One of the most significant Soviet innovations was the formation of the so-called State Archival Fond (Gosudarstvennyi arkhivnyi fond—GAF), a legal entity extending state proprietorship to all archival records regardless of their institutional or private origin. With nationalization, this theoretical and legal structure also extended state custody and control to all current records produced by curARCHIVES ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY 73 ARCHIVES rent agencies of state and society. Subsequently a parallel Archival Fond of the Communist Party emerged with proprietorship and custody of Party records. A second innovation was the establishment of a centralized state agency charged with the management of the State Archival Fond, enabling the centralization, standardization, and planning that characterized Soviet archival development. Indicative of the importance that Stalin attributed to control of archives and their utilization, from 1938 through 1960 the Main Archival Administration of the USSR (Glavarkhiv SSSR) was under the Commissariat and later (after 1946), Ministry of Internal Affairs (NKVD, MVD). Subsequently it was responsible directly to the Council of Ministers of the USSR. A third innovation saw the organization of a network of archival repositories, although with substantial reorganizations during the decades of Soviet rule. A series of central state archives of the USSR paralleled central state archives for the union republics, with a hierarchical network of regional archives, all controlled and adopting standardized organizational and methodological guidelines dictated by Glavarkhiv in Moscow. Strict disposal and retention schedules regulated what went into the archives. A parallel network of Communist Party archives emerged. Records of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs remained separate, as did those of the security services and other specialized repositories ranging from geological data to Gosfilmofond for feature films. The Academy of Sciences maintained its own archival network, and archival materials in libraries and museums remained under their own controlling agencies. Public research availability of the nation’s documentary legacy was severely restricted during the Soviet era, although there was a brief thaw after 1956, and more significant research possibilities starting in the Gorbachev era of glasnost after the mid-1980s. But while limited public access to archives was a hallmark of the regime, so was the preservation and control of the nation’s documentary legacy in all spheres. In many ways, those three Soviet innovations continue to characterize the archival system in the Russian Federation, with the most notable innovation of more openness and public accessibility. Already in the summer of 1991, a presidential decree nationalized the archival legacy of the Communist Party, to the extent that the newly reorganized state archival system was actually broader than its Soviet predecessor. The Soviet-era Glavarkhiv was replaced by the Archival Service of the Russian Federation (Rosarkhiv, initially Roskomarkhiv). Russia’s first archival law, the Basic Legislature of the Russian Federation on the Archival Fond of the Russian Federation and Archives, enacted in July 1993, extended the concept of a state “Archival Fond.” Although it also provided for a “non-State” component to comprise records of non-governmental, commercial, religious, and other societal agencies, it did not permit re-privatization of holdings nationalized during the Soviet period. Nor did it provide for the apportionment of archival records and manuscript materials gathered in central Soviet repositories from the union republics that after 1991 emerged as independent countries. The latter all remained legally part of the new Russian “Archival Fond.” In most cases, the actual archival repositories that developed during the Soviet era continue to exist, although almost all of their names have changed, with some combined or reorganized. As heir to Soviet-period predecessors, fourteen central state archives constitute the main repositories for governmental (and former Communist Party) records in different historical, military, and economic categories, along with separate repositories for literature and art, sound recordings, documentary films, and photographs, as well as technical and engineering documentation. As a second category of central archives, a number of federal agencies still have the right to retain their own records, including the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, Internal Affairs, and the security services. Municipal archives in Moscow and St. Peteresburg comprise a third category. As there were in the Soviet period, there are also many archival repositories in institutes and libraries under the Russian Academy of Sciences, and libraries and museums under the Ministry of Culture and other agencies. The extensive network of regional state (including former Communist Party) archives for each and every subject administrative-territorial unit of the Russian Federation, all of which have considerable more autonomy from Moscow than had been the case before 1991. The most important distinction between Russian archives in the early twenty-first century and those under Soviet rule is the principle of openness and general public accessibility. Significantly, such openness extends to the information sphere, whereby 74 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY published directories now identify all major repositories and their reference systems. New archival guides and specialized finding aids reveal the holdings of many important archives (many with foreign subsidies). And since 1997, information about an increasing number of archives is publicly available in both Russian and English-language versions on the Internet. Complaints abound about continued restrictions in sensitive areas, such as the contemporary archives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and the security services. Declassification has been all to slow in many areas, including more recent Communist Party records, and new laws governing state secrets often limit the otherwise proclaimed openness. Yet often the most serious research complaints stem from economic causes— closures due to leaking roofs or lack of heat, slow delivery time, and high copying fees. While Russia has opened its archives to the world, there have been more dangers of loss due to inadequate support for physical facilities and professional staff, leading to commercialization and higher service charges, because the new federal government has had less ideological and political cause than its Soviet predecessors to subsidize new buildings, physical preservation, and information resources adequately for the archival heritage of the nation. See also: CENSORSHIP; NATIONAL LIBRARY OF RUSSIA; RUSSIAN STATE LIBRARY; SMOLENSK ARCHIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY Grimsted, Patricia Kennedy. (1989). A Handbook for Archival Research in the USSR. Washington, DC,: Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies and the International Research & Exchanges Board. Grimsted, Patricia Kennedy. (1998). Archives of Russia Seven Years After: “Purveyors of Sensations” or “Shadows Cast out to the Past.” Washington, DC: Cold War International History Project, Working Paper, no. 20, parts 1 and 2. Electronic version: . Grimsted, Patricia Kennedy, ed. (2000). Archives of Russia: A Directory and Bibliographic Guide to Holdings in Moscow and St. Petersburg. 2 vols. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. Grimsted, Patricia Kennedy. (2003). “Archives of Russia—ArcheoBiblioBase on Line.” . PATRICIA KENNEDY GRIMSTED ARMAND, INESSA (1874–1920), née Elisabeth Stefan, revolutionary and feminist, first head of the zhenotdel, the women’s section of the Communist Party. Born in France, Inessa Armand came to Russia as a child when her parents died and her aunt took a job as governess in the wealthy Armand merchant family. At age nineteen she married Alexander Armand, who was to support her and her numerous Bolshevik undertakings throughout his life. In 1899 she became involved in the Moscow Society for Improving the Lot of Women, a philanthropic organization devoted to assisting prostitutes and other poor women. By 1900 she was president of the society and working hard to create a Sunday school for working women. In 1903, disillusioned with philanthropic work, she joined the Social Democratic Party and became active in revolutionary propaganda work. In exile in Europe from 1909 to 1917, with a brief illegal return to Russia, she helped Vladimir Lenin establish a party school at Longjumeau, France, in 1911; she taught there herself. When Russian women workers gained the right to vote and be elected to factory committees in 1912, Armand, Nadezhda Krupskaya, and others persuaded Lenin to create a special journal Rabotnitsa (Woman Worker). Although Armand and other editors insisted that women workers were not making special demands separate from those of men, they did recognize the importance of writing about women’s health and safety issues in the factories. During World War I Armand was one of Lenin’s and the party’s principal delegates to international socialist conferences, especially those of women protesting the war. In April 1917 Armand returned to Petrograd with Lenin and Krupskaya. Soon she was made a member of the Executive Committee of the Moscow Provincial Soviet and of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VtsIK), as well as chair of the Moscow Provincial economic council. Her crowning achievement, however, was her role in founding the women’s section of the Communist Party, the zhenotdel. In that role she worked on problems as diverse as supporting legislation legalizing abortion, combating prostitution, creating special sections for the protection of mothers and infants in the Health Commissariat, working with the trade unions, and developing agitation methods for peasant women. In all of these, Armand advocated the creation of ARMAND, INESSA ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY 75 ARMENIA AND ARMENIANS special methods for work among women, given women’s historical backwardness and the prejudices of many men towards women’s increased participation in the workforce and in society. However, Armand’s tenure as director of the zhenotdel was short-lived. On September 24, 1920, while on leave in the Caucasus, she succumbed to cholera and died. See also: FEMINISM; KRUPSKAYA, NADEZHDA KONSTANTINOVNA; LENIN, VLADIMIR ILICH; ZHENOTDEL BIBLIOGRAPHY Clements, Barbara Evans. (1997). Bolshevik Women. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Elwood, Ralph C. (1992). Inessa Armand: Revolutionary and Feminist. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. McNeal, Robert H. (1972). Bride of the Revolution: Krupskaya and Lenin. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Stites, Richard. (1975). “Kollontai, Inessa, and Krupskaia: A Review of Recent Literature.” Canadian-American Slavic Studies 9(1):84–92. Stites, Richard. (1978). The Women’s Liberation Movement in Russia: Feminism, Nihilism, and Bolshevism, 1860–1930. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Wood, Elizabeth A. (1997). The Baba and the Comrade: Gender and Politics in Revolutionary Russia. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. ELIZABETH A. WOOD ARMENIA AND ARMENIANS Armenia is a landlocked, mountainous plateau that rises to an average of 3,000 to 7,000 feet (914 to 2,134 meters) above sea level. It extends to the Anatolian plateau in the west, the Iranian plateau in the southwest, the plains of the South Caucasus in the north, and the Karadagh Mountains and the Moghan Steppe in the south and southeast. The Armenian highlands stretch roughly between longitudes 37° and 48.5° east, and 38° and 41° north latitudes, with a total area of some 150,000 square miles (388,500 square kilometers). In present-day terms, historic Armenia comprises most of eastern Turkey, the northeastern corner of Iran, parts of the Azerbaijan and Georgian Republics, as well as the entire territory of the Armenian Republic. GEOLOGY, GEOGRAPHY, AND CLIMATE The Kur (Kura) and Arax (Araxes) Rivers separate the Armenian highlands in the east from the lowlands that adjoin the Caspian Sea. The Pontus Mountains, which connect to the Lesser Caucasus mountain chain, separate Armenia from the Black Sea and Georgia and form the region’s northern boundary. The Taurus Mountains, which join the upper Zagros Mountains and the Iranian Plateau, form the southern boundary of Armenia and separate it from Syria, Kurdistan, and Iran. The western boundary of Armenia has generally been between the western Euphrates River and the northern stretch of the Anti-Taurus Mountains. Armenians also established communities east of the Kur as far as the Caspian Sea, and states west of the Euphrates as far as Cilicia on the Mediterranean Sea. Lying on the Anatolian fault, the Armenian plateau is subject to seismic tremors. Major earthquakes have been recorded there since the ninth century, some of which have destroyed entire cities. The most recent earthquake in the region, occurring on December 7, 1988, killed some 25,000 people and leveled numerous communities. Some fifty million years ago, the geological structure of Armenia underwent many changes, creating great mountains and high, now-inactive, volcanic peaks throughout the plateau. The larger peaks of Mount Ararat (16,946 feet; 5,279 meters), Mount Sipan (14,540 feet; 4,432 meters), and Mount Aragats (13,410 feet; 4,087 meters), and the smaller peaks of Mount Ararat (12,839 feet; 3,913 meters), and Mount Bingol (10,770 feet; 3,283 meters), from which the Arax and the Euphrates Rivers originate, are some examples. Tufa, limestone, basalt, quartz, and obsidian form the main composition of the terrain. The mountains also contain abundant deposits of mineral ores, including copper, iron, zinc, lead, silver, and gold. There are also large deposits of salt, borax, and obsidian, as well as volcanic tufa stone, which is used for construction. Armenia’s mountains give rise to numerous rivers, practically all unnavigable, which have created deep gorges, ravines, and waterfalls. The longest is the Arax River, which starts in the mountains of western Armenia, joins the Kur River, then empties into the Caspian Sea. The Arax flows through the plain of Ararat, which is the site of the major Armenian cities. Another important river is the Euphrates, which splits into western and 76 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY eastern branches. Both branches flow westward, then turn south toward Mesopotamia. The Euphrates was the ancient boundary dividing what became Lesser and Greater Armenia. The Kur and the Tigris and their tributaries flow briefly through Armenia. Two other rivers, the Akhurian, a tributary of the Arax, and the Hrazdan, which flows from Lake Sevan, provide water to an otherwise parched and rocky landscape devoid of forests. A number of lakes are situated in the Armenian highlands, the deepest and most important of which is Lake Van in present-day Turkey. Van’s waters are charged with borax, and hence undrinkable. Lake Sevan is the highest in elevation, lying some 6,300 feet (1,917 meters) above sea level. It is found in the present-day Armenian Republic. Armenia lies in the temperate zone and has a variety of climates. In general, winters are long and can be severe, while summers are usually short and very hot. Some of the plains, because of their lower altitudes, are better suited for agriculture, and have fostered population centers throughout the centuries. The variety of temperatures has enabled the land to support a great diversity of flora and fauna common to western Asia and Transcaucasia. The generally dry Armenian climate has necessitated artificial irrigation throughout history. The soil, which is volcanic, is quite fertile and, with sufficient water, is capable of intensive farming. Farming is prevalent in the lower altitudes, while sheep and goat herding dominates the highlands. Although Armenians have been known as artisans and merchants, the majority of Armenians, until modern times, were engaged primarily in agriculture. In addition to cereal crops, Armenia grew vegetables, various oil seeds, and especially fruit. Armenian fruit has been famous from ancient times, with the pomegranate and apricot, referred to by the Romans as the Armenian plum, being the most renowned. THE EARLIEST ARMENIANS According to legend, the Armenians are the descendants of Japeth, a son of Noah, who settled in the Ararat valley. This legend places the Armenians in a prominent position within the Biblical tradition. In this tradition, the Armenians, as the descendants of Noah (the “second Adam”) are like the Jews, chosen and blessed by God. Greek historians, writing centuries after the appearance of the Armenians in their homeland, have left other exARMENIA N WE S S E R C A C A S U U a S M T S . A n r a p d a z a r H r A a s r A V p a o r o t a r A ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY 77 0 25 0 25 50 75 Kilometers 75 Miles ARMENIA AND ARMENIANS 50 GEORGIA Kalinino Alaverdi Step'anavan Akstafa Ijevan Tovuz AZERBAIJAN Kumayri Mt. Aragats 13,419 ft. Kirovakan Dilijan Akhta 4090 m. Kamo Ejmiatsin Arzni Hoktemberyan Yerevan Sevana Lich Zod Nagorno-Karabakh boundary Igdir TURKEY Armenia Shakhbus AZERBAIJAN Sisian Goris Ghap'an Meghri Garni Artashat Ararat Martuni Basargech'ar Kälbäjär n s Armenia, 1992 © MARYLAND CARTOGRAPHICS. REPRINTED WITH PERMISSION planations of the origins of the Armenian people. Two of the most quoted versions are provided by Herodotus, the fifth century B.C.E. historian, and Strabo, the geographer and historian writing at the end of the first century B.C.E. According to Herodotus, the Armenians had originally lived in Thrace, from where they crossed into Phrygia, in Asia Minor. They first settled in Phrygia, and then gradually moved west of the Euphrates River to what became Armenia. Their language resembled that of the Phrygians, while their names and dress was close to the Medes. According to Strabo, the Armenians came from two directions: one group from the west, or Phrygia; and the other from the south, or the Zagros region. In other words, according to the ancient Greeks, the Armenians were not the original inKhovy IRAN ARMENIA AND ARMENIANS habitants of the region. They appear to have arrived sometime between the Phrygian migration to Asia Minor that followed the collapse of the Hittite Empire in the thirteenth century B.C.E., and the Cimmerian invasion of the Kingdom of Urartu (existed ca. 900–590 B.C.E.) in the eighth century B.C.E. In 782 B.C.E., the Urartian king, Argishti I, built the fortress-city of Erebuni (present-day Erevan, capital of Armenia). The decline of Urartu enabled the Armenians to establish themselves as the primary occupants of the region. Xenophon, who passed through Armenia in 401 B.C.E., recorded that, by his time, the Armenians had absorbed most of the local inhabitants. THE LINGUISTIC EVIDENCE Modem archeological finds in the Caucasus and Anatolia have presented sketchy and incomplete evidence of the possible origins of the Armenians. Until the 1980s, scholars unanimously agreed that the Armenians were an Indo-European group who either came into the area with the proto-Iranians from the Aral Sea region, or arrived from the Balkans with the Phrygians after the fall of the Hittites. Some scholars maintain that Hay or Hai (pronounced high), the Armenian word for “Armenian,” is derived from Hai-yos (Hattian). Hence, it is argued, the Armenians adopted the name of that empire as their own during their migration over Hittite lands. Others maintain that the Armeno-Phrygians crossed into Asia Minor, took the name Muskhi, and concentrated in the Arme-Shupria region east of the Euphrates River, where non-Indo-European words became part of their vocabulary. They stayed in the region until the Cimmero-Scythian invasions altered the power structure. The Armenians then managed to consolidate their rule over Urartu and, in time, assimilated most of its original inhabitants to form the Armenian nation. According to this theory, the names designating Armenia and Armenians derive from the PersoGreek: Arme-Shupria. More recent scholarship offers yet another possibility—that the Armenians were not later immigrants, but were among the original inhabitants of the region. Although this notion gained some credibility since the mid-1980s, there remain a number of unresolved questions: What was the spoken language of the early Armenians? Are the Armenians members of a non-Indo-European, Caucasian-speaking group who later adopted an IndoEuropean dialect, or are they, as many believe, one of the native Indo-European speaking groups? A number of linguists maintain that the Armenians, whom they identify with the Hayasa, together with the Hurrians, Kassites, and others, were indigenous Anatolian or Caucasian people who lived in the region until the arrival of the Indo-Europeans. The Armenians adopted some of the vocabulary of these Indo-European arrivals. This theory explains why Armenian is a unique branch of the IndoEuropean language tree and may well explain the origin of the word Hayastan (“Armenia” in the Armenian language). As evidence, these scholars point to Hurrian suffixes, the absence of gender, and other linguistic data. Archeologists add that the images of Armenians on a number of sixth-century Persian monuments depict physical features similar to those of other people of the Caucasus. Other scholars, also relying on linguistic evidence, believe that Indo-European languages may have originated in the Caucasus and that the Armenians, as a result of pressure from large empires such as the Hittite and Assyrian, merged with neighboring tribes and adopted some of the Semitic and Kartvelian vocabulary and legends. They eventually formed a federation called Nairi, which became part of the united state of Urartu. The decline and fall of Urartu enabled the Armenian component to achieve predominance and, by the sixth century B.C.E., establish a separate entity, which the Greeks and Persians, the new major powers of the ancient world, called Armenia. Further linguistic and archeological studies may one day explain the exact origins of the IndoEuropeans and that of the Armenian people. As of the early twenty-first century, Western historians maintain that Armenians arrived from Thrace and Phrygia, while academics from Armenia argue in favor of the more nationalistic explanation; that is, Armenians are the native inhabitants of historic Armenia. CENTURIES OF CONQUERORS Located between East and West, Armenians from the very beginning were frequently subject to invasions and conquest. The Armenians adopted features of other civilizations, but managed to maintain their own unique culture. Following the demise of Urartu, Armenia was controlled by the Medes, and soon after became part of the Achaemenid Empire of Persia. The word Armenia is first mentioned as Armina on the Behistun Rock, in the Zagros Mountains of Iran, which was inscribed by Darius I in about 520 B.C.E. Armenia formed one of the Per78 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY sian satrapies governed by the Ervandids (Orontids). Alexander the Great’s conquest of Persia enabled the Ervandids to become autonomous and to resist the Seleucids. The Roman defeat of the Seleucids in 190 B.C.E. encouraged Artahses, a general of the Ervandids, to take over the land and establish the first Armenian dynasty, the Artashesid (Artaxiad). in 189 B.C.E. The Artashesids faced Rome to the west and Parthia to the east. During the first century B.C.E., when both powers were otherwise engaged, Armenia, with the help of Pontus, managed to extend its territory and for a short time, under Tigranes the Great, had an empire stretching from the Caspian to the Mediterranean. By the first century of the common era, however, the first Armenian dynasty came to an end, and Armenia fell under successive Roman and Parthian rule. The struggle between Rome and Parthia to install their own government in Armenia was finally settled by the peace of Rhandeia, in 64 C.E. The brother of the Persian king became king of Armenia, but had to travel to Rome and receive his crown from Nero. Originally Parthian, the Arshakids (Arsacids) became a distinctly Armenian dynasty. During their four-century rule, Armenia became the first state to adopt Christianity and developed its own, unique alphabet. The accession of the Sasanids in Persia posed new problems for Armenia. The Sasanids sought a revival of the first Persian Empire. They eradicated Hellenism and established Zoroastrianism as a state religion. The Sasanids not only attacked Armenia, but also fought Rome. By 387, the two powers partitioned Armenia. Four decades later, the second Armenian dynasty came to an end. Another partition occurred between Persia and the eastern Roman Byzantine empire (Byzantium) in 591. Armenia was ruled by local magnates who answered to Persian or Byzantine governors. Despite all this, Armenians not only maintained their national character, but also produced major historical and religious works and translations. Their church separated itself from Rome and Constantinople and assumed a national character under its supreme patriarch, the catholicos. The advent of Islam and the arrival of the Arabs had a major impact on Armenia. The Arabs soon accepted a new Armenian dynasty, the Bagratids, who ruled parts of Armenia from 885 to 1045. Cities, trade, and architecture revived, and a branch of the Bagratids established the Georgian Bagratid house, which ruled parts of Georgia until the nineteenth century. The Bagratids, the last Armenian kingdom in historic Armenia, finally succumbed to the Byzantines, who under the Macedonian dynasty had experienced a revival and incorporated Armenia into their empire. By destroying the Armenian buffer zone, however, the Byzantines had to face the Seljuk Turks. In 1071, the Turks defeated the Byzantines in the battle of Manzikert and entered Armenia. The Turkish invasion differed in one significant respect from all other previous invasions of Armenia: The Turkish nomads remained in Armenia and settled on the land. During the next four centuries, the Seljuk and the Ottoman Turks started the Turkification of Anatolia. The Armenians and Greeks slowly lost their dominance and became a minority. Emigration, war, and forced conversions depleted the Anatolian and Transcaucasian Christian population. Mountainous Karabagh, Siunik (Zangezur), Zeitun, and Sasun peoples, and a few other pockets of settlement were the only regions where an Armenian nobility and military leaders kept a semblance of autonomy. The rest of the Armenian population, mostly peasants, lived under Turkish or Kurdish rule. A number of Armenian military leaders who had left for Byzantium settled in Cilicia. The arrival of the Crusaders enabled these Armenians to establish a kingdom in 1199. This kingdom became a center of east-west trade and, thanks to the Mongol campaigns against the Muslims, lasted until 1375, when the Egyptian Mamluks overrun the region. From then until 1918, historic Armenia was first divided between the Persians and Ottomans, and then between the Ottomans and Russians. Although Armenian diasporas were established in western Europe, South Asia, and Africa, the largest and most influential communities rose in the major cities of the Ottoman, Persian, and Russian empires. ARMENIANS IN TURKEY AND RUSSIA Following the Russian conquest of Transcaucasia, the Armenians in Russia adopted Western ideas and began their national and political revival. Soon after, the Armenians in Turkey also began a cultural renaissance. Armenians in Baku and Tiflis (Tbilisi) wielded economic power, and Armenians in Moscow and St. Petersburg associated with government officials. Armenian political parties emerged in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. Beginning as reformist groups in Van (Turkey), the Armenians soon began to copy the programs of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party and the Russian Populists (Narodniks), the Hnchakian Social Democratic ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY 79 ARMENIA AND ARMENIANS ARMENIA AND ARMENIANS Party, and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaktsutiun). Armenian political activities angered both the Russians and the Turks. The Russians issued a decree in 1903 which confiscated the property of the Armenian Church. They arrested and executed some leaders and began a general Russification program. The Armenian armed response and the 1905 revolution abrogated the decree. Meanwhile, the Turkish sultan Abdul-Hamid II ordered Armenian massacres from 1895 to 1896. Armenian hopes were raised when, in 1908, the Young Turks overthrew the sultan and promised a state where all citizens would be equal. Unfortunately, the Young Turks became increasingly nationalistic. PanIslamism and Pan-Turkism, combined with chauvinism and social Darwinism, eroded the Armeno-Turkish cooperation. The defeat of the Turkish army in the winter campaign of 1914 and 1915 gave them the excuse to rid Turkish Armenia of its Armenian population. Some 1.5 million Armenians perished in the first genocide of the twentieth century. The small number of survivors, mostly women and children, managed to reach Syria or Russia. The Russian revolution and civil war initially established a Transcaucasian Federated Republic in 1918. On May 26 of that year, however, Georgia, under German protection, pulled out of the federation. Azerbaijan, under Turkish protection, followed the next day. On May 28, Armenia was forced to declare its independence. The small, backward, and mountainous territory of Yerevan Gubernya housed the new nation. Yerevan, with a population of thirty thousand, was one-tenth the size of Tiflis or Baku. It had no administrative, economic, or political structure. The affluent Armenians all lived outside the borders of the new republic. A government composed of Dashnak party members controlled the new state. Armenia was immediately attacked by Turkey, but resisted long enough for World War I to end. The republic also had border disputes over historic Armenian enclaves that had ended up as parts of Georgian and Azerbaijani republics. Despite a blockade, terrible economic and public health problems, and starvation, the Armenians hoped that the Allied promises for the restoration of historic Armenia would be carried out. The Allies, however, had their own agenda, embodied in the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Armenia was forgotten in the peace conferences that divided parts of the Ottoman Empire between the French and the British. Although the United States, led by President Woodrow Wilson, tried its best to help Armenia, the American mandate did not materialize. Armenia was invaded by both republican Turkey, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk), and by the Bolsheviks. In December 1920, it became a Soviet state. ARMENIA UNDER THE SOVIETS Bolshevik rule began harshly for Armenia. Armenian political leaders were either arrested or fled to Iran. Not only did Karabagh and Ganja remain part of Azerbaijan, but Nakhichevan, which had always been part of Persian and Russian Armenia, together with the adjoining district of Sharur, was handed over to Azerbaijan as well. The Armenian regions of Akhalkalaki remained part of Georgia. Armenian regions of Kars and Ardahan, captured by Russia in 1878, were returned to Turkey. As a final slap, Mt. Ararat, which had never been part of Turkish Armenia, was given to Turkey. Armenia thus became the junior member of the Soviet Transcaucasian Federation. The history of Soviet Armenia paralleled that of the Soviet Union. Armenians experienced the harshness of war communism, and breathed a sigh of relief during the years of New Economic Policy (NEP). Mountainous Karabakh, with its predominantly Armenian population, was accorded autonomy within Azerbaijan. Nakhichevan, separated from Azerbaijan by Zangezur, remained part of the constituent republic of Azerbaijan, but as an autonomous republic. The task of the Armenian communists was to build a new Armenia that would attract immigrants from Tiflis, Baku, and Russia and thus compete with the large Armenian diaspora. Modernization meant urbanization. The small, dusty town of Yerevan was transformed into a large city that, by 1990, had more than one million inhabitants. Armenia, which had had primarily an agricultural economy, was transformed into an industrial region. Antireligious propaganda was strong, and women were encouraged to break the male domination of society. Ancient traditions were ignored and the new order praised. The idea of korenizatsiia (indigenization) enabled Armenian communists to defend Armenian national aspirations within the communist mold. Like their counterparts in other national republics, Armenian leaders were purged by Josef Stalin and Lavrenti Pavlovich Beria between 1936 and 1938. Beria installed his protege, Grigor Arutiunov, who ruled Armenia until 1953. 80 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY The so-called Thaw begun under Nikita Khrushchev (1953–1964) benefited Armenia. Anastas Mikoyan came to Armenia to rehabilitate a number of Armenian authors and to signal the end of the Stalin era. After 1956, therefore, Armenians built new cadre of national leaders and were empowered to run their local ministries. For the next thirty-five years, Armenia was ruled by only four heads of state. Armenian industrial output surpassed that of Georgia and Azerbaijan. Seventy percent of Armenians lived in urban centers, and more than 80 percent had a secondary education or higher, making them one of the best educated groups in the USSR, along with the Jews and ethnic Russians. Armenians vastly outnumbered all other ethnic groups living in their republic, comprising 98 percent of the population. Ironically, however, Armenians also had the largest numbers living outside their republic. More than 1.5 million lived in the other Soviet republics, and more than 2.5 million had participated in the diaspora. After the Jews, Armenians were the most dispersed people in the USSR. A million lived in Georgia and Azerbaijan alone. The two decades of the Leonid Brezhnev era were years of benign neglect that enabled the Armenian elite to become more independent and nationalistic in character. Removed from the governing elite, Armenian dissident factions emerged to demand major changes. They even managed to remove the Armenian Communist chief, Anton Kochinian, on charges of corruption, and replaced him with a new leader, Karen Demirjian. Ironically, much of the dissent was not directed against the Russians, but against the Turks and the Azeris. Russia was viewed as a traditional friend, the one power that could redress the wrongs of the past and reinstate Armenia’s lost lands. Since Armenian nationalism did not threaten the USSR, the Armenians were permitted, within reason, to flourish. The fiftieth anniversary of the Armenian genocide (1965) was commemorated in Armenia and a monument to the victims was erected. The status of Karabakh was openly discussed. Armenian protests shelved the idea, proposed during the 1978 revision of the Constitution of the USSR, of making Russian the official language of all republics. Mikhail Gorbachev’s glasnost and perestroika had a major impact on Armenia. Russia anticipated problems in the Ukraine and the Baltic states, but no one predicted the great eruption of Armenian nationalism, primarily over Karabakh. On February 28, 1988, the Karabakh Soviet passed a resolution for the transference of Karabakh to Armenia. Gigantic peaceful demonstrations followed in Yerevan. The Azeris reacted by carrying out pogroms against the Armenians in Azerbaijan. Gorbachev’s inaction soured Russo-Armenian relations, and dissident leaders, known as the Karabakh Committee, gained credibility with the public. In May 1988, Demirjian was replaced by Suren Harutiunian, who promised to take the Karabakh issue to the Supreme Soviet. Moscow rejected the transfer, and a crackdown began in Karabakh and Yerevan. The terrible earthquake of December 7, 1988, Moscow’s inept handling of the crisis, and Azeri attacks upon Karabakh resulted in something extraordinary. Armenians, the most pro-Russian of all ethnic groups, demanded independence. Harutiunian resigned, and after declaring its intent to separate from the USSR, the Armenian National Movement, under the leadership of Levon TerPetrossian, a member of the Karabakh Committee, assumed power in Armenia. On September 21, 1991, the Armenian parliament unanimously declared a sovereign state outside the Soviet Union and two days later, on September 23, Armenia declared its independence. INDEPENDENT, POST-SOVIET ARMENIA On October 16, 1991, barely a month after independence, Armenians went to the polls. Levon TerPetrossian, representing the Armenian National Movement (ANM), won 83 percent of the vote. Neither the Dashnaks nor the Communists could accept their defeat and, ironically, they found common cause against Levon Ter-Petrossian’s government. Receiving a clear mandate did not mean that the government of Levon Ter-Petrossian would be free from internal or external pressures. The major internal problem was the virtual blockade of Armenia by Azerbaijan, exacerbated by the plight of the hundreds of thousands of Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan and the earthquake zone. Other domestic issues involved the implementation of free-market reforms, the establishment of democratic governmental structures, and the privatization of land. The external concerns involved future relations with Russia, Turkey, Georgia, and Iran. The immediate concern, however, was the conflict with Azerbaijan over mountainous Karabakh and the political uncertainties in Georgia, which contained 400,000 Armenians. Ter-Petrossian attempted to assure Turkey that Armenia had no territorial claims against it and ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY 81 ARMENIA AND ARMENIANS ARMENIAN APOSTOLIC CHURCH that it desired neighborly diplomatic and economic relations. Rather than espousing an ideologically dogmatic and biased outlook, Armenia was to have a pragmatic and flexible foreign policy. In the long run, however, Armenian efforts to establish political and economic relations with Turkey did not materialize. The Turks not only maintained their blockade of Armenia, but also insisted that the issue of Karabakh had to be resolved before anything else could be discussed. The Azeri blockade had resulted in food and fuel shortages and, since 1989, had virtually halted supplies for earthquake reconstruction. The closing down of the Medzamor Nuclear Energy Plant in 1989 meant that Armenian citizens, including the many refugees, would have to face many difficult winters. The presidential election of 1996 was marred by accusations of fraud. A broad coalition supported Vazgen Manoukian, the candidate of the National Democratic Union, but the election results gave TerPetrossian a victory with 51 percent of the vote. The opposition accused the ruling party of massive frauds in the counting of the ballots. Foreign observers cited some irregularities, but concluded that these did not significantly affect the outcome. Continued rallies, riots, and some shootings resulted in arrests and the ban on all public gatherings for a short time. By early 1998, a major split over Karabakh had occurred between Levon Ter-Petrossian and members of his own cabinet. Prime Minister Robert Kocharian, Defense Minister Vazgen Sargisian, and the Interior and National Security Minister Serge Sargisian joined forces against the president, who was forced to resign. Kocharian succeeded him. The parliamentary elections of May 1999 reshaped the balance of power. The Unity Coalition, led by Vazgen Sargisian, and the People’s Party of Armenia, led by Karen Demirjian, won the elections and left Kocharian without any control over the parliamentary majority. Sargisian became prime minister, and Demirjian became the speaker of Parliament. They removed Serge Sargisian, a Karabakhi and Kocharian’s closest ally, from his post of minister of the interior. Karen Demirjian, meanwhile, became the speaker of Parliament. But on October 27, five assassins entered the building of the National Assembly of Armenia and killed Sargisian and Demirjian, as well as two deputy speakers, two ministers, and four deputies. With the government in the hands of Kocharian, the economy at a standstill, and the Karabakh conflict unresolved, Armenians by the tens of thousands voted with their feet and emigrated from the country. See also: ARMENIAN APOSTOLIC CHURCH; AZERBAIJAN AND AZERIS; CAUCASUS; DASHNAKTSUTIUN; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, 82 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY TSARIST; LEVON BIBLIOGRAPHY NAGORNO-KARABAKH; TER-PETROSSIAN, Bournoutian, George A. (1992). The Khanate of Erevan under Qajar Rule, 1795–1828. Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Press. Bournoutian, George A. (1994). A History of Qarabagh. Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Press. Bournoutian, George A. (1998). Russia and the Armenians of Transcaucasia: 1797–1889. Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Press. Bournoutian, George A. (1999). The Chronicle of Abraham of Crete. Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Press. Bournoutian, George A. (1999). History of the Wars: 1721–1738. Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Press. Bournoutian, George A. (2001). Armenians and Russia: 1626–1796. Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Press. Bournoutian, George A. (2002). A Concise History of the Armenian People. Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Press. Bournoutian, George A. (2002). The Journal of Zak’aria of Agulis. Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Press. Hovannisian, Richard. G. (1967). Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918. Berkeley: University of California Press. Hovannisian, Richard. G. (1971–1996). The Armenian Republic. 4 vols. Berkeley: University of California Press. Libaridian, Gerard. (1991). Armenia at the Crossroads. Watertown, MA: Blue Crane Publishing. Libaridian, Gerard. (1999). The Challenge of Statehood. Watertown, MA: Blue Crane Publishing. Matossian, Mary Allerton Kilbourne. (1962). The Impact of Soviet Policies in Armenia. Leiden: E.J. Brill. Nalbandian, Louise. (1963). The Armenian Revolutionary Movement. Berkeley: University of California Press. Suny, Ronald Grigor. (1993). Looking toward Ararat. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. GEORGE A. BOURNOUTIAN ARMENIAN APOSTOLIC CHURCH The Armenian Apostolic Church has a long and ancient history. Its received tradition remembers the apostolic preaching of Saint Bartholomew and Saint Thaddeus among the Armenians of Edessa and surrounding territories. It is likely that there were Armenian Christians from early times, such that Saint Gregory the Illuminator, in the fourth century, who worked among people who had previous contact with Christianity. The Armenian Church celebrates the year 301 as the time when Gregory converted King Trdat. The king, in turn, made Christianity the state religion. There is disagreement among scholars about this date. It should also be remembered that the idea of Christianity as state religion was an innovation at that time. Events of the fifth century were critical to the making of a distinctively Armenian Christian culture and identity. The foremost of these was the invention of the Armenian alphabet by the monk Mesrob Mashtots and his community. Translations of scripture, commentaries, liturgy, theology, and histories were made. Greek and Syriac literature were important sources. In addition, the fifth century witnessed the first flowering of original Armenian literature. An example is Eznik Koghbatsi’s doctrinal work, Refutation of the Sects. The Battle of Avarayr in 451 against Persia, although a defeat for the Armenians under Vartan, has been remembered as critical for winning the Armenians the right to practice their Christian belief. The fact that the Armenians eventually rejected the Christology of the Council of Chalcedon (451) has defined their communion with the Oriental Orthodox churches and their schism from the Orthodox churches that grew out of Constantinople (that is, the Orthodox churches of the Greeks, Georgians, and Russians, among others). The dispute concerned the way in which the natures of Christ were properly described. The Armenian Church believed that the language of Chalcedon, defining the person of Jesus Christ as “in two natures,” destroyed the unity of divinity and humanity in Christ. Throughout much of its history, the Armenian Orthodox Church has been an instrument of the Armenian nation’s survival. The head of the church, called catholicos, has been located in various Armenian cities, often in the center of political power. In the early twenty-first century the supreme catholicos is located in the city of Echmiadzin, near the Armenian capital, Yerevan. Another catholicos, descended from the leaders of Sis in Cilicia, is located in Lebanon. During the existence of Cilician Armenia (from the eleventh to fourteenth centuries), when Crusaders were present in the Middle East, the Armenian Church had close ties with Rome. Nerses Shnorhali, known as “the Graceful” (1102–1173), was an important catholicos of this period. The Armenian Church played a significant role in the succession of Muslim empires in which its faithful were located. Because some of these were divided according to religious affiliation, the leaders of the Armenian were, in fact, also politically responsible for their communities. The Armenian Church was greatly affected by two phenomenon in the twentieth century: the genocide in Turkey, in which 1.5 million died, and the Sovietization of eastern Armenia, which ushered in seven decades of official atheism. The genocide essentially destroyed the church in Turkey, where only a remnant remains. It has also profoundly affected the way in which the Armenian Church approaches the idea of suffering in this world. The church thrived in many parts of the Armenian diaspora, and is regaining its strength in newly independent Armenia. In the post-Soviet period, the church has struggled to define itself in society, having to overcome the decades of persecution and neglect, as well as making adjustments in a political culture in which it is favored but must still coexist in an officially pluralistic society. The liturgy of the Armenian Church (the eucharistic service is called patarag) with Syriac and Greek roots, has been vastly enriched by the hymnody of Armenian writers. Contact with Rome has also been important in this context. Armenians, preserving an ancient Eastern tradition, celebrate Christmas and Epiphany together on January 6. See also: ARMENIA AND ARMENIANS; ORTHODOXY; RELIGION; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH BIBLIOGRAPHY Maksoudian, Krikor (1995). Chosen of God: The Election of the Catholicos of All Armenians. New York: St. Vartan’s Press. Ormanian, Malachia. (1988). The Church of Armenia: Her History, Doctrine, Rule, Discipline, Liturgy, Literature, and Existing Conditions. New York: St. Vartan’s Press. PAUL CREGO ARMENIAN REVOLUTIONARY FEDERATION See DASHNAKTSUTIUN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY 83 ARMENIAN REVOLUTIONARY FEDERATION ARMORY ARMORY The Armory (Oruzheinaia palata) was a Muscovite state department that organized the production of arms, icons, and other objects for the tsars and their household; later it became a museum. An Armory chancery (prikaz) was established in the Moscow Kremlin at the beginning of the sixteenth century to supervise the production and storage of the tsars’ personal weapons and other objects, such as saddles and banners. By the middle of the seventeenth century, it encompassed a complex of studios, including the Gold and Silver Workshops and the Armory Chamber itself, which employed teams of craftsmen to produce a wide variety of artwork and artifacts and also stored and maintained items for the palace’s ceremonial and liturgical use and for distribution as gifts. The chancery commanded considerable funds and a large administrative staff, presided over by such Partial view of the Kremlin Armory in Moscow. © WOLFGANG KAEHLER/CORBIS leading boyars as Bogdan Khitrovo, who was director of the Armory from 1654 to 1680, during which time it emerged as a virtual academy of arts. From the 1640s onward, the Armory had dedicated studios for icon painting and, beginning in 1683, for nonreligious painting. Its most influential artist was Simon Ushakov (1626–1686), whose images demonstrate a mixture of traditional compositions and more naturalistic use of light, shade, and perspective. Characteristic examples include his icons “The Planting of the Tree of the Muscovite Realm” (1668) and “Old Testament Trinity” (1671). He also made charts and engravings and painted portraits. The development of portrait painting from life by artists such as Ivan Bezmin and Bogdan Saltanov was one of the Armory’s most striking innovations, although surviving works show the influence of older conventions of Byzantine imperial portraits and Polish “parsuna” portraits, rather than contemporary Western trends. Teams of Armory artists also restored and painted frescoes in the Kremlin cathedrals and the royal residences: for example, in the cathedrals of the Dormition (1632–1643) and Archangel (1652). Russian Armory artists worked alongside foreign personnel, including many from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, who specialized in woodcarving, carpentry, and ceramics. Other foreigners worked as gunsmiths and clockand instrumentmakers. A handful of painters from western Europe encouraged the development of oil painting on canvas and introduced new Biblical and historical subjects into the artistic repertoire. By the late 1680s secular painters began to predominate: Armory employment rolls for 1687–1688 record twenty-seven icon painters and forty secular painters. Nonreligious painting assignments included making maps, charts, prints and banners, and decorating all manner of objects, from painted Easter eggs and chess sets to children’s toys. Under the influence of Peter I (r. 1682–1725) and his circle, in the 1690s artists were called upon to undertake new projects, such as decorating the ships of Peter’s new navy and constructing triumphal arches. In the early eighteenth century Peter transferred many Armory craftsmen to St. Petersburg, and by 1711 the institution was virtually dissolved, surviving only as a museum and treasury. From 1844 to 1851 the architect Karl Ton designed the present classical building, which houses and displays Muscovite and Imperial Russian regalia and treasures, vestments, carriages, gifts from foreign delegations, saddles, and other items But the city was also the site for workers of new pleasures and possibilities. C. No less part of the story of working-class life was what socialists called workers’ awakening: their growing self-esteem, rising expectations, and exposure to new ideas. IV. To better understand these historical trends, we need to listen to workers’ own words, to working-class Russians’ own efforts to explain what they experienced and what they desired. A. Workers’ collective demands (often presented during strikes) are one important body of evidence of their experiences and aspirations. 1. Some demands were the usual economic or political demands (higher wages, shorter hours, and civil rights). 2. But many demands focused on what might be called “moral issues,” especially for “polite address.” B. Other major sources of workers’ voices are their diaries, personal letters, and essays in the trade union or political party press. 1. Here, too, similar moral issues stand out, especially the idea that workers have the “right to live as human beings.” 2. Sometimes, workers used such words as “exploitation,” but more often, they used more emotional and ethical terms, including “despotism,” “rudeness,” and “cruelty.” 3. Finally, workers most often justified their protest as a defense of lichnost’, of their dignity and, hence, their natural rights as human beings. C. Some of the most remarkable expressions of concern with the self can be found in poetry written by workers. 1. The suffering self is one of the major themes of this body of writings. 2. For many workers, the solution was clear: the need for a society and a political system that respected the natural human dignity in each individual. D. This ideal of lichnost’ (of the person, the self) again can be seen as central to Russian life and how it was understood. 1. On the one hand, modern urban life seemed to provide an environment in which lichnost’ could thrive, with new opportunities at every turn. 2. On the other hand, indignities and humiliations were no less pervasive than before. Essential Reading: Stephen Frank and Mark Steinberg, eds., Cultures in Flux: Lower-Class Values, Practices, and Resistance in Late Imperial Russia (Princeton, 1994), introduction, chapters 6–10. Supplementary Reading: Edith Clowes et al., eds., Between Tsar and People: Educated Society and the Quest for Public Identity in Late Imperial Russia (Princeton, 1991). Catriona Kelly and David Shepherd, eds., Constructing Russian Culture in the Age of Revolution, 1881–1940 (Oxford, 1998). Mark Steinberg, Proletarian Imagination: Self, Modernity, and the Sacred in Russia, 1910–1925 (Ithaca, 2002). Reginald Zelnik, ed., A Radical Worker in Tsarist Russia: The Autobiography of Semen Ivanovich Kanatchikov (Stanford, 1986). Questions to Consider: 1. Were industrialization and urbanization leading to greater or lesser tensions in Russian society? Was a crisis looming? 2. Why, judging by stories in the popular press, were there such anxieties about modern urban life? What were the underlying concerns and values? ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 27 Lecture Twenty-Three Fin-de-Siècle CultureDecadence and Iconoclasm Scope: This lecture begins with the debate among historians over whether Russia was heading toward crisis and even revolution on the eve of the war. To further explore this question, the lecture examines two major cultural trends of the years between the 1905 revolution and World War I: decadence and futurism. First, we examine everyday decadence, including popular entertainment. The lecture then looks at “decadent” attitudes visible in literature and art: the evocation of love and beauty, sensualism, as well as a preoccupation with darkness, morbidity, and evil. The lecture next explores Russian futurist poetry and art: the iconoclastic attempt to “shock the philistine” in both everyday style and art and the attraction to primitivism and abstraction. Finally, the embrace of modernity is considered. The lecture concludes by considering the evaluation of futurism as ambiguous, as expressing a “characteristic joyful horror.” Outline I. One may speak of the last decade before World War I as the Russian fin-de-siècle. A. We know, of course, that these were, in fact, the final years of the old order in Russia. B. But these years also felt like a turning point; many at the time saw them as years of decadent decline and crisis. C. Scholars have long argued about where Russia was heading from 1905 to 1914 and about what might have happened had Russia not experienced the strain and devastation of World War I. 1. “Optimists” argue that collapse and revolution were not inevitable, that important reforms and progress were being made. 2. “Pessimists,” by contrast, note the increase in political and social tensions even before the war. 3. What is perhaps most salient about these years is neither progress nor crisis alone but their coexistence, the contradictoriness of these times. II. Many have noted the cultural “decadence” of early twentieth-century Russia. A. Traditions of order and morality seemed to be challenged everywhere. B. Most visible was the everyday decadence in daily life. 1. Both hooliganism and suicide were widely viewed as signs of the moral decline and disorder among the lower classes. 2. Many contemporaries were no less dismayed by the public cultural life of the middle classes, especially the proliferation of “low-brow” cultural entertainments. C. This was a contradictory decadence. 1. Some were outraged and frightened by this disintegration of order and morality. 2. Others felt liberated by the lack of restraint and the new possibilities. D. Decadence, and the ambivalence of its meanings, is clearly visible in much of the modern art and literature of these years (the “Silver Age”). 1. Amoral aestheticism, the escapist love of beauty for its own sake, was a frequent theme in poetry, especially the work of Anna Akhmatova and other Acmeists. 2. A related theme was sensualism, a fascination with physical beauty and even sexuality. An important expression of this was the famous Ballets Russes. 3. Another related, and more extreme, theme was a fascination with the morbid: with images of death, evil, melancholy, and despair. III. The artists who called themselves “futurists” reveal another revealing—and contradictory—face of the cultural life of this period. 28 ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership A. Motivated by a desire to subvert the present in the name of the future, these artists did all they could to be provocative and outrageous. 1. The most famous statement of this futurist challenge was the 1912 Manifesto of the Moscow Futurists, called “A Slap in the Face of Public Taste.” 2. This manifesto attacked all of Russia’s established culture as old-fashioned, crass, and cheap. B. The futurists sought “to shock the philistine” (the bourgeois), starting with the way they dressed and behaved in public. 1. Vladimir Maiakovskii appeared in bright shirts with a radish in his buttonhole. 2. David Burliuk might paint pictures on his face while wearing a top hat. 3. Futurist performances also featured a lively, and sometimes insulting, interaction with the audience. C. Above all, futurists tried to “shock the philistines” in their art. D. The most important expression of this effort to shock was the use of transrational language—or simply zaum (beyond the mind). 1. Partly, zaum represented a sort of “iconoclastic game.” 2. These sounds were also deliberately savage. 3. Zaum echoed and embraced the confusion and chaos of modern life. 4. Zaum was an attempt to express things that could not be conveyed through a conventional use of words. E. Futurists carried over this “savage” attack on philistine civilization into the visual arts. F. This savagery is visible, for example, in the primitivist paintings of Mikhail Larionov. 1. Larionov, like many artists and writers, was fascinated with images of the East. 2. He used color in a way that challenged conventional aesthetics. 3. The emotions expressed were strong, vital, wild, primitive, and true. G. The 1. Malevich sometimes presents an explicit iconoclastic challenge to high culture (by juxtaposing a cow work of Kazimir Malevich is another example of artistic futurism. and a violin, for example). 2. But his series of abstract paintings were his most famous challenge to conventional thinking. IV. These artists also embraced the vitality and possibility of the modern world. A. An infatuation with the objects of modernity is evident in futurist writing and painting. 1. Poets and painters insisted that true beauty lay not in pastoral scenes or still lifes, but in machines, iron, and skyscrapers. 2. Some artists followed the logic of this to its end and introduced modern objects into their paintings. B. Although futurists appeared to be optimistic and hopeful, to believe in the modern world and in the future, there were signs of doubt. 1. The contemporary symbolist poet Aleksandr Blok described Russian futurism as “reflecting in its foggy mirror a characteristic joyful horror.” 2. These contradictions emerge clearly in what was probably the most famous futurist production of the prewar period, the opera Victory over the Sun. 3. In this work, the future wins the struggle between the forces of the future and those of the past, but many people find it impossible to live or even breathe in the new world. Essential Reading: W. Bruce Lincoln, Between Heaven and Hell: The Story of a Thousand Years of Artistic Life in Russia (New York, 1998), chapter 13. Supplementary Reading: Vladimir Markov, Russian Futurism: A History (Berkeley, 1968). Camilla Grey, The Russian Experiment in Art, 1863–1922 (London, 1986). Questions to Consider: 1. Do you agree with optimistic or pessimistic assessments of the direction of Russian life between 1905 and 1914? Were the prewar years a time of progress leading to lessening political and social tensions or a time of deepening crisis? 2. Was artistic and cultural iconoclasm an expression of moral crisis or vitality? Either way, what philosophical values underlay what was called decadence and futurism? ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 29 Lecture Twenty-Four Fin-de-Siècle CultureThe Religious Renaissance Scope: This lecture looks at another side of Russian cultural life in the decades before the first world war: the widespread religious revival. The lecture begins by looking at the nature of Russian Orthodoxy, especially what has been called its “sacramental mysticism.” We consider the influential ideas of Vladimir Soloviev, including his notions of Godmanhood and Sophia. The lecture then explores the various movements known together as “God-seeking”: ethical idealism, mysticism, and the occult. Marxist “God-building” is examined, as are movements within the Church. Next, the lecture considers popular religious movements and the rise of sectarianism. Finally, we examine the growing interest in the spiritual among writers and artists, expressed especially in literary symbolism and in the paintings of Kazimir Malevich. Outline I. Religion and spirituality were at the heart of the contradictory sense of crisis, possibility, and searching in the Russian fin de siècle, especially between 1905 and 1914. A. Starting in the 1890s, and especially after the 1905 revolution, Russia experienced what has been called a “religious renaissance,” much of it outside, or even opposed to, the established Church. B. In many ways, the term “religious renaissance” is too feeble to describe the passionate and often troubled nature of this spiritual ferment. C. Better is Alexander Blok’s image of an upheaval of emotion and fear through the “crusted lava” of civilization. II. First, we must look at Russian Orthodoxy itself. A. It is important to note that the English word “orthodoxy” does not convey the sense of the Russian “Pravoslavie,” meaning the correct way to glorify God; the focus is on ceremony, not theology B. The Russian Primary Chronicle tells a revealing story about the reasons the Grand Prince Vladimir chose Christianity for Russia in the tenth century. 1. It was decided that Russia needed to adopt one of the religions of one of the major empires that it had dealings with. 2. Vladimir sent emissaries to the Muslim Bulgars, the Catholic Holy Roman Empire, and the Eastern Orthodox Church in Constantinople. 3. The emissaries, the Chronicles say, were dazzled by the glory and beauty of the Orthodox churches and their ceremonies such that they reported “we knew not whether we were in heaven or on earth.” 4. This emphasis on beauty and feeling says much about the nature of Orthodoxy. C. Orthodoxy, it has been said, places particular emphasis on the “mysticism of the sacrament.” 1. This sense of the presence of the sacred in holy objects is visible in frescoes, mosaics, and icons that covered every wall of the Greek and, later, the Russian Church. 2. It is visible in the rich and beautiful liturgy. 3. It is visible in the sense of the sacred in a plenitude of objects: wine, water, oil, bread, fruit, homes, fields, and nature. 4. All of these were efforts to create “heaven on earth.” 5. The emphasis on the sacramental can be seen also in a lesser stress put on the historical Christ and his teachings. III. A major influence on this spiritual renaissance was the philosopher and poet Vladimir Soloviev. 30 ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership A. B. One of his key ideas was the mystical ideal of the unity of all things—known as “All-Unity”—and of the movement of the world toward unity. His notion of “Godmanhood” was even more influential. 1. 2. 3. For Soloviev, the essence of Christianity was mystical, not ethical. The key mystical moment was the appearance of Christ in the world. This was also prophetic, pointing to human perfection and the unity of the spiritual and the material. C. Closely related to this idea was the idea of Sophia, of divine Wisdom: 1. Soloviev adapted this idea from the Old Testament, Jewish mystical writings, seventeenth-century philosophers, and the Orthodox tradition. 2. Sophia represented not only divine wisdom but also the incarnation of the ideal of All-Unityof God’s Word made fleshand the promise of the perfection toward which humanity is striving. IV. In the years after 1905, mystical and spiritual idealism became more pervasive than ever before, such that many spoke of a “God-seeking” movement. A. God-seeking was a sign of the widespread desire for spiritual meaning, as well as a sign of the crisis of the times. B. Many intellectuals sought to reemphasize ethics and their spiritual roots, including both neo-Kantianism and Tolstoyanism. C. Many others were more oriented to mysticism, including theosophy, occult spirituality, interest in Eastern religions, and apocalypticism. D. Marxist “God-building” echoed these trends in its efforts to bring to Marxism emotional passion and moral certainty. E. The Church, too, was changing in these years. 1. Individual priests joined intellectuals in discussing religion and spirituality. 2. Some clergy talked about the need to free the Church from state control. 3. Some individual priests, notably the charismatic Father John of Kronstadt, innovated in tradition to get back to the essence of Orthodox spirituality. F. We also see in these years popular movements of spiritual renaissance. 1. Beginning in the 1890s, we see a steady growth of Tolstoyan communities among urban and rural poor. 2. We see a growing interest in various new religious groups (“sects”). 3. Baptists and other Protestant denominations were attracting followers. 4. Individual mystics, healers, and charismatic preachers attracted attention. 5. Most influential in these years were the St. Petersburg and Moscow Brethren, who attracted thousands of workers and other lower-class Russians with their message of sobriety, self-respect, and a rich inner life. G. Among peasants, as well, we see the growth of interest in spiritual-ethical literature, the popularity of “cults,” an upsurge in pilgrimage to sacred sites, and stories of healings and miracles. V. We see much the same nonconformist searching for personal spiritual meaning in art and literature during these years. A. In literature, symbolism thrived. 1. Symbolism shared the widespread discontent with rationalism and positivism. 2. Symbolism also reflected a certain dark, pessimistic mood. 3. Even urban lower-class writers were affected by contradictory anxieties and hopes: suffering and deep melancholy mixed with hopes for salvation. B. In the visual arts, we see this same spiritual searching in the work of Kazimir Malevich. 1. When still painting representational works, Malevich painted images of Christ on the Cross. 2. Increasingly, Malevich’s efforts to express his spiritual feelings took him beyond mere representation. 3. As abstraction, these works were an effort to express non-rational, emotional, and spiritual truths. 4. His famous Black Square functioned much like an icon. 5. Other images significantly took the shape of a cross, a symbol of suffering, as well as the promise of salvation. Supplementary Reading: George Kline, Religious and Anti-Religious Thought in Russia (Chicago, 1968). Christopher Read, Religion, Revolution, and the Russian Intelligentsia (Totowa, 1979). Bernice Glatzer Rosenthal, The Occult in Russian and Soviet Culture (Ithaca, 1997). ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 31 Mark Steinberg, Proletarian Imagination: Self, Modernity, and the Sacred in Russia, 1910–1925 (Ithaca, 2002), chapter 6. Questions to Consider: 1. 2. What do you think were the main reasons that so many people began to turn to various forms of spirituality in the years after 1905? Was this another sign of Russia’s crisis or of its progress? How positive and hopeful were these religious expressions and movements? 32 ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership Biographical Notes Alexander I (Aleksandr Pavlovich, 1777–1825; emperor 1801–1825). Son of Paul I. He alternately fought and befriended Napoleon I but, ultimately (1813–1815), helped form the coalition that defeated the emperor of the French. Initially influenced by the liberalism of his Swiss tutor, Alexander established an “Unofficial Committee” to discuss major political and social reforms and enacted a number of preliminary reforms. Always concerned with maintaining order, he grew increasingly anxious about the dangers of liberal reform. Toward the end of his life, Alexander I steadily lost confidence even in rationalistic order as an ideal and became increasingly influenced by religious mysticism. He was succeeded by his brother Nicholas I. Alexander II (Aleksandr Nikolaevich, 1818–1881; emperor 1855–1881). Emperor. Son and successor of Nicholas I. Alexander II initiated a major program of modernization and reform, including the emancipation of the serfs in 1861. These reforms were combined with limitations to control the consequences of reform. Many were dissatisfied with these limits. A political crisis erupted during the years 1879 to 1881, caused by failure in the Russo-Turkish war in the Balkans, renewed peasant unrest, and a growing terrorist movement. In 1881, Alexander II was assassinated by a member of the People’s Will, the terrorist wing of the populist movement. He was succeeded by his son Alexander III. Alexander III (Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, 1845–1894; emperor 1881–1894). Alexander III’s response to the assassination of his father was to reverse many of the reforms his father had initiated. Working with his close adviser Konstantin Pobedonostsev, Alexander III increased the repressive powers of the police, tightened censorship, controlled education, limited the power of the zemstvos and the judiciary, increased the government’s control over the peasants, subjected national minorities to forcible Russification, and persecuted religious minorities, especially the Jews. His Minister of Finance, Sergei Witte, however, used government pressure to stimulate the industrial development of the country. Alexander III was succeeded by his son Nicholas II. Anna (Anna Ioannova, 1693–1740; empress 1730–1740). Daughter of Ivan V, Peter I’s half-brother and co-tsar until his death, and niece of Peter the Great. When emperor Peter II (1727–1730) died, bringing to an end the male Romanov line, the aristocratic Supreme Privy Council, the de facto ruling body, offered her the throne. She accepted the proposal as well as its stipulation that she agree to “conditions” placing much real power in the council’s hands. Soon after taking the throne, she abrogated the conditions, abolished the Privy Council, and reestablished autocracy. In practice, she left much of the day-to-day government activity in the hands of her lover, Ernst Johann Biron, and a small group of German advisers. The policies of her reign became increasingly brutal, though she was also known for her lavish entertainments at court. Vissarion Grigorevich Belinskii (1811–1848). Prominent Russian literary critic and leading Westernizer. Born the son of a doctor, he was one of the first important non-noble members of the intelligentsia. Writing mainly literary criticism for influential journals in the 1830s and 1840s, he was Russia’s first professional literary critic. His life was brief but lived with emotional intensity and strong moral commitment, true to the Romantic spirit of the age. As a literary critic, he insisted that good literature was that which best served “truth”both in reflecting the realities of the world and in advocating true morals and principles. As a social critic, he was influential for his articulate critique of Russian society based on its failure to place sufficient value in the individual human being. He died of tuberculosis. Leonid Il’ich Brezhnev (1906–1982; first secretary [after 1966, general secretary] of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [CPSU], 1964–1983; Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet [head of state], 1977–1982). Educated as an engineer, Brezhnev held a variety of party posts starting in the 1930s, his career flourishing under Stalin’s regime. After Khrushchev was forced from power in 1964, he led the Soviet Union for eighteen years (1964–1982), initially through a “collective leadership” with Aleksei Kosygin, then alone. Stability was the guiding principle of his domestic politics. In international affairs, he pursued détente with the West. The Soviet welfare state developed extensively during his time in power, but so did privileges for the elite. Partly due to heavy focus on military industrial production, other sectors of the economy suffered, leading to stagnation and, possibly, decline in the standard of living. Nikolai Ivanovich Bukharin (1888–1938). Bolshevik, Marxist theoretician and economist, prominent party leader. Joined the Russian Social-Democratic Workers’ Party in 1906. After the February 1917 revolution, Bukharin returned to Russia, was elected to the Bolshevik Central Committee, and after the Bolsheviks took power, became ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 33 editor of Pravda. In 1918, Bukharin briefly led an opposition group, the Left Communists, which opposed the Brest-Litovsk treaty and proposed to transform the war into a revolutionary war to spread Communism to Europe. After Lenin’s death in 1924, Bukharin became a full member of the Politburo. A strong believer in the New Economic Policy as a strategy for building socialism without violence and force and in accord with the natural development of the market, Bukharin was initially allied with Stalin against Trotsky and the Left. In 1928, Stalin denounced Bukharin and his supporters as a “Right Deviation” and expelled him from the Politburo. After recanting his views, Bukharin was partially rehabilitated. Arrested in 1937, Bukharin was expelled from the party, tried in the last great purge trial in 1938, forced to confess, and executed. In 1988, he was posthumously reinstated as a member of the Communist Party. Catherine I (Ekaterina Alekseevna, born Marta Skavronska, 1684–1727; empress 1725–1727). Of likely Lithuanian background, orphaned at the age of three, raised by a Lutheran pastor in the Baltic region, seized by conquering Russian soldiers during the Northern War, she became a servant in the house of Peter I’s associate Aleksandr Menshikov. After being Menshikov’s mistress, she became the mistress of the tsar, who married her (his second wife) in 1712 after she converted to Orthodoxy. When Peter died without naming a successor, though having set up a new law that the emperor was free to appoint whomever he wished, Menshikov and the imperial guards placed Catherine on the throne. Menshikov played a dominant role in her brief reign, as did the Supreme Privy Council, which Catherine established. Catherine II the Great (Ekaterina Aleeksevna, born Sophie Augusta of Anhalt-Zerbst, 1729–1796; empress 1762– 1796). Born in Stettin, Germany, Catherine converted to Orthodoxy in 1744 and married the future emperor Peter III in 1745. After her husband was murdered in 1762, with her willing support, she became empress. Catherine increased Russia’s power and prestige through skillful diplomacy and by extending Russia’s boundaries. Although inspired by Enlightenment ideals, clearly visible in her Instructions to the Legislative Commission she appointed in 1767 to consider reform, Catherine did not believe that Russia was ready for liberty or democracy and held firmly to her absolutist power. Nevertheless, she undertook numerous major reforms, including codifying the laws, restructuring the central administration, encouraging non-state service by nobles, promoting education and culture, allowing private publishing, and developing the economy. Although she had many lovers, only Count Grigorii Orlov and Prince Grigorii Potemkin had significant influence in government affairs. Petr Iakovlevich Chaadaev (1794–1856). Writer and intellectual. Born in a family of wealthy landowners, Chaadaev studied at Moscow University but left to serve in the army in 1812 without completing his studies. In 1829, he undertook his main philosophical effort, the Philosophical Letters, written in French. The first letter was published in Russian in 1836 in the cultural journal Teleskop (The Telescope). This work, highly critical of Russia’s cultural backwardness, inspired widespread debate among educated Russians. The government of Nicholas I declared Chaadaev insane for his critical views and placed him under house arrest. In 1837, he wrote “Apology of a Madman,” in which he retreated from his stated despair about Russia’s future and argued for the advantages of backwardness for Western-orientated progress. Nikolai Gavrilovich Chernyshevskii (1828–1889) Radical journalist and political activist. Son of a poor priest. A Westernizer, Chernyshevskii shared the common belief in the central importance of the individual human being. Unlike the earlier generation of the intelligentsia, however, he was convinced of the need to ground ideology in science more than morality. In all his writings, he made clear his radical opposition to the existing social and political order. After his arrest by the tsarist police for sedition in 1862, Chernyshevskii was sentenced to seven years in prison and hard labor and lifelong exile to Siberia. His political novel What Is to Be Done?, written in prison and published in 1863, exerted a major influence on Russian revolutionaries, including Lenin. Elizabeth (Elizaveta Petrovna, 1709–1761; empress 1741–1761). Daughter of Peter the Great and Catherine I. Supported by members of the Russian court who hoped to reduce German domination at court, Elizabeth seized power from the infant Ivan VI and the regent, his mother, Anna, in a coup. Elizabeth endeavored to bring a spirit of culture and beauty to Russia and to demonstrate to the world that Russia was not a savage land. Many of Russia’s great palaces were constructed during her reign. She also restored the Senate created by her father and is often credited with returning to the principles and traditions of Peter I by rationalizing government, encouraging cultural development, stimulating the economy, and demonstrating Russia’s importance in the world. Georgii Appollonovich Gapon (1870–1906). Priest and labor organizer. Born into a peasant family in Ukraine. He was influenced by the religious and moral ideals of Lev Tolstoi, causing him to become increasingly critical of mere ritual and to devote his efforts to working with the urban poor. In 1902–1903, he assisted the head of the special 34 ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership section of the Department of Police (Okhrana) in establishing an official labor organization in St. Petersburg to undermine socialist agitation among workers while promoting workers’ needs and interests. In 1904, he established his own legal workers’ organization, the Assembly of Russian Factory and Mill Workers. In early January 1905, Gapon helped draft a petition to the emperor in the name of workers, which was read at mass meetings and carried in a procession of workers headed by Gapon on January 9. The procession was fired on by troops. After this “Bloody Sunday,” Gapon escaped abroad with the help of the Socialist Revolutionary (SR) party. In March 1906, after allegedly attempting on behalf of the police to discover the membership of the SR party’s terrorist “fighting organization,” he was tried by a party tribunal and hanged. Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev (1931– ; general secretary of the CPSU 1985–1991; president of the Soviet Union 1990–1991). The son of peasants, in 1952 Gorbachev entered the law school of Moscow State University and became a member of the Communist Party. After graduation, he held a number of posts in the Komsomol and in party organizations in Stavropol, rising to become first secretary of the regional party committee in 1970. He was named a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU in 1971, became a candidate member of the Politburo in 1979, and became a full member in 1980. In 1985, after the death of Konstantin Chernenko, he was named general secretary with a mandate to reform a stagnant economy and a society marked by what he called “spiritual crisis.” From 1989 to 1990, he was chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and, from 1990 to 1991, President. He was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1990. Gorbachev’s policies of glasnost’ and perestroika brought about increases in democracy and civic freedom, but did not succeed in stimulating the stagnant economy nor in satisfying the desires of many for greater freedom and democracy, which led to growing instability. In August 1991, conservative Communists arrested Gorbachev and seized power. When the coup failed, the Russian government banned the Communist Party and joined other republics in quitting the USSR. In December 1991, Gorbachev resigned as head of the USSR, which had effectively ceased to exist. He remained in Russia and established, mainly with income from his publications in the West, the Gorbachev Foundation, a think-tank based in Moscow. He remains active as a writer and public speaker. Maksim Gor’kii (Gorky) (pseudonym of Aleksei Maksimovich Peshkov; 1858–1938). Writer and critic. Born into a provincial lower-middle-class family, orphaned at a young age, his youth was filled with wandering and manual labor, as well as gradual political radicalization. Gor’kii began his career as a professional writer in the early 1890s. His stories and plays, filled with sympathetic images of lower-class life but also critical of the slavish submissiveness and fatalism of the masses and, thus, idealizing vital individuals, became extremely popular. In 1908–1909, Gor’kii was one of the leaders in the Marxist “God-Building” movement. In 1917–1918, he published an influential series of essays on politics, culture, and morality in the newspaper Novoe vremia (New Times), entitled “Untimely Thoughts,” which offered an ethical critique of the revolution. In October 1921, Gor’kii left Russia, ostensibly for his health. He returned to live in the USSR in 1933, evidently reconciled to the Soviet system and openly supporting Stalin and his policies. Aleksandr Ivanovich Herzen (Gertsen in Russian; 1812–1870). Political thinker, activist, and writer. A leading Westernizer and early Russian socialist. The illegitimate son of a Moscow nobleman and a young German household servant, Herzen attended Moscow University, where he became involved in philosophical study circles (kruzhki). In 1834, his circle was broken up as seditious and Herzen was sent to the provinces as a civil servant. In 1840, he returned to Moscow, where he was again involved in the circles of the intelligentsia and, together with Belinskii and others, elaborated the ideals of Westernism and socialism. In 1847, Herzen left Russia for freer conditions in Western Europe, never to return. He settled first in Paris and later in England, where he set up the first free Russian press abroad and a weekly journal, Kolokol (The Bell, 1857–1862), which was officially banned but widely read in Russia. At the heart of his work was the notion of the essential freedom and dignity of the individual person, notwithstanding the pressures of nature and history. Aleksei Stepanovich Khomiakov (1804–1860). A leading Slavophile writer and intellectual. Born in Moscow into a wealthy noble family, Khomiakov was raised in a religious environment and grew increasingly religious as he got older, in contrast to the atheism of Westernizer intellectuals. He was an officer in the army from 1822–1825 and 1828–1829, living in Western Europe in between, then withdrew to the life of a landowner. He attended Moscow University but was largely self-taught, especially in theology and philosophy. His doctrine of sobornost’ (natural spiritual community) was central to Slavophile thinking. Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev (1894–1971; first secretary of the CPSU 1953–1964; also chairman of the council of ministers [head of government] 1958–1964). Born in a family of peasants, Khrushchev was a metal worker ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 35 before the revolution. He joined the party in 1918 and fought in the Red Army during the civil war. He was active in the Ukrainian party organization in the 1920s. As an active supporter of Stalin, Khrushchev was promoted rapidly in the party leadership, becoming a member of the Politburo in 1939. After Stalin’s death in 1953, Khrushchev won the struggle for succession. Khrushchev is best known for his policies of de-Stalinization and “peaceful coexistence” with the West. He sought to revitalize the system with greater rank-and-file activism and a more consumer-oriented economy. Khrushchev was forced to resign in 1964, in the wake of economic and foreign policy failures, as well as the discontent of the elite, whose interests were often undermined by his reforms. Petr Lavrovich Lavrov (pseudonym of Petr Lavrovich Mirtov, 1823–1900). Populist philosopher and writer. From a landed family, Lavrov graduated from an artillery school in St. Petersburg in 1842 and taught mathematics in St. Petersburg from 1844 to 1866. Becoming involved in antigovernment activities in 1857, he joined a secret revolutionary society and edited an underground newspaper. Arrested and sentenced to internal banishment in 1867, he escaped to Paris, where he participated in the Paris Commune of 1871. Lavrov edited various émigré publications and organized discussion circles among Russian émigrés. His writings, especially his influential Historical Letters (published in 1869–1870), articulated a practical philosophy at the center of which stood the humanistic concern for individual dignity and rights (lichnost’see Glossary), the duty of “critically thinking individuals” to act on behalf of society as a whole, and the essential moral foundations of truth. His writings helped provide the theoretical foundation for the activities of the Russian radical populist organizations in the late nineteenth century. Vladimir Il’ich Lenin (pseudonym of Vladimir Il’ich Ulianov, 1870–1924; leader of the Bolshevik [later Communist] party 1903–1924; chairman of the Sovnarkom [Soviet government] 1917–1924). Revolutionary, political writer, leader of the Bolshevik party and the Soviet government. Lenin was born into a moderately well-to- do family in Simbirsk, a small town on the Volga River, where his father served as an education official. Following the execution of his older brother for the attempted assassination of Alexander III, Lenin became involved in revolutionary activities. Before the revolution of 1917, he lived primarily abroad, in Munich, London, Geneva, and Paris. In 1895, he helped establish the St. Petersburg Union of Struggle for the Liberation of the Working Class. At a meeting of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers’ Party in 1903, when the party split into two factions over questions of organization and strategy, Lenin led the Bolshevik faction. A prolific writer, Lenin was the leading advocate of a vision of revolution led by professional revolutionaries and daring to act creatively to seize the opportunities history provided. After the February revolution, Lenin received permission to travel across Germany in a sealed train to return to Russia. In October, he led the Bolsheviks in the successful overthrow of the Provisional Government and became the leader of the Soviet government. He died in 1924, two years after a stroke left him incapacitated. His embalmed body was placed in a mausoleum on Moscow’s Red Square. Count Mikhail Tarielovich Loris-Melikov (1825–1888). Tsarist government official. Born in Tiflis, the son of an Armenian merchant, Loris-Melikov served as governor of the Terek region in the Caucasus from 1863 to 1875, commanded an army corps in Turkey during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878, and was governor-general of the plague-ridden lower Volga region in 1879. Alexander II appointed him chairman of a special commission to suppress the revolutionary movement but also to prepare a reform program for the country. In 1880, Alexander II named him minister of the interior and head of the Imperial Police Department. His program of reforms combined forceful suppression of dissent with reforms designed to lessen discontent, including a consultative national assembly. The project was approved in principle by Alexander II, but the emperor was assassinated before it was formally enacted, and it was rejected by the new emperor, Alexander III. Loris-Melikov resigned his post and retired to Nice. Vladimir Vladimirovich Maiakovskii (Mayakovsky) (1893–1930). Futurist and revolutionary poet. Joined the Russian Social-Democratic Workers’ Party at the age of fifteen and was repeatedly jailed for subversive activity. He started to write poetry during solitary confinement in 1909. On his release, he attended the Moscow Art School and joined the iconoclastic futurist movement. Maiakovskii’s poetry was self-assertive and defiant in form and content but also explored the tragedy of unrequited love and discontent with the world. Maiakovskii embraced the Bolshevik revolution and wrote many revolutionary poems and works of propaganda. In the 1920s, he completed two satirical plays aimed at troubling aspects of Soviet life. In 1930, disappointed in love, increasingly alienated from Soviet reality, and denied a visa to travel abroad, he committed suicide. L. Martov (pseudonym of Iulii Osipovich Tsederbaum, 1873–1923). Revolutionary, political writer, leader of the Mensheviks. Martov grew up in a Jewish family in Odessa at a time of considerable discrimination and persecution. 36 ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership In the 1880s, his family moved to St. Petersburg, where Martov became involved in the student movement and embraced Marxism. He was active in Vilna as a member of the Jewish socialist Bund and, in 1895, joined Lenin in forming the St. Petersburg Union of Struggle for the Liberation of the Working Class. Arrested in 1896, after three years in Siberia, he left Russia for Switzerland, where he joined Lenin as an editor of the socialist paper Iskra. At the second congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers’ Party in 1903, Martov was the leading figure among those who would become known as Mensheviks, favoring a more open and democratic party. During 1917, he led a left-wing faction of Menshevik-Internationalists, who favored breaking with the Provisional Government and establishing a democratic Soviet government. After the Bolshevik revolution, he opposed many of the new regime’s dictatorial measures but supported the government during the civil war. In 1920, Martov left Soviet Russia and edited the Socialist Courier in Berlin until his death. Roi (Roy) Aleksandrovich Medvedev (1925– ). Soviet historian and Marxist dissident. His father was arrested in 1938 and died in a labor camp, helping to spark Medvedev’s lifelong interest in reexamining the Soviet political system and its history. After university, he worked as a teacher, school administrator, and editor before becoming a senior researcher at the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences in the 1960s. He was a member of the Communist Party from 1956 until his expulsion in 1969. From 1971, he worked as a freelance writer based in Moscow. His works, which reexamined Soviet political history from the period of the Russian revolution to the 1960s, could only be published abroad and smuggled back into the USSR. His most important book was Let History Judge in 1971, dealing with the crimes of the Stalin period. Unlike most dissidents, Medvedev believed in the possibility of revitalizing socialism and returning to its healthier pre-Stalinist roots. Nicholas I (Nikolai Pavlovich, 1796–1855; emperor 1825–1855). Nicholas I came to the throne amidst the Decembrist rebellion, which broke out in the midst of the public uncertainty about the succession following the death of Alexander I, given the secret agreement of Nicholas’s older brother, Constantine, not to take the throne due a morganatic marriage. His reign was characterized by regimentation, militarism, and repression. Nicholas was also deeply religious and preoccupied with moral discipline and virtue. As ruler, he struggled unceasingly against the rising tide of revolution in Western Europe, implemented intense Russification policies throughout the empire, and repressed dissident cultural and intellectual trends. His special political police agency (the Third Department) did much to create a police state in Russia. His rule was inspired by three key principles: Orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationality. Nicholas II (Nikolai Aleksandrovich, 1866–1918; emperor 1894–1917). Succeeded to the throne after the death of his father, Alexander III. His rule was characterized by a mixture of continued economic progress (as well as periodic crises) and efforts to contain the effects of modernization. In particular, Nicholas resisted demands for more participatory government and civil rights. During the 1905 revolution, he was compelled to establish a Duma (parliament) and ensure fundamental civil rights, though he tried in the following years to limit these reforms. During World War I, he took personal command of the war effort. He was consistently inspired by an ideology of autocracy that combined a conviction about the necessity and righteousness of the absolute power of the tsar with a faith in a special bond of love and devotion between tsar and people. Tradition, discipline, duty, religion, and love were among his highest values. In the midst of war and revolution, Nicholas II abdicated in March 1917, bringing to an end the Romanov dynasty. He was executed, along with his family and close servants, in Ekaterinburg in July 1918. Nikolai Ivanovich Novikov (1744–1818) Writer and publisher. Born into a family of old service gentry, Novikov was educated at Moscow University, then joined the Izmailovskii Guards Regiment. In 1767, he was selected as a secretary for Catherine the Great’s Legislative Commission. Rather than continuing in the army or state service, he retired to devote himself to literary and civic activism as a publisher, printer, editor, and writer. He established an influential series of satirical journals in which he criticized unenlightened conditions in Russian life. In 1775, Novikov became a Freemason and focused increasing attention on inward transformation, combined with civic service to others. His journal, Morning Light, begun in 1777, advocated civic virtue, chastised imperfection and vice, and championed the idea that human beings are made in God’s image and, hence, equal in rights and dignity. In 1779, he took over the lease of the Moscow University Press and, after the legalization of private publishing in 1783, set up his own firm. In 1792, the government arrested Novikov, closed his publishing house, and condemned him without trial as a “subversive” to fifteen years’ imprisonment. He was released four years later a broken man, physically and financially. He turned in his final years to mysticism. ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 37 Paul I (Pavel Petrovich, 1754–1801; emperor 1796–1801). Despite Catherine II’s apparent intention to name Paul’s son Alexander her heir, rather than her son Paul, he succeeded her when she died in 1796. Paul repealed the decree issued by Peter the Great that had given each monarch the right to choose his successor and established a definite order of succession within the male line of the Romanov family. Paul attempted to revive the tradition of the all- powerful autocrat and to increase militarization in accordance with the Prussian model. He reversed many of Catherine’s policies, reestablishing centralized administrative agencies she had abolished, increasing bureaucratic control in local government, and revoking the Charter of the Nobility. His frequently capricious conduct; his obsessive militarization of all aspects of life; his foreign policy, which alienated Russia from most of the great powers; and his restrictions on the autonomy and authority of the nobility led to widespread dissatisfaction among the elites. Paul was assassinated by palace guards, with the knowledge and tacit approval of his son and heir, Alexander. Peter I the Great (Petr Alekseevich, 1672–1725; co-tsar 1682–1696; tsar 1696–1725; emperor titled “the Great” 1721–1725). Peter I fought wars with his neighbors almost constantly throughout his reign. The result was the considerable expansion of Russia and its self-identification as an empire. An exceptional individual and ruler, he devoted himself to transforming Russia into a powerful nation with a European civilization. His reforms were extensive: He redesigned the central governmental administration, created a Senate to advise on policy, reorganized the growing empire geographically, put the Church under state control, created a single “Table of Ranks” designed to ensure that rank reflected service and merit more than birth, organized the urban population into guilds and corporations, established factories and other industries, reformed the tax structure, and stimulated a Western intellectual life (especially among the elite). He also altered the law of succession to enable the monarch to choose the most able individual to succeed rather than leave this to the irrational chance of birth, though he died without formally naming a successor. Konstantin Petrovich Pobedonostsev (1827–1907). Tsarist government official and conservative political philosopher. The youngest son of a Russian Orthodox priest and literature professor, Pobedonostsev was educated at home and in a school of law in St. Petersburg from 1841 to 1846. He taught law at Moscow University, served in the Moscow Senate, wrote and published. In the 1860s, he became tutor to the tsar’s sons, including the heir, Alexander III. He was appointed to the Senate in 1868 and to the State Council in 1872. In 1880, he was named Chief Procurator (secular head) of the Holy Synod, a position he held until the fall of 1905. He also tutored the future Nicholas II. A strong believer in autocracy, he denounced the eighteenth-century Enlightenment view of the perfectibility of man and society and, therefore, supported paternalistic and authoritarian government. In 1881, he persuaded Alexander III to reject the reforms proposed by Loris-Melikov and influenced domestic policies throughout the 1880s. His hatred and fear of constitutional and democratic government, freedom of the press, religious freedom, trial by jury, and free secular education was best expressed in a collection of essays, Moskovskii sbornik (Moscow Collection), published in 1896. Aleksandr Sergeevich Pushkin (1799–1837). Poet, novelist, and dramatist, often viewed as a cultural symbol of Russia. Born in Moscow in 1799, Pushkin’s ancestry reached back into the old Muscovite nobility but also to a captive Abyssinian prince given to Peter the Great. In 1811, he entered the new Imperial Lyceum at Tsarskoe selo, where he was trained to enter the civil service. While there, Pushkin began to write poetry that was innovative and popular. In 1817, he took a post in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in St. Petersburg. He expressed dissident political views in some of his writings, for which he was exiled in 1820 from the capital. In 1826, Pushkin was allowed to return to Moscow. Although his work was censored and he was put under observation by the police, it was in this period that he began to write his most important works. In 1831, Pushkin married, settled again in St. Petersburg, and took up government service. His desire to continue writing came into conflict with his court position, and his petitions to be allowed to resign were all refused. He died in 1837 from wounds suffered in a duel. This transformed his weakening reputation into that of a cultural idol, as the supreme “manifestation of the Russian spirit.” Grigorii Efimovich Rasputin (real name, Grigorii Efimovich Novykh, 1864–1916). Siberian peasant and mystic. Born a peasant in Tobolsk Province in Siberia, Rasputin acquired a reputation as a starets (holy man) with the ability to heal the sick and predict the future. He also had a reputation for licentiousness, for which he was called Rasputin (from the Russian word for debauchery). Nicholas II and his wife Aleksandra, seeking spiritual counsel, as well help with the hemophilia of their son Aleksei, heir to the throne, invited Rasputin to court in 1905, where he gained considerable popularity and influence, especially among women. During the war, with Nicholas at the front, Rasputin’s political advice to Alexandra, who advised her husband, was often heeded. His political influence and his boasting and debauchery tarnished the reputation of the imperial family. He was killed in December 1916 in a 38 ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership conspiracy by Prince Feliks Iusupov (a relative of Nicholas II), Vladimir Purishkevich (a conservative politician), and Grand Duke Dmitrii Pavlovich (the tsar’s cousin) Andrei Dmitrievich Sakharov (1921–1989). Physicist and dissident. Sakharov won a doctorate in physics at the age of twenty-six and was admitted as a full member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences at age thirty-two. He helped develop the Soviet Union’s first hydrogen bomb and was accorded many honors and privileges. But he also became increasingly critical of Soviet policies, including nuclear testing in the atmosphere. In 1968, he published an essay in the West, which called for nuclear arms reductions, predicted and approved of the integration of communist and capitalist systems in a form of democratic socialism, and criticized the increasing repression of Soviet dissidents. He became an increasingly outspoken advocate of human rights, civil liberties, and reform in the Soviet Union, as well as for rapprochement with noncommunist nations. In 1975, he was awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace. He was increasingly the target of official censure and harassment. In 1980, after his denunciation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and his call for a world boycott of the Moscow Olympic Games, Sakharov was stripped of his honors and exiled to the closed city of Gor’kii. In December 1986, under Gorbachev, the government allowed Sakharov to return to Moscow. He was elected to the new Congress of People’s Deputies in April 1989, where he was an outspoken and widely admired voice for liberal progress. Aleksandr Isaevich Solzhenitsyn (1918– ). Writer and dissident. Born into a family of Cossack intellectuals, Solzhenitsyn studied mathematics at the University of Rostov and literature at Moscow State University by correspondence course. He fought in World War II, achieving the rank of captain, but in 1945, was arrested for writing a letter criticizing Stalin. He spent eight years in prisons and labor camps, followed by three years in exile. In 1956, he was allowed to settle in Riazan, where he taught mathematics and began to write. In 1962, during a cultural thaw, Solzhenitsyn’s first major success, the prison camp story One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, appeared in print. By the late 1960s, he was facing increasing criticism and harassment. Defiant, he emerged as an eloquent critic of repressive government policies. After the publication of a collection of his short stories in 1963, he was denied further official publication of his work. His later works were produced as samizdat (“self-published”) or published abroad. Novels published in these years, all of which criticized repressive and brutal aspects of the Soviet system, gained Solzhenitsyn an international reputation. He was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1970. In 1974, he was arrested, charged with treason, and exiled from the Soviet Union. From 1976 to 1994, he lived in an isolated estate outside the small town of Cavendish, Vermont. He returned to Russia in 1994. As a leading Soviet dissident, he rejected Western emphases on democracy, individual freedom, and urban modernity and, instead, favored a strong but benevolent state, drawing for its inspiration on Russia’s political traditions and Orthodox Christian values. He continues to criticize Western materialism and Russian secularization. Iosif (Joseph) Stalin (pseudonym of Iosif Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili, 1879–1953; general secretary of the CPSU 1922–1953; chairman of the council of ministers 1941–1953). Revolutionary and Soviet leader. Born in Georgia, the son of a poor shoemaker. At the age of fourteen, Stalin was sent to an Orthodox seminary to be educated for the priesthood. Active already in socialist politics, he was expelled in 1899. He joined the Russian Social-Democratic Workers’ Party. Stalin joined the Bolsheviks after the party split in 1903 and became a party leader in his native Transcaucasia. In 1912, he was made a member of the party’s Central Committee. After the October revolution, he was named Commissar of Nationalities. During the civil war, Stalin served as a political commissar in the Red Army. In 1922, he was named general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist party. He was also a member of the Politburo. During the debates and struggles for power in the 1920s, Stalin first allied with the pro- NEP faction to defeat Trotsky and the Left, then turned against Bukharin and the Right. In the late 1920s, he initiated a major and often brutal drive to end all remnants of capitalist economics and culture and to rapidly industrialize the Soviet Union. After a period of relative calm in the early 1930s, he initiated a bloody purge. After the invasion of the Soviet Union by the Nazis in 1939, Stalin increasingly took the stance of national leader, becoming head of the government in 1941. After the war, he initiated new repressive policies in economic and cultural life. Stalin died on March 5, 1953. His body was embalmed and placed alongside that of Lenin in the tomb in Red Square, where it lay until removed in 1956 on order from the new party leader Nikita Khrushchev. Petr Arkadeevich Stolypin (1862–1911; prime minister 1906–1911). Tsarist government official. After serving as governor of Grodno and the Saratov provinces, he was appointed minister of the interior and prime minister in 1906, at a critical time following the 1905 revolution. Ideologically conservative but pragmatic, Stolypin combined far-reaching agrarian reforms to improve the legal and economic status of the peasantry (and reduce discontent) with repressive political policies meant to ensure political stability. He dismissed the oppositional first and second Dumas and, defying the constitution, rewrote the electoral law to limit the role in the parliament of liberals and ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 39 socialists. He arrested, jailed, exiled, and executed large numbers of revolutionaries. But he also introduced a number of important reforms to improve social conditions, especially for the peasantry. In 1906, he gave peasants the possibility of leaving the commune and setting up as independent peasant farmers, with the hope of creating a prosperous, stable, and loyally conservative class. Over the next few years, his policies, especially his frequent defiance of the new constitutional system, alienated even the moderate Right, which predominated in the Duma. In 1911, Stolypin was assassinated by a revolutionary. Lev Nikolaevich Tolstoi (Leo Tolstoy) (1828–1910). Writer. Born into a distinguished noble family, Tolstoi was educated at home and for three years at Kazan University, after which he returned to his estates and led a largely dissipated life in Moscow and Petersburg. In 1851, he joined the army and, in 1854, served as an officer in the Crimean War. While in the military, he began writing fiction, which he decided to pursue as a career after 1856. From the 1850s through the 1870s, he wrote some of Russia’s (and the world’s) most famous novels, including War and Peace (1865–1869) and Anna Karenina (1875–1877). From quite early, Tolstoi was obsessed with moral and personal self-perfection and the search for truth. Around 1878, Tolstoi experienced a religious crisis that resulted in a “conversion” to a truer Christianity, after which he devoted his life to propagating (and practicing) his religious views, which rejected the sacraments and the divinity of Christ in favor of a religion of Christian ethics based on a social ideal of simplicity, love, and nonviolence. He was excommunicated in 1901. In 1910, he fled his estate to take up the life of a pilgrim and hermit but soon fell ill and died while on the road. Not withstanding his official condemnation by government and Church, Tolstoi was one of the most widely admired individuals in Russia, including long after his death. Lev Trotskii (Leon Trotsky) (pseudonym of Lev Davidovich Bronshtein, 1879–1940). Revolutionary, Soviet leader, and exiled dissident. Born in a Russified Jewish family, Trotskii attended school in Ukraine and briefly attended the University of Odessa. While a student, he was attracted to the socialist underground and to Marxism. In 1898, he was arrested for revolutionary activity and exiled to Siberia, from which he escaped abroad in 1902. At the second congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers’ Party in July 1903, Trotskii sided with the Mensheviks. During the 1905 revolution, he was a leader of the St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers’ Deputies, for which he was again sent into Siberian exile and from which he again escaped abroad. Returning to Russia in May 1917, Trotskii assumed leadership of an independent left-wing faction. After the abortive July uprising, Trotskii was arrested. He joined the Bolshevik party and was elected to its Central Committee. In September, he was elected chairman of the Petrograd Soviet. In October, Trotskii took a leading role in planning and leading the Bolshevik seizure of power. In the new Soviet government, he was named commissar of foreign affairs (1917–1918), headed the delegation discussing peace with Germany at the Brest-Litovsk negotiations in 1918, then became commissar of war (1918–1925), in which capacity he founded and led the Red Army. He was also a member of the Politburo in 1919–1926. During the 1920s, Trotskii applied his belief in the creative value of coercion and of the need for a vanguard to economic and social programs, favoring state-directed industrialization to overcome Russia’s backwardness. At the same time, he criticized authoritarianism, bureaucratization, and an emerging political culture of servility within the party as harmful to the building of socialism. Defeated in the debates and struggles for power in the mid-1920s, Trotsky was dismissed from his position as war commissar, from the Politburo, and in 1927, from the party. He was exiled first to Alma Ata in Central Asia (1928), then expelled from the country (1929). In 1940, a man believed to be a Soviet security police agent assassinated him in his home in Mexico City. Nikolai Ivanovich Turgenev (1789–1871). Tsarist state official and Decembrist. Born into a cultured gentry family, Turgenev was educated at home, at Moscow University (where his father was director), and from 1808– 1811, at the University of Göttingen. He found it painful to return home to Russia in 1812, distressed at his country’s political and cultural backwardness and at the brutality of serfdom. After service with the Prussian government, under the reformer Baron von Stein, he served in the Russian State Council and the Ministry of Finance. He actively worked on plans for economic and social reform. Frustrated by efforts to convince the government to undertake reform, or even to allow private initiatives, Turgenev grew disappointed with Alexander I. In 1816, he was involved in discussions that led to the establishment of the first secret political society, the Union of Salvation. He was active in the successor Union of Welfare, where he advocated his abolitionist program. In 1821, he was involved in the decision to form a more secret organization, the Northern Society, which organized the uprising in December 1825, though Turgenev had left Russia for Western Europe in 1824. He was sentenced to death in absentia, though pardoned in 1855 by the new emperor Alexander II. While in Europe, he continued to advocate reform in Russia, especially the abolition of serfdom, which he viewed as the greatest obstacle to Russia’s progress. 40 ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership Sergei Iulevich Vitte (Witte), Count (1849–1915). Tsarist government official. Born into a family of mixed Dutch and Russian ancestry in government service, Witte studied mathematics at the University of Odessa, then entered the railway administration, in which he rose to responsible positions. In 1889, Witte was invited to establish a railway department in the Ministry of Finance and, in 1892, was named minister of finance. He developed far- reaching plans, combining both state direction and the nurturing of a “spirit of enterprise” for the economic development of the empire. At the heart of his plans was railway building, particularly the Trans-Siberian line. His relationship with the emperor, Nicholas II, was strained. In August 1903, Witte was removed from the Ministry of Finance and appointed to the then largely powerless position of chairman of the Council of Ministers. In July 1905, he was appointed chief Russian plenipotentiary to conduct peace negotiations with Japan. He used his influence in 1905, amidst the national general strike, to persuade the tsar to issue the “October Manifesto,” which promised to grant a measure of representative government. He was forced to resign his post as chairman of the Council of Ministers in 1906 after the tsar lost confidence in him. In the summer and winter of 1914–1915, he opposed Russian entry into World War I. He died foreseeing disaster for the tsarist empire. Vera Ivanovna Zasulich (1849–1919). Revolutionary. The daughter of a nobleman, educated to be a governess, Zasulich became a revolutionary in 1868, spending many of the succeeding years in prison, in hiding, or in exile. She was best known for shooting and wounding General Fedor Trepov, the governor of St. Petersburg, in punishment for his public flogging of a young revolutionary. She was acquitted by the jury in a much-publicized trial in 1878. She joined the populist group “Black Repartition” in 1879 and, along with many populists, was attracted to Marxism. She corresponded with Karl Marx and, later, Friedrich Engels. In 1884, she was a founding member of the first Russian Marxist organization, the émigré Liberation of Labor Group. She sided with the Menshevik faction when the Russian Social-Democratic Workers’ Party split in 1903 and became a leader of those Marxists who favored legal political activities over underground tactics after 1908. She opposed the Bolshevik seizure of power in 1917. ©2002 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 41 A History of Russia: From Peter the Great to Gorbachev Part III Professor Mark D. Steinberg THE TEACHING COMPANY ® Mark D. Steinberg, Ph.D. Professor of History, Director of the Russian and East European Center, University of Illinois Mark Steinberg completed his undergraduate work at the University of California at Santa Cruz in 1978 and received his Ph.D. in European history at the University of California at Berkeley in 1987. He taught Russian and European history at the University of Oregon (1987), Harvard University (1987–1989), and Yale University (1989– 1996) before joining the faculty at the University of Illinois, at its main campus in Urbana-Champaign, in 1996. Since 1998, Professor Steinberg has also been the Director of the Russian and East European Center at Illinois, an interdisciplinary program designated by the Department of Education as a national resource center. Professor Steinberg has received many awards for his teaching, including the Sarai Ribicoff Prize for Teaching at Yale University (1993) and, at Illinois, the George and Gladys Queen Excellence in History Teaching Award (1998 and 2002) and the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences Award for Excellence in Undergraduate Teaching (2002). For his work as a scholar, he has received numerous prestigious fellowships, including from the International Research and Exchanges Board, the Social Science Research Council, the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies of the Smithsonian Institution, the Illinois Program for Research in the Humanities, and the National Endowment for the Humanities. In 2001, the University of Illinois gave him one of its highest honors and named him a University Scholar. Professor Steinberg has published many articles, delivered numerous papers at national and international conferences, given public lectures throughout the country, and served on several national professional committees and editorial boards. He specializes in the cultural, intellectual, and social history of Russia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. His first book, published in 1992, was a study of the relations among employers, managers, and workers in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, entitled Moral Communities. In 1994, Professor Steinberg co-edited Cultures in Flux, an influential collection of essays on Russian lower-class cultures. In 1995, he published, together with a Russian archivist, The Fall of the Romanovs, which examines the fate of the tsar and his family during the revolution and includes translations of documents from then recently opened Russian archives. In 2001, Professor Steinberg published Voices of Revolution, 1917, a study and collection of translated documents exploring the revolution through contemporary letters and other writings by ordinary Russians. His most recent book, Proletarian Imagination, published in 2002, explores poetry and other writings by lower-class Russians in the years before and after 1917, focusing on ideas about self, modern times, and the sacred. He is currently working on a collection of essays on religion in Russia, a revised textbook on Russian history, and a study of St. Petersburg in the late 1800s and early 1900s. Professor Steinberg is a native of San Francisco and is married to Jane Hedges, an editor and translator. Further information can be found at his Web site: ©2003 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership i Table of Contents A History of Russia: From Peter the Great to Gorbachev Part III Professor Biography............................................................................................i Course Scope.......................................................................................................1 Lecture Twenty-Five Lecture Twenty-Six Lecture Twenty-Seven Lecture Twenty-Eight Lecture Twenty-Nine Lecture Thirty Lecture Thirty-One Lecture Thirty-Two Lecture Thirty-Three Lecture Thirty-Four Lecture Thirty-Five Lecture Thirty-Six War and Revolution...................................................2 Democratic Russia—1917 .........................................5 Bolsheviks in Power ..................................................8 Civil War .................................................................10 Paths to Socialism—the 1920s ................................13 Joseph Stalin ............................................................16 Stalin’s Revolution ..................................................18 Joy and Terror—Society and Culture in the 1930s..............................................................21 The “Great Patriotic War” .......................................24 The Soviet Union after Stalin ..................................27 Private and Public Dissidence .................................30 Mikhail Gorbachev—Perestroika and Glasnost’...........................................................33 Bibliography......................................................................................................36 Please refer to Part I for the timeline and glossary and Part II for the biographical notes. ii ©2003 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership Scope: A History of Russia: From Peter the Great to Gorbachev After a discussion of background issues (geography, multi-ethnicity, the problem of backwardness, Europeanization), the course begins with politics and culture on the eve of Peter the Great’s efforts to transform his country, then looks at Peter and his reforms. Next, women’s rule in eighteenth-century Russia is examined, with a particular focus on the reigns of Elizabeth (Peter the Great’s daughter) and Catherine the Great. Turning toward society, two additional lectures on the eighteenth century follow: on the Pugachev uprising and the growing critique of autocratic despotism by educated Russians, especially the publisher and writer Nikolai Novikov. Lecture Seven begins the nineteenth century by returning to a focus on the state and the monarch: Paul I and especially Alexander I, who seriously discussed possible reform. We also look at the Decembrist rebellion, in which educated nobles took arms against the state to bring about social and political reform. Next, we consider Nicholas I and the ideas about power and order that inspired the Russian state at that time. Returning the gaze to society, the course then offers lectures on different intellectuals’ visions of change: the “national poet” Alexander Pushkin (whom we consider also for what his image as a symbol of the Russian nation tells us) and the full-fledged emergence of the “intelligentsia” in the 1830s and 1840s. Particular attention is paid to their ideas about Russia, the West, and the meanings of freedom. Lecture Thirteen begins the history of the Great Reforms under Alexander II, which sought to create a modern society in Russia though dramatic reform. We then examine dissident trends and the individuals associated with them: nihilism (including terrorism), populism, Marxism (including the emergence of Bolshevism). For a different voice, we look at the famous writer Lev Tolstoy, especially his life and his arguments about morality and conscience. Returning our gaze to official Russia, we highlight the lives, personalities, and outlooks of the last two tsars, Alexander III and his son Nicholas II. We then consider a decisive event in the reign of Nicholas: the strikes, demonstrations, and public demands that the tsarist government accept civil rights and democratic rule in Russia in 1905. To see Russia’s changes in larger perspective, we look at peasant life and culture in the late 1800s and early 1900s, life in the changing cities (especially for workers and the middle class) from the industrialization drive of the 1890s to the eve of World War I, and at aspects of what might be called fin-de-siècle culture: decadence in everyday life and in the arts, cultural iconoclasm, and the religious renaissance. Lecture Twenty-Five examines the Russian experience in World War I and the coming of revolution. It is followed with an examination of the Russian experience in the key months from the fall of the tsarist government in February to the coming to power of the Bolsheviks in October, then by a lecture on the Bolsheviks during their first year in power. The story of the Civil War comes next, followed by a discussion of the debates in the 1920s in the Soviet Union over how to overcome Russia’s backwardness and build socialism. Next, we look at Joseph Stalin’s biography and political personality, the era of radical industrialization and social transformation that he launched at the end of the 1920s, and the contradictory political, social, and cultural life of the 1930s (including the Great Terror). We turn then to the Soviet experience in World War II and to politics and the experiences of Soviet people during the decades after the war and before Gorbachev’s reforms. Continuing the theme of exploring dissent, we look at some of the various forms of alienation from, and resistance to, the Soviet system during the years before Gorbachev came to power (both everyday forms and open dissidence). Finally, we look at Mikhail Gorbachev’s recognition of the many problems of the system and his efforts to make Communism work though a policy of reform. The final lecture concludes with a consideration of the situation left in the wake of the collapse of Communism. 1 ©2003 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership Lecture Twenty-Five War and Revolution Scope: This lecture examines the Russian experience in World War I and the coming of revolution. It begins with the growing disenchantment with the war as a result of horrible conditions on the front, enormous human losses, and terrible economic conditions at home. Particular attention is paid to the situation of ordinary Russians, including their growing anger and protests. The lecture looks at unsuccessful efforts by liberals to convince the government to establish a cabinet that could command “the confidence of the public,” but also their unwillingness to do more than appeal to the government to take action. The lecture concludes with the events of late February 1917, when strikes and demonstrations in the streets of the capital— centered on the symbolic demand for bread—led to the collapse of the monarchy and the coming to power of a liberal democratic government. Outline I. Russia had never experienced a war like World War I, a protracted modern war that required mobilizing the entire society and economy, as well as the military. A. Initially, the war was a positive event. 1. Going to war took people’s minds off their problems. 2. Many people united in support of the government and against the external enemy. B. But this patriotic enthusiasm soon faded, and many people began to see the war as nothing less than a catastrophe. C. Conditions at the front led to growing discontent. 1. The supply situation was critical: The army quickly ran short of rifles and ammunition, uniforms and food. 2. The human losses were devastating. 3. Many soldiers justifiably felt that they were treated not as men but simply as raw material to be squandered by the powerful. 4. By the spring of 1915, the army was in steady (and often chaotic) retreat. 5. Although the military and supply situation improved in 1916, morale among the soldiers continued to decline. D. The under the strain of wartime demand. 1. Fuel and raw materials were increasingly scarce. 2. Productivity was declining. 3. The cities were suffering from food shortages. 4. Shortages were creating inflation. 5. These economic conditions produced increasing suffering, especially among the urban poor and middle classes. 6. Ironically and dangerously, suffering was particularly profound in the capital, Petrograd. situation at home was also difficult: By the end of 1915, the economy seemed to be breaking down E. The 1. Instead of involving citizens as active participants, Nicholas retreated even further into his political decisions made by the tsar and his government exacerbated the situation. personalized ideal of governance. 2. Reflecting this, in 1915, he took personal command of the army. 3. This associated him with Russia’s lack of success at the front and gave his wife, Alexandra, and Rasputin greater day-to-day power in his absence. II. The continuing carnage at the front, the heightened economic suffering in the rear, and the political rigidity of the tsar’s government all led to intense civic protest. A. Among the urban lower classes, this discontent was expressed in a growing strike movement. 1. The main issues in the strikes were economic—wages and food. 2. But workers also made political demands, including calling for an end to the war. ©2003 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 2 B. There were other signs of deepening discontent and anger among the urban poor. 1. Speakers at factory meetings complained about economic conditions and the lack of a democratic government. 2. On bread lines, working-class women grew angry standing for hours in the cold. 3. Subversive leaflets and proclamations issued by all sorts of radical parties, unions, and committees found an increasingly eager readership. C. Socialists worked to push this discontent in a political direction. D. Educated upper-class and middle-class liberals also began to mobilize in protest. 1. Liberals appealed to the autocracy to establish a unifying “government of national confidence.” 2. During the summer of 1915, a “Progressive Bloc” of Duma deputies formed to promote this idea. 3. However, given his firm belief that Russia’s salvation lay in the tsar’s divine personal and unlimited power, Nicholas II rejected such suggestions and, instead, ordered the Duma prorogued in the fall of 1915. E. Even many conservative monarchists, fearing revolution, appealed for political changes, though the murder of Rasputin was the only concrete effort made. F. Liberals in the press and in the Duma (reconvened toward the end of 1916) criticized the government with increasing passion and even hostility. 1. But they were afraid to do more than simply appeal to the tsar to make changes. 2. They were strongly committed to principles of legality and feared provoking popular revolution in the streets. 3. Some liberal Duma deputies chafed at the feeling of being trapped and powerless. 4. Only when lower-class unrest broke out in the streets were liberals forced to take action. III. This upheaval began on International Women’s Day, February 23, 1917 (March 8 on the Western calendar). A. In addition to the already large number of men and women on strike, thousands of women textile workers in Petrograd shut down their factories. 1. The lack of bread had become the symbolic focus of protest and was the main focus of this strike. 2. Crowds marched through the streets shouting, “Give us bread,” and headed toward the city center. B. By February 25 (March 10), Petrograd was virtually shut down. 1. The demands had also expanded. In addition to “Bread,” the banners read, “Down with the War” and “Down with the Autocracy.” 2. Soon, students, white-collar workers, teachers, and others joined workers in the streets. C. Nicholas forced a showdown. 1. Convinced that the people still fundamentally loved him, he commanded the head of the Petrograd garrison to stop the disorders in the capital. 2. The garrison chief obeyed Nicholas’s command and sent soldiers into the streets with orders to shoot at demonstrators. 3. On the first day, the soldiers followed orders and shot at the crowds of demonstrators. 4. However, on February 27 (March 12), with workers armed and ready for combat with troops, the soldiers mutinied and joined the crowds in the streets. D. Effective civil authority collapsed, and the streets became a theater of revolutionary defiance. E. The government quickly collapsed. 1. The Cabinet resigned and fled on February 27. 2. On March 2, Nicholas abdicated, hoping that this would end the disorder and bring unity to Russia. 3. Formally, Nicholas abdicated in favor of his brother, who declined to accept the position. 4. In essence, power, rather than being transferred, was droppedthe question of who would or could pick it up was central to the story of 1917. Essential Reading: W. Bruce Lincoln, Passage through Armageddon: The Russians in War and Revolution, 1914–1918 (New York, 1986). 3 ©2003 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership Supplementary Reading: Orlando Figes, A People’s Tragedy: The Russian Revolution, 1891–1924 (Harmondsworth, 1996), chapters 7–8. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, The February Revolution: Petrograd, 1917 (Seattle, 1981). Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution (New York, 1990), chapters 6–8. Allan Wildman, The End of the Russian Imperial Army (Princeton, 1980), volume 1. Questions to Consider: 1. Could the revolution that toppled Romanov rule in February 1917 have been avoided? Might the government or liberals have acted any differently? 2. Did workers and liberals share common discontents and common goals in seeking a change of government? ©2003 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 4 Lecture Twenty-Six Democratic Russia—1917 Scope: This lecture looks at the Russian experience in the key months from the fall of the tsarist government in February to the coming to power of the Bolsheviks in October. It first examines the formation of the new Provisional Government, the competing power of the Soviets of Workers and Soldiers’ Deputies, and the hesitations of both. To answer the question of why this liberal democratic government fell, the lecture considers both its accomplishments and its failures. Given that popular discontent and its reflection in growing Bolshevik popularity was a major threat to the government, the lecture looks next at the most common popular attitudes during the revolution. In particular, we explore four central ideas of the time: the love of freedom but also its social definition, the need for a strong and progressive state, distrust of and hostility toward the rich and powerful, and the centrality of moral feeling and ethical judgment. I. The Outline government of Nicholas II was replaced by a rather unusual system of hesitant and divided authority. II. The Moscow Soviets. 3. On October 25, amidst a Bolshevik armed seizure of state power, the assembled national Congress of Soviets declared itself the new state authority. key question is why did the Provisional Government fall after less than eight months in power? 5 ©2003 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership A. Middle-class and upper-class liberals formed a Provisional Government. B. Although they controlled the machinery of government, their real authority was limited. 1. Some of these limitations were created by their own political reluctance and their sense of doubt about their legal legitimacy. 2. An external limitation on their authority came from the competing power of the Soviets (“Councils”) of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputiesespecially the Petrograd Soviet and the Central Executive Committee of Soviets. C. “Dual power” was the term used to describe this coexistence of two competing structures of authority in the capital. 1. The Provisional Government controlled the state. 2. But the Soviets had real civic authority because they were considered the national representatives of the “people” (workers, peasants, soldiers) and could control their actions in the streets and factories and at the front. D. Leaders of the Soviets also resisted exercising their full authority because they did not believe that they should seek state power. 1. According to their ideological belief in the stages of history, this was a democratic, not a socialist, revolution. 2. They also believed that the time was not right for a socialist revolution in Russia. E. In the course of 1917, the situation deteriorated. 1. Opposition to the Provisional Government grew among workers, soldiers, and peasants. 2. By the fall of 1917, the Bolsheviks had succeeded in winning most of the seats in the Petrograd and A. This was a government deeply committed to democracy, and its accomplishments were impressive. 1. Complete civil liberties were granted. 2. Thousands of political prisoners and exiles were released, and the old police was abolished. 3. Flogging, exile to Siberia, and the death penalty were all abolished. 4. Legal restrictions of individual rights based on nationality or religion were removed. 5. Social reforms were enacted. 6. Preparations for creating a new democratic, constitutional political system were undertaken. B. But what they were unable to do was perhaps equally important. 1. They refused to withdraw unilaterally from the war. 2. They refused to sanction seizures of land by peasants. 3. They were unable to improve the economic situation. C. The Bolsheviks took advantage of these failures. 1. Lenin, who had returned to Russia in April 1917, believed that the party’s goal must be to force the Soviets to take power. 2. Lenin believed that the time had come for a government representing workers and peasants. III. Popular attitudes toward the revolution were a critical element in Bolshevik success. A. The torrent of words that followed the fall of the autocracy is a valuable source for understanding popular attitudes. B. For diverse social and political groups, the key meaning of this revolution was freedom. 1. For ordinary Russians, this was a mythic, even mystical, time of freedom. 2. In part, freedom involved the negation of repression and lack of rights. 3. But freedom was also viewed positively as an absolute value in itself. 4. Concrete and tangible benefits were also expected to accrue from freedom. C. Power was another major theme in popular understanding of the revolution. 1. The dominant idea was the need for a strong and unified political authority. 2. Power was valued not for its own sake but for how it would be used and whom it would serve. 3. In part, the desire for strong authority reflected the practical desire to restore order to the country, to suppress crime, and to revive the collapsing economy. 4. But this was to be “democratic” power, power that would serve the interests of the poor against the rich. D. Class was also a major theme in all these writings and discussions. 1. Most lower-class Russians distrusted the rich and powerful and blamed them for the revolution’s failure to bring “bread, peace, land” and freedom. 2. For some people, the Bolsheviks or the Jews (or other outsiders) were the enemies and traitors. 3. But the primary enemy was always the “bourgeoisie.” E. Morality also pervaded popular attitudes during the revolution. 1. Moral feeling is visible in the emotional pathos and fervor in the language of the revolution. 2. Lower-class Russians persistently voiced their resentment at being humiliated and insulted by the elite. 3. We also see a widespread critique of the immorality of those in power. 4. The pervasive use of religious language also expressed this moral conception of the meaning of the revolution. F. When the Bolsheviks came to power, they could draw support from popular attitudesespecially class hatred and a desire for a strong state serving their interestsbut they also had to contend with popular conceptions of liberty and morality and a suspicion of all elites. G. The writer Maksim Gor’kii insightfully described 1917 as “days of monstrous contradiction.” Essential Reading: Mark Steinberg, Voices of Revolution, 1917 (New Haven, 2001). Supplementary Reading: Orlando Figes, A People’s Tragedy: The Russian Revolution, 1891–1924 (Harmondsworth, 1996), chapters 8–11. Donald H. Kaiser, ed., The Workers Revolution in Russia, 1917 (Cambridge, England, 1987). Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution (New York, 1990), chapters 8–11. Alexander Rabinowitch, The Bolsheviks Come to Power (New York, 1976). ©2003 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 6 Questions to Consider: 1. If the revolution was largely about freedom and democracy, how were these notions understood by lower-class Russians in 1917? 2. What might the Provisional Government or national Soviet have done, especially before Bolsheviks won majorities in Moscow and Petrograd Soviets, to prevent the Bolsheviks from gaining such popularity and successfully taking power in 1917? 7 ©2003 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership Lecture Twenty-Seven Bolsheviks in Power Scope: This lecture considers the actions and motivating ideas of the new Communist rulers of Russia, focusing on the first months of Soviet power. It begins by looking at the widespread doubt that Bolshevik rule could survive the many obstacles to success. To understand Bolshevik thinking about power, the lecture looks first at ideals of democratic emancipation and participation, especially as voiced by Lenin, and at specific emancipatory policies, including legislation on peace, land, workers’ control, and nationalities. The lecture next considers the other side of Bolshevik thinking and policies: authoritarianism, repression, and violence. We look at Lenin’s ideology and at particular policies: one-party rule, press censorship, the creation of the Cheka, economic and managerial centralization, and the disbanding of the Constituent Assembly. The lecture concludes with a look at the serious threats that faced Bolshevik power by mid-1918. Outline I. Few expected the Bolsheviks to remain in power very long, considering the challenges they confronted. A. On October 26, having taken power in Petrograd by force of arms, the Bolsheviks proposed to the Soviet Congress a new cabinet composed entirely of Bolsheviks: the Council of People’s Commissars. 1. After most other parties had walked out of the Congress to protest the Bolsheviks’ seizure of power, the Congress approved the new government. 2. Vladimir Lenin, leader of the Bolshevik party, was elected head of the new government. 3. For this government to survive, however, it would have to do what it had promised: get Russia out of the war, restore the economy, and establish effective political rule. B. Predictions of failure were widespread. 1. Most socialists argued that only a broad alliance of all revolutionary groups could hope to defend Soviet power against certain opposition from “the propertied classes.” 2. Many predicted Bolshevik power would be only a brief stage in Russia’s continued suffering. C. The Bolsheviks themselves had two somewhat contradictory answers to these doubts. 1. The first was to view their actions as inspiring a worldwide socialist revolution that would bring help from the West. 2. The second was optimistic faith in the creative and heroic power of individuals to change history. II. Nonetheless, Bolshevik leaders were rather unsure about how to rule the country. A. Part of the problem was that the Bolsheviks were ambivalent about power itself. 1. The libertarian tradition in Bolshevism favored the ideals of popular creativity and power. 2. The authoritarian tradition in Bolshevism believed in the necessity of strong leadership and control, discipline and dictatorship, even coercive violence. 3. In some cases, different individuals held different views, but often these represented the two poles of a single individual’s thought (including Lenin’s). B. On the one hand, Lenin envisioned governance as a “commune state” (on the model of the Paris Commune of 1871). 1. The revolution, he argued, had released the “energy, initiative, and decisiveness” of the people, who could now perform “miracles.” 2. In the first weeks and months after October, Lenin regularly appealed to the people to realize these ideals. C. Many of the government’s first acts expressed these libertarian ideals. 1. The Decree on Peace (October 26) proclaimed a new approach to international affairs, free of secret diplomacy and grounded in the ideal of peace without indemnities or annexations. 2. The Decree on Land (October 26) abolished, without compensation, all landholding by the gentry and transferred all land to peasant land committees and soviets. 3. The workers’ control decree of early November 1917 gave workers the right to supervise their own managers. 4. National minorities were told that they had the right to complete self-determination. ©2003 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 8 5. All existing courts were replaced by courts in which judges were elected. 6. The administrative system was democratized by recruiting thousands of workers and soldiers into the bureaucracy and allowing extensive local control. D. Some see this talk of democracy (and these early efforts) as insincere and even cynical. 1. At best, these were attempts to undermine the old order before asserting a new dictatorship. 2. At worst, these words and actions reflected Lenin’s effort to hide his true authoritarian goals behind a democratic and libertarian fig leaf. 3. However, others argue that ideas of popular democracy and elite authoritarianism competed in the minds of Bolsheviks and that circumstances pushed authoritarianism to the fore. E. Even before coming to power, Lenin did not hesitate to argue for the necessities of coercion and discipline. F. After he came to power, this discourse grew increasingly common. G. The early policies of the new government reflected these authoritarian convictions. 1. One of the first laws issued by the new government was a press law (October 27), which followed a decree closing most “bourgeois” papers and even some socialist papers. 2. On December 5, the Cheka (All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for the Struggle against Counterrevolution and Sabotage) was established to control disorder, fight economic crime, and suppress opposition to Soviet power. 3. Many opponents of the regime were imprisoned, and some Bolshevik leaders, notably Lev Trotsky, warned that a greater terror against enemies was coming. 4. At the same time, vigorous moves were underway to centralize control of the still-declining economy and to increase labor discipline. 5. Unwilling to give up power, the Bolsheviks disbanded the long-awaited Constituent Assembly on January 5, 1918. III. In these first few months, Bolshevik authority was still tenuous. A. The economy was declining precipitously. B. Disorder was pervasive. C. Alternative parties on the left remained active and were increasingly critical of Bolshevik failures and betrayals. D. In the spring of 1918, anti-Bolshevik armies began moving against the Soviet regime and the long- anticipated civil war began. Essential Reading: Mark Steinberg, Voices of Revolution, 1917 (New Haven, 2001), part 3. Supplementary Reading: Orlando Figes, A People’s Tragedy: The Russian Revolution, 1891–1924 (Harmondsworth, 1996), chapter 11. Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution (New York, 1990), chapter 12. Robert Service, Lenin: A Political Life (Bloomington, 1991), volume 2, chapters 7–10. Questions to Consider: 1. How can one reconcile the evidence for emancipatory, democratic, and even libertarian ideals in Bolshevism alongside Bolshevik authoritarianism in both word and deed? 2. Were the Bolsheviks, as their critics said, “destroyers of freedom”? Can one justify their efforts as necessary to create a viable order that could ensure the realization of the main demands of 1917: bread, peace, and land? 9 ©2003 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership Lecture Twenty-Eight Civil War Scope: The Civil War of 1918–1920 is the subject of this lecture. We look at the extent of political and military opposition to the new Communist government and trace the rising and declining fortunes of this opposition. To understand why the Bolsheviks won, the lecture examines the political divisions among the Whites, their military and material disadvantages, and their political handicaps, especially in the eyes of the country’s peasant majority. The lecture considers the Red and White “terrors” and efforts to mobilize the population. Next, it looks at the impact of the Civil War on Bolshevik rule, especially increased centralization and a militarization of politics. But we also consider the persistence and intensification of Bolshevik emancipatory and utopian idealism. This discussion focuses, in particular, on efforts to transform everyday life and on visionary artistic projects of the Civil War years. I. The Outline Bolsheviks faced an impressive array of opponents in the Russian Civil War of 1918–1920. II. The crucial question is how did they manage to win? A. The most well known of the Bolsheviks’ opponents were the “White Armies,” organized and led by former tsarist military officers and Cossacks. 1. The Volunteer Army was based in the south and led, at its height, by General Anton Denikin. 2. In Siberia, Admiral Aleksandr Kolchak formed an army in November 1918. 3. In the northwest, General Nikolai Iudenich established an army based in Estonia. 4. By the autumn 1919, a White victory seemed a real possibility. B. The 1. Right Socialist Revolutionaries, some Mensheviks, and liberal Kadets established anti-Communist Bolsheviks also faced the organized opposition of parties on the Left. governments in various cities in the late spring. 2. Even the Left Socialist Revolutionaries had attempted an uprising against the Bolsheviks in the spring of 1918. C. In the south and southeast, local Cossacks established anti-Communist (though not always pro-White) governments. 1. In the borderlands, independence movements removed large parts of the former empire. 2. A large part of the western territory was occupied by German troops as part of the March 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk that took Soviet Russia out of the war. 3. More than a dozen nations sent troops and money to oppose the Bolsheviks. D. Despite these many opponents and challenges, the Bolsheviks won the Civil War. A. One of the reasons that the Communists survived was that their opponents failed to form a coordinated and united opposition. 1. The opposition was politically divided, ranging from moderate socialists to extreme monarchists. 2. They were also militarily divided, lacking a central command structure comparable to the Red Army commanded by Lev Trotsky. B. The 1. The Whites were scattered around the peripheries. 2. The Soviet government controlled the Russian heartlands, which gave them control of the railroad. C. The wage war. Communists also had logistical advantages. Soviet government was also more effective than the Whites in mobilizing the resources needed to 1. Soon after the Civil War began, the government nationalized all industry. 2. Strict labor discipline and even forced labor were instituted. 3. Through a policy of forced requisitioning of grain, the government ensured adequate food supplies for the army and the industrial labor force. D. In the areas they ruled or won control over, the Communists also restored political order. 1. They established a functioning state apparatus. ©2003 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 10 2. They used ruthless tactics to control dissent and stifle opposition, including launching a “Red Terror.” E. This brutality might have worked against the Communists, but the Whites were scarcely less ruthless. 1. The Whites also requisitioned grain by force (though less systematically). 2. The Whites also used terror and even torture against their enemies. F. Ultimately, it is most often argued that the Communists won because they had more support among the majority of the population. 1. In part, the Bolsheviks did a better job of getting their message across, of communicating what Bolshevik power represented. 2. But more important than the medium of Bolshevik propaganda was the message: A White victory would mean the return of the capitalists and the landlords. 3. The Whites themselves helped to reinforce this Bolshevik message. The leaders of the White armies were former tsarist officers and large landowners, and the Whites sometimes returned expropriated land to its former owners. III. Although the Bolsheviks survived this cataclysm and retained their hold on power, Bolshevism was profoundly changed by the experience of the Civil War. A. B. IV. The A. B. C. The Civil War encouraged greater centralization and authoritarianism. 1. Rather than the ideal of an “armed working class” fighting a guerilla war, the Red Army was a traditional standing army of peasant draftees in which democratic models of command were set aside. 2. To effectively mobilize the population and the economy for the war, the state became increasingly centralized. The experiences of the Civil War led to what has been called a “militarization” of Bolshevik political culture. 1. Bolsheviks grew accustomed to an essentially military style of rule. 2. Ruling by administrative fiat, using force and violence, and applying summary justice became normal methods of governance. idealistic, emancipatory, and utopian side of Bolshevism was also intensified by the Civil War. Radical attempts were made to transform personal life, especially relations between men and women. 1. Laws were enacted that mandated complete equal rights for women. 2. A special branch of the party (Zhenotdel) was formed to encourage women to act more independently. 3. Some Communists even took the first steps toward the Communist ideal of abolishing the family. Campaigns were also launched to transform everyday cultural life, especially among the lower classes. 1. Campaigns against religious beliefs sought especially to “demystify” religion. 2. A massive literacy campaign was inaugurated. 3. Campaigns against swearing, drinking, and fighting were undertaken. 4. Campaigns to persuade peasants to adopt more civilized habits were launched. Radical artistic visions of a new and better world also appeared during the period of the Civil War. 1. Exemplary are two visionary, and never built, public monuments. 2. The first was a large architectural and sculptural ensemble proposed in September 1918 by Ivan Shadra “Monument to the World’s Suffering”which would lead visitors on a symbolic journey from suffering to redemption. 3. In 1919, Vladimir Tatlin was authorized to construct a “Monument to the Third International,” which was meant to symbolize and serve the modernist idealism of Communism. Essential Reading: Orlando Figes, A People’s Tragedy: The Russian Revolution, 1891–1924 (Harmondsworth, 1996), chapters 12–16. 11 ©2003 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership Supplementary Reading: Diane Koenker, William Rosenberg, and Ronald Suny, eds., Party, State, and Society in the Russian Civil War (Bloomington, 1989). Evan Mawdsley, The Russian Civil War (Boston, 1987). Lewis Siegelbaum, Soviet State and Society between Revolutions, 1918–1929 (Cambridge, England, 1992). Questions to Consider: 1. What might the opponents of Bolshevism have done differently to win the Civil War? Why did they not do these things? 2. What are the ideological ideals implied by such projects as Shadr’s “Monument to the World’s Suffering” and Tatlin’s “Monument to the Third International”? ©2003 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 12 Lecture Twenty-Nine Paths to Socialism—the 1920s Scope: This lecture focuses on the debates in the 1920s in the Soviet Union about how to overcome Russia’s backwardness and build socialism. It first considers the economic and political crisis and the end of the Civil War and the creation of the New Economic Policy (NEP). The positive effects of NEP on the economy are considered, as well as the continuation of troubling social conditions. The lecture then turns to the debates in the Communist leadership, focusing on the arguments of the leaders of the Left and Right, Lev Trotsky and Nikolai Bukharin. Trotsky’s arguments about the essential need to overcome Russian backwardness through the aggressive efforts of the party and the state are examined, as are his political criticisms of the bureacraticization of the party. The lecture then considers Bukharin’s critique of these proposals, focusing on both his economic logic and his ethical concerns. The lecture concludes by looking again at NEP society, especially continuing expressions of revolutionary idealism. Outline I. The A. The economy had virtually collapsed: Famine was widespread and growing, and trade and industry were end of the Civil War was a time of crisis and decision for the Bolsheviks. nearly at a standstill. B. Peasants and workers began to express their frustrations and anger over economic conditions, as well as Bolshevik authoritarianism. 1. Much of the country saw the outbreak of massive peasant rebellions. 2. Among urban workers, 1920–1921 was a time of protest meetings, demonstrations, and strikes. C. A rebellion also took place at the Kronstadt naval base, once a center of Bolshevik radicalism. D. Various dissident factions formed within the Communist Party. II. These conditions forced the party to change course or, as it seemed to some, to retreat. A. At the Tenth Party Congress in March 1921, Lenin proposed a compromise strategy combining repression and reform. 1. Repression was still needed to protect Communist power. 2. But reform, known as the New Economic Policy (NEP), was also needed to appease popular discontent. B. These changes had a dramatic impact on the economy, and by 1926, the economy had largely reached its prewar level. C. Problems persisted, however. 1. The amount of capital available was inadequate to expand the economy beyond prewar levels; thus, it was not possible to overcome backwardness and poverty. 2. Workers were still a subordinate class. 3. Living conditions in the cities were terrible. 4. Crime was rampant. 5. Much of the old bourgeois culture had returned: expensive restaurants, cafes, casinos, and nightclubs. D. One of the most serious problems was the feeling that NEP represented a betrayal of the revolution and should soon be ended. E. These conditions and concerns generated significant debates in the 1920s. III. A key figure in these debates was Lev Trotsky (1879–1940). A. Trotsky had joined the party only in mid-1917, but as a convert to Bolshevism, he was (in the terminology of the time) the hardest of the hard. B. During the Civil War, as commander of the Red Army, he was a leading advocate of the use of force, coercion, even terror. 1. Trotsky offered a utilitarian argument in defense of terror: In times of revolution and civil war, whatever means are expedient are just. 13 ©2003 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 2. Trotsky also argued that the ends not only justify the means but ennoble them and make them moral. C. Two other key beliefs also influenced the arguments he would advance in the 1920s. 1. Russia’s abysmal economic and cultural backwardness was a major obstacle to building socialism. 2. Like Lenin, Trotsky believed in the necessity, under conditions of backwardness, of the vanguard (the state and the party). D. Trotsky, along with other Bolsheviks, known as the Left, articulated an extensive critique of the NEP. 1. Industrialization must be given high priority if Russia was to overcome its backwardness. 2. Long-term and extensive economic planning was necessary, as was capital for investment (which had to be accumulated by the state). 3. To accomplish these goals, the state needed to direct and control an activist and intrusive economic policy that would squeeze the private sector. E. Trotsky also criticized the party’s authoritarianism and bureaucratization. 1. He criticized the appointment of provincial party secretaries, who became virtual local dictators. 2. He called for wider mass initiative and participation in party affairs. 3. He called for freedom of expression and independent thought. IV. Within the party leadership, Trotsky’s chief intellectual opponent was Nikolai Bukharin (1888–1938). A. B. C. D. E. F. V. It is A. B. C. As a person, Bukharin was quite different from Trotsky: more personable and better liked, less oriented to the military style. Bukharin opposed Trotsky and those allied with him on the Left because he disagreed with their economic program. 1. Bukharin agreed that Russia’s backwardness was the most serious obstacle to building socialism in Russia. 2. But he feared that planning and forced accumulation and development would only impede growth. 3. Bukharin favored a more gradual industrialization plan based on consumption and the market, rather than on forced accumulation and production. Like Lenin, Bukharin saw the essential political need to ensure that the peasants tolerated Bolshevism. 1. Peasants needed to be taught about socialism, persuaded and converted. 2. He feared that the Left’s program would alienate the peasants and lead to civil conflict and rebellion. The road to socialism was, for Bukharin, necessarily gradual and evolutionary, peaceful and bloodless, not the road of class struggle and coercion. Thus, Bukharin’s attacks on the Left also contained an ethical element. 1. Capitalism, though historically progressive, was cruel and brutal. 2. Socialism would be different. The party intensely debated these questions throughout the 1920s. 1. Trotsky and the Left were defeated and removed from the party leadership. 2. Then Stalin turned against Bukharin and his supporters on the party Right. important to look briefly at life outside the party at this time. Soviet society in the 1920s was partly a continuation of old Russian life, including business and pleasure, crime and corruption, poverty and progress. But revolutionary idealism persisted, and many experiments in transforming everyday life were undertaken. 1. Young people organized communes. 2. Individual women insisted on their rights to complete personal freedom. 3. Symbolic of the new spirit of collectivism and lack of authoritarianism were such experiments as the Orchestra without a Conductor. 4. The “Down with Shame Movement” believed that the only really egalitarian and truly free apparel was no apparel at all and that “shame” at nakedness reflected philistine cultural values. For many Russians, the diversity of the Soviet experience in the 1920s made them look back on NEP as a golden age. ©2003 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 14 Essential Reading: Stephen F. Cohen, Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution (Oxford, 1980). Isaac Deutscher, The Prophet Unarmed: Trotsky, 1921–1929 (any edition). Supplementary Reading: Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Cultural Front: Power and Culture in Revolutionary Russia (Ithaca, 1992). Sheila Fitzpatrick, Alexander Rabinowitch, and Richard Stites, eds., Russia in the Era of NEP (Bloomington, 1991). Richard Stites, Revolutionary Dreams: Utopian Vision and Experimental Life in the Russian Revolution (Oxford, 1985). Ronald G. Suny, The Structure of Russian History: Essays and Documents (Oxford, 2003), part II. Questions to Consider: 1. Which plan, Trotsky’s or Bukharin’s, would seem most likely to have been able, if given the chance, to overcome Russian economic backwardness and create a viable and more just society? 2. Many ordinary Russians who believed in the promises of the revolution felt that NEP policies and social conditions were leading the country in the wrong direction. What troubled them about NEP and the society it enabled? 15 ©2003 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership Lecture Thirty Joseph Stalin Scope: This lecture looks at Stalin’s biography and political personality. It begins with what we know of Stalin’s personality and values as a young man, especially his rebellious spirit, his ideal of heroism, and his sacralization of principles. The lecture also examines his attraction to the Bolsheviks and his approach to Bolshevik ideology, notably his ideas about will and positive faith. Next, Stalin’s rise to power is considered, especially in relationship to the increasingly centralized structure of the Communist party, Stalin’s place in the party apparatus, and changes in membership. To fully understand Stalin’s success, the lecture also considers discontent with the policies of NEP. Outline I. We must begin with the youthful personality, ideas, and values of the man who most dominated Soviet life from the late 1920s to his death in 1953: Joseph Stalin (born Iosif Dzhugashvili in 1879). A. Everyone who knew Stalin as a boy spoke of traits that have been described as that of an angry “rebel personality.” 1. He tended to rebel against every manifestation of authority over him, notably at the seminary where he studied. 2. Soon, he extended the petty defiances of a schoolboy into political defiance: He joined an underground Social Democratic Party circle (for which he was expelled from the seminary). B. Complicating this, he was known to be insecure and defensive. C. The seminary may have encouraged certain features of his personal political culture. 1. He seems to have imbibed a taste for dogma and for the sacredness of principles. 2. The seminary may also have encouraged his Manichean vision of the world. D. Another noticeable trait in Stalin’s youth was an obsession with heroes and heroism. 1. Throughout his life, he had special heroes—and did everything he could to emulate them. 2. Reflecting this, when still in elementary school, he took the nickname Koba after a Robin Hood-like hero in a favorite book; later, he changed to the revolutionary underground name Stalin (“Man of Steel”). II. Stalin’s political biography reflected many of these traits and self-ideals. A. At a time when most Georgian socialists were Mensheviks, Stalin chose the Bolsheviks. 1. He was impressed by Lenin’s heroic idea of the vanguard party of professional revolutionaries. 2. He was attracted by the Bolshevik reputation for toughness and greater militancy. 3. For Stalin, all these traits were embodied in the ideas and personality of the Bolshevik leader, Lenin, whom Stalin liked to call the “mountain eagle” of the party. B. In the great debates over policy in the 1920swhich were also struggles over powerStalin generally supported the dominant pro-NEP view, but in speeches and writings, he indicated that this was not his basic philosophical approach. 1. He placed great stress on the importance and power of human will, on the “subjective” in history. 2. He argued that Leninism was a style of leadership entailing the combination of “Russian revolutionary sweep” with “American practicality.” 3. When Stalin criticized Trotsky in the 1920s, he accused him of lacking sufficient optimism and faith. 4. Similarly, in 1928–1929, Stalin and his supporters criticized the pro-NEP arguments of Bukharin and others of the “Right deviation” for their “pessimism.” 5. There was also what some have called a religious spirit to Stalin’s ideas—a preoccupation with faith and the dogmatic sacrality of certain ideas. III. We must consider how Stalin acquired so much influence and power in the 1920s. A. Perhaps the most important factor was the changing structure of the party and Stalin’s place in this apparatus. ©2003 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 16 B. During the Civil War, the whole structure of the party was reorganized. 1. Until then, the party was governed by a small Central Committee dominated by Lenin. 2. In 1919, a more complex structure was created, including a Political Bureau (Politburo), an Organizational Bureau (Orgburo), and a Secretariat. 3. The role of the Secretariatwhich Stalin headed after 1922grew increasingly important, having control of party membership, appointments, and assignments. C. In Stalin’s hands, these powers proved to be tools for strengthening his own influence. 1. He could fill the party bureaucracy with supporters and loyalists. 2. He could appoint the powerful party secretaries. 3. Through the secretaries, he could also influence selection of delegates to the Party Congress, which was the supreme power in the party. 4. This can be described as a “circular flow of power,” with Stalin holding the key levers. D. There were a number of reasons why the rank and file of the party was not more assertive of their formal rights to elect officials and delegates, but the most important may have been the changing composition of the party. 1. During the Civil War there was an enormous increase in party membership, especially as Communist victory became more likely. 2. This had a major impact on political attitudes and behavior. 3. Above all, these new Communists, now a majority, were less independent-minded and more obedient to the party organization. 4. This was intensified in 1924, at the time of Lenin’s death, with the massive “Lenin enrollment” promoted by Stalin. E. As General Secretary, Stalin could make use of these conditions. 1. He built networks of supporters in both party and state. 2. This administrative power played a critical role in Stalin’s defeat of the party oppositions in the 1920s. IV. Once Stalin succeeded in becoming the dominant leader in the party at the very end of the 1920s, he made his heroic and willful political-cultural style central to the spirit of the times. A. Given his personality and style, it is not surprising that he felt uncomfortable with Bukharin’s moderate arguments about economic and social development. B. But Stalin also spoke to the dissatisfactions and desires of many. 1. There were troubling economic problems with NEP. 2. Internationally, there was a growing fear of a coming war against the USSR, for which the country was not prepared. 3. Most important, there was considerable hostility to NEP. C. The main policy expression of Stalin’s approach was a massive program of industrial and social transformation, embodied in the First Five-Year Plan. 1. A good expression of the spirit motivating this drive to transform Russia was the statement in 1927 by Stalin’s chief economist Strumilin: “There are no fortresses that Bolsheviks cannot storm.” 2. In many ways, this phrase captured the essence of the emerging Stalinist political culture. Essential Reading: Robert Tucker, Stalin as Revolutionary, 1879–1929 (New York, 1973). Supplementary Reading: Lewis Siegelbaum, Soviet State and Society between Revolutions, 1918–1929 (Cambridge, England, 1992). Questions to Consider: 1. How would you characterize Stalin’s political outlook in comparison to Trotsky’s and Bukharin’s? 2. In what way was Stalin’s party nickname, which meant “Man of Steel,” revealing about his political personality and values? 17 ©2003 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership Lecture Thirty-One Stalin’s Revolution Scope: This lecture covers the era of radical industrialization and social transformation of the First Five-Year Plan (1928–1932). It considers why Stalin led the country on this sudden change of course in abandonment of NEP. Looking at the industrialization drive, the lecture examines the military atmosphere of the campaign, the politicization of economics, and the effects of this industrial upheaval. Next, forced collectivization of the peasantry is examinedthe course of the campaign, peasant responses, and its effects. Finally, the lecture looks at the time of social radicalism known as the “cultural revolution.” We consider class and generational conflict in the professions, as well as plans by professionals to remake human society and even the individual. Outline I. In 1928, Stalin distanced himself from his ally Bukharin and the market-based ideas of NEP. A. Bukharin offered the most cynical interpretation of this shift: Stalin is an “unprincipled intriguer” who changes his theories according to whom he wishes to get rid of. B. A variant was that Stalin had always favored a more aggressive industrialization strategy than Bukharin but had kept these views in the background in order to defeat Trotsky and the Left. C. It is also possible, however, that Stalin’s thinking gradually evolved in response to economic, social, and political pressures in the late 1920s. II. Stalin’s policy began to resemble a new revolution, or a new civil war. A. B. C. III. The A. B. This new militancy was apparent, for example, in the announced drafts of the First Five-Year Plan for 1928–1932. 1. While this plan was being drafted, there were strong political pressures to be more ambitious. 2. The final draft set almost mythical targets. 3. From the point of view of enthusiasts of this industrial revolution from above, including Stalin, this plan was not ambitious enough. 4. One may argue that the First Five-Year Plan was less an economic plan than a political manifesto meant to inspire. The whole atmosphere of the First Five-Year Plan reflected this politicization, which meant militarization, of economics. 1. The press described industry as a battlefield. 2. To achieve or overfulfill goals, “shock troops” of workers were rushed to production sites. 3. Young people volunteered to work on such grandiose projects as the Magnitogorsk metallurgical factories in the Urals. 4. Those who urged that more rational policies be adopted, or who failed in their tasks, were treated like traitors in wartime. These efforts produced mixed and unbalanced economic results. 1. Heavy industry developed at the expense of consumer goods. 2. Even heavy industry suffered from an imbalance of growth. 3. But production did increase considerably. 4. These efforts also helped lay a foundation for more moderate but sustained growth during the following Five-Year Plans. changes in agriculture were even greater. Agrarian development was also treated as a political, even military, campaign. From 1927 to 1930, the attack on the peasantry gradually intensified. 1. In the winter of 1927–1928, grain requisitioning was reinstated. 2. Peasants responded by sowing less land. ©2003 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 18 3. In response, the campaign was intensified; kulaks (richer peasants) were to be “liquidated as a class,” and collectivization of all agriculture was decreed in 1930. C. The result of these decrees was intense and violent. 1. Hundreds of thousands of kulaks were evicted from their homes and their property was confiscated. 2. More than half of all remaining peasants were forced into collective farms. 3. Almost all property was collectivized. D. Peasants resisted these measures in different ways. 1. Some peasants resisted actively. 2. Most peasants, though, engaged in more passive resistance: abandoning the countryside or, if remaining, slaughtering vast numbers of their animals. E. The 1. Grain procurements had increased and peasants were now under the political control of the state. 2. But agriculture suffered as sullen peasants refused to exert themselves. 3. The most serious consequence of collectivization was its toll in human lives. IV. When recounting these years, it can be difficult to recall that this was also a time of heroic idealism. A. One sign of this was the widespread idea that the First Five-Year Plan was also a “cultural revolution.” B. One aspect of this revolution was “social purging.” 1. Beginning in 1928, “bourgeois experts” (especially engineers) were publicly tried. 2. Communists were encouraged to challenge the role of non-proletarian experts throughout Soviet society in almost every profession and every institution. 3. Although initiated and manipulated from above, this cultural revolution had great public appeal and spontaneity. 4. Elements of class and generational conflict were clearly visible in these struggles. C. The cultural revolution was also about ideas, especially about how to transform everyday life. D. In education, Shulgin proposed replacing formal schooling with a proletarian education that would involve school communes and extensive participation in productive labor. E. City planners also offered transformative plans. 1. For example, various proposals were made for a new type of city. 2. Many of these plans combined a radical modernist love of technology with a desire to eliminate the traditional city and even the state. 3. A good example of these ideas was the vision of the sociologist Okhitovich and the architects Sokolov and Ginzburg, who envisioned a world without any permanent settlements at all and people living in one-person cells. 4. Many of these visionaries also sought to create environments that would liberate the inner person. results of collectivization were also mixed. F. The 1. Centralized control, tyrannical state power, brutality, even murderous violence were commonplace. 2. Yet idealism, enthusiasm, dreams of a new world, and often fantastic optimism were also present. 3. No wonder, then, that historians have fiercely debated the meaning of these years. Essential Reading: Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization (Berkeley, 1995). Supplementary Reading: R. W. Davies, The Industrialization of Soviet Russia (Cambridge, 1979), 2 volumes. ———, The Socialist Offensive: The Collectivization of Soviet Agriculture, 1929–30 (Cambridge, 1980). Sheila Fitzpatrick, Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1928–1931 (Bloomington, 1978). Moshe Lewin, Russian Peasants and Soviet Power: A Study of Collectivization (New York, 1968). Ronald G. Suny, The Structure of Russian History: Essays and Documents (Oxford, 2003), chapter 4. 19 ©2003 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership years of Stalin’s revolution were contradictory times. Questions to Consider: 1. In interpreting the era of the First Five-Year Plan, how would you balance the mixture of brutality and idealism and explain their interrelationship? 2. Why were peasants forced into collective farms in 1930? For economic reasons? For political reasons? ©2003 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 20 Lecture Thirty-Two Joy and TerrorSociety and Culture in the 1930s Scope: This lecture looks at political, social, and cultural life during the years of high Stalinism. Framed by the controversial argument over whether the Stalinist 1930s were a period of totalitarianism and victimhood or of popular support and happiness, the lecture looks at contradictory trends in the 1930s. First, we examine Stalinist authoritarianism: censorship, cultural uniformity and conservatism, the cult of Stalin, and constant mobilization against enemies. Next, the lecture looks at the violent state terror of the late 1930s, including the famous show trials and the devastation of the party, but also the pervasiveness of the terror throughout Soviet society. Next, the lecture considers the many manifestations of the ideal captured in the slogan of 1936, “Life has become more joyful.” We look at the cult of prosperity and happiness and at its reflections in everyday life, including material life, leisure culture, popular music, and film. Outline I. The Stalinist 1930s may well be the most enigmatic period in Soviet history, and the era has generated fierce debates among scholars. A. B. II. It is A. B. C. D. E. Some have insisted on the totalitarian character of these years, focusing on indoctrination, terror, and victimization. Others have emphasized social support for the system and its responsiveness. clear that the 1930s was a time of overwhelming authoritarian power. A cultural “iron curtain” surrounded the country. 1. Travel abroad was almost impossible. 2. Censorship was strict. Russian culture was made more uniform than ever before in Russian history. 1. The relative freedom and diversity in art and literature in the 1920s was ended. 2. This orthodoxy was in many ways quite conservative. Experimentation in everyday social and cultural life was also discouraged. 1. The family policies of the 1920s were reversed. 2. The social radicalism of the First Five-Year Plan was abandoned, with attacks on experts halted, income inequality allowed to grow, and status and rank reinforced by privilege. 3. Education reverted to traditional forms. Another sign of this totalitarian culture of power was the cult of the leader. 1. Everywhere, one saw huge pictures of Stalin and Lenin, and they were constantly quoted. 2. Huge ceremonies were staged in which citizens expressed love for Stalin. The 1930s was also a time of constant mobilization as if for war against various internal and external enemies. III. At its most extreme, the 1930s witnessed violent repression on a wide scale. A. The face of the “terror” best known to the world was the series of show trials of prominent Communists (from August 1936–March 1938). 1. In these trials, leading “Old Bolsheviks” were accused of, and forced to confess to, implausible political crimes. 2. Most of the victims of these trials, though high-ranking Communists, were executed. B. Among the rank and file of the party, a frenzy of public denunciations paralleled the show trials. 1. Constant meetings were held at which party members were expected to denounce enemies of the regime. 2. Those caught up in this sweep of denunciations would be thrown out of the party, imprisoned, sent to labor camps, or perhaps, shot. C. Not only party members suffered. 21 ©2003 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 1. Large numbers of officials, military officers, engineers, scientists, and others were arrested and sent to the camps (the Gulag). 2. Many other groups were specially victimized, ranging from non-Russian nationalities to foreign communists who fled Hitler and Mussolini. 3. Even children were expected to denounce their parents for criticisms of the regime. D. The 1. Communists suffered the worst, especially the party’s top ranks, which were decimated. 2. Other institutions were also targeted, notably the officer corps of the Red Army. 3. The total numbers who suffered, of course, are unknown, but likely included several million under arrest and perhaps millions killed. IV. Also part of the story of the 1930s was the spirit of public pleasure and joy. A. In 1936, Stalin captured this spirit in a new guiding slogan: “Life has become more joyful.” B. This spirit was expressed publicly in many ways throughout the thirties. 1. We see this in the ways Stalin himself began to be portrayed. 2. We see it in pervasive images of prosperity and happiness. C. This was more than an image: There was a growing practical emphasis on the material rewards of hard work and loyalty. D. The Stakhanovist movement is a good illustration. 1. At first glance, Stakhnovism would seem to represent the totalitarian mobilization of society for production. 2. But by the mid-1930s, the focus was increasingly on the personal and material rewards of devoted labor. 3. The press made a point of describing Stakhanovites acquiring goods and spending leisure time with their happy families. E. Another major expression of this official mood of happiness and optimism was popular entertainment. 1. In Moscow, Gorky Park became a fantasy escape park. 2. The 1930s also marked the time of a great jazz revival, with public concerts widespread. 3. Most city parks sponsored nighttime dances in the summer. 4. Soviet life was pervaded with light or romantic popular songs. 5. Cinema also tended to emphasize not only ideology but adventure, romance, and fun. F. Even architecture tried to express the idea that “Life has become more joyful.” 1. This was a time of constant construction (especially in Moscow) for the government and the elite. 2. In addition, public spaces were created to foster the feeling that the state cared for people. The famous Moscow metro was typical. G. Meanwhile, most Muscovites lived in crowded “communal apartments.” H. How is one to interpret this emphasis on “joy” even amidst “terror”? 1. Some argue that this was a concession to popular tastes and desires. 2. Others argue that both joy and terror were parts of the way the system controlled people. 3. Still others suggest a relationship that was more complex and contradictory. Essential Reading: Sheila Fitzpatrick, Everyday Stalinism (Oxford, 1999). Supplementary Reading: Robert Conquest, The Great Terror (Oxford, 1991). Sheila Fitzpatrick, Stalin’s Peasants: Resistance and Survival in the Russian Village after Collectivization (Oxford, 1994). J. Arch Getty and Roberta Manning, eds., Stalinist Terror (Cambridge, England, 1993). Lewis Siegelbaum and Andrei Sokolov, eds., Stalinism as a Way of Life (New Haven, 2000). full scope of the “Great Terror” is difficult to measure. ©2003 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 22 Questions to Consider: 1. How do you interpret the seemingly contradictory faces of Stalinist political culture in the 1930s, that is, conservatism, ideological mobilization, terror, and a culture of happiness? Can these be reconciled as part of a consistent political strategy? 2. Why was the radical experimentalism of the first decade of the revolution, and even of the Stalinist revolution, rejected after 1931? 23 ©2003 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership Lecture Thirty-Three The “Great Patriotic War” Scope: This lecture examines the Soviet experience in World War II. It begins with Soviet expectations and fears of war that preceded the Nazi attack, efforts to delay its coming, and unpreparedness when it did come in 1941. Next, the lecture examines the course of the war itself and key battles, especially at Stalingrad. Asking how the Soviet Union survived and helped to win the war, the lecture explores the military and economic conditions aiding Soviet victory and, above all, popular mobilization in support of the war against Germany. We consider the main values around which resistance coalesced, especially defense of nation and home, and how Nazi ideology and practices contributed to their defeat in Russia. Finally, the lecture analyzes the consequences of the war experience for postwar society and politics. Outline I. Although the USSR had long anticipated war, when it came on June 22, 1941, the country was shockingly unprepared. A. Since 1917, Soviet leaders had been constantly predicting a great confrontation between the socialist and the capitalist worlds. 1. This seemed especially likely in the 1930s with the rise of fascism, seen as extreme capitalism. 2. From 1934–1938, Soviet diplomacy sought “collective security” to contain German expansion. 3. When this failed, the Soviet Union made a deal with Germany (the 1939 Non-Aggression Pact) to give it a buffer of space and time. B. When Nazi Germany invaded the USSR two years later, the Soviet leadership (and the army and economy) was shockingly unprepared. 1. The Soviet Union suffered great losses of airplanes, tanks, and soldiers in the first days of the war. 2. By late November 1941, the German armies had reached the outskirts of Moscow, surrounded Leningrad, and taken most of Ukraine. C. There are many explanations for why Russia was so unprepared. 1. The official Soviet explanation was German perfidiousness and surprise. 2. One problem was the quality of the army, especially its leadership, because of both purges and poor equipment. 3. More subtly, the political culture of Stalinism had effects on Soviet preparedness in the military, discouraging officers on the frontier from acting without orders. 4. A major factor was Stalin, especially his conviction that his pact with Germany would effectively protect the USSR. 5. Stalin had even been warned about the planned German invasion, but he distrusted these reports. D. Hitler made his own miscalculations in invading Russia. 1. He expected a short war, certainly over before the notorious Russian winter. 2. Instead, the war was protracted, with a long front, overextended supply lines, and worsening weather. II. As the war dragged on, Russia was able to recover from the defeats of 1941. A. In the summer of 1942, the Germans launched a second offensive. 1. They focused on the south in order to seize the valuable oil fields of the Caucasus. 2. Once again, the Red Army suffered serious losses, but German success was not complete. B. The 1. Both Hitler and Stalin considered the city of great symbolic importance. 2. The Germans took the city against enormous resistance. 3. A Red Army counteroffensive cut off the German army’s overstretched supply lines and prevailed. 4. This was a turning point in the warnot only for Russia, but, many argue, for the entire Allied cause. III. How did the Soviet Union survive and even contribute to winning the war? A. One factor was the improved quality of military command in the Red Army. crucial battle in this campaign came at Stalingrad in the fall and winter of 1942. ©2003 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 24 1. After the initial defeats, Stalin was willing to fire incompetent commanders, even when they were personal friends, and appoint competent commanders, such as Georgii Zhukov. 2. Stalin also let the military experts make the major military decisions. B. No less important were the economic resources that the army had at its disposal. 1. By 1943, the Red Army was supplied with sufficient quantities of weapons, ammunition, tanks, and airplanes. 2. The quality of its equipment was sometimes superior to that of Germany. C. This was partly attributable to lend-lease aid from Britain and the United States, but mostly to Russia’s own resources, enabled by earlier industrialization and centralized control of the economy. IV. No less important was the mobilization of human resources, the methods of which reveal much about the deeper meanings of the war for Soviet society. A. Official propaganda was full of tales of heroism, courage, and sacrifice, but these were also quite real. This can be seen in: 1. The high morale and willingness to fight of Red Army soldiers; 2. The efforts of partisans; 3. The impressive solidarity of non-combatants in such situations as the siege of Leningrad. B. The 1. Above all, the war was portrayed as a patriotic war of national resistance. 2. No less important was the idea that this was a war in defense of home and family. 3. The enemy was portrayed as the personification of evil. country had never in Soviet times been so united, but what were the terms of this unity? C. The 1. The Church was rehabilitated. 2. Peasants were given greater freedom to sell produce grown on their private plots. government also took practical measures to strengthen popular support of the war effort: D. Nazi behavior during the war also encouraged patriotic unity. 1. When the German invasion began, some Soviet citizens, especially on the Western border lands, welcomed the Germans as liberators, but they were soon disappointed. 2. Instead of liberating peasants from collective farms, the Nazis used the kolkhozy for their own purposes. 3. They deported nearly three million civilians to camps in Germany. 4. Millions of Jews, gypsies, and Communists were executed or sent to German death camps. 5. Partisans were tortured, and whole villages were punished for helping the partisans. 6. These policies were consistent with Nazi thinking about Russia and Russians. E. Ultimately, popular determination to resist the Nazis was a decisive element in Soviet victory. 1. In the long run, this did more to bolster the legitimacy and popularity of the Soviet regime than anything before. 2. But the mobilization of popular support also raised expectations about changed political and social relationships after the war. Essential Reading: Alexander Werth, Russia at War, 1941–1945, 2nd ed. (New York, 1999). Supplementary Reading: John Barber and Mark Harrison, The Soviet Home Front, 1941–1945: A Social and Economic History of the USSR in World War II (London, 1991). John Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad: Stalin’s War with Germany (New York, 1975). ———, The Road to Berlin (Boulder, 1983). David Glantz and Jonathan House, When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler (Lawrence, 1988). Ronald G. Suny, The Structure of Russian History: Essays and Documents (Oxford, 2003), chapter 5. 25 ©2003 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership Questions to Consider: 1. Why did the Soviet army perform so poorly at the start of the war when war was so long expected? 2. What was the meaning of the war to ordinary Soviet citizens? ©2003 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 26 Lecture Thirty-Four The Soviet Union after Stalin Scope: This lecture looks at politics and the experiences of the Soviet people during the decades after the war and before Gorbachev’s reforms. We examine people’s expectations of a more normal life and Stalin’s return to the harsh order of the past, including lack of attention to consumer needs, harsh xenophobia, and cultural repressiveness. The lecture then focuses on the policies of Stalin’s successors, in particular, the long years of rule by Leonid Brezhnev. It considers the nurturing of loyal elites through various privileges but also the important efforts to create a welfare state that promised rising standards of living for the majority. To understand Soviet society at the level of everyday experience, the lecture then looks at important changes in social life, especially education and property holding, and people’s growing connections to the larger world. Outline I. At the end of the war, most Soviet people, relieved and proud that they had been victorious, anticipated that a better and more “relaxed” life would be their reward. A. Instead, in the name of rebuilding their devastated country, the harsh order of the past returned. 1. Collectivization was strengthened. 2. Investment was focused on heavy industry, causing a shortage of consumer goods, including housing. 3. Cultural and intellectual life was again severely restricted, and writers or intellectuals who refused to conform were viciously condemned in public. 4. Relations with the West again became tense, such that a Cold War developed. B. Like the war itself, the Cold War was not simply a fact of international relations—it affected every aspect of culture and politics. 1. There was a massive upsurge in officially promoted nationalism (even xenophobia), and everything foreign was condemned. 2. By contrast, everything Russian was praised. C. To cap off these regressive tendencies, it appeared that a new purge was coming. 1. In January 1953, a number of Kremlin doctors (mainly Jews) were arrested for conspiring to murder the country’s leaders. 2. Many saw this as the first step in a new terror against suspected enemies. 3. Only Stalin’s death on March 5, 1953, may have prevented this from occurring. II. Stalin’s successors recognized that they could not continue to rule as Stalin hadmore attention needed to be paid to people’s desire for a more “normal life.” A. Nikita Khrushchev (who headed the party from 1953–1964) began the reforms. 1. He initiated de-Stalinization, an open critique of Stalin’s repression. 2. He made a significant effort to stimulate the consumer economy. B. Leonid Brezhnev’s long rule (1964–1982) officially became known as “developed socialism.” 1. In practice, it created a welfare state. 2. But the party also jealously guarded its power. C. During his brief time in office, Iurii Andropov (1982–1984) attempted to revitalize the stagnating economy. D. The seriously ailing Konstantin Chernenko, during his even briefer time in office (1984–1985), accomplished little. E. As the sense of crisis grew, Mikhail Gorbachev was chosen as party leader. 27 ©2003 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership III. A larger view of post-Stalinist Soviet life, particularly during the long period when Brezhnev was in power, will help us understand post-Stalin ideas and arrangements with respect to power, as well as why and how the system was heading toward radical reform, followed by collapse. A. A key starting point is the state’s relationship with its own elites, for which the Brezhnev regime took as its motto the phrase “trust in cadres.” 1. In practice, this meant that officials were assured of greater job security than ever before in Soviet times. 2. The clearest evidence of this new security was the dramatic aging of the leadership. B. “Trust in cadres” also meant catering to their interests, particularly their personal interests, which included providing them with all sorts of privileges. 1. Although few ordinary Russians were able to buy cars, the elite were given special access to limited supplies. 2. There were special stores at which only members of the elite could shop. 3. The ability to travel abroad was another privilege of status. 4. Elite status also meant better medical care. 5. Housing was also a perquisite of rank and service. 6. These numerous privileges did much to create a loyal managerial class, which proved to be one of the keys to the system’s stability. C. To encourage ordinary citizens to accept the legitimacy of the status quo, a form of social contract was established (one might call it a socialist welfare state) between the government and the population. 1. People were offered opportunities for upward mobility, a chance to become part of the elite. 2. Repression was kept within clearly defined and predictable bounds. 3. Free medical care was guaranteed for all citizens. 4. Unemployment was virtually nonexistent. 5. Everyone received a state pension at retirement. 6. Rents were subsidized and cheap, although housing was often substandard and crowded. 7. Food (especially bread and dairy products) was also subsidized. 8. Major investments were made in the consumer economy. D. Although warning signs were visible, the standard of living rose throughout most of the 1960s and 1970s. 1. Wages and salaries increased (and there was little inflation to cut into these). 2. Food supplies improved. 3. The amount and variety of consumer goods increased. 4. New housing continued to be built. E. What formal economic channels could not handle could often be found in the “second economy” (the “black market” or “unofficial economy”). 1. Here, one could find foreign products, illegally manufactured goods, scarce Soviet goods, and services from moonlighters. 2. In the late Brezhnev years, the black market was estimated at 25 percent of the gross national product. IV. To understand what all of this meant at the level of everyday human experience, we need to examine how people experienced all this and how they expressed their needs and values. A. This is important as part of the cause (perhaps the main reason) for the collapse of communism in Russia and the Soviet Union, because the crisis was especially about attitudes that produced growing alienation from the Soviet system. B. These changes in thinking derived from tangible changes in people’s lives. 1. Starting in the mid-1960s, Soviet society became an urban societycity life tends to undermine traditional ways of thinking and encourage an appreciation of freedom and choice. 2. No less important was the fact that the USSR became a more educated society. A product of both urbanization and education was the growth of a large educated middle class of office workers, professionals, and specialists of all sorts. 3. A dramatic increase in small private property was allowed and even encouraged by the government, though expectations greatly exceeded realities. ©2003 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 28 4. Exposure to new ideas and images through books, film, television, contact with Westerners, and some travel abroad led to an increasing awareness of the larger world. C. All these conditions nurtured growing expectations and discontent. Essential Reading: Hedrick Smith, The Russians (New York, 1985). Supplementary Reading: George Breslauer, Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders (London, 1982). James Millar, ed., Politics, Work, and Daily Life in the USSR (New York, 1987). Ronald G. Suny, The Structure of Russian History: Essays and Documents (Oxford, 2003), part IV. Questions to Consider: 1. What was the meaning of Brezhnev’s motto “trust in cadres”? Was this an effective means of building an effective state authority or was it counterproductive corruption? 2. Do you agree with the characterization of post-Stalinist Soviet society as a “welfare state”? 29 ©2003 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership Lecture Thirty-Five Private and Public Dissidence Scope: This lecture looks at alienation from and resistance to the Soviet system during the years before Gorbachev came to power. After considering widespread everyday conformity to the system, the lecture explores the many everyday ways that large numbers of people did not conform. The lecture looks at forms of subtle everyday defiance, the widespread withdrawal from public life, the development of alternative youth cultures, and various informal organizations. It also highlights popular literature and nonconformist art as exemplifying cultural trends of the time. The lecture next looks at the dissident movement, especially as expressed in samizdat and in the formation of dissident groups. We consider differing ideologies and the underlying values that united them. Outline I. Throughout Soviet life in the years after Stalin and before the Gorbachev reforms, one sees a great deal of what might be called “everyday dissidence.” A. Most Soviet citizens were generally obedient and conformist and even supported the status quo. 1. Most read official papers and attended required political meetings. 2. Many cooperated with the KGB and even sought to join the party. B. However, large numbers of people did signal a measure of dissent through various forms of nonconformity. C. People dissented in scores of tiny but meaningful ways, gestures of defiance that made their lives more tolerable by them giving moments of control. 1. Although they attended the required meetings, they would knit, read the paper, talk, even play chess. 2. Although they read the official papers, they started at the back, with the sports section, the television listings, or articles about culture. 3. Although they worked, they came to work late and worked haphazardly. D. A larger trend in Soviet everyday life was the withdrawal from public into private life. 1. For example, during leisure time, people focused on such activities as sports, rather than politics. 2. Most important, though, was an increasing focus of energy and values on family and friends. E. A related sign of the cultural change that was undermining the status quo can be found in the everyday cultural lives of young people. 1. The Soviet press was filled with articles lamenting the lack of good Soviet consciousness among young people. 2. Dress, which emulated Western styles, was seen as emblematic of the problem. F. Another visible sign of a changing culture was the appearance of graffiti, which articulated alternative identities. 1. Some graffiti signaled identification with sports clubs. 2. By the early 1980s, much of the graffiti identified rock bands. 3. Some graffiti identified countercultural or even vaguely political groups, ranging from hippies to neo- fascists. II. More direct, engaged, and even public expressions of dissident values also began appearing. A. The expanding private sphere of extended and interlinking circles of friends was a starting point for many of these dissident groupings. 1. A wide variety of religious circles arose. 2. Private cultural gatherings to discuss ideas and listen to poems and songs that could not be heard in public took place at individual apartments. 3. Certain singers, songwriters, and poets, such as Vladimir Vysotskii or Bulat Okudzhava, were popular because they expressed what most mattered in life: honesty and truth, human suffering and endurance, friendship and love. B. Another revealing trend was the nonofficial art of the time. ©2003 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 30 C. D. E. III. The A. B. C. D. E. F. 1. Some of this art was nonconformist in subject and mood. 2. Some of it was philosophically inclined toward existential doubts and religion. 3. Much of this art asked big questions about life’s meaning. 4. This art was also deeply ironic. Another way to explore these trends is to look at popular tastes in reading. 1. Stories about individuals and their families and friends were most pervasive. 2. Equally telling is the lack of interest in tales about workers fulfilling the plan or Communist revolutionaries. Certain themes were especially popular. 1. Stories about the war were widely read, as in the novels of Iurii Bondarev. 2. Escapist adventure, as well as a sense of justice, made crime and detective novels appealing, such as those of Iulian Semenov. 3. Spy novels served similar functions, often with an added nationalistic element. 4. Science fiction was another popular genre, though it often expressed a rather dark view of the effects of technology. 5. Stories about rural life (“village prose”), such as the novels and stories of Valentin Rasputin, which emphasized natural values and simplicity, were also popular. Certain salient cultural patterns emerge from these thematic choices. 1. There was a widespread desire to escape from the ever-present official ideology. 2. There was also a need to seek out the spiritual or existential meaning in life. face of Soviet dissidence that was best known was the underground dissident movement. The tactics of this movement were diverse and ranged from publishing forbidden works in samizdat, to circulating petitions against the repressive acts of the state, to organizing or participating in demonstrations. The ideas and values of this movement were even more diverse. 1. From the late 1960s to the early 1980s, various dissident groups formed. 2. Most of these groups protested the denial of rights to a particular group, such as feminists, Protestants, Jews, national minorities, or workers. Certain ideological tendencies can be seen. 1. The smallest group was the Marxist dissidents, the “true” Leninists, who complained that Stalin had crushed the democratic socialist spirit. A leading advocate of this point of view was Roy Medvedev. 2. The aim of another group, which some have called “neo-Slavophiles,” was to return Russia to the traditions of its national culture and to rid Russia of alien Communism. Alexander Solzhenitsyn was a principle voice. 3. Most dissidents, however, shared a liberal-democratic and reformist perspective that aimed to force Communism to live up to its own democratic and humanitarian claims. Andrei Sakharov, the famous physicist, was the most well known spokesman of this point of view. These ideological distinctions do not explain what inspired dissenters to put their personal lives at risk to serve a cause and to cooperate with one another. 1. All of them shared the ideal of “human rights,” of the “rights of man.” 2. No less important was something even more subtle, a desire to live for “truth” above all, to live as if they were free. 3. Of course, they were not really freestate repression often harassed these groups and individuals. In many respects, these dissidents had much in common with earlier generations of the Russian intelligentsia. Some Russian leaders recognized that much of the population was becoming visibly disenchanted with the established order. 1. This recognition is noticeable in the works of many Soviet sociologists and psychologists. 2. After 1985, the new party leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, spoke openly of a dukhovny krizis (spiritual or cultural crisis) in Russiaa crisis of values, judgments, beliefs, and sentiment. 31 ©2003 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership Essential Reading: David Shipler, Russia: Broken Idols, Solemn Dreams (New York, 1983). Supplementary Reading: Ludmilla Alexeyeva, Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for National, Religious and Human Rights (Middletown, 1985). Peter Reddaway, ed., Uncensored Russia: Protest and Dissent in the Soviet Union (New York, 1972). Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, “Matryona’s Home,” in Patricia Blake and Max Hayward, eds., Half-way to the Moon (New York, 1964). Andrei Sakharov, Sakharov Speaks (New York, 1974). Questions to Consider: 1. In what sense was there a growing “spiritual crisis,” as Gorbachev called it, in Russian society in the years after Stalin? Were nonconformist attitudes a sign of the failure of the Soviet system or of its growing normalization? 2. Was there a consistent set of core ideas and values visible in all of this public and private dissidence? ©2003 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 32 Lecture Thirty-Six Mikhail Gorbachev—Perestroika and Glasnost’ Scope: This series of lectures concludes by looking at Mikhail Gorbachev’s recognition of the many problems of the system and his efforts to make Communism work. It considers the policies of perestroika in economics and politics and of glasnost’ in civic and cultural life. The focus is on Gorbachev and his ideas. The lecture begins by looking at his true belief in the possibilities of socialism. To understand what socialism meant to Gorbachev, the lecture examines three key ideas. First, it looks at his notions of democracy as both free and orderly. Next, the lecture examines his notion of authority. Like many previous reformers, we see that Gorbachev believed in the necessity of strong leadership and power to ensure reform. Third, the lecture explores his preoccupations with moral order for both politics and society. Finally, the lecture asks why Gorbachev failed and concludes with a consideration of the situation left in the wake of the collapse of Communism. Outline I. In March 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev was made head of the Communist Party, with a mandate to address the approaching economic and social crisis in the system. A. His first step was to admit the problems publicly. 1. For the first time, the government and party spoke openly and honestly of slowing economic growth (“stagnation”). 2. Leaders also admitted widespread alienation and withdrawala cultural-ideological crisis. B. Gorbachev’s solution was two-pronged. 1. The first part of the solution was political and economic restructuring (perestroika). 2. The second was openness in civic discussions of both the past and the present (glasnost’). C. Gorbachev’s reforms encouraged a loosening of bonds everywhere. 1. People began to speak openly about problems and solutions, including the need for a more democratic and market-oriented system. 2. In Eastern Europe, a wave of popular revolutions swept Communists out of power. 3. In 1990–1991, the Baltic States and Georgia demanded independence from the USSR, and Boris Yeltsin was elected President of the Russian Republic. 4. Conservative Communists arrested Gorbachev and seized power. 5. Resistance to the coup led to its failure within days, along with the collapse of Communist rule and the USSR. D. Understanding these events requires understanding what Mikhail Gorbachev was seeking to accomplish. 1. Gorbachev was a characteristic “true believer.” 2. He so believed in his country’s official version of itselfthe ideal of socialismthat he could not bear the wide discrepancy between ideals and reality. 3. This was the source of both his reforming zeal and his unwillingness to let reform go too far. II. To understand Gorbachev’s conception of socialismin its ideal form and potentialone must begin with his notion of democracy. A. It was the official claim of the Soviet system that it was more democratic than any other. 1. Gorbachev was the first Soviet leader since the 1920s to admit that the practices of Soviet socialism were far from democratic. 2. But he wanted this dream to come true. B. We see this in his speeches, which were filled with talk about the democratic nature of socialism and appeals for more popular involvement and initiative. C. When Gorbachev talked about “democracy” and popular participation, he used these ideas in a distinctive way. 1. For Gorbachev, real democracy meant orderly and responsible public participation. 33 ©2003 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 2. He constantly lectured people about the need to ground freedom in “civic responsibility” and to preserve “law and order” (pravoporiadok). 3. During his last year in power, his appeals for reason, order, and responsibility became especially pervasive, especially in his criticisms of Boris Yeltsin, of “so-called democrats,” and of right-wing nationalists. III. Gorbachev’s arguments also reflected his belief in the necessity of strong central authority in times of change. A. Throughout his career, he spoke of the important role that the party played in Soviet history and Soviet life. 1. After perestroika was underway, Gorbachev continually insisted on the need for a “strong political party” to unite the country and guide change. 2. By early 1991, as the Communist Party proved rigid and resistant to change, he began to shift attention from the party to the centralized state. B. Gorbachev insisted on the necessity not only of strong power, but also of civilized power. 1. Gorbachev was obsessed with the problem of leadership quality. 2. Even before he came to power, Gorbachev regularly criticized the inadequacies of local leadership. 3. By the early 1980s, his critique became more encompassing, criticizing officials for such failings as formalism, procrastination (volokita), inertia, and self-satisfaction. 4. After he came to power, he launched a major campaign against these evils. IV. Central to Gorbachev’s ideas about both democracy and authority was a striking moralism. A. Since the mid-1970s, Gorbachev had been preaching a high moral code. 1. While party leader in Stavropol, he frequently called on people to struggle against indiscipline, acquisitiveness, theft, bribe-taking, and drunkenness. 2. In the early 1980s, he intensified his appeals, demanding intolerance of such moral weaknesses as social passivity, parasitism, and moral nihilism. B. Once in power, these arguments reached a fever pitch. 1. He launched a massive campaign against drunkenness. 2. Another campaign sought to instill work discipline. 3. He also fought against pornography, prostitution, and “mass culture.” 4. His lists of condemned moral failings continued to grow, including arrogance, boorishness, consumerism, materialism, and philistine vulgarity (poshlost’). C. Gorbachev’s first uses of the term perestroika in the early-1980s involved what he called “perestroika of consciousness” and “perestroika of spiritual life.” D. How are we to interpret this moral preaching? 1. Partly, it sprang from practical considerationsthe social and economic costs of indiscipline and the need for effective leaders. 2. No less, ethics and morality went to the heart of Gorbachev’s ideals about socialism. 3. For Gorbachev, socialism must be a variety of “humanism” that promotes the fullest development and dignity of the “human person” (lichnost’). V. Why did Gorbachev fail to create a viable humanistic, socialist society? A. In part, his failure was practical: The economy remained stagnant. B. But most of all, he failed because too few people shared his vision of socialism. 1. Tradition-minded Communists viewed his ideas as undermining power and order. 2. More liberal-minded citizens lacked his attachment to socialism and insisted on greater change. C. The dramatic collapse of Communism did not immediately solve Russia’s problems. 1. While freedom flourished, social order disintegrated. 2. Although conditions have improved in recent years, most Russians are still far from living the “normal life” they crave. ©2003 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 34 Essential Reading: Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World (New York, 1987). Supplementary Reading: Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor (Oxford, 1997). George Breslauer, Gorbachev and Yeltsin as Leaders (Cambridge, England, 2002). Stephen Kotkin, Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970–2000 (Oxford, 2001). Michael McFaul, Russia’s Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin (Ithaca, 2001). Nancy Ries, Russia Talk: Culture and Conversation during Perestroika (Ithaca, 1997). Questions to Consider: 1. Was Gorbachev’s vision of a reformed and humanistic socialism unrealizable? 2. How do you explain the central role of morality in Gorbachev’s vision of reform, given that Marxism traditionally rejected the notion of universal values existing apart from the interests of social classes? 35 ©2003 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership Essential Reading: Bibliography John Alexander, Catherine the Great: Life and Legend (New York, 1989). A very readable introduction to Catherine’s life and reputation. , Emperor of the Cossacks: Pugachov and the Frontier Jacquerie of 1773–1775 (Lawrence, 1973). The only major English-language study of this remarkable revolt. Abraham Ascher, The Russian Revolution of 1905, 2 volumes (Stanford, 1988 and 1992). The best overview of this first major social revolution, based on careful and thorough scholarship and balanced interpretations. Paul Avrich, Russian Rebels, 1600–1800 (New York, 1972). An insightful series of sympathetic essays on the Pugachev uprising and earlier peasant rebellions in Russian history. Isaiah Berlin, Russian Thinkers (New York, 1995or earlier editions). A series of brilliant and accessible essays on Herzen, Belinskii, Tolstoy, and others by an eminent British scholar and essayist. Stephen Cohen, Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution (Oxford, 1980). Though written before the opening of the archives, an insightful and even eloquent biography of Bukharin and his times. Isaac Deutscher, The Prophet Armed, The Prophet Unarmed, The Prophet Outcast (any edition). Although written many years ago and often too sympathetic to Trotsky, this three-volume biography remains one of the most compelling stories of a Russian revolutionary. Orlando Figes, A People’s Tragedy: The Russian Revolution, 1891–1924 (Harmondsworth, 1996). An important interpretive history of the origins and consequences of the revolution, written with passion and with sympathy for ordinary Russians. , Natasha’s Dance: A Cultural History of Russia (New York, 2002). Three centuries of Russian cultural history told through compelling individual stories. Sheila Fitzpatrick, Everyday Stalinism (Oxford, 1999). A pioneering account of everyday life under Stalin, focusing on urban life, by an eminent and influential historian. Stephen Frank and Mark Steinberg, eds., Cultures in Flux: Lower-Class Values, Practices, and Resistance in Late Imperial Russia (Princeton, 1994). A collection of articles on the everyday lives, cultural outlooks, and forms of protest among urban workers, peasants, and other common people. Gregory Freeze, ed., Russia: A History (Oxford, 1997). A new survey history of Russia composed of essays by leading scholars. Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World (New York, 1987). Gorbachev’s own attempt to explain to a Western audience the meaning of his reforms. Camilla Grey, The Russian Experiment in Art, 1863–1922 (London, 1986). A fascinating introduction to modern artistic movements in Russia. Geoffrey Hosking, The First Socialist Society: A History of the Soviet Union from Within (Cambridge, MA, 1993). An excellent introduction to Soviet history, with a strong emphasis on society and human experience, by a leading British historian. Lindsey Hughes, Peter the Great: A Biography (New Haven, 2002). The best biography of Peter the Great, by a leading scholar of the era, exploring Peter’s complex character, his relationships with many individuals of his time, and his image in the eyes of others. Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization (Berkeley, 1995). An important and original study of Stalin’s industrial and social revolution from above from the perspective of one of the greatest projects of these years, the city of Magnitogorsk. Dominic Lieven, Nicholas II (New York, 1994). An intelligent and fair introduction to the life of Russia’s last tsar, focusing on politics. W. Bruce Lincoln, Between Heaven and Hell: The Story of a Thousand Years of Artistic Life in Russia (New York, 1998). A sweeping and readable introduction to the whole of Russia’s artistic life, by a respected historian. Like most of Lincoln’s books, written for general readers. ©2003 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 36 , The Great Reforms: Autocracy, Bureaucracy, and the Politics of Change in Imperial Russia (DeKalb, 1990). An excellent introduction to Alexander II’s great reforms, focusing on political and social policy and change. , Passage through Armageddon: The Russians in War and Revolution, 1914–1918 (New York, 1986). One of the best general accounts of Russia during the first world war. Isabel de Madariaga, Catherine the Great: A Short History (New Haven, 1990). A condensed version, organized thematically, of Madariaga’s longer study of Catherine and her age, widely considered the best study of Catherine’s reign. Anatole Mazour, The First Russian Revolution, 1825 (Stanford, 1964). Still the best history of the Decembrist rebellion, if rather dry. Richard Pipes, Russia under the Old Regime (New York: Penguin, 1997). An important if controversial interpretation of the evolution of Russia from earliest times to the formation of an authoritarian state and society by the 1880s. Alexander Pushkin, Eugene Onegin and Other Poems (Everyman’s Library Pocket Poets) (New York, 1999). Nicholas Riasanovsky, A History of Russia, 6th ed. (Oxford, 2000). Widely considered the most fair, reliable, and comprehensive history of Russia. , The Image of Peter the Great in Russian History and Thought (New York, 1985). A fascinating exploration of what others said about Peter from his own time into the Soviet period and what this reveals about how Russians thought about politics, their relation to the West and to their own past, and much else. Hans Rogger, Russia in the Age of Modernization and Revolution, 1881–1917 (London and New York, 1983). A densely written but superb introduction to these critical final years of the Russian empire. Robert Service, Lenin: A Biography (Cambridge, 2000). The best biography of Lenin, this is a condensed version of his more detailed three-volume study. David Shipler, Russia: Broken Idols, Solemn Dreams (New York, 1983). An insightful and moving account of Soviet lives and individuals in the early 1980s by the New York Times bureau chief. Hedrick Smith, The Russians (New York, 1985). A revised edition of this excellent and fascinating journalistic account of life in Brezhnev’s Russia by an earlier New York Times bureau chief. Mark Steinberg, Voices of Revolution, 1917 (New Haven, 2001). A book that combines introductory essays on the history of the revolution based on the most recent scholarship, a discussion of popular attitudes about the revolution, and full texts of translated letters, appeals, and other writings by lower-class Russians. Richard Stites, Revolutionary Dreams: Utopian Vision and Experimental Life in the Russian Revolution (Oxford, 1985). A fascinating account of the visionary dimensions of the Soviet experiment and their suppression in the 1930s. Ronald G. Suny, The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the Soviet Union, and the Successor States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998). Victor Terras, A History of Russian Literature (New Haven, 1991). Though a bit dry, because it is written as a textbook, this is the best introduction to a wide variety of Russian writers and the cultural contexts in which they worked. Olga Semyonova Tian-Shanskaia, Village Life in Late Tsarist Russia (Bloomington, 1993). The translation of a unique firsthand portrait of peasant life in pre-revolutionary Russia, written by a noted ethnographer. Henri Troyat, Tolstoy (New York, 1967). A dramatic account of Tolstoy’s life that itself reads like a sweeping epic novel. Robert Tucker, Stalin as Revolutionary, 1879–1929 (New York, 1973) and Stalin in Power: The Revolution from Above, 1928–1941 (New York, 1992). The best overall history of Stalin as man and ruler, emphasizing Stalin’s personality and his authoritarian politics. Franco Venturi, The Roots of Revolution (London, 2001). A reprint of a classic history of Russian populist socialism, from Herzen to the terrorists of the People’s Will. Andrzej Walicki, A History of Russian Thought: From the Enlightenment to Marxism (Stanford, 1979). A sophisticated introduction to the history of Russian political, social, and philosophical thought from the time of Catherine II to the 1905 revolution. 37 ©2003 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership Alexander Werth, Russia at War, 1941–1945, 2nd ed. (New York, 1999). A widely acclaimed history and eyewitness account of the Soviet Union in World War II, focusing on both the military history and on the human stories that made the war such a traumatic and compelling time. Werth has been justly criticized for being not sufficiently critical of Stalin. Richard Wortman, Scenarios of Power: Myth and Ceremony in the Russian Monarchy, 2 volumes (Princeton, 1995 and 2000). A brilliant account of the whole history of monarchy in Russia from the perspective of ritual and legitimating myth and what these tell us about the ideology of power in Russia. Supplementary Reading: Ludmilla Alexeyeva, Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for National, Religious and Human Rights (Middletown, 1985). A survey of the variety of Soviet dissident movements. John Barber and Mark Harrison, The Soviet Home Front, 1941–1945: A Social and Economic History of the USSR in World War II (London, 1991). David Bethea, Realizing Metaphors: Alexander Pushkin and the Life of the Poet (Madison, 1998). George Breslauer, Gorbachev and Yeltsin as Leaders (Cambridge, England, 2002) and Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders (London, 1982). A probing analysis of leadership styles and political roles by a political scientist. Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor (Oxford, 1997). Jeffrey Burds, Peasant Dreams and Market Politics: Labor Migration and the Russian Village, 1861–1905 (Pittsburgh, 1998). Paul Bushkovitch, Peter the Great (Oxford, 2001). A concise and tightly argued study of Peter the Great’s domestic reforms, especially his struggle with the conservative aristocratic opposition. Robert Byrnes, Pobedonostsev: His Life and Thought (Bloomington, 1968). Michael Cherniavsky, “Khan or Basileus: An Aspect of Russian Medieval Political Theory,” Journal of the History of Ideas 20 (1959): 459–476. Nikolai Chernyshevsky, What Is to Be Done? (Ithaca, 1989). Perhaps the most influential text written in Russia in the nineteenth century, this novel, written in prison in 1862, offers a fascinating window into the utopian ideals of Russia’s radical intellectuals. Edith Clowes et al., eds., Between Tsar and People: Educated Society and the Quest for Public Identity in Late Imperial Russia (Princeton, 1991). An important collection of essays by scholars exploring different aspects of the rise of a public sphere, especially among educated middle-class Russians. Robert Conquest, The Great Terror (Oxford, 1991). A searing critical account, filled with detailed stories, of Stalin’s terror. R. W. Davies, The Industrialization of Soviet Russia (Cambridge, 1979), 2 volumes. ———, The Socialist Offensive: The Collectivization of Soviet Agriculture, 1929–30 (Cambridge, 1980). James Edie, James Scanlan, and Mary-Barbara Zeldin, Russian Philosophy (Chicago, 1965). Ben Eklof, John Bushnell, and Larissa Zakharova, eds., Russia’s Great Reforms, 1855–1881 (Bloomington, 1994). Barbara Alpern Engel, Between the Fields and the City: Women, Work, and Family in Russia, 1861–1914 (Cambridge, England, 1995). A fascinating social history of the experiences of the impact of industry and urban life on village women, whether or not they migrated to work in industry. Barbara Alpern Engel and Clifford Rosenthal, Five Sisters: Women against the Tsar (Boston, 1987). Laura Engelstein, Moscow, 1905 (Stanford, 1982). John Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad: Stalin’s War with Germany (New York, 1975) and The Road to Berlin (Boulder, 1983). The best scholarly history of the Soviet role in World War II. Sheila Fitzpatrick, Stalin’s Peasants: Resistance and Survival in the Russian Village after Collectivization (Oxford, 1994). A pioneering social history of the Soviet countryside after collectivism, which reveals much about the texture of everyday life in the countryside and the structures of conformity and resistance. ———, The Cultural Front: Power and Culture in Revolutionary Russia (Ithaca, 1992). ©2003 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 38 , ed., Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1928–1931 (Bloomington, 1978). An influential collection of scholarly essays that explore upheavals in the professions during Stalin’s first five-year plan. A revisionist work that focuses on the complex social history of the Stalinist revolution. Sheila Fitzpatrick, Alexander Rabinowitch, and Richard Stites, eds., Russia in the Era of NEP (Bloomington, 1991). A superb collection of scholarly essays on varied aspects of the NEP era, especially social and cultural. Stephen Frank, Crime, Cultural Conflict, and Justice in Rural Russia, 1856–1914 (Berkeley, 1999). A deeply researched study of the unknown world of crime and justice in rural Russia and what this reveals about peasant life and culture and peasant relations with the state and social elites. J. Arch Getty and Roberta Manning, eds., Stalinist Terror (Cambridge, England, 1993). Israel Getzler, Martov: A Political Biography of a Russian Social Democrat (Cambridge, England, 1967). David Glantz and Jonathan House, When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler (Lawrence, 1988). Abbott Gleason, Young Russia: The Genesis of Russian Radicalism in the 1860s (New York, 1980). Leopold Haimson, The Russian Marxists and the Origins of Bolshevism (Boston, 1955). A fascinating study of the personalities and ideologies of the leading MarxistsLenin, Plekhanov, Akselrod, and Martovwho most shaped Marxism in Russia and the split between Bolshevism and Menshevism. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, The February Revolution: Petrograd, 1917 (Seattle, 1981). Alexander Herzen, My Past and Thoughts (Berkeley, 1999). An extraordinary, brilliantly written firsthand account of Russian life, his own experiences, and the rise of the early nineteenth-century intelligentsia by one of its leaders. It has often been described as one of the greatest autobiographies ever written. Steven Hoch, Serfdom and Social Control in Russia (Chicago, 1986). The best account of life on a serf estate in the nineteenth century. Lindsey Hughes, Russia in the Age of Peter the Great (New Haven, 1998). The most important study of Peter the Great, one that views Peter’s policies in the context of his times. W. Gareth Jones, Nikolay Novikov: Enlightener of Russia (Cambridge, 1984). Donald H. Kaiser, ed., The Workers Revolution in Russia, 1917 (Cambridge, England, 1987). Daniel Kaiser and Gary Marker, eds., Reinterpreting Russian History: Readings, 860s–1860s (York, 1994). An excellent selection of original documents and interpretive writings covering state structure, economy, society, and daily life in Russia. Catriona Kelly and David Shepherd, eds., Constructing Russian Culture in the Age of Revolution, 1881–1940 (Oxford, 1998). An innovative and insightful collection of collaboratively written essays by historians and literary scholars on aspects of Russian and Soviet cultural life, ranging from consumerism to art and literature. George Kline, Religious and Anti-Religious Thought in Russia (Chicago, 1968). Still the best account of various religious movements in imperial Russia, including God-seeking and God-building. Vasili Kliuchevsky, Peter the Great (New York, 1958). Diane Koenker, William Rosenberg, and Ronald Suny, eds., Party, State, and Society in the Russian Civil War (Bloomington, 1989). An excellent collection of scholarly articles on the civil war era, offering new interpretations on politics and society. Peter Kolchin, Unfree Labor: American Slavery and Russian Serfdom (Cambridge, MA, 1987). A fascinating comparison of the social lives and forms of resistance by American slaves and Russian serfs in the early nineteenth century. Stephen Kotkin, Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970–2000 (Oxford, 2001). An interpretation of the end of Communism, focusing on the unintended consequences and ironies of reformist efforts. Peter Lavrov, Historical Letters (Berkeley, 1967). Moshe Lewin, Russian Peasants and Soviet Power: A Study of Collectivization (New York, 1968). W. Bruce Lincoln, In the Vanguard of Reform: Russia’s Enlightened Bureaucrats, 1825–1861 (DeKalb, 1986). An important study of often-neglected tsarist officials: the enlightened officials who helped shape the great reforms. Isabel de Madariaga, Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great (New Haven, 1981). A masterly study of Catherine and her reign. 39 ©2003 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership Vladimir Markov, Russian Futurism: A History (Berkeley, 1968). Evan Mawdsley, The Russian Civil War (Boston, 1987). Allen McConnell, Tsar Alexander I: Paternalistic Reformer (New York, 1970). Michael McFaul, Russia’s Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin (Ithaca, 2001). An important account and interpretation of the efforts to create a democratic policy and society in Russia, beginning with Gorbachev’s reforms. James Millar, ed., Politics, Work, and Daily Life in the USSR (New York, 1987). Nikolai Novikov, “On Man’s High Estate,” in Russian Intellectual History: An Anthology (New York, 1966). Irina Paperno, Chernyshevsky and the Age of Realism: A Study in the Semiotics of Behavior (Stanford, 1988). Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution (New York, 1990). An important interpretive history of the origins and consequences of the revolution, written from a highly critical perspective. Konstantin Pobedonostsev, Reflections of a Russian Statesman (Ann Arbor, 1965). Philip Pomper, The Russian Revolutionary Intelligentsia (Arlington Heights, IL, 1970). Alexander Rabinowitch, The Bolsheviks Come to Power (New York, 1976). A very important account of the Bolshevik revolution that focuses on the party and its success in building a constituency and responding to conditions. Marc Raeff, Catherine the Great: A Profile (New York, 1972). ———, The Decembrist Movement (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1966). An excellent selection of documents with an insightful introductory essay by one of the best historians of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. , The Origins of the Intelligentsia: The Eighteenth-Century Nobility (New York, 1966). A brilliant and fascinating account of the changing world of the eighteenth-century Russian nobility, focusing on relations to the state, home life, education, and the impact of Western ideas. Peter Reddaway, ed., Uncensored Russia: Protest and Dissent in the Soviet Union (New York, 1972). Christopher Read, Religion, Revolution, and the Russian Intelligentsia (Totowa, 1979). Nicholas Riasanovsky, Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia, 1825–1855 (Berkeley, 1959). The best study of Nicholas I, especially of the ideological ideas that inspired his policies. , A Parting of the Ways: Government and the Educated Public in Russia, 1801–1855 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976). An intelligent and thoughtful account of trends in political and social dissent in early nineteenth- century Russia. Nancy Ries, Russian Talk: Culture and Conversation during Perestroika (Ithaca, 1997). A wonderful study by an American anthropologist, on the basis of field work in Moscow, exploring themes in everyday conversation and how these reflect and shape Russian identity and culture. Bernice Glatzer Rosenthal, The Occult in Russian and Soviet Culture (Ithaca, 1997). Andrei Sakharov, Sakharov Speaks (New York, 1974). Lewis Siegelbaum, Soviet State and Society between Revolutions, 1918–1929 (Cambridge, England, 1992). An excellent survey, based on recent research, of issues and themes in early Soviet political and social history. Lewis Siegelbaum and Andrei Sokolov, eds., Stalinism as a Way of Life (New Haven, 2000). Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, “Matryona’s Home,” in Patricia Blake and Max Hayward, eds., Half-way to the Moon (New York, 1964). Mark D. Steinberg, Proletarian Imagination: Self, Modernity, and the Sacred in Russia, 1910–1925 (Ithaca, 2002). An unusual exploration of ideas and values in late-Imperial and early Soviet Russia through the prism of poetry and other writings by urban lower-class Russians. Mark D. Steinberg and Vladimir Khrustalev, The Fall of the Romanovs: Political Dreams and Personal Struggles in a Time of Revolution (New Haven, 1995). A study and collection of documents on the last tsar from the revolution to his execution. Ronald G. Suny, The Structure of Russian History: Essays and Documents (Oxford, 2003). ©2003 The Teaching Company Limited Partnership 40 Gerald Surh, 1905 in St. Petersburg (Stanford, 1989). Abram Terts (Andrei Sinyavsky), Strolls with Pushkin (New Haven, 1993). William Mills Todd, III, Fiction and Society in the Age of Pushkin: Ideology, Institutions and Narrative (Cambridge, MA, 1986). Robert C. Tucker, ed., The Lenin Anthology (New York, 1975). An essential collection of Lenin’s most important writings. George Vernadsky, Ralph Fisher, et al., eds., A Source Book for Russian History from Early Times to 1917, 3 volumes (New Haven, 1972). The best collection of translated original documents, organized chronologically and by topic. Andrew Verner, The Crisis of Russian Autocracy: Nicholas II and the 1905 Revolution (Princeton, 1990). An insightful study of Nicholas II’s personality and ideology, especially as visible during the crisis of 1905. Andrzej Walicki, The Slavophile Controversy: History of a Conservative Utopia in Nineteenth-Century Russian Thought (Oxford, 1975). Cynthia Whittaker, The Origins of Modern Russian Education: An Intellectual Biography of Count Sergei Uvarov, 1786–1855 (DeKalb, 1984). Allan Wildman, The End of the Russian Imperial Army, 2 volumes (Princeton, 1980 and 1987). A magisterial study of soldiers and the army during the first world war and the 1917 revolution. Christine Worobec, Peasant Russia (DeKalb, 1995). A pathbreaking study on peasant life in the decades immediately following emancipation, focusing on community, gender, and family. Reginald Zelnik, ed., A Radical Worker in Tsarist Russia: The Autobiography of Semen Ivanovich Kanatchikov (Stanford, 1986). An exceptional autobiography, introduced by a leading historian of Russian labor, of a Bolshevik metal worker, describing his personal, social, and political transformations. Web Sites:Russian History. An extensive index by Robert Beard of Bucknell University, with many sites devoted to Russian history. Particularly recommended is the Chronology of Russian History, which includes many hypertext links.The Face of Russia. A Web site developed in connection with a PBS program on Russian history, which includes an interactive timeline and hundreds of images, movies, and audio tracks.Russian Painting. A site covering the history of Russian art, with many visual examples and excellent short descriptions of periods and artists.Lotman Institute for Russian and Soviet Culture. A German site with an excellent collection of Russian and Soviet posters and portraits. 41 ©2003