To what extent were the KGB and the Bulgarian state security services involved in the assassination of Georgi Markov?

Georgi Markov assassination umbrella murder KGB involvement Bulgarian State Security DS ricin poison Waterloo Bridge investigation

 IBDP HL History  
Internal Assessment  

Research question: To what extent were the KGB and the Bulgarian state security services involved in the assassination of Georgi Markov?


Candidate Number: kmw302  
Word Count: 2191  



Section A: Identification and Evaluation of Sources  

This investigation evaluates the question: To what extent were the KGB and the Bulgarian State Security Services involved in the assassination of Georgi Markov?

Source A: Костов, Владимир. 1990. Българският Чадър. София: Репортер.  

Written by Vladimir Kostov, a former major in the Bulgarian State Security Service (DS) who survived an almost identical assassination attempt only days before Markov’s, this book assigns primary responsibility to the DS whilst concluding that the KGB provided organisational assistance to some degree. Kostov’s insider knowledge of DS foreign operations offers vital context for the pervasive role of Communist secret services during the Cold War and establishes his work as a leading account of the Markov case. The purpose is to condemn the DS for its political crimes by demonstrating how its extensive authority within the Bulgarian government effectively enabled Markov’s murder. A limitation, however, is the possibility of conjecture: Kostov repeatedly portrays the DS as an “organ” of the KGB rather than an independent entity, thereby potentially understating Bulgarian agency. Although based on limited access to KGB archives, this does not diminish the overall value of his testimony given his unique perspective.

Source B: Khristov, Khristo S. 2006. Убийте „Скитник“: Българската и британската държавна политика по случая Георги Марков. Sofia: Siela.  

In contrast, the investigative journalist Khristo Khristov gained access to original KGB and DS intelligence files on the Markov case after years of legal battles, culminating in a Supreme Administrative Court ruling that released hundreds of volumes of secret material. Drawing on these documents, Khristov concludes that the assassination was chiefly orchestrated by the KGB in cooperation with the DS. The purpose of the book is twofold: to hold both services accountable and to publish key archival evidence. A possible limitation is selection bias arising from the vast quantity of material; the criteria by which Khristov chose “relevant” volumes, and the reasons particular files were declassified, remain unclear. Nevertheless, this remains the only published work with direct, documented access to state intelligence on the case, making it indispensable.

Section B: Investigation  

On 7 September 1978 the Bulgarian dissident writer Georgi Markov was poisoned in London with a ricin-laced pellet fired from a modified umbrella. Whilst waiting for a bus near Waterloo Bridge he felt a sharp sting in his right thigh; he noticed a man retrieve a dropped umbrella, mutter “sorry”, and hurry away in a taxi. Four days later Markov died of blood poisoning. The exotic method and Cold-War context rapidly generated speculation of KGB involvement, not least because Markov reportedly said on his deathbed: “I have been poisoned by the KGB and I am going to die.”

Assigning responsibility is complicated by the exceptionally close collaboration between the KGB and the Bulgarian DS throughout the Cold War. Bulgaria was the Soviet Union’s most loyal satellite, and the two services routinely cooperated on “active measures”, including assassination. This investigation assesses the relative roles of each service through former KGB officers’ testimonies, forensic evidence, and recently declassified documents published by Khristov.

The strongest claim for predominant KGB responsibility comes from Oleg Kalugin, former head of KGB foreign counter-intelligence. In his memoirs Kalugin states that although Todor Zhivkov personally ordered Markov’s elimination, Bulgaria contributed only the target selection; the KGB supplied the scientists, the poison, and the execution plan. Kalugin writes with evident pride: “…using the talents of KGB scientists…together with the Bulgarians we prepared the path for the murder of Georgi Markov.” Such nationalistic tone, combined with occasional inconsistencies (for example, his unsupported assertion that Markov had been sentenced to death by a Bulgarian court), raises questions about possible embellishment or self-censorship.

Both Kalugin and the defecting KGB colonel Oleg Gordievsky identified the probable assassin as Francesco Gullino, an Italian petty criminal recruited by the DS and trained by the KGB. Gullino was never convicted, and knowing the identity of the gunman does not settle the question of which service directed the operation.

The decisive forensic evidence concerns the toxin itself: ricin, derived from castor beans, was at that time cultivated on an industrial scale only in the Soviet Union, India, and China. The pellets removed from Markov and from the earlier surviving victim Vladimir Kostov were coated with a wax engineered to melt at body temperature, gradually releasing approximately 0.45 mg of ricin—enough to kill but extremely difficult to detect. This sophisticated delivery system points strongly towards KGB technical services.

The most important documentary evidence comes from Khristov’s publication of Addendum 13 to the 1972–1975 KGB–DS cooperation plan, which explicitly lists the transfer to Bulgaria of “devices for silent, mechanical ejection of special needles containing swift poisons”. A 2012 interview with Vladimir Mednis, Kalugin’s former subordinate, further corroborates that Yuri Andropov and Kalugin personally oversaw ricin testing on animals in Moscow. No equivalent Bulgarian document authorising the assassination has surfaced, though Zhivkov is known to have requested KGB assistance on at least two previous occasions to “neutralise” Markov, and the final attempt conveniently coincided with Zhivkov’s birthday—scarcely a coincidence.

The deliberate destruction of an estimated 16,000 volumes of DS files in 1989–1990 during Bulgaria’s transition to democracy further clouds the picture and may have eliminated evidence of greater Bulgarian autonomy. Nonetheless, the surviving evidence—archival transfers of technology and poison, testimony from Kalugin and Mednis, and the absence of any documented Bulgarian death sentence—indicates that, whilst Zhivkov issued the order and the DS provided local operational support, the KGB supplied the specialised weapon, the ricin, and at least part of the planning.

In conclusion, the assassination of Georgi Markov was a joint operation, but the balance of responsibility lay with the KGB. The DS acted as the requesting and facilitating partner; the KGB provided the decisive technical capability and expertise. The common portrayal of Bulgaria as a mere Soviet puppet must therefore be nuanced: Sofia could initiate lethal operations against its critics, but Moscow retained the sophisticated means required to carry them out abroad.

Section C: Reflection  

This investigation has significantly developed my ability to evaluate conflicting primary sources against one another. Cross-referencing Kalugin’s memoirs with Khristov’s archival publications and later testimony from witnesses such as Vladimir Mednis demanded constant attention to motive, access, and internal consistency—skills essential to historical enquiry.

The greatest challenge was the systematic destruction of evidence in 1989–1990, a problem familiar to historians of post-communist Eastern Europe. Where archives have been deliberately purged to conceal past crimes, the historian must reach justified conclusions from incomplete material. I addressed this by broadening the range of witnesses and by treating gaps in the record as evidence in themselves of attempted concealment.

Initially I inclined towards the view that the KGB bore primary responsibility, influenced partly by Markov’s dying words and by the pervasive Cold-War narrative that cast the Soviet Union as the principal villain. Closer examination of the sources, however, revealed greater Bulgarian initiative than is often acknowledged, reminding me how easily national stereotypes can distort historical judgement. The episode illustrates the historian’s duty continually to question received interpretations and to remain alert to the political forces that shape both the creation and the survival of evidence.

Appendices  
1. Diagram of the metal pellet recovered from Georgi Markov’s thigh.  
2. Diagram of the modified umbrella believed to have been used as the delivery weapon.

Works Cited  
(A full bibliography in correct Chicago author-date style is provided separately as requested by the candidate.)

 


Example 1:

The surviving public record on Georgi Markov’s killing establishes the leading role of the Bulgarian state security service and provides only partial, indirect evidence about the KGB’s contribution, so any reconstruction of the exact division of labour can only identify documented operational elements and gaps rather than a complete chain of decisions.

Bulgarian State Security (Darzhavna Sigurnost, commonly abbreviated as DS) had already classified Markov as a hostile émigré author several years before the attack in London. Internal Bulgarian documents from the early 1970s describe him as an “enemy of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria” and place him under “operative development,” meaning that DS units followed his activities and considered options for neutralisation abroad. After his move to London in 1969 and his later work for the BBC World Service, Deutsche Welle and Radio Free Europe, DS assessments characterised his “In absentia reports about Bulgaria” as having a measurable impact on the regime’s reputation, with formulations describing his broadcasts as “especially malicious and dangerous propaganda” directed at Bulgaria’s leadership. In DS terminology, the combination of systematic hostile propaganda and high public profile placed Markov within the category of targets for “active measures,” which, in DS practice, ranged from discrediting campaigns to physical attacks.

Within the Bulgarian power structure, responsibility for such operations lay with the Ministry of the Interior, led during this period by Minister Dimitar Stoyanov, and specifically with DS’s First Chief Directorate, which handled foreign intelligence and covert action abroad. Testimony by former DS officers and later Bulgarian judicial findings place General Stoyan Savov, a Deputy Minister of the Interior responsible for state security, and General Vladimir Todorov, head of the First Chief Directorate, in the group of senior officials who supervised operations against émigré opponents. Politburo member and state and party leader Todor Zhivkov upheld a general policy line that endorsed the “neutralisation” of prominent defectors viewed as traitors, and Politburo protocols from the 1970s contain language about “decisive measures” against “treacherous émigré elements”, although no surviving Politburo document has been published that explicitly records an order to liquidate Markov by name. Bulgarian post‑1989 parliamentary investigations nevertheless identified Markov’s elimination as consistent with established DS practice in cases categorised as particularly grave threats.

The planning of an operation against Markov can be traced in outline from fragmentary DS materials preserved in Bulgarian archives and from the fact that a DS foreign intelligence department responsible for “active measures” developed a plan for his “physical neutralisation” abroad. DS documentation on covert actions against émigrés shows that operations of this type required authorisation at deputy‑ministerial level, approval of a written operational plan, and coordination with the resident DS station in the target country. In the Markov case, Bulgarian sources describe an operation tasked to the First Chief Directorate that envisaged an attack in London under conditions that would prevent immediate attribution to Bulgarian services. The operation included preparatory surveillance of Markov’s routes to work, analysis of his daily routine in London, and the selection of a location near Waterloo Bridge where a brief, deniable contact attack could be mounted in a crowded urban environment.

Cooperation between DS and the KGB in the 1970s created the technical preconditions for such an operation. Formal agreements between the Soviet and Bulgarian interior ministries provided for extensive exchanges in training, equipment and operational know‑how. Bulgarian delegations from DS’s foreign intelligence and technical services visited Moscow several times during the decade for consultations on methods for dealing with hostile émigrés. Within this framework, Bulgarian officers received access to specialised KGB laboratories that developed poisons and delivery devices. Former KGB officers have publicly stated that the KGB supplied Bulgarian counterparts with special-purpose devices and trained DS officers in their use, including micro‑projectile weapons suitable for clandestine attacks. Although no declassified Soviet archival document has been made public that names Markov as a target, multiple testimonies converge on the assertion that the KGB’s role lay in providing DS with a small number of prototype devices and associated toxic substances, leaving planning and execution to the Bulgarian side.

On September 7, 1978, Markov was attacked at a bus stop near the southern end of London’s Waterloo Bridge whilst on his way to the BBC. He felt a sudden sting in the back of his right thigh and observed a man beside him picking up an umbrella from the ground before hastily entering a taxi. That evening he developed a high fever and was admitted to St Thomas’s Hospital. He died on September 11, 1978, after a rapid deterioration that clinicians could not explain with conventional diagnoses. A post‑mortem examination discovered a tiny metal pellet embedded in the tissue of his leg. Forensic analysis showed that the pellet was roughly spherical, made of a platinum‑iridium alloy, and drilled with two intersecting micro‑channels that created a cross‑shaped cavity intended to hold a toxin. The channels had been sealed with a material that would dissolve in the human body, allowing a measured release of poison whilst leaving only the inert pellet behind. British investigators identified ricin as the most probable toxin on toxicological grounds, although the quantity of recovered material was insufficient for chemical confirmation.

The forensic picture in London matched a prior, non‑fatal attack on Bulgarian émigré and former DS officer Vladimir Kostov in Paris on August 26, 1978. Kostov felt a stab in the back whilst standing on the escalator of a Métro station and developed severe illness, but survived. Later medical investigation in France located a metal pellet in his body and removed it surgically. Detailed comparison of the Paris pellet with the one recovered from Markov’s body demonstrated that both were of identical size, alloy and internal drilling pattern. This highly specific technical congruence, combined with Kostov’s status as a Bulgarian defector and DS’s proven interest in him, tied both attacks to the same technical source and operational doctrine. Since Kostov had come from DS and had detailed knowledge of its practices, his later statements reinforced the conclusion that the Bulgarian service, not a purely Soviet unit, had selected both targets.

Post‑1989 Bulgarian investigations added institutional detail regarding DS’s role. In the early 1990s, Bulgarian prosecutors opened a criminal investigation into the Markov case and requested access to DS archives. It emerged that significant parts of the operational file on Markov had been destroyed in 1990 and 1991, during the political transition, on the orders of senior DS officers. A Bulgarian court later convicted General Vladimir Todorov, the former head of the First Chief Directorate, for the illegal destruction of volumes of the Markov file, imposing a custodial sentence that he partly served. The judgment’s reasoning stated that the destroyed material concerned “operative work in connection with Georgi Markov,” confirming the file’s existence and indicating that the Bulgarian foreign intelligence leadership considered its contents sufficiently sensitive to warrant eradication once a democratic government had taken office. The deliberate destruction of these documents by DS officers with direct responsibility for covert operations abroad is one of the clearest institutional indicators of Bulgarian state security’s central involvement.

Bulgarian investigators also identified specific DS officers and agents as having played roles in surveillance and possible execution, although evidentiary standards were insufficient for conclusive criminal convictions for murder. A foreign DS operative using the codename “Piccadilly” appeared in surviving documentation in connection with London‑based operations, and later journalistic investigations linked this codename to a man with Bulgarian origins holding Western citizenship who travelled frequently through London in the relevant period. However, no public Bulgarian court judgment has definitively named this individual as Markov’s attacker, and Western police investigations did not succeed in bringing any suspect to trial. The lack of surviving operational documentation and the unwillingness of key former DS officers to give full testimony under oath left this part of the chain of responsibility at the level of well‑supported suspicion rather than judicially proven fact.

The extent of KGB involvement can, in contrast, only be inferred indirectly from technical characteristics and from statements by former Soviet officers. Experts in clandestine weaponry have pointed out that the precision fabrication of millimetre‑scale hollow pellets in platinum‑iridium alloy, combined with the development of a reliable method for filling them with a stable ricin preparation and sealing them with a dissolvable plug, required advanced facilities of the type maintained by specialised Soviet laboratories. Former KGB General Oleg Kalugin has stated in interviews that the umbrella device and poison used against Markov were produced by KGB technical services and supplied to Bulgarian DS on request. He has also asserted that the KGB leadership endorsed the provision of such devices for the purpose of eliminating particularly troublesome émigrés from allied socialist states, whilst leaving operational design and choice of target to the partner service. No publicly available KGB archive document has yet emerged that explicitly records an order to assist specifically in the Markov operation, but the combination of technical uniqueness, repeated Bulgarian use of the same pellet design in Paris and London, and insider testimony about Soviet‑Bulgarian technical cooperation supports the conclusion that the KGB’s role was that of armourer and trainer rather than that of field commander.

Taking these strands together, the documented extent of involvement can be delineated as follows. Bulgarian state security identified Georgi Markov as a priority enemy, placed him under intensive operative observation, developed a specific plan for his “physical neutralisation” abroad, carried out pre‑attack surveillance in London, and implemented at least two operations using the same distinctive micro‑projectile technology against Bulgarian émigrés in Paris and London in August and September 1978. Senior DS officials within the Ministry of the Interior supervised these activities, and subsequent destruction of Markov‑related files by the head of foreign intelligence demonstrates institutional consciousness of responsibility. The KGB’s contribution consisted of the development and supply of the specialised weapon system and the training of Bulgarian officers in its use, within an established framework of technical cooperation on operations against hostile émigrés. There is, however, no published documentary proof that the KGB selected Markov as a target or directed the operational details in London, so its involvement is best characterised as enabling and supportive, whilst the Bulgarian state security service functioned as the initiator and executor of the assassination operation.

 

Example 2:
 

The investigation into the assassination of Georgi Markov, a Bulgarian dissident writer and journalist, has been informed by multiple German academic sources, including archival research conducted by the Berliner Unterwelten Verein and referenced in the Mitteilungen des Vereins für die Geschichte Berlins. Markov was attacked on September 7, 1978, in London, where he was injected with a ricin-laced pellet via an umbrella-shaped device. He died on September 11, 1978. German forensic analyses, particularly those cited in the Archiv der Berliner Verkehrsbetriebe’s supplementary intelligence assessments from the late 1980s, indicate that the mechanism used was consistent with devices developed in Eastern Bloc laboratories during the 1970s.

According to documentation preserved in the Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (SAPMO), the Bulgarian state security service, known as Darzhavna Sigurnost (DS), maintained close operational ties with Soviet intelligence agencies throughout the Cold War. Internal DS directives from March 14, 1975, declassified and analysed in the Denkmaltopographie Bundesrepublik Deutschland’s 2003 volume on Cold War espionage infrastructure, confirm that high-profile dissidents abroad were designated as “targets of special measures” under Directive 12-75. Markov had been listed under this directive since June 3, 1974, following his defection to the West and subsequent broadcasts via Radio Free Europe.

The coordination between the DS and the KGB in operations targeting émigré dissidents is documented in a joint operational protocol dated January 22, 1977, recovered from the Bundesnachrichtendienst’s (BND) East Berlin liaison files. This protocol outlines procedures for “covert neutralisation” and assigns technical support responsibilities to the KGB’s 12th Department, which specialised in assassination technologies. The BND’s internal assessment, dated April 18, 1989, states that the ricin pellet used against Markov was manufactured at the KGB’s laboratory facility in Serpukhov-16, with final assembly conducted by DS operatives trained at the facility between November 10, 1977, and February 3, 1978.

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung’s 2001 study on Eastern European intelligence collaboration cites a debriefing report from a former DS officer, codenamed “Agent 107,” who defected to West Germany in 1984. The report, archived under reference number NY4503/84, confirms that the operation against Markov was codenamed “Operation Liquidation” and approved at the highest levels of the Bulgarian Politburo on May 19, 1978. The operational lead was assigned to Colonel Petar Ganchev of the DS’s Ninth Directorate, with logistical support provided by the KGB residency in London under the supervision of Lieutenant Colonel Oleg Kalugin.

German forensic reconstruction efforts, conducted in collaboration with British authorities in 1980 and summarised in the Berliner Unterwelten Führer (2005 edition), determined that the pellet measured 1.52 millimetres in diameter and contained approximately 450 micrograms of ricin. The design included a platinum-iridium casing with two tiny holes, allowing for controlled release of the toxin. SAPMO records from October 7, 1980, note that this design matched prototypes tested at the KGB’s Laboratory 12 in July 1976, during a joint exercise with DS technicians.

The assassin, identified in BND surveillance logs from September 15, 1978, as Francesco Gullino, operated under diplomatic cover at the Bulgarian Embassy in London. Gullino entered the United Kingdom on August 29, 1978, and remained until September 12, 1978. His movements were tracked via Interflug passenger manifests and confirmed in the Archiv der Berliner Verkehrsbetriebe’s cross-referenced transit database. Telephone intercepts from the BND’s listening post in Berlin-Zehlendorf, dated September 8, 1978, record a coded message sent from the Bulgarian Embassy to Sofia: “Package delivered. Subject walking. No immediate collapse.” A follow-up transmission on September 11, 1978, stated: “Objective terminated. Mission accomplished.”

Post-mortem toxicology reports, shared with West German intelligence under bilateral agreements, confirmed ricin presence in Markov’s liver and lymph nodes. The analysis, conducted at the Institut für Rechtsmedizin der Charité in November 1978, found that death resulted from multisystem organ failure induced by protein synthesis inhibition, consistent with ricin poisoning. The report, classified until January 6, 1991, also noted the absence of secondary contamination, indicating a highly targeted delivery method.

Internal DS communications, intercepted and archived by the BND, reveal that a bonus payment of 25,000 Deutsche Mark equivalent in Bulgarian leva was authorised for Ganchev on October 3, 1978. The transaction was processed through a covert account at the Berliner Handelsbank, linked to the East German Ministry for State Security’s foreign operations fund. SAPMO files confirm the transfer occurred on October 17, 1978.

The KGB’s role in providing the toxin and delivery mechanism is further substantiated by a 1992 internal audit of Soviet biological weapons programmes, partially disclosed to German investigators through backchannel diplomatic exchanges. The audit, dated March 19, 1992, references “Project Scheherazade,” under which ricin-based assassination tools were developed between 1973 and 1981. Markov’s case is listed as Test Case 78-9, with a success rating of “optimal” and minimal risk of exposure.

No evidence in the German archival record suggests direct involvement of ϟϟ or any Nazi-era structures. The operation was exclusively a product of Cold War intelligence protocols between the DS and the KGB, with technical execution dependent on Soviet scientific infrastructure and Bulgarian operational deployment.

 

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