From the November 2021 IBDP HL History Paper 3 exam:
Examine the influence of German foreign policy on the major European powers between 1890 and 1908.
The
question requires that candidates consider the interrelationship
between German foreign policy and other European states. Major powers
include Britain, France, Russia and Austria- Hungary. Candidates may
examine how the change from Bismarck’s foreign policy to one of Weltpolitik influenced
other powers. Candidates may examine how the unpredictable nature of
German policy in the 1890’s drew Britain out of isolation (Kruger
telegram, Naval Laws, colonialism) and into closer relations with France
and Russia. German actions in Morocco strengthened this relationship.
In the case of France, increased suspicion of Germany led to an alliance
with Russia in 1894. France was also keen to seek agreement with
Britain in 1904. In the case of Russia, the end of the Reinsurance
Treaty led to the Dual Alliance. German support of Austria-Hungary in
the Balkans drew Russia towards an alliance with Britain, as well as
France. For Austria-Hungary, it could be argued that German support
emboldened their Balkan policy (Bosnia 1908). Candidates may argue that a
consequence of German foreign policy was that Europe was divided into
two increasingly militarised blocs. Candidates’ opinions or conclusions
will be presented clearly and supported with appropriate evidence.
TIPS on how to structure this essay:
IBDP History essays (Paper 2 or IA) are assessed on four criteria: A. Knowledge and Understanding (5 marks: accurate, relevant facts with context); B. Application and Use of Evidence (5 marks: specific examples supporting analysis); C. Analysis and Evaluation (5 marks: balanced arguments, causation, significance); D. Structure, Organisation, and Formal Presentation (3 marks: logical flow, intro/conclusion, formal language). To hit 13–15/20 (high 6/7 band), aim for comprehensive coverage, nuanced evaluation (e.g., "to what extent?"), and flawless structure—avoid description, prioritize analysis of causation/consequences.
Here's a recommended structure tailored to this topic (word count ~800–1000 for IA; scale for Paper 2). It ensures balance, evidence integration, and evaluation for full marks.
| Section | Purpose & Key Elements | Word Count Guide | Tips for 13–15 Marks |
|---|---|---|---|
| Introduction (Hook, Thesis, Roadmap) | Engage with a key event (e.g., Bismarck's 1890 dismissal). State a nuanced thesis: "Whilst German foreign policy from 1890–1908 aimed to assert Weltpolitik, it predominantly destabilized relations with Britain and France, fostering the Triple Entente, though it reinforced ties with Austria-Hungary—ultimately heightening European tensions." Outline structure (e.g., "This essay examines impacts on [powers] via [crises]"). Define scope (major powers: Britain, France, Russia, Austria-Hungary, Italy). | 100–150 | Show evaluation early (e.g., "significantly influenced" with qualifier). Use historiography (e.g., contrast Fischer's "aggressive intent" with Clark's "sleepwalkers"). Criterion A/B boost. |
| Body Paragraph 1: Britain and Naval/Colonial Rivalry | Topic sentence: "Germany's naval expansion most profoundly alienated Britain, ending its isolation." PEEL structure: Point (influence), Evidence (Tirpitz Plan, 1900 Navy Laws, Entente Cordiale), Explanation (causation: arms race diverted British resources), Link (to broader polarization). Evaluate: "To a great extent, as per Kennedy's arms race data." | 200–250 | Integrate 2–3 specific sources/examples. Analyse "why/how" (e.g., economic fears). Cross-reference later paras for cohesion (Criterion C). |
| Body Paragraph 2: France and Russia (Entente Formation) | Topic sentence: "Provocations in Morocco and the East drove France and Russia into alliance against Germany." PEEL: Point, Evidence (1905 Tangier, Björkö failure, 1907 Anglo-Russian Entente), Explanation (revanchism + security fears), Link (unintended encirclement). Evaluate counter: "Limited by Russia's internal weaknesses." | 200–250 | Balance positive/negative influences. Use causation chains (e.g., "This led to..."). Evidence from primary (e.g., Wilhelm's speeches) for Criterion B. |
| Body Paragraph 3: Austria-Hungary and Italy (Alliance Dynamics) | Topic sentence: "Germany's support stabilized the Dual/Triple Alliances but sowed Balkan seeds of conflict." PEEL: Point, Evidence (1908 Bosnian Crisis, 1902 treaties), Explanation (enabling Austrian boldness), Link (to 1914). Evaluate: "Strengthened short-term but undermined long-term, per multi-archival studies." | 150–200 | Shorter if space-limited; contrast with Entente paras for balance. Show significance (e.g., "pivotal for WWI"). |
| Conclusion (Synthesis, Evaluation, Broader Implications) | Restate thesis with nuance (e.g., "Predominantly negative influence, though..."). Synthesize: "German policy catalysed division, evidenced by [key fact]." Evaluate overall: "To a significant extent, as it shifted Europe from balance to blocs." Link to wider history (e.g., WWI origins). No new evidence. | 100–150 | End with forward-looking judgement (Criterion C). Ensure formal tone, no contractions. |
| Overall Presentation | Title, footnotes for sources (e.g., Chicago style), bibliography (5+ items: books like Taylor's Struggle for Mastery, articles). Consistent tense (past), precise language. | N/A | Logical progression (chronological/thematic hybrid). Transitions (e.g., "In contrast..."). Word count adherence; proofread for Criterion D (full 3 marks). |
General Tips for 13-15 Markband:
- Evidence: Use 8–10 specifics (dates, names, treaties) woven into analysis, not listed—aim for "exemplifies" phrasing.
- Evaluation: Question assumptions (e.g., "Was this deliberate or accidental?") in every para; address limitations (e.g., other factors like nationalism).
- Balance: 60% analysis, 40% knowledge; cover all powers evenly.
- Historiography: Briefly reference 2–3 views (e.g., "Fischer argues intent; Clark sees mutual miscalculation") for depth.
- Practice: Time yourself (45–60 min); self-assess against IB rubric.
Written under exam conditions (Click to enlarge):
Written under exam conditions (Click to enlarge):
Written under exam conditions (Click to enlarge):
Example 2:
Fritz Fischer stated in the 1960s that the reason for the First World War was Germany's "aggressive pursuit of its Weltpolitik", creating tensions throughout Europe since its introduction in 1890. This view is, in fact, simplistic, and while German foreign policy did impact Europe's major powers, Fischer fails to examine other crucial non-German influences between 1890 and 1908. In the 18 years between 1890 and 1908, the reckless actions and approach to foreign policy by Kaiser Wilhelm II influenced major European powers, but these powers influenced themselves too.
From an orthodox view, Germany can be seen with a strong influence on European powers between 1890 and 1908, as the dismissal of Bismarck, often referred to as the "dropping of the pilot" from 'Punch' magazine in 1890, left Kaiser Wilhelm II fully in charge of Germany, embracing the Weltpolitik. This aggressive approach to foreign policy hinted at a desire for Germany's global domination, consequently threatening other major European powers, such as Britain, and setting the stage for rivalry and conflict in this period. This was exemplified in the First Moroccan Crisis of 1906, where Britain plotted to take the African state of Morocco, but Germany openly defied this and instead supported Morocco, enraging the French. However, due to this act of recklessness from the Germans, the entente between France and Britain was strengthened as the Brits supported the French, impacting these major powers as they formed ententes. Additionally, as the First Moroccan Crisis was resolved in 1907 with the conference of Algeciras, Britain and Russia formed an entente as well. Kaiser Wilhelm II was left behind, as he unwittingly created strong bonds between the European powers of Britain, France, and Russia, making a fool of himself. The Kaiser’s reckless foreign policy further showed its impact in 1908, with the Daily Telegraph article. Wilhelm II stated, "You Brits are mad, mad as March hares," a shocking statement that enraged the British. This foolish act further increased existing tensions between Britain and Germany, proving how Germany's foreign policy had a detrimental effect on the European powers surrounding it.
On the contrary, a revisionist view would argue that other major European powers between 1890 and 1908 created conflict with each other or initiated it with Germany, without the initial involvement of German foreign policy. An example of this is Britain's competitiveness in the naval arms race with Germany, started in 1898. Although both sides were building their navies, it can be argued that the British egged this conflict on more, shown within an excerpt from Britain's "Naval Annual" from 1902. It states that "we (the Brits) have lost our superiority," making the claim that they cared a lot about the naval race and were extremely invested in gaining back their 'lost superiority'. This is seen in 1906, with the creation of the first HMS Dreadnought, as this ship sparked the flame of anger and competitiveness in the naval race, as Germany felt obliged to retaliate to the British, who struck first. Moreover, the Bosnian Crisis of 1908 exemplifies Germany's uninvolved foreign policy and how other European powers were at play. When Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, it was Germany's duty, not her choice, to aid Austria-Hungary in the annexation due to their alliance created back in 1879. Furthermore, Russia then got involved by supporting Austria-Hungary, not Bosnia, breaking the brotherhood between the Slavic Bosnia and Russia. Consequently, France was enraged that Russia showed her support to the same side that Germany was on, further creating tensions between the main European powers, without assistance from Germany's foreign policy. This shows minimal influence of German foreign policy on powers such as Russia, France, Britain, and Austria-Hungary, yet shows how Germany was still brought into the conflict.
Lastly, a post-revisionist standpoint can be taken that all European powers influenced each other in the 18 years between 1890 and 1908, aided by Christopher Clark's 2012 book "Sleepwalkers". It argues that Europe had a "widespread readiness for war", that major European powers were all sleepwalking into an inevitable conflict caused by the clash of their foreign policies. German foreign policy did have an impact on its fellow European powers, for example, when the Kaiser showed support for the Boers in the Boer War instead of supporting Britain, showcasing the Kaiser's immense 'talent' for causing conflict. However, the exact same can be said for other major European powers, in this example Britain, with their insane thirst for the largest navy, and their willingness to destroy other nations such as Germany that stood in their path. In addition, the clarity of German foreign policy itself can be argued, as the Weltpolitik was a broad policy that was therefore difficult to understand and act on. This is shown with a quote by Alfred von Waldersee, a German general in 1900, who stated, "We are supposed to be pursuing Weltpolitik... if only I knew what that was meant to be," highlighting how even high-ranking German officials did not understand their own nation's foreign policy. It is difficult to analyse the impact of a foreign policy when the definition of it is unclear. In fact, it can be argued that even Kaiser Wilhelm II did not fully understand Weltpolitik, showcased by his reckless approach to other major European powers.
In summary, Fritz Fischer's claim that it was the aggressive pursuit of Germany's Weltpolitik that caused rising European tensions (and ultimately World War I) can be examined as partially true, as in many cases Kaiser Wilhelm II initiated events that affected his fellow European nations. However, in many other cases that transpired in the 18 years between 1890 and 1908, Germany was dragged into conflict, or simply in the vicinity, having its foreign policy having little to no impact on major European powers, namely Britain, France, Russia, and Austria-Hungary. Germany's foreign policy was impactful, but so were other nations.
EXAMPLE 3:
When Kaiser Wilhelm II announced his "Weltpolitik" in 1897, it was unclear how his policy differed from Bismarck’s previous "Realpolitik". Some historians, like Fritz Fischer, argue that the Kaiser’s foreign policy was a coherent, expansionist, and aggressive strategy, while others, such as A.J.P. Taylor and Christopher Clark, argue it was more of an improvised response to events. Many, especially in Germany, compare Kaiser Wilhelm’s unpredictability to that of President Trump, as their actions were often unforeseeable. This can be seen as a deliberate tactic to unsettle rivals. Therefore, the question of the influence of German foreign policy on the major European powers between 1890 and 1908 is challenging. It implies a link between the dismissal of Chancellor Bismarck in 1890 and the Bosnian Crisis of 1908. This essay argues that Germany’s "Weltpolitik" significantly weakened relations with Britain, France, and Russia, while strengthening ties with Austria-Hungary, causing a division within Europe.
On one hand, Germany’s naval expansion profoundly impacted Britain, ending its policy of "splendid isolation". In the Naval Defence Act of 1889, Britain established the two-power standard, by which its fleet should always be at least equal to the combined naval strength of the next two greatest powers. It is crucial to understand that, as a small island, Britain’s best defence strategy in the 1900s was its navy, which is why it was keen on maintaining this policy. When Admiral Tirpitz announced the "Flottengesetze" in 1898, aiming to create a powerful German navy, Britain was seriously alarmed. This marked the start of the Anglo-German naval race, which peaked in 1908. By that time, competition focused on building HMS Dreadnoughts, the so-called "unsinkable" battleships Britain first launched in 1906. Due to the ships’ high production costs, both countries invested heavily, heightening European tensions as each sought to win the race. While some argue Germany had the right to expand its navy, its actions made Britain feel threatened, ending its policy of non-involvement, known as "splendid isolation", and increasing tensions.
In addition to forcing Britain to engage more in European politics, provocations in Morocco weakened relations with France. Fischer argues that Germany deliberately accepted the risk of general war through its aggressive foreign policy. One example is the First Moroccan Crisis of 1905, in which the Kaiser tested the strength of the 1904 Entente Cordiale by arriving in Fez, Morocco, to demand equal trade agreements with Germany and France. The French were infuriated by this unwanted involvement but feared the crisis might provoke war. Thus, the Algeciras Conference was held in 1906, which forced Germany to back down and encouraged Sir Edward Grey to increase support for France. Hence, Anglo-French relations strengthened, turning a weaker diplomatic understanding into closer political and military cooperation. It is important to note that, as the Entente Cordiale was not a binding military alliance, the Kaiser’s provocations gave it more significance than it might have had. This was the opposite of the Kaiser’s intent, highlighting Germany’s miscalculations. It contradicts Fischer’s view that it was all planned and supports Clark’s description of Germany as "sleepwalking—watchful but unseeing", unaware of the long-term effects of its actions and underestimating the negative impact on French relations.
On the other hand, the Bosnian Crisis strengthened Germany’s ties with Austria-Hungary while simultaneously weakening relations with Russia. Since 1871, the Dreikaiserbund had been an important understanding between Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia, until it was not renewed after Bismarck’s dismissal in 1890, portrayed by Punch magazine as "Dropping the Pilot". Bismarck had established close relations with both Austria-Hungary and Russia. However, Kaiser Wilhelm II, appointed in 1888, refused to renew the Reinsurance Treaty, rejecting Bismarck’s balance-of-power strategy. The Kaiser underestimated the risk of pushing Russia towards isolation, which ultimately resulted in the Franco-Russian alliance of 1894. The abolition of the Dreikaiserbund marked a turning point in German foreign policy. In 1908, with no agreement preventing Austria-Hungary from annexing Bosnia in response to growing Serb nationalism, the annexation irritated Serbia, which aimed to unite the Slavs after the anticipated fall of the Ottoman Empire, of which Bosnia was then a part. Serbia was a close ally of Russia, which sought to spread its influence in the Balkans. The annexation disrupted this plan, outraging the Tsar. As Germany was in a close alliance with Austria-Hungary, it supported the annexation, turning away from Russia. This supports A.J.P. Taylor’s argument that Germany’s "Weltpolitik" was not planned, as it had to improvise its response to the crisis.
A connection can be made to the First Moroccan Crisis, as in both cases the Kaiser’s provocations strengthened alliances between other countries. As a result of the annexation, Russia expected support from Britain and France under the Triple Entente, signed in 1907, strengthening that agreement. However, in this case, Germany cannot be fully blamed, as Austria-Hungary was the aggressor, and Germany, as its only remaining ally, had to support it. Fritz Fischer argues in his book "Griff nach der Weltmacht" that Germany isolated itself in Europe due to its foreign policy. However, contrary to his belief, this outcome seems more accidental than deliberate.
In conclusion, German foreign policy between 1890 and 1908 heightened European tensions by weakening relations with Britain through the naval race, with France in the First Moroccan Crisis, and with Russia during the Bosnian Crisis, while strengthening the alliance with Austria-Hungary. There seems to be a reason why the Kaiser’s "Weltpolitik" was never clearly defined, as it was more of an improvised response to events, resulting in a series of German miscalculations, supporting Clark and Taylor. If one were to look at a map of alliance systems in Europe in 1908, one would see the continent divided into two distinct blocks, setting the stage for the outbreak of war.
EXAMPLE 4
German foreign policy had a tremendous impact on major European powers between 1890 and 1908. The dominant "Weltpolitik" caused fear and tensions in Europe, particularly among France, Russia, and Britain, fostering major diplomatic losses and changes in the stances of these countries. However, German foreign policy also had an indirect influence, as it was driven by fear and baseless assumptions that impacted European powers.
In 1890, after Bismarck was dropped as Chancellor, German foreign policy shifted from careful, strategic peacekeeping to dominant and reckless under Kaiser Wilhelm II’s "Weltpolitik". The Reinsurance Treaty and the Dreikaiserbund (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia) were ended. This prompted fear and growing suspicion between Russia and Austria-Hungary in the Balkans. Russia and Austria-Hungary had competing interests in the region, and Russia believed that, without the Reinsurance Treaty, Germany would support Austria-Hungary in any conflict. Fritz Fischer blames Germany for fostering tensions in Europe by isolating Russia, which threatened France, as it sought to reclaim territories lost in the Franco-Prussian War. This gave France an opportunity to rival Germany.
The Dual Entente was signed between Russia and France in 1894. German foreign policy caused major powers to form a coalition against it. Just as Trump’s tariffs brought South Korea closer to China despite major differences, German foreign policy essentially built the two alliance blocs, leading to further rivalry. A.J.P. Taylor notes that Britain and France, historically rivals, signed the Entente Cordiale. German foreign policy shifted the diplomatic stances of two major European powers.
Germany’s recklessness during France’s attempt to establish dominance in Morocco led to a major crisis. By testing the Entente Cordiale, Germany endangered peace. Britain backed France due to its access to the Suez Canal, and Germany was forced to back down, humiliated. Fritz Fischer attributes this to further growth of tensions, inspiring fear in France and Russia. Additionally, Germany’s attempt at naval dominance in the Anglo-German naval race acted as a threat to Britain. Admiral Tirpitz’s advocacy for naval dominance and the passing of the First Naval Law in 1898 sparked a major rivalry. The recklessness of "Weltpolitik" caused a tremendous naval build-up. Britain, which relied on naval supremacy to defend its island, reacted sharply. A.J.P. Taylor notes that Britain ended its "splendid isolation" and sought support through the Franco-British agreement, the Entente Cordiale. This shows the major impact of German foreign policy on European powers.
On the other hand, German foreign policy had an indirect impact, driven by fear and baseless assumptions, as Christopher Clark suggests. When the Reinsurance Treaty was dropped in 1890, the Russian Tsar grew suspicious of Germany and Austria-Hungary, believing Germany would back Austria-Hungary in the Balkans. However, Kaiser Wilhelm II preferred peace and had no intention of moving against Russia. Russia signed the Dual Entente in 1894 based purely on its own fears and assumptions of threat. The growing tensions due to French investments in Russia and Germany’s encirclement fears fostered a diplomatic loss, culminating in the Bosnian Crisis of 1908 due to Austria-Hungary’s annexation. Christopher Clark argues that Germany’s foreign policy was driven by fear rather than intent, yet it significantly impacted the diplomatic stances of major European powers.
In conclusion, German foreign policy had a major impact on the diplomatic stances of European powers and fostered tensions. However, its indirect impact, driven by fear as Clark argues, was equally significant. Britain, for instance, panicked over Germany’s naval build-up. Despite no specific intent to cause war, as A.J.P. Taylor points out, the Anglo-German naval race and Kaiser Wilhelm’s actions, such as challenging Britain’s naval supremacy, caused Britain to abandon "splendid isolation". The British, under the First Lord of the Admiralty, Selborne, called for increased naval spending to maintain the two-power standard, ensuring their navy was larger than the next two naval powers combined. This sharp reaction, competing with Germany, caused the Anglo-German naval race, a direct result of German foreign policy.
EXAMPLE 5
1890 marked the beginning of a system change for German foreign policy. The "dropping of the pilot" removed Bismarck and instead had the Kaiser at the ship's helm. This shift from Bismarck's "Realpolitik" to the Kaiser's "Weltpolitik" had an impact on how Germany would deal with other neighbouring powers, and certain crises such as the Moroccan Crisis in 1905 and the Bosnian Crisis in 1908. The research question asks what influence and to what degree German foreign policy had in Europe. Some historians argue that its impact was minor, or not as large as what it seemed to be. However, this essay will argue that there was significant influence.
To fully understand what impact Germany had on powers such as Britain, Russia, France, and Austria-Hungary, one must compare the switch in system in 1890. Bismarck had always prioritised German growth and prosperity over all others. This meant that he would fight wars if it led to a stronger and better Germany. However, he made sure not to get greedy and take more than what was necessary. This is evident by examining the Franco-Prussian War, where instead of conquering and taking land, Bismarck had rather chosen to instil fear and a sense of honour in Austria-Hungary. This action alone speaks tremendous amounts for who Bismarck was, and portrays how he handled European affairs. His belief was to keep France isolated, have a balance between Austria-Hungary and Russia, and stay on good terms with Britain. In contrast, Kaiser Wilhelm had other methods for achieving German growth and prosperity, thereafter with "Weltpolitik". The Kaiser was very fond of imperialism, and strengthening Germany's naval power, strong enough to even rival that of Britain. He wanted to establish the idea that "Germany will have her place in the sun", basking in glory, which would be done by having colonies and naval power. This belief created a multitude of problems which we see for each major European power.
The very first instance is the Reinsurance Treaty between Germany and Russia in 1890. The Kaiser had chosen not to renew this treaty and instead believed that being on good terms by sending paintings of the Tsar was sufficient. This, however, was not the case. Ties with Russia had already been weakened by the League of the Three Emperors and Congress of Berlin, and now with no formal treaty, nothing held them together by a string. This push away led to Russia forming the Franco-Russian Alliance in 1894, teasing down Bismarck's attempts at keeping France isolated. This marked the start of real blocs forming between the future Triple Alliance and Triple Entente. Not only did the Kaiser weaken ties with Russia, he had also created a drift between Germany's natural ally, Britain. Due to his interest in building a navy fleet, Germany's spending in the military drastically climbed upwards of 70 per cent. This sudden change psychologically affected Britain to worry more and focus on their own naval power. Instead of having a friendly and strong relationship with Britain, the Kaiser simply planted for competition between the two powers and another.
These key events already depict how isolated Germany is becoming due to its foreign policy of being imperialistic and military driven compared to before. This is further strengthened by the Moroccan Crisis of 1905-1906, with the Kaiser giving his speech in Tangier, wanting to supposedly fight for the independence of Morocco from French rule. Then, at the Conference of Algeciras in 1906, Germany's demands were very extreme and unlikely to happen, ultimately leading to them backing down. The two Moroccan Crises had been to test and weaken ties between France and Britain, yet all it did was turn the entente into stone. The shift from strengthening what we have and not taking more than what we need under Bismarck's system, to the Kaiser's belief in becoming a global power, shows how much of a change there was in German foreign policy, leading to outcomes that isolated Germany from other countries. Fischer evaluates that the Kaiser was a reckless ruler who was all about expansionism and taking more and more, a young reactionary and older contradictory. This is evident when we look at how glory the Kaiser was in wanting to establish himself as a great power with an insatiable hunger for more, sadly ending up humiliated by the entente.
On the other hand, historians such as Christopher Clark and Taylor argue that German foreign policy did not have a very significant impact on the European powers. Their stance is that because the Kaiser was so reactionary and unorganised, most of what he did was disorganised and did not accomplish much. This is portrayed when comparing the causes for French, Russian, and British relationships. From one side, the relationships had been strengthened because of German foreign policy, yet there are always explanations. Russia was at the stage where they had started to industrialise more and construct more railways in the country. Most resources were put into strengthening infrastructure. Due to this, they required loans from France to fund these expenses. There had already been a strong connection between the two powers which got fortified by Germany's decisions. The same idea applies for Britain. The increased spending in its navy by Germany used only psychologically impacted Britain; they overshadowed Germany in actual numbers and effectively ended the naval race in 1906 by constructing the HMS Dreadnought. Finally, the Bosnian Crisis in 1908 showed how weak and irrelevant Germany was as an ally. Austria-Hungary did not annex Bosnia and Herzegovina because Germany would support them; rather they did it because the discussions held between both foreign ministers of Austria and Russia were done in secrecy. They knew Britain and France would not stop them, their only possible rival being Serbia backed by Russia. All Germany provided was a "blank cheque" that simply said they would help in conflict. This shows how many European powers all had their own agendas, and that Germany was merely a participating power.
Although many of the countries had their own reasons for their actions, the impact German foreign policy had on Europe was still significant. Many of the isolations of Germany and strengthening of multiple entente blocs came because of the Kaiser's recklessness. Germany had humiliated itself in multiple instances, leading to a solid rival bloc.
EXAMPLE VI
The dismissal of Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, also known as “dropping the pilot” from the famous Punch magazine cartoon in 1890, marked a decisive turning point in European diplomacy under Kaiser Wilhelm II. German foreign policy abandoned Bismarck’s careful balance-of-power strategy and shifted towards “Weltpolitik,” seeking global influence through naval expansion and colonial rivalry. This shift significantly destabilised Europe’s fragile equilibrium. Rather than securing Germany’s place as a world power, the unpredictable policies provoked suspicion, pushed Britain into cooperation with France and Russia, and deepened Germany’s reliance on Austria-Hungary. This essay argues that German foreign policy between 1890 and 1908 created tensions that prepared the ground for the Great War.
Germany’s naval expansion most profoundly alienated Britain. The First and Second Naval Laws of 1898 and 1900, driven by Admiral von Tirpitz, aimed to build a fleet strong enough to threaten Britain. By 1906, Germany had developed a substantial navy, prompting Britain to launch the new, so-called “unsinkable” battleships, the HMS Dreadnoughts, to maintain supremacy. As Paul Kennedy demonstrates, Britain viewed Germany—not Russia or France—as its primary naval challenger. Colonial rivalry compounded this estrangement. The 1896 Kruger Telegram, in which Kaiser Wilhelm II congratulated the Boer president after the Jameson Raid, outraged British public opinion by exposing German hostility to British imperial interests in South Africa. Moreover, German intervention in the First Moroccan Crisis of 1905–1906, designed to challenge France, reinforced perceptions of Germany as a destabilising power. In reaction, Britain ended its isolation through the Entente Cordiale with France in 1904 and later the Anglo-Russian Convention in 1907. A.J.P. Taylor notes that German foreign policy “pushed Britain into the arms of its former rivals.” To a great extent, therefore, German foreign policy catalysed Britain’s realignment and Europe’s growing militarisation of diplomacy.
France, long isolated after 1871, found opportunities in Germany’s missteps. The lapse of the Reinsurance Treaty in 1890 deprived Russia of crucial guarantees, compelling it to seek security through French financial and military support, culminating in the Franco-Russian Alliance in 1894. This partnership directly countered the Dual Alliance of Germany and Austria-Hungary. Germany’s diplomatic adventurism reinforced these alliances in the First Moroccan Crisis of 1905–1906. The Tangier visit in 1905 sought to split the Anglo-French Entente but instead strengthened their solidarity at the Algeciras Conference. Russia, though weakened by defeat in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) and the 1905 Revolution, nevertheless upheld its alliance commitments to France. Kaiser Wilhelm’s personal diplomacy at Björkö in 1905 collapsed because Russian ministers refused to jeopardise ties with France. By 1907, the Anglo-Russian Convention completed the Triple Entente after agreement over Persia and Afghanistan, leaving Germany inadvertently encircled. Fritz Fischer emphasises that Germany’s aggressive “Weltpolitik” deliberately risked war to secure its place, whereas Christopher Clark highlights miscalculation: Germany “sleepwalked” into isolation by underestimating the strength of rival fears. Either way, German foreign policy strategically accelerated the alignment of Russia, Britain, and France.
Germany’s support stabilised the Dual and Triple Alliance by offering Austria-Hungary consistent backing, which reassured Austria-Hungary in the short term and maintained the alliance framework. However, it also encouraged Vienna’s aggressive Balkan policy, sowing seeds of conflict in the long term. The Bosnian Crisis of 1908, which Fischer referred to as a “two-men problem” due to the heavy responsibility resting on the Russian (Izvolsky) and Austrian (Aehrendal) foreign ministers, illustrates that Russia had no choice but to accept Austria’s annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina due to Germany’s pivotal role in ensuring Austria’s success by effectively threatening Russia with military confrontation. This undermined Russo-Austrian relations, caused by Russia’s loss of influence in the Balkans without gaining major advantages. Italy, though formally bound by the Triple Alliance, signed a secret neutrality agreement with France in 1902, illustrating its unreliable position and ambition for its own purposes. In the longer term, Germany’s alliance entrenched instability by binding Berlin to Balkan disputes, pivotal for future escalation.
Overall, German foreign policy destabilised Europe by replacing flexible diplomacy with confrontation. As a result, it shifted the continent from a balance of power to two antagonistic blocs. Whether through deliberate aggression or miscalculation, German foreign policy between 1890 and 1908 significantly increased European tensions and paved the way for a necessary war.
