Summary of Evidence
Evaluation of Sources:
Sankichi Yasui, Marco Polo Bridge Incident (Hong Kong, Kehua Publisher, 1999)
Analysis:
Conclusion
List of Sources
Dong, Linyi, “Why is it that the LuGou Bridge Incident became the beginning of the wars all over the country? Shandong Normal University Newspaper, 4th Edition, 1987. “From Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor, Who was responsible?” ASIAN PERSPECTIVE, Vol. 31, No. 1, 2007. Books Akira, Nakamura. The road to the Greater East Asian War. Tokyo: Tendensha, 1990. Benson, John, and Takao Matsumura. Japan 1865-1945: From isolation to occupation. Essex: Pearson Education Limited, 2001. Brower, Daniel R. The World in the 20th Century-The Age of Global War and Revolution. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1992. Chang, Iris. The Rape of Nanking. New York: Penguin Books, 1997. CPC Central Committee Party School Communist Party Historical Archives Center, The LuGou Bridge Incident and Beijing and Tianjing Anti-Japanese War. Beijing: CPC Central Committee Party School Research, Office 1986. Ferguson, Niall. The War of the Worlds. London: Penguin Books, 2007. Harries, Meirion, and Susan Harries. Soldiers of the Sun: the Rise and Fall of the Imperial Japanese Army. New York: Random House, 1991. Hattori, Takushiro. The Complete History of the Greater East Asia War (1). Yuxiang Zhang, Trans, Hong Kong: The Commercial Press, 1984. Hunter, Alan. Peace Studies in the Chinese Century. Hampshire, England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006. Li, Yunhan. Marco Polo Bridge Incident. Taiwan Dongdatushu Company, 1987. Liu, Dejun. Research works about Anti-Japanese war, Jinan: Jilu Book Publisher. 2005. Liu, Yifei. The records of Incident of LuGou Bridge blooded War ---7.7 Incident. Beijing: Tuan Jie Publishers, 1994 McClain, James L. A Modern History, Japan. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2002. New History Textbook 2005 version. Fushosha, 49 Qu, Jiayuan, and Zhaoqin Bai, History about LuGou Bridge Incident, Beijing: Beijing Publishers, 1997. Rhoads, Murphey, A History of Asia. Lin Huang, trans, Beijing, Hainian Publisher, 2005. Roberts, J. M. The Penguin History of the Twentieth Century, London: Penguin Group, 1999. Sankichi, Yasui. Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Guifang Shi and Xutian Wang, trans. Hong Kong: Kehua Chuban Corporation, 1999. Shudo, Higashinakano. The Nanking Massacre: Fact versus Fiction: A Historian's Quest for the Truth, Sekai Shuppan, Inc, 2005. Takushiro, Hattori. Great East Asia War History (1). Shangwu Yinshua Guan. Wu, Yuexing, Zhibo Lin, Hua Lin, and Youyu Liu. Stories of LuGou Bridge Incident. Beijing: Beijing People’s University Publisher, 1987. Yang, Qing, and Yang Wang. Articles about the Anti-Japanese War during recent 10 years. Beijing: Zhong Gong Dang Shi Chu, 2005. Zhang, Chunxiang. The Incident of LuGou Bridge and eight-year Anti-Japanese War, Beijing: Beijing Chu Ban She, 1990. CD-Rom Encarta 2005 Reference Library. CD-ROM. Microsoft, 2004 Interview Luo, Cunkang, personal interview, December 25th, 2007. Magazine Tucker-Jones, Anthony. “Clash of the Titans.” Military Illustrated Feb 2008: 9.
1. "The Marco Polo Bridge Incident." History - China Culture. Cultural China. Web. 14 Nov. 2011. . 2. "Marco Polo Bridge Incident (Asian History) -- Britannica Online Encyclopedia."Encyclopedia - Britannica Online Encyclopedia. Encyclopedia Britannica Inc. Web. 13 Nov. 2011. . 3. Epstein, Israel. History Should Not Be Forgotten. Beijing: China Intercontinental, 2005. Print. 4. Ferguson, Niall. "China's War." The War of the World. Penguin. Print. 5. Harper, Damian. China. Footscray, Vic., Australia: Lonely Planet Publications, 2007. Print. 6. Peng, Xunhou. China in the World Anti-fascist War. [Beijing]: China Intercontinental, 2005. Print. 7. Simkin, John. "Mao Zedong." Spartacus Educational. Web. 13 Nov. 2011. . 8. Toland, John. The Rising Sun. The Decline and fall of the Japanese Empire. Random House, 1982. Print. 9. Xiang, Ah. "Marco Polo Bridge Incident." Resistance Wars. Web. 10 Nov. 2011. . 10. Xu, Haiyan. Historical View of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident: a Comparison of the Chinese and Japanese Accounts. Indiana University, 1990. Print.
How Many were Slaughtered at Nanking?
A.
B.
C.
D.
Drawing to a conclusion from the analysis carried out, there is a higher possibility the 300,000 death toll is comparatively justified than the other assumptions. As have been briefly mentioned above, relatively low figures are often based on imaginative factors and theories such as double counting, miscounting, and so on, whereas the 300,000 death toll is closely associated with researches and investigations that were carried out practically namely interviews, and most importantly the recognition of certain Japanese officials.
Ara,Kenichi (2002) Nankin Jiken no Syougen(The witnesses of the Nanking Incident):Nihonjin 48nin no syougen(witnesses of 48 Japanese). Tokyo. Syougakkan 2005 Barrres, Charles (1998) Amerika wo yurugasu “Za reipu obu nankin” Tyuoukouron 1998, August, www.history.gr.jp/~nanking/books_chuokouron9808.html viewed on 01.11.2011 Chang, Iris.(1997) The Rape of Nanking: the Forgotten Holocaust of World War II. London, Penguin Books, 1998 The Diet Members Group for Japan’s Future and History Education (2008). The Truth of Nanjing:The League of nations Failed to even recognise the “Massacre of 20,000 Persons at Nanjing Tokyo,Nitisinhoudou. 2010 Fogel, Joshua. A. (2000) The Nanjing Massacre: in history and historiography, Berkeley, Los Angelos, London, University of California Press, 2000 Fujioka, Nobukastu. Syudou Higasinakano (1999). Za Reipu obu Nankin no kenkyuu( The study on the Rape of Nanking), Tokyo, Syoudensya, 2007 Hata, Ikuhiko(1986) .Nankin Jiken: Gyakusatu no koudou(The Nanking Incident: the mechanism of the massacre), Tokyo,Tyuoukouronsya, 2007 Kasahara, Tokushi.(1997) Nankin Jiken(The Nanking Incident), Tokyo, Iwanamisinyo, 2009 : so no jituzou wo motomete(The research of the Nanking Incident: to find the real image), Tokyo,Bungeisyusyun. 2007 Li, Fei Fei;Sabella, Robert; Liu, David (2002). Nanking 1937: Memory and healing, Armonk, New York, M.E. Sharpe,Inc. 2002 Takemoto, Tadao;Ohara, Yasuo (2000). The Alleged Nanking Massacre: Japan’s rebuttal to China’s forged claims, Tokyo, Meiseisya 2010 Wakabayashi, Bob.T (2001). The Nanking Massacre, now you see it..., Monumenta Nipponica, Vol. 56. No 4 Tokyo, Sophia University Press,2001
Why Did Macarthur Ignore the Postdam Declaration's Demand for the Removal of the Japanese Emperor?
IBDP Extended Essay in History
Abstract
This essay analyzes the reason for the decision to exonerate the Emperor of Japan from WWII war crimes contrary to the terms first presented in the Potsdam Declaration of July 1945.
On July 17, 1945, President Harry S Truman, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Party General Secretary to the Soviet Union, Joseph Stalin met in Potsdam to discuss the terms of surrender for Germany. Also, during the conference, Churchill, Truman and Chaing Kai Chek, Chairman of Nationalist China, outlined the terms of surrender for Japan. On July 26, the Potsdam Declaration was issued to Japan calling for their unconditional surrender at the risk of total annihilation. While the declaration did not specifically address the Emperor or the Emperor system, it did state; “stern justice will be meted to all war criminals”. This language suggested that the Emperor might be vulnerable and in contrast to the Atlantic Charter that the Japanese had been negotiating for, be tried and hung as a war criminal.
On August 6th & 9th, 1945, two atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Japan surrendered. By August 30th, the US occupied Japan with General MacArthur appointed Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers. He was given absolute authority to implement the terms of the Potsdam Declaration with the eventual goal to democratize Japan.
But Macarthur also had to deal with the Emperor. While the other allied powers wanted the Emperor to be tried and hung as a war criminal, MacArthur learned that such an act would be the equivalent to crucifying Christ to the Japanese people who viewed the Emperor as a God and would rather die than see him deposed and humiliated. As a consequence, MacArthur reasoned that he could use the Emperor as effective tool to further his larger goal to democratize and restore Japan as an ally in the Pacific.
This essay concludes that MacArthur needed the Emperor in order to fulfill the goals of the Potsdam Declaration.
Introduction/Background
On the 17th of July 1945, U.S. President Harry S. Truman, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Communist Party General Secretary Joseph Stalin of the Soviet Union convened in Potsdam, Germany for a conference to discuss reparations for a defeated Nazi Germany. Nine days later at the same conference, Churchill and Truman sat down with Chairman Chaing Kai-shek, leader of the nationalist government of China to discuss the surrender terms for Japan. Known as the Potsdam Declaration, Japan was issued an ultimatum for unconditional surrender with the threat of total annihilation should they refuse. The Allies stayed true to their promise dropping atomic bombs both on Hiroshima on August 6th and Nagasaki 3, days later. The bombings were followed up by the surrender of Japan and the occupation of Japanese soil by American forces on August 30th, 1945. The occupation would last until 1952.
Documents from the MacArthur Memorial show that the Truman administration had a general consensus that “fundamental changes” should be imposed in the political, industrial, and general economic conditions of German, Italy, and Japan. (The MacArthur Memorial) However, Japan was seen as a special case and was given special consideration. The administration believed that:
In a few words, the basic point that was being made was that a viable Japanese economy is to be considered a first prerequisite of lasting peace in the Pacific. (The MacArthur Memorial)
The process of democratization and the roles played by General MacArthur and the Emperor is the scope of this essay.
Content
Prior to the end of the Second World War, Japan had little in the way of democracy. It possessed no political parties and hosted no free elections, and women were denied what even those living in 40s considered “equal rights”. (Constitutional Rights Foundation) Despite the Meji Constitution outlining a few individual liberties, from an American standpoint there were few. For instance, although free speech was protected under the constitution, the government prohibited what it considered to be “dangerous thoughts.” (Constitutional Rights Foundation) This was intentional. The Meji Constitution (1889) was designed to concentrate actual political power into the hands of a small group of influential political leaders whose sole loyalty and responsibility was to the Emperor, not the people. From 1930 to the end of the Second World War only military officials dominated this governing group. (Constitutional Rights Foundation)
In the aftermath of the two atomic bombings and the surrender of Japan to the Allies, the Japanese government indicated it would accept the conditions of the Potsdam Declaration on the understanding that it would not include any demands that would compromise the authority of the Emperor as the sovereign ruler of the country, thereby preserving the “kokutai”. The kokutai represents “a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal.” (National Diet Library)
However, the Allies were adamant that under the occupation the most powerful leader would be the military governor and stated, “the authority of the Emperor… to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers.” (National Diet Library) Additionally, the Allies aimed to ultimately create a system where democratically elected leaders would hold the highest authority in Japan, stating that, “the ultimate form of Government of Japan shall…be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people.” (Constitutional Rights Foundation)
On September 6, 1945, General MacArthur was installed as the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) over the occupation forces in Japan. While control of Japan would be through the Japanese government, MacArthur could employ such measures as necessary, including the “use of force”. (National Diet Library) It was also stated that the Potsdam Declaration did not override Japan’s “unconditional surrender” and that the government of the UK, Soviet Union, or China was under the authority of MacArthur.
However, while MacArthur held power over the government, the Emperor was still a powerful symbol to the people and held a considerable influence over their hearts and minds despite being stripped of all formal authority. General MacArthur was told by his advisors that executing the Emperor would be the same as “crucifying Jesus Christ” to the people who saw him as a God and would lead to widespread unrest insurrections. (Harvey) MacArthur reflects on this in his autobiography: “... I would need at least one million reinforcements should such an action be taken … Military government would have to be instituted throughout all Japan, and guerrilla warfare would probably break out.” (Harvey) Having chosen to keep the Japanese Parliament (the Diet), as well the original cabinet in place, MacArthur next faced the question of what to do with Hirohito. In his memoirs, MacArthur wrote of his first meeting with the Emperor.
Shortly after my arrival in Tokyo, I was urged by members of my staff to summon the Emperor to my headquarters as a show of power. I brushed the suggestions aside. "To do so," I explained, "would be to outrage the feelings of the Japanese people and make a martyr of the Emperor in their eyes.
No, I shall wait and in time the Emperor will voluntarily come to see me. In this case, the patience of the East rather than the haste of the West will best serve our purpose."
The Emperor did indeed shortly request an interview. (On 27 September 1945) In cutaway, striped trousers, and top hat, riding in his Daimler with the imperial grand chamberlain facing him on the jump seat, Hirohito arrived at the embassy. I had, from the start of the occupation, directed that there should be no derogation in his treatment. Every honor due a sovereign was to be his. I met him cordially, and recalled that I had at one time been received by his father at the close of the Russo-Japanese War. He was nervous and the stress of the past months showed plainly. I dismissed everyone but his own interpreter, and we sat down before an open fire at one end of the long reception hall.
I offered him an American cigarette, which he took with thanks. I noticed how his hands shook as I lighted it for him. I tried to make it as easy for him as I could, but I knew how deep and dreadful must be his agony of humiliation. I had an uneasy feeling he might plead his own cause against indictment as a war criminal. There had been considerable outcry from some of the Allies, notably the Russians and the British, to include him in this category. Indeed, the initial list of those proposed by them was headed by the Emperor's name. Realizing the tragic consequences that would follow such an unjust action, I had stoutly resisted such efforts. When Washington seemed to be veering toward the British point of view, I had advised that I would need at least one million reinforcements should such action be taken. I believed that if the Emperor were indicted, and perhaps hanged, as a war criminal, military government would have to be instituted throughout all Japan, and guerrilla warfare would probably break out. The Emperor's name had then been stricken from the list. But of all this he knew nothing. But my fears were groundless. What he said was this: "I come to you, General MacArthur, to offer myself to the judgment of the powers you represent as the one to bear sole responsibility for every political and military decision made and action taken by my people in the conduct of war." A tremendous impression swept me. This courageous assumption of a responsibility implicit with death, a responsibility clearly belied by facts of which I was fully aware, moved me to the very marrow of my bones. He was an - Emperor by inherent birth, but in that instant I knew I faced the First Gentleman of Japan in his own right. (MacArthur 287)
Nevertheless, both the Russians and the British wanted Hirohito to be tried and hanged as a war criminal and by November, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered MacArthur to gather information regarding whether the Emperor been responsible for any war crimes and called for either the complete abolishment of the Emperor System or steps initiating its reform along democratic lines. (National Diet Library) In response, MacArthur sent a telegram dated January 25, 1946 reporting that he could find no evidence of the Emperor’s involvement with war crimes and that to try the Emperor would generate confusion and unrest in Japan. In his classified telegram to the War Department he wrote:
No specific and tangible evidence has been uncovered with regard to his exact activities, which might connect him in varying degree with the political decisions of the Japanese Emperor during the last decade. I have gained the definite impression from as complete a research as was possible to me that his connection with affairs of state up to the time of the end of the war was largely ministerial and automatically responsive to the advice of his counselors. There are those who believe that even had he positive ideas it would have been quite possible that any effort on his part to thwart the current of public opinion controlled and represented by the dominant military clique would have placed him in actual jeopardy. If he is to be tried great changes must be made in the occupational plans and due preparation therefore should be accomplished in preparedness before actual action is initiated. His indictment will unquestionably cause a tremendous convulsion among the Japanese people. He is a symbol which (sic) unites all Japanese. Destroy him and the nation will disintegrate. (National Diet Library)
On August 14th, 1945, the Emperor submitted and publicly stated during the New Years Address the “Imperial Rescript for the Termination of the War” in which he stated, “The kokutai (“the line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal”) has been maintained.” During the address, the Emperor also renounced his claim to Godhood and stated that the concept of the Emperor’s divinity was not true. (National Diet Library) That same day, MacArthur commented on Hirohito’s Imperial Rescript, praising the Emperor for taking the first steps to democratizing Japan. He wrote in a press release;
The Emperor’s New Year’s statement pleases me very much. By it he undertakes a leading part in the democratization of his people. He squarely takes his stand for the future along liberal lines. His action reflects the irresistible influence of a sound idea. A sound idea cannot be stopped.” (National Diet Library)
Early into his position as military governor, MacArthur saw the need for a complete overhaul of the Meji Constitution. In his autobiography he said:
We could not simply encourage the growth of democracy. We had to make sure that it grew. Under the old constitution, government flowed downward from the emperor, who held the supreme authority, to those to whom he had delegated power. It was a dictatorship to begin with; a hereditary one, and the people existed to serve it. (Constitutional Rights Foundation)
To this end, MacArthur assembled a team to draft a new constitution for Japan composing of himself, Courtney Whitney, the Chief Government Section at GHQ, and the Steering Committee. The team worked on the language of the new constitution, paying special attention to the language of the document pertaining to the relationship between the people and the Emperor. For example, the team had originally drafted “The Emperor shall be the symbol of the state and of the Unity of the People,…” along with recognition and declaration regarding to, “the sovereignty of the people’s will.” (National Diet Library) In March, the phrase “the sovereignty of the people’s will” was replaced with “the supreme will of the people” which made the principles for sovereignty of the people ambiguous. (National Diet Library) Ultimately, the language was amended to include “proclaim that sovereign power resides with the people” and the passage relating to the Emperor to read, “deriving his position from the will of the people with who resides sovereign power.” (National Diet Library)
The Japanese parliament was stunned by the radical changes in the new “model constitution” finding it hard to grasp the concept of “rule by the people” which conflicted so much with the Japanese tradition of ultimate obedience to the Emperor. The average people of Japan were also confused and upset. MacArthur had chosen to keep Hirohito only as “the symbol of the State and of the unity of the people.” (Constitutional Rights Foundation) After debating among themselves and failing to come to a consensus, the Japanese cabinet went to the Emperor to ask if they should accept the model constitution. On February 22, Hirohito made his decision in favor of the “model” becoming the basis for which the new Japanese constitution was written. “Upon these principles,” Hirohito said, “will we truly rest the welfare of our people and the rebuilding of Japan.” (Constitutional Rights Foundation) However, even following the enactment of the constitution the problems in interpreting the “sovereignty of the people and the Emperor as a symbol” still proved to be a contentious issue. (National Diet Library)
Conclusion
The Constitutional Rights Foundation credits MacArthur with developing democracy in Japan by abolishing laws that suppressed political, civil, and religious liberties and by forcing the Diet to pass new laws for free, democratic elections.
His policies dismantled the Japanese military industrial complex and disbarred 200,000 wartime officials from ever holding office in the new Japan. He even eliminated government support from Shinto, the official state religion. (Constitutional Rights Foundation)
The Japanese eventually welcomed these changes. The Americans encouraged an atmosphere of free public debate and discussion on nearly every kind of issue, from politics to marriage to women’s rights. After years of wartime censorship and thought control, most Japanese appreciated their new freedom. (CountriesQuest.com)
However, this could not be accomplished without the cooperation of Hirohito. Without the humility and bravery Hirohito displayed in surrendering to the Allies, the lives of countless solders and civilians on both sides would have been lost in the subsequent invasion. (Sanello)
Bibliography
Constitutional Rights Foundation. Bringing Democracy to Japan. Los Angeles.
Harvey, Robert. "American Shogun: MacArthur, Hirohito and the American Duel with Japan." n.d.
MacArthur, General Douglas. Reminiscences. Naval Institute Press, 2001.
National Diet Library. "Emperor, Imperial Rescript Denying His Divinity (Professing His Humanity)." 2003-2004. Birth of the Constitution of Japan. April 2013 .
—. "Popular Sovereignty and the Emperor System." 2003-2004. Birth of the Japanese Constitution. April 2013 .
—. "Telegram, MacArthur to Eisenhower ... concerning exemption of the Emperor from War Criminals." 2003-2004. Documents with Commentaries. April 2013 .
Sanello, Frank. "Why Gen MacArthur Spared Emperor Hirohito
's Life but not Gen Tojo's." Red Room. June 2013 .
The MacArthur Memorial. "The Occupation of Japan Economic Policy and Reform." The Proceedings of a Symposium Sponsored by the MacArthur Memorial. Norfolk: The MacArthur Memorial, 1980.