From the November 2005 IBDP History Paper 2 exam
Example 1:
The assertion that a multiparty state represented the ideal form of government for the twentieth century is one that invites a thorough examination of the political landscape of the era. The twentieth century was a period of profound political change, marked by the rise and fall of various forms of government, from totalitarian regimes to liberal democracies. However, the claim that a multiparty system was the ideal form of government during this period is one that warrants a critical evaluation.
The first argument against the assertion lies in the inherent instability often associated with multiparty systems. The twentieth century witnessed numerous instances where multiparty states descended into political chaos, as the presence of multiple parties led to a fragmentation of the political landscape. Huntington's analysis of political order in changing societies provides a compelling argument against the idealisation of multiparty systems. He posits that political stability is not necessarily a product of the number of parties in a system, but rather the institutionalisation of these parties and the political system as a whole. In the context of the twentieth century, many newly independent nations adopted multiparty systems in an attempt to establish democratic governance. However, the lack of established political institutions often led to instability and conflict. For instance, the multiparty system in Nigeria after its independence in 1960 resulted in a series of military coups and a devastating civil war. Similarly, the multiparty democracy in Weimar Germany led to political fragmentation and paved the way for the rise of Hitler's totalitarian regime. These examples illustrate that the presence of multiple parties does not necessarily lead to political stability or democratic governance. Huntington's argument is further supported by the experiences of countries like Singapore and Malaysia, which, despite having a dominant party system, have achieved significant economic progress and political stability. In these cases, the stability of the political system and the effectiveness of governance were not undermined by the lack of a multiparty system. Instead, the dominant parties in these countries were able to maintain political order and drive economic development, challenging the notion that a multiparty system is the ideal form of government.
It is important to consider the role of multiparty systems in the context of the Cold War. The ideological battle between the United States and the Soviet Union during the second half of the twentieth century significantly influenced the political systems of many countries. The bipolar nature of the Cold War often forced countries to align with one of the two superpowers, leading to the establishment of either capitalist or socialist political systems. In this context, the assertion that a multiparty system was the ideal form of government becomes even more contentious. As Linz and Stepan argue, the bipolar nature of the Cold War often led to the establishment of single-party systems, particularly in countries within the Soviet sphere of influence. These single-party systems, while not democratic, were often stable and were able to maintain political order. Moreover, the Cold War also saw the emergence of non-aligned countries that sought to maintain their independence from both superpowers. Many of these countries, such as India and Yugoslavia, adopted multiparty systems. However, the political stability and economic development of these countries varied significantly, further challenging the notion that a multiparty system was the ideal form of government during the twentieth century. In addition, the end of the Cold War did not necessarily lead to the establishment of successful multiparty systems. As Fukuyama points out, the "end of history" did not result in the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as a form of government. Instead, many post-communist countries struggled to establish stable multiparty systems, and some even reverted to authoritarian rule. In conclusion, the assertion that a multiparty system was the ideal form of government for the twentieth century is not supported by the historical evidence. The experiences of various countries during this period demonstrate that political stability and effective governance are not necessarily the products of a multiparty system. Instead, these outcomes are more closely related to the institutionalisation of political systems and the specific historical and cultural contexts of individual countries.
The second argument against the assertion that a multiparty state was the ideal form of government for the twentieth century is the potential for policy paralysis. Sartori's work on the influence of party systems on government stability and efficiency provides a useful framework for this discussion. He argues that while a multiparty system can enhance representation, it can also lead to a fragmentation of the political landscape, making it difficult to form stable governments and implement policies effectively. The Italian political system in the latter half of the twentieth century serves as a case in point. Despite being a multiparty democracy, Italy experienced frequent changes in government, with an average government lifespan of less than a year between 1945 and 1992. This political instability often resulted in policy paralysis, as governments were unable to implement long-term policies due to their short lifespan and the need to maintain a broad coalition of parties. Sartori's argument is further supported by the experiences of countries like Belgium and Israel, where the multiparty system has often led to protracted negotiations to form coalition governments. In some cases, these negotiations have resulted in political deadlock and the inability to form a government, as was the case in Belgium in 2010-2011 and in Israel in 2019-2020. These examples illustrate that a multiparty system can lead to policy paralysis and political instability, challenging the assertion that it is the ideal form of government.
The multiparty system, while fostering a diversity of voices and promoting democratic values, can also lead to a diffusion of responsibility. This diffusion can hinder decisive action and effective governance. The case of India, the world's largest democracy, provides a pertinent example. Despite its vibrant multiparty system, India has often struggled with policy implementation due to the need for consensus among a diverse array of political parties. This has led to delays in economic reforms and infrastructure projects, impacting the country's development trajectory. Moreover, the multiparty system can also exacerbate social divisions. Lijphart's analysis of consociational democracy highlights how multiparty systems in divided societies can reinforce rather than mitigate social cleavages. In countries with deep ethnic, religious, or linguistic divisions, the existence of multiple parties can lead to the politicisation of these divisions, potentially leading to conflict. The experiences of countries like Lebanon and Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the multiparty system has often been a reflection of societal divisions rather than a means of managing them, support Lijphart's argument. In contrast, some countries with a dominant party system or a two-party system have been able to maintain political stability and implement policies effectively. The experiences of countries like China and Singapore, which have achieved significant economic progress despite the lack of a multiparty system, challenge the assertion that a multiparty system is the ideal form of government.
In the context of the twentieth century, the multiparty system, while fostering a diversity of voices and promoting democratic values, can also lead to a diffusion of responsibility. This diffusion can hinder decisive action and effective governance. The case of India, the world's largest democracy, provides a pertinent example. Despite its vibrant multiparty system, India has often struggled with policy implementation due to the need for consensus among a diverse array of political parties. This has led to delays in economic reforms and infrastructure projects, impacting the country's development trajectory. Moreover, the multiparty system can also exacerbate social divisions. Lijphart's analysis of consociational democracy highlights how multiparty systems in divided societies can reinforce rather than mitigate social cleavages. In countries with deep ethnic, religious, or linguistic divisions, the existence of multiple parties can lead to the politicisation of these divisions, potentially leading to conflict. The experiences of countries like Lebanon and Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the multiparty system has often been a reflection of societal divisions rather than a means of managing them, support Lijphart's argument. In contrast, some countries with a dominant party system or a two-party system have been able to maintain political stability and implement policies effectively. The experiences of countries like China and Singapore, which have achieved significant economic progress despite the lack of a multiparty system, challenge the assertion that a multiparty system is the ideal form of government. This section has reached its word limit.
the multiparty system can also lead to a lack of accountability. With multiple parties sharing power, it can be difficult for voters to attribute responsibility for policy outcomes. This can undermine the democratic principle of accountability, as voters may not be able to hold the government to account effectively. The case of Italy, with its frequent changes in government and complex coalitions, illustrates this issue. With so many parties involved in governing, it can be challenging for voters to determine which party is responsible for specific policy outcomes. This can lead to voter apathy and cynicism, undermining the democratic process. Moreover, the multiparty system can also lead to short-termism in policy making. Governments in multiparty systems, particularly those dependent on coalition partners, may prioritise short-term policy gains to maintain their position, at the expense of long-term strategic planning. This can hinder the effective governance and development of a country. In contrast, countries with a dominant party system or a two-party system, such as China or the United States, have been able to pursue long-term strategic policies. This ability to plan and implement long-term policies is a crucial aspect of effective governance, challenging the assertion that a multiparty system is the ideal form of government.
Moreover, the multiparty system can also lead to a focus on partisan interests over national interests. With multiple parties representing different constituencies and interest groups, policy making can become a process of negotiation and compromise among parties, rather than a focus on the national interest. This can lead to policy outcomes that favour specific interest groups, rather than the broader population. In contrast, countries with a dominant party system or a two-party system, such as China or the United States, have been able to pursue policies that, while not without criticism, have often been aimed at national development and progress. This ability to focus on the national interest is a crucial aspect of effective governance, challenging the assertion that a multiparty system is the ideal form of government. In light of these arguments, it becomes clear that the assertion that a multiparty system was the ideal form of government for the twentieth century is not supported by the historical evidence. The experiences of various countries during this period demonstrate that political stability, effective governance, and policy continuity are not necessarily the products of a multiparty system.
The assertion that the multiparty state was the ideal form of government for the twentieth century is not substantiated by the historical evidence. The inherent instability often associated with multiparty systems, the potential for policy paralysis, and the diffusion of responsibility that can hinder decisive action and effective governance all challenge this assertion. The experiences of various countries during the twentieth century, from Nigeria and Weimar Germany to Italy and India, illustrate the complexities and challenges associated with multiparty systems. Moreover, the multiparty system can exacerbate social divisions, lead to a lack of accountability, and result in short-termism in policy making. The experiences of countries like Lebanon, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Italy demonstrate these issues. In contrast, some countries with a dominant party system or a two-party system, such as China, Singapore, and the United States, have been able to maintain political stability, implement policies effectively, and pursue long-term strategic policies. In conclusion, while a multiparty system can enhance representation and promote democratic values, it is not necessarily the ideal form of government. The effectiveness of a political system depends on a variety of factors, including the institutionalisation of political systems, the specific historical and cultural contexts of individual countries, and the ability to maintain political stability and implement policies effectively. Therefore, the assertion that a multiparty state was the ideal form of government for the twentieth century is not supported by the historical evidence.
Example 2:
Multiparty states dominated twentieth-century governance in Western Europe and North America, facilitating representation of diverse interests through coalitions and electoral competition that stabilised regimes against extremist takeovers. The Weimar Republic operated with proportional representation from January 19, 1919, producing cabinets averaging eight months in duration until March 30, 1930, when Heinrich Brüning formed a minority government supported by 107 Reichstag seats out of 491. French Third Republic parliaments elected on May 11, 1924, included 104 Socialists, 159 Radicals, and 53 Communists amongst 577 deputies, enabling the Cartel des Gauches to pass the Herriot ministry's secular education reforms on June 10, 1924. British general elections on October 29, 1924, returned 419 Conservative members to the House of Commons, granting Stanley Baldwin a majority of 223 seats over Labour's 151 and Liberals' 40, permitting tariff protections under the Safeguards Act of February 28, 1925. Scandinavian countries maintained multiparty systems with minority governments, as in Sweden where the Social Democrats held 104 seats in the Riksdag after September 15, 1924, elections, relying on Liberal tolerance to enact unemployment insurance on January 1, 1935, covering 500,000 workers by 1939. Italian elections on April 6, 1924, awarded Mussolini's National List 374 seats out of 535 under the Acerbo Law of November 18, 1923, which allocated two-thirds of seats to lists securing 25 percent of votes, yet opposition parties like the Popular Party with 39 deputies continued parliamentary criticism until the Aventine Secession on June 26, 1924. Belgian proportional elections on April 5, 1925, produced 78 Catholics, 70 Socialists, and 38 Liberals in the Chamber, forming the Poullet-Vandervelde cabinet on June 15, 1925, which nationalised railways on March 1, 1926, integrating 50,000 employees. Dutch elections on July 3, 1925, returned 32 Catholics, 24 Anti-Revolutionaries, and 11 Social Democrats to the Tweede Kamer, sustaining Hendrik Colijn's coalition that balanced the budget with cuts of 200,000,000 guilders in 1934. Multiparty competition in Czechoslovakia after October 28, 1925, elections gave 69 Agrarians, 45 Social Democrats, and 41 Czechoslovak Socialists in the 300-seat chamber, enabling the Pětka coalition to ratify the Locarno Treaties on March 16, 1926. Finnish elections on July 1, 1924, elected 53 Social Democrats, 44 Agrarians, and 38 Progressives to the Eduskunta, permitting Kyösti Kallio's minority government to enact land redistribution transferring 100,000 hectares to 20,000 tenants by 1930. Norwegian Labour Party split in November 1923 left 43 moderates and 6 communists in the Storting after October 22, 1924, elections, allowing Johan Ludwig Mowinckel's Liberal cabinet to negotiate trade agreements with Britain on May 15, 1925, boosting exports by 15 percent. Canadian federal elections on October 29, 1925, returned 101 Liberals, 116 Conservatives, and 24 Progressives to the Commons, with Arthur Meighen's minority government collapsing on June 28, 1926, after losing a confidence vote by one ballot. Australian elections on November 14, 1925, gave Stanley Bruce's Nationalists 51 seats in the 75-member House, enacting the Crimes Act on October 30, 1926, deporting 12 union leaders. New Zealand Reform Party secured 55 seats in the November 4, 1925, elections, enabling Gordon Coates to establish the Dairy Board on March 1, 1926, controlling 80 percent of exports. Multiparty systems accommodated industrial growth, with British trade unions representing 8,300,000 members by 1920 negotiating the Mond-Turner talks on February 8, 1928. French Confédération Générale du Travail claimed 2,400,000 affiliates by 1920, securing the eight-hour day law on April 23, 1919. German Free Trade Unions enrolled 7,900,000 by 1920, participating in the Zentralarbeitsgemeinschaft agreement on November 15, 1918, recognising collective bargaining. Swedish LO federation grew to 1,000,000 by 1930, mediating the Saltsjöbaden Agreement on December 20, 1938. Dahl examines multiparty dynamics in Norway, noting that 12 cabinets between 1920 and 1935 averaged 18 months, yet produced welfare expansions covering 60 percent of GDP by 1939 through cross-party compromises. Dahl connects proportional representation to policy continuity, arguing that minority governments under Juho Sunila in Finland from December 17, 1927, to December 22, 1928, passed language laws protecting Swedish speakers numbering 350,000. Multiparty states integrated ethnic minorities, as in Belgium where Flemish demands led to the Language Law of July 31, 1932, establishing Dutch universities in Ghent. Swiss referenda on June 3, 1928, approved old-age insurance with 323,000 yes votes against 198,000 no, reflecting concordant politics amongst 195 National Councillors divided into 58 Radicals, 49 Catholics, and 42 Social Democrats. Austrian elections on April 24, 1927, elected 73 Christian Socials, 71 Social Democrats, and 12 Pan-Germans to the Nationalrat, sustaining Ignaz Seipel's coalition that suppressed the July Revolt on July 15, 1927, with 89 deaths. Greek Venizelist-Republican coalition won 228 seats in the November 3, 1920, plebiscite restoring Constantine I, yet multiparty restoration collapsed into dictatorship under Pangalos on June 24, 1925. Spanish Primo de Rivera dissolved the Cortes on September 15, 1923, banning parties until Alfonso XIII's abdication on April 14, 1931. Multiparty competition prevented totalitarian consolidation in 12 of 15 Western European states by 1939, with exceptions in Italy after October 28, 1922, Germany after March 5, 1933, and Spain after July 18, 1936. British electoral turnout averaged 77 percent in 1920s elections, producing alternance between Labour's 287 seats on May 30, 1929, and Conservatives' 260 on October 27, 1931. French instability yielded 11 ministries between June 16, 1924, and July 18, 1926, yet maintained republican institutions against 6,000 Croix de Feu members by 1934. Dahl's assessment ties multiparty resilience to veto players, as Belgian Catholics with 40 percent votes blocked socialist nationalisations in 1935. The systems accommodated 1918-1919 revolutions without regime collapse in 10 countries, incorporating socialist parties representing 30 percent average vote share.
Multiparty states faltered under economic depression and ideological polarisation, enabling authoritarian seizures in Central and Eastern Europe where coalitions proved unmanageable. German elections on September 14, 1930, returned 107 Nazis, 143 Social Democrats, and 77 Communists to the 577-seat Reichstag, fragmenting mandates into 12 parties and preventing majority cabinets after Brüning's resignation on May 30, 1932. Polish Sejm elections on November 16, 1930, awarded Piłsudski's Nonpartisan Bloc 249 seats out of 444 through intimidation, with 5,000 opposition arrests by October 1930. Hungarian elections on June 28, 1931, gave István Bethlen's Unity Party 155 seats in the 245-member assembly, sustaining restricted suffrage limiting voters to 2,900,000 of 8,500,000 adults. Romanian elections on June 1, 1931, produced 338 National Liberals and 77 National Peasants in the 387-seat chamber, but King Carol II dismissed Iuliu Maniu on April 10, 1931, installing Nicolae Iorga's minority government. Bulgarian elections on June 21, 1931, elected 151 Democratic Entente deputies against 107 Agrarians in the 273-seat Sobranie, yet Alexander Tsankov's coup on June 9, 1923, precedent enabled military rule under Kimon Georgiev on May 19, 1934. Yugoslav elections on November 8, 1931, boycotted by opposition, left Alexander I's regime unopposed in the 305-seat Skupština, proclaiming the October Dictatorship on January 6, 1929. Albanian Zogolli declared monarchy on September 1, 1928, after elections on August 17, 1928, returned 55 government supporters in the 57-member assembly. Greek elections on September 25, 1932, fragmented into 98 Venizelists, 95 Populists, and 15 Communists amongst 248 deputies, prompting the Plastiras coup on March 6, 1933. Portuguese National Union list secured all 90 seats in the December 16, 1934, elections under Salazar's constitution of March 19, 1933. Spanish elections on November 19, 1933, gave 207 CEDA, 102 Radicals, and 59 Socialists in the 473-seat Cortes, with Gil Robles refusing power on October 1, 1934, enabling Lerroux's minority cabinet until the Asturias revolt on October 5, 1934, suppressed with 1,335 deaths. Austrian Dollfuss dissolved parliament on March 4, 1933, after tied votes, establishing the Fatherland Front regime banning parties on May 12, 1933. Latvian Ulmanis coup on May 15, 1934, closed the Saeima elected with 26 Social Democrats on October 6, 1928. Lithuanian elections on June 9, 1936, rubber-stamped Smetona's 42 nominees in the 49-seat Seimas. Estonian Constantine Päts declared martial law on March 12, 1934, arresting 400 Vaps members after February 24, 1934, local gains. Romanian Iron Guard grew to 272,000 members by 1937, assassinating Prime Minister Duca on December 29, 1933. Hungarian Arrow Cross recruited 300,000 by 1939 under electoral restrictions. Polish Camp of National Unity won 60 percent in the September 25, 1935, elections with 16 percent turnout. Bulgarian Tsankov movement claimed 200,000 by 1936. Seton-Watson documents multiparty collapse in succession states, noting that 14 of 16 Eastern European legislatures suspended between 1922 and 1938, with average cabinet duration falling to six months by 1935. Seton-Watson links fragmentation to ethnic divisions, as Czechoslovak elections on May 19, 1935, gave 45 Sudeten Germans seats demanding autonomy granted partially on September 18, 1938. Romanian Peasant Party's 1,000,000 votes on July 20, 1937, failed coalition formation, enabling Carol's royal dictatorship on February 10, 1938. Greek Metaxas imposed censorship on August 4, 1936, after 15 communist deputies elected on January 26, 1936. Spanish CEDA's 4,600,000 votes on February 16, 1936, lost to Popular Front's 4,700,000, triggering military rebellion on July 17, 1936. Seton-Watson evaluates that proportional systems amplified minorities, with Hungarian Germans securing 25 percent votes for 5 percent population in 1935. Polish minorities comprising 31 percent population held 120 Sejm seats in 1922 but faced assimilation laws by 1938. Baltic states' Russian populations of 10 percent lacked representation after 1934 coups. Multiparty governance sustained in only 5 of 28 European states by 1939, with 18 dictatorships emerging from coalition paralysis. German Enabling Act on March 23, 1933, passed 444 to 94 with Social Democrats alone opposing after communist arrests of 81 deputies. Italian Grand Council voted 19 to 8 against Mussolini on July 25, 1943, only after military defeat. Spanish Republic executed 50,000 during civil war, collapsing multiparty framework by March 28, 1939. Seton-Watson's analysis connects economic crisis to polarisation, as unemployment reached 6,000,000 in Germany by January 1933, boosting Nazi votes from 107 to 288 seats on July 31, 1932. Austrian Social Democrats mobilised 200,000 Schutzbund members crushed in February 12, 1934, fighting leaving 320 dead. Greek communist KKE grew to 15,000 by 1936, repressed under Metaxas. Multiparty states proved brittle where GDP fell 30 percent between 1929 and 1932.
One-party regimes delivered rapid industrialisation and military mobilisation in the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, achieving outputs unattainable through multiparty negotiation. Soviet Five-Year Plan from October 1, 1928, constructed 1,500 enterprises by 1932, raising steel production from 4,300,000 tons in 1928 to 5,900,000 in 1932. Magnitogorsk iron complex employed 200,000 workers by 1932, outputting 3,300,000 tons annually by 1940. Collective farms numbered 211,000 by 1932, encompassing 62 percent of peasant households and delivering 6,000,000 tons grain to state in 1931. German Four-Year Plan under Hermann Göring from October 18, 1936, produced 19,900,000 tons steel by 1940 against 5,400,000 in 1932. Autobahn network reached 3,860 kilometres by 1938, employing 130,000. Reichsarbeitsdienst conscripted 400,000 annually from 1935, reducing unemployment from 6,000,000 in January 1933 to 34,000 by September 1939. Soviet tractor output rose from 1,000 in 1928 to 146,000 in 1932 at Stalingrad plant opened June 1, 1930. German Volkswagen project laid cornerstone on May 26, 1938, planning 1,000,000 vehicles annually though producing 210 by 1939. Carr contends that centralised planning enabled Soviet survival against invasion, mobilising 34,500,000 troops by June 22, 1941, with T-34 production reaching 3,000 in 1941 at Kharkov factory evacuated October 19, 1941. Carr connects one-party efficiency to evacuation of 1,500 factories eastwards by December 1941, resuming output in Urals with 10,000,000 workers relocated. Nazi Autobahn facilitated troop movements at 100 kilometres per hour, supporting Blitzkrieg capturing 300,000 French prisoners by June 22, 1940. Soviet Dnieprostroi dam generated 560,000 kilowatts by October 10, 1932, powering aluminium plants producing 50,000 tons by 1940. German synthetic oil plants at Leuna produced 4,000,000 tons by 1944 under IG Farben management from 1936. Carr's assessment ties authoritarian coordination to resource allocation, noting Soviet grain exports of 5,200,000 tons in 1931 financed import of 100,000 tons machinery from Britain. German rearmament expenditure reached 21,000,000,000 Reichsmarks by 1939, equipping 100 divisions with 2,500 tanks. Soviet Gosplan directives set quotas for 9,000 enterprises by 1933, achieving 93 percent plan fulfilment in heavy industry. Nazi Kraft durch Freude organised 25,000,000 vacations by 1938, maintaining worker productivity at 12-hour shifts. Carr evaluates that multiparty systems in France produced 20 cabinets between 1932 and 1940, delaying rearmament to 1,000 aircraft by 1938 against Germany's 5,000. Soviet NKVD arrested 1,500,000 in 1937-1938 purges, eliminating opposition to mobilisation plans. German Gestapo detained 160,000 in concentration camps by 1939, enforcing labour discipline. Soviet Urals-Kuznetsk combine transported 20,000,000 tons coal annually by 1939 via 3,000 kilometres rail built 1930-1932. German Mittelwerk underground factory employed 60,000 slave labourers producing 5,000 V-2 rockets by 1945. Carr argues one-party states concentrated investment, with Soviet capital formation at 26 percent GDP in 1932 against British 7 percent. Nazi Schacht's Mefo bills financed 12,000,000,000 Reichsmarks off-budget by 1938. Soviet Stakhanovite movement raised coal output 30 percent in Donbass during 1936. German Deutsche Arbeitsfront unified 20,000,000 workers under loyalty oaths from May 10, 1933. Carr's analysis integrates repression with output, as Soviet penal labour contributed 2,000,000 tons timber in 1938. One-party regimes sustained 10 percent annual growth 1933-1939 in Germany, 14 percent in USSR 1928-1940, whilst French GDP stagnated 1931-1938.
In conclusion, multiparty states proved effective for representation and stability in economically developed societies with strong civic traditions, sustaining governance in 12 Western democracies through depression and war threats until 1939. Central and Eastern European multiparty systems collapsed under ethnic tensions and economic crisis, with 18 regimes succumbing to authoritarianism by 1938. One-party states achieved unprecedented industrial and military mobilisation, as Soviet output grew 400 percent in heavy industry 1928-1940 and German rearmament equipped forces conquering Europe by 1941. Dahl, Seton-Watson, and Carr concur that contextual factors determined outcomes, with multiparty competition ideal where social cohesion permitted compromise but inadequate against polarisation or existential threats requiring centralised direction. The twentieth century thus revealed multiparty governance as conditionally optimal rather than universally superior.
