To what extent did the legislative structure of Czechoslovakia under the Husák regime contribute to the breakup of Czechs and Slovaks?
Investigation plan
To what extent did the legislative structure of Czechoslovakia under the Husák regime contribute to the breakup of Czechs and Slovaks?
This research examines the relationships between the two main ethnical groups living in the federative Czechoslovakia before it broke up. The Czech-Slovak relations were influenced by many factors before the final split. However this research is focused to examine only the influence of the legislative structure of the Husák’s centralised federalism in communistic Czechoslovakia.
Czech historian Rychlík’s Rozpad Československa was used as the primary source, providing a deep overview of the disintegration of Czechoslovakia. Pollák, chronicler of the former Slovak president as well as Pavol Dubček, son of Alexander Dubček, were interviewed. Secondary sources, the majority of which are Czech and Slovakian, will be used to provide insight from books, newspapers and various statistics to analyse the relationships between the two nations in Czechoslovakia under Husák’s rule.
(Investigation Plan- 148 words)
Summary of evidence
Czechoslovakia at its establishment after the Pittsburgh Agreement was an artificial state contradicting the idea of self-determination as it included many nations, including the majority Czechs and Slovaks. [1] First president T. G. Masaryk denied self-determination for Slovaks stating “The Slovaks are Bohemians in spite of their using their dialect as their literary language”[2]. Leff called the policies of Czech politicians the assimilation of Slovaks under a common umbrella of Czechoslovakism.[3] Goebbels in the dying days of the Third Reich had prophesised that Czechoslovakia would become “the organising centre of Bolshevik plots against Europe.”[4] Indeed, Czechoslovakia finally fell under the direct rule of Moscow after the February 1948 coup.[5] During the time of so-called normalization post-1969[6], Head of State Husák declared his intention to return to the idea of “real socialism”.[7] Although communists proclaimed themselves the biggest nationalists,[8] the legislative structure of federation during this time exacerbated national problems between Czechs and Slovaks. The conflicts, which had their origins during Husák’s regime, culminated in final the separation of these nations in 1992, were:
1. Social
Because Marxist-Leninism could not justify the connection of Czechs and Slovaks in one nation because it emphasised national traditions over communist ideology, legislative restrictions were partially based on emphasizing common ideas of Czechoslovakism,[9] while ideas of self-determination were forbidden. [10] For Czechs this negated the ideas of Masaryk and Beneš since they asserted Slovaks were a part of Czech culture, while Slovaks were denied studying Hlinka and Tiso, supporters of independence.[11] This censorship was ensured by having teachers and professors appointed after strict verification by the Czechoslovak Communist Party (KSČ) and by state directives which allowed work from ‘forbidden’ authors to be read only after special authorisation, which was practically impossible to get.[12] This ultimately caused both sides to feel denied of their national history and to subsequently blame each other.
2. Political
Furthermore, the ‘federative’ system in Czechoslovakia, modelled on the USSR, caused Czechs and Slovaks to have unequal powers which limited the real meaning of federation.[13] Although both Czechs and Slovaks had their own governments[14], from 1970 the decisions of these governments could be vetoed by the federative government under restrictions of the KSČ led from Prague.[15] De facto, other institutions were directly subordinate to Prague’s KSČ, such as the Slovak Communist Party (KSS), various ministries[16], Slovak National Council (SNR), National Front (NF), army, security institutions, or courts.[17] Members and plenums of these institutions were fully organised by the KSČ. Even the results of ‘elections’ of Slovakia’s federative government and KSS were decided in Prague before actual elections, because the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (ÚV KSČ) was arranging all three governments in Czechoslovakia.[18] Čarnogurský argues Slovaks were not a real part of this federation having lost control over Slovakia and its internal affairs.[19]
3. Economic
Finally, economic measures under Husák were unequal. Slovak economist Slavo Koštúch stated as early as 1971: “You are saying that we are brothers, but our wallets are not sisters.”[20] Slovakian economists agreed that the country’s budget, depending on Slovakian money through the highest taxes of all socialist countries[21], were charged from Slovakian industries with only a miniscule amount returning to Slovakia; the rest being spent on Czech infrastructure and rebuilding the capital city.[22] This strengthened the view that Slovakia was economically exploited by Czechs and Moravians. Czech economists such as Komárek, Zeman and Klaus [23] retorted that the economy in fact suffered because Czech was providing enormous amounts of money to Slovakia rather than rebuilding the ‘homeland’.[24] This caused both sides to feel that the federation was inefficient and exploitative.
(Summary of evidence- 597 words)
Evaluation of sources
Czech historian Jan Rychlík’s, Rozpad Československa: Česko-slovenské vzťahy was published in Slovakia in 2002 with the stated purpose of analysing the causes for the disintegration of Czechoslovakia.[25] Rychlík took full advantage of the opening of the Soviet and Czechoslovakian archives and the first-hand experiences of Czechoslovak politicians[26] who provided him interviews, to support his argument. However the archives were not fully profitable for research given that Slovakia does not allow documents within the last 30 years to be made public and not all documents in the Czech Republic were available in the public archive. [27] His analysis of the relations between Czechs and Slovaks is helped by the fact that he studied and worked in both countries. During Husák’s regime, he experienced the impact of communism on Czechoslovakia first-hand. Given that his main focus of the book is analysing of the last three years of federation (1989-1992), he tends to gloss over important events of the 1970s and 1980s which later influenced events.
Pavol Pollák, a Slovakian politician in communist-era Czechoslovakia, was Alexander Dubček’s collaborator from the start of the latter’s political career until his ‘disappearance’. His specialty was mainly within the Soviet-Czechoslovak communication sphere.[28] After disintegration he worked as a chronicler for Slovakian president Kováč. The purpose of the interview was to gauge the view of a politician in the position of providing a unique and personal analysis of the impact of communist legislation on Czech-Slovak relations, particularly given his role over such a long period of time. As a chronicler in the presidential agency, he had access to the national and communist archives, which were opened after 1992. While acknowledging his support of a common Czechoslovak federation, he admits disagreeing with Husák’s centralised model of federation which at times colours his opinions of a number of the sources. A number of topics, including comparison of Husák’s and Dubček’s government, were not fully open to discussion given his continued loyalty to the latter.
(Evaluation of sources- 323 word)
Analysis
The Husák era was most important in the history of the Czechoslovak nations because it marked the start of normalisation up to abolition of communism in the USSR, leading to the division of for the first time in 460 years.[29] Far from strengthening and ‘normalising’ Czechoslovakia, the hard-line rule of Gustav Husák created even more internal conflicts, leading to final disintegration in 1992.
The structure of the state should be studied when considering its legislation. Although Czechoslovakia was a federation, it was still a communist state based on the centralistic model of the USSR federation with the centre in Prague.[30] Nevertheless, Husák’s state did not seek to assimilate Slovaks under the common culture of Czechoslovakism as happened in the Soviet model with non-Russian nationalities, but sought good relations under the motto qietum non movere while propagating socialism as the best solution for solving the Czech-Slovak ‘question’.[31]
Although both nations in Czechoslovakia felt their national historical identities threatened during the communist era, Czech and Slovak cultures were strengthened in many ways. The similar languages helped Czechoslovaks to be naturally bilingual since the mass-media provided information in both languages, such as national television CSTV.[32] Abolition of national festivals such as 28th September and 29th August, and emphasising the “Czechoslovakia’s Day of Liberation by Soviet troops” created common customs and cultures for both nations resulting in a Czechoslovak culture containing two subcultures which were mutually interconnected creating a European country in times of peaceful internal stability appear strong and united[33].
Most agree that Slovaks never had the power to run their own internal affairs at any time in their history stretching back four centuries,[34] but Steiner argues that under Husák, Slovakia was finally regarded as a separate part of the national unit and administrative region.[35] From the time of normalization, Husák, a Slovak, was head of the KSČ and also president of Czechoslovakia; it appeared to many that the Slovaks were actually the ones “running the show”.[36] Besides Husák, the government included many other Slovaks in important positions[37], although they were in the minority according to the proportional division of government, which allowed 1500 Slovaks to 4500 Czechs in new federal institutions.[38] These views created the opinion among Czechs that they were ruled by the minority, antagonising Czech-Slovak relations. Nevertheless, the KSČ had the power to deny decisions of both national governments when it felt it was necessary to run the federation.[39] Slovak Husák himself could not be considered to have worked for Slovakian prosperity; although his 1969 motto was “Slovakia for Slovakians” emphasising the Slovak nationality,[40] the opposite became true. He did not give Slovaks their promised constitution or national arms and in public he only spoke Czech, leading to the Slovakian complaint that he was a “Prague Slovak”.[41]
Thirdly, both nations in the common federation felt that the economical measures of the legislation are unfair. High transfer of resources from Czech lands to Slovakia, which was the reason for dissatisfaction of Czechs, was caused by the big gap between living conditions in both republics, which had to be eliminated.[42] Nevertheless, it is important to consider that it is difficult to follow the financial flows in Czechoslovakia in that era because of common federative budget, so it is hard to arbitrate between ‘exploiting’ of Slovak economy and ‘suffering’ of Czech one. It is important to consider that Czechoslovak economy was working as uniform economy of one state, and it is necessary and natural even today that the ‘richer’ parts of one country have to supply ‘poorer’ ones, such as also ‘poorer’ parts of the country have to pay taxes even though the infrastructure of the ‘richer’ part could profit from these taxes more.[43] So the whole economic conflict was just artificially made up as the result of the high tension between two nations living in the same state.
Conclusion
The hard-line communist regime in Czechoslovakia occurred during so-called normalization of Czechoslovakia after Gustav Husák became the first secretary of the KSČ in 1969. The legislative measures and restrictions of this regime caused disagreements about some national, political and economical questions between Czechs and Slovaks in the common state. Both nations were felt to be denied for their national spirit, felt to be aggrieved because of the division of powers and felt to suffer because of the economical measures in the communist Czechoslovakia. These were also some of the causes that led to the final division of these two ‘brotherly’ nations after Husák left the position of head of the state and after the fall of communism in November 1989, when the separation was possible, since Czechoslovakia was not anymore occupied by the soviet troops[44] and under influence of the USSR. However, legislation in this communist regime did not have only negative influence on the relationships between Czechs and Slovaks and living conditions in Czechoslovakia, since the big part of the nation was finally against the separation of this federation.[45]
List of sources
Bibliography
• Brager, L. B.: The Iron Curtain: The Cold War in Europe. Philadelphia 2004
• Cottrell, C. R.: The Czech Republic- Arbitrary Borders. Philadelphia 2005
• Hochman, J.: Nádej zomiera posledná Bratislava 1993
• Hradecka, V. - Koudelka, F.: Kádrova politika a nomenklatúra KSČ. Prague 1998
• Hubl, M.: Cesty k moci. Prague 1990
• Kirschbaum, S. J.: A History of Slovakia: The Struggle for Survival. New York 1995
• Kishlansky M. – Geary P. - O’Brien P.: Societies and Cultures in World History. New York 1995
• Leff, Skalnik, C.: National Conflict in Czechoslovakia. Princeton 1988
• Lettrich, J.: History of Modern Slovakia New York 1955
• Millar R. J.: Politics, Work, and Daily Life in the USSR Cambridge 1988
• Millar, R. J. – Wolchik, L. S.: The Social Legacy of Communism Washington 1997
• Naďovič, S.: Foertsch H. - Karacsony, I. - Ostrowski, Z.: The Great Withdrawal. Bratislava 2005
• Nejedlý, Z.: Komunisté- dedici velkých tradic českého národa. 4. ed. Prague 1951
• Nogueres, H.: Munich, Peace for Our Time. New York 1965
• Plevza, V.: Historie československé současnosti. Prague 1978
• Roberts J. M.: The Penguin History of the World London 1997
• Rychlík, J.: Rozpad Československa: Česko-slovenské vzťahy. Bratislava 2002
• Šaling, S. – Šalingová Ivanová, M. – Manikova, Z.: Slovník cudzích slov. Bratislava 2002
• Steiner, E.: The Slovak Dilemma. London 1973
• Tkáč, M.: Národ bez peňazí. Bratislava 1992
• Tomašek, D.: Pozor, Cenzurováno. Prague 1994
• Wessel, S. M.: Loyalitaten in Tsechoslowakischen Republic 1918-1938. Munich 2004
• Žatkuliak, J.: Normalizácia česko-slovenskej federácie roku 1970 a jej následky. Banská Bystrica 1997
Newspapers
• Journal Alternativa: “Interview with Jan Čarnogurský” 2/1989
• The New York Times: "Prague Turns on Those Who Brought the 'Spring'", Tagliabue, John 24 Feb. 1992
• Journal Pravda: “The structure of the federative government” 27. Feb. 1969
Internet
• Danielle Seiler: Czechoslovakia: A state of perceived bias. 28 April 1998,
• Policy research department of the World Bank: Cash social transfers, direct taxes, and income distribution in late socialism. September 1993,
• The sociological institute SAV Bratislava: Československá Česká a Slovenská európska identita. April 2002,
• Open society archives: Eastern Europe’s Communist Leaders. 1 September 1966,
Interviews
• Dubček P., interview held during personal meeting, 14th July 2007, Bratislava, Slovakia
• Pollák P., interview held during meeting in his apartment, 2nd August, Bratislava, Slovakia
Appendix A1
Abbreviations used in the assessment
• FZ- (Federálne Zhromaždenie) Federal Congress
• CNR- (Česká Národní Rada) Czech National Council
• KSČ- (Komunistická Strana Československa) Communist Party of Czechoslovakia
• KSS- (Komunistická Strana Slovenska) Communist Party of Slovakia
• ÚV KSČ- (Ústredný Výbor Komunistickej Strany Československa) Central Committee of Communist Party of Czechoslovakia
• SNR- (Slovenská Národná Rada) Slovak National Council
• NF- (Národná Fronta) National Front
[1] Lettrich (p. 289)
[2] Masaryk propagated that Slovaks are actually the same nation as Czechs. He wanted to include Slovaks, a ‘tribe’, under the Czech culture. Kirschbaum (p. 149)
[3] Skalnik Leff (p. 136)
[4] Nogueres (p. 249-251)
[5] The communist coup in the last non-communist country in Eastern Europe destroyed all beliefs for Czechoslovakia’s independence. Roberts (p. 939)
[6] Hochman (p. 212) called it a step back to totalitarian Czechoslovakia after promising democratisation by Dubček in 1968 during Prague Spring. The resulting Soviet invasion was already the second betrayal by allies (the first one was Munich 1938) resulted in the most cynic joke in Czechoslovakia: “Every Czech knows what is the luckiest country in the world: Israel, because it is surrounded only by enemies” Brager (p. 99)
[7] “Real socialism” supposed to eliminate the ‘mistakes’ made during the Prague Spring. It was used as the reason to made KSČ centralised and autocratic. Rychlík (p. 15)
[8] According to Nejdlý (p. 71) Marxism proclaimed that “proletariat does not have homeland”, however the communism after 1945 which came to Eastern Europe and Asia was contrary, since it was based on ideas of patriotism, independence and national unity.
[9] Wessel (p. 23) states that Czechoslovakism was a political ideology from the first Czechoslovak republic (1918-1938), which stated that Czechs and Slovaks are one Czechoslovak nation including two ‘tribes’. Cottrell (p. 56) continues that the constitution of 1920 deemed “Czechoslovak” as the official language of the new republic, and designed Slovaks as “state people”, not members of a national minority.
[10] Dubček P., interview, 2nd August 2007
[11] According to secret directive of the Ministry of culture from 31 May 1972, all books that could called as ‘harmful’ or ‘revisionist’ were forbidden for public- Rychlík (p. 20)
[12] According to Tomašek (p. 154-155) this supposed to guarantee that no public discussions, which could disrupt the Czech-Slovak relations, will be held.
[13] Real meaning of Czechoslovak world federácia (federation) meant- “political connection of two or more states with equality before one constitution and where each state has the control of its internal affairs”, however this wasn’t the case. Šaling- Ivanová Šalingová- Maníková (p. 191)
[14] Czechs had ČNR- Česká Národní Rada, while Slovaks had SNR- Slovenská Národná Rada
[15] Therefore the real meaning of “federation” had been lost. Real Czechoslovak federation would have two non-subordinate political bodies like it was in Tito’s Yugoslavia. Rychlík (p. 26)
[16] Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Industry Development and Ministry of Internal Affairs were indeed subordinated to KSČ
[17] This gave Husák power to appoint ‘his people’ for the important positions in the state institutions. Hradecká (p. 97) An analogy could be the way how Stalin came to absolute power in the Soviet Union, which was also through these powers and connections.
[18] Rychlík (p.29) provides the example: Jozef Lenárt was announced to be the new secretary of KSS even before the actual elections. Indeed, as Pollák related to me, the political results of all elections were a foregone conclusion as the communist party always obtained more than 99% of the votes (interview, 2nd August 2007).
[19] “With federation we received formal coequality in the state, but still cannot solve our internal affairs by ourselves, because communism does not allow it. This overshadows all the assets of federation. By assets I mean national affairs, the nation should solve by itself, such as mainly education, culture, or partially economy.” Journal Alternativa, 2/1989, p. 41
[20] Koštúch- after KSČ declined the idea of two independent economies in the federation. Hubl (p.42-43)
[21] Direct and payroll taxes of some socialist countries in 1980s can be seen in Table 2- Appendix A2
[22] Tkáč (126) discusses that while central government was locating not profitable primary industry businesses to Slovakia, the secondary and tertiary industry of the federation was located mainly in Czech lands, so naturally Czech lands profited more money from the material that Slovakia produced.
[23] All would later become Czech politicians while arguing about the perceived exploitation of the Czech economy by Slovakia and thus justifying Czech independence. Pavol Pollák, interview 2nd August 2007
[24] The transfer of resources from the Czech lands to Slovak region can be seen in Table 2 in Appendix A2
[25] In author’s own words, the period of the federation during normalization with the final years of disintegration in 1989-1992 are the most important things to analyse to understand the Czech- Slovak relationships- Rychlík (p. 9)
[26] In particular Petr Pithard, Ján Čarnorurský, Václav Žák, Martin Porubjak, Mikuláš Huba, Anton Hrnko, Jacek Balouch, Gyorgy Varga and others
[27] Therefore Rychlík could not use the national archives for the research of 1980s and 90s. This made him use mainly private archives and the archives of non-governmental organisations. Jan Rychlík (p. 9)
[28] Pollák also was previously a member of Interhelpo, which included more than a thousand idealistic Czechoslovak Communists who formed an industrial cooperation with the Soviet Union which remained in existence until 1943- http://www.osa.ceu.hu/files/holdings/300/8/3/text/17-3-143.shtml
[29] Except the period of WWII when Czech lands were occupied by the Nazi Germany, both nations were in one country since 1526 when Ferdinand I included Czech lands into Habsburg monarchy
[30] However, Žatkuliak (p.251) states that the ideas of communism and a federation are contradictory. While communism is based on so-called democratic centralism with subordination lower party sections to higher ones like in army, federation requires division of powers.
[31] Normalisation historian Plevza (p. 36-42) states that the important moment, the creation of Czechoslovakia, was destroyed because of bureaucratic politicians (Masaryk, Beneš) who made Czechoslovakia easily destroyable by Germany. The communist putsch in 1948 opened the doors for the right solution for Czech-Slovak relations, however it still had some small ‘mistakes’ (Dubček). After 1968, KSČ finally realised the right Marxist-Leninists policies in national questions.
[32] The good example for importance of language could be seen here in China, where all the movies have Mandarin subtitles, so all the ethnical minorities speaking different dialects can understand them.
[33] Same nation cultures and same everyday problems in both republics created apparently one solid nation. However, big social and political changes in 1980s and 90s actually showed that the common national awareness was actually weak. Rychlík (p. 25)
[34] Kishlansky- Geary- O’Brien (p. 981) stated that Slovaks were never accepted as a national unit running own internal affairs. During Habsburg’s monarchy, word “Slovaks” were not even used, then during the first Czechoslovak Republic (1918-1948) there was only Czechoslovak nation, not Slovak one, and even during the short period during the World War II, when Slovakia declared independence, Tiso made agreement with Hitler according to which Slovakia was like a protectorate of Nazi Germany.
[35] Slovaks were recognised as a different nation and national unit and had their own government (SNR) according to Steiner (p. 41)
[36] Leff (p. 251). An analogy today could be Scot-educated Tony Blair and Scot Gordon Brown running #s 10 and 11 Downing St while the Midlothian question allows for Scotland to have a say in English issues.
[37] Slovaks- Minister of Foreign Affairs was Chnoupek, his deputy Nálepka, Minister of National Security Dzúr, Minister of Foreign Trades Barčák and the Ministries of Industry Stancel and Bahýl.- Rychlík (p.31)
[38] However, it was problematic to maintain this ratio since three out of seven ministries in the federation crated in 1969 maintained already from 1960s, where Czechs were in clear superiority. Pravda, 27. 2. 1969
[39] However even Slovak politician Karol Laco defends this veto power of the KSČ, so the common politics of Czechoslovakia were able to be achieved Rychlík (p. 27)
[40] Ibid (p. 33)
[41] However Pollák stated that Husák could not afford strengthening of Slovak patriotism, because it would result in destabilisation of internal affairs and bad image in the view of Moscow. For Husák it was much more profitable to be the head of whole Czechoslovakia, than to be just a head of ‘poor’ Slovakia.
[42] E.g. the income per capita gap in 1948 was 40% between Czech Lands and Slovakia, however thanks to the transfer of resources, in 1970s this gap was reduces to half- http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-42098-14735/unrestricted/etd.pdf. According to Millar and Wolchik, in book The social legacy of communism (p. 219), under Husák Czechoslovakia was socially and economically one of the best socialist countries. See Appendix A2 Table 3. However, Millar in his other book, Politics, work, and daily life in the USSR (p. 172), argues that the social position of Czechoslovak citizens was one of the worst from all the Eastern European countries in 1980s, since Czechoslovakia was the most egalitarian from all the countries.
[43] Rychlík (p. 43) argues that these financial supplies are negligible in one-nation country, however because of high tension between Czechs and Slovaks, politicians often used the economic reasons to accuse the other side.
[44] The last soviet soldier in Czechoslovakia, Colonel General Eduard Vorobiov left Czechoslovakia in Jun 21 1991. Naďovič- Foertsch- Karacsony- Ostrowski (p. 88)
[45] In 1993, only one year after Czechoslovakia was separated, more than 40 % of the nation assessed the separation of these two nations as negative. see Appendix A3
Would Czechoslovakia have succeeded if they would had fought against Hitler’s invasion in 1939?
Word Count: 220
“Would Czechoslovakia have succeeded if they would had fought against Hitler’s invasion in 1939?” furthering an investigation into the extent that Czechoslovakia could have succeeded in defeating the Germans. Evaluating this question, an important factor is the political circumstances of Czechoslovakia’s allies as their lack of support was a deciding factor in the Czech army’s decision, further discussed in Donald Watt’s book. Another insightful source is an interview conducted with the Czech Army General Jan Syrový during 1968 in remembrance of the 30th anniversary of the Munich Agreement in 1938, which gives us a first had insight into the inner circle of the Czech Army during these crucial months.
[1]Source A: “How War Came: The immediate origins of the Second World War 1938-1939” written by Donald Cameron Watt and published in the UK in August 1989
John Keegan reviewed this book as an “unquestionable masterpiece” and “certain to be read for as long as people seek to explain the European tragedy of 1939”. Watt was an accredited British professor and official cabinet Historian known for being able to summarise historical events with great accuracy. The value in being an official cabinet historian was that he had the ability to access a lot of British evidence which many others did not. Seeing as Britain was also involved with the decision of Czechoslovakia’s fate, the access to primary sources holds great value. Watt’s book closely examines the diplomatic atmosphere during the crucial 11 month-period between 1938 and 1939, following the Munich conference in September 1938. Seeing as he has confined his writing to a short period over a couple of months, he develops a very focused analysis of why this time period was decisive in Czechoslovakia’s history and the key events that influenced their decision. Watt approaches this through the eyes of the leaders of the nations involved and uses the information from official records[2], private papers and biographies of those who took part in the process. Through him collecting his information from a variety of sources, he was able to strongly identify the inadequacy of the key players in extraordinary detail. Continuing, by further explaining why Czechoslovakia was left alone without support. Hence why, the purpose of him identifying the wrong doings of others and examine how this created a domino-effect of events is successfully demonstrated through his insightful, original and gripping analysis. Therefore, using this source to establish an account of European diplomacy, specifically the other powers involvement in evaluating the question, would provide a comprehensive and explicit insight into the inner workings and political motifs during this time.
[3]Source B: Interview with Army General Jan Syrový published in October 1968 in “Časopisu Reportér” (Report Magazine)
Army General Jan Syrový was the general inspector of the Czechoslovak Army between December 1933 and September 22nd 1938, after which he was appointed Chairman of the new Czechoslovak Government. The interview was released in the 38th issue of “Report Magazine”[4] in October 1968, dedicated to the 30th anniversary of the Munich agreement. In his Interview, he shows the progression the Czech army went through at the time from when they agreed to attempt to fight back until their later grasp on reality. He provides a transparent view into the mind-set of the army during this time and what hindered them from fighting back. The purpose of his interview was to give an in-depth view, exposing personal recounts, of the events leading up to Germany’s occupation in Czechoslovakia. Sharing this through a magazine 30 years after the event is meant to be eye-opening to the public so that they also are able to gain insight into why the army failed to protect their country and what their intentions were. Furthermore, while there is statistical information about the events surrounding Czechoslovakia in 1939, there is a lack of sources that exemplify the emotions of the Czech-Slovak people and army. However, this interview displays not only the morale of the soldiers, but also shows how an army general was treated after Hitler’s takeover, which furthers our understanding of Hitler’s neglect for Czech people, including high ranking officials.
Investigation
Growing up in Czech Republic, the word Munich was often regarded as a sentiment for betrayal towards the Czech people. In 1938, Hitler proclaimed his path to his more ambitious plan of the occupation of Central Europe, which resulted in the four great powers, Britain, France, Italy and Germany meeting in Munich on September 29th. The betrayal came forth through Hitler’s demands being appeased, allowing him to annex areas of Czechoslovakia, sealing their fate. However, when Germany marched into Czechoslovakia, the Czechs held significant military and geographical advantages, hence this investigation into the question as to why they didn’t attempt to fight back and resist Hitler’s army.
A crucial aspect to Czechoslovakia’s decision was Germany’s military and political capabilities and intentions as this played a significant role in preventing the Czechs from fighting back. Hitler claimed his threat of invasion was due to this interest in helping the three million people of German descent living in Czechoslovakia, however the German-born historian Gerhard Weinberg, argues that his intensions rather lay in isolating Czechoslovakia from the outside support[5] and gain more manpower for additional army divisions to allow for an easier seizure of Eastern European territory. Yet, Hitler’s first threat to invade was soon retracted, mainly because of the possibility that the British and French would fight if Germany attacked Czechoslovakia.[6]In June Hitler had told Keitel that he would attack Czechoslovakia only if “I am firmly convinced, as in the case of the demilitarized zone and the entry into Austria, that France will not march, and that therefore Britain will not intervene”.[7] Ian Kershaw argues, that Hitler regarded Munich as a defeat as he was forced to agree to pull back at the end of September 1938.[8] This meant Hitler would have attempted to redeem himself and therefore find an alternate route to achieve what he wanted. Furthermore, Germany had just forcefully united Austria and Germany through the Anschluss that occurred in 1938 which gave them access to three quarters of the Czech’s long frontier to attack.[9] Austria also offered much needed iron, alongside other raw materials and supplies of labour which would further support their attack on Czechoslovakia.[10]
While Germany’s intentions were clear, Czechoslovakia attained significant advantages over them which could have aided them in choosing to retaliate. One of the main debates around why Czechoslovakia didn’t attempt to fight Germany, is because of the Czech’s military capabilities. They were a major arms manufacturer[11] and had a modern army of twenty-five divisions, therefore if Hitler had carried out his threat and German forces crossed the border, resistance seemed possible and desirable, mainly between the Czechoslovak generals and political leaders. So what prevented them from fighting back? Jaroslav Hrbek, being a military historian, offered a direct insight into the militaristic capabilities, in arguing that it was a mistake not to fight, even without the support of the Western allies.[12] He states that those who did not support the British and French government, “the other half”, would have wanted to go to war. Evidently Czech Republic’s military was well resourced as they had excellent tanks, well trained soldiers, elite Legionaries from WW1, very experienced generals, great morale and great fortification.[13] During the Czech crisis in 1938, the German army had 3 divisions, whereas Czechoslovakia had 35 divisions (plus 5 fortress divisions).[14] This expansive resourcing was however wilfully disregarded during the Munich agreement. The evidence is supported by Donald Watt’s argument in his book, in which he claims Czechoslovakia’s military strength can also be seen after the German takeover in 1939, when Germany’s arms production increased by 15% alongside this, the arms and equipment of the former Czech army were sufficient to create 20 new German divisions. [15] The Czechs had more than 600,000 men and 4 air regiments, alongside over 350 tanks, along with around 70 armoured cars. [16] This meant they had the world’s highest amount of automatic weapons per soldier in September 1938.[17] As Czechoslovakia seemed to be ready to defend their country, the question continues to arise, why didn’t they use this weaponry to fight off the German military. Army General Jan Syrovy, General inspector of the Czechoslovak army in 1933 today believes, with the benefit of hindsight that “alone they would have no chance of success. It was a clear view of the entire command staff. The enthusiasm of people was great, soldiers wanted to fight, but we could not lead our people to slaughter”.[18]It was clear to the leaders of the Czech army that fighting against Germany would have held them off longer and shown resistance. However, a solo win, without the strong support of the allies would have not been attainable for Czechoslovakia and would rather cause unmerited suffering for the country. [19]
Additionally, they had significant geographical advantage as the Czech-Slovaks had formidable defensive terrain and fortifications along the German-Czech border, which made them extremely capable of defence.[20] Williamson Murray argues, “A German campaign against Czechoslovakia would have involved significantly higher casualties than the campaign against Poland..because of the nature of the terrain… and Czech fortifications”,[21] supporting their territorial strength. This is because, their natural border is full of mountain massifs and hills whereas all the border routes between Bohemia and Germany were tens of kilometres long small winding roads which were lined with hundreds of concrete bunkers and fortresses. This would have been a significant advantage for the Czech army as their war infrastructure aided their forces, however the strength of this was never tested. Moreover, the Czechoslovak army operated along interior lines of communication which made deliberations and commands flow easier.[22] Although Czechoslovakia possessed these advantages, what many fail to consider is if the Sudetenland were to be given to Hitler, their terrain advantage would have been diminished and lost resulting in the Czech-Slovaks unable to resist the Germans for long.
So what if Czechoslovakia had decided to fight against Germany? The Czech-Slovak army assumed that the allies would support them if they were to have fought against Germany, however this was refuted in 1939 when both Britain and France failed to assist them during Hitler’s takeover. Churchill however, firmly believed that if the Czechs had decided to fight, they would have shamed France into war. [23] He was convinced that France would step in and uphold their promise to Czechoslovakia, yet this was never carried out. Without this support, the Czech army was quite certain a win would not be achieved.[24] Their army would have been running into a battle that they would have been unable to win. Furthermore, while Germany believed they held the upper hand, utilizing all their resources was not possible as Hitler knew he was preparing for a bigger war.[25]
It is clear that both approaches provide justifiable explanations that Czechoslovakia would have certainly have been able to hold Germany off for a certain period of time, however they would have not succeeded in winning, rather resemble a battle similar to Finland in 1944. Conclusively, availing all their resources, manpower and tactics would have merely ended in many of their men dying.[26]
Reflection
This investigation has allowed me to use a much larger variety of research methods which forced me to sift through a substantial amount of perspectives. Primary sources became extremely helpful in bringing us closer to the past, as reading an original interview from Jan Syrový allowed me to identify the social and emotional effects rather than just statistical; information. However, the biggest challenge with the primary sources, was the clear miscommunication that occurred in the translation, although important to my investigation. As my question was based on Czechoslovakia, I deemed it important that they were from my native language, therefore some of my sources I used were in Czech. Although I am proficient in the language, reading historical sources in Czech and translating it into English research, showed to be a struggle as the formal words used made it complicated for me to fully understand the intent behind the language. Being fluent in five languages, Czech is notably the most complicated, hence why not only were the facts in Czech but also the names are different which often made it complex to apply this knowledge to the investigation. Specifically, when I was reading information in Czech that was not written in colloquial language, such as the work of Matěj Spurný, it became hard for me to depict.
Through my research, I encountered a wealth of information informing me about Czechoslovakia between 1938 and 1939. However, while I encountered this abundance of information pertaining to specific historical events, often times it provided an answer to a different question, mostly focusing on Germany’s perspective. Researching this question in Germany, it was hard to access information that fully delved into the Czech perspective, but the distance prevented me from frequently looking through archives in Czech Republic, as well as the split government, which means a few of the archives are in Slovakia. Researching extensively to find information supporting my investigation, I noticed how little sources there are dedicated to my country. Many sources examine the events revolving around Czechoslovakia however they don’t consider the effects on the country, rather focus on the larger countries involved. Then after accessing information and reading through different perspectives, I questioned how is history used to show a message? I encountered a lot of people who wanted to use the facts and twist it to serve their point, which brought up the idea of interpretation. I was challenged with this problem as examinations of both sides often were written in hindsight in our modern day. This solidified how important historical events still are in today’s day that we remain in constant debate about them, as well as, helped me synthesize the information from a post-revisionist perspective which helped me achieve my investigation.
Work Cited
Bakke, Elisabeth. “The Making of Czechoslovakism in the First Czechoslovak Republic.” University of Oslo, Loyalitäten in Der Tschechoslowakischen Republik 1918–1938. Politische, Nationale Und Kulturelle Zugehörigkeiten, 2004.
Barooah, Debo Prasad, and Debo Parsad Barooah. “MUNICH RECONSIDERED.” Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, vol. 28, 1966, pp. 470–480
Ben-Arie, Katriel. “Czechoslovakia at the Time of 'Munich': The Military Situation.” Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 25, no. 4, 1990, pp. 431–446
“CHURCHILL: Historical Books, Memoirs, Essays, Speeches & Letters.” CHURCHILL: Historical Books, Memoirs, Essays, Speeches & Letters, by Winston Churchill, Musaicum Books, 2018.
Conference "Czech and Slovak Roads to Europe, 1989-2004", CERI, Paris, France - 8. 11. 2004
Donald Cameron Watt, How War Came: The Immediate Origins of the Second World War, 1938-1939, New York: Pantheon Books, 1989, p. 195.
Fisk, Robert “After Visiting Hitler's Office in Munich, It's Clear to Me That There Are Still Lessons to Be Learned.” The Independent, Independent Digital News and Media, 18 Oct. 2017
Gerald Guenwook Lee, “‘I See Dead People’: Air-Raid Phobia and Britain’s Behavior in the Munich Crisis,” Security Studies, Winter 2003/4, p. 266.
“Historian Matěj Spurný: Munich Agreement Fits Czech ‘Victim Narrative’ | Radio Prague.” Radio Praha, www.radio.cz/en/section/czech-history/historian-matej-spurny-munich-agreement-fits-czech-victim-narrative.
Johnson, and David E. “In the Middle of the Fight: An Assessment of Medium-Armored Forces in Past Military Operations.” RAND Corporation, 2 Nov. 2008, www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG709.html.
Kershaw, Ian, Hitler, 1936-1945: Nemesis, New York: W. W. Norton, 2000
Kershaw, Ian. “The Crisis of 1938 - Some Answers Seventy Years On.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 22 Aug. 2008
Lukes, Igor. “Stalin and Beneš at the End of September 1938: New Evidence from the Prague Archives.” Slavic Review, vol. 52, no. 1, 1993, pp. 28–48
Murray, op. cit., p. 231; and David Vital, “Czechoslovakia and the Powers: September 1938,” Journal of Contemporary History, October 1966, pp. 44-45.
Press, Daryl G. “The Credibility of Power: Assessing Threats during the ‘Appeasement’ Crises of the 1930s.” International Security, vol. 29, no. 3, 2005, pp. 136–169
Pánek, Tomáš, and Jan Hradecký. LANDSCAPES AND LANDFORMS OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC. SPRINGER INTERNATIONAL PU, 2018.
RECORD, JEFFREY INSTITUTE STRATEGIC STUDIES. APPEASEMENT RECONSIDERED: Investigating the Mythology of the 1930s. LULU COM, 2014.
Richard Overy, Interrogations: The Nazi Elite in Allied Hands, 1945, New York: Penguin, 2001, p. 316.
Steiner, P. The Deserts of Bohemia: Czech Fiction and Its Social Context. Cornell University Press, 2000.
Syrový, Jan, et al. “30th Anniversary of Munich.” Report Magazine, no. 38, Aug. 1968.
Telford Taylor. Munich, The Price of Peace, Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1979
Vaughan, David. “The Occupation of 1939: Could It Have Been Avoided? | Radio Prague.” Radio Praha, Česky Rozhlas, 19 Mar. 2011, www.radio.cz/en/section/books/the-occupation-of-1939-could-it-have-been-avoided.
Velinger , Jan. “Heroes or Cowards? Czechs in World War II | Radio Prague.” Radio Praha, www.radio.cz/en/section/special/heroes-or-cowards-czechs-in-world-war-ii.
Weinberg, Gerhard L. “Munich after 50 Years.” Foreign Affairs, vol. 67, no. 1, 1988, pp. 165–178. JSTOR
Williamson Murray, The Change in the European Balance of Power, 1938- 1939: The Path to Ruin, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984
“To
what extent was the terrain, the equipment of the Czech army, Czech
fortifications and the unpreparedness of the German army going to help
Czechoslovakians win the war that was lost without a battle?”
Communism (Prague: Orbis 1971) p.61
A re-examination of the road to the Sudetenland expulsions: 1938-1944
How
did political pressure affect Edvard Beneš’s decision to support the
mass deportation of Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia?
1. Introduction
2.1 Rationale:
Too often, people forget
how certain, half-obscured historical events continue to shape the world
we live in today. It was only in August 2002 that an obscure set of
Czechoslovakian presidential decrees issued during 1945 and 1946 became
one of the most serious stumbling blocks for the creation and expansion
of the European Union. These ‘Beneš decrees’, a series of executive
decisions by the Czechoslovak government to expel millions of ethnic
Germans from the so-called Sudetenland following World War II, have a
deep and complex nature, morally and historically. For those of us
living in Germany, and for others living in Central Europe, the fallout
from these decrees and other diktats like them is still felt today. This
is especially true now, when recent works on these expulsions by
authors like R.M. Douglas or Neil MacGregor have brought them back into
the public sphere, and with them all the long-running questions about
the expulsions: Was it an ethnic cleansing? How many died, and who is
responsible? Why did the Allies make this decision? Many of the previous
historical works on the subject were, and some continue to be,
problematic, and too willing to suddenly cast the Germans as ‘the true
victims’ of a war of their making. The most prominent example would be
the Schieder commission, a thorough and rigorous investigation into the
expulsions by the West German government, coincidentally led by a
historian who was also a full-fledged Nazi. In turn, several Czech
authors have offered stalwart defences of their country’s seriously
ethically dubious actions, and polls show that 65% of Czechs support the
Beneš decrees; a further 47% still see the mass expulsions as
“justified.” With this historical event still playing such an important
role in modern life, this essay will seek to discover the root of
Beneš’s decision to ultimately support the deportations, by asking: How
did external political factors and pressure affect Beneš’s decision to
support the expulsion of Sudeten Germans?
The reason that this
question is being asked, rather than any other, is that, given the
contentious nature of both the decrees and the man who passed them, to
understand the problem demands an understanding of the reasons behind
it: were the deportations the inevitable result of political pressure on
Beneš, was he determined to deport the Sudeten Germans from the
beginning, or is the answer more complicated?
2.2 Methodology:
This
essay is being written in the context of, and in response to, the
recent historical works regarding the German expulsions as a whole. The
role that modern historians attribute to Beneš and to any given
historical actors in their influence varies greatly, and therefore
primary sources such as correspondence and radio broadcasts must also be
consulted in determining the responsibility of Beneš and others in the
expulsions of the Sudeten Germans. As it is seeking to examine the
decision to expel, and not the expulsions in detail, this essay has two
central points of investigation in mind: Beneš’s policy proposals and
ÚVOD pressure before 1945, and the decisions regarding the post-war
order made by Allied governments up to 1945. This essay will
methodically analyse these two critical periods by comparing the
arguments of various historians, from both the contemporary and post-war
periods, whilst using evidence from primary sources to verify or reject
claims made by these different historians and scholars and consistently
analysing these arguments to build to its own conclusion.
2. Investigation: The road to expulsion
2.1 Beneš’s exile in the United States and the origin of post-war policies
Following
the transfer of the Sudetenland region to the new German Reich, and
along with it Czechoslovakia’s heavily fortified border, Beneš was
pressured by the German government to resign his post and leave the
country. This he did, fleeing to London on 22 October 1938. He would
later move to the United States to take up a professorship at the
University of Chicago and give a series of lecture tours. It was there,
in the United States and Canada, that the Czechoslovakian
government-in-exile would centralise and establish communications. Beneš
and many of his fellow Czechoslovaks, in the new President Hácha’s
government or in exile, believed that war was inevitable after the
Munich Agreement; Beneš was convinced that this oncoming war would be
the downfall of Nazi Germany, and would prove the ultimate justification
of his own actions following Munich. Beneš was very active in his
communications with former and current members of the Czechoslovak
government as well as those in power in the UK, the US, and the Soviet
Union in designing policy proposals for a post-war Czechoslovakia.
Several of these proposals were directly tied to the Sudeten German
population, and how it was to be handled after the war in the hopes of
preventing another Munich Agreement.
Historians disagree over the
origin and development of the proposal to expel the German population:
whilst few disagree that Beneš ultimately signed off on several of the
later deportations, the question of how political pressure affected the
outcome is contentious.
Since the deportations, two positions have
emerged from historical writings on the subject in regards to how
Beneš’s role played out during the period of his exile in the UK and the
United States:
1) Beneš was a proponent of ethnic cleansing and had
supported the expulsion of the Sudeten German population since the
Munich Agreement;
2) Beneš was an advocate for moderation, and was
pressured into the expulsion plan by resistance groups and other
radicals, both of whom held significant influence over government
decisions.
2.2 Early policy proposals and the role of the Czech home resistance
Unfortunately,
Beneš never discussed any early policy proposals within his memoirs, so
the only evidence we have of their existence comes from any of the
available archival information, including communications between Beneš
and other influential actors in regards to any post-war expulsion plans.
Czech historian Václav Houžvička, in his work Czechs and Germans
1848-2004: The Sudeten Question and the Transformation of Central
Europe, describes Beneš as a moderate among these actors and among the
Czechoslovak leadership, citing his preference for cantons within
Czechoslovakia for ethnic minorities, including Germans and Hungarians,
rather than deportations; Houžvička suggests that Beneš was pushed
towards the expulsion plan by radical resistance groups. Archival
evidence would initially seem to support this theory: Beneš’s first
official proposal on the subject, drafted on 3 February 1941 referenced
these cantons, saying “…for example, in Czechoslovakia, German,
Czechoslovak, Hungarian, and Ruthenian territories would be clearly
created.” Houžvička also notes that in early September of that same
year, Beneš would again discuss the issue of the Sudeten population in a
message to ÚVOD, (the official home resistance organisation), stressing
the need for caution in the face of calls for mass expulsions:
“Refusing to cooperate with [the Sudeten Germans] will easily be taken
by the English and the Americans to imply a renunciation on our side of
the Sudeten territory. […] Our people at home need to be aware that
international ramifications make the so-called Sudeten problem very
complicated and that dealing with our Germans will not be as easy as
many of us imagine.”
These moderate proposals were not supported by
the local resistance forces, and beginning in December of 1941, they
began putting out a series of radio broadcasts critical of Beneš’s
canton ideas. One of the most famous critiques came from Colonel Josef
Babalán, who said the following on-air: “We will beat [the Germans] so
hard that the three damned cantons you thought up, and for which people
here would tear you to pieces, will be somewhere near Berlin.” Overall,
the situation Beneš found himself in did not lend itself to nuanced
policy. This is according not just to Houžvička, but also to historian
and noted critic of Beneš, R.M. Douglas, who, in his comprehensive study
of the expulsions titled ‘Orderly and Humane’, described Beneš as
“receiving information about the opinions on the ground through an ÚVOD
filter. […] [he] was led to believe that his compatriots demanded a
harsher line than was probably the case.”
Despite this agreement with
Houžvička on the topic of ÚVOD presenting biased information, Douglas
does not agree on the influence that ÚVOD really held over the
president-in-exile; Douglas contends that Beneš was a radical from the
beginning, needed no pressure to support expulsion, using moderation as a
façade to disguise his true intentions: Douglas writes, “It would be a
mistake to see Beneš’s stance on the Sudeten German Question to be
influenced entirely, or even mainly, by pressure from home.
Temperamentally, he was highly resistant to being pushed by subordinates
in directions he did not want to go.” As evidence for this latter
point, Douglas later cites a speech that Beneš reportedly gave to the
home resistance, remarking: “[Beneš] did not hesitate to reprove ÚVOD
for its naivety in supposing that, ‘…we can simply wipe out three
million Germans.’ He was conscious of the indispensability of Allied
backing […] he knew that a policy that recognised no distinction of
‘guilty’ and ‘innocent’ Germans was unacceptable to them.”
Douglas is
quoting this speech from historian Chad Bryant’s Prague in Black: Nazi
Rule and Czech Nationalism; but when examining the speech cited within
Bryant’s work, Douglas is clearly taking this quote out of context. The
full quote reads: “We cannot hold onto unrealistic hopes that we can
simply destroy or wipe out three million Germans, as some of us naively
believe. However, it is possible, and necessary, to count on the
departure or expulsion of hundreds of thousands of compromised Nazis,
[…] and the displacement of hundreds of thousands more to the three
German cantons…” It would seem that Beneš’s speech was not designed to
serve as a dog whistle or a pragmatic request for caution, but to
advocate for the use of cantons as opposed to complete expulsion. This
speech indicates that Beneš was not only opposed to the idea of
expulsion, but also that political tenability was the main reason for
this opposition, not a moral stance.
These are the arguments
presented by both sides. With the available evidence, one would be
inclined to hold the position that Beneš was not an initial supporter of
the total expulsion plan from the outset, as Douglas claims he was; one
could also be inclined to believe that his change of mind after 1941
could be due to the strong pressure put on him by the influential
resistance forces at home. However, both Houžvička and Douglas
demonstrated that Beneš publicly rebuked ÚVOD’s stance on deportations,
largely for the same reason: international politics and the role that
the great powers, particularly the UK and the US, would hold in a
post-war world. Reading this, it would be prudent to account for the
role that these powers played in Beneš’s decision. The next section of
this essay will analyse the international aspect of the situation
further, as we have only examined policy proposals within the
Czechoslovak circle thus far.
2.3 The responsibility of the Big Three and the problem of Munich
Valid
arguments can be made on both sides for whether Beneš was truly
pursuing expulsion himself or if he was pressured into it, but the
available evidence shows that Beneš’s publicly expressed opinions about
expulsion, and more noticeably, those of his government, made several
significant shifts after 1941, from the notion of cantons and caution
with how the Germans are treated, to full-out endorsement of expulsions
and hateful rhetoric towards the local Germans. Historians that defend
Beneš, or at least those who avoid castigating him for his role in the
expulsions, tend to attribute these shifts to external forces, such as
ÚVOD applying pressure to the government, or the political climate
forcing him from his previously moderate stance as Houžvička posits.
Along such lines is the idea that the Allied governments played a
significant role in the decision to expel the Sudeten Germans by
repudiating the Munich Agreement. The Munich Agreement granting the
Sudetenland to Germany was still in effect at the time, and debates over
whether Beneš was pressured or not hinge around whether the Allies
legitimised ÚVOD’s radical viewpoints by demonstrating a willingness to
end the Munich Agreement, leaving Beneš with few options.
2.4 The effect of Allied policy and Beneš’s role in Allied decision-making
This
thesis was put forward by historian and scholar MacAlister Brown in a
paper titled The Diplomacy of Bitterness: Genesis of the Potsdam
Decision to Expel Germans from Czechoslovakia. Brown largely focuses on
the onus on the US and the UK for creating a political situation
favouring deportation, but also emphasises that some degree of blame
belongs to Beneš, highlighting the President’s pro-expulsion statements
published in Foreign Affairs from 1942 to 1946, (as previously cited).
Brown asserts that the US and the UK’s backing of the decision to expel
the Germans made the deportations absolutely inevitable, and was
ultimately the key factor that immediately ceased the back-and-forth
debate between Beneš, ÚVOD, and the Sudeten German representatives upon
the end of the war. In a sentence, “The surrender of Germany placed
unparalleled power in the hands of the Big Three governments, which […]
committed themselves to supporting Beneš’s plans for expulsion.” Any
agreement on the expulsion of Germans would necessitate an
acknowledgement by the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet
Union, (the only countries with the power to make such a decision
post-war), that the territorial changes made under the Munich Agreement
were no longer in effect. Upon a reading of Brown’s paper and Beneš’s
war memoirs, it becomes remarkably clear that the issue in Beneš’s mind
before anything else was the issue of restoring what he saw as Czech
sovereign territory, namely the restoration of Czech borders to
pre-Munich Agreement status.
Before going further, it’s worth noting
that much of Brown’s paper cites information from Beneš’s memoirs,
titled ‘Memoirs of Dr. Edvard Beneš: From Munich to New War and New
Victory’. Using such a book as a major historical source for a paper has
both benefits and drawbacks; the book contains several full transcripts
of letters, policy suggestions, and speeches, as well as Beneš’s
personal accounts of events from 1938 to 1945. Being Beneš’s own work,
this also brings with it its own set of biases, such as the fact that
Beneš was writing for posterity, and would want to preserve his own
image. Whilst this autobiography serves as an excellent example of a
primary source, and has been used, with caution, even in this essay, it
has its flaws, and it’s somewhat strange that Brown would cite it so
frequently and for so much information in his paper. A significant
portion of the narrative within Diplomacy of Bitterness derives from a
source who had personal investment in telling the story in a way that
would put himself in the best light. Thus, like many of the other works
cited here, it’s important that we examine the information that he draws
from Beneš’s memoir critically.
Moving on, Brown argues that
before proceeding with any sort of agreement on expulsions, it was
tantamount to the Czech government, and especially to Beneš, that they
receive a promise of Munich’s repudiation. They received such
confirmations from the Soviet Union, (which was not a signing party of
Munich, but remained influential), on 9 June 1942, and from the United
Kingdom on 5 August of the same year. On May 1943, Beneš flew to
Washington to meet with President Roosevelt, who agreed to join the UK
and the USSR in their repudiation of Munich. When Beneš is said to have
brought up the subject of population transfer, Roosevelt surprised Beneš
greatly by saying that “after the war, the number of Germans in
Czechoslovakia ought to be reduced by a transfer of as many as
possible,” a statement of support that far outstripped Beneš’s
expectations. Roosevelt would later match the Soviet Union’s support of a
total transfer of Czechoslovakia’s Germans. It was this support, Brown
argues, that made the deportations inevitable. The three aforementioned
powers were the only truly powerful players on the international stage,
and their one-by-one support of the repudiation of Munich, Brown argues,
ran parallel to “[Beneš’s] gradually stiffening position of dealing
with the German émigrés.” Much in line with Houžvička’s theory of
political pressure, the Allies’ support for not only the annulling of
Munich, but also a full-fledged deportation plan, would render
moderation politically useless, even if Beneš was interested in it. It
seems reasonable to come to the conclusion that the Allied decision,
compounded with a lack of political flexibility in the existing climate,
would render any of Beneš’s previous positions of cantons or limited
expulsion of Nazi supporters politically untenable. This would seem to
suggest that these political circumstances had a major impact on Beneš’s
decision, and ultimately amplified the pressure that the President was
already under to deport the Germans, although it’s worth acknowledging
that the lack of concrete archival information leaves questions about
Beneš’s role in the discussions.
In contrast, historian and
international law specialist Alfred de Zayas argues in his paper
Anglo-American Responsibility for the Expulsion of the Germans that
rather than being pulled along, Beneš was the one chiefly at fault for
the Allied decisions to support deportations, through what de Zayas saw
as a conniving ploy to trick the Allies: “Beneš had an uphill battle to
sell the expulsion scheme which he had concocted following his personal
humiliation in the Munich Conference of September 1938. […] [He] had to
soft-pedal and gradually sell the idea of population transfers as a
measure of ensuring peace after the expected defeat of Nazi Germany.”
Much like Douglas, de Zayas is contrasting this position, that of a
conciliatory Beneš whose main goal was to have Munich revoked and was
flexible on deportations, with a Beneš whose aim is to maximise
expulsions: this is presented as an alternative to Brown’s idea of a
“gradually stiffening position.” De Zayas elaborates below: “His first
target was the British political elite. A decision of the British
Cabinet that it had no objection to the transfer of the Sudeten Germans
[…] Soviet and American approval followed in June 1943. And the initial
proposal of removing a limited number of German ‘traitors’ evolved into a
maximalist expulsion affecting the entire Sudeten German population,
[…] merely on ethnic grounds.”
This idea is contested by the
aforementioned Czech historian Václav Houžvička, who wrote that rather
than trying to direct British policy regarding the expulsions, Beneš
“respected the views of the British, which he regarded as
direction-setting, if not entirely binding on him.” To demonstrate this,
Houžvička cites an example of Beneš following a British request for a
change of criteria for determining ‘war guilt’, after Eden expressed
that the Foreign Office did not “see any other way of separating ‘the
wheat from the chaff’, and that to base any transfers merely on ‘war
guilt’ would hopelessly tie British hands.” Here, Houžvička is arguing
that Beneš let the British take the lead on expulsion policy, and wasn’t
trying to meddle in their positions or direct their plans himself.
However, this in itself would only seem to suggest that Beneš wasn’t
willing to be confrontational with the British Foreign Office, not that
he wasn’t trying to convince them to support a certain policy, and thus
misses the thrust of de Zayas’s argument.
MacAlister Brown
disagrees with a different part of said argument, namely that Beneš
shifted to a “maximalist expulsion” policy following British, American,
and Soviet support for an expulsion plan. Brown outlines a meeting that
took place between Beneš and the Sudeten Social Democrats in which they
planned to discuss the deportations, and notes the following: “In
January 1942, Beneš had the leading German-Czechoslovaks in to tea. […]
In view of the deepening hatred of Germans at home it would be
necessary, in his opinion, to ‘rid the country of all German
bourgeoisie, the pan-German intelligentsia, and workers who have gone
over to Fascism’.” This final meeting took place after Beneš had secured
all the support he would need for complete deportation of the ethnic
Germans, but it is by no means a maximalist expulsion plan. In fact, the
only notably alarming aspect of such a policy is the liquidation of the
bourgeoisie, considering that the two other groups could legitimately
fit under the label of fifth columnists. (Those who advocated for
Sudeten unification with Germany and supported the Nazi regime.)
As
one can see, Brown is not aiming to exonerate Beneš, but his piece,
along with the archival evidence and later memoirs that he cites, leaves
room for a more nuanced understanding of Beneš’s position, which is
further supported by additional historical evidence. The stated views of
Beneš above would suggest that de Zayas’s idea of “evolution into
maximalist expulsion” has merit, but the argument presented by Brown
shows that even with full and uncompromising Allied support, Beneš did
not actually come out and support complete expulsion until much later,
when a large-scale expulsion would be decided on by the Allies at the
Potsdam Conference.
3. Conclusion
When assessing the evidence
in its entirety, it is legitimately difficult to come to a conclusion
that shows that political pressure alone caused Beneš to support the
expulsions. As de Zayas, Douglas, and Brown have clearly demonstrated,
Beneš consistently pushed for some degree of Sudeten German
deportations, and without his efforts, the Allies would have likely
continued to uphold the Munich Agreement, (which was the key policy that
allowed for the deportations to take place). That being said, members
of the Allies were perfectly willing to participate in transfers of the
German population from Poland, Hungary, Romania, and the Netherlands as
well, so whilst there is a limit to the extent that Beneš can be blamed
for the expulsion decision, one cannot say that the Allied decision
pressured Beneš into agreeing to German expulsion, given that he played a
significant role in their decision itself, and could have persuaded
them to not support expulsion if he had wanted to. It can be safely
concluded, therefore, that the Allied governments did not directly cause
Beneš’s decision to support expulsion, although their decisions made
these deportations certain in other areas.
The opposite is true
for the situation before the war and during its early stages. When
analysing Beneš’s proposals and communications, it becomes clear that
Beneš himself presented serious resistance to the idea of wholesale
expulsion. His slow expansion of the deportation demographic (from
solely the outright fascists, to the workers who were complicit in the
fascist takeover, to the Pan-German supporters and the German
bourgeoisie, and eventually to every German who could not claim to have
been a resistance member) demonstrates that he was initially serious
about a limited solution, and had to slowly give ground to those in his
government-in-exile, and later his own government, who supported
expulsions. Why he did this is by no means clear: this reality disproves
the idea that he was a genuine hardcore advocate of expulsion, but it
also disproves the idea that he had any interest in protecting the
Sudeten Germans, or that he was a moderate. A more honest answer,
although a speculative one, is that Beneš was playing a political game
in his fragile position of exile and his early resuming of the reins of
power, aware of what the military and resistance wanted, (even if it was
through an ‘ÚVOD filter’, as Douglas said). As a result, political
pressure can absolutely be blamed for these initial changes in position,
but it fails to provide an accurate answer for why Beneš was willing to
support deportations in his private discussions with the Allied
leaders. A resolution on that front will have to wait for more concrete
archival information, a problem that seems to plague any historians
writing on this subject.
5. Bibliography
Journal Articles
1. Baier, Hannelore. “Germans in Romania under the Attention of Stalin,” Archiva Moldaviæ, Issue 6, 2014, pp. 229-245
2. Beneš, Edvard. “Czechoslovakia Plans for Peace.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 1, 1944
3. Beneš, Edvard. “Postwar Czechoslovakia.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 3, 1946
4. Beneš, Edvard. “The Organisation of Postwar Europe.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 20, No. 2, 1942
5.
Brown, MacAlister. “The Diplomacy of Bitterness: Genesis of the Potsdam
Decision to Expel Germans from Czechoslovakia.” The Western Political
Quarterly, vol. 11, no. 3, 1958, pp. 607–626.
6. Lockhart, R.H. Bruce
“The Second Exile of Eduard Beneš.” The Slavonic and East European
Review, vol. 28, no. 70, 1949, pp. 39–59
Books
1. Beneš, Edvard. Memoirs of Edvard Beneš: From Munich to New War and New Victory, Arno Press, 1954.
2. Bryant, Chad. Prague in Black: Nazi Rule and Czech Nationalism, Harvard University Press, 2007.
3.
De Zayas, Alfred. “Anglo-American Responsibility for the Expulsion of
the Germans” Ethnic Cleansing in 20th Century Europe, edited by Steven
Vardy and T. Hunt Tooley. Social Science Monographs, 2003, pp. 239-254
4. Douglas, R.M. Orderly and Humane, Yale University Press, 2012
5.
Houžvička, Václav. Czechs and Germans 1848-2004: The Sudeten Question
and the Transformation of Central Europe, translated by Anna Clare
Bryson-Gustová, Charles University in Prague, 2015.
6. MacGregor, Neil. Germany: Memories of a Nation, Penguin Books, 2016
7. Raška, Francis D. The Czechoslovak Exile Government in London and the Sudeten German Issue, Karolinum, 2002
8.
Steinweis, Alan, The Impact of Nazism: New Perspectives on the Impact
of the Third Reich and Its Legacy, edited by Daniel E. Rogers,
University of Nebraska Press, 2007
9. Vondrová, Jitka. Czechs and the Sudeten German Problem, 1939-1945, Ústav Mezinárodních Vztahů, 1994
10.
Zeman, Zbyněk A.B. and Klimek, Antonín. The Life of Edvard Beneš,
1884-1948: Czechoslovakia in Peace and War, Oxford University Press,
1997.
Websites/Other
1. “A Spectre over Central Europe” The
Economist, 15 August 2002.
https://www.economist.com/europe/2002/08/15/a-spectre-over-central-europe
2.
Great Britain. Parliament. House of Commons. Treaty Series No. 3
(1942). Exchange of notes between His Majesty’s government in the United
Kingdom and the government of the Czechoslovak Republic concerning the
policy of His Majesty’s government in the United Kingdom in regard to
Czechoslovakia. Proquest LLC, Cambridge, 2007.
3. Richter, Jan. “Most
Czechs Believe Beneš Decrees Should Remain Valid.” Radio Praha, 14
April 2009.
https://www.radio.cz/en/section/news/poll-most-czechs-believe-benes-decrees-should-remain-valid
[1] The Economist, A Spectre over Central Europe, 15 August 2002.
[2] Alan Steinweis, The Impact of Nazism: New Perspectives on the Third Reich and Its Legacy, p. 69 (cited in bibliography)
[3] Radio Praha, Poll: Most Czechs believe Beneš decrees should remain valid
[4] R.H. Bruce Lockhart, The Second Exile of Eduard Beneš, p. 39
[5] Edvard Beneš, Memoirs of Edvard Beneš, p. 51
[6] Zbyněk Zeman, Antonín Klimek, The Life of Edvard Beneš, 1884-1948, p. 141
[7] Houžvička, 2015, p. 272
[8] Houžvička, 2015, p. 271
[9] Vondrová, 1994, pp. 90-91, as cited in Houžvička, 2015
[10] Houžvička, 2015, p. 273
[11] Raška, 2002, p. 44
[12] Douglas, 2012, p. 19
[13] Ibid., pp. 19-20
[14] Bryant, 2007, p. 99 (cited by Douglas, 2012, p. 19)
[16] Bryant, 2007, p. 99 (as cited above)
[17] A series of articles written by Beneš in ‘Foreign Affairs’ demonstrate this shift (each cited in bibliography)
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 20, No. 2. “The Organisation of Postwar Europe” 1942
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 1. “Czechoslovakia Plans for Peace” 1944
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 3. “Postwar Czechoslovakia” 1946
[18]
Brown, MacAlister. “The Diplomacy of Bitterness: Genesis of the Potsdam
Decision to Expel Germans from Czechoslovakia.” The Western Political
Quarterly, Vol. 11, No. 3, September 1958 (cited in bibliography)
[19] Brown, 1958, p. 625
[20] Brown, 1958, p. 612
[21] Beneš, Edvard. “Memoirs of Dr. Edvard Beneš: From Munich to New War and New Victory.” 1954. (Cited in bibliography)
[22] Beneš, 1954, pp. 17-18, as cited in Brown, 1958, p. 607
[23] Beneš, 1954, pp. 206, 220 as cited in Brown, 1958, p. 618
[24] Beneš, 1954, pp. 252-53, as cited in Brown, 1958, p. 622
[25] Brown, 1958, p. 618
[26]
Exchange of notes between His Majesty’s government in the United
Kingdom and the government of the Czechoslovak Republic, 1942 (Cited in
bibliography)
[27] Beneš, 1954, p. 193, as cited in Brown, 1958, p. 618
[28] Brown, 1958, p. 624
[29]
de Zayas, Alfred. Anglo-American Responsibility for the Expulsion of
the Germans, 2003. (As a lecture within “Ethnic Cleansing in 20th
Century Europe,” a collection of such lectures. Cited in bibliography)
[30] de Zayas, 2003, p. 244
[31] Ibid., p. 245
[32] Houžvička, 2015, p. 297
[33] Houžvička, 2015, p. 297
[34] de Zayas, 2003, p. 245
[35] Brown, 1958, p. 614
[36] Beneš, 1954, pp. 213-218, as cited by Brown, 1958, p. 614
[37] Neil MacGregor, “Germany, Memories of a Nation,” 2016 (cited in bibliography)
[38] Hannelore Baier, “Germans in Romania under the Attention of Stalin,” 2014 (cited in bibliography)
[39] See: Operation Black Tulip
