From IBO Examination November 2008 —Paper III
Why did the Central Powers lose the First World War?
MARKSCHEME: Candidates could include the following factors: the failure of the Schlieffen Plan which led to a two front war, the use of unrestricted submarine warfare, the entry of the USA, the military weaknesses of Germany’s allies, poor military tactics such as the failure of the March 1918 offensive, internal dissension at home due to hunger and inflation, Allied control of the sea and the leadership qualities of Allied statesmen. The question is not just about Germany so candidates should include the importance of the role of Germany’s allies. [0 to 7 marks] for unsubstantiated generalizations, inadequate general answers or vague, inaccurate and irrelevant comments. [8 to 10 marks] for narrative or descriptive accounts of the First World War, unbalanced answers or implicit or undeveloped arguments. [11 to 13 marks] for narrative framework with explicit focus on the question. Arguments with limited examples and analysis. [14 to 16 marks] for analytical, well focused, relevant, developed and balanced answers focusing on why the Central Powers lost: some may not address all aspects of the question. [17+ marks] for fully analytical and relevant answers with detail, insight, perceptive comments and perhaps different interpretations, which address all aspects of the question.
EXAMPLE ONE:
On the 3rd of March, 1918, Germany and Russia signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsky that effectively confirmed Russia’s defeat and the end of the eastern front. This treaty brought about great change to the course of the First World War. Germany no longer was fighting a war on two fronts and was thus able to transfer millions of troops to the still contested western front, along with heavy artillery and other weaponry, as reinforcements. This enabled the German high command to launch a huge, concentrated offensive on France in the search of breaking the deadlock that had been held since 1914. This offensive, the Spring Offensive, was perhaps the most effective German offensive of the First World War, as it was able to drive further into France than Germany had previously been able to during the entirety of the war; close enough for the Germans to shell Paris. Then, suddenly, coinciding with the arrival of help from America, the allied forces, under the command of General Foch, were able to halt the advance of the German army and even turn the tides against it, pushing it back into Germany to the extent, where, on the 11th of November, Germany was forced into signing an armistice that would sow the seeds for the now infamous Treaty of Versailles. How were the Allied forces able to defeat the Germans when they themselves were on the brink of collapse? Why did the German Blitzkrieg style offensive, which had previously been so effective, suddenly fail? To answer thus, a number of factors need to be considered.
Perhaps one of the most notable causes of the failure of Germany’s Spring Offensive was the strategic incompetence of the commanders of the German army: Hindenburg and Ludendorff. Ludendorff’s central strategy was very simple: concentrate his newly amassed forces and artillery on the weakest parts of the British line, break through and through the power of will drive to Paris and defeat the Allied before the Americans could attack. This form of Blitzkrieg was not a knew concept on the western battlefront, indeed the Schlieffen Plan itself was based on the concept of Blitzkrieg. This similarity causes historian Trevor Wilson to label the Spring Offensive as little more than “a Schlieffen Plan Mark 2.” Wilson remarks that although the concentrated force of the German Army initially overwhelmed the British forces, the longer the Germans battled, the slower their progress became, before eventually their advance ground to a halt. Wilson believes this is due to a number of reasons. First, the German infantry soon outpaced the slow moving artillery in their haste to advance into France. Once beyond the protection of the big guns, the British troops were able to pick off the German troops, causing the Germans casualties that they could not replace. While the German army was slowly decimated, thousands of American troops arrived as reinforcements to the allied nations each week. This meant that as the Spring Offensive became longer, the German army slowly lost more and more troops while the allied nations became more and more powerful in terms of man power, eventually desperately outnumbering the Germans. A second consequence of Ludendorff’s tactics was that soon the German troops were extended a long way into France, meaning that they began to outpace their supply lines. Pretty soon, the British were able to encircle the Germans by reassigning troops from Ypres and thus encircle the German forces and attack their supply lines. This had dire consequences, as by restricting the line of supply, the British were able to stop the Germans receiving the additional bullets, hardware and man-power that they required to compensate for the casualties that their army was suffering and thus continue their momentum into France. As Colonel Henderson famously said: “The line of supply may be said to be as vital to the existence of an army as the heart to the life of a human being.” By cutting off the lines of supply, Britain was able to slowly strangle the German army, depriving it of the resources it needed and thus causing their advance to lose its momentum. A final argument that Trevor Wilson makes concerning why the Germans failed was the lack of direction showed by the German commanders. Wilson describes how Ludendorff, when his initial advance fails, first attacks northwards towards Flanders, then southwards against the fight, each time with the same result: initial success followed by a loss of momentum and an eventual failure. Wilson claims that this is primarily due to Ludendorff relying on this tried and tested Blitzkrieg method that relied more on the quick moving infantry than the slower but more devastating guns. This he describes as lunacy, as the German infantry was being decimated and there were no replacements for the casualties suffered. Thus it can be seen that Ludendorff’s rather obvious strategies and unwillingness to change his strategy allowed the allies to exploit some major strategic flaws of the German offense and consequently stop it in its tracks. There are some flaws to this argument, however. Wilson fails to account for the fact that the British and French were suffering huge casualties as well. Furthermore, the Allied counterattack used very similar tactics to what had been used previously, but it was successful. Also it was unclear what other tactics Ludendorff could have used, considering the War fatigue that was present during 1918. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the flawed strategies used by Ludendorff during the Spring Offensive allowed the allies to, eventually, stop it and counter attack.
A second major cause of the failure of the Spring Offensive of 1918 was the low morale of the German troops. Many of the reinforcements that arrived on the western front at the beginning of the Spring Offensive had been transferred from the eastern front. This meant that many had believed or hoped that the war for them was over, only for them to be required to continue fighting. This caused many of the soldiers to lose the will to fight, as they were unwilling to throw their lives away, having already survived fighting on a completely different, but equally brutal front. Furthermore, as the Germans advanced through France they discovered evidence of how the Allied soldiers were enduring significantly better conditions than the Germans. This was due to the support of the Americans supplying the Allied troops with resources that Germany was not able to get as easily from its own fading industry, trade and disintegrating allies. As a result, when progressing through France, the German soldiers were further demoralised by the fact that the Allied troops, despite being routed, were being treated better than the Germans were. This planted the seeds for rebellion as well as further grew the discontent amongst the German troops. Finally, the spreading of new ideals, specifically socialist and communist ones about the troops turned many soldiers against the idea of a continued war. Many of the German soldiers were pictured interacting with former Russian soldiers following the armistice on the eastern front. This allowed the spread of Bolshevik ideals to reach the Germans, who then carried these new beliefs to the western front and spread them there. This had the effect of allowing the soldiers to realize that they continued to fight for a cause which they no longer believed in and thus there will to fight lessened dramatically. As historian Laura Downs argued, the soldiers no longer believed that the government should be allowed to throw the lives of soldiers away to the damage caused by machine guns purely in order to advance a few miles. This change in beliefs and faith in the command structure had the effect of sowing the seeds of rebellion in the German army that were eventually seen during the Kiel Revolt in October, following the defeat of the German Army. As the historian Jay Winter remarks, Ludendorff’s Spring Offensive did not rely on the power of the German army in its quest for success, but instead on the will of the soldiers. However, as has been already seen, the will of the soldiers had by this time greatly lessened since the patriotic days of the Battle of Langmark and thus by relying on this wavering morale when competing against the new found determination of the Allies born from the desperation stemming from the avoidance of total national annihilation, the offensive could be seen as having been doomed from the start, despite initial success. What is unclear is how great of an effect this loss of morale actually had. The French also had revolts in their army and the British soldiers, especially the colonial ones, were also questioning their loyalties, nevertheless they succeeded in beating back the Germans, implying that the loss of morale was universal as a result of general war fatigue and that other factors may also have caused the failure of Germany’s spring offensive.
Perhaps the foremost reason why Germany lost the First World War in 1918 was that it fell apart internally due to various reasons. First, as more and more farmers were drafted into either the manufacturing of weapons, less and less worked in the fields to supply the Germans with food. Following the famines during the winters of 1916 and 1917 as well as the British blockade preventing Germany from importing food from abroad, widespread starvation that in total caused 750,000 civilian deaths, quickly disillusioned the German populace from the patriotic ideals that had made them initially support the war in 1914. This meant that they no longer supported the war effort, sowing the seeds for a revolution that would blossom during 1918. Living in Munich, this is particularly notable, as it allowed for the declaration of a communist state of Bavaria for a short period of time. These divisions were not just caused by the damaged agricultural sector. Industry had also failed in Germany as they began to run out of the steel and coal needed for the war effort. This meant that the German government had to use desperate measure to gain the steel that it could not get from elsewhere due to the allied forces blockading German trade routes. Hew Strachan tells of how the army melted down 300 year old church bells to be turned into bullets for the war effort. This shows the desperation of Germany to get resources that it didn’t have and this direct attack on the cultural heritage of the German people did nothing to help garner support for the war effort. Similarly, just as the German people was slowly splitting away from the war in favour of peace, so too was the German government fractured and unstable. The orthodox view is that the Kaiser and his band of Junkers made most of the decisions in the German government and that the general population had little say. Historian Niall Ferguson disagrees with this view, as he argues that most of what the Kaiser did was mere posturing and that in effect, in terms of policy making, he was powerless. Indeed, the Kaiser was, if anything, extremely damaging to Germany, as argued by historian Bernd Huppauf, who argues that the Kaiser’s tendency for strong language and rash remarks and speeches made his construct a fragile one. In the words of Niall Ferguson, he was “an embarrassment.” The fragility of the German government went deeper, however. Heinrich Winkler describes how the Reichstag itself was split between socialists such as Friedrich Ebert who opposed the war and aristocratic patriots who supported the war. This divide caused the German government to be increasingly unstable, eventually leading to the 1918 revolution that would confirm Germany’s defeat. This political instability, combined with the alienation of the masses from the war effort, meant that the German commanders not only experienced a loss of support from its own soldiers, but also from the nation it was fighting for. Combining this with the low supply of necessary resources, t becomes clear that the Germans lost the war because their own nation could no longer afford to support the needs of its army. Although the British and French also were on the brink of bankruptcy and political suicide, the arrival of fresh resources and aid from America helped to stave off disaster. This may help to explain why Britain and France avoided collapse, but Germany didn’t (its allies were of no help).
In conclusion, the Germans lost the war for a number of reasons. Some historians argue that the flawed military strategies used by the German commanders stopped the German advance and eventually forced their army into retreat. Others blame the loss of morale as a seed for rebellion that eventually tore apart the German army from the inside out, thus causing them to lose the war. The most convincing argument however, which is argued by the majority of Historians, is that Germany lost the war because internal strife in Germany meant that the nation, economy and society could no longer support the army’s needs, whereas the allies, who were on the brink of disintegration themselves, survived through American aid and could continue to support their armies and thus causing the German defeat.
EXAMPLE TWO:
Although the poem “The Second Coming”, written in 1919 by W.B. Yeats concentrates on describing the future, after the First World War, many of the thoughts in it can also be applied to the past. Phrases such as “Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold; mere anarchy is loosed upon the world” and “the worst are full of passionate intensity” address some of the reasons and opinions on what finally led to the end of the war and why the Central Powers lost. Like Yeats's poem, this essay will be concerned with arguments such as the weaknesses in the alliances between the Central Powers, including Germany’s change and decay from within and the fact that although Germany may have been lucky in many of its gambles, it never had a good strategy and was driven by thirst for power. However this text will also discuss further arguments not raised in “The Second Coming”, such as the U.S.A. joining the First World War and Germany's success in Russia as a source for disaster.
The Americans joining the war was one of the main factors that lead to the Central Powers being defeated. It is clear that they were a principal reason for the German Collapse, because it is when they joined the war in August 1918, fighting under their own flag but on the Allies’ side, that the Germans’ “Operation Michael” first started to falter. By the middle of August the combined armies of Britain, France and America managed to push their lines all the way back to the Hindenburg Line, were Germans had first started of from in spring. The Americans did not only have good leadership and morale, but were adaptable and learnt fast. At first they were at a disadvantage on account of their out-dated tactics and their lack of experience in this completely new field. To begin with, they were fighting as the Europeans had been fighting in 1914, remaining in open terrain and attacking by trying to cover expanses of free ground. Other armies had since then developed new tactics and strategies adapted to trench warfare. The Americans were soon found to be fighting with new tactics as well as British helmets and French tanks. Lastly, the Allies were clearly in a superior position to the Central Powers due to the immense difference in manpower between the two sides. For, in addition to the Germans losing 2 million men in the war the Americans brought 2 million men to the front as they joined the war. From these facts it is evident that the Americans managed to tip the scales of power within Europe by joining the war and help the Allies in overpowering the Central Powers.
The line “Things fall apart, the centre cannot hold; mere anarchy is loosed upon the world” in Yeats’ poem evokes another reason for the Central Powers losing the war: the centre of the alliance was not strong enough, could not endure and did not hold together. Germany was let down by its main ally, Austria-Hungary, for while Germany had created a strong and victorious army, that of Austria-Hungary was definitely not strong enough to keep up with the war. The Austro-Hungarian army was divided. On the one hand it was needed at the front, to support Germany but on the other hand at least seven divisions were required within the State to maintain order in the Balkans. An additional source of weakness within the Central Powers was that Germany and its allies often had different aims. For example, Ludendorff was intent on threatening India, Britain’s’ “most sensitive spot”, and therefore commandeered Turkish troops to prepare themselves. However these troops were not in the least interested in such ambitions; they were even willing to turn against Germany if need be, as Halil Pasha a commander in the Caucasus declared, “If necessary I would not hold back from waging war against the Germans”. Other incidents, like the seizure of a Ukrainian grain barge, that was bound for Germany, in Vienna, which lead to Ludendorff nearly calling for Germany to go to war against its “ally”, illustrate the lack of cohesion between the Central Powers. Given this evidence, it is undeniable that there were complications in the alliance between Germany and its allies. At the beginning of the war, Germany’s strength was such that it was able to compensate for its allies weaknesses. However over the course of the war this changed. As Strachan argues by 1918 “Austria-Hungary was truly shackled to Germany, but by the same token Germany itself was now too weak to survive without its ally”.
Returning to “The Second Coming”, Yeats’ claim, “the worst are full of passionate intensity”, reflects the tone of German leaders mind-sets. Although the Germans were often successful in many of their operation and offensives, they were gambling most of the time and driven by thirst for power and annexation. Germany gambled on victory in a two-front war in August 1914 as well as on Austria-Hungary making a reasonable partner for an alliance. The gamble on winning a two-front war was a success in the East, but a tremendous failure regarding the West, due to its predestined logistical deficiencies. Concerning Austria-Hungary, as Niall Ferguson argues, “the gamble […] went wrong”, for Germany had to divert men to the eastern front to bail out its ally more than once. The Germans did not have a strategy, as is confirmed by Ludendorff’s’ erratic and inconsiderate actions throughout the First World War. Strachan points out that for Ludendorff, “If a breakthrough could be effected, then strategy could follow”. One of the many examples for Germany’s lack of strategy is the “Michael Offensive” in 1918. Pushing forwards through the weakest part of French and British lines in the north of France and heading towards Paris, Germany managed to gain an enormous amount of territory within few weeks. It seemed like they were on a straight road to victory. However though Germany had moved forwards so fast, their plan had no hope of victory. The logistics of supplying their army, that was now so far from “mainland” Germany had no chance of working. Besides, it was now very easy for enemy lines to attack them from the sides of their outstretched surge into French territory. Pursuing Yeats’ thought on “passionate intensity”, it is also possible to consider the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which was signed on the 3rd of March 1918, as a reason for the Central Powers to lose the First World War. The fact that Germany’s wildest dreams were realized in defeating Russia was liable to lead to disaster. Evidence for this is that in response to this German victory, the Allies took further steps to strengthen their own forces. In addition to that, parts of the German army were now forced to remain in the East, attending to the newly acquired countries, and could not be put into action at the Western Front, where they were desperately needed. From this it is clear that Germany's Victory against Russia was not their ticket to success, let alone to winning the war.
Having now considered these different arguments that all imply that the Central Powers lost due to various reasons, I think the Central Powers defeat can not be attributed to a single cause. Strachan and Ferguson argue, that the failure lay with German problems concerning strategy and the weakness of the Central Powers alliances. It must however also be acknowledged that factors such as the Allies building up their armies and working in an adaptable and flexible way led to the Central Powers being defeated. In Conclusion I would like to take up Ferguson's position. He claims, “Even when the tide turned in the summer of 1918 it had more to do with errors of German strategy than improvements on the Allied side.”
EXAMPLE THREE:
March 24th, 1918, the Kaiser orders all church bells in Germany to be rung in celebration of the success of Operation Michael, and what seemed like the imminent victory of the Great War. Not even six months later, these same bells, symbols to hundreds of years of undying German morale and culture were melted down in a pitiful attempt for scrapes of ammunition, even though the nation had beat Russia on the Eastern front, ‘freeing’ 1.5 million troops to fight on the West. This will examine why Germany and her allies failed to ring those church bells one final time in a declaration of victory.
One of the major reasons of the Central Power’s defeat was the British Blockade and its damaging effects. It officially began the same day the British joined the war, August 4th 1914, and become progressively worse for nearly 5 years to July 17th 1919; 8 months after the armistice was officially signed. It would later be christened the ‘Starvation Policy,’ by the historian Lord Delvin, in 1975. To understand just how this lead to being one of the foremost causes of Germany’s defeat and why it was called the ‘Starvation Policy’, one has to understand just how dire the situation was. An American correspondent in Berlin during the mass starvations caused by the blockade said, ‘In the case of the youngest women and children the skin was drawn hard to the bones and bloodless. Eyes had fallen deeper into the sockets. From the lips all colour was gone…’ This paints a decent visual of the circumstances, and is acceptable as it was written before America came into the war, however he may have been biased; he may not wanted America to join the war and as a result exaggerated this to show how Germany was suffering and it was ‘unnecessary’ to enter the ever-growing conflict. By the winter of 1916-7, the nation was at its worst and the time is commonly referred to as the ‘Turnip Winter.’ Almost the entire potato crop had run out and severe food rations occurred. By March 1918 Germany was on it’s knees; the general consensus is that 760,000 people starved to death during this period, however some figures reach upwards of 800,000, such as the British historian, Arthur Bryant in his book ‘The conduct of War.’ The economy was under huge stress as well, with an estimated 55% decrease in production, as well as its industry, which relied upon imports to manufacture goods and war items. Germany now relied on digging up pipes and other metals they could find in their own country, as they had no ‘new’ materials being delivered into their borders. This is seen with the amount of tanks the country produced compared to their opponents. Germany produced only about 20, while Britain and her allies produced over 4,000. This lack of industry and raw materials is of great significance as this meant the military leaders had to be cautious of how they used their weapons and resources, making it necessary to make compromises regularly on the fronts, leading to weak defenses in the essential last months of the war. The huge amounts of starvation and the lack of imports were a main cause of the Central Power’s losing the war.
Because of the mass starvation, citizens started to become anxious and opposed to the war, causing extremist parties to flourish in the once proud German state. One of the most important of these was the communist party of the time. They held large demonstrations throughout Germany (namely in Bavaria). The government responded by sending these ‘rebels’ to the front lines to fight in hopes it would punish them and deter future attempts. The leadership made this decision unknowingly of the circumstance it would cause, leading to communist ideals spreading through the army and essentially splitting, not only the military, but also the population at home. This caused the country to become much more frail, as they would have to ‘please’ more than one ‘variety’ of people. Another effect of the blockade was that it laid the foundation for America becoming involved. The inclusion of the American’s on the side of Britain’s empire and France was arguably the final straw in the falling of Germany and her allies. As the situation worsened in Germany due to the Blockade, they decided the only way to combat it was unrestricted submarine warfare in the Atlantic, North Sea, and the English Channel in hopes of deterring and shrinking Britain’s navy. This arguably brought America into the war, specifically the German sinking of the Lusitania. One must recognize however, this was not the only reason of America joining, but at most the final straw for the nation. Other factors such as the ‘Zimmerman Telegram’ and the American loans that were given to the allies, played a large part as well. The inclusion of the United States was devastating for the already weak central powers. America brought 2 million fresh and energetic troops to the western front, while up to that point, that same number of German’s, 2 million had died in the war. Even though the American’s were fairly new to war in Europe, they were a godsend to the allies and were one of the main reasons why Germany lost, as seen with the ‘Hundred Day Offence:’ the last hundred days of the war where the allies lunched a series of offensives that lead to the final defeat of Germany. These series of allied offensives simply would not of been possible without the great number of American troops, however many historians still believe Germany may have lost later due to the growing severity of its domestic problems and lack of nationalism. This could be debunked however, as the new ‘German states’ formed under the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, would provide a great amount of food the following year, dampening the effects of starvation, which are often seen as the root cause of the rise of extremist parties, meaning the introduction of the American’s was a major part of their defeat. One can see how the blockade was the primary reason why Germany lost the war, not only because of starvation and dwindling resources, but also of the rise of extremist parties, the split of the German military and society, and the American’s joining the war effort. Germany, however, should not only be focused on; the role and underestimated weakness of the other Central powers were a leading cause of the failure of the war as well. The opening sentence of the film ‘The Go-Between,’ an adaptation of LP Hartley’s book, is striking: ‘The past is a foreign country: they do things differently here.’ This has become a renowned sentence over the years, and is exceptionally fitting when examining the Central Powers, or more particularly Austria-Hungary. Their nation was poly-nationalistic: a melting pot of several different cultures, ideas, and nationalistic ideals from Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Croats, Slovenes, Bosnians, Italians, Ruthenes and Jews living in under one umbrella. The opening sentence is extremely relevant as these different cultures had to change to meet new requirements, dissimilar to their former nations. Even though Germany formed around the same time and was similar in the fact they united many different states, they did not suffer as much as Austria-Hungary in this regard, as Austria-Hungary had exceptionally more diverse cultures and gained this territory by means of aggression. This was always a problem within the relatively young empire, but as time wore on during the Great War, it became greatly detrimental to the war effort and the state of the empire itself. By autumn 1918, the empire was falling apart when Germany needed them most. Although many minorities in Austria-Hungary at the beginning were loyal to the empire, worsening circumstances and misfortunes forced them to reconsider their allegiance. The first of a series of mutinies in the Austrian army was that in 1917 of group of Slovenes. This was followed by other groups and led to the decent of the army and the worsening weakness of the nation. As Bismarck said years before, ‘All treaties between great states cease to be binding when they come in conflict with the struggle for existence.’ By the end of the war, Austria-Hungary’s domestic problems lead it to putting the alliance with Germany on the sidelines. As seen when Austria-Hungary commandeered a ship headed to Bavaria with precious food on board. This escalated already strong tensions between the two countries and made the two ‘allies’ come nerve-rackingly close to war. All of this meant that the nation would not fight nearly as hard as they did during the beginning of the war, while Germany needed them to help them in the last months when the American’s got involved. One must wonder if Austria-Hungary stayed strong, would victor would be very different. Even though America were never ‘allies’ of Britain or France during the war, the now growing ‘Triple Entente’ were very close, a stark contrast to that of the relationships between the Central Powers, a very important reason why they failed to win the first world war. The Ottoman Empire suffered a similar history, but was much weaker as their empire was already starting to fall apart before WW1. This meant they were of little help to the main power, Germany. However, the Ottoman Empire did keep Britain busy and was an important buffer in the Middle East, for a possible offence from the South-East of Europe. Germany’s and her allies did not cooperate very well and were very weak, offering little to the German’s fight, leading to the loss of the war. The Schlieffen Plan was undoubtedly a severe failure for the Central powers and led to the failure of the Great War. Several historians argue that the Schlieffen Plan was infeasible for its time, in particular, B.H. Liddell, and was why it failed. He states that it would have been possible in the next generation when air power could paralyse an army and fast mechanical vehicles could encircle the enemy much quicker than traditional war tactics in the early 1900s. Some historians, such as David Fromkin argue that the Schlieffen Plan had too many changes made by Moltke prior to the war to be successful, however recent close inspection by A. Palmer on recently released documents, show that the plan was flawed from the start, and no sizeable changes were made prior to the war. One of the main flaws of the plan were the unrealistic expectations of speed and the reliance almost exclusively on rapid movement. This is backed by the British historian Sir John Keegan: when summarizing the plan, he states that there was an unreasonable expectation that the Right Wing of the German army could fight through Belgium and the Netherlands arrive to Paris on schedule. This is one of the fundamental reasons of why the plan failed, and as a result the Central Powers lost. Along with this, however, the Russians mobilized much quicker than anticipated, pulling troops away from the Western Front to the Eastern Front, further slowing down the advance in the West and eventually creating a stalemate. This stalemate created a severe lack of resources for Germany and her allies as they had to constantly supply an army with troops that would die quickly and military resources that would be expelled rapidly. Although both sides had negative effects from this, such as lower morale, Germany suffered considerably worse due to its limited resources, while Britain and its allies had almost the entire world to supply them, further depleting Germany’s precious food, raw materials, and infantry resources, making it much easier to lose the war.
When the plan did fail, the leadership of the time, Hindenburg and Ludendorff failed to react until near the end of the war. Even though they desperately wanted to break through the stalemate, they could not create a military tactic that would create a hole in the line. The passage of time of the stalemate only played further to the defeat of Germany, due to its lack of domestic resources and the small industries of its allies. A contrast to the British Empire’s abundance of materials. Even when the American’s joined and broke the stalemate, Ludendorff stated that they did not have a strong strategy, only to go as far into France as they could and as quick as they could. This had severe problems. This lead the army to taking over areas that had little importance and thus made it null to have and an exceptional waste of resources. Also, once the army got so far in, the supply line could not keep up due to the long distances, essentially deserting platoons in the middle of France causing a less organized and supplied military resulting in the loss of the war. These examples clearly show how the leadership of the time were anything but competent. It was not only Ludendorff and Hindenburg however, the other leaders in the Central Power’s are also to blame: i.e. von Kühlmann and Hoffmann of Germany, Czernin of Austria-Hungary, and Mehmed Talat of the Ottoman Empire. All these leaders signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, a treaty that would be labelled as their ‘Greatest achievement, and their greatest failure.’ The main result of the treaty was the land of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Ukraine, Lithuania, and Poland being given to Germany and Austria-Hungary. This was seen as a great success in the eyes of the leaders and the people, however it was short lived. One of the major effects of the treaty was the impact it had on the western allies. Living in Germany, and seeing the Haimhausen war memorial every day, one notices that the loses of the German’s became more and more severe as time went on. At the time, Britain and her allies were losing morale and desperately wanted the war to be over, however this treaty was shock to them. It served as a warning to what would come if the Central Powers won the war. This was seen with the raising exponential rise of deaths of the nations, signalling that Britain and her allies were ready to do anything to avoid losing the war and dealing with the terrifying German’s demands. This made it increasingly difficult to win and fight, something that the German’s believed would have been easy with their ‘freed’ troops, from the East. Even though the decision to take this territory from Russia had a huge impact on the morale, and eventually how hard the western allies fought, it also had effects on it’s military. The Central Power’s that signed the Treaty for all of this land, failed to recognize that they would have to use significant force to keep them at bay, making what should have been about 1.5 million troops moving from the East to the West, much smaller. This was disastrous for the German army; not only did they have to keep its new territory, but also fight and win on the West, spreading its resources even thinner then it should have been if they decided to not take as much land. The leaders of the Central Powers made some very large mistakes that significantly added to their future loss of the war.
There was no one reason why the Central Powers failed to win the war, but a culmination of many varied points. From huge domestic problems, lack of resources, weak allies and alliances, to poor leadership and military strategies. ‘Fight on and fly on to the last drop of blood and the last drop of fuel, to the last beat of the heart.’ (Baron Manfred von Richtofen). Germany and her allies tried their best and fought until they could no more, and for that it is important to give them even a small amount of gratification.
EXAMPLE FOUR:
“Whoever has access to the railways wins the war”. Although AJP Taylor’s statements may no longer hold merit this statement was true about the First World War. This was clearly seen after the battle of Amiens where the German advance during operation Michael was stopped. This was Germany's last gamble and the last hope for the Central powers to win the war. Germany had lost the battle for the factories as the allies had 4000 tanks and they only had 20. They lost the battle for leadership as the allied generals were united under Foch and Ludendorff was crazy and he was supposed to be leading their forces. The Central powers also had no clear aims, they were in disarray, whereas the Allies had a clear aim defeat Germany. This essay will show that the Central powers lost the war because they did not win the battle of the factories, they lost their last gamble operation Michael, they lost the battle of leadership and the Central powers were also in disarray caused them to lose the war.
“We must strike at the earliest moment before the Americans can throw strong forces into the scale. We must beat the British.” Ludendorff in this statement shows the desperate situation that the central powers are in at the moment, and that the Michael offensive was their last hope. Three days after the offensive had been in action the Kaiser ordered al the church bells to be rung in victory, because of how much land the Germans had taken in such a short amount of time. However later in the war these bells that had been there for hundreds of years would be melted down for ammunition for the war. Ludendorff decided that this was the only option that Germany had to possibly win the war; However what the offensive did was spread the German lines very thin, thus if a weak link in the front was attacked then the rest of the front would be cut off and would not receive any supplies. Also the land that the Germans were taking was not of strategic value, the Allies did not put up a very strong defence to the Germans offensive. The end of the German advances came at Amiens, this was a main transportation hub for the Allies. After this the and with the arrival of the 2 million American soldiers the Germans lost ground fast and ultimately lost the gamble that the placed on their victory of operation Michael. In the Beginning of the war the German army was the most elite, best equipped and best trained. To be able to achieve this they needed factories that they had, but by the end of the war Germany had fallen behind in the race for new weapons to turn the tide in the war. The Allies however had continued to build up their factories and invest in new weapons for the war. This is clearly shown in the number of Tanks that each side had. The allies had 4000 tanks and the Germans only had 20. Tanks would be a deciding factor in winning the war as they gave advancing soldiers something to hide behind and they could advance on enemy lines and incite fear. However the tanks in the First World War were quite slow (could only travel 4mph) and when armour-piercing ammo was invented there effectively in battle was diminished. But the psychological affect that it had on the German soldiers to see a large metal behemoth coming towards you incited fear within the German ranks. Without any proper tank threat the Germans could not properly counter this weapon of the British. The fact that the Germans could not counter this was a main reason why they lost the war because of the psychological factor that these metal Goliaths had on the German troops.
When looking at the battle of leadership it was clear that it was only a matter of time that the Central powers would lose the war. The man in charge of the German military command was Ludendorff, and for the allies Ferdinand Foch was in control of the military. Foch had the generals united under him, this means that the allies had a clear leadership structure for how their supreme command was set up. The Central powers had Ludendorff in charge of their armies, a man who was often described as crazy. The allies under the leadership of Foch had one clear aim, “Defeat Germany”. Whereas the central powers did not have a clear aim. After the treaty of Brest-litovsk the Germans annexed 1/3 of the Russian territory, this however made Ludendorff leave over 1 million troops in these territories to subdue the populace. When the allies realized that this is what Germany would to all of them if they would win the war. This gave the Allies one clear goal “ defeat Germany to end the war”. In addition the central powers were in disarray. Austria Hungary in 1918 commandeered a German grain boat that was going through Vienna, this act of desperation shows that the Central powers would turn on themselves and fight each other even while they are still fighting the Allies. After the incident Ludendorff almost declared war on A-H, Germanys only ally. This action shows that the Central powers were willing to go to war with each other for their own needs when they should be allies. The central powers by the end of the war were not allies but they were a mess that would be easily defeated by the Allies because of superior leadership from Foch and the fact that they had an aim and were fighting together and not with one another.
In conclusion the central powers only have themselves to blame for the loss of the Great War. If they would have held together at the end in 1918 they might have been able to repel the advance of the allies. Also the treaty of brest-litovsk was a disaster for the Central powers, because they annexed so much land that they did not need Germany needed to leave over 1 million troops in these lands when these men could have been fighting against the allied offensive. If the central powers had not been oblivious to the fact that tanks would become a decisive factor in warfare and built more of them then they might have been able to defeat the allies but they did not do this, they disregarded the moral shock that this would have on the men and how important tanks would be in battle. They also needed a goal a major target to focus on like the allies with defeating Germany. The Central powers lost the war to their own incompetence, lack of leadership and the fact that they did not build enough tanks. They only have themselves to blame for the loss of the “war to end all war”.
EXAMPLE FIVE
Austro-Hungary was an empire made up of thirteen countries: many of which demanded self-determination, a concept supported by the enemies. As Hew Stracken argues, this did not only pose a threat to the Austro-Hungarian Empire’s survival in general but also crippled their army. Men who did not even want to live in this country were definitely not ready to die for it. Even the Austrian and Hungarian kingdom disagreed throughout the war, and the Hungarian’s did not import food into Austria. This caused for Austria to do the unspeakable in March 1918, proving that the central powers were not only divided domestically. In this month, Austro-Hungary stopped a Germany ship on the Danube and confiscated their food supplies although their ally Germany at the time was also starving. Needless to say Germany was infuriated. Such quarrel between allies only weakened forces further instead of creating a strong system of support like the one Britain and France had with the advantage of the United States’ fresh batch of resources and extra men. This internal division within the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which spread throughout the front as well as their unfaithful behaviour towards their allies added to the burdens that the central powers had to carry compared to the allies, ultimately resulting in the loss of world war one.
The Ottoman Empire on the other hand faced similar issues to Austro-Hungary as its thirty-two provinces were divided, many of which did not want to be part of the Ottoman Empire apparent in the fact that there was the Young Turk revolution in 1908. Although, the Ottoman Empire had held itself up despite the revolts in 1908, in 1912 they were once again destabilized through Italy’s invasion of Libya. In fact, Christopher Clark argues in his book “The Sleepwalkers” that this specific invasion caused for the collapse of the Sick Man of Europe. The Ottoman Empire’s troops were focused on the Russian front; such that once the treaty of Brest Litovsk was signed between Germany and Russia on the 21st of March 1918 they basically retreated from the war in general. Instead of helping their allies Germany and Austro-Hungary at the Western front once the Eastern front had been defeated, the Ottoman Empire sent their troops to Baku. In June 1918, while the central powers were still fighting Britain, U.S and France the Ottoman Empire was engaged in the Battle of Baku miles away from the Western Front. This lack of support from the Ottoman Empire caused for very little resources for Germany and Austro-Hungary who were still fighting, thus six months after Russia had been defeated and the Ottoman Empire had more or less retreated from the war the central powers were forced to plead for an armistice.
Last but not least it was the German’s who experienced trouble at home as well as causing trouble amongst their own allies. With the treaty of Brest-Litovsk signed the German morale was through the roof, Kaiser Wilhelm rang bells of victory and the troops were convinced the war was soon to be over. However, due to the 35% of land mass that had been taken away from Russia in the treaty of Brest-Litovsk both troops and government were unhappy. Instead of being sent home, 1.5 million troops had to stay in Russia in order to occupy the land that had been taken from Russia, which had been battered by the war. In addition to this Germany was mostly governed by the SPD at the time, the Socialist Party, who was against taking land from Russia who was a “fellow socialist” country. This caused large controversy amongst Germans back home, as well as a sink in morale. Furthermore, the army and the government started becoming increasingly distant, as the army was busy occupying land whilst the government disagreed with this point in the treaty. This issue crippled Germany and sure enough in November 1918 Hindenburg and Ludendorff appealed for an armistice as they realized that the central powers could not possibly win the war. The Germans had also weakened their ally the Ottoman Empire during this period, as in an attempt to destabilize India. Kaiser Wilhelm had called for Jihad throughout the Middle East and Asia. Considering many of the countries under the rule of the Ottoman Empire were Muslim, this act caused for chaos and rebellion in the Ottoman Empire kicking this collapsing country whilst it was down. Consequently in the summer of 1918 when it became obvious to the Germans that they were going to lose, the Ottoman Empire was busy with its own battles and the maintenance of its Empire and was unable to help the central powers win the war.
In conclusion the central powers lost the war because they had several domestic issues such as political and national segregation, which spread quickly to the troops at the front as well. And in addition to this weakness they betrayed each other and weakened one another to create benefits for their own countries that ultimately caused everyone’s loss.
Why did Germany lose the Great War in 1918?
To comprehend why we are being asked this question, one hundred years after the start of the First World War, it is essential to understand that in March of 1918, victory seemed to be at Germany’s doorstep. The Eastern front had been defeated, and Germany was now ready to “reinforce the [Western] front line for a fresh attack.” Kaiser Wilhelm had church bells ring all throughout Germany in anticipation of a Germany triumph that everyone deemed to be arriving soon. How is it then, that in the matter of months, Hindenburg and Ludendorff had Germany signing an Armistice and accepting defeat? The answer to this question is so complex, that still rings in our ears to this day. Sir Hew Strachan (a Scottish military historian well known for his work on the history of the First World War) argues that Germany lost three battles, the battle of manpower (morale), the battle of resources and the battle of leadership. This essay will interpret his argument into a more specific scheme, analyzing the role of the British Blockade, Brest-Litovsk, and allies in the loss of these battles.
Since 1914 the British Blockade held its “iron grip” on German supplies and resources. By 1918 here in Munich alone, 750 000 Germans had starved to death as a result of this blockade, which was intensified by the conscription of agricultural workers that led to the reduction of German harvest in 1917-1918 by half of its former yields. The German public suffered under rations and resource scarcity, whilst the front too was lacking in weaponry and ammunition. Thus, the infamous melting of the church bells was implemented in order to provide further steel, which Carsten (a British-German historian who lived in Germany between 1911-1936) himself labels as a true “cause of despair.” Centuries of marriages, funerals, baptisms and religious celebrations manifested in these symbolic church bells were melted away. Soldiers heard of these dreadful effects of the war on their friends and families back home, heavily diminishing their morale at the front and forcing them to question the value of the war. Furthermore, it encouraged them to report back home with their own problems, promoting pessimism both back in Germany as well as up in the fronts.
The treaty of Brest-Litovsk signed in March of 1918 was meant to be a significant step towards victory for the Germans, after all they now had won the battle in the East and could replenish their Western lines with two million additional soldiers. However, this in itself posed a huge problem. The German soldiers who had fought to success in the East were seriously disappointed to be sent right to the next battlefront instead of home to their families. Furthermore, half of them were forced to stay behind and occupy the vast amount of land Germany had claimed from Russia through the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. This sparked political conflicts within Germany, as Socialists such as Karl Liebknecht concluded that this “was not a war of nationalist defence but had imperialist causes and aims.” Pacifists also agreed with this claim, as well as a large proportion of the German population that did not support such expansion into the East. Lorne Armstrong of the Hambubger Institute of Paedogogic Affairs stresses that even the SPD themselves, who were the biggest party in the Reichstag at the time, were unhappy with the results of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, as it very much promoted the deterioration rather than the support of their so-called “Socialist Brothers”. Whilst such turmoil occurred within Germany in regards to the former Eastern Front, the Western Front also posed a threat to the German military leaders. As Hindenburg himself had stated, during the peace talks of Brest-Litovsk, Lenin and Trotsky had attempted to “sow the seeds of political dissolution into the ranks of [the German] army.” The German soldiers who had fought in the East had heard tales of worker uprisings and Lenin’s socialist promises from their Russian counterparts, which could spread into the Western Fronts once they arrived. Hence, the German generals now above worrying about losing the war, also had to worry about infesting their troops and causing military insurrection.
In terms of Germany’s allies, it could be argued that they had already lost this battle before the war begun. After all, the Ottoman Empire, or as it was labelled at the time “the Sick man of Europe” was collapsing bit by bit ever since the Italian annexation of Libya in 1912. Austro-Hungary was divided and constantly feared their own soldiers to turn against them and turn to fight for the entente powers, as half the Slav and Romanian populations of Europe still lived in their empire. Throughout the war, Austro-Hungary had even gone as far as attempting to conclude a separate peace with the entente powers in late 1917 and stealing a boat full of German grain during the Danube incident. Thus, despite being so-called allies, Austro-Hungary almost provoked Germany to start a war against them in several occasions. Though Bulgaria was a relatively powerful ally, it was much smaller than the other countries (except Serbia) who were fighting, such that “The whole process of disintegration was hurried on by surrender, one by one, of Germany’s key allies” according to Patrick Cavendish (a British journalist who published a book on the First World War). On the other hand, the Entente powers gained an ally in April 1918, giving German morale one last deadly blow. Although the Americans only sent 200 000 troops, with minimal experience, they learned fast. The U.S. also brought with it extensive amounts of resources, such that the ratio of tanks for example, between the US and Germany, was 4000:20. The boost in French and British morale with the arrival of the Americans trumped the German morale, which existed on the basis that the Michael Offensive would allow the Germans to hold out until the Americans arrived. However, the Americans had arrived and the Germans were far from victory, Ludendorff had spread the Western front line so far apart that communication and transport of resources was no longer sustainable whilst General Pershing was able to launch a series of successful offensives against the German troops.
Thus, by 1918 Ludendorff and Hindenburg accepted
that Germany had no chance of victory, and signed the armistice with the
Entente Powers and America on the 11.11.1918, the last one of the Central
Powers to do so. This twist from close victory to strident defeat led to the
“stab in the back” theory in the German army, who, like many others to this
day, did not understand how the Germans suddenly lost the war. This would lead
to the establishment of the Weimar Republic and many more historical events to
come. Thus these few months, which resulted in German defeat, act as an
important milestone in 20th century history.
Why did Germany and her allies lose the First World War?
On the 24th of March 1918 church bells across all of Germany where ringing, Germans were celebrating and Kaiser Wilhelm declared that day to be a national holiday. Everyone thought that the English had been defeated and the war was won. For the first time in four years people were singing the national anthem with pride and regaining trust in the government for it’s highly successful “Operation Michael”.
With such high spirits in the country, what could have then led to Germany being down to her knees, begging for an armistice short six months later? There are many factors that can be taken into account for Germany’s, and therefore he allies failure, like the Schlieffen Plan, unrestricted submarine warfare and poor military tactics, however this essay will discuss and evaluate the significance of Sir Hew Strachan’s famous theory of the ‘three battles’ lost in those six months: the battle of manpower, the battle of leadership and the battle of resources.
One important aspect to consider when looking for possible causes of Germany’s defeat is the “battle of manpower”. After Russia had taken her armies out of war in 1917, Germany was able to sent hundreds of thousands of soldiers to the Western front and, for the first time, had a great advantage over her contractors; Germany’s army outnumbered all others. The problem that arose, however, was that the Americans were preparing for war against Germany after the Zimmermann Telegraph, which sparked enormous anger in the United States. Large numbers of American soldiers were now on their way to Europe to fight the war independently, but with the same aims as the Allies: to defeat Germany. General Erich Ludendorff announced: “Our general situation requires that we should strike at the earliest moment… before the Americans can throw strong forces into the scale.”[1] With this given statement it is made clear that with fit, refreshed and high-spirited soldiers on their way, German military leaders knew that they wouldn’t stand a chance if they were to face them, which forced them was to initiate gambles in the hope of winning the war before the Americans would arrive. Another example for the disadvantage in German manpower is the organisation of their troops. On March 3, 1918, the Russians signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The outcome of this, besides very harsh conditions for the Russians, was that Germany had now gained massive territory in the east, including Poland, Finland and the Baltic provinces. Even though this seemed like a glorious gain to German people, what it really meant was that now one million German soldiers had to occupy and defend these territories and thus less soldiers were able to take part in fighting the Allied Powers. Adding onto that, Germany’s ally Austria-Hungary was facing bankruptcy and famine; national debt was 75 billion and hunger was crushing the masses. Austrians were tired of fighting and in 1917 started secret peace negotiations with France. Ultimately this lead to Austrian soldiers slowly diminishing their efforts along the Italian borders. As for manpower, Austrian troops along the Alps were reported to slowly starve to death. Towards the end of the war, Austria-Hungary became a burden to Germany rather than an ally and so Germany was on it’s own with it’s troops and it’s manpower could in no way outlast the Allies’ manpower.
Another point in Hew Strachan’s thesis for the lost war is the ‘battle of resources’, which describes huge differences between Germany and the Allied powers. On August 8, 1918 the Allied Powers launched the “Hundred Days Offensive”; also known as the Battle of Amiens, which turned out to be a huge setback for Germany and ultimately led to the end of the First World War. The first day of that offensive came to be known as the “Black Day” for German people, as it was then that many soldiers lost their will to fight. Very interesting, when looking at statistics for this offensive is that when it comes to strength and resources, Germany had a huge disadvantage. The Allied powers had 32 different divisions, whereas the Germans only had 10 active and 4 reserved ones; the Allied Powers had 1,104 French and 800 British aircrafts[2], whereas the Germans only had 365; the Allied Powers had 532 tanks[3], whereas the Germans had none. The example of the Battle of Amiens shows how these tremendous differences in resources helped the Allies to succeed and how Germany in no way was prepared enough for such battles. But why did Germany have such disadvantages in resources? Something that played a very important role in this limitation during the war was the Blockade of Germany. As the German empire relied heavily on imports not only to feed their population but also to supply for warfare, the British Empire established a naval blockade right after the beginning of the war in 1914, yet this blockade reached it’s peak in 1918. John Maynard Keynes cited the testimony of an observer who accompanied Herbert Hoover's mission to help the starving as such: “Tiny faces, with large, dull eyes, overshadowed by huge puffed, rickety foreheads, their small arms just skin and bones, and above the crooked legs with their dislocated joints the swollen, pointed stomachs of the hunger edema...”[4] By 1918, not only children, but nearly all German people were starving. Those soldiers, who hadn’t lost their will to fight before, had lost it then. These observations written down by Keynes, make clear how extreme the blockade was affecting the German population and how severe it’s impacts were. Starvation and malnutrition brought diseases like influenza pandemic, which caused great suffering and nearly 763,000 wartime deaths in Germany during the war can be associated with the Allied Blockade, yet there is an argument that says that the blockade and starvation didn’t play as big of a role in Germany’s defeat as believed by many. Revisionists argue that though many people went hungry, few actually starved and that the capitulation in 1918 was precipitated on the Western Front, not among the discontented populace back home.[5]
The third ‘battle’ that Germany lost and that inevitably lead to her defeat is the ‘battle of leadership’. During the time of Germany’s “operation Michael” in March, the Allied Powers realized that they were facing a serious crisis and that their only chance was to change the way they organized themselves. Thus Ferdinand Foch, the French general, was made Allied Généralissime and given unified command over of the Allied forces. This was an important strategic movement because now the Allies were even more unified and organized then before and were thus able to perform highly complicated attacks like the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. Larry H. Addington, Professor Emeritus of History at The Citadel, said “to a large extent the final Allied strategy which won the war on land in Western Europe in 1918 was Foch's alone."[6] Without a doubt, Ferdinand Foch played a very important and essential role in European history when it comes to war strategies, but it wasn’t only him who helped the Allies to success. The fact that all different nations and divisions that fought for the Allied Powers accepted a Frenchman to be in complete charge and followed his commands as if it came from their own leader is extraordinary. And it is exactly this cohesiveness and organization the Germans were lacking. Their leadership at that time had many faults. Military leaders were all acting independently and no one knew exactly who was doing what. This lead uncertainty when it came to Germany’s allies as well. Whenever important militaristic strategies needed to be discussed between Austria-Hungary and Germany for example, Austria-Hungary leaders had no way of knowing who to talk to about issues. Leadership was not only a problem in Germany, but also a problem in Austria-Hungary. Austria-Hungary, with 15 different languages spoken, had major communication and leadership issues long before the war started. Revolutionary and nationalistic feelings had been a problem for the empire for a long time and the starvation and killing of soldiers made the situations much worse. Overall it can be said that the Central Powers’ leadership systems, especially Germany’s, were too scattered and underdeveloped to be able to keep up with the Allies’.
With all that has been said above, Germany’s and her allies’ defeat can be very well explained using the ‘three lost battles’. Manpower, resources and leadership are strong and important components to any war and nearly all mistakes that Germany and her allies made during the First World War can be traced back to those three basic principles. If Germany would have had better strategies and tactics regarding their troops, easier access to more and better resources and a much clearer and simpler concept to their leadership, the war might have ended differently, but with the Allies strengths in manpower, resources and leadership, it was impossible for Germany to defeat them.
[1] Marshall,
S.L.A.. “World War I”, 2001, page 343 [2] Hart 2008, page 311 [3]
Kearsey, pages 2–3 [4] Blahut, Fred (April 1996). "Hidden Historical
Fact: The Allied Attempt to Starve Germany in 1919". The Barnes Review:
11–14. [5] "The Blockade of Germany." The National Archives |
Exhibitions & Learning Online | First World War | Spotlights on History.
N.p., n.d. Web. [6] Larry H. Addington (1994). The Patterns of War Since
the Eighteenth Century. Indiana UP. pp. 167–68.
On March 21, 1918 Germany
began ‘Operation Michael’ attempting one last desperate push to win the war.
The operation brought immediate success to German army, gaining forty miles in
only four months and arriving fifty six miles off of Paris, close enough to
shell it and kill 250 Parisians. However, only 4 months later, on 11 November
1918, as a result of the allies overwhelming counteroffensive, Germany signed
an armistice which ended the war, with the allies coming out victorious. How
could Germany and her allies have collapsed so quickly, when only a few months
earlier it seemed as if they were winning the war? This essay will attempt to
explain the answer to this question by looking at the three main factors,
proposed by historian Hew Strachan, responsible for the central powers’ defeat:
leadership, manpower and resources.
Perhaps the greatest weakness of the central powers during the war was their
inability to cooperate and coordinate their effort in order to defeat a common
enemy. While the allied troops were all under the command of Ferdinand Foch,
making them united and with a clear common goal, on the other hand the central
powers did not have a shared objective and even ended up fighting each other as
the war progressed. For example, in 1918, Austria-Hungary, brought to its knees
by a lack of resources, commandeered a German grain sheep nearly causing
Lundendorff ( the german army’s general) to declare war on Austria-Hungary.
Furthermore, Lundendorff’s mental health deteriorated due to the immense
stress and fatigue caused by the long war, and he was said to only have taken a
few days off in the four years of war. This made Lundendorff very emotional,
and unable to identify the purpose behind Germany's attacks. During Operation
Michael Lundendorff lost his step son on the battlefield, and in a letter to
his wife he confessed that he kept the body as it gave him great comfort. This
clearly shows that the people in positions of power for the central powers were
not in the right conditions to make sensible and well thought out decisions,
resulting in the central powers collapsing and in losing the war. In addition
to this, in Germany there was no communication or cooperation between the army
and politicians. While the army wanted to continue fighting and win as much
territory as possible, back in Germany the parliament wanted to stop the war as
they knew Germany was collapsing from the inside due to the famine and lack of
resources.
The central powers’ lack of resources was also at the basis of their defeat in
World War one. Germany's industries were no match for the immense amount of
resources at the disposal of the British empire, France and USA. Furthermore,
the British Blockade
started in 1914, preventing Germany from importing supplies and resources
from abroad. This, combined with the inability of the agricultural sector to
support Germany caused a great famine during the winters of 1916 and 1917,
killing 750,000 civilians and making the war effort lose support from the
public. Famine was not the only problem haunting the Germans, the lack of metal
to make bullets in 1918 forced the Germans to melt down 300 years old church
bells, which only a few months earlier had been ringing in celebration for the
success of Operation Michael. Germany’s allies were in even worse conditions,
Austria- Hungary was completely devastated by starvation and national groups
inside of the country started forming armies of their own in order to rebel
against Kaiser Karl. The Ottoman Empire was also in no condition to support
itself during the war, it was an agricultural state while all the other
countries in Europe were focusing on industrial growth. The Ottoman Empire’s
economy had already been put under heavy pressure after the Balkan war in 1912
and 1913, this meant it simply did not have the economic resources to support
the war effort. Therefore, the combined resources of the central powers were
not enough to keep up with the allies and this was a significant reason for
their defeat in World War One.
On the 6th of April 1917 the USA officially joined the war and in August 1918
it launched a huge counteroffensive along with the allies which marked the
beginning of the end for the German army. Over two million american soldiers
fought in France, completely overwhelming the Germans and pushing them back to
the Hindenburg Line where they had started Operation Michael. On the 8th of
August 1918, which became known as the German army’s black day, the allies
gained over eight miles of territory making the morale of the German soldiers
completely drop. This clearly shows the total superiority in man power of the
allies once the USA joined the war effort. To make matters worse the rest of
the central powers started dropping out of the war leaving Germany on its own.
On September 29th, 1918 Bulgaria became the first of the central powers to sign
an armistice, and was quickly followed by Austria-Hungary which began to
dissolve on the Italian front, causing many soldiers to be captured at Vittorio
Veneto. Austria-Hungary officially signed an armistice with the allies on the
3rd of November 1918. Mutinies and revolution broke out in Germany, who was
left with no choice but to sign an armistice with the allies. Therefore at
11a.m, on November 11 1918 the guns fell silent on the Western Front, putting
an end to the war.
To conclude, there was not one dominant reason for the defeat of the central
powers, but it was rather a combination of poor leadership, scarce resources
and inferior manpower. Therefore, many historians argue that the war was lost
not due to the merit of the allies but to the poor organisation of the central
powers.
On the 11th of November 1918 Germany was
forced to sign an armistice which put an end to WW1. The poem “The Second
Coming” by W.B. Yeats, written in 1919, offers an interesting perspective on
what led to the end of the war and why the central powers lost, with lines such
as “Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold; mere anarchy is loosed upon the
world”. Similarly, this essay will explore the Central Powers’ lack of,
ironically, centralised, united leadership and how that led to an abundance of
infighting. Furthermore, this essay will diverge from “The Second Coming” as it
will analyse the Central Powers’ lack of manpower and resources compared to
that of large empires such as France and, most of all, Britain; and how that
affected, not only the armies’ ability to fight, but most importantly the
soldier’s morale. The first world war is the most written about event in human
history, this essay will only focus on these three general topics, as an in
depth analysis of all the reasons why Germany and its allies lost would be too
convoluted and prolonged. Nevertheless resources, manpower and leadership are
good holistic approximations of what led to the Central Powers’ final defeat on
that fateful day in November 1918.
A major reason for the Central Powers’ loss was their lack of centralized
leadership. On the 26th of march 1918, the Allied armies formed by France, Britain,
Italy, Japan and the soon to join United States, were united under France’s
Marshal Foch, who was appointed as supreme allied commander. Such a move proved
to be crucial for the allied victory, as on the other hand, the Central Powers’
leaders seemed to be more preoccupied with their own national goals, than with
winning this now four year old conflict. The BBC documentary, inspired by
historian Hew Strachan’s book “The First World War: A New History”, by the name
“Germany’s Last Gamble” presents various leadership failures within the Central
Powers. One such failure is that of turkish war leader Ismail Enver Pasha.
After years of fighting, the Ottoman Empire was in shambles, at the time,
general Mustafa Kemal recounts: “there are no bonds between the people and the
government, what we call the people is now composed of women, disabled men and
children”. As Britain swallowed up the remains of the Ottoman Empire from the
south, conquering Baghdad and Jerusalem, all the empire could do for the
Central Powers’ war effort was holding up against the British advance as best
they could like Germany instructed. Meanwhile, Pasha dreamed of a new Turkish
Empire,
extending into the east, and with his newly reformed army of Islam he set
to capture the oil rich city of Baku, which, was already being targetted by
Britain, and Turky’s ally, Germany. This resulted in infighting between Germany
and Turkey which then resulted in Britain capturing the capital of the newly
formed country of Azerbaijan. This was not the only case of infighting between
Germany and one of its allies. By February 1918, the Austrian troops in the
Alps and on the Venetian Plaines were near starvation. As Austria could not
keep up the food demand of their people on their own, General Lanfair, in charge
of food distribution, decided to raid a grain barge from Romania Directed
towards Germany, which passed through Vienna on the Danube. German General
Ludendorff was so infuriated by this action that he almost declared war on his
own ally, but the problems with Austria didn’t end there. Emperor Franz-Joseph
died in 1916, and his successor, Kaiser Karl 1st of Austria had no intention to
fight on. In 1917 he entered secret peace negotiations with his wife’s
homeland, France, which the latter intentionally spread as to further worsen
Austria’s and Germany’s relationship, which succeeded. The situation back in
the German High command was not any better. The two major leaders: Ludendorff
and Hindenburg were growing tired of the war in different ways. Hindenburg was
purely objective; he saw that, even with the recent successes of the Spring
Offensive, there was little to no chance of Germany being totally victorious in
the end. On the other hand, Ludendorf was growing weaker both physically and
mentally due to his total lack of rest during the course of the war. The
documentary “the Fall of Eagles”, which reenacts scenes of the German High
Command following historical transcripts, truly conveys Ludendorff’s character
at the end of the war. Ludendorff was a very emotional man, this led to him not
accepting the fact that his armies had run out of fuel. Instead of realizing
that they could no longer fight due to a lack of manpower and resources, he
blamed the men for being weak minded and unpatriotic, going as far as calling
them all traitors to the Fatherland. He himself was slowly descending into
madness; when his stepson died he kept the corpse and wrote to his wife that
having the body with him brought him comfort; clearly, he was not fit to be in
Germany's top brass anymore. While The Central Powers had to deal with all this
chaos and confusion, the allied powers were organized and efficient with their
decision making, a point that would ultimately cost Germany and its allies the
war.
After the treaty of brest-litovsk on match 8th 1918, which signed off on
the retirement of Russia from the war, Germany was able to move the troops
stationed on the eastern front over to the western front; which meant that for
the first time during the course of the war, Germany outnumbered the allies on
the french border. This advantage led to the greatest offensive of WW1:
Operation Michael, named after the patron saint of the German people. The
so-called spring offensive counted on using the newly freed up soldiers from
the estern front and using them to drive a wedge into the heart of France. On
paper the offensive seemed quite successful, as Paris was temporarily shelled
by german artillery, but there were quite a few problems with this strategy. A
crucial mistake made by Germany was taking large amounts of territory from
Russia through the treaty of brest-litovsk. This land now annexed by Germany,
somehow had to be kept by Germany. Not only that, but the territory they were
occupying was virtually useless. What are now parts of Ukraine, Poland,
Belarus, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and so on, at the time had barely any
infrastructure, and, after years of war, the fields were destroyed and the
people were starving and hostile towards Germans. Large numbers of men had to
stay behind and occupy these newly acquired territories, instead they could
have been used to further enhance Germany’s advantage on the western front.
Another problem with this offensive is that it was on a time limit. While
Germany’s troops were slowly diminishing, the allied armies only got bigger.
The United States joined the war in April 1918, giving a huge boost to the
Allie’s manpower and morale. Furthermore, France’s and most importantly
Britain’s manpower reserves were near bottomless, as their large colonial empires
spanned India, Canada, Australia and most of Africa, as well as various other
territories. Italian historian Arrigo Petacco argues that the Michael offensive
would have never worked as, even if Germany managed to capture Paris, France
could have adopted a strategy similar to that of Russia during the Napoleonic
wars, by retreating and waiting for help from its colonies which would have
ultimately crushed Germany’s efforts. Germany wasn’t the only Central power
with a lack of men. The various british attacks on the Ottoman Empire such as
Gallipoli have left the Empire virtually without able combattants, as stated
before, General Mustafa Kemal states that the Ottoman Empire was left with only
women, children and injured men. In Austria-Hungary on the other hand there was
the problem of
ethnicities. Austria itself is a small country, populated by families
originating from all fighting countries. Hungarians found the war to be, like
author of “The First World War” John Keegan would say, “a tragic and unnecessary
conflict”. This means that most of the able men in Austria-Hungary were
fighting for a war they didn’t want. Meanwhile, the allies kept getting support
from their colonies, which allowed them to keep fighting on longer than the
Central Powers could, and win the war of attrition.
By the end of the war, the Central Powers started collapsing internally, with
riots and revolts sparking in all the countries’ major cities, such behaviour
can be partially explained with a lack of resources. On March 23rd, the Kaiser
ordered all the bells in Germany to be rung in celebration of the German
victory and declared the 24th of March to be a national holiday. A few months
later, those very bells that I can view from my window are being taken down and
melted to make bullets. The sight of century old bells that rung for every
wedding and funeral for generations being taken down and melted right after
they were rung in victory was quite an aggravating sign for the populace, a
sign that they were being lied to and taken advantage of. That’s not all, all
the german soldiers that were now successfully taking miles and miles of land
in the spring offensive, were passing by the Allied trenches and towns, and
seeing the true power of colonial empires. The soldiers had spam in their
rations, the life in the towns seemed like normal, food shops stocked up and no
signs of starvation, at least not to the extent of what they had seen back
home. This naturally disheartened the soldiers that started writing back home
messages of defitism. To keep these soldiers in check Ludendorff ordered the
women of the families to spy on their lovers and husbands and report back to
the army thus putting families against each other. This eventually led to civil
war in Germany and mutinies in the army, as the soldiers chose that they would
rather get drunk and be captured then die for the Fatherland and a kaiser that
they never even met. Aside from it being the cause of civil war, the lack of
resources was in itself a major problem to the Central Powers. WW1 was a war of
attrition and thus the side with the ability to last longer would eventually
come out victorious. Germany was out of food and metal, starvation was rampant
and their resources finite, Austria-Hungary was also on the brink of famine and
borderline bankrupt with a debt of 7.5 billion krone. The ottoman empire was
quickly crumbling and thus losing access to its resources. On the other
hand, the allies had full support from their colonies and America who just
joined the war effort; The Central powers ran out of time.
In conclusion, The Central powers lost the war not due to a single cause, but a
combination of poor choices and lack of raw materials needed to fight such a
long war. Their command was disorganized and tired from the years of battling,
their manpower was not up to the task of fighting such large empires as Britain
and France and their lack of resources lost them the war on the front and at
home. Lastly I would like to take a similar stance as historian Niall Ferguson
who argues that “Even when the tide turned in the summer of 1918 it had more to
do with errors of German strategy than improvements on the Allied side” albeit
that in my opinion, as an Italian living in Germany, the Central powers also
mainly lacked the foresight of knowing that they could not compete against such
large empires.
Germany, a lost cause?
The day is March 23 1918, Kaiser Wilhelm the 2nd has just announced that Germany
is going to win WW1, church bells are ringing in towns across the country and
that date is declared a national holiday. Fast Forward to August 8th of that
same year, 5 months go by and Germany is set to lose the war. How this
phenomenon occurs is yet to be decided, a theory presented by Hew Strachan
explores the involvement of 3 topics that decided the outcome of the war.
Germany lost because of leadership, manpower and resources.
Germany was a dictatorship led by Kaiser Wilhelm the 2nd, and like any
government at the time also had their own war generals. The war generals
presented ideas to the Kaiser, and he either approved or denied them. All
important decisions went through a person that did not want a war in the first
place. This managed to be a problem, Wilhelm was not a war general and had not
directly fought in any war. Not only because he was the Kaiser but also because
he had a permanent injury that rendered one of his arms virtually useless.
Because of this lack of knowledge the Kaiser has 2 war generals that fed him
plans and opportunities. These two war generals are known as Paul von
Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff. They were seen as the perfect duo, Hindenburg
was seen as ‘the rock’ and was extremely calm and controlled. Ludendorff on the
other hand was erratic and tumultuous, he was extremely uncanny and it is known
that he kept his dead son’s body in his room to make him feel ‘relaxed’,
however, unlike Hindenburg he was considered a genius when it came to war
strategy. Together they advised a Kaiser who did not know much about war and
therefore could only follow their advice. I argue that while Ludendorff might
have been a genius war strategist he didn’t know about politics, morale was
always down during his command and the only boost in team spirit of the army
appeared after winning battles. An excellent example of great morale boost is
Britain, the country went to war in WW1 with 700,000 men. This was considered a
tiny amount compared to the other great powers at the time, but Britain was an
island and didn’t need a big ground army. After a lot of pressure from the
government and society men began to enlist, by 1918 Britain had a total army of
4 million men. Germany was desperate, they had a big army but soldiers kept
dying and Ludendorff didn’t seem to understand that the war had to be fought
‘back home’ too. Although the Germans had increased their army from 700,000 men
to 3.8 million in just a week they suffered a total of 5 million casualties
which enticed people inland to not join this ‘suicide’ mission. This failure to
see the problem was seen when Ludendorff began the ‘Spring Offensive’, a plan
designed to end the war before 2 million American joined the allies. It proved
to be extremely effective during the first weeks, however, Ludendorff failed to
assess the vulnerabilities of their enemies properly and just kept on sending
men to a ‘death trap’. Germany kept on losing men and not many new soldiers
were enlisted. Ludendorff still failed to see the error in his actions and
began to blame the loss of morale ‘back home’ on the Jewish. He was a man that
failed to see his wrongs and only saw what he did right. Germany needed a
leader that not only knew what they were doing but also kept everyone decently
happy, this is something Hindenburg and Ludendorff failed at forcing the Kaiser
to flee to the Netherlands as well as
Ludendorff to Sweden. Overall Germany lacked proper leadership during the
war causing a large decrease in hope which ultimately lost them the country the
war.
Germany was at the time considered the most effective and sophisticated army in
history, the people managed to multiply their army from a measly 700,000 men to
3.8 million men. They almost multiplied their army by 6. However, she and her
allies were fighting a war on 2 fronts, the Western front and the Eastern
front. By August 1916 there were 2.85 million men fighting in the Western front
against the British Empire, French and later the Americans and 1.7 million men
fighting in the Eastern Front against the Russians. This displacement of troops
made it hard for Germany to fight the war effectively and although Russia
signed the treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918 announcing their withdrawal of WW1
Russia still had to keep troops on the Eastern front to prevent revolts from sparking.
The allies also had a big advantage, their colonies. At the time the British
controlled about 1⁄5 of the world. And the French still had vasts of land
outside Europe. This advantage in colonies allowed the French and British to
not only but have more natural resources available but also more manpower.
Britain saw a lot of support from its colonies, New Zealand, Australia and
Africa providing 700,000 men to help with logistics, production and warfare.
However, the main standout was Britain's golden ‘baby’, India. Around 1.27
million Indians took part in WW1, a huge help to not only the troops in the
trenches but also the people in the factories. While the French did not have
such a big boost as the British from the colonies they still managed to gather
300,000 more men to fight for them in the front lines. This recruitment of
people outside of Europe was not available to Germany as their number of
colonies was almost nonexistent. The only source of manpower Germany had been
from its own borders, and while this allowed every member of the army to be
highly trained in war which is what allowed Germany to be the ‘best’ army at
the time the Germans kept on losing men and having no place to replace the
losses from. This caused the country to exhaust itself of personnel and since
substitutions came in the ‘boche’ were seen as weak. And as history shows time
and time again showing weakness is the demise for countries, no one escapes
this truth. The allies took advantage of this weakness and forced Germany to sign
the Treaty of Versailles which caused the Germans to not only lose the war but
take blame for it and have to pay 2⁄3 of its cost.
The last main point to explain Germany’s defeat is the loss of resources
throughout the war. Germany had problems on the war front and in its towns and
cities, they didn’t have enough supply of goods to keep society running
normally. Britain had the most advanced, large and powerful navy, the ‘Royal
Navy’. They used it to create a blockade and prevent the flow of assets into
the country. Food, medicine, fuel and other materials stopped from making their
way into the country. The people began to starve and there was a predicted
death toll of 750,000 from malnutrition and disease because of the blockade.
The people that didn’t die from starvation were killed by the ‘influenza’ also
known as the ‘Spanish Flu’ as medication couldn’t make its way into the
country. While the death toll for malnutrition and disease was of 750,000 many
people died in the front line because of it too. Raw materials couldn’t also
make their way into the country, bullets, weapons, mortar shells, vehicles and
uniforms. While this proved to be detrimental for Germany, Britain saw this as
one of the most important wins of the war.
However, Britain was not unchallenged by Germany. The ‘boches’ used
arguably their most powerful weapon to try and stop the blockade, the U-boat.
The Germans were experts when it came to using submarines, they had the most
advanced weaponry under the sea and no one came close to them underwater. The
British developed defensive convoys to try and stop the effectiveness of these
vessels, it proved to have worked as the blockade stood throughout the war.
Away from the sea Germany couldn’t make enough weaponry to support the army
which called for desperate measures. The Germans began to strip down their own
country to try and gather enough steel for bullets and weapons. Notably, they
began to melt the bells that had rung months before announcing their victory,
quite ironic. This had a huge effect on the morale, people had their entire
lives decided by those bells. From their parents marrying to the sound of those
bells to their own marriage or to mourn over the death of loved one’s. People
felt betrayed by their country and revolutions began to arise further affecting
the spirit of the people. Another area in which Germany was greatly affected
was transportation, no fuel and no resources to make automobiles meant the army
had to travel by horse. These means were ineffective on a large scale as they
couldn’t transport large numbers of people or large amounts of goods. On top of
being slower than cars, this meant that it was hard to get resources into the
country by land too. The lack of food also forced soldiers to eat their own
horses. Eating horse meat is not a satisfactory source of food since horses are
known for having high amounts of muscle but low amounts of fat which is where
energy is gotten from in meat. This shows how desperate the Germans to not only
stay in the war but also survive while doing so. This exhaustion of resources
was a defining factor in Germany’s embarrassment and inevitable loss of the
war.
In conclusion as Germany came closer to the end of the war they had their
chances of victory decreased. Manpower was at its best during the beginning and
the availability of resources reached a peak there too. Leadership was always
at a loss since a Kaiser had never been replaced and war generals were not
dispatched easily. The allies played their disadvantages masterfully and forced
Germany into a defeat that not only hurt the country but also created
ideologies within the country that defined the history of the 20th Century.
