Actual examination response (scoring within the 7-9 markband):
Example I
The origins of the Cold War cannot be attributed solely to either the United States or the Soviet Union but emerged from a complex interplay of mutual distrust, ideological antagonism, and geopolitical competition that escalated between 1945 and 1950. The superpowers’ post-1945 policies were shaped by conflicting visions of global order, security imperatives, and historical grievances, rendering shared responsibility for the conflict’s emergence. While Soviet actions in Eastern Europe and American containment policies each contributed significantly to the breakdown of post-war cooperation, neither side acted in isolation. The collapse of the Grand Alliance stemmed from a combination of incompatible ambitions, misperceptions, and institutionalised hostility that neither leadership sought to de-escalate. The extent of mutual responsibility lies in how both nations prioritised ideological supremacy and territorial security over compromise, transforming wartime partnership into a zero-sum struggle for dominance.
Soviet actions in Eastern Europe from 1945 onwards were central to the crystallisation of Cold War divisions. Stalin’s insistence on securing a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, justified as a buffer against future invasions, clashed with Western expectations of free elections and geopolitical equilibrium. The 1945 Yalta agreements had established zones of occupation in Germany and Eastern Europe, but Stalin’s rapid consolidation of control in Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria through rigged elections and suppression of non-communist parties violated implicit understandings of joint administration. The Molotov Plan of 1947, creating the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), institutionalised economic isolation of Eastern Europe from Western markets, while the 1948-1949 Berlin Blockade demonstrated Moscow’s willingness to use force to exclude Western influence from its sphere. Zubok argues that Stalin’s actions were driven by a combination of ideological conviction and geopolitical pragmatism, rooted in the USSR’s historical vulnerability to invasion and the belief that capitalist nations would never accept communist coexistence. The establishment of satellite regimes in East Germany, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia through purges of opposition leaders like the 1948 Slánský trial in Czechoslovakia created a cordon sanitaire that the West perceived as aggressive expansionism rather than defensive positioning.
The Soviet Union’s refusal to participate in the Marshall Plan and its encouragement of anti-American propaganda through organs like Pravda further entrenched ideological confrontation. The 1949 coup in Czechoslovakia, orchestrated by Communist Party leader Klement Gottwald, reinforced Western fears of a monolithic communist bloc directed from Moscow. However, Soviet actions were not unilateral; they responded to perceived American threats such as the Truman Doctrine’s pledge to ‘contain’ communism, NATO’s formation in 1949, and the integration of West Germany into Western alliances. Stalin’s paranoia, exacerbated by the assassination of Bulgarian leader Georgi Dimitrov in 1949 and fears of a capitalist ‘encirclement,’ led to heightened security measures like the 1948 expulsion of all non-communist parties from the Polish government. The USSR’s acquisition of atomic weapons in 1949 and its support for North Korea’s 1950 invasion of the South reflected a strategy of asserting parity with the United States, yet these moves also stemmed from defensive calculations in an increasingly hostile international environment.
American policies of containment and ideological expansionism were equally critical to the Cold War’s emergence. The Truman Doctrine of March 1947, committing the US to ‘support free peoples’ resisting ‘totalitarian regimes,’ framed the conflict as a global moral struggle that necessitated intervention in Greece and Turkey against communist insurgencies. The Marshall Plan, announced in June 1947, allocated $13 billion to European recovery but tied aid to market-oriented reforms and exclusion of communist parties from government, thereby politicising economic assistance. The establishment of NATO in April 1949, despite Soviet warnings, institutionalised a military alliance aimed at deterring Soviet aggression while consolidating US hegemony in Western Europe. Kennan’s Long Telegram of February 1946 provided the intellectual foundation for containment, positing that Soviet power was inherently expansionist and must be countered through ‘strong resistance’ at every point of pressure.
The US prioritised ideological supremacy over diplomatic flexibility, rejecting proposals for joint occupation of Germany or disarmament negotiations. The 1948 decision to introduce the Deutsche Mark in West Germany, bypassing Soviet veto in the Allied Control Council, and the subsequent division of Berlin into four sectors with incompatible currencies, exemplified unilateralism that deepened divisions. American fears of communist influence were amplified by events like the 1948 Czechoslovak coup and the revelation of atomic espionage by Klaus Fuchs and the Rosenbergs, which fuelled domestic anti-communist hysteria. The 1950 National Security Council Report 68 (NSC-68) framed the USSR as an ‘expansionist threat to world order,’ justifying massive military spending and global interventionism. However, US actions were not merely aggressive; they were also reactive, shaped by Soviet moves like the Berlin Blockade and the testing of its first atomic bomb in 1949. The Truman administration’s focus on building alliances and economic dominance reflected a belief that the USSR’s internal contradictions would lead to collapse, a strategy that assumed inevitability rather than seeking accommodation.
The Cold War’s emergence was thus a product of mutual escalation rather than unilateral aggression. Both superpowers perceived the other as an existential threat: the USSR feared capitalist encirclement and ideological subversion, while the US viewed communism as a monolithic menace to global stability. The breakdown of Yalta’s cooperative framework was accelerated by incompatible security needs—the USSR’s demand for buffer states clashed with American insistence on open borders and self-determination. The 1946 Churchill Iron Curtain speech and Stalin’s 1946 Zhdanov Report mutually denounced the other’s policies as imperialistic, cementing a cycle of suspicion. Neither side sought dialogue; the 1945-1946 Atomic Energy Commission negotiations over nuclear cooperation collapsed when the US refused to share technology, while Stalin’s purges of pro-Western figures like Nikolai Novikov in 1948 eliminated potential moderates.
David Heath’s analysis highlights how both nations institutionalised Cold War structures to legitimise their global roles: the USSR justified purges and militarisation as necessary for survival, while the US used containment to reinforce its economic and political dominance. The 1948 formation of the OEEC and Comecon as rival economic blocs, coupled with the 1949 NATO-Warsaw Pact rivalry, created a self-sustaining system of confrontation. Even minor incidents like the 1948 Berlin Airlift and the 1949 capture of Klaus Fuchs became symbolic markers of hostility that reinforced public support for escalation.
To conclude, the Cold War arose from equal measures of ideological rigidity, security anxieties, and strategic miscalculations on both sides. The Soviet Union’s consolidation of Eastern Europe and the US’s containment policies were mutually reinforcing, each feeding the other’s fears. While Stalin’s paranoia and Truman’s unilateralism were central to the conflict’s emergence, neither side acted in isolation. The inability to reconcile differing visions of post-war order—between a multipolar, ideologically diverse world and a bipolar system dominated by two blocs—ensured that cooperation gave way to perpetual rivalry. The Cold War was not the result of one nation’s aggression but of a tragic convergence of mistrust and ambition that defined the second half of the twentieth century.
EXAMPLE II
The origins of the Cold War cannot be attributed solely to either the United States or the Soviet Union but emerged from a complex interplay of mutual distrust, ideological antagonism, and geopolitical competition that escalated between 1945 and 1950. The superpowers’ post-1945 policies were shaped by conflicting visions of global order, security imperatives, and historical grievances, rendering shared responsibility for the conflict’s emergence. While Soviet actions in Eastern Europe and American containment policies each contributed significantly to the breakdown of post-war cooperation, neither side acted in isolation. The collapse of the Grand Alliance stemmed from a combination of incompatible ambitions, misperceptions, and institutionalised hostility that neither leadership sought to de-escalate. The extent of mutual responsibility lies in how both nations prioritised ideological supremacy and territorial security over compromise, transforming wartime partnership into a zero-sum struggle for dominance.
Soviet actions in Eastern Europe from 1945 onwards were central to the crystallisation of Cold War divisions. Stalin’s insistence on securing a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, justified as a buffer against future invasions, clashed with Western expectations of free elections and geopolitical equilibrium. The 1945 Yalta agreements had established zones of occupation in Germany and Eastern Europe, but Stalin’s rapid consolidation of control in Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria through rigged elections and suppression of non-communist parties violated implicit understandings of joint administration. The Molotov Plan of 1947, creating the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), institutionalised economic isolation of Eastern Europe from Western markets, while the 1948-1949 Berlin Blockade demonstrated Moscow’s willingness to use force to exclude Western influence from its sphere. Zubok argues that Stalin’s actions were driven by a combination of ideological conviction and geopolitical pragmatism, rooted in the USSR’s historical vulnerability to invasion and the belief that capitalist nations would never accept communist coexistence. The establishment of satellite regimes in East Germany, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia through purges of opposition leaders like the 1948 Slánský trial in Czechoslovakia created a cordon sanitaire that the West perceived as aggressive expansionism rather than defensive positioning.
The Soviet Union’s refusal to participate in the Marshall Plan and its encouragement of anti-American propaganda through organs like Pravda further entrenched ideological confrontation. The 1949 coup in Czechoslovakia, orchestrated by Communist Party leader Klement Gottwald, reinforced Western fears of a monolithic communist bloc directed from Moscow. However, Soviet actions were not unilateral; they responded to perceived American threats such as the Truman Doctrine’s pledge to ‘contain’ communism, NATO’s formation in 1949, and the integration of West Germany into Western alliances. Stalin’s paranoia, exacerbated by the assassination of Bulgarian leader Georgi Dimitrov in 1949 and fears of a capitalist ‘encirclement,’ led to heightened security measures like the 1948 expulsion of all non-communist parties from the Polish government. The USSR’s acquisition of atomic weapons in 1949 and its support for North Korea’s 1950 invasion of the South reflected a strategy of asserting parity with the United States, yet these moves also stemmed from defensive calculations in an increasingly hostile international environment.
American policies of containment and ideological expansionism were equally critical to the Cold War’s emergence. The Truman Doctrine of March 1947, committing the US to ‘support free peoples’ resisting ‘totalitarian regimes,’ framed the conflict as a global moral struggle that necessitated intervention in Greece and Turkey against communist insurgencies. The Marshall Plan, announced in June 1947, allocated $13 billion to European recovery but tied aid to market-oriented reforms and exclusion of communist parties from government, thereby politicising economic assistance. The establishment of NATO in April 1949, despite Soviet warnings, institutionalised a military alliance aimed at deterring Soviet aggression while consolidating US hegemony in Western Europe. Kennan’s Long Telegram of February 1946 provided the intellectual foundation for containment, positing that Soviet power was inherently expansionist and must be countered through ‘strong resistance’ at every point of pressure.
The US prioritised ideological supremacy over diplomatic flexibility, rejecting proposals for joint occupation of Germany or disarmament negotiations. The 1948 decision to introduce the Deutsche Mark in West Germany, bypassing Soviet veto in the Allied Control Council, and the subsequent division of Berlin into four sectors with incompatible currencies, exemplified unilateralism that deepened divisions. American fears of communist influence were amplified by events like the 1948 Czechoslovak coup and the revelation of atomic espionage by Klaus Fuchs and the Rosenbergs, which fuelled domestic anti-communist hysteria. The 1950 National Security Council Report 68 (NSC-68) framed the USSR as an ‘expansionist threat to world order,’ justifying massive military spending and global interventionism. However, US actions were not merely aggressive; they were also reactive, shaped by Soviet moves like the Berlin Blockade and the testing of its first atomic bomb in 1949. The Truman administration’s focus on building alliances and economic dominance reflected a belief that the USSR’s internal contradictions would lead to collapse, a strategy that assumed inevitability rather than seeking accommodation.
The Cold War’s emergence was thus a product of mutual escalation rather than unilateral aggression. Both superpowers perceived the other as an existential threat: the USSR feared capitalist encirclement and ideological subversion, while the US viewed communism as a monolithic menace to global stability. The breakdown of Yalta’s cooperative framework was accelerated by incompatible security needs—the USSR’s demand for buffer states clashed with American insistence on open borders and self-determination. The 1946 Churchill Iron Curtain speech and Stalin’s 1946 Zhdanov Report mutually denounced the other’s policies as imperialistic, cementing a cycle of suspicion. Neither side sought dialogue; the 1945-1946 Atomic Energy Commission negotiations over nuclear cooperation collapsed when the US refused to share technology, while Stalin’s purges of pro-Western figures like Nikolai Novikov in 1948 eliminated potential moderates.
David Heath’s analysis highlights how both nations institutionalised Cold War structures to legitimise their global roles: the USSR justified purges and militarisation as necessary for survival, while the US used containment to reinforce its economic and political dominance. The 1948 formation of the OEEC and Comecon as rival economic blocs, coupled with the 1949 NATO-Warsaw Pact rivalry, created a self-sustaining system of confrontation. Even minor incidents like the 1948 Berlin Airlift and the 1949 capture of Klaus Fuchs became symbolic markers of hostility that reinforced public support for escalation.
To conclude, the Cold War arose from equal measures of ideological rigidity, security anxieties, and strategic miscalculations on both sides. The Soviet Union’s consolidation of Eastern Europe and the US’s containment policies were mutually reinforcing, each feeding the other’s fears. While Stalin’s paranoia and Truman’s unilateralism were central to the conflict’s emergence, neither side acted in isolation. The inability to reconcile differing visions of post-war order—between a multipolar, ideologically diverse world and a bipolar system dominated by two blocs—ensured that cooperation gave way to perpetual rivalry. The Cold War was not the result of one nation’s aggression but of a tragic convergence of mistrust and ambition that defined the second half of the twentieth century.
EXAMPLE II
The Soviet Union's actions in the immediate aftermath of World War II were central to the emergence of the Cold War. Stalin's determination to establish a buffer zone in Eastern Europe, motivated by historical insecurities and a desire to spread socialist influence, directly challenged the principles of self-determination and open societies championed by the West. The imposition of communist governments in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and other Eastern European countries, often through rigged elections and political repression, created a perception of Soviet aggression. As George Kennan observed in his Long Telegram (1946), the Soviet Union's "traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity" drove its expansionist policies, which the West viewed as a threat to international stability. The Berlin Blockade (1948–1949), a direct response to the introduction of a new currency in Western-occupied zones of Germany, further heightened tensions, demonstrating the Soviet Union's willingness to use coercive measures to achieve its objectives.
Additionally, the Soviet Union's establishment of the Cominform in 1947, aimed at coordinating communist parties across Europe, reinforced Western fears of a monolithic communist bloc seeking global domination. The Czechoslovak coup of 1948, in which communists seized power with Soviet backing, exemplified the Kremlin's determination to consolidate control in its sphere of influence, even at the expense of democratic processes. These actions, as argued by John Lewis Gaddis, created an atmosphere of crisis that made diplomatic compromise increasingly difficult.
However, the United States also bears significant responsibility for the escalation of Cold War tensions. American policymakers, influenced by the ideology of containment articulated by Kennan, adopted a confrontational stance toward the Soviet Union. The Truman Doctrine (1947), which pledged U.S. support to any nation resisting communism, and the Marshall Plan (1948), aimed at rebuilding Western Europe's economies, were perceived by the Soviets as attempts to encircle and undermine their influence. While these policies were framed as defensive measures, they contributed to a zero-sum dynamic in which cooperation became increasingly untenable.
The formation of NATO in 1949, a military alliance explicitly directed against Soviet expansion, further deepened the divide. As Melvyn Leffler highlights, the United States' emphasis on military deterrence and economic integration in Western Europe reinforced the Soviet Union's sense of encirclement, prompting a hardening of Stalin's policies. The U.S. atomic monopoly until 1949 also played a role in shaping the Cold War's early dynamics, as the threat of nuclear escalation influenced both sides' strategic calculations.
Despite these contributions, the argument that the Soviet Union bore greater responsibility is supported by its consistent pursuit of ideological and territorial expansion, often at the expense of diplomatic solutions. The United States, while adopting policies that exacerbated tensions, initially sought to avoid direct confrontation and focused on rebuilding war-torn Europe. The Soviet Union's actions, particularly in Eastern Europe, created a fait accompli that left the West with limited options for response. As Archie Brown argues, Stalin's "determination to secure Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe was the single most important factor in the origins of the Cold War."
In conclusion, while both the United States and the Soviet Union contributed to the emergence of the Cold War, the Soviet Union's expansionist policies and ideological rigidity were more directly responsible for creating the conditions of mutual hostility. The imposition of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, the Berlin Blockade, and the establishment of the Cominform demonstrated a proactive strategy of control and influence that the West perceived as a fundamental threat. The United States, though its policies of containment and alliance-building heightened tensions, initially sought to stabilise post-war Europe rather than provoke conflict. Thus, while both superpowers share responsibility, the Soviet Union's actions were more instrumental in the onset of the Cold War.
