From the May 2025 IBDP History Paper 3 exam.
I'm most grateful to this former student who obtained and shared his actual exam, graded by the IBO and earning 10/15 on his way to a 7 in the course.
I'm equally grateful to this senior who also provided his actual exam paper, graded by an examiner and remoderated to earn an insulting 9/15:
Written essay:
The First World War exerted profound pressure on the Russian Empire, accelerating structural weaknesses that culminated in the abdication of Nicholas II on March 2, 1917, and the end of the Romanov dynasty after three centuries. Military defeats exposed the inadequacies of the autocratic system, whilst economic dislocation and social unrest eroded public confidence in the regime. The war mobilised over fifteen million men between July 1914 and March 1917, resulting in approximately 1,700,000 deaths and 4,950,000 wounded by early 1917, figures that overwhelmed medical and logistical capacities. Supply shortages led to bread queues in Petrograd stretching for hours, with daily rations falling to one-eighth of a pound by February 1917. Strikes escalated from 1,400 in 1914 to over 1,000 in January 1917 alone, involving 676,000 workers in Petrograd. The Tsarina Alexandra's reliance on Grigori Rasputin, who influenced appointments such as Alexander Protopopov as Minister of the Interior in September 1916, fuelled perceptions of corruption at court. On March 8, 1917, International Women's Day demonstrations in Petrograd merged with food riots, drawing 200,000 participants. Troops of the Petrograd garrison, including the Volynsky Regiment, mutinied on March 12, 1917, refusing orders to fire on crowds. The Duma formed a Provisional Committee on March 12, 1917, and Nicholas II's train was halted at Dno station on March 1, 1917, preventing return to the capital. Generals Mikhail Alekseev and Nikolai Ruzsky advised abdication on March 2, 1917, citing the need to maintain army morale. The war thus acted as a catalyst, transforming latent discontent into revolutionary action, though pre-existing factors such as the 1905 Revolution's unresolved grievances and industrial growth under Sergei Witte from 1892 contributed to the regime's vulnerability.
The military strain imposed by the First World War undermined the Tsarist government's authority through successive defeats and logistical failures that alienated both the armed forces and civilian population. Russia's entry into the conflict on August 1, 1914, followed mobilisation orders issued on July 30, 1914, but initial advances into East Prussia collapsed at the Battle of Tannenberg from August 26 to August 30, 1914, where General Alexander Samsonov's Second Army suffered 120,000 casualties, including 78,000 captured. General Paul von Rennenkampf's First Army retreated after the Battle of the Masurian Lakes from September 9 to September 14, 1914, losing another 100,000 men. By June 1915, the Gorlice-Tarnow offensive forced a Russian withdrawal of 300 miles, evacuating Poland and Lithuania. Shell shortages reached critical levels, with artillery firing rates limited to three rounds per gun per day by spring 1915, compared to Germany's fifty. The Brusilov Offensive from June 4 to September 20, 1916, achieved temporary gains, capturing 400,000 prisoners, but cost Russia 1,000,000 casualties, including 62,000 killed in the first days. Desertions rose to 1,500,000 by January 1917, with soldiers at the front receiving letters describing family starvation. In Petrograd, the Putilov works locked out 30,000 workers on March 3, 1917, after strikes began on March 7, 1917. The Tsar's assumption of supreme command on September 5, 1915, linked him directly to failures, as telegrams from Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaevich on August 22, 1915, had warned against it. Rodzianko, Duma president, cabled Nicholas II on January 9, 1917, stating the country faced grave danger from ministerial incompetence. Heath emphasises that the war exposed the autocracy's inability to adapt, noting in his analysis that Nicholas II's refusal to delegate to competent generals like Brusilov after 1916 sealed the regime's fate, as military reversals translated into political discredit. Heath's view connects the front-line collapses to domestic upheaval, arguing that without the war's intensification of command errors, such as the failure to reinforce after Brusilov's gains, the monarchy might have sustained control through limited concessions. The appointment of Ivan Goremykin as prime minister until February 1916, followed by Boris Sturmer until November 1916, reflected court intrigue rather than merit, with Rasputin's influence evident in Sturmer's selection on February 2, 1916. By December 1916, Rasputin's murder on December 30, 1916, by Prince Felix Yusupov and Grand Duke Dmitri Pavlovich highlighted elite desperation. The war's demand for 5,500,000 rifles by 1917, against production of only 3,000,000, left one-third of troops unarmed, prompting mutinies like that of the 3rd Infantry Regiment on February 26, 1917. Food requisitions under the prodrazvyorstka system from 1916 diverted grain to the army, leaving urban areas with 25 percent of pre-war supplies by January 1917. Inflation reached 300 percent by 1917, with the ruble losing 75 percent of its value since 1914. The Zemgor union, formed in July 1915 under Prince Georgy Lvov, managed war industries but criticised government inefficiency, reporting 1,000,000 untreated wounded by October 1916. The Progressive Bloc in the Duma, established August 1915, demanded a ministry of public confidence, rejected by Nicholas II on September 16, 1915. Strikes in 1916 totalled 1,284, involving 1,000,000 workers, with police reports noting revolutionary slogans by October. The war thus dismantled the Tsarist military pillar, as order number 1 from the Petrograd Soviet on March 14, 1917, subordinated officers to soldier committees, rendering the army ineffective for repression. Heath evaluates that the Tsar's personal command exacerbated divisions, pointing to Alekseev's memorandum on February 22, 1917, urging concession to avoid catastrophe. The collapse of the Great Retreat in 1915 demoralised officers, with 50,000 surrendering voluntarily at Przemysl on March 22, 1915. Railway breakdowns delayed reinforcements, with 500 locomotives out of service by December 1916 due to coal shortages. The war's role in militarising society backfired, as 150,000 garrison troops in Petrograd joined protesters on March 12, 1917, seizing the arsenal and distributing 40,000 rifles. Without these armed defections, the regime's police force of 3,500 could not contain 300,000 demonstrators. Heath's assessment ties the war's causal weight to its erosion of coercive power, contending that pre-war stability under Stolypin's reforms from 1906 might have persisted absent the conflict's scale. The February Revolution began spontaneously on March 8, 1917, with women textile workers protesting bread prices at 4 rubles per pound, up from 3 kopecks in 1914. By March 10, 1917, 240,000 strikers paralysed the city, and the Tsar's order to dissolve the Duma on March 11, 1917, was ignored. Abdication followed on March 2, 1917, with Nicholas II naming Grand Duke Michael as successor, who declined on March 3, 1917. The war precipitated this sequence by depleting resources and loyalty, though industrialisation had created a proletariat of 3,500,000 by 1914, prone to organisation. The Vyborg district soviet formed on March 13, 1917, coordinating with the Duma committee. Military failure thus directly enabled the power vacuum filled by dual authority.
Economic disruption stemming from the First World War devastated Russia's infrastructure and exacerbated class tensions, rendering the Tsarist economy unsustainable by early 1917. War expenditures totalled 38,600,000,000 rubles by March 1917, financed through printing money, which increased circulation from 1,600,000,000 rubles in 1914 to 9,100,000,000 in 1917. Grain procurements fell to 1,400,000 tons in 1916-1917 from 4,000,000 tons pre-war, as 4,000,000 peasants were conscripted, leaving fields untended. Petrograd received 300 railway cars of flour monthly in February 1917, down from 1,200 in 1914. Coal production dropped 30 percent by 1917, halting factories and trains. The Donbass mines output fell from 2,200,000 tons monthly in 1914 to 1,500,000 in 1916. Budget deficits reached 13,000,000,000 rubles in 1916, with foreign loans from Britain and France covering only 20 percent. Tax revenues declined as vodka sales, banned since August 1914, previously contributed 25 percent of income. Black market prices for bread reached 1 ruble per pound by January 1917. Workers' real wages fell 50 percent between 1914 and 1917, with a 12-hour day yielding 1 ruble 50 kopecks. The Ministry of Agriculture under Alexei Bobrinsky failed to implement fixed prices until December 1916, too late to prevent hoarding. Urban population grew by 33 percent due to refugees, straining housing with 500,000 in Petrograd barracks by 1917. Disease outbreaks killed 100,000 civilians in 1916 from typhus. The war industries committee, chaired by Alexander Guchkov from August 1915, produced 1,000,000 shells monthly by 1916 but could not offset shortages. Pipes argues that economic mobilisation favoured military needs, diverting 70 percent of textiles to uniforms by 1916, leaving civilians without clothing. Pipes connects this prioritisation to social breakdown, asserting that the Tsar's refusal to establish a unified supply command under the Duma in November 1916 accelerated famine conditions. Pipes's perspective links wartime expropriations to revolutionary mobilisation, noting that without the war's fiscal demands, Stolypin's land reforms might have stabilised rural areas. The rouble exchange rate fell to 27 kopecks against the dollar by February 1917 from 50 in 1914. Gold reserves depleted from 1,700,000,000 rubles to 300,000,000. Strikes at the Petrograd metal works on January 22, 1917, commemorated Bloody Sunday, involving 145,000 participants demanding 8-hour days. Police arrested 800 but released most due to overcrowding. The economy's collapse manifested in transport failures, with 575 trains delayed daily in January 1917. Fuel shortages closed 50 bakeries in Petrograd on March 5, 1917. The Provisional Government's inheritance included 2,000,000,000 rubles in unpaid wages. Pipes evaluates that the war's economic legacy precluded reform, as Nicholas II's dissolution of the Duma four times between 1906 and 1917 left no mechanism for fiscal oversight. War profits concentrated in firms like Putilov, where dividends rose 20 percent, widening inequality. Peasant revolts seized 500 estates in Tambov province by February 1917. The war thus dismantled economic cohesion, fuelling the February events where economic grievances dominated chants for bread and peace.
Social and political alienation intensified under the First World War, as the regime's isolation from liberal elements and reliance on repression alienated key groups essential for survival. The murder of Rasputin on December 30, 1916, removed a scapegoat but exposed court divisions, with Alexandra writing to Nicholas II on December 14, 1916, urging firm rule. The nobility's Union of Landowners petitioned for responsibility on August 20, 1915, ignored by the Tsar. Kadet leader Pavel Milyukov denounced the government in the Duma on November 14, 1916, asking if ministerial actions were stupidity or treason. Socialist Revolutionary pamphlets circulated 100,000 copies in Petrograd by January 1917. The war swelled Bolshevik membership from 10,000 in 1914 to 240,000 by April 1917, with Lenin returning on April 16, 1917, via the sealed train. Pre-war opposition included the Lena Goldfields massacre on April 17, 1912, killing 270 strikers. The war suspended Duma sessions from August 1914 to February 1915, resuming under pressure. The Tsar's prorogation on September 3, 1915, prompted the Progressive Bloc's formation with 300 deputies. Arrests of workers' deputies in November 1914 weakened moderate socialism. Heath contends that social polarisation stemmed from the war's amplification of autocratic rigidity, citing Nicholas II's rejection of Lvov's war relief offer in July 1915 as a missed opportunity for alliance. Heath's analysis integrates this with political miscalculation, arguing that the Tsarina's German origin, evident in letters intercepted by military intelligence in 1916, undermined legitimacy irrespective of actual influence. The Okhrana reported 1,000,000 revolutionary leaflets distributed in 1916. Women entered factories, numbering 1,000,000 by 1917, organising the March 8, 1917, protests. Intellectuals like Maxim Gorky criticised the war in Novaya Zhizn from May 1917, but pre-revolution dissent grew. The Moscow security conference in January 1917 warned of uprising. Social breakdown culminated in the Soviet's order 1, democratising the army. Heath evaluates that without the war's social mobilisation, the 1905 soviets might have remained dormant. The regime's fall reflected accumulated alienation, precipitated by wartime strains.
In conclusion, the First World War served as the primary catalyst for Tsarism's collapse in 1917, transforming chronic weaknesses into acute crisis through military, economic, and social channels. Defeats at Tannenberg and elsewhere, economic collapse with inflation and shortages, and political isolation converged in the March abdication. Whilst factors like 1905 lingered, the war's scale—15,000,000 mobilised, 6,650,000 casualties—overwhelmed the system. Pipes and Heath concur that adaptation failures under war pressure doomed the autocracy, rendering alternatives unviable by 1917. The revolution thus marked the war's direct outcome in Russia.
