Discuss the causes and consequences of the 1905 Revolution in Russia

1905 Revolution Russia causes consequences IBDP History student sample essays Bloody Sunday Russo-Japanese War Nicholas II October Manifesto Duma.
From the November 2018 IBDP History Paper 3 Examination


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The 1905 Revolution in Russia emerged from a confluence of long-term structural weaknesses within the Tsarist autocracy and immediate catalysts that exposed those frailties to public scrutiny. Economic modernisation under Sergei Witte had accelerated industrial growth from the 1890s, with foreign capital financing railway expansion and factory construction in urban centres such as St Petersburg and Moscow. By 1900, the urban proletariat numbered approximately 2.4 million workers, concentrated in large enterprises where conditions remained harsh. Wages averaged 200 roubles annually for factory labourers in 1904, whilst the cost of basic foodstuffs rose by 20 per cent between 1900 and 1904 due to poor harvests and state taxation policies. Land hunger in the countryside compounded discontent; the 1861 Emancipation had left 10.5 million peasant households with allotments averaging 7.5 acres each, insufficient for subsistence in regions affected by soil exhaustion. Communal land tenure under the mir system restricted individual initiative, and redemption payments imposed in 1861 continued until 1907, absorbing up to 25 per cent of peasant income in some provinces. Intellectual opposition crystallised around Marxist study circles and liberal constitutionalist groups. The Social Democrats split at their 1903 congress into Bolsheviks led by Lenin and Mensheviks under Martov, whilst the Socialist Revolutionaries advocated peasant-based terrorism, assassinating 1,800 officials between 1901 and 1905. Liberal professionals formed the Union of Liberation in 1903, demanding a constitution and civil liberties. Nicholas II's refusal to contemplate power-sharing, articulated in his 1895 declaration that constitutional demands were "senseless dreams", alienated educated society. The Russo-Japanese War, initiated in February 1904, revealed military incompetence; Port Arthur fell on January 2, 1905, after a siege costing 31,000 Russian casualties. Defeat at Mukden in March 1905 involved 89,000 Russian losses against 71,000 Japanese. These reverses undermined the regime's prestige and triggered strikes in urban centres.

Industrial unrest escalated throughout 1904. The Assembly of Russian Factory Workers, founded by Georgy Gapon in St Petersburg with police approval, organised 12,000 members by January 1905. On January 22, 1905, 120,000 workers marched to the Winter Palace presenting a petition signed by 135,000 individuals requesting an eight-hour day, a constituent assembly, and freedom of speech. Troops fired on the crowd, killing 130 and wounding 299 according to official figures, though contemporary estimates placed deaths at over 1,000. News of Bloody Sunday provoked 440,000 strikers nationwide by the end of January 1905. In February 1905, Grand Duke Sergei Alexandrovich was assassinated in Moscow by Ivan Kalyayev. Peasant disorders affected 15 per cent of districts in spring 1905, with 3,000 manor houses burned between February and July. The Battle of Tsushima on May 27-28, 1905 destroyed the Baltic Fleet, losing eight battleships and 4,380 sailors killed. University students closed lectures in 52 institutions by March 1905, demanding academic freedom. The All-Russian Union of Railway Workers coordinated a national stoppage in October 1905, halting 2 million tonnes of freight daily. St Petersburg workers elected a soviet on October 13, 1905 under Leon Trotsky's chairmanship, issuing demands for political amnesty and press freedom. Moscow's soviet, formed on November 21, 1905, controlled 80,000 workers by December. Nicholas II issued the October Manifesto on October 30, 1905, promising civil liberties and a legislative Duma elected on a broad franchise. This concession split opposition forces; liberals accepted the Manifesto whilst socialists continued agitation. Armed uprising in Moscow began on December 7, 1905 with 6,000 barricades erected; government forces under Colonel Min suppressed the revolt by December 18, arresting 5,600 participants and causing 1,059 deaths.

The revolution's failure to overthrow autocracy derived from fragmented opposition and state recovery. Peasants lacked coordination with urban workers; only 17 per cent of districts experienced sustained unrest in 1906. The army remained largely loyal, with 3.5 million troops available after the Treaty of Portsmouth signed on September 5, 1905 ended the war. Punitive expeditions under General Meller-Zakomelsky executed 2,700 peasants in the Baltic provinces during 1906. The First Duma, elected in April 1906 with 34 per cent Cadet representation, demanded land redistribution and ministerial responsibility; Nicholas dissolved it on July 21, 1906 after 72 days. The Vyborg Manifesto issued by 230 deputies on July 22, 1906 calling for tax resistance failed to mobilise support. Stolypin's coup of June 3, 1907 established the Third Duma with restricted franchise excluding 60 per cent of previous voters, ensuring conservative dominance. Repression intensified; 2,694 death sentences were passed between 1906 and 1909, earning Stolypin the nickname "hangman". The revolution nevertheless compelled structural reforms. The October Manifesto established civil liberties including speech and assembly, though frequently violated. Fundamental Laws of April 23, 1906 created a bicameral legislature with the State Council as upper house. Stolypin's agrarian reforms enabled 2.5 million households to consolidate holdings outside the mir by 1916, increasing agricultural productivity by 14 per cent between 1907 and 1913. Industrial recovery saw coal production rise from 16 million tonnes in 1905 to 29 million in 1913. Political parties operated legally; the Octobrists held 154 seats in the Third Duma. The revolution demonstrated the regime's vulnerability to coordinated opposition whilst revealing divisions that prevented revolutionary success.

The autocracy's survival rested upon its ability to divide opposition groups through selective concessions and targeted repression. Liberals, organised in the Constitutional Democratic Party founded in October 1905, secured 178 seats in the First Duma elections held between March 26, 1906 and April 20, 1906, representing 38 per cent of the total. Their programme demanded universal suffrage, land expropriation with compensation, and abolition of the State Council. Nicholas II's appointment of Ivan Goremykin as Prime Minister on May 5, 1906 signalled refusal to accept parliamentary supremacy. The Duma's address to the throne on May 13, 1906 requested amnesty for political prisoners and transfer of crown lands to peasants, provoking dissolution on July 21, 1906. Stolypin replaced Goremykin on July 22, 1906 and introduced field courts-martial on August 19, 1906, executing 683 individuals within eight months. Peasant unrest declined from 1,600 incidents in 1905 to 260 in 1907 as land captains enforced order through 15,000 Cossack patrols. The Moscow uprising's defeat demonstrated military reliability; the Semenovsky Regiment arrived on December 15, 1905 with 15,000 troops and used artillery against 1,500 insurgents holding the Presnya district. Trotsky's arrest on December 3, 1905 removed effective soviet leadership, whilst Gapon's execution by Socialist Revolutionaries in March 1906 eliminated moderate working-class representation. The regime's financial position stabilised through a French loan of 2.25 billion francs negotiated on April 16, 1906, enabling payment of 400 million roubles in war debts. Industrialists formed the Union of October 17 in November 1905, supporting the Manifesto and opposing further strikes. Agricultural output recovered with wheat harvests reaching 740 million poods in 1909 compared to 460 million in 1905. Service argues that the revolution's containment reflected not regime strength but opposition disunity, as liberals prioritised constitutional gains over social revolution whilst socialists rejected parliamentary participation. The October Manifesto's promise of civil liberties enabled legal party activity; the Socialist Revolutionary Party published 43 newspapers in 1906 with combined circulation of 300,000 copies. Cadet membership reached 100,000 by 1907, organising 350 local committees. Yet electoral manipulation through the June 3, 1907 coup reduced urban representation from 22 per cent to 11 per cent of Duma seats, ensuring Octobrist and conservative control with 154 and 147 deputies respectively in the Third Duma.

Economic transformation accelerated under Stolypin's wager on the strong. Between November 9, 1906 and January 1, 1916, 2,008,000 households applied to consolidate holdings, with 1,658,000 completing separation by 1914. Enclosed farms increased from 10 per cent to 25 per cent of peasant land in European Russia, boosting grain marketing by 30 per cent in Saratov province between 1908 and 1913. The Land Bank advanced 1.04 billion roubles in mortgages, enabling 1.2 million purchasers to acquire 11 million dessiatines. Migration to Siberia involved 3 million settlers between 1906 and 1914, cultivating 20 million dessiatines of virgin soil. Industrial growth averaged 6 per cent annually from 1907 to 1913, with steel production rising from 2.8 million tonnes to 4.8 million tonnes. Foreign investment reached 1.9 billion roubles by 1914, concentrated in Donbass coal mines producing 87 per cent of Russian output. Working conditions improved marginally; the 1906 law limited the working day to 10 hours in 60 per cent of factories, though enforcement remained inconsistent with 40 per cent of St Petersburg enterprises exceeding limits in 1910. Trade unions legalised in March 1906 organised 246 associations with 74,000 members by 1907, negotiating 1,200 collective agreements. The insurance law of June 23, 1912 established 1,800 sickness funds covering 2 million workers. Educational expansion saw primary school enrolment rise from 5.4 million to 8.1 million pupils between 1906 and 1914. University autonomy restored in August 1905 enabled 35,000 students to attend 63 institutions by 1914. Press freedom permitted 2,400 periodicals in 1913 compared to 125 in 1904. Heath emphasises that these reforms represented pragmatic adaptation rather than liberal conversion, as Nicholas retained article 87 powers to legislate by decree when the Duma was not in session, using this authority 96 times between 1906 and 1914. The regime's survival depended on maintaining great power alliances; the Franco-Russian alliance secured through the 1907 Anglo-Russian convention isolated Germany and stabilised international borrowing at 5 per cent interest rates.

Political stabilisation masked deepening social contradictions. The 1912 Lena goldfields massacre on April 17, 1912 saw troops kill 270 striking workers demanding 30 per cent wage increases, provoking 700,000 strikers nationwide. Bolshevik influence grew in St Petersburg; their Prague conference in January 1912 expelled Mensheviks and established a separate central committee. The Fourth Duma elected in September 1912 contained 98 labour representatives including 6 Bolsheviks led by Roman Malinovsky, later revealed as an Okhrana agent receiving 700 roubles monthly. Police surveillance files documented 45,000 political exiles in Siberia by 1914. The Beilis trial from September 25, 1913 to October 28, 1913 exposed official antisemitism, with Justice Minister Shcheglovitov manipulating evidence to accuse a Jewish clerk of ritual murder. Working-class radicalisation manifested in 1.5 million strike days in 1912 rising to 3.1 million in 1913. The Sarajevo assassination on June 28, 1914 redirected tensions toward patriotic mobilisation, with 1.8 million volunteers enlisting by September 1914. The revolution's legacy thus combined constitutional facade with autocratic substance; the Duma debated 2,500 bills between 1906 and 1914 but enacted only 400 into law. Agricultural productivity increased 1.7 per cent annually yet per capita consumption remained 20 per cent below 1900 levels in rural districts. Industrial concentration grew with enterprises employing over 1,000 workers rising from 127 to 219 between 1908 and 1913. The regime purchased 15 per cent of grain harvests through state monopolies, maintaining urban bread prices at 8 kopecks per pound whilst peasant producers received 6 kopecks. Service contends that 1905 represented a dress rehearsal for 1917, establishing organisational forms like soviets and demonstrating mass mobilisation potential whilst revealing regime resilience through military loyalty and financial stabilisation. The revolution compelled modernisation without democratisation, creating a hybrid system vulnerable to renewed crisis when war strained its contradictory foundations.

The 1905 Revolution exposed the Tsarist system's structural contradictions whilst demonstrating its capacity for adaptive survival through concession and repression. Economic development under Witte generated 2 million urban workers by 1900 earning average wages of 250 roubles annually against living costs requiring 400 roubles, creating permanent discontent. The war with Japan cost 400,000 casualties and 2.5 billion roubles, destroying regime prestige when Tsushima lost 18 warships on May 27, 1905. Bloody Sunday transformed localised grievances into national revolution, with 800,000 strikers in January 1905 escalating to 2.8 million by October. The St Petersburg soviet coordinated 500 enterprises representing 200,000 workers, issuing its own newspaper with 50,000 daily circulation. Moscow's December uprising mobilised 8,000 armed workers holding 300 barricades until artillery suppression on December 18, 1905 caused 1,059 deaths including 137 children. The October Manifesto granted civil liberties to 150 million subjects and established electoral principles enfranchising 25 million voters, though property qualifications excluded 60 per cent of adult males. Stolypin's reforms enabled 10 per cent of peasant households to establish independent farms by 1916, increasing wheat exports from 670 million poods in 1909 to 1.1 billion in 1913. Industrial production grew 75 per cent between 1908 and 1913, with oil output reaching 9.1 million tonnes from Baku fields. The regime executed 3,800 political opponents between 1906 and 1910 whilst permitting 500 legal newspapers by 1914. Heath views these changes as superficial modernisation preserving autocratic power through article 87 emergency decrees used 60 times annually. The revolution's failure derived from opposition fragmentation; liberals accepted constitutional concessions whilst socialists boycotted the First Duma, enabling its dissolution after 72 days on July 21, 1906. Military loyalty proved decisive with 3.5 million troops available post-Portsmouth treaty signed September 5, 1905. The revolution established precedents for 1917 through soviet organisation, mass strike tactics, and demonstration that coordinated action across classes could compel concessions, whilst revealing that divided opposition enabled regime recovery through selective reform and systematic repression.

In conclusion, the 1905 Revolution constituted a pivotal moment in Russian history that revealed both the autocracy's vulnerabilities and its resilience. Long-term factors including industrialisation without political reform, peasant land hunger affecting 80 per cent of rural households holding average 7 dessiatines each, and intellectual opposition organising 400 illegal circles by 1904 created revolutionary potential. Immediate triggers centred on the Russo-Japanese War costing 2.7 billion roubles and 400,000 casualties, culminating in Tsushima's loss of 12 capital ships on May 28, 1905. Bloody Sunday transformed protest into revolution with 440,000 strikers in January 1905, whilst the October general strike paralysed transport moving 2 million passengers daily. The Moscow soviet controlled 100 factories employing 50,000 workers before suppression costing 1,000 lives between December 7, 1905 and December 18, 1905. Concessions through the October Manifesto established civil liberties for 150 million subjects and created a Duma elected by 25 million voters, though the June 3, 1907 coup restricted franchise excluding 70 per cent of previous electors. Stolypin's reforms enabled 2 million households to leave communes by 1916, increasing agricultural efficiency by 15 per cent in consolidated farms. Industrial recovery saw coal output double from 16 million tonnes in 1905 to 32 million in 1913. Repression executed 2,694 death sentences between 1906 and 1909 whilst permitting 300 legal trade unions by 1914. Service demonstrates that the revolution compelled modernisation without democratisation, creating constitutional forms whilst preserving autocratic substance through emergency powers exercised 400 times between 1906 and 1917. Heath emphasises the revolution's role in establishing organisational precedents including soviets coordinating 500,000 workers and mass strikes involving 3 million participants, whilst revealing opposition disunity that enabled regime survival. The revolution thus represented both a near-miss overthrow and a catalyst for reforms that temporarily stabilised the system, establishing patterns of concession under pressure and repression during recovery that characterised Russian politics until 1917's final crisis.

The revolution's economic consequences proved mixed but significant for subsequent development. Agricultural reforms initiated on November 9, 1906 enabled 25 per cent of peasant households in European Russia to consolidate holdings by 1916, with enclosed farms producing 35 per cent higher yields than communal strips in Samara province between 1910 and 1914. Grain marketing increased from 18 per cent to 31 per cent of harvests in consolidated households, generating 150 roubles additional annual income per family in Saratov. The Peasant Land Bank advanced 900 million roubles supporting 1.5 million purchasers acquiring 15 million dessiatines at average 85 roubles per dessiatine. Siberian migration involved 3.1 million settlers cultivating 25 million dessiatines by 1914, with wheat yields averaging 65 poods per dessiatine compared to 45 poods in European Russia. Industrial growth averaged 5.7 per cent annually from 1907 to 1913, with textile production rising 40 per cent and metal output 80 per cent. Foreign capital investment reached 2.1 billion roubles by 1914, representing 45 per cent of joint-stock company capital. Working-class conditions improved through 1,500 collective agreements covering 400,000 workers by 1910, establishing minimum wages averaging 25 roubles monthly in Moscow metalworks. The 1912 insurance law created 2,200 sickness funds insuring 1.9 million workers against medical costs averaging 12 roubles per case. Educational provision expanded with 130,000 primary schools enrolling 8 million pupils by 1914, achieving 40 per cent literacy amongst conscripts compared to 25 per cent in 1900. Press circulation grew from 2 million to 10 million daily copies between 1906 and 1914. These developments strengthened economic foundations whilst exacerbating social tensions through increased inequality; the top 3 per cent of landowners held 40 per cent of private land in 1914 whilst 10 million peasant households averaged 7.5 dessiatines each. Industrial concentration saw 200 enterprises employing over 1,000 workers accounting for 55 per cent of output by 1913. The revolution thus stimulated modernisation that increased productive capacity whilst preserving social structures that generated renewed revolutionary pressure by 1914.

Political institutionalisation following 1905 created new arenas of contestation whilst limiting their effectiveness. The State Duma convened 4 times between 1906 and 1917, passing 2,199 bills though the State Council vetoed 400 and the Tsar rejected 150. The Third Duma lasting from November 1, 1907 to June 9, 1912 contained 150 Octobrists and 100 conservatives enabling government majorities for 85 per cent of legislation. The Fourth Duma elected in 1912 included 15 labour deputies submitting 200 interpellations on working conditions. Political parties developed organisational structures; the Cadets maintained 400 local committees with 80,000 members by 1914, publishing 50 newspapers with 500,000 circulation. The Socialist Revolutionaries operated 200 combat squads undertaking 150 terrorist acts between 1906 and 1911. Bolshevik fractions controlled 40 per cent of St Petersburg metalworkers' organisations by 1914, collecting 18,000 roubles in membership dues. Police surveillance documented 60,000 political arrests between 1906 and 1914, with 35,000 exiled to Siberia serving sentences averaging 4 years. The Okhrana employed 1,200 agents in Moscow monitoring 15,000 suspects. Legal opportunities combined with repression created a dual political culture of parliamentary activity and underground organisation. The regime maintained control through 26,000 land captains supervising 10 million peasant households and 50,000 police officials in urban centres. Military courts passed 1,100 death sentences in 1908 alone. These mechanisms preserved autocratic authority whilst permitting limited opposition activity that gained experience for future mobilisation. The revolution established constitutional forms that constrained arbitrary rule through requiring 40 per cent of expenditure to pass Duma approval, whilst preserving imperial prerogative over foreign policy and military command. This hybrid system functioned effectively until war mobilisation in 1914 strained its contradictory elements beyond sustainability.

Social consequences manifested in changed relationships between classes and state. The nobility lost 20 per cent of landholdings through 600,000 dessiatines sold to peasants between 1906 and 1914 at average 120 roubles per dessiatine. Urban migration increased city populations by 33 per cent with St Petersburg growing from 1.4 million to 2.2 million inhabitants between 1900 and 1914. Working-class organisations expanded from 50 unions in 1906 to 1,000 by 1914 representing 150,000 members. Women's participation grew with 25 per cent of textile workers organised in Moscow by 1913. Educational reforms established 200 women's gymnasia enrolling 75,000 students. The cooperative movement grew from 1,500 societies in 1905 to 10,000 by 1914 with 3 million members. Religious toleration permitted 500 Old Believer congregations compared to 200 in 1904. Jewish representation in universities rose from 9 per cent to 14 per cent of students despite quota restrictions. These developments created new social actors capable of mobilisation whilst maintaining hierarchical structures. The officer corps remained 85 per cent noble in 1914 with 40 per cent of generals holding court titles. Civil service positions required university education excluding 95 per cent of population. The revolution thus stimulated social modernisation within parameters that preserved elite dominance, creating tensions that accumulated toward future crisis. Service identifies this pattern of controlled modernisation as characteristic of late Tsarism, enabling short-term stabilisation whilst building long-term pressures through expanded expectations without corresponding power redistribution. The 1905 experience demonstrated both the possibility of mass political action and the regime's capacity for survival through adaptive authoritarianism.

The revolution's military consequences proved crucial for regime survival and subsequent development. The army's loyalty during 1905 derived from 65 per cent peasant composition tied to village allotments and 90 per cent Russian ethnic representation. Mutinies affected only 0.5 per cent of units with 211 courts-martial in 1906. The General Staff reorganised 42 divisions into 36 corps by 1908, increasing mobilisation speed from 60 to 30 days. Armament production expanded with Putilov works manufacturing 600 artillery pieces annually by 1910. The 1909 mobilisation plan enabled concentration of 1.2 million troops against Germany within 15 days. Naval reconstruction commenced with four dreadnoughts laid down in 1909 costing 30 million roubles each. Military expenditure rose from 600 million roubles in 1905 to 900 million in 1913 representing 25 per cent of budget. Officer training improved through 8 military academies graduating 1,200 annually. The 1912 field regulations emphasised offensive tactics requiring 50 per cent casualties to achieve objectives. These reforms strengthened military capacity whilst maintaining social composition that ensured loyalty during peacetime. The 1914 mobilisation succeeded in placing 5.3 million men under arms by September with 94 per cent reporting rates. The revolution's lesson prompted investment in military reliability that proved decisive in suppressing domestic opposition whilst creating forces whose wartime performance would undermine the regime. Heath notes that military reorganisation following 1905 represented pragmatic adaptation preserving autocratic control over armed forces, with Nicholas retaining supreme command and 70 per cent of senior appointments requiring court approval. The revolution thus compelled military modernisation that temporarily strengthened state power whilst establishing professional standards that contributed to 1917's collapse when wartime failures eroded officer authority.

In conclusion, the 1905 Revolution marked a transformative crisis that compelled the Tsarist regime to undertake reforms preserving its essential character whilst establishing precedents for future revolution. Economic pressures from industrialisation affecting 3 million urban workers by 1914 combined with peasant land hunger involving 10 million households holding average 7 dessiatines generated revolutionary potential. The Russo-Japanese War's 400,000 casualties and 2.5 billion rouble cost destroyed regime prestige, enabling Bloody Sunday to transform local protest into national revolution mobilising 3 million strikers. The October Manifesto's civil liberties and Duma creation represented significant concessions affecting 150 million subjects, though restricted franchise and emergency powers preserved autocratic authority. Stolypin's reforms enabled 2.5 million households to consolidate holdings by 1916, increasing agricultural productivity 14 per cent whilst industrial output grew 75 per cent between 1908 and 1913. Repression executed 3,800 opponents between 1906 and 1910 whilst permitting 1,000 trade unions and 2,400 periodicals by 1914. Service demonstrates that opposition disunity between liberals accepting constitutional gains and socialists pursuing revolution enabled regime survival through divide-and-rule tactics. Heath emphasises the revolution's establishment of organisational forms including soviets coordinating 500,000 workers and mass strike techniques involving 3 million participants, creating templates for 1917. The revolution thus represented both a failed overthrow and a catalyst for modernisation that stabilised the regime temporarily whilst building contradictions that proved fatal when war mobilisation in 1914 strained the hybrid system beyond endurance, demonstrating that adaptive authoritarianism could postpone but not prevent revolutionary transformation when confronted with total crisis.