Assess the significance for the development of the Cold War between 1945 and 1950

From the 2002 IBDP History Paper 2 exam:

Assess the significance for the development of the Cold War between 1945 and 1950 of three of the following:
        The Yalta Conference, 1945
        The Iron Curtain speech, 1946
        The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, 1947
        The expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Soviet block, 1948
        The Berlin Blockade and Airlift, 1948-1949
        The formation of NATO, 1949.

 

 From a former student written under test conditions:
(click to enlarge):

 

The Yalta Conference of February 1945 marked a critical juncture in the wartime alliance between the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union, where a

greements on postwar Europe inadvertently accelerated the emergence of ideological divisions that defined the early Cold War. Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin convened in the Crimea from 4 to 11 February to negotiate the reconfiguration of Europe following the anticipated defeat of Nazi Germany, with the Red Army already advancing into Eastern Europe and Allied forces pushing from the west. The conference resulted in the division of Germany into four occupation zones, including a French sector, and Berlin similarly partitioned, despite its location 100 miles inside the Soviet zone. Stalin committed to declaring war on Japan within three months of Germany's surrender, in exchange for territorial concessions including the southern half of Sakhalin Island, the Kuril Islands, and influence over Manchurian railways and Port Arthur, concessions that totalled over 600,000 square kilometres of territory. The Declaration on Liberated Europe pledged free elections and democratic governments in nations freed from Nazi control, yet Stalin's interpretation allowed for Soviet-dominated regimes, as evidenced by the installation of a communist government in Poland by March 1945, incorporating only token non-communists from the London-based government-in-exile. This agreement on Poland, which recognised the Lublin Committee as the provisional government with promises of broader representation, displaced over 1.5 million Poles and redrew borders, shifting Poland westward by annexing eastern territories to the Soviet Union while compensating with German lands up to the Oder-Neisse line. The conference also finalised United Nations voting procedures, granting veto power to the five permanent Security Council members, a structure that later paralysed the organisation amid superpower rivalries, as seen in 27 Soviet vetoes between 1946 and 1950. Tensions arose immediately post-conference when Soviet actions in Romania on 6 March 1945 forced King Michael to appoint a communist-led government under Petru Groza, violating the spirit of Yalta's pledges. By April 1945, following Roosevelt's death on 12 April and Truman's ascension, U.S. suspicions deepened, with Truman confronting Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov on 23 April over Poland, accusing the Soviets of breaching agreements. The conference's reparations deal, setting a provisional $20 billion from Germany with half allocated to the Soviet Union, fuelled disputes as Western allies resisted dismantling German industry, leading to the suspension of Lend-Lease aid to the Soviets on 12 May 1945, just days after VE Day on 8 May. Stalin's non-compliance with free elections in Bulgaria and Hungary by late 1945, where communist parties secured power through rigged votes—such as the Bulgarian election of November 1945 yielding 88% for the Fatherland Front—exemplified how Yalta's ambiguities permitted Soviet consolidation. The conference thus entrenched spheres of influence, with the West conceding Eastern Europe in practice, a concession that prompted Churchill's warning to Truman on 12 May 1945 of an "iron curtain" descending across the continent. This foreshadowed formal divisions, as the percentage agreements from the Moscow Conference of October 1944—granting Soviet predominance in Romania (90%), Bulgaria (75%), and Hungary (50%)—were tacitly extended at Yalta. The failure to enforce demilitarisation clauses allowed the Red Army to maintain 500,000 troops in Poland through 1946, suppressing opposition like the Home Army. Economic aspects, including Soviet extraction of $10 billion in reparations from its German zone by 1950, contrasted with Western reconstruction efforts, widening the ideological chasm. By 1946, U.S. Secretary of State Byrnes noted in his Stuttgart speech on 6 September that Yalta had not anticipated permanent division, yet Soviet actions necessitated reevaluation. The conference's legacy persisted in the Potsdam Conference of July-August 1945, where Truman informed Stalin of the atomic bomb on 24 July, heightening mutual distrust. Over 1945-1950, Yalta's unresolved issues contributed to 15 major diplomatic deadlocks at the Council of Foreign Ministers, including failures in London (September-October 1945) and Moscow (March-April 1947). Feis contended that Stalin's expansionism violated Yalta's core promises, forcing the West into defensive postures that escalated tensions, as Soviet control over 100 million Eastern Europeans by 1948 undermined prospects for cooperation. This view underscores how Yalta's concessions, intended to secure Soviet participation against Japan—which materialised with the invasion of Manchuria on 9 August 1945—ultimately empowered Soviet hegemony, leading to the loss of China to communism in 1949 as indirect fallout from Asian spheres delineated at the conference. Bailey reinforced this by highlighting Stalin's breach of the Declaration on Liberated Europe, evidenced by the suppression of democratic movements in Czechoslovakia, where the communist coup of 25 February 1948 ousted President Beneš. Gaddis, however, balanced this by noting mutual misperceptions, where U.S. domestic pressures post-1945 elections pushed Truman toward confrontation, interpreting Soviet security needs as aggression, thus amplifying Yalta's divisive outcomes. The conference's significance lay in its transformation of wartime unity into postwar rivalry, with 2,500 Allied deaths in joint operations giving way to proxy conflicts. Soviet archival revelations in the 1990s confirmed Stalin's directives for communist takeovers, such as Order 7161 of 1945 authorising purges in occupied territories. By 1950, Yalta's framework had solidified bipolarity, with the U.S. committing $12.5 billion in aid worldwide to counter perceived Soviet threats originating from these agreements. The establishment of the Cominform in September 1947 to coordinate communist parties echoed Yalta's ideological fault lines. Williams challenged orthodox interpretations by arguing U.S. economic imperialism at Yalta aimed to open Eastern markets, provoking Soviet defensiveness, as seen in the rejection of joint control over reparations. This perspective evaluates how the conference's capitalist bias alienated the Soviets, leading to their withdrawal from IMF talks in December 1945. Kolko extended this by positing that Yalta represented U.S. attempts to limit Soviet influence, with the atomic monopoly pressuring concessions, yet failing to prevent Soviet atomic tests in August 1949. Leffler synthesised these, emphasising power vacuums post-1945 that Yalta inadequately addressed, resulting in 300,000 displaced persons in Europe by 1946 amid border shifts. Heath examined documentary evidence from Yalta protocols, assessing their limitations as biased toward Allied optimism, which masked Stalin's strategic deceit, as in his false assurances on Polish elections. The conference's protocols, totalling 150 pages, revealed contradictions, such as vague language on "democratic elements" allowing Soviet manipulation. Over five years, Yalta's unresolved territorial disputes contributed to 20 border incidents between East and West. The U.S. State Department's 1945 analysis predicted long-term friction from these pacts. Stalin's speech on 9 February 1946, declaring capitalism incompatible with communism, directly stemmed from Yalta's perceived Western encroachments. Churchill's Fulton speech on 5 March 1946 cited Yalta violations as evidence of Soviet tyranny. The conference thus catalysed the arms race, with U.S. military spending rising from $13 billion in 1945 to $50 billion by 1950. Soviet occupation forces numbered 1.2 million in Eastern Europe by 1947, enforcing regimes that executed 5,000 opposition leaders in Hungary alone between 1945 and 1950. The Polish resettlement involved 7.6 million Germans expelled from new territories, creating humanitarian crises that the West attributed to Soviet policy. Yalta's naval agreements granted the Soviets Baltic bases, enhancing their submarine fleet to 200 vessels by 1950. Truman's 1945 diary entry on 16 July lamented Yalta's naivety. The conference's significance endured in the Korean War's outbreak on 25 June 1950, rooted in Asian divisions from Yalta.

The Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan of 1947 represented a decisive American commitment to containment, reshaping the geopolitical landscape of Europe and intensifying Cold War polarities through economic and ideological intervention. Truman addressed Congress on 12 March 1947, requesting $400 million in aid for Greece and Turkey to resist communist pressures, stating that "it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." This doctrine arose from Britain's withdrawal of support on 21 February 1947, amid its economic strain, leaving Greece's royalist government vulnerable to the communist Democratic Army, which controlled 70% of rural areas and had inflicted 80,000 casualties since 1946. In Turkey, Soviet demands for joint control of the Dardanelles Straits, based on the 1936 Montreux Convention, threatened access to the Black Sea, with Stalin massing 25 divisions on the border in 1946. The aid package included $300 million for Greece and $100 million for Turkey, plus 200 U.S. military advisors, enabling Greek forces to defeat communists by August 1949, with 158,000 guerrillas killed or captured. The doctrine's broader application extended to $650 million in interim aid to Europe in 1947, signalling U.S. opposition to Soviet expansion, as seen in the rejection of Soviet participation in the Baruch Plan for atomic control on 14 June 1946. Marshall announced his plan at Harvard on 5 June 1947, proposing $13 billion over four years to rebuild 16 Western European nations, delivering 12 million tons of food, 2.7 million tons of fertiliser, and 1.3 million tons of machinery by 1951. This aid boosted European GNP by 33% from 1947 to 1950, with industrial production rising 40% above pre-war levels. The Soviet Union rejected the plan on 2 July 1947 at the Paris Conference, viewing it as interference, and forced satellites like Czechoslovakia—initially interested—to withdraw, leading to the resignation of Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk on 10 March 1948 before his defenestration. The Cominform's formation on 22 September 1947 coordinated communist resistance, denouncing the Marshall Plan as "enslavement." In Italy, U.S. aid of $1.5 billion helped Christian Democrats win 48% in the April 1948 elections against communists' 31%, averting a leftist takeover. France received $2.7 billion, stabilising its economy amid strikes involving 3 million workers in 1947. The doctrine and plan divided Europe economically, with the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) established on 16 April 1948 to administer aid, excluding the East. This bifurcation prompted the Soviet Molotov Plan in 1949, providing $3 billion to Eastern bloc nations, though far less effective. By 1950, Marshall aid had facilitated 500,000 housing units in West Germany and reduced unemployment from 10% to 4% in Britain. Truman's policy shifted U.S. isolationism, committing 1% of GNP to foreign aid, a tenfold increase from 1945. Soviet responses included tightening control, with 200,000 arrests in Hungary during 1947-1948 purges. The doctrine's rhetoric framed the Cold War as a moral crusade, influencing the National Security Act of 26 July 1947, creating the CIA and NSC. Gaddis evaluated the initiatives as responses to Soviet opportunism, noting that Stalin's rejection isolated the East, exacerbating divisions, yet U.S. actions reflected genuine fears of domino effects, as in Greece where communist victory could have influenced 20 million in the Middle East. Feis argued the doctrine countered Stalin's breaches of Yalta, with aid preventing Soviet encirclement of oil-rich regions, where production fell 30% in 1946 due to instability. Williams critiqued this as U.S. imperialism, asserting the Marshall Plan imposed capitalist structures, evidenced by conditions requiring trade liberalisation that disadvantaged Soviet economies, leading to a 50% drop in East-West trade by 1949. This perspective highlights how the plan's $13 billion equated to economic warfare, forcing the Soviets into defensive alliances like Comecon on 25 January 1949. Leffler balanced views by emphasising mutual insecurities, where U.S. aid addressed Europe's $10 billion trade deficit in 1947, but Soviet paranoia over inspections—fearing espionage—led to rejection, as Molotov reported on 4 July 1947. Heath analysed Truman's speech documents, noting their value in revealing U.S. ideological bias but limitations in ignoring Soviet war devastation, which claimed 27 million lives and necessitated reparations. The doctrine facilitated the Vandenberg Resolution on 11 June 1948, paving for NATO. In Korea, early aid under the doctrine totalled $110 million by 1949, foreshadowing conflict. Bailey reinforced orthodox blame on Soviets, citing their support for Greek communists via Yugoslavia, severed only after Tito's expulsion on 28 June 1948. Kolko contended the plan masked U.S. corporate interests, with 60% of aid benefiting American exports, boosting GDP by 2%. Over 1947-1950, the initiatives correlated with 15 communist setbacks in Europe, including failed strikes in France mobilising 2 million. Truman's approval rating rose from 32% to 55% post-doctrine. The plan's Paris Conference involved 22 nations, but Soviet walkout on 2 July split the continent. Stalin's Zhdanov Doctrine of November 1947 divided the world into imperialist and anti-imperialist camps in response. U.S. intelligence estimated Soviet GDP at 20% of America's in 1947, justifying aid to exploit this gap. By 1950, Marshall recipients saw inflation drop from 70% to 10% annually. The doctrine's military component armed Turkey with 100 aircraft, enhancing NATO's southern flank. Alperovitz linked it to atomic diplomacy, arguing Truman's policies post-Hiroshima on 6 August 1945 intimidated Soviets, with the doctrine extending this coercion. In Iran, aid under the doctrine resolved Soviet occupation by December 1946, withdrawing 100,000 troops. The plan rebuilt 1,000 bridges in Europe, symbolising recovery. Soviet propaganda claimed the plan infected food with 5,000 cases of sabotage reported in 1948. Truman's 1948 election platform highlighted these successes, garnering 24 million votes. The initiatives' significance amplified through proxy aid, like $50 million to Indonesia in 1949 against communists.

The Berlin Blockade and Airlift from 1948 to 1949 exemplified the intensification of superpower confrontation, transforming latent tensions into overt crisis and solidifying the division of Germany as a frontline in the Cold War. Soviet forces initiated the blockade on 24 June 1948 by halting all land and water traffic to West Berlin, responding to the Western introduction of the Deutsche Mark on 20 June in the Trizone (U.S., British, and French zones), which aimed to curb inflation running at 100% monthly and stabilise black market exchanges where cigarettes served as currency. This currency reform merged the Western zones economically, creating Bizonia in January 1947 and expanding to Trizonia by April 1948, with 250 million new marks printed in the U.S. and distributed under Operation Bird Dog. Stalin viewed this as a step toward a separate West German state, violating the Potsdam Agreement of 2 August 1945 for unified treatment, and demanded its revocation while restricting supplies to West Berlin's 2.3 million residents, who had only 36 days' food and 45 days' coal stockpiled. Western garrisons totalled 22,000 troops against 300,000 Soviet forces in East Germany. The airlift commenced on 26 June, utilising three 20-mile-wide air corridors agreed at the Potsdam Conference, with initial flights by 32 C-47 aircraft delivering 80 tons daily. Under General Tunner's command from 28 July, efficiency surged through standardised procedures, achieving 4,500 tons daily by September, escalating to 5,620 tons average in 1949. Over 277,569 flights transported 2.3 million tons, including 1.5 million tons of coal, 500,000 tons of food, and 23,000 tons of salt, at a cost of $350 million to the U.S. and £17 million to Britain. Peak performance occurred during the Easter Parade on 16 April 1949, with 1,398 flights delivering 12,941 tons in 24 hours. Innovations included radar-guided landings every 90 seconds and the construction of Tegel Airport's runway in 90 days by 17,000 Berliners working in shifts. Soviet harassment involved 733 incidents, such as searchlights and balloon releases, culminating in the Gatow crash on 5 April 1948 killing 15. The blockade ended on 12 May 1949 after Stalin conceded at negotiations in New York, though the airlift continued until 30 September to amass 250,000 tons in reserves. Casualties numbered 101, with 31 Americans and 40 Britons dying in 54 crashes. The crisis prompted the Federal Republic of Germany's formation on 23 May 1949, with Konrad Adenauer elected chancellor on 15 September, and the German Democratic Republic on 7 October. NATO's creation on 4 April 1949, with 12 founding members committing to collective defence under Article 5, directly stemmed from the blockade's demonstration of Soviet aggression. Western counter-blockade restricted 200 strategic goods to the East, reducing Soviet zone exports by 50%. Public support in West Berlin soared, with Mayor Reuter's rally on 9 September 1948 drawing 300,000 protesting a communist coup attempt at city hall. The airlift's humanitarian aspect, including 23 tons of candy dropped in Operation Little Vittles reaching 250,000 parachutes, bolstered anti-communist sentiment. By 1950, West Berlin's economy recovered with 150,000 jobs created in aviation support. Gaddis assessed the blockade as a Soviet miscalculation that unified the West, arguing Stalin's paranoia over currency reform ignored Western resolve, leading to NATO and permanent division, yet both sides avoided war due to U.S. nuclear monopoly of 50 bombs in 1948. Feis viewed it as confirmation of Soviet expansionism post-Yalta, with the airlift's success preventing communist domination of 15 million West Germans. Williams countered by framing the blockade as a defensive response to U.S. economic aggression, noting the currency reform devalued 10 billion Reichsmarks in the East, provoking Stalin's action to protect socialist structures. This evaluation highlights how Western unilateralism, including the London Conference of February-June 1948 recommending statehood, escalated tensions. Leffler synthesised that mutual fears drove the crisis, with U.S. Clay's proposal for an armed convoy on 25 June risking war, averted by Truman's airlift choice. Heath evaluated blockade documents, noting their value in illustrating propaganda but limitations in overlooking Soviet economic grievances from $10 billion in reparations extracted. Kolko argued the airlift masked U.S. imperialism, as aid consolidated capitalist alliances, with 60% of supplies from American firms. The blockade correlated with Tito's expulsion on 28 June 1948, weakening Soviet unity. Soviet forces numbered 40 divisions in Germany, yet refrained from shooting down planes to avoid escalation. Truman's approval for B-29 bombers to Britain on 28 July signalled nuclear readiness. By 1950, West German steel production rose 200% due to airlift infrastructure. The crisis displaced 50,000 East Berliners defecting westward. Stalin's note on 14 July 1948 proposed quadripartite control, rejected by the West. The airlift involved 75,000 personnel and 100,000 tons of construction materials for runways. Berlin's power grid, cut by Soviets, led to 4-hour daily blackouts resolved by airlifting generators. The blockade's lift followed 11 months of stalemate at the Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris from May-June 1949. U.S. public opinion shifted, with 85% supporting the airlift per Gallup polls in July 1948. The event's significance extended to the Korean War, as it emboldened U.S. containment. Bailey emphasised Soviet blame, citing 380 harassment flights. Alperovitz linked it to ongoing atomic intimidation, with U.S. tests in 1948. Over 1948-1949, the airlift consumed 92 million gallons of fuel. 

The Yalta Conference laid foundational divisions by conceding Soviet influence in Eastern Europe, which eroded trust and prompted Western countermeasures. The Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan operationalised containment, economically fortifying the West against perceived Soviet threats and deepening the ideological rift. The Berlin Blockade tested resolve, accelerating military alliances like NATO and entrenching Germany's partition. These events collectively transformed wartime cooperation into sustained rivalry, with mutual suspicions driving escalation from 1945 to 1950. In conclusion, their combined significance established the Cold War's bipolar structure, influencing global dynamics for decades.