IBDP example of Internal Assessment
How Significant was Fidel Castro’s Role in the Missile Crisis of 1962?
A.Plan of Investigation
The investigation assesses the significance of Fidel Castro in the Missile Crisis of 1962. In order to evaluate Castro’s significance, the investigation evaluates his role in each stage of the Crisis in reference to other participants of the event; Castro’s role is investigated in the initial days of the Crisis, during the shooting down of the American U-2 plane, and in the resolution of the Crisis. Memoirs and oral history are mostly used to evaluate Castro’s significance. Two of the sources used in the essay, Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis and the Soviet Collapse compiled by James Blight, Allyn Bruce and David Welsh and Cuban documents, “The Mikoyan-Castro Talks, 4-5 November 1962: the Cuban Version,” are then evaluated for their origins, purposes, values and limitations.
The investigation does not assess the difference in ideologies (communist versus imperialism or capitalism) of the nations involved nor does the investigation assess opinions other than those of United States, Soviet Union, and Cuba.
B. Summary of Evidence
Prior to the Missile Crisis, Castro-American relationships were already strained by the Bay of Pigs in 1961 in which American funded counterrevolutionary Cubans to invade Cuba and overthrow Castro.1 The counterrevolutionary failed, pushing Castro into an alliance with communist Soviet Union and leaving Castro wary of American designs in Cuba.2 Castro’s fears were confirmed in early 1962 when his intelligence service noticed signs of U.S. activities related to what was later uncovered to be Operation Mongoose, another American invasion to overthrow Castro.3 Thus, “it was under these circumstances that [Cuban officials] informed the Soviet Union that [they] were concerned about a direct invasion of Cuba by the United States and that [they] were thinking about how to step up [their] country’s ability to resist an attack”.4 In response, Soviet President Khrushchev conceived the plan of protecting Cuban sovereignty by “installing missile with nuclear warheads in Cuba without letting the United States find out until it was too late do anything about them.”5 Castro accepted Khrushchev’s proposal6 and the Soviet Union began deploying nuclear arms.
How Significant was Fidel Castro’s Role in the Missile Crisis of 1962?
A.Plan of Investigation
The investigation assesses the significance of Fidel Castro in the Missile Crisis of 1962. In order to evaluate Castro’s significance, the investigation evaluates his role in each stage of the Crisis in reference to other participants of the event; Castro’s role is investigated in the initial days of the Crisis, during the shooting down of the American U-2 plane, and in the resolution of the Crisis. Memoirs and oral history are mostly used to evaluate Castro’s significance. Two of the sources used in the essay, Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis and the Soviet Collapse compiled by James Blight, Allyn Bruce and David Welsh and Cuban documents, “The Mikoyan-Castro Talks, 4-5 November 1962: the Cuban Version,” are then evaluated for their origins, purposes, values and limitations.
The investigation does not assess the difference in ideologies (communist versus imperialism or capitalism) of the nations involved nor does the investigation assess opinions other than those of United States, Soviet Union, and Cuba.
B. Summary of Evidence
Prior to the Missile Crisis, Castro-American relationships were already strained by the Bay of Pigs in 1961 in which American funded counterrevolutionary Cubans to invade Cuba and overthrow Castro.1 The counterrevolutionary failed, pushing Castro into an alliance with communist Soviet Union and leaving Castro wary of American designs in Cuba.2 Castro’s fears were confirmed in early 1962 when his intelligence service noticed signs of U.S. activities related to what was later uncovered to be Operation Mongoose, another American invasion to overthrow Castro.3 Thus, “it was under these circumstances that [Cuban officials] informed the Soviet Union that [they] were concerned about a direct invasion of Cuba by the United States and that [they] were thinking about how to step up [their] country’s ability to resist an attack”.4 In response, Soviet President Khrushchev conceived the plan of protecting Cuban sovereignty by “installing missile with nuclear warheads in Cuba without letting the United States find out until it was too late do anything about them.”5 Castro accepted Khrushchev’s proposal6 and the Soviet Union began deploying nuclear arms.
For America, the Crisis began in mid October 1962 when American intelligence
discovered Russian nuclear missile in Cuba. For most of the world, the Crisis began on 22
October 1962 when American President Kennedy revealed in a televised broadcast that U.S.
“surveillance of the Soviet military build-up on the island of Cuba” had uncovered “as series
of offensive missile sites” in preparation for no other purpose “than to provide a nuclear strike
capability against the Western Hemisphere.”7 After Kennedy’s broadcast, the American
President called for a naval blockade of Cuba8 and used diplomatic negotiations with
Khrushchev to come to an agreement in the removal of the weapons. During negotiations,
several incidents occurred which heightened tensions and seemed to bring the world one step
closer to nuclear holocaust. One of the incidents is the shooting down of the U.S. U-2 airplane
on 27 October 1962 causing the death of Major Rudolf Anderson Jr.9 At the time the United
States and the Soviet Union believed that it was Castro who ordered Cuban antiaircraft
artillery to fire at low-flying U.S. planes on the morning of 27 October.’10 After further
analysis, it is clear that it was a Soviet soldier, not Cuban, who shot the plane. Although
Castro ordered Cuban antiaircraft artillery to fire, there is no evidence that he ordered Soviet artillery to fire. Instead, what is most likely to have happened was that the Soviet officers in
Cuba identified so closely with the Cuban government’s cause that their field commander
gave the order to shoot at the U-2, thinking as an ally supporting comrades in war.11 Another
incident is Castro’s letter to Khrushchev recommending that the Soviet Union should launch a
first-strike nuclear attack on the United States.12 This outlandish recommendation shocked
Khrushchev, leaving him with the impression that Castro “was a young and hotheaded man”
one who was “inexperienced as a statesman.” 13
The Crisis drew to a close when both great powers found a mutual solution outlined in a
message sent by Khrushchev on 26 October 1962, and in Kennedy’s response of 27 October;
the two men agreed that if the Soviets would withdraw their offensive weapons from Cuba
under United Nations supervision, the U.S. would remove its naval blockade of the island and
pledge not to invade Cuba.14 The Crisis came to an end on 28 October 1962 when Radio
Moscow announced Khrushchev’s “new order to dismantle the weapons... and to crate them
and return them to the Soviet Union.”15 Throughout the negotiation period, neither Castro not
a Cuban representative took part, leaving the issue to be “entirely one between the United
States and the Soviet Union.”16 So, Khrushchev’s announcement on the radio not only
shocked Castro but also humiliated him for his exclusion from the negotiations.’
C. Evaluation of Sources
Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis and the Soviet Collapse compiled by James G. Blight, Allyn J. Bruce and David A. Welsh is an in-depth “report” on the Havana conference in 1992 hosted by Castro to discuss Cuba’s specific role during the Crisis. Cuba on the Brink was written with the purpose to “greatly enlarge the number of ‘participants’ in the Havana conference by supplying context sufficient for our readers to ‘be there’ vicariously.”18 The book’s values lies in the fact that it provides a new Cuban perspective on the Crisis that has often been disregarded. As well, since Castro hosted the conference, the reader is exposed to Castro’s own interpretation and evaluation of Cuba’s significance. Its limitations is that the Havana conference is dependent on “critical oral history19”; considering that the conference occurred thirty years after the Crisis, it is doubtful that the recollections of the veteran participants have not been altered either subconsciously or for the purpose of conforming to political pressures.
C. Evaluation of Sources
Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis and the Soviet Collapse compiled by James G. Blight, Allyn J. Bruce and David A. Welsh is an in-depth “report” on the Havana conference in 1992 hosted by Castro to discuss Cuba’s specific role during the Crisis. Cuba on the Brink was written with the purpose to “greatly enlarge the number of ‘participants’ in the Havana conference by supplying context sufficient for our readers to ‘be there’ vicariously.”18 The book’s values lies in the fact that it provides a new Cuban perspective on the Crisis that has often been disregarded. As well, since Castro hosted the conference, the reader is exposed to Castro’s own interpretation and evaluation of Cuba’s significance. Its limitations is that the Havana conference is dependent on “critical oral history19”; considering that the conference occurred thirty years after the Crisis, it is doubtful that the recollections of the veteran participants have not been altered either subconsciously or for the purpose of conforming to political pressures.
Whereas Cuba on the Brink is based on discussion thirty years after the Crisis, “The
Mikoyan-Castro Talks, 4-5 November 1962: the Cuban Version” is a record of conversations
between Castro and Soviet envoy Mikoyan in the immediate aftermath of Khrushchev’s
acceptance of Kennedy’s demand that Soviet nuclear missiles be withdrawn from Cuba.
These conversations, which occurred on 4-5 November 1962, were obtained form Philip
Brenner, Cuba specialist, who provided them to the Cold War International History Project
and were translated form Spanish by Carlos Osorio. Cuba’s release of these documents
provide a valuable source since these records are primary documents recorded immediately
after the event and expose the hurt and betrayal felt by Castro over Khrushchev’s decision to
withdraw. As well, since this is a conversation between a Soviet and a Cuban, the historian
can notice the different interpretations of each country. These Cuban documents are limited as
they were translated awkwardly and both documents are transcriptions of memo notes taken
during a speech and do not seem to have been corrected. However, these Cuba documents can
be compared against the Russian version of the Mikoyan-Castro Talks released prior to the
Cuban version. Thus, assuming that both versions are independent from one another, the
historian can compare the versions to one another for accuracy and biases.
D. Analysis
Castro’s significance in the Crisis can either justify or discredit American interference in Cuban internal affairs. Prior to the event, the international society was willing to accept American attempts to overthrow Castro since Americans were portrayed as heroes while Castro seemed to be a fanatical socialist.20 But, if Castro was merely a pawn between U.S. and Soviet Union, Castro improves his international reputation making it difficult for future “heroic” American interference in Cuba.
In the initial days, Castro’s role seems to be significant for two reasons: one, he consented to Khrushchev’s plan and two; nuclear arms were sent for the sole interest of preserving Castro’s socialist regime. However, Castro’s role may be more limited since it is unlikely that Khrushchev’s missiles were sent solely to protect Cuba. Is more likely that Khrushchev wanted to equalize the “balance of power” and redress the strategic imbalance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union Before the Crisis, the American had surrounded the Soviet Union with military bases in Turkey21; sending missiles to Cuba would give the United States “a little of their own medicine...it was high time America learned what it feels like to have her own land and her own people threatened.”22 Furthermore, Khrushchev’s and Kennedy’s secret deal later on in the Crisis that Khrushchev would remove missiles from Cuba if Kennedy would remove Jupiters from Turkey give credibility to the possibility that despite Khrushchev’s altruistic claims, it is more plausible that his actions of 1962 were reflective of the Soviet Union’s own interests rather than Castro’s.
During late October 1962, Castro’s role is often directly related to the shooting down of the U.S. U-2 airplane. Khrushchev blames Castro, writing, “Castro ordered our antiaircraft officers to shoot down a U-2 reconnaissance plane.”23 If Khrushchev’s claim is true, then Castro played a significant role in the Crisis since the shooting down anticipated the end of diplomatic U.S. negotiations and the start of nuclear warfare. Yet, since new evidence indicate that is it more likely that Soviet officers shot down the plane without Castro’s orders, Castro should neither be blamed nor be given significance for the shooting down of the U-2 plane. As well, Castro’s role is also associated with his recommendation that the Soviet should launch a nuclear attack on the United States. Actually, Castro’s apparent eagerness for nuclear war may be his greatest significance in the Crisis since his willingness to use aggression ironically convinced Khrushchev of the importance of maintaining world peace and contributed to the Soviet decision to yield to the United States.24
Castro’s significance in the Crisis can either justify or discredit American interference in Cuban internal affairs. Prior to the event, the international society was willing to accept American attempts to overthrow Castro since Americans were portrayed as heroes while Castro seemed to be a fanatical socialist.20 But, if Castro was merely a pawn between U.S. and Soviet Union, Castro improves his international reputation making it difficult for future “heroic” American interference in Cuba.
In the initial days, Castro’s role seems to be significant for two reasons: one, he consented to Khrushchev’s plan and two; nuclear arms were sent for the sole interest of preserving Castro’s socialist regime. However, Castro’s role may be more limited since it is unlikely that Khrushchev’s missiles were sent solely to protect Cuba. Is more likely that Khrushchev wanted to equalize the “balance of power” and redress the strategic imbalance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union Before the Crisis, the American had surrounded the Soviet Union with military bases in Turkey21; sending missiles to Cuba would give the United States “a little of their own medicine...it was high time America learned what it feels like to have her own land and her own people threatened.”22 Furthermore, Khrushchev’s and Kennedy’s secret deal later on in the Crisis that Khrushchev would remove missiles from Cuba if Kennedy would remove Jupiters from Turkey give credibility to the possibility that despite Khrushchev’s altruistic claims, it is more plausible that his actions of 1962 were reflective of the Soviet Union’s own interests rather than Castro’s.
During late October 1962, Castro’s role is often directly related to the shooting down of the U.S. U-2 airplane. Khrushchev blames Castro, writing, “Castro ordered our antiaircraft officers to shoot down a U-2 reconnaissance plane.”23 If Khrushchev’s claim is true, then Castro played a significant role in the Crisis since the shooting down anticipated the end of diplomatic U.S. negotiations and the start of nuclear warfare. Yet, since new evidence indicate that is it more likely that Soviet officers shot down the plane without Castro’s orders, Castro should neither be blamed nor be given significance for the shooting down of the U-2 plane. As well, Castro’s role is also associated with his recommendation that the Soviet should launch a nuclear attack on the United States. Actually, Castro’s apparent eagerness for nuclear war may be his greatest significance in the Crisis since his willingness to use aggression ironically convinced Khrushchev of the importance of maintaining world peace and contributed to the Soviet decision to yield to the United States.24
Overall, the clearest indication of Castro’s importance to the Crisis lies in his lack of
participation in the Soviet-American negotiations. Castro did not realize that Khrushchev had
conceded to remove all soviet offensive weapons from Cuba until he heard Khrushchev’s
announcement on the radio. His exclusion from the negotiations was no error on the Soviet-
American’s behalf, but a sign of his political insignificance in the Crisis.
For many U.S. government decision makers at the time of the crisis most have agreed that Cuba was just a locale for a U.S.- Soviet confrontation. Ex U.S. Ambassador to Cuba (1959-60) Philip W. Bonsal declares that the Missile Crisis cannot truly be classified under Cuban American relation since “the issue was entirely one between the United States and the Soviet Union.”25 He states that although the confrontation could have eliminated Castro, “the exercise had little to do with him.”26
For many U.S. government decision makers at the time of the crisis most have agreed that Cuba was just a locale for a U.S.- Soviet confrontation. Ex U.S. Ambassador to Cuba (1959-60) Philip W. Bonsal declares that the Missile Crisis cannot truly be classified under Cuban American relation since “the issue was entirely one between the United States and the Soviet Union.”25 He states that although the confrontation could have eliminated Castro, “the exercise had little to do with him.”26
On the other hand, Khrushchev writes in his memoirs that Castro did indeed play a
significant role in the Crisis. He bluntly announces that Castro was solely responsible for the
shooting of the U-2 plane27 and that Castro encouraged the Soviet Union to “launch a
preemptive strike against the United States.”28 However, in view of contradicting sources and
Khrushchev’s tendency to make declarations without details and factual evidence, it is
unlikely that Castro’s role was as significant as claimed.
E. Conclusion
During each and every stage of the Crisis, Castro’s role is overshadowed by that of the Soviet Union’s and the United States. In the beginning, it was Khrushchev, not Castro, who initiated the deployment of nuclear arms; and Castro’s’ relation with the U-2 shooting is little more than a misunderstanding on the part of the Soviet soldiers. As argued by Bonsal, the Missile Crisis was entirely between the Soviet Union and the United States. This view can be justified when we consider the possibility that Khrushchev may have sent his missiles for reasons other than for Castro’s defense and when we are faced with Castro’s obvious exclusion from the Crisis negotiations. Castro’s “role” in the Crisis, if he has one at all, is that he unintentionally helped convinced Khrushchev to concede to Kennedy’s demands. As Castro himself declares, “I cannot take the credit for the resolution of the crisis...the major role belongs to Khrushchev who caused that crisis by his stubbornness, and then resolved it.”29
Word Count: 1989
1 Nikita S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes. Trans and ed. Jerrold L. Schechter with Yacheslav V. Luchkov. (Boston: Little Brow, 1990) 171.
2 Philip Brenner and James G. Blight, “The Crisis and Cuban-Soviet Relations: Fidel Castro’s Secret 1968 Speech,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin. No. 5 (Spring 1995).
3 James G. Blight et al. Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis and the Soviet Collapse. (New York: Pantheon, 1993) 19.
19 Critical oral history is the synthesis of recollections of participants with declassified documentation and the analyses of historians.
E. Conclusion
During each and every stage of the Crisis, Castro’s role is overshadowed by that of the Soviet Union’s and the United States. In the beginning, it was Khrushchev, not Castro, who initiated the deployment of nuclear arms; and Castro’s’ relation with the U-2 shooting is little more than a misunderstanding on the part of the Soviet soldiers. As argued by Bonsal, the Missile Crisis was entirely between the Soviet Union and the United States. This view can be justified when we consider the possibility that Khrushchev may have sent his missiles for reasons other than for Castro’s defense and when we are faced with Castro’s obvious exclusion from the Crisis negotiations. Castro’s “role” in the Crisis, if he has one at all, is that he unintentionally helped convinced Khrushchev to concede to Kennedy’s demands. As Castro himself declares, “I cannot take the credit for the resolution of the crisis...the major role belongs to Khrushchev who caused that crisis by his stubbornness, and then resolved it.”29
Word Count: 1989
1 Nikita S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes. Trans and ed. Jerrold L. Schechter with Yacheslav V. Luchkov. (Boston: Little Brow, 1990) 171.
2 Philip Brenner and James G. Blight, “The Crisis and Cuban-Soviet Relations: Fidel Castro’s Secret 1968 Speech,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin. No. 5 (Spring 1995).
3 James G. Blight et al. Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis and the Soviet Collapse. (New York: Pantheon, 1993) 19.
4 Blight, 19.
5 Nikita S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers. Ed. and trans. Strobe Talbott. (Boston: Little Brow, 1970) 493.
6 Khrushchev, Glasnost. 171.
7 Anatoli I. Gribkov and William Y. Smith, Operation ANADYR: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis. (Chicago: Edition Q, 1994) 1.
8 Ibid, 28. 9 Ibid, 66. 10 Ibid, 67.
5 Nikita S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers. Ed. and trans. Strobe Talbott. (Boston: Little Brow, 1970) 493.
6 Khrushchev, Glasnost. 171.
7 Anatoli I. Gribkov and William Y. Smith, Operation ANADYR: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis. (Chicago: Edition Q, 1994) 1.
8 Ibid, 28. 9 Ibid, 66. 10 Ibid, 67.
11 Blight, xi.
12 Ibid, 474-491.
13 Khrushchev, Glasnost. 178.
14 Wayne S. Smith, The Closest of Enemies: A Personal and Diplomatic Account of U.S.-Cuban
Relations Since 1957. (New York: Norton, 1987) 81. 15 Blight, 472.
16 Philip W. Bonsal, Cuba, Castro and the United States. (London: U of Pittsburgh P, 1971) 187.
17 “The Mikoyan-Castro Talks, 4-5 November 1962: The Cuban Version,” Cold War International
18 Blight, 10.
12 Ibid, 474-491.
13 Khrushchev, Glasnost. 178.
14 Wayne S. Smith, The Closest of Enemies: A Personal and Diplomatic Account of U.S.-Cuban
Relations Since 1957. (New York: Norton, 1987) 81. 15 Blight, 472.
16 Philip W. Bonsal, Cuba, Castro and the United States. (London: U of Pittsburgh P, 1971) 187.
17 “The Mikoyan-Castro Talks, 4-5 November 1962: The Cuban Version,” Cold War International
19 Critical oral history is the synthesis of recollections of participants with declassified documentation and the analyses of historians.
20 Blight, 178,
21 Anatoli, 11.
22 Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers. 494.
21 Anatoli, 11.
22 Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers. 494.
23 Khrushchev, Glasnost. 178,
24 Ibid, 177.
25 Bonsal, 187.
26 Ibid.
25 Bonsal, 187.
26 Ibid.
27 Khrushchev, Glasnost, 178.
28 Ibid, 177.
29 Georgy Shakhnazarov, “Fidel Castro, Glasnost, and the Caribbean Crisis,” Cold War
28 Ibid, 177.
29 Georgy Shakhnazarov, “Fidel Castro, Glasnost, and the Caribbean Crisis,” Cold War
F. Bibliography
Blight James G., Bruce J. Allyn and David A. Welsh. Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile
Crisis and the Soviet Collapse. New York: Pantheon, 1993.
Bonsal, Philip W. Cuba, Castro and the United States. London: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971.
Brenner, Philip and James G. Blight. “The Crisis and Cuban Soviet Relations: Fidel Castro’s Secret 1968 Speech,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin. No. 5 (Spring 1995)
Gribkov, Anatoli I. And William Y. Smith. Operation ANADYR: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis. Chicago: Edition Q, 1994.
Khrushchev, Nikita S. Khrushchev Remembers. Ed. and trans. Strobe Talbott. Boston: Little Brow, 1970
---.Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes. Trans and ed. Jerrold L. Schechter with Yacheslav V. Luchkov. Boston: Little Brow , 1990.
“The Mikoyan-Castro Talks, 4-5 November 1962: The Cuban Version.” Cold War International History Project Bulletin. Nos. 8-9 (Winter 1996/1997).
Shakhnazarov, Georgy. “Fidel Castro, Glasnost, and the Caribbean Crisis,” Cold War International History project Bulletin. No. 5 (Spring 1995)
Smith, Wayne S. The Closest of Enemies: A personal and Diplomatic Account of U.S.-Cuban Relations Since 1957. New York: Norton, 1987,
Other IBDP Student Essays from past exam papers
Castro's role in intensifying American antagonism.
Building up to the Cuban Missile Crisis, aggression occurred between the USA and Cuba for many reasons. Cuba had been in the hands of Fulgencio Batista since 1933. Batista was a military dictator and his corrupt rule caused popular discontent. Fidel Castro came into power January 1st 1959, after a brief struggle with Batista, with the help of Ernesto "Che" Guevara and nine other rebels. Castro was a brilliant propagandist and a very charismatic person. The incidents which happened between 1959 and 1961 built up tension and resulted in strong animosity.
Economically, Cuba had always been dependent on the United States. The US was exploiting them, owning most of Cuban industry, transportation, electricity production and telephone lines. 80% of Cuba's export revenue was from producing and selling sugar. Most of this sugar was grown on plantations owned by the United States and then sent to the USA. Under Batista's rule, the United States was allowed to continue with their actions but when Fidel Castro came into power in 1959, he formed a new government. Castro wanted to make Cuba an independent country, free from US control and exploitation. He nationalized industry, impounded all foreign-owned property, and collectivized agriculture. This did not please the US government. President Dwight Eisenhower decided to stop trading arms with Cuba and eventually refused to purchase Cuban sugar in July of 1960. Castro looked to the Soviet Union for assistance. The USSR saw this as an opportunity and took advantage of the situation. The Soviets would buy Cuban sugar and in return, they would send oil, machines and money. In response to the US's action, Castro nationalized most US-owned factories and plantations. US-owned oil refineries were nationalized when they refused to take Soviet oil. Eventually, Castro severed all economic and political ties to the United States.
Secondly, political affairs added to the antagonism between the USA and Cuba. After Castro came into power, he established a totalitarian government which benefited the working class at the expense of the middle class. Castro arrested, imprisoned and executed many of Batista's supporters who had been responsible for the repression of Cuba. This heightened tension because many of the people executed were in fact allies to the United States. Most social and political opposition between the United States and Cuba happened because of the fact that Cuba had become communist with the aid of the USSR. At this time, to the United States, communism was seen as the enemy. Cuba was essentially a puppet state of the US. As it wiggled out of their grasp, they needed to act. The United States needed to show the world they were still a super power. Destroying Castro became a priority.
Militarily, the Bay of Pigs invasion was the "straw which broke the camels back". The Bay of Pigs invasion was a very unsuccessful invasion of Cuba issued by the new US president John F. Kennedy. The plan was suggested by Richard Nixon, Eisenhower's Vice president. The CIA had been scheming different strategies to take Castro out of power but none had been successful. Towards the end of Eisenhower's term, the CIA came up with a plan titled "A Program of Covert Action Against the Castro Regime" on March 17th 1960. The Bay of Pigs invasion started on April 17th when six ships sailed from Nicaragua. Roughly 1,500 Cuban exiles landed in the Bay of Pigs, Bahi a de Cochinos, with the sole purpose of ousting the Communist regime present under Castro. These exiles were trained by the CIA and supplied with U.S. arms but they barely made it past the beaches. Most exiles were captured and killed by the Cuban army. 1,189 men were captured and each sentenced to thirty years in prison. After months of interrogation and negotiation, in December of 1962, Cuba traded 1,112 captured rebels for fifty-three million US dollars in food and medicine. Castro saw the Bay of Pigs as confirmation that the USA was working to overthrow his government. The United States was terrified and embarrassed that Cuba, only 90 miles from the shores of Florida, a country in American's sphere of influence, had become communist.
By the end of the Bay of Pigs invasion, both the United States and Cuba were aware that the hostility and aggression towards one another would not go away. Pressure only increased as the US struggled to fight communism.
Bonsal, Philip W. Cuba, Castro and the United States. London: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971.
Brenner, Philip and James G. Blight. “The Crisis and Cuban Soviet Relations: Fidel Castro’s Secret 1968 Speech,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin. No. 5 (Spring 1995)
Gribkov, Anatoli I. And William Y. Smith. Operation ANADYR: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis. Chicago: Edition Q, 1994.
Khrushchev, Nikita S. Khrushchev Remembers. Ed. and trans. Strobe Talbott. Boston: Little Brow, 1970
---.Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes. Trans and ed. Jerrold L. Schechter with Yacheslav V. Luchkov. Boston: Little Brow , 1990.
“The Mikoyan-Castro Talks, 4-5 November 1962: The Cuban Version.” Cold War International History Project Bulletin. Nos. 8-9 (Winter 1996/1997).
Shakhnazarov, Georgy. “Fidel Castro, Glasnost, and the Caribbean Crisis,” Cold War International History project Bulletin. No. 5 (Spring 1995)
Smith, Wayne S. The Closest of Enemies: A personal and Diplomatic Account of U.S.-Cuban Relations Since 1957. New York: Norton, 1987,
Other IBDP Student Essays from past exam papers
Castro's role in intensifying American antagonism.
Building up to the Cuban Missile Crisis, aggression occurred between the USA and Cuba for many reasons. Cuba had been in the hands of Fulgencio Batista since 1933. Batista was a military dictator and his corrupt rule caused popular discontent. Fidel Castro came into power January 1st 1959, after a brief struggle with Batista, with the help of Ernesto "Che" Guevara and nine other rebels. Castro was a brilliant propagandist and a very charismatic person. The incidents which happened between 1959 and 1961 built up tension and resulted in strong animosity.
Economically, Cuba had always been dependent on the United States. The US was exploiting them, owning most of Cuban industry, transportation, electricity production and telephone lines. 80% of Cuba's export revenue was from producing and selling sugar. Most of this sugar was grown on plantations owned by the United States and then sent to the USA. Under Batista's rule, the United States was allowed to continue with their actions but when Fidel Castro came into power in 1959, he formed a new government. Castro wanted to make Cuba an independent country, free from US control and exploitation. He nationalized industry, impounded all foreign-owned property, and collectivized agriculture. This did not please the US government. President Dwight Eisenhower decided to stop trading arms with Cuba and eventually refused to purchase Cuban sugar in July of 1960. Castro looked to the Soviet Union for assistance. The USSR saw this as an opportunity and took advantage of the situation. The Soviets would buy Cuban sugar and in return, they would send oil, machines and money. In response to the US's action, Castro nationalized most US-owned factories and plantations. US-owned oil refineries were nationalized when they refused to take Soviet oil. Eventually, Castro severed all economic and political ties to the United States.
Secondly, political affairs added to the antagonism between the USA and Cuba. After Castro came into power, he established a totalitarian government which benefited the working class at the expense of the middle class. Castro arrested, imprisoned and executed many of Batista's supporters who had been responsible for the repression of Cuba. This heightened tension because many of the people executed were in fact allies to the United States. Most social and political opposition between the United States and Cuba happened because of the fact that Cuba had become communist with the aid of the USSR. At this time, to the United States, communism was seen as the enemy. Cuba was essentially a puppet state of the US. As it wiggled out of their grasp, they needed to act. The United States needed to show the world they were still a super power. Destroying Castro became a priority.
Militarily, the Bay of Pigs invasion was the "straw which broke the camels back". The Bay of Pigs invasion was a very unsuccessful invasion of Cuba issued by the new US president John F. Kennedy. The plan was suggested by Richard Nixon, Eisenhower's Vice president. The CIA had been scheming different strategies to take Castro out of power but none had been successful. Towards the end of Eisenhower's term, the CIA came up with a plan titled "A Program of Covert Action Against the Castro Regime" on March 17th 1960. The Bay of Pigs invasion started on April 17th when six ships sailed from Nicaragua. Roughly 1,500 Cuban exiles landed in the Bay of Pigs, Bahi a de Cochinos, with the sole purpose of ousting the Communist regime present under Castro. These exiles were trained by the CIA and supplied with U.S. arms but they barely made it past the beaches. Most exiles were captured and killed by the Cuban army. 1,189 men were captured and each sentenced to thirty years in prison. After months of interrogation and negotiation, in December of 1962, Cuba traded 1,112 captured rebels for fifty-three million US dollars in food and medicine. Castro saw the Bay of Pigs as confirmation that the USA was working to overthrow his government. The United States was terrified and embarrassed that Cuba, only 90 miles from the shores of Florida, a country in American's sphere of influence, had become communist.
By the end of the Bay of Pigs invasion, both the United States and Cuba were aware that the hostility and aggression towards one another would not go away. Pressure only increased as the US struggled to fight communism.
The Cuban Missile Crisis
For
thirteen days in October of 1962, the two most powerful nations in the
world at that time were staring each other down "eyeball to eyeball"
in one of the most dangerous crises the world has ever seen. On October
14th, 1962, American U2 planes caught sight of Soviet missile sites
being built in Cuba. For the next thirteen days, the world held its
breath as President J.F Kennedy and his advisers deliberated on how to
react to Premier Mikhail Khrushchev's actions, and decided on
blockading Cuba in order to prevent missiles from reaching their
intended destinations. The Cuban Missile Crisis made its mark on the
history of the Cold War by becoming one of the most important landmarks
in the history of the tensions between the US and the USSR because of
it being the closest to nuclear war the world has ever come, the
effects it had on Kennedy's image, the damage it did to Khrushchev's
reputation, and the effects it had on negotiations between the two
superpowers.
The
Cuban Missile Crisis was made so memorable because of the
frighteningly near possibility of the start of the world's first ever
nuclear war. It was and is the nearest the world has ever come to
nuclear war, having the possibility of multiple sides employing the use
of nuclear weaponry. The US at the time of the Crisis had missiles
positioned in areas including Turkey, Italy, and Britain, the closest
missiles to the Soviet Union being 150 miles away , meaning the US had a
clear first-strike capability over the Soviets. The Cuban Missile
Crisis brought a greater sense of equality in terms of military force,
since before the installation of Cuban missiles the Soviets had no
missiles capable of striking any parts of the US. The building of
missile sites in Cuba levelled the field between the two superpowers,
as the US was compelled to deal with the Soviets with a greater degree
of caution and wariness as they recognized the capability of the
Soviets to attack their own soil. This meant that the Soviets were in a
position to negotiate in terms of arms control because of their
elevated status due to the Crisis. However, the US was still clearly
ahead of the Soviets in weapons in terms of quantity, so after the
withdrawal of the missiles from Cuba by the Soviets, the missile gap
again prevailed, with Khrushchev's main ambition of closing the missile
gap failing. At the time of the crisis, the US had 8 times as many
nuclear weapons as the Soviet Union, with 27,297 warheads to the USSR's
3,332 . In this way, the Crisis had no effect on the long-term nuclear
parity between the US and the USSR; however during the Crisis the
Soviets had succeeded in reaching more of a military equanimity because
of the fact that they had installed missiles capable of striking the
US. The near-parity of the two countries' nuclear capability meant that
nuclear war was an even greater possibility, as previously,
second-strike capacity for the USSR was not great enough to begin a
nuclear war--however with the addition of the Cuban missiles, the
Soviets' first-strike capability had increased 70% . The crisis was
brought to a head on October 27th, 1962, where the beginning of a
nuclear war seemed entirely possible. Kennedy had raised the US
military's Defensive Condition status to DEFCON 3 on October 22nd. On
the 27th, an American U-2 plane over Western Alaska accidentally flew
in Soviet airspace, causing Soviet MiG fighters to attempt to intercept
the spy plane, which left the airspace in time to avoid a conflict.
When news of this incident was reported to the Whitehouse, Defence
Secretary McNamara exclaimed "This means war with the Soviet Union!" He
believed the Soviets would interpret the U-2 plane as a recon mission
precluding a nuclear first-strike, and act accordingly. Later that day,
another U-2 plane was shot down over Cuba. Kennedy's advisors believed
the shooting to be an act of planned escalation of the situation of
the Soviets; it was not known the the command to shoot was given by a
Soviet commander in Cuba rather than Moscow. Kennedy's advisers
pressured him to attack and invade Cuba "no later than Monday, the
29th", however Kennedy chose to wait for further hostile action on the
part of the Soviets. Had Kennedy not chosen to wait out the situation,
the Cold War would indeed have turned into a "hot war", a nuclear one.
The situation was further intensified by the Chiefs of Staff and their
respective commands and their statuses; for the first time in history,
the US had raised their Strategic Air Command forces to the Defensive
Condition DEFCON 2 on October 24th , meaning they were at a heightened
state of alert poised to strike targets within the Soviet Union. The
events played out during the Cuban Missile Crisis resulted in the
closest the world has ever come to a full-out nuclear war, which would
have been catastrophic had it not been for the actions of the leaders
of the US and the USSR.
The Cuban Missile Crisis also directly affected the images of the leaders in the Cold War, which proved a large factor in the events of the War, by improving Kennedy's image in the eyes of his people and his opposition, lending further importance to the Crisis as a landmark in US and Soviet history. Four months after Kennedy took the office of President of the US, the catastrophic Bay of Pigs incident occurred, observed by historian John Gaddis to be "a monumental disaster for the United States". Kennedy had given his approval for the operation to be carried out with pressure from his advisor and the previous Eisenhower administration, who had concocted the invasion. The Bay of Pigs incident was a blow to Kennedy's image, portraying him to Khrushchev as young, inexperienced, and lacking courage. Kennedy's administration, especially his Chiefs of Staff, most notably General Curtis LeMay, also shared the same views as Khrushchev to an extent and believed military force would be the resolution to the crisis, which Kennedy was opposed to. This difference in ideologies within the administration itself brought further discord to the decision-making process during the crisis, with Kennedy facing much resistance to his determination to keep military intervention as a last resort. Kennedy's dealing with the crisis, including his secret dealings with Robert Kennedy involving the Turkish missiles, proved to avoid a potential nuclear holocaust. Post-revisionist historians applaud Kennedy for his insistence about the dismantling and withdrawal of the missiles from Cuba, and his firm stance in dealing with the USSR and Khrushchev, especially after the demeaning Vienna Conference with Khrushchev in June of the previous year. Kennedy, because of the Cuban Missile Crisis, was also admired for his restraint and careful action in eliminating invasions and air strikes as options to deal with the situation, despite constant pressure from his generals to employ military action. However, some historians claim that the Cuban Missile Crisis was a direct result of Kennedy's rash decisions during the Bay of Pigs incident, as Khrushchev and the Soviets believed him to be weak and inexperienced and so accordingly took advantage with the Cuban missiles. Other criticisms include the proximity of the mid-term US elections in November, meaning that throughout the crisis, Kennedy kept in mind the garnering of domestic support by putting on a tough face for the Soviets, perhaps over-dramatizing the entire matter. Nevertheless, in the end, Kennedy's image improved greatly and he proved to be one of the most popular US presidents in history, leaving an entire nation in mourning following his assassination the next year. However, it must be noted that Kennedy was allowed his rational decision-making procedures due to the other side's response as well. Had Khrushchev and the Kremlin acted differently and played with less restraint on their part, Kennedy would not have been able to take the credit for avoiding military intervention, which may have been necessary in a different scenario where the Soviets used force in response to the US' demands. The Soviets' actions are often ignored when relating the Cuban Missile Crisis, when in fact they were equally essential to the development of the Crisis as Kennedy's actions and decisions. The Cuban Missile Crisis was an essential milestone in Cold War history, as it improved the tarnished image of the leader of the two most important players of the Cold War.
The Crisis also greatly affected the Cold War by resulting in the diminishing of Khrushchev's image to his own administration and his allies. Khrushchev fell from power shortly after the Crisis concluded, a mere two years later in October 1964. For the Soviet Union, the Cuban Missile Crisis, or the Caribbean Crisis, as it is known by the Soviets, was more of an embarrassment than a victory--few of their aims were fully achieved. Firstly, hard-line generals saw the overall backing down of the USSR over the missiles as a complete humiliation in itself, including the fact that the missile gap between the US and the USSR had prevailed, since the brief period of nuclear parity had terminated when Khrushchev withdrew his Cuban missiles. Furthermore, the second deal proposed by the USSR in a formal letter to the US on October 27th demanded that the Jupiter missiles the US had in Turkey would have to be removed. The deal that was pushed by the US involved Attorney General Robert Kennedy meeting secretly with KGB representative in Washington Anatoly Dobrynin to discuss the proposal that the US would accept the terms of the letter, but that the missiles would be removed six months in the future, and not made public, or else the US would withdraw the deal. This was promised by the US along with the promise not to ever invade Cuba, which followed along the lines of the first, more informal letter sent by Khrushchev on October 26th, the day before. The secrecy involved in the withdrawal of the Turkish missiles, and the fact that Khrushchev accepted these terms further dropped him in the eyes of his domestic political enemies, as well as his own hard-line administration. Even more curious was the actual penning of the two different letters; US Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara described the first letter of the 26th as an impassioned proposal most likely written by Khrushchev himself, probably in an inebriated state . He also speculated that Khrushchev did not screen the letter through his administration, and it was sent to the US without others' approval or input. The message contained within this letter simply demanded that the US would promise to stay out of Cuba, and nothing more. However, the following day, another contradictory letter emerged, this time with much more formality, and with hard-liner demands. This sequence of events leads to conjecture that Khrushchev's political advisor discovered his soft-line transmission to the US, and quickly manoeuvred, in their eyes, to rectify the situation and the damage inflicted by a possibly drunk Khrushchev. This could possibly indicate the future ousting of Khrushchev from his seat of power, as his action were considered to need correction by his own administration, who believed he was acting too softly. Not only did his own government develop doubts about him because of the Crisis, but his allies were questioning his authority as well. China, who was at this time doubting the USSR's commitment to dealing with "imperialists" such as the US, witnessed the backing down of Khrushchev to US demands, which later led to Chinese propaganda movements that contributed to his fall from power. The entire world was witness to this supposed loss of face for the Soviets, however, the Soviets could have turned the situation in their favour in terms of global support, by demonstrating that the USSR was heroically "saving the world" by not demanding that nuclear equilibrium was restored after being stripped of a significant portion of their arsenal from Cuba. Furthermore, the USSR failed to emphasize the unjustified demands on the part of the US; the US had offensive missiles directed towards the USSR, however they claimed the USSR was in violation when they simply followed the US' lead. Furthermore, blockades, as defined under international treaties, are illegal acts of war; however the US thinly disguised their blockade of Cuba by renaming it as a "quarantine". Khrushchev himself emphasized that his actions in Cuba were not illegal, but simply a reflection of the US' own, when he questioning "Why shouldn't the Soviet Union have the right to do the same as America?" Had he pressed these points to the international community and taken a firmer stance towards the actions of the US, emphasizing the fact that the US itself was engaging in a poorly veiled illegal act of war, Khrushchev would have possibly improved his image in the eyes of his contemporaries. The Cuban Missile Crisis had a direct impact on the image of Khrushchev in the eyes of his own government and in the eyes of the rest of the world, which contributed to his fall from power.
Finally, the Cuban Missile Crisis had a great impact on negotiations between the two superpowers after the conclusion of the Crisis, especially its impact on the treaties that were agreed upon as a result of the crisis. First of all, the Cuban Missile Crisis saw the first direct communication line formed between the Kremlin and the White House. Because of the communications problems encountered during the Crisis, since messages took several hours to be delivered, Khrushchev and Kennedy saw a need for a proper means of contact. In 1963, a Hotline was established, which connected the White House and the Kremlin via telex. This completely changed the nature of the Cold War, as previously a scenario that could have occurred with the current state of communications was that Khrushchev could have agreed to withdraw the missiles, however because of the seven-hour delay, Kennedy ordered an invasion as Khrushchev was apparently delaying his reply. The establishment of the Hotline ensured that the risk of a war starting over poor contact was eliminated. Furthermore, nine months after the end of the crisis, both sides, plus Britain, signed the Test Ban Treaty, which banned the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, underwater, and in outer space. This treaty was a result of both recognizing how close they had come to nuclear war, and the necessity of ensuring that the development of nuclear weaponry did not spiral out of control before it became too late. However, the treaty did not include other countries, such as France and China who rejected it. Another treaty resulting from the lessons learned by both sides from the Missile Crisis was the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, where it was agreed that states would not transfer nuclear weapons to other countries or to aid other states in their manufacture. In short, the Cuban Missile Crisis instilled the desire in the US and the USSR to limit the spread of the nuclear weaponry. The end of the Cuban Missile Crisis was the beginning of a long period of détente in the history of the Cold War, as the two main players had been exposed to a scare, and both were ready to begin changes in their negotiations. This period was known as the "long peace", where both superpowers had it in their interests to seek détente in Europe. Because of the Cuban Missile Crisis, there was a concerted effort by the US and the USSR to improve relations between the two nations and monitor the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world, ultimately resulting in a period of relative reprieve.
"Eyeball to eyeball....and the other fellow just blinked" has long been touted as the Cuban Missile Crisis' main description; however it is astounding to speculate how easily it could have gone the other way and resulted in a full-out world war. The Cuban Missile Crisis was significant in the Cold War for a number of reasons, mainly being the closest to nuclear war the world has ever seen, the benefits it had to Kennedy's image, the consequences it had for Khrushchev's image, and finally what it led to in terms of negotiations and peace settlements between the two superpowers.
The Cuban Missile Crisis also directly affected the images of the leaders in the Cold War, which proved a large factor in the events of the War, by improving Kennedy's image in the eyes of his people and his opposition, lending further importance to the Crisis as a landmark in US and Soviet history. Four months after Kennedy took the office of President of the US, the catastrophic Bay of Pigs incident occurred, observed by historian John Gaddis to be "a monumental disaster for the United States". Kennedy had given his approval for the operation to be carried out with pressure from his advisor and the previous Eisenhower administration, who had concocted the invasion. The Bay of Pigs incident was a blow to Kennedy's image, portraying him to Khrushchev as young, inexperienced, and lacking courage. Kennedy's administration, especially his Chiefs of Staff, most notably General Curtis LeMay, also shared the same views as Khrushchev to an extent and believed military force would be the resolution to the crisis, which Kennedy was opposed to. This difference in ideologies within the administration itself brought further discord to the decision-making process during the crisis, with Kennedy facing much resistance to his determination to keep military intervention as a last resort. Kennedy's dealing with the crisis, including his secret dealings with Robert Kennedy involving the Turkish missiles, proved to avoid a potential nuclear holocaust. Post-revisionist historians applaud Kennedy for his insistence about the dismantling and withdrawal of the missiles from Cuba, and his firm stance in dealing with the USSR and Khrushchev, especially after the demeaning Vienna Conference with Khrushchev in June of the previous year. Kennedy, because of the Cuban Missile Crisis, was also admired for his restraint and careful action in eliminating invasions and air strikes as options to deal with the situation, despite constant pressure from his generals to employ military action. However, some historians claim that the Cuban Missile Crisis was a direct result of Kennedy's rash decisions during the Bay of Pigs incident, as Khrushchev and the Soviets believed him to be weak and inexperienced and so accordingly took advantage with the Cuban missiles. Other criticisms include the proximity of the mid-term US elections in November, meaning that throughout the crisis, Kennedy kept in mind the garnering of domestic support by putting on a tough face for the Soviets, perhaps over-dramatizing the entire matter. Nevertheless, in the end, Kennedy's image improved greatly and he proved to be one of the most popular US presidents in history, leaving an entire nation in mourning following his assassination the next year. However, it must be noted that Kennedy was allowed his rational decision-making procedures due to the other side's response as well. Had Khrushchev and the Kremlin acted differently and played with less restraint on their part, Kennedy would not have been able to take the credit for avoiding military intervention, which may have been necessary in a different scenario where the Soviets used force in response to the US' demands. The Soviets' actions are often ignored when relating the Cuban Missile Crisis, when in fact they were equally essential to the development of the Crisis as Kennedy's actions and decisions. The Cuban Missile Crisis was an essential milestone in Cold War history, as it improved the tarnished image of the leader of the two most important players of the Cold War.
The Crisis also greatly affected the Cold War by resulting in the diminishing of Khrushchev's image to his own administration and his allies. Khrushchev fell from power shortly after the Crisis concluded, a mere two years later in October 1964. For the Soviet Union, the Cuban Missile Crisis, or the Caribbean Crisis, as it is known by the Soviets, was more of an embarrassment than a victory--few of their aims were fully achieved. Firstly, hard-line generals saw the overall backing down of the USSR over the missiles as a complete humiliation in itself, including the fact that the missile gap between the US and the USSR had prevailed, since the brief period of nuclear parity had terminated when Khrushchev withdrew his Cuban missiles. Furthermore, the second deal proposed by the USSR in a formal letter to the US on October 27th demanded that the Jupiter missiles the US had in Turkey would have to be removed. The deal that was pushed by the US involved Attorney General Robert Kennedy meeting secretly with KGB representative in Washington Anatoly Dobrynin to discuss the proposal that the US would accept the terms of the letter, but that the missiles would be removed six months in the future, and not made public, or else the US would withdraw the deal. This was promised by the US along with the promise not to ever invade Cuba, which followed along the lines of the first, more informal letter sent by Khrushchev on October 26th, the day before. The secrecy involved in the withdrawal of the Turkish missiles, and the fact that Khrushchev accepted these terms further dropped him in the eyes of his domestic political enemies, as well as his own hard-line administration. Even more curious was the actual penning of the two different letters; US Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara described the first letter of the 26th as an impassioned proposal most likely written by Khrushchev himself, probably in an inebriated state . He also speculated that Khrushchev did not screen the letter through his administration, and it was sent to the US without others' approval or input. The message contained within this letter simply demanded that the US would promise to stay out of Cuba, and nothing more. However, the following day, another contradictory letter emerged, this time with much more formality, and with hard-liner demands. This sequence of events leads to conjecture that Khrushchev's political advisor discovered his soft-line transmission to the US, and quickly manoeuvred, in their eyes, to rectify the situation and the damage inflicted by a possibly drunk Khrushchev. This could possibly indicate the future ousting of Khrushchev from his seat of power, as his action were considered to need correction by his own administration, who believed he was acting too softly. Not only did his own government develop doubts about him because of the Crisis, but his allies were questioning his authority as well. China, who was at this time doubting the USSR's commitment to dealing with "imperialists" such as the US, witnessed the backing down of Khrushchev to US demands, which later led to Chinese propaganda movements that contributed to his fall from power. The entire world was witness to this supposed loss of face for the Soviets, however, the Soviets could have turned the situation in their favour in terms of global support, by demonstrating that the USSR was heroically "saving the world" by not demanding that nuclear equilibrium was restored after being stripped of a significant portion of their arsenal from Cuba. Furthermore, the USSR failed to emphasize the unjustified demands on the part of the US; the US had offensive missiles directed towards the USSR, however they claimed the USSR was in violation when they simply followed the US' lead. Furthermore, blockades, as defined under international treaties, are illegal acts of war; however the US thinly disguised their blockade of Cuba by renaming it as a "quarantine". Khrushchev himself emphasized that his actions in Cuba were not illegal, but simply a reflection of the US' own, when he questioning "Why shouldn't the Soviet Union have the right to do the same as America?" Had he pressed these points to the international community and taken a firmer stance towards the actions of the US, emphasizing the fact that the US itself was engaging in a poorly veiled illegal act of war, Khrushchev would have possibly improved his image in the eyes of his contemporaries. The Cuban Missile Crisis had a direct impact on the image of Khrushchev in the eyes of his own government and in the eyes of the rest of the world, which contributed to his fall from power.
Finally, the Cuban Missile Crisis had a great impact on negotiations between the two superpowers after the conclusion of the Crisis, especially its impact on the treaties that were agreed upon as a result of the crisis. First of all, the Cuban Missile Crisis saw the first direct communication line formed between the Kremlin and the White House. Because of the communications problems encountered during the Crisis, since messages took several hours to be delivered, Khrushchev and Kennedy saw a need for a proper means of contact. In 1963, a Hotline was established, which connected the White House and the Kremlin via telex. This completely changed the nature of the Cold War, as previously a scenario that could have occurred with the current state of communications was that Khrushchev could have agreed to withdraw the missiles, however because of the seven-hour delay, Kennedy ordered an invasion as Khrushchev was apparently delaying his reply. The establishment of the Hotline ensured that the risk of a war starting over poor contact was eliminated. Furthermore, nine months after the end of the crisis, both sides, plus Britain, signed the Test Ban Treaty, which banned the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, underwater, and in outer space. This treaty was a result of both recognizing how close they had come to nuclear war, and the necessity of ensuring that the development of nuclear weaponry did not spiral out of control before it became too late. However, the treaty did not include other countries, such as France and China who rejected it. Another treaty resulting from the lessons learned by both sides from the Missile Crisis was the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, where it was agreed that states would not transfer nuclear weapons to other countries or to aid other states in their manufacture. In short, the Cuban Missile Crisis instilled the desire in the US and the USSR to limit the spread of the nuclear weaponry. The end of the Cuban Missile Crisis was the beginning of a long period of détente in the history of the Cold War, as the two main players had been exposed to a scare, and both were ready to begin changes in their negotiations. This period was known as the "long peace", where both superpowers had it in their interests to seek détente in Europe. Because of the Cuban Missile Crisis, there was a concerted effort by the US and the USSR to improve relations between the two nations and monitor the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world, ultimately resulting in a period of relative reprieve.
"Eyeball to eyeball....and the other fellow just blinked" has long been touted as the Cuban Missile Crisis' main description; however it is astounding to speculate how easily it could have gone the other way and resulted in a full-out world war. The Cuban Missile Crisis was significant in the Cold War for a number of reasons, mainly being the closest to nuclear war the world has ever seen, the benefits it had to Kennedy's image, the consequences it had for Khrushchev's image, and finally what it led to in terms of negotiations and peace settlements between the two superpowers.
