From the May 2016 IBDP History Paper 2 exam
EXAMPLE I:
The social welfare legislation enacted during Lyndon B. Johnson’s presidency between 1963 and 1969 represented one of the most significant expansions of federal responsibility for social welfare in United States history. This period, often referred to as the Great Society, introduced programmes designed to address poverty, inequality, and access to essential services. Key legislation included the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Medicare and Medicaid Acts of 1965, and the War on Poverty initiatives. These measures aimed to transform American society through federal intervention, though their long-term impact remains debated. The Economic Opportunity Act established community action programmes to combat poverty, while the Civil Rights Act prohibited discrimination in public accommodations and employment. Medicare provided health insurance for individuals over 65, and Medicaid extended coverage to low-income individuals. These policies were rooted in the belief that federal action could reduce social inequalities and improve economic opportunities.
The economic impact of Johnson’s legislation was significant, though contested. Between 1964 and 1969, federal spending on social programmes increased dramatically, with expenditures on anti-poverty initiatives rising from approximately £1.2 billion in 1964 to over £3.5 billion by 1969. This period coincided with a period of economic growth, as GDP per capita increased by roughly 35 per cent between 1965 and 1969. Some attributed this growth to increased consumer spending enabled by social programmes, which injected funds into local economies. Schlarbaum emphasized that direct financial assistance and job creation schemes contributed to a reduction in unemployment, which fell from 5.2 per cent in 1963 to 3.8 per cent by 1969. Poverty rates also declined, dropping from 19 per cent of the population in 1960 to 12 per cent by 1969, though part of this decline may have been due to broader economic conditions. However, critics argued that government spending contributed to inflationary pressures, as the money supply grew by over 20 per cent during the same period. The costs of funding these programmes through tax increases, including higher income taxes in 1964 and 1968, may have also discouraged private investment in some sectors. The long-term fiscal implications became evident in the 1970s, when rising programme costs strained federal budgets. The establishment of Medicare and Medicaid, in particular, created ongoing obligations that increased as healthcare costs rose. By 1970, federal spending on healthcare had surpassed £5 billion annually, a figure that would continue to grow in subsequent decades. These programmes altered the relationship between citizens and the state, as individuals increasingly relied on federal support for basic needs. The economic benefits were unevenly distributed, with rural and minority communities often receiving less support than urban areas. Schlarbaum noted that while overall economic indicators improved, regional disparities persisted, particularly in the South, where infrastructure and educational resources remained inadequate. The legislation also faced challenges in implementation, as local agencies struggled to administer complex programmes with limited resources. The focus on economic growth through social spending highlighted a tension between immediate relief and sustainable development, a debate that continues to influence policy discussions.
The social impact of Johnson’s legislation extended beyond economics, reshaping American society in profound ways. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 marked turning points in the struggle for racial equality, though their effectiveness depended on enforcement. The Civil Rights Act prohibited discrimination in public facilities, employment, and education, leading to desegregation in many schools and workplaces. By 1968, over 90 per cent of public schools in the North had complied with desegregation orders, though progress in the South was slower due to resistance from state governments. The Voting Rights Act removed barriers such as literacy tests, resulting in a surge in African American voter registration in Southern states. In Mississippi, for example, black voter registration rose from 6.7 per cent in 1965 to 59.8 per cent by 1967. These changes contributed to a shift in political power, as African American voters began to influence elections at local and national levels. Riess highlighted that the legislation also fostered greater social mobility, as access to education and employment opportunities improved for marginalized groups. programmes like Head Start, launched in 1965, aimed to provide early childhood education to low-income children, with over 500,000 children participating by 1969. This initiative was designed to address developmental gaps caused by poverty, though its long-term effects on educational outcomes remained mixed. Medicare and Medicaid expanded access to healthcare, reducing mortality rates and improving public health. By 1969, over 19 million elderly individuals and 10 million low-income families had gained insurance coverage, leading to a 15 per cent decline in hospitalisation rates for preventable conditions. However, disparities in access persisted, particularly for rural populations and minorities, who often faced segregation in healthcare facilities. The legislation also influenced cultural attitudes, as the federal government’s role in promoting social welfare became normalized. Public perception of these programmes varied, with many supporting their goals but criticising their execution. The War on Poverty, in particular, faced scepticism from those who believed it encouraged dependency on government aid. Murray later argued that welfare programmes created disincentives for work, a claim supported by data showing that some recipients reduced labour participation to maintain eligibility. Despite these challenges, the social changes brought about by the legislation were profound, laying the groundwork for future progress in civil rights and social justice. The programmes established during this period continue to shape contemporary debates about equality and federal responsibility.
The long-term implications of Johnson’s social welfare legislation reveal both enduring successes and structural challenges. The programmes established in the 1960s remain central to the U.S. social safety net, with Medicare and Medicaid continuing to provide critical support to vulnerable populations. By 2020, Medicare served over 60 million individuals, while Medicaid covered more than 75 million, demonstrating the programmes’ lasting influence. However, their expansion also led to significant fiscal pressures, as healthcare costs rose sharply over decades. In 1970, federal spending on healthcare constituted 2.5 per cent of GDP, but by 2020, this had increased to over 5 per cent, reflecting the programmes’ growing financial burden. Critics such as Murray argued that welfare dependencies had intensified, pointing to data showing that by the 1980s, over 30 per cent of American families received some form of federal assistance, up from 15 per cent in 1960. This trend raised questions about the sustainability of such programmes, particularly as demographic shifts, including an ageing population, increased demand for services. The legislation also faced political challenges, as subsequent administrations sought to reform or reduce its scope. The Reagan administration in the 1980s introduced work requirements for certain programmes, while the Clinton administration in the 1990s implemented welfare reform that limited eligibility. These changes reflected ongoing ideological debates about the role of government in social welfare. Despite these challenges, the Great Society programmes achieved significant reductions in poverty and inequality in the short term. By 1969, the number of Americans living in poverty had fallen by over 10 million, though poverty rates began to rise again in the 1970s due to economic stagnation. The legislation also set precedents for future policies, influencing programmes such as the Affordable Care Act of 2010, which expanded healthcare access further. The Civil Rights Act and Voting Rights Act contributed to broader societal changes, including increased representation of minorities in political offices and greater awareness of systemic inequalities. However, enforcement of these laws remained inconsistent, particularly in regions with histories of discrimination. The legacy of Johnson’s policies is thus complex, reflecting both transformative achievements and unresolved challenges. The programmes altered the federal government’s relationship with citizens, establishing expectations of support that continue to shape political discourse. While critics argue that dependency and fiscal unsustainable practices increased, others emphasize the programmes’ role in promoting social stability and reducing suffering. The evaluation of their impact depends on perspectives on government responsibility and the balance between immediate relief and long-term structural change.
In conclusion, Johnson’s social welfare legislation between 1963 and 1969 had profound and lasting effects on the United States. The programmes achieved significant reductions in poverty and inequality, expanded access to healthcare and education, and reshaped civil rights protections. Economic growth during the period was influenced by increased federal spending, though fiscal challenges emerged later. Social changes included greater racial equality and improved public health, though disparities persisted. Long-term implications involved sustained fiscal pressures and political debates about welfare dependency. The legacy of these policies remains evident in contemporary social safety nets and ongoing discussions about government responsibility.
EXAMPLE II:
The expansion of federal responsibility in social welfare during the presidency of Lyndon Baines Johnson between 1963 and 1969 marked a transformative period in American domestic policy, characterised by an unprecedented legislative drive aimed at eradicating poverty and reducing social inequality. The suite of programmes introduced under the banner of the Great Society represented a fundamental reimagining of the state’s role in securing the well-being of its citizens, extending far beyond the New Deal framework established by Franklin D Roosevelt in the 1930s. Central to this transformation was the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, which institutionalised the War on Poverty through mechanisms such as the creation of the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), the deployment of Community Action Programmes (CAPs), and the establishment of Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA). These initiatives sought not merely to alleviate material deprivation but to empower marginalised communities through participatory governance, education, and job training. By 1965, the scope of reform broadened significantly with the passage of the Social Security Amendments, which created Medicare and Medicaid, thereby guaranteeing federal health insurance for the elderly and low-income populations. Over 19 million Americans became eligible for Medicare within its first year, while Medicaid extended coverage to approximately 17 million individuals by 1970. The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) of 1965 allocated $1.3 billion in federal funding to schools serving low-income districts, marking the first large-scale intervention by the national government in primary and secondary education. These legislative achievements were underpinned by Johnson’s belief that structural barriers, rather than individual moral failings, were the root causes of poverty, a conceptual shift that redefined the parameters of public policy. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) was elevated to cabinet status in 1965, with Robert C Weaver appointed as the first African American cabinet secretary, symbolising both the racial dimensions of urban deprivation and the administration’s commitment to addressing them. The Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 introduced rent supplements and increased funding for public housing, aiming to improve living conditions in inner cities. Between 1965 and 1968, federal expenditure on urban development rose from $830 million to $2.4 billion. Simultaneously, the Higher Education Act of 1965 expanded access to college through scholarships and low-interest student loans, enabling over 2 million students to attend university by 1970 who otherwise would have been unable to afford it. The legislative momentum was sustained by Johnson’s mastery of congressional politics, leveraging his experience as former Senate Majority Leader to navigate complex legislative terrain. In January 1964, he declared an unconditional War on Poverty during his State of the Union address, framing it as a national moral imperative. By August of that year, the Economic Opportunity Act had been signed into law with bipartisan support, reflecting a rare moment of consensus on the necessity of federal intervention. The legislative output of the 89th Congress (1965–1966) was extraordinary: 60 pieces of major legislation were enacted, including the Voting Rights Act, the Immigration and Nationality Act, and the creation of public broadcasting. The scope of Johnson’s vision was not confined to economic upliftment but encompassed broader cultural and civic inclusion. The establishment of the National Endowment for the Arts and the National Endowment for the Humanities in 1965 signalled a commitment to enriching public life beyond material needs. However, the efficacy and legacy of these programmes have been subject to intense scholarly debate, particularly regarding their capacity to achieve structural change versus merely mitigating symptoms of inequality. The administrative fragmentation of the OEO, which operated semi-independently from existing federal agencies, led to coordination problems and duplication of efforts. Local CAPs often clashed with municipal authorities, as seen in cities like Newark and Chicago, where mayors resented the federal government bypassing traditional political channels to fund grassroots organisations. This tension underscored a central contradiction in the War on Poverty: the attempt to democratise decision-making while operating within a hierarchical federal bureaucracy. Moreover, the geographic distribution of funds was uneven; rural areas in the South and Appalachia received disproportionately less support despite high poverty rates. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the official poverty rate declined from 19% in 1964 to 12.6% by 1969, a reduction of nearly 10 million people lifted above the poverty line. Yet critics argue that this decline began prior to Johnson’s presidency and was as much a product of sustained economic growth during the post-war boom as of social policy. GDP per capita grew at an average annual rate of 3.2% between 1964 and 1969, and unemployment remained below 4% until 1968, suggesting that macroeconomic conditions played a significant role in poverty reduction. Nevertheless, targeted programmes such as Head Start, launched in 1965, demonstrated measurable impacts: by 1968, over 500,000 children had participated in the pre-school initiative, with longitudinal studies indicating improved educational outcomes and reduced grade repetition. The Job Corps, another cornerstone of the Economic Opportunity Act, enrolled more than 100,000 young people by 1967, providing vocational training and basic education in residential centres across the country. Evaluations conducted by the Department of Labour in 1968 indicated that participants experienced a 15% higher employment rate compared to non-participants, though long-term wage gains remained modest. The Peace Corps, though established under Kennedy in 1961, was expanded under Johnson, with volunteer numbers increasing from 7,300 in 1963 to 15,500 by 1966, reflecting a broader ethos of civic engagement that permeated the era. The Food Stamp Act of 1964 institutionalised a national nutrition assistance programme, expanding eligibility and standardising benefits; by 1969, 2.9 million Americans were receiving food stamps, up from 380,000 in 1964. This expansion was critical in addressing hunger in both urban and rural communities, particularly in the Mississippi Delta, where malnutrition rates among children were found to be as high as 40% in some counties during the early 1960s. Medical inspections conducted by the Child Health and Development Project in 1964 revealed widespread protein deficiency and anaemia, prompting federal intervention through food aid and school meal programmes. The impact of these measures was evident in declining infant mortality rates, which fell from 25.5 per 1,000 live births in 1963 to 19.8 by 1969, a reduction attributed in part to improved prenatal care and nutrition access. However, the administrative complexity of overlapping programmes created inefficiencies. Medicaid, for instance, was implemented differently across states due to its optional nature, leading to disparities in coverage. By 1969, only 28 states had fully implemented Medicaid, while others imposed restrictive eligibility criteria, excluding childless adults and setting income thresholds below the federal poverty line. In Louisiana, for example, eligibility was limited to families with incomes below 35% of the poverty threshold, effectively excluding the working poor. This patchwork implementation undermined the universality of the welfare expansion and reinforced regional inequities. Furthermore, the reliance on matching funds placed a disproportionate burden on poorer states, many of which lacked the fiscal capacity to maximise federal grants. The ESEA similarly faced challenges in ensuring equitable distribution; although Title I funding was allocated based on poverty concentration, local school districts retained control over how funds were spent, often diverting resources to non-targeted programmes. A 1968 General Accounting Office report found that in 42% of districts receiving Title I funds, the money was not exclusively used for low-income students, diluting its intended impact. Despite these limitations, the ideological shift embodied in Johnson’s legislation was profound. For the first time, the federal government assumed direct responsibility for the social welfare of all citizens, irrespective of race, geography, or employment status. This principle was most clearly articulated in the 1966 report of the President’s Commission on Civil Disorders, chaired by Otto Kerner, which concluded that systemic racism and economic neglect were the root causes of urban unrest, calling for massive investment in housing, education, and employment. The Kerner Report, published in March 1968, warned that the United States was “moving toward two societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal,” and recommended a $23 billion annual investment over five years to reverse this trajectory. Although Johnson distanced himself from the report’s conclusions, its findings reflected the diagnostic framework underpinning much of his social policy. The Fair Housing Act of 1968, passed in the wake of Martin Luther King Jr’s assassination, sought to address residential segregation by prohibiting discrimination in the sale, rental, and financing of housing. Enforcement mechanisms, however, were weak; the Department of Justice filed only 124 cases under the Act between 1968 and 1970, and discriminatory practices such as redlining persisted. Nevertheless, the legislation represented a symbolic commitment to racial equity in housing policy, even if its practical effects were limited. The legacy of Johnson’s welfare state expansion must therefore be assessed not only in terms of immediate outcomes but also in relation to its long-term institutionalisation. Many of the programmes initiated between 1964 and 1968 endured beyond his presidency, becoming permanent fixtures of the American social safety net. Medicare, in particular, became one of the most popular federal programmes, with over 20 million beneficiaries by 1970 and public approval ratings consistently above 75%. Its success laid the groundwork for subsequent debates about universal health care, influencing policy discourse for decades. Medicaid, despite its fragmented implementation, became a critical source of funding for hospitals serving low-income populations, particularly in the South. By 1970, it accounted for 18% of total health care spending on the poor, up from negligible levels before 1965. The National Teacher Corps, established in 1965 to place educators in underserved schools, operated until 1981 and influenced later initiatives such as Teach for America. The Model Cities Program, launched in 1966 with $2.3 billion in funding, aimed to coordinate federal, state, and local efforts in 63 selected urban areas, promoting comprehensive redevelopment. Though often criticised for bureaucratic inertia and insufficient funding, the programme introduced the concept of holistic urban renewal, integrating housing, transportation, and social services. In cities like Chattanooga and Hartford, model projects led to the construction of new community health centres and job training facilities, demonstrating the potential of coordinated intervention. However, the escalating cost of the Vietnam War severely constrained the financial sustainability of these initiatives. Defense spending rose from $50.4 billion in 1965 to $81.2 billion in 1968, consuming an increasing share of the federal budget. Johnson’s refusal to raise taxes sufficiently to cover war expenditures led to inflationary pressures and forced cuts in social programming. The Omnibus Housing Act of 1965 promised 26 million new housing units by 1985, including 6 million for low-income families, but by 1969 only 1.6 million had been completed, falling far short of projections. Urban renewal projects frequently displaced poor residents without providing adequate relocation assistance, exacerbating housing insecurity. In Detroit, the construction of the I-375 freeway demolished over 1,500 homes in the Black Bottom neighbourhood, displacing thousands of African American families with minimal compensation. Such outcomes fuelled growing disillusionment with federal programmes, particularly among civil rights leaders who had initially supported Johnson’s agenda. Bayard Rustin, a key advisor to Martin Luther King Jr, warned in 1966 that the War on Poverty risked becoming a tool of social control rather than liberation, co-opting community leaders and depoliticising grassroots movements. This critique was echoed by Stokely Carmichael, who argued that federal funding corrupted local organisations by making them dependent on government approval. The tension between empowerment and assimilation remained unresolved throughout the period, reflecting deeper ideological fissures within the liberal consensus.
The limitations of Johnson’s social welfare agenda were further exposed by its inability to address the structural transformation of the American economy. Whilst the programmes of the Great Society assumed that poverty could be overcome through education, training, and public investment, they did not confront the decline of manufacturing or the rise of automation, which began to erode the availability of well-paying industrial jobs. Between 1960 and 1970, the number of factory workers in the United States increased only marginally from 15.3 million to 15.7 million, whilst productivity rose by 40%, indicating a growing reliance on technology rather than labour. In cities like Cleveland and Buffalo, deindustrialisation had already begun to hollow out the urban economy, leaving behind concentrations of jobless men and declining tax bases. The Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962, expanded under Johnson, aimed to retrain displaced workers, but by 1968 only 400,000 individuals had been served, a fraction of those affected by industrial restructuring. Moreover, the focus on individual upliftment neglected the role of corporate power in shaping labour markets. The minimum wage, raised to $1.60 per hour in 1968 (equivalent to $13.30 in 2023), covered only 45% of the workforce, excluding large sectors such as agriculture and domestic work, where African Americans and women were disproportionately employed. This exclusion was a direct legacy of New Deal compromises, which Johnson chose not to challenge. Consequently, many of the most vulnerable workers remained outside the protective framework of federal labour standards. The War on Poverty also failed to dismantle the racialised logic of welfare administration, which often stigmatised recipients and imposed punitive conditions. State welfare programmes, even when funded federally, retained discretion over eligibility, leading to discriminatory practices. In Mississippi, welfare officials conducted “midnight raids” to catch recipients cohabiting with men, using the presence of an able-bodied male as grounds for termination of benefits. These investigations, known as “man-in-the-house” rules, were justified as preventing fraud but disproportionately targeted African American women. A 1968 study by the National Welfare Rights Organization found that 78% of welfare terminations in Hinds County, Mississippi, were based on such investigations, despite a lack of corroborating evidence. This surveillance apparatus reinforced racial stereotypes and undermined the dignity of recipients, contradicting the Great Society’s rhetoric of empowerment. The feminist critique of welfare policy, articulated by activists such as Johnnie Tillmon, highlighted how the system punished single mothers while failing to address the structural causes of female poverty. Tillmon, writing in Ms. magazine in 1972, described welfare as a form of “slave wages” that trapped women in dependency. Although her analysis post-dated Johnson’s presidency, it exposed the gendered assumptions embedded in the design of social programmes, which assumed male breadwinner models and provided inadequate support for childcare and domestic work. The absence of a national childcare programme limited the effectiveness of job training initiatives for women, many of whom could not participate due to family responsibilities. The Child Development Group of Mississippi, one of the largest Head Start providers, employed over 1,000 women in 1965, offering both early education and employment opportunities. However, when local authorities regained control in 1966, most of these positions were eliminated, reflecting resistance to expanding women’s economic independence. The intersection of race, class, and gender in welfare policy thus revealed the boundaries of Johnson’s reform vision, which, whilst expansive, remained constrained by prevailing social norms and political compromises. The backlash against welfare expansion became increasingly evident in the late 1960s, as conservative politicians framed federal programmes as sources of dependency and moral decay. George Wallace’s 1968 presidential campaign capitalised on white resentment toward perceived preferential treatment of African Americans, using coded language about “handouts” and “welfare queens” to mobilise support. This rhetoric gained traction in the North as well as the South, contributing to the erosion of liberal consensus. By 1969, public approval of the War on Poverty had declined from 76% in 1965 to 49%, according to Gallup polling. The Nixon administration, which succeeded Johnson, retained many Great Society programmes but shifted emphasis toward workfare and state control, exemplified by the 1969 Family Assistance Plan, which proposed a guaranteed minimum income but conditioned benefits on work requirements. Although the plan ultimately failed in Congress, it signalled a retreat from the universalist aspirations of the mid-1960s. The fiscal crisis of the 1970s further undermined the welfare state, as stagflation and declining tax revenues led to austerity measures. Nevertheless, the institutional foundations laid between 1964 and 1968 proved resilient. Medicare and Medicaid survived repeated attempts at retrenchment, and federal education funding became a permanent feature of the budget. The Environmental Protection Agency, established in 1970 but rooted in Great Society-era legislation such as the Clean Air Act of 1963 and the Water Quality Act of 1965, extended the principle of federal responsibility into new domains. The Consumer Protection Act of 1966, requiring safety standards for automobiles and children’s toys, reflected a broader commitment to public welfare beyond income support. These developments indicate that Johnson’s legacy extended beyond poverty reduction to a redefinition of the social contract. The belief that government had a duty to ensure basic standards of health, education, and dignity became embedded in American political culture, even as partisan battles over the size and scope of the state continued. The success of the Great Society must therefore be measured not only by its immediate outcomes but by its enduring influence on the expectations citizens hold toward their government. Subsequent reforms, including the Affordable Care Act of 2010, drew explicit inspiration from Medicare’s structure, demonstrating the long shadow of Johnson’s legislative achievements. However, the failure to achieve full employment, universal childcare, or affordable housing revealed the limits of reform within a capitalist democracy resistant to redistribution. The urban uprisings of 1965 (Watts), 1967 (Newark, Detroit), and 1968 (Washington, Chicago) underscored the depth of alienation in African American communities, despite federal investment. The National Advisory Commission on Violence and Civil Disorders, in its 1968 report, attributed the unrest to police brutality, unemployment, and substandard housing, concluding that white society bore primary responsibility for racial injustice. Johnson’s social welfare legislation, whilst ambitious, could not overcome these entrenched pathologies without confronting the power structures that reproduced them. The programmes were often implemented in a piecemeal and underfunded manner, lacking the coherence and scale required for systemic change. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, serving as Assistant Secretary of Labor in 1965, argued in the controversial “Moynihan Report” that the breakdown of the Black family was a key cause of poverty, a thesis that diverted attention from structural economic factors and fuelled conservative narratives about cultural pathology. This emphasis on culture over economics weakened the political justification for sustained investment, allowing opponents to portray welfare as enabling dysfunction rather than alleviating disadvantage. The tension between structural and cultural explanations of poverty thus shaped the trajectory of policy, limiting its transformative potential. Nevertheless, the sheer volume of legislation passed between 1964 and 1968 represented a high-water mark in American liberalism, demonstrating that large-scale social reform was politically feasible under the right conditions. The combination of Johnson’s legislative skill, Democratic majorities in Congress, and a national mood receptive to change created a unique window of opportunity. That window closed with the escalation of the Vietnam War, which drained resources and fractured the liberal coalition. By 1968, the federal deficit had reached $25.2 billion, up from $1.2 billion in 1965, forcing difficult trade-offs between guns and butter. Johnson’s decision to fund the war without raising taxes undermined the fiscal credibility of the Great Society and contributed to the inflation that plagued the 1970s. The Federal Reserve raised interest rates in 1969 to curb inflation, triggering a recession that disproportionately affected low-income households. In this context, the promise of the War on Poverty appeared increasingly unattainable, not because the goals were flawed, but because they were subordinated to military priorities. The long-term impact of Johnson’s social welfare legislation must therefore be assessed within this dual framework: as a historic expansion of the welfare state that improved the lives of millions, and as a missed opportunity to achieve more fundamental economic democracy. The programmes succeeded in reducing absolute poverty and expanding access to essential services, but they did not redistribute power or wealth in a meaningful way. The top 1% of earners still controlled 15% of national income in 1969, a share that had remained relatively stable since the 1950s, indicating that the benefits of growth were not equitably shared. Corporate profits rose by 75% between 1964 and 1969, whilst wages increased by only 38%, reflecting a growing imbalance in the distribution of economic gains. The failure to link welfare expansion with industrial policy or worker ownership limited its redistributive impact. Unlike European social democracies, which coupled welfare states with strong labour unions and co-determination, the American model relied on market mechanisms and individual mobility, leaving structural inequalities intact. The persistence of racial segregation in housing and education, despite federal legislation, further constrained the reach of reform. By 1970, 80% of African American students in the South attended predominantly Black schools, a figure only slightly improved from 1964, due to resistance to desegregation and the proliferation of private academies. Busing initiatives, such as those implemented in Charlotte in 1971, faced violent opposition and legal challenges, highlighting the limits of federal authority in enforcing social change. Thus, whilst Johnson’s legislation achieved significant improvements in material well-being, it did not dismantle the systems of racial and economic hierarchy that underpinned American society. Its legacy is one of both achievement and constraint, reflecting the possibilities and limits of liberal reform in the twentieth century.
