Revision Notes and Sample Essays for Weimar Germany

Weimar Germany was the name given to the period of German history from 1919 until 1933. It got its name from the fact that the constitution for the post war republic was drawn up at the town of Weimar in South Eastern Germany. The town was chosen for the constituent assembly because it was peaceful compared to revolution torn Berlin and as a signal to the Allied peacemakers in Paris. The hope was that the Allies would treat more leniently a new peaceful German Republic rather than the militaristic empire that had led Germany into war. 

The History of the Republic can be divided into three main areas: 
1. The Years of Turmoil, 1919-1923 
2. The Stresemann Era, 1924-1929 
3. The Collapse of Weimar, 1930-1933 

1. The Years of Turmoil, 1919-1923 

The Republic 
As the First World War drew to a close, morale in the army and at home collapsed. A series of defeats led to strikes throughout Germany. The Sailors at the Kiel naval base mutinied rather than sail to for a final showdown with the British fleet. Soldiers, sailors and workers formed councils or soviets with echoes of events in Communist Russia. The Kaiser, William II abdicated and went into exile in Holland. A republic was proclaimed with the SPD leader Frederich Ebert as Chancellor (Prime Minster). The first act of the new government was to sign the armistice with the Allies. Many including Adolf Hitler saw this as an act of treason and the men who agreed to surrender became known as the “November Criminals.” 
The new republic faced a host of problems. These included: 
Over two and half million Germans had died in the war and four million were wounded. 
The army and many other Nationalist groups in German society were unhappy that the Kaiser had been forced to abdicate and were openly hostile to the government. 
Germany faced the prospect of a harsh treaty that was being negotiated in Paris. 

The Spartacus Revolt 
Even before the constitution had been drawn up the left wing Spartacus movement led by Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg began a revolt in Berlin in January 1919 seizing buildings throughout the city. The government fled the city. Many feared the “red plague” and the defence minister Gustav Noske used the army and the Freikorps to crush the revolt. The Freikorps was a volunteer militia made up of ex army men set up to defend the borders of Germany. It was strongly anti-communist and took brutal steps to restore order with summary executions becoming common-place. Liebknecht and Luxemburg were shot and the revolt was crushed. Here in Bavaria another Communist revolt was defeated with Freikorps help in May. Political violence had marred the foundation of the new state. 

The New Constitution 
Despite the Spartacus revolt, most Germans voted for parties in January 1919 that favoured the new democratic republic- the SPD, the liberal DDP and the Catholic Centre party. The constituent assembly met at Weimar in February 1919 and Ebert was chosen as president. The new constitution was very democratic. REMEMBER SHIRER’S QUOTE. Germany was to be a Federal state with the states or Lander retaining considerable control over their own affairs. The parliament (Reichstag) was to be elected every four years with a system of proportional representation that meant it was impossible for one party to get an overall majority. 
All people over the age of twenty could vote. The Reichstag dealt with issues such as tax, trade, defence and foreign affairs. As there were a large number of political parties, there were many coalition governments. During the fourteen years of the Weimar Republic, there were twenty separate coalitions. The longest government lasted two years. This political chaos caused many to lose faith in the new democratic system (Richard J Evans argues this). 
The head of state was the president who was elected every seven years. He was the commander of the armed forces and was designed to a largely figurehead position. He did have the power to dissolve the Reichstag and to nominate the Chancellor who was to enjoy the support of the Reichstag. Crucially under Article 48, the president could declare a state of emergency and rule by decree. He could also veto laws passed by the Reichstag that he did not like. 

 The Main Political Parties 

The parties of the Republic 
The SPD (Social Democrats) were a moderate socialist party and the largest of the parties committed to the Republic. It was strongly anti-communist. 
 The Centre Party (Zentrum) was set up to defend Catholic interests in 1870. It drew support from all classes. It was present in every Weimar coalition government until 1933. The BVP was its Bavarian ally. 
The DDP (German Democratic Party) was a middle class Liberal party. It lost support rapidly after 1920. In 1919 it received 19% of the vote. By 1932 this was down to 1%. 
The DVP (German People’s Party) didn't trust the new Republic and at heart they were Monarchists. They were supported by the middle-classes. The outstanding political figure of the Weimar Republic, Gustav Stresemann, was the leader of this party. Its highest point of support was in 1920 when it received 14% of the vote. By 1932 this was down to 2%. 

The opposition of the left 
The USPD (Independent Socialist Party) had broken from the SPD in 1917 because they did not support Germany’s continued participation in WWI. It declined rapidly after 1920 with the rise of the Communist party. 
The KPD (Communist Party) was formed from the Spartacus Union that had led a revolt against the Weimar government in January 1919. It was very closely allied to Moscow and it refused to co-operate, in any way, with the parties that supported Weimar. They were especially hostile to the SPD. This refusal to support Democratic parties went as far as allying with the Nazis (their sworn enemies) in Reichstag votes. This was in order to further destabilise the Republic 

The opposition of the right 
The DNVP (German National People’s Party) set up in 1918 and composed of supporters of the old Monarchy. Had strong rural support especially in Protestant areas. They were Hitler’s coalition partners when he came to power in 1933. 
The NSDAP (National Socialist German Worker’s Party) founded in Munich in 1919. At first favoured the violent overthrow of the Weimar Republic. But after the failed Putsch of 1923 it adopted a legal approach to achieving power. 

The Treaty of Versailles
 Came as a complete shock to the new government and to the German people. Virtually all sections of German opinion denounced the treaty. It was known as the Diktat as Germany had been forced to sign the treaty. On the day it was signed, Germany’s Protestant churches declared a day of national mourning. 

The Kapp Putsch 
Right wing dissatisfaction with the new government was worsened when the government moved to disband Freikorps units. A nationalist politician, Wolfgang Kapp led a revolt in Berlin backed by the Freikorps and the military commander of Berlin. The regular army refused to crush the revolt and the government fled to Stuttgart. Its call for a general strike was carried out by the trade unions in the city and the putsch collapsed. At the same time a communist revolt was crushed in the Ruhr, the industrial heartland of Germany, with over a thousand dead. Right wing assassinations were to plague the early years of the new republic with leading politicians such as Matthias Erzberger and Walther Rathenau assassinated. Many of the murderers were treated with great leniency by the courts but the murders did have the effect of strengthening support for the institutions of the republic. 

The French occupation of the Ruhr 
In 1921 the Allied Reparations Commission presented the government with a bill for reparations of £6.6 Billion. The Germans could not pay the amount owed and over the Christmas and New Year, 1922-3, they defaulted on their payments. Seventy thousand French and Belgian troops occupied the Ruhr intending to use the produce of Germany’s industrial heartland as payment in kind for reparations. The government began a policy of passive resistance and called a general strike. Some began a low level terrorist campaign. The French reacted brutally with aggressive house searches, hostage taking and shooting over a hundred Germans. 
The economic effects of the occupation were catastrophic. The loss of production in the Ruhr caused a fall in production elsewhere and unemployment rose from 2% to 23%. Prices rose out of control as tax revenues collapsed and the government financed its activities through the printing of money. By November prices were a billion times their pre-war levels. 
The hyper inflation of this period can be seen from the following table: 
The rise in prices hit the middle classes and those on fixed income very hard. Many who had saved money found that their savings were worthless. 

2. The Stresemann Era 
Click here for free essays relating specifically to Stresemann

During the dark days of 1923, Gustav Stresemann was appointed chancellor and his policies would help to transform the fortunes of Weimar. He had been a strong supporter of Germany’s involvement in World War I and advocated unrestricted submarine warfare as the only means to defeat Britain. 
At first, Stresemann felt no loyalty to the new Weimar Republic and he opposed the Treaty of Versailles. He set up his own party the German People’s Party (DVP). However his views developed and he advocated a great coalition from the SPD to the DVP to consolidate democracy against the extremes of left and right. 
He became Chancellor in August 1923. His government lasted a hundred days until November 1923 but he remained as foreign minister in successive coalitions until his death in October 1929. As Chancellor he took the crucial step of ceasing financial support to the general strike in the Ruhr. He introduced a new and stable currency (the Rentenmark) that ended the hyper-inflation. He also crushed a communist revolt in Saxony and faced down the threat from Hitler in Bavaria. 

The Period of Prosperity 
Over the next six years, as foreign minister he sought to improve Germany’s international position, cooperate with France and Britain in order to secure a revision of some of the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. This policy became known as fulfilment. He achieved a large measure of success. Under Anglo-American pressure France withdrew from the Ruhr. Stresemann accepted the recommendations of the Dawes committee for a settlement of the reparations issue. A moderate scale of payments was fixed rising from £50 million to £125 million after 5 years and a 2-year moratorium (suspension) on reparation payments was set. A loan of $800 million was raised for Germany, mainly in America. For the next 5 years American loans poured into Germany which greatly improved the economic position. 

The Locarno Pact 
In 1925 he took the initiative that led to the Locarno Pact we looked at in a past Paper 1. In it Germany recognised her Western frontiers as final and agreed to use peaceful means to ensure revision of her frontiers in the east. Stresemann was a German nationalist and was not prepared to give up what he saw as legitimate demands for the return of Danzig and the northern half of the Polish Corridor. In September 1926 Germany joined the League of Nations with a permanent seat on the Council in recognition of her status as a great power. As part of this policy of co-operation, the first of the three Rhineland zones which had been placed under Allied military occupation by the Treaty of Versailles were evacuated in 1926. In 1927 the Inter-Allied Control Commission to supervise German disarmament was withdrawn. The Young Plan agreed in 1929 greatly reduced German reparations to a figure of £2 billion and Repayments were to be made over a period of 59 years. Stresemann also won complete allied evacuation of the Rhineland by June 1930 (five years ahead of schedule). It is hardly surprising that when he died of a stroke in October 1929 at the early age of fifty-one Stresemann’s reputation stood very high. He had also become a focus for hopes of European peace. Hitler is reported to have remarked that in Stresemann’s position “he could not have achieved more”. 

3. The Collapse of Weimar, 1930-1933 

The Great Depression and Germany 
Stresemann’s death could not have come at a worse time for the young republic. The onset of the Great Depression was to have dramatic effects on Germany The German economy’s recovery after the inflation of 1923 had been financed by loans from the United States. Many of these short term loans had been used to finance capital projects such as road building. State governments financed their activities with the help of these loans. German interest rates were high, and capital flowed in. Large firms borrowed money and depended heavily on American loans. German banks took out American loans to invest in German businesses. The German economic recovery was based on shaky foundations. 

The Wall Street Crash 
The German economy was in decline prior to the Wall Street Crash. There was no growth in German industrial production in 1928-9 and unemployment rose to two and a half million. On the 24th October, “Black Thursday”, there was panic selling on the New York Stock Exchange reacting to a business crisis in America. Early the following week, “Black Tuesday”, 29th of October, panic selling set in again. 16.4 million shares were sold, a record not surpassed for forty years. Share prices went into freefall. Ten billion dollars was wiped off the value of share prices in one day. 

Effects on Germany 
As a result American demand for imports collapsed. American banks saw their losses mount and they started calling in their short term loans with which so much of German economy had been financing itself for the past five years. Firms began to cut back drastically. Industrial production fell quickly and by 1932 it was 40% of its 1929 level. To make matters worse in 1931 a number of Austrian and German banks went out of business. . Unemployment rose from 1.6 million in October 1929 to 6.12 million in February 1932. 33% percent of the workforce were now unemployed. 
 By 1932 roughly one worker in three was registered as unemployed with rates even higher in industrial areas of Germany. Matters were made worse by the fact that the drastic fall in people’s income caused a collapse in tax revenues. Many soon were not in receipt of unemployment benefits as state governments could not afford to pay it. 
 It was in this economic chaos that the Nazis and Communists thrived. Crime and suicide rates rose sharply and many lost hope. People deserted the democratic parties in droves and turned to either the Communists or the Nazis. In the election of 1930, the Nazis made their electoral breakthrough winning 107 deputies while the Communists won 77. Both parties were opposed to the democratic system and used violence against their political opponents. Hitler’s Brownshirts clashed frequently on the streets with their Communist enemies. 

Bruning (1930-2)  
The new chancellor, the Centre politician Heinrich Bruning, followed a policy of economic austerity where government spending was cut in order to keep inflation under control and keep German exports competitive. He increased taxes, reduced salaries and reduced unemployment assistance. While it was sound economic thinking at the time, it only worsened the situation. The banking collapse in 1931 made matters even worse. Bruning was so unpopular that when he travelled by train he had to keep the blinds down as when people caught sight of him, they threw rocks! He was nicknamed the “hunger chancellor”. 

The end of Parliamentary democracy 
Given the unpopularity of Bruning’s policies, he found it very difficult to get a majority in the Reichstag. He relied on Article 48 and the emergency powers of the president to get laws passed. By 1932, parliament was being largely ignored. 
Some of the advisors to the President including General Kurt von Schleicher wanted to include the Nazis in government which Bruning opposed. They wanted to bypass the Reichstag completely and bring in a right wing authoritarian government. 
Hindenburg lost confidence in Bruning and they quarrelled about land reform. Bruning was replaced as chancellor by the equally unpopular von Papen. His cabinet of barons had absolutely no support and this was shown in the election of July 1932. 
The result was a disaster for democracy in Weimar Germany. The Nazis received 37% of the vote and 230 seats while their communist enemies got 89 seats. A majority of Germans had voted for non-democratic parties. Political violence intensified with twelve people killed on the day of the polls. 
The election of November 1932 saw a decline in Nazi but they still remained the largest party in the Reichstag. Communist support continued to rise and this worried many industrialists. Von Papen was replaced as chancellor by von Schleicher. 
Von Papen immediately began to plot against von Schleicher and met Hitler. They agreed that Hitler would become the chancellor of a government made up mainly of von Papen’s supporters. Hindenburg who disliked Hitler, was persuaded to appoint him chancellor on the 30th of January. The Weimar Republic was dead! 

Main Weaknesses of the Weimar Republic 

The was electoral system too democratic. It was too easy for splinter parties to get elected and very difficult to form stable governments. Parties could contest elections that did not accept the democratic system. After 1930 many of the deputies in the Reichstag were ether communist or Nazi and this made parliamentary government became almost impossible. 
There were twenty separate coalition governments in the period and this gave the impression of instability. Many believed that democracy was too weak to defend Germany against the communist threat. 
It was a republic born out of defeat. Many Germans refused to accept its legitimacy especially monarchists. They blamed it for accepting the hated treaty of Versailles. Many within important groups in society such as the army, big business, the civil service and the judiciary wished to see a more authoritarian form of government. 
They admired pre-war Germany and there was little respect for democratic institutions. 
The severe economic problems that were faced reduced support especially the hyper-inflation of 1923 and the Great Depression of the 1930s. 


“Full democracy undermined the state.” To what extent do you agree with this statement with reference to Germany (1919–1933)?

Historians Quotes for Germany
ALY, GÖTZ (b. 1947) One of the most innovative and provocative of German historians, Aly stirred up controversy in the 1980s and 1990s by arguing that there were rational, economic motives driving the murder of the Jews in the Holocaust. In the eyes of his critics, attributing rational, utilitarian motives to Nazi perpetrators risked diluting the “absolute evil” of Nazism. Aly’s revelations of the complicity of mid-level academic and bureaucratic officials in the planning of the Final Solution, however, were based on thorough research and have gained general acceptance among historians. His 1991 book, co-authored with Susanne Heim, Architects of Annihilation: Auschwitz and the Logic of Destruction  dealt with the Schreibtischtäter (desk-bound perpetrators) who drew up plans for population transfers in Eastern Europe in the early 1940s to combat the perceived problem of agrarian “over-population” and create space for German colonisation. Although Aly and Heim may have exaggerated the influence of population planners on Nazi decision-making, their research revealed the close linkage between German settlement policies in the east and the Holocaust. Their interpretation – epitomized in their provocative phrase, “the economy of the final solution” – was controversial because in emphasising bureaucratic plans aimed at economic modernization and rationalization in the causation of the Holocaust, Aly and Heim seemed to downplay the significance of irrational racial ideology. 
ARENDT, HANNAH (1906–1975) One of the leading political thinkers of the twentieth century, Arendt sought refuge from the Nazis in Paris in 1933, eventually coming to the US with her husband Heinrich Blücher in 1941. Arendt traced the origins of totalitarianism to nineteenth-century racism and imperialism. Her work helped to popularise the notion of totalitarianism as a novel form of twentieth-century dictatorship by pointing to parallels in the tyrannies of Hitler and Stalin, despite their ideological differences. By mobilising the atomized masses around their respective ideologies both regimes adopted a form of rule that made unprecedented mass murder possible, thus marking a radical break in European history and Western civilisation. Yet in Eichmann in Jerusalem, Arendt struck a different note, emphasizing “the banality of evil” and the potentially pernicious effects of bureaucratic careerism. Her portrait of Eichmann as a colourless but ambitious bureaucrat scrupulously following orders, rather than as a demonic sadist or virulent anti-Semite, aroused controversy by seeming to diminish his wickedness; her purpose, though, was not to trivialise the evil of the Holocaust but rather to warn that the failure to understand the “normality” of many perpetrators was to ignore the dangers of similar horrors occurring in other states under different historical conditions. Her critics accused her of slighting anti- Semitism as a driving factor in the Holocaust so as to emphasise the genocidal potential residing in modern states. Her criticism of the role of some members of the Jewish Councils in collaborating with the Nazis aroused controversy as well, but it also stimulated further research that has borne out some of her contentions. 
BARTOV, OMER (b. 1954) In his books on the German military, (available on the right) Bartov described the barbarous nature of the Nazi war against the Soviet Union and the role of the Wehrmacht as an integral part and willing tool of the Nazi regime. Bartov challenged the post-war myth of the Wehrmacht as an unpolitical professional force and demonstrated the army’s complicity and close involvement in the genocidal programme of the regime. Bartov maintained that German soldiers fought out of conviction, believing themselves to be part of a redemptive project to create a better world. Bartov has been critical both of Goldhagen’s monocausal explanation of the Holocaust as the product of a collective German “eliminationist antisemitism” and of German functionalist or structuralist historians, such as Mommsen or Aly, who seem to downplay the importance of anti- Semitic ideology and the role of moral choice in the causation of the Holocaust. Bartov has also explored and revealed the connections between the mass industrialised killing of the First World War and the readiness to commit genocide in the Second World War. The destruction of war came to be widely viewed in Germany as sweeping away the weak and degenerate, and seemed to confirm the adage that life was war and war was life. German military history cannot be separated from the history of the Holocaust, according to Bartov, nor can the Holocaust be adequately represented or explained without integrating the perspectives of victims with those of the perpetrators.
BAUER, YEHUDA (b. 1926) Has argued forcefully for the uniqueness of the Holocaust in the history of genocide, but has also criticised mythical representations that treated the Holocaust as outside the realm of history and beyond human understanding. Although Bauer has been critical of structuralist or functionalist explanations that minimised Hitler’s personal role in the origins of the Holocaust or the role of racist ideology, he has himself modified his earlier interpretation of the Holocaust as primarily the result of the Nazi leadership’s long-standing intention to destroy the Jews physically. According to Bauer, the basic motives for the killings were not bureaucratic or pragmatic, but ideological.
BESSEL, RICHARD (b. 1948) Bessel, many of whose books are in my classroom) has contributed numerous publications to the study of political violence, paramilitary formations, and the police in twentieth-century Germany. Bessel has been critical of Wehler’s Sonderweg interpretation, which traces the origins of Nazism to an inherited set of social structures peculiar to Germany. He has also been critical of Marxist interpretations and of both totalitarianism theory and modernization theory. In his view Nazism did indeed mark the culmination of a long tradition of European racism, but not one confined to Germany. What was unique to Germany was the fact that the specific conditions resulting from the First World War and German defeat allowed a band of political thugs imbued with racist ideology to capture power in a highly developed industrial nation. The memory of the humiliating end of the First World War and a determination not to permit a repetition remained powerful influences on Nazi policies right up to 1945. Bessel has also made a sharp distinction between the “revolutionary” Nazis and the inept “counter-revolutionary” elite that helped them to gain power and shared many of their goals. 
BOCK, GISELA (b. 1942) Leading German feminist historian and author of Zwangssterilisierung im Nationalsozialismus which linked Nazi racial policy to Nazi policy toward women in general. Bock argued that “compulsory sterilisation affected women more than men . . . because women’s identities were more closely connected to their sexual fertility.” While Bock’s argument that women were more adversely affected than men by the Nazis’ eugenic practices has been generally accepted, her conceptual equation of anti-feminism with anti- Semitism as two sides of the same deadly racial policy remains controversial. Bock acknowledged that some women had contributed to Nazi crimes in their functions outside the home, but she continued to deny any “specifically female guilt” in the traditionally separate private sphere.
BROSZAT, MARTIN (1926–1989) Argued the failure of Weimar was Hindenburg’s fault. He introduced the novel concept of Resistenz to describe a passive kind of nonconformity that was far more widespread in the Bavarian population than active resistance (Widerstand) to Nazi rule. Broszat called for the “historicisation” of National Socialism, a plea to integrate the Third Reich within the continuity of German history rather than treating it as an episode outside of history and thus inaccessible to historical understanding. Broszat warned that routine and ritualistic moral condemnation of Nazism for didactic reasons stood in the way of full understanding, which he believed could only be achieved by applying the same rigorous and objective scholarly methodology as historians applied to other periods of history. He denied that use of normal historical methodology would inevitably lead to a more favourable evaluation of Nazism. Broszat introduced the notion of “polycracy” to describe the often chaotic Nazi administrative system characterized by personal rivalries, jurisdictional disputes, power struggles, overlapping competencies, and bureaucratic confusion.
BROWNING, CHRISTOPHER (b. 1944) A leading American historian of the Holocaust, Browning published what has come to be recognised as the most authoritative work of synthesis on the early stages of the Holocaust. He did not believe that the Nazis pursued a master plan aimed at the physical extermination of the Jews from the very start; but Browning was also critical of historical interpretations that portrayed the Holocaust as motivated predominantly by rational or economic goals, such as modernizing agriculture in eastern Europe by reducing the “surplus population” or combating food shortages by destroying “useless eaters”. According to Browning the Holocaust can only be explained as a consequence of the Nazis’ ideological obsessions and extreme anti-Semitism; the decision-making that led to the “final solution” should be understood as the product of the interaction between local and central authorities in which, however, the central authorities played the predominant role. Browning contended that the decision for the “final solution” must have been reached by October 1941, for in that month plans for the deportation of Jews from the German Reich were developed, all Jewish emigration from areas controlled by Germany was prohibited, and construction of the Belzec extermination camp was under way. More controversially, Browning argued that it was the euphoria of battlefield success in the Soviet Union, not the prospects of impending defeat or the entry of the United States into the war (as argued by Gerlach), that led Nazi leaders to take the decisive step to the physical annihilation of all European Jews.
BULLOCK, ALAN Lord (1914–2004) A focus in class, British historian whose scholarly interests extended well beyond German history and the Nazi era. His importance as a historian of Nazi Germany rests on his influential Hitler: A Study in Tyranny (1952), the first comprehensive biography of the Nazi leader. However, his portrait of Hitler as an opportunist without principles or convictions motivated primarily by the desire to wield power is no longer widely shared. Bullock himself revised his earlier interpretation in his book, Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives (1991), in which he stressed the importance of ideology and Hitler’s commitment to the basic ideas he expressed in Mein Kampf. 
Quotes: Hitler was jobbed into power by the old guard.”   Hitler was a “Mountebank
BURLEIGH, MICHAEL (b. 1955) Trained as a medievalist, Burleigh developed an interest in Nazi Germany as a result of work on his first book, a history of the Teutonic Order in the fifteenth century, published in 1984. His opus magnum, The Third Reich, was written in a tone of moral outrage which described the unique criminality of the Third Reich in grim detail. Its interpretation of Nazism, however, fell well within the conventional parameters of totalitarianism theory and shared the weaknesses of that paradigm, highlighting the similarities between Nazism and communism, while neglecting their significant differences. Burleigh invoked the excessively vague concept of “political religion” as his main explanatory trope, attributing the force of Nazism (like communism) to its utopian urge to create a new kind of man and a heaven on earth based on the triumph of the master race (rather than, as in communism, the triumph of the underclass). In contrast to structural interpretations of Nazi Germany, especially ones that implicate Western rationalism or bourgeois capitalist society in Nazism or in the Holocaust, Burleigh stressed the uniquely irrational, racist, and anti-modern aspects of the Nazi regime and the personal responsibility of Hitler and his leading henchmen for Nazi atrocities.
DAHRENDORF, RALF (b. 1929) Dahrendorf, a German sociologist who became a British citizen, berated his fellow Germans for their lack of social consciousness and sought to educate them in the principles of liberal democracy. His importance for the historiography of Nazism is his structural analysis of the long-range anti-democratic trends in German society that made the Nazi seizure of power possible: First, the persistence of inequalities in class status, educational opportunities, and social advancement. Second, repression of social conflict in the name of national harmony rather than resolution of conflicts through compromise and open debate. Third, the self-preservation and durability of Germany’s social elite, which retained its unity through inherited authoritarian patterns of behaviour and a “cartel of fear” even in the critical years after the First World War. And fourth, a preference for private virtues rather than public political participation, leading to escapism and timidity. According to Dahrendorf, Imperial Germany missed the road to modernity and consolidated itself as an industrial feudal society and an authoritarian welfare state. The failure of Germans to develop the liberal civic consciousness necessary for the responsibilities of citizenship explained the demise of democracy in 1933. The Nazis, gained their legitimacy in the eyes of the German public by carrying out the modernising social revolution that Germany’s illiberal social structures had previously prevented. The Nazi revolution took such a catastrophic form precisely because German social realities made peaceful social reform impossible even in the democratic Weimar Republic.
EVANS, RICHARD Sir (b. 1947) Originally a specialist in nineteenth-century German social history, British historian Richard Evans has become one of the leading authorities on Nazi Germany with his three-volume history of the Third Reich, all of which are in my classroom. Evans adopted a less Hitler-centred or moralistic approach than earlier comprehensive histories of Nazism in English (such as those by Kershaw, Burleigh, or Shirer), and he also challenged the Sonderweg notion that Germany was by tradition or history uniquely susceptible to Hitler’s racist message or totalitarian rule. Evans’s narrative is especially effective in portraying the complexities and ambiguities of the Nazis’ seizure of power, Nazi rule, and popular reactions to the Nazis. His book, Lying about Hitler: History, Holocaust, and the David Irving Trial (available right), resulted from his testimony in American historian Deborah Lipstadt’s successful defence in a libel suit brought by British historian David Irving, whom Lipstadt accused of denying the Holocaust.
Chief quote: "To say someone is morally good or bad is either unnecessary or simplistic. The principal task of history is to explain and interpret, not to issue moral judgements."
FEST, JOACHIM (1926–2006) Conservative journalist and historian best known for the first major biography of Hitler by a German historian, stressing his misguided idealism and nationalism. Taking issue with Bullock’s contention that Hitler was driven only by the desire for power, Fest emphasised the importance of Hitler’s strong ideological convictions. “The problem was not one of criminal impulses but of a perverted moral energy.” Fest answered in the affirmative his own question as to whether Hitler would have been considered “one of the greatest German statesmen” if he had died in 1938. For Fest the “negative greatness” of Hitler’s personality explained Nazism better than did social or economic developments. Fest’s account of the last days of the Third Reich, Inside Hitler’s Bunker, provided the basis for the film Der Untergang (The Downfall) in 2004.
FISCHER, FRITZ(1908–1999) Influential German historian whose landmark book Germany’s Aims in the First World War (first published under the title Griff nach der Weltmacht [Grasp for World Power] in 1961) precipitated a controversy in Germany and led to a new awareness of German responsibility for the outbreak of war in 1914. An older generation of German historians, chief among them Gerhard Ritter, rejected Fischer’s assertion that the German leadership had taken advantage of the assassination of the Austrian crown prince by Serbian nationalists in June 1914 to pursue policies that they knew were likely to result in war. Fischer repudiated the prevailing consensus among Germans that war had been forced on their nation and that Germany bore no greater responsibility for the conflict than the other European powers. Fischer’s thesis that the German leadership consciously risked war because of their confidence in the superiority of German arms in a continental war has been widely accepted and was corroborated by historian Mark Hewitson in his book on the origins of the First World War in 2004. The “Fischer thesis” did not change the historical consensus on Germany’s guilt for the Second World War, which was never in doubt in any case. Its main effect on the historiography of Nazism was to have revealed continuities linking the expansionist goals of the Wilhelmian Empire to those of the Nazis.

FRIEDLANDER, HENRY (b. 1930) A survivor of the Nazi camps, Friedlander  described the continuity between the Aktion T-4 euthanasia program, launched in 1939, and the “final solution,” the killing of the Jews. Friedlander advocated expanding the definition of the Holocaust to embrace not only Jewish victims but all victim groups defined in biological terms, which would include the gypsies and the mentally and physically disabled. Friedlander argues the Holocaust resulted from the conjunction of two main strands of Nazi ideology – anti-Semitism and eugenic selection – under the favourable conditions for systematic murder created by total war.
FRIEDLÄNDER, SAUL (b. 1932) Friedländer introduced the concept of “redemptive” anti-Semitism, a radical form of Jew- hatred resulting from the convergence of racial anti-Semitism and a pseudo-religious ideology of redemption (or perdition). “Redemptive” anti-Semitism was based on a vision of an apocalyptic struggle to the death between the Jews and “Aryan humanity” and served an integrating and mobilising function in the Nazi system. While Friedländer differed with “intentionalists,” who argued that extermination of the Jews had always been Hitler’s goal, he did insist that the “redemptive” anti- Semitism of Hitler and the core of the Nazi Party was the key to the origins of the Holocaust. Friedländer recognised the role of technocratic rationality in the extermination programme, but insisted on the centrality of Hitler and his ideological goals.
GELLATELY, ROBERT (b. 1943) Referred to regularly in HL classes, Canadian-American historian whose most important contributions to the historiography of Nazism to date have been his studies of popular cooperation in the totalitarian Nazi regime which marked a shift in emphasis from public dissent and non- cooperation in earlier literature on Nazi Germany to an emphasis on the participation, compliance, and accommodation of ordinary German citizens. Gellately concluded that the efficient functioning of the understaffed secret police was dependent on the continuing cooperation of ordinary Germans in denouncing their fellow citizens. Gellately argued, however, that loyalty to the regime, ideological fanaticism, or fear of Gestapo reprisal were less important as motives for denunciation than opportunism, conformism, professional rivalries, personal grudges, and conflicts between neighbours. Not only was it far smaller than had previously been assumed, but its personnel were drawn mainly from the professional police force that pre-dated the Nazi regime. Gellately debunked what remained of the popular conception of the Nazi regime as a police state imposed by force on an unsuspecting population, which then found it too late to resist What makes Gellately’s findings on Nazi Germany particularly relevant to contemporary concerns is the implication that a totalitarian system can function effectively even without the use of large- scale coercion. Totalitarianism thus constitutes an insidious potential threat even in societies that perceive themselves as democratic.
GERLACH, CHRISTIAN (b. 1963) Young German historian whose discovery of Heinrich Himmler’s appointment calendar in a newly opened Soviet archive in 1997 led to a reappraisal of the long-disputed question about whether and when Hitler made the decision to launch the “final solution.” Based on several of Himmler’s entries, as well as newly discovered pages of Goebbels’ diary, Gerlach concluded that Hitler announced his decision to exterminate all European Jews to a meeting of Reichsleiter and Gauleiter in Berlin on 12 December 1941, one day after the German declaration of war on the United States. The Wannsee Conference, originally intended to decide the fate of the German Jews, was now assigned the function of coordinating the implementation of the Final Solution and deciding whether German Mischlings and Jews married to Germans should be included in the extermination program. Gerlach’s dating of Hitler’s decision to early December ran counter to Christopher Browning’s contention that Hitler’s decision to extend the killing program to include all European Jews had already been made by October 1941. Gerlach also disputed Browning’s hypothesis that Hitler’s decision was the result of the euphoria that accompanied German battlefield successes in the east in late summer 1941, arguing instead that the US entry into the war was the crucial catalyst of Hitler’s decision.
GOLDHAGEN, DANIEL J. (b. 1959) His best-selling book, Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust (a couple of copies in my classroom), became the subject of a fierce controversy among historians about the causes of the Holocaust, the participation of ordinary people in atrocities, and the motivation of the perpetrators. Goldhagen contended that the Holocaust was a German “national project” perpetrated with the full knowledge and approval of the German public. He identified an “eliminationist” anti-Semitism so deeply rooted in German history and culture as to have become part of the common sense of the average German. In collapsing the distinction between Nazis and Germans, Goldhagen violated a taboo that had been useful in reintegrating the post-war Federal Republic in the Western cold war alliance. Goldhagen was roundly criticised for overstating German exceptionalism, offering an overly simplistic, monocausal explanatory model for the origin of the Holocaust, neglecting the political context in which Nazism arose, insisting that anti-Semitism was more pervasive in Germany than in other countries without providing any comparative data, and for exaggerating the novelty of his thesis that anti-Semitism was the root cause of the Holocaust. 
As the deliberate use of the phrase “ordinary Germans” in his title made clear, Goldhagen directly challenged Christopher Browning who had concluded that ordinary men became brutal killers, not because they were ideological fanatics or bloodthirsty sadists but because of situational factors such as peer pressure, conformism, careerism, deference to higher authority, the brutalisation of war, and the routinisation of killing. Goldhagen argued instead that German killers were decisively motivated by passionate hatred of Jews, a hostility shared by virtually all Germans as a result of their socialisation in a specifically German culture of “eliminationist” anti- Semitism.
HILLGRUBER, ANDREAS (1925–1989)  Prominent West German diplomatic and military historian of the generation just old enough to have been drafted into the German army in the closing stages of the Second World War. Argued a strongly “intentionalist” view in which the course of the Third Reich and the Second World War were almost exclusively attributed to Hitler’s personal and ideological goals. Hillgruber retracted his earlier contention that the German invasion of the Soviet Union had been a “preventive war” (a contention successfully refuted by the American historian Gerhard Weinberg in 1954). Hillgruber now attributed the attack on Russia to Hitler’s fanatical racist beliefs and desire for Lebensraum. Whilst Hillgruber agreed with Fischer that the German leadership brought about the First World War by its high- risk diplomatic strategy, he discounted the role of domestic factors in the German government’s decisions. Hillgruber’s pronounced Hitler-centrism also left him open to the charge of indirectly exculpating the German elites by making Hitler solely responsible for the Holocaust and other Nazi atrocities. 
IRVING, DAVID His controversial 1977 book Hitler’s War suggests that Hitler was very much a creature of his time, rather than a power-crazed madman. Irving’s Hitler is a brilliant politician who seized government not to exploit the situation, but because the situation – and the people of Germany – demanded a dictator.
JÄCKEL, EBERHARD (b. 1929) Jäckel is a leading representative of the “intentionalist” school of thought- Jäckel believed that Hitler’s world-view was formed in the aftermath of the First World War and aimed for the physical destruction of the Jews as early as 1924. According to Jäckel, extermination of the Jews was an essential German war aim from the start of the Second World War. The essential political decisions were taken by Hitler alone as the logical consequence of his ideological obsessions, justifying in Jäckel’s judgement his labelling of the Nazi regime as Alleinherrschaft. Jäckel believed that Hitler’s ultimate aim was continental, not global domination.
KERSHAW, IAN Sir (b. 1943) Leading British historian of Nazi Germany, whose two- volume biography of Hitler, Hitler: Hubris (1998) and Hitler: Nemesis (2002), both in the school library, has been widely recognised as the most reliable account of Hitler’s life and rule to date. It is not so much a personal biography as it is a study of how Hitler interacted with German society and exploited and mirrored the fears and resentments of the German population after the First World War. Kershaw introduced the innovative concept of “working towards the Führer” to explain why so many Nazi policies originated on the local or regional levels and how an apparently dysfunctional Nazi administrative system of competing authorities, personal rivalries, and overlapping competencies was nonetheless able to carry out the murder of the Jews efficiently and obsessively. Hitler, who showed little interest in the day-to-day business of government or in administrative detail, needed only to establish the broad parameters of policy. Subordinate leaders and their underlings were encouraged to exercise their own initiative in fulfilling Hitler’s perceived objectives.
KOONZ, CLAUDIA (b. 1940) Leading American feminist historian of Nazism, Koonz described women as active participants in the Nazi system despite their restriction to the private sphere. Whilst men were responsible for public policy, women provided the emotional support in domestic life that helped to stabilise the regime. Koonz emphasised the role of German women as willing accomplices and contributors to Nazi power.
LONGERICH, PETER (b. 1955) A leading member of a younger generation of German historians who have used the opening of East European archives after the collapse of the Soviet Union to make important contributions to the historiography of the Holocaust. Longerich concluded that Hitler played a central, hands-on role in the origins and implementation of the Holocaust, even though there probably was no written order or even a single basic decision (Grundsatzentscheidung). Longerich traced the extermination policy through several stages, beginning with the resettlement of Jews into ghettos after the defeat of Poland in October 1939. Although the ethnic cleansing of Soviet Jews began with the German invasion of the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941, Longerich believed that it was not until May 1942 that the “final solution” was extended to all European Jews under German control. Unlike Christopher Browning, Longerich did not consider the construction of killing centres, the deportation of Jews from the Reich, or the prohibition of Jewish emigration in October 1941 as compelling evidence that a basic decision to include all European Jews in the extermination program had already been made in 1941. “The history of the Holocaust,” Longerich argued, “is not the history of an extermination program that progressed without deviation as a result of a single order, but is rather the history of a process, in the course of which various interests were weighed, priorities established, and decisions made – a process that was, in short, the result of a policy, but shaped by politics.” In “Davon haben wir nichts gewusst!” Longerich addressed the paradox that Nazi leaders spoke openly about the destruction of the Jews in public speeches but treated the details of the death camps as a state secret. By announcing the extermination program without revealing its full scale and barbarity, the Nazis ensured the complicity of the German public while avoiding the potentially demoralising effects of that knowledge. The purpose of this double strategy of treating the Holocaust as an “open secret” was to convince the German people that there was no alternative to fighting the war to the bitter end.
MARRUS, MICHAEL R. (b. 1941) Marrus argues that anti-Semitism was not forced on the Vichy regime by the Nazis but originated from domestic sources and was marked by unusual brutality. Marrus was critical of Pius XII’s reluctance to assist non-Catholic Jews and his failure to publicise reports of the Holocaust or of the plight of the Polish Church. 
MASON, TIMOTHY (1940–1990) Mason is perhaps best known as the historian who introduced the distinction between intentionalism and functionalism (or structuralism) in 1981. At issue was the question whether the peculiar destructiveness and self-destructiveness of the Third Reich could best be understood through an analysis of systemic social and economic structures and processes (the structuralist method), or whether the purposes and decisions of the Nazi leadership, particularly Hitler himself, were ultimately the crucial factor in explaining the criminality of Nazism. At stake was nothing less than the moral responsibility of historians, as both sides accused each other of misrepresenting and understating the evil of Nazism. Mason was particularly critical of the intentionalist interpretative model, which in his view gave far too much explanatory weight to Hitler’s own program and rhetoric, but he also criticized functionalist approaches that failed to attach sufficient importance to economic factors or class analysis.  Richard Overy disputed Mason’s conclusion that war in 1939 was (in part) a response to an insoluble domestic crisis brought about by rearmament. Overy’s conclusion that Germany did not face an economic crisis in 1939 was corroborated by Adam Tooze.
MOMMSEN, HANS (b. 1930) Member of a famous family of historians, Mommsen is the leading representative of the left-liberal “functionalist” interpretation of Nazism that emerged to prominence in Germany in the 1960s and 1970s. Mommsen stressed the culpability of Germany’s conservative economic and military elites both in Hitler’s rise to power and in his system of rule. He has been critical of potentially apologetic interpretations that overemphasise Hitler’s personal role in the Nazi system, thus neglecting the complicity of collaborating elites as well as the conditions and structures that allowed Hitler to gain such indisputable overall control. According to Mommsen, anti-Semitic ideology and Hitler’s intentions are not enough to account for the “final solution,” which was conceived as a sequence of emergency measures to solve the self-created “Jewish problem” rather than as the realization of a master plan for extermination. Mommsen certainly did not slight ideological factors in his interpretation of Nazism, however. Ideology provided the indispensable motor of “cumulative radicalisation.” Mommsen attributed Germany’s fanatical resistance at the end of the war to the Nazis’ ideological mobilisation and their belief that a resolute will could make up for lack of material resources. In his account of Nazi policies in the Second World War, Mommsen gave great weight to Nazi leaders’ determination to avoid the perceived mistakes of German leaders in the First World War, who had failed to secure the unity of the home front. Mommsen was critical of totalitarianism theory, which located Nazism closer to revolutionary movements of the left than to counter-revolutionary movements of the right. Mommsen also rejected interpretations that depicted Nazism as a modernising movement. Mommsen played a leading role in the Historikerstreit.
MOSSE, GEORGE L. (1918–1999) Grandson of the founder of Berlin’s most prestigious press empire before 1933, Mosse turned to a more post-modern interpretation that traced the sources of Nazi criminality not just to a uniquely German anti-Semitism but to the European-wide hatred, intolerance, and exclusion resulting from the marriage of bourgeois nationalism and morality. He came to see Nazism not as a revolt against middle-class values but rather as a corruption and radicalisation of those very values. Nazism represented the most destructive expression of the “bourgeois” drive to dominate and cleanse the world in the name of morality and respectability.
NOLTE, ERNST (b. 1923) The leading representative of right-wing historical revisionism in Germany seeking to “normalise” the history of Nazism, Nolte achieved public notoriety in the Historikerstreit with his assertion that Nazism must be understood as an at least partially justified response to the greater evil and destructiveness of Soviet Communism. He denied the unique criminality of the Holocaust, portraying it instead as a radical defensive reaction to the perceived genocidal threat posed by “Asiatic Bolshevism” and the Russian Revolution. According to him, Nazi plans to destroy an entire race, the Jews, were modelled on the precedent established by the Bolsheviks in their efforts to destroy an entire class, the bourgeoisie. Nolte attributed ultimate responsibility for the atrocities of the twentieth century to the communist revolutionaries, without whose provocation there would have been no Nazi counter-revolution. Nolte’s right-wing bias and apologetic purposes became increasingly apparent, linking Hitler’s cause with the Western cause in the cold war. Nolte thus provided an interpretation that allows Nazism to be at least partially rehabilitated without denying its radical nature or genocidal crimes.
OVERY, RICHARD (b. 1947) British military and economic historian and one of the foremost authorities on the Second World War. He disputed Mason’s claim that Hitler had been forced to go to war in 1939 to prevent an economic crisis. Overy contended that Hitler had only miscalculated the likelihood of Britain and France intervening in the war against Poland. Overy rejected the notion that the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 was a preventive war. In The Dictators: Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Russia (2004) Overy concluded that the similarities between the two regimes outweighed the differences. Both systems were based on utopian visions that were similar in form though divergent in purpose, and both regimes understood that their true enemy was the liberal West. Critics of Overy’s revived totalitarianism model, however, questioned his failure to differentiate between the very different popular bases on which these two regimes rested.
PEUKERT, DETLEV J. K. (1950–1990) Short-lived but highly influential German historian and part of the movement of Alltagsgeschichte in the 1980s to which he contributed a history of the experiences of ordinary Germans during the Third Reich. Peukert stressed the ambivalence of popular interactions with the regime, ranging from active collaboration to passive resistance, and revealed the ambiguous but unavoidable complicity even of Germans who did not share the Nazi ideology. Peukert’s most significant contribution to the historiography of Nazism, however, was his critique of modernisation theory (the notion that Nazism can best be understood as a product of inadequate modernisation). Peukert took issue with the conventional notion that Nazism resulted from Germany’s failure to modernise and argued instead that Nazism represented the dark side of Germany’s extraordinary modernity. In Peukert’s view Nazi racial policy, including compulsory sterilization, eugenic abortion, euthanasia (the killing of the mentally and physically disabled), and the “final solution of the Jewish question,” exemplified a central feature of modernity, Machbarkeitswahn (the illusion that anything is doable), the belief that society could be renovated and social problems resolved through the application of biological principles and practices. In Peukert’s interpretation Nazism typified the murderous potential of modern social engineering projects. Peukert rejected the comforting notion that Nazi barbarism marked a relapse into the primitive past, warning that it might instead offer a preview of a potentially genocidal future. 
RAUSCHNING, HERMANN (1887–1982) A prominent German conservative, veteran of the First World War, and member of the Nazi party in 1931, Rauschning argued Hitler’s movement was solely opportunistic, without consistent ideology, program, or principle. By describing the Nazis as only interested in exercising power, Rauschning in effect extricated his own anti-democratic and anti-communist values and goals from complicity in the Nazi project without denying them. In some respects Rauschning anticipated totalitarianism theory by situating the Nazi movement on the left rather than the right of the political spectrum. Many of the direct quotations in his 1939 book, Hitler Speaks, purportedly based on conversations with Hitler, were fabricated, and this book is no longer considered a reliable historical source.
RITTER, GERHARD (1888–1967) Like most German nationalists he rejected the Versailles Treaty and the Weimar parliamentary system, embraced the “stab-in-the-back” legend, and denied German guilt for the outbreak of the First World War. While rejecting the Nazis’ extremism in the 1930s, particularly their violent persecution of the Jews, Ritter admired and celebrated Hitler’s foreign policy successes and supported German expansionism. These nationalist attitudes coloured his historical works as well. According to Ritter, Nazism was the product of mass politics and the revolutionary movements emanating from the French Revolution. He rejected attempts to trace the origins of Nazism to German history, attributing it instead to such European- wide aspects of modernity as industrialisation, materialism, rationalism, Marxism, secularisation, Darwinian science, and technology. However, the consensus today is that Ritter was simply wrong in identifying Nazism as a direct consequence of the rise of socialism rather than as a reaction to it.
SHIRER, WILLIAM L. (1904–1993) Journalist turned historian, William Shirer is today primarily known for his massive best-seller, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (1960), a well-documented, richly detailed, non-academic narrative account written from a strongly anti-Nazi perspective. Shirer was thoroughly familiar with Germany and with the Nazi hierarchy, having served as a CBS radio reporter in Berlin at the start of the war before being forced to leave in December 1940. His Berlin Diary, published in early 1941, accurately predicted the German invasion of Russia and the outbreak of war with the United States. It also contained eyewitness accounts of the Nuremberg party rallies, the French capitulation on June 22, 1940, and numerous other events.

TAYLOR, A. J. P. (1906–1990) Popular but controversial British historian, whose major work was The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848–1918 (1954). His importance for the historiography of Nazism is based on two works, The Course of German History: A Survey of the Development of Germany since 1815 (1946) and The Origins of the Second World War (1961). The former, written during the war and inevitably reflecting the hostile passions of that conflict, was a classic indictment of Germany’s anti-democratic and militarist tradition. In his later book on the events leading up to the Second World War Taylor seemed to reverse course, blaming the out- break of the war on Britain’s disastrous policy of appeasement, thus seemingly taking some of the onus of guilt from Germany’s leadership. By characterizing Hitler’s foreign policy as not significantly different from earlier German policies, Taylor did not intend to absolve Hitler of culpability, however. Instead, his assertion that Hitler’s policies were consistent with those of mainstream German nationalists was intended as a rebuke to British leaders, whose miscalculations and policy of appeasement made war in September 1939 unavoidable. Taylor was particularly critical of the failure of the British government to follow up Soviet overtures for an anti- fascist military alliance in the 1930s. Only by resurrecting the grand alliance of the First World War, which in fact came about after the German invasion of the USSR and the Japanese attack on the US in 1941, might war have been prevented in 1939. 
Main quote:  "The Depression put the wind in Hitler’s sails"
TOLAND, JOHN Strove for dispassionate objectivity about Hitler. Ignoring the presumption that Hitler was ‘evil’, Toland sought to identify his positive attributes and qualities, to understand why so many supported and even worshipped him.
TOOZE, ADAM Young British economic historian whose impressive tome, The Wages of Destruction, interprets the Second World War as Hitler’s desperate response (in the context of his conviction that Germany was locked in a mortal racial struggle with the Jews) to the challenge posed by the allegedly Jewish-dominated United States, both as a rival to Germany for global power and as a seductive model of a way of life that threatened traditional European institutions by its affluence and gratification of material and sensual desires. The book describes in unprecedented detail the extraordinary mobilisation of German resources during the war to overcome the material advantages of Germany’s foes. Tooze places the genocide of the Jews within a framework that gives weight both to overarching ideological tenets and mundane pragmatic considerations. Whilst in no way denying the Nazis’ predatory practices, Tooze showed that the Nazis would not have been able to finance the war solely by conquest and spoliation. Moreover, the sacrifices imposed on the German population were borne unequally by Germany’s subordinate classes.
WAITE, ROBERT G. L. (1919–1999) Canadian-American historian whose book, Vanguard of Nazism (1952), pioneered the study of the Free Corps as the forerunners of Nazism in the period following the First World War. Waite also authored a biography of Hitler, The Psychopathic God (1977), perhaps the most notable example of the genre of “psycho-history,” which utilised psychoanalytical categories to explain Hitler’s policies and practices and which left a deep impression on me growing up.
WEHLER, HANS-ULRICH (b. 1931) Wehler set forth the so-called Sonderweg theory to help explain the rise and triumph of Nazism in Germany. According to this interpretation, a key factor in Germany’s susceptibility to fascism was the lack of a liberal bourgeois revolution in Germany (due to the failure of the revolution of 1848). The consequence of the weakness of liberalism was that the landed aristocracy continued to wield disproportionate power in German politics. According to Wehler, pre-democratic values and institutions predominated in Bismarckian and Wilhelminian Germany. Whilst the German economy was rapidly modernized, Germany’s political system failed to keep pace with democratic reforms enacted in Western Europe. The resulting social tensions in Germany and differences from the Western European model of liberal democracy helped to account for the aggressive nature of German foreign policy in the twentieth century.
WEINBERG, GERHARD L. (b. 1928) Leading American historian of Nazi foreign policy and the Second World War. His massive A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II is available for download on the right. In contrast to A.J.P. Taylor’s portrait of Hitler pursuing a traditional foreign policy of continental dominance, Weinberg argued that Hitler was driven by global ambitions. Weinberg also effectively refuted David Hoggan’s contention in 1961 that war had been forced on Hitler by the hostile actions of the West. It was Weinberg who first discovered Hitler’s Second Book in the archives, a translation of which he published in 2003.
WELCH, DAVID (b. 1950) Author of The Third Reich: Politics and Propaganda (also available for download on the right), Welch has concentrated his research on Nazi propaganda both in practice and in theory. Welch has investigated not only the specific rhetorical or psychological techniques of persuasion that Hitler, Goebbels and other Nazis used to achieve their desired effects (particularly in the new medium of film), but also the social and political context that enhanced or limited the power of propaganda. One key to the Nazis’ propagandistic success was their skill in merging Nazi ideology with traditional themes of patriotism and religion. Rather than changing people’s minds, they reinforced existing prejudices.
WINKLER, HEINRICH AUGUST Winkler’s main field of expertise is the Weimar Republic, arguing that the SPD’s failure to enact thoroughgoing social reform in the aftermath of the First World War impaired the long-term viability of the Weimar Republic by strengthening the right and alienating the left, but he defended the SPD for pursuing the only course that could possibly have led to the establishment of a functioning parliamentary democracy under extremely adverse conditions.
ZITELMANN, RAINER Conservative publicist whose major claim to inclusion in a survey of the historiography of Nazism was his startling revival of the thesis that Hitler was a man of the left, not the right. Zitelmann set forth this dubious interpretation in his book Hitler as Social Revolutionary in which he claimed that Nazi social programs like Strength through Joy were not intended merely to maintain social peace but rather genuinely to improve the conditions of the working class. For Zitelmann Hitler and the Nazis were modernisers who constructively sought to enhance social equality and mobility in Germany. His critics pointed out that wages remained disproportionately low in Germany and that the social benefits that Zitelmann touted were only available to racially pure “Aryans.”

Bullock and Nicholls- Hitler was important in failure of the Weimar Republic
Gordon Craig- Weimar Republic's "normal state was crisis."
John Maynard Keynes: The Economic Consequences of the Peace. Nazis used government money to put people in jobs- later used in USA Walther Frank- Nazi historian, anti-Semite
David Hoggan- Der Erzwungene Krieg- about Anglo-Polish conspiracy to wage aggression against Germany, The Myth of the Six Million- denying Holocaust
Hugh Trevor-Roper: A. J. P. Taylor, Hitler and the War.

Goebbels: If we are attacked we can only defend ourselves with guns not with butter.”
One German woman told the American reporter Nora Wall: “He is my mother and my father. He keeps me safe from all harm.”
Fritz Lang's Metropolis remixed with Vangelis's soundtrack to Blade Runner.

IBDP History Paper 2 November 2011
7. “Weakness in the constitution and the failure of political parties to support democracy caused the failure of the multiparty state in Weimar Germany (1919-1933).” To what extent do you agree with this statement?

The Weimar constitution by democracy’s most literal interpretation created one of, if not, the most democratic state in the world, in theory. The Weimar constitution and the provisions it contained allowed for a vast breadth of political parties all representing individual, particular ideologies. It is, however the unrestrained, extreme form of democracy that the Weimar constitution, and the political parties it caused that was the fundamental weakness, that caused the ultimate failure of democracy.
Proportional representation was a centrepiece of the Weimar democratic system, and was, in part its undoing, a point articulated in Richard J. Evans’s 2003 book “The Coming of the Third Reich”.  Proportional representation was a system of voting whereby the size of any voting block in Germany would receive exactly equal to that scale in the Reichstag. This sounds, in theory exactly what a democratic system should strive for, but that is in theory, but reality is not theoretical. In practice, from1919-1924 at a time when in McGonigle words in the legacy of war  “ The November criminals hung like a giant shadow over the period of Weimar Germany”, already detracting from the legitimacy of the Weimar state which needed strong leadership. The German people saw their nation being fractured by unrest, with the Spartacist revolt January 1919 or the declaration of an independent Bavarian communist state in a April 1919. In this time the Weimar government seemed unable to control unable to control Germany, with 11 parties actively holding seats in the Reichstag in 1920 and 28 at its highest point in later years, the largest party only holding 37% of the seats in 1920, and no party ever gaining a majority. This lack of a majority made decisions far harder to come by and less speedy always needing a coalition to form a government.
Coalitions often needed more than two political parties to be able to form a majority as in the election of 1920, further compounding the problems of Weimar. The amount of political parties created by the proportional representation also allow for more extreme voices, voices often openly hostile to the idea of democracy such as the KDP or NSDAP. The instability caused weak government unable to truly rule, weak government through time, caused a lacking in trust and patience for the established political order. This is despite what seemed an end to troubles for some in the golden years, but was in fact the result, not of parliamentary democracy but of the presidential power Gustav Stresemann, working on borrowed money. This established political order who, because of the plurality of proportional representation was never able to rule, but blamed for that fact. This despair amongst the general public, made them seek after the catalyst of the 1929 wall street crash smaller fringe parties promising end to political deadlock. As the leader of the the once fringe NSDAP Hitler said at his annual Nuremburg rally in 1932, “They say we don't want to work with other political parties – I have to admit on thing these gentlemen are right- I have one goal to sweep these 30 political parties out of Germany.” Proportional representation and political volatility it created, manifested an atmosphere of such extreme democracy that it hindered the function of democracy, and as a result did not support democracy in practice.
The weakness of this proportional representation parliamentary system was contrasted and contradicted by Article 48 of the Weimar constitution. Article 48 allowed in times warranting quick action the issuing of dictatorial decrees. Article 48 was not, however a designed to be a means of government but an extreme measure in times of emergency. The first President of the Weimar government Freidrich Ebert, used this power on 136 occasions, to control unrest in the early years of the Weimar democracy. Many of these instances help maintain the continuation of Weimar democracy such as the organization of the Freikorps to restore order to a ceded Bavaria workers republic, or to squash a rebellion in the Rhineland. In the short term it could be fairly asserted the Article supported democracy, but in the long term is served to undermine the parliamentary authority by showing its inadequacy, and showing the strength of authoritarian power. It must however be noted that in some instances Article 48 was even used to depose fairly elected governments such as in Saxony, further and in a most blatant way detracting the constitution claim to supporting democracy. Article 48 throughout the Weimar republic increasingly became seen as not responding to specific emergency but as replacement for parliamentary leadership.
It could be contended as it is in Richard J. Evans afore mentioned book that the misuse of Article 48 is not to be blamed on the constitution but on the men who misused. It is for men to decide whether they wish to follow the spirit of the laws they work with. Under this premise it could not be argued that the constitution failed democracy but democracy failed the constitution.
To say the Weimar constitution and the failure of political parties caused, solely the failure of Weimar would naive and overly simplistic; It is however true the Weimar constitution, contained within the Trojan horses of proportional representation and Article 48. On the surface it seemed these notions seemed to add stability and longevity to a new Germany state. How far from the truth this thoughts would turn out to be. Instead these fundamental sections of the constitution served to destabilize and undermine, the democracy in it’s infancy not support it. They caused democracy to fail and people to seek more forceful and authoritarian leadership, leadership promised by fringe political parties. The ultimate result of this was the 1933-enabling act in which Hitler took total control of Germany, after winning the election 1932.
What were the main features of the Weimar constitution, and to what extent was it democratic?

The Weimar Republic was developed in accordance with the Treaty of Versailles following the Armistice of 1918. Germany having suffered great losses in the Great War blamed much of their miserable predicament on their new government (known later as the 'November Criminals') as they saw them as the ones that had signed the treaty and admitted defeat. The constitution attempted to bring democracy to Germany and according to William Shirer was the "most liberal and democratic document of its kind the twentieth century had ever seen."  Why then, were the years under Weimar Germany so politically controversial and deeply unstable, leading to the rise of Hitler? The historian Richard J. Evans remarked that "It's more problematical provision might not have mattered so much had the circumstances been different." Indeed, the orthodox view of Weimar Germany sees it as a time period full of struggle, assassinations and political instability. This orthodox view is orthodox for a reason. Knowing that ironically this democracy led to the rise of a dictator who arguably caused one of the most horrific wars in history it is easy to pinpoint elements of the Weimar Republic and it's legislation that were negative. But despite its collapse, I believe Weimar Germany was a brave attempt at creating a constitution that was not only concerned with building a viable democratic political structure but also one that sought to establish revolutionary social and economic rights - a complex document aiming to make way for the basis of modern parliamentary democracy. Therefore the document itself represented clear democratic features, but the enactment of these features in this time period could not maintain democracy and led to one of the most politically confused eras of German history.

Perhaps the most significant element of the constitution that proves without a doubt that Weimar Germany was a democracy is the system of election - proportional representation. Article 20 states that "The Reichstag is composed by the representatives elected by the German people." To think in mathematical terms, this is the most democratic system that could be put in place - the number of votes a party received corresponded directly to the number of seats that party held in government. Unlike other democratic systems in place the German election process also included all men and women over the age of 20 making Germany one of the first countries in Europe to allow women to vote. This alone is surely enough to convince one of the sophistication the constitution demonstrated. The country, divided into 35 electoral areas, voted, and a party was ensured one seat for every 60,000 people that voted them there. Furthermore, the parliament was given power over the army and was to be re-elected every four years. Evidently in writing this is a magnificent document. However the components of the constitution being democratic does not necessarily that it worked flawlessly. The ideology encountered terrible problems. First the wide spectrum of political parties such as the right-winged DVP, to the Zentrum Partei, to the left-winged KPD had such conflicting principles, and had left Germany so divided that no single party was able to secure 50% of the vote. As a result coalition governments were rife, decisions were not made easily, government upon government was overturned and there was deep political instability. There was a total of twenty different coalitions with the longest government maintaining control for a mere two years. Once again in practise the document was the epitome of democracy, but in reality it fell into a political stew pot of flavours and poisons.

The system of election itself not enough, even parliamentary control was to be tempered, especially under Article 48 - there was still a lot of power placed in the hands of very few individuals. Articles 46-49 of the Weimar Constitution delineated the powers of the president and made very clear the immense power the president would hold from appointing and dismissing chancellors, to having control of the army, to being able to call a state of emergency and rule by degree under Article 48. Firstly, the appointing and dismissing of chancellors by the president is seen by some as an undemocratic element of the constitution as it gives the power to one person, and not the people. However, I feel that as the German population voted the president in, they would have chosen someone that represented their ideals which would be expressed through the appointing of chancellors. As for having power over the army, this was important to democracy, the president was again chosen by the people and therefore had the final say. Unfortunately as has been a common theme already the practise was different than the written word and often the president lost control of the army such as happened during the Kapp Putsch revolt in Berlin. Finally a highly criticised aspect of the constitution was in regards to Article 48 - giving one man pure control of the country in any situation he chooses to define as an 'emergency' takes the power completely away from the people and nudges it strongly towards a dictatorship. However, without this the governmental system may have fallen many times such as when Ebert called for a state of emergency and took control during the Spartacist uprising in 1919. As Baroness Ruth B. Henig wrote in her book on the Weimar Republic after explaining the power the president was given, "Thus the President would check the Reichstag, the Reichstag would check the individual states, and parliamentary democracy would be safeguarded." Evidently this holds significant merit - the problem of course arises when the 'checker' at the top of the chain is abusing his power. Therefore I feel that although the initial formula for maintaining parliamentary democracy was sound, it did not address or even recognise this vital flaw and set itself up to be ripped apart in its putting of power in the hands of one man.

Another single man continued to rule during Weimar Germany, even though he was no longer in a direct position of power - a fact that undermined the playing out of democracy. Officials and judges put in place by the Kaiser had not lost their positions of power when he did. His once important hand continued to reach out into Weimar Germany - take article 109 which stated "All Germans are equal in front of the law." However these Kaiser judges were heavily biased and this article was not exercised. Let us take for example the Spartacus movement of 1919 and the Kapp Putsch of March 1920. 1919 brought about the left-wing Spartacist movement, led by Rosa Luxenburg and Karl Leibknecht. The attempted revolution was dramatically crushed by both the army and the Free Corps, and the leaders were brutally murdered. In contrast, during the right-winged Kapp Putsch the army refused to crush the rebellion and instead supported Kapp by providing him with weaponry. In fact, the movement was only stopped when the people threw a general strike, bringing the country to a standstill and forcing Kapp to Sweden after just 100 hours in power. Isolated, this strike may show true democracy. A Marxist perspective would be quick to point out the power of the people. What this demonstrates in terms of democracy is that the people did have control and could make the changes they desired. But then we are presented with further information: 770 people were arrested, but one soul man stood trial. Clearly the deep discrepancies in the application of the democratic legislation were varied and the originally democratic rights German citizens were given were tainted and marred in their application to real life situations.

This connects heavily to the Bill of Rights which is the final aspect that can be used to heavily outline to democratic system in place. As well as creating a constitution that served the requirements of a democratic, fair, and just parliament it also expanded its aims to attend to the welfare of its population. Article 118 stated that "Every German is entitled […] to express his opinion freely in word, writing, print, image or otherwise […] there is no censorship…"  Article 135 continued along the same freedom of the people lines "All Reich inhabitants enjoy full freedom of liberty and conscience." Furthermore many aspects of the constitution aimed to provide financial aid to the people - Article 119 declares "Large families may claim social welfare". Such grand aims were truly admirable, but to be fair were also unrealistic. Germany was in a situation of deep economic trouble - it was being asked to pay reparations for the first war of 2/3 of the total price, a grand 6.6 billion. With such financial issues it was impossible for the government to financially aid its people. However, as revisionist historian Michael E. Brooks wrote, "At the same time we should not forget that few democracies have been founded in such difficult circumstance as the Weimar Republic. The republic needed a long breathing space, it needed a more expansive and forgiving attitude on the part of the Western allies, it needed economic stability and progress - all of that was in precious short supply in the post World War 1 years." I think he definitely captures the essence of the document - it was democratic, but appears to have been produced without looking at the context of Germany, and what Germany was capable of achieving and being led under.

To conclude, the Weimar Republic's constitution was written with total democracy in mind - to bring this fabulous ideal to the country that had just emerged from an autocratic political system. However it asked a lot of the people of Germany who had just emerged from a devastating war, and who were suffering from deep economic troubles and on many accounts starvation. For this reason a truly democratic constitution was tossed around in a melee of different political spectrum's ideologies that in the end did not at all represent the true democratic nature of the document - but that did do perhaps the best it could considering the devastating circumstances.

In order to evaluate the democratic merit of the Weimar Republic, one needs to consider its roots: the Weimar constitution. Many claim that the Weimar Constitution made the republic intrinsically weak. It would be simplistic to blame this weakness on any single aspect of the constitution, but I believe that the a truly fatal weakness of the Weimar Constitution was that it was democratic to an unrealistic extent. This is particularly true of the voting process. It was too much too soon, going straight from a monarchy to this sort of republic. The role of the President in the constitution, as well as other governmental branches will also be considered.
            One of the main features of the Weimar Constitution was the concept of proportional representation. In this method of electing representatives for the Reichstag, political parties received the percentage of seats that they had received reflected the percentage of votes they got. Votes were taken from all men and women aged 20 and older. This was better than Britain, where only women 30 and older could vote. Overall, both of these constitutional concepts are very democratic ones. All popular view points are represented. However, the concept of proportional representation was almost too democratic. Decisions could not be made. There were simply too many parties and no one party could gain the majority vote, so there were frequently changing coalitions.
Another major player in the Weimar Constitution was the President. A President would be elected by the people and remain in office for 7 years. The President himself would choose a Chancellor. He also could dissolve the Reichstag and veto any laws he disapproved of. These aspects of the constitution could be seen as a stumbling block to the democratic process. However the height of the President’s power was found in Article 48, in which the President could declare a state of emergency and become, essentially, a dictator. The constitution did not specify what qualified as an emergency, and so this came to be known as the “enabling act.” It was supposed to be used only to restore order to the public, but Richard J Evans claimed that “in the end, [the President’s] excessive use [of Article 48], and occasional misuse of the Article widened its application to a point where it became a potential threat to democratic institutions.” Therefore, to some extent the President’s great power put the democratic nature of the Weimar Republic in peril.

Perhaps this presidential power was necessary, however, with the army’s, the legal system’s, and the local state governments’ lack of loyalty. Evans says that “Ebert’s concern for a smooth transition from war to peace led him to collaborate closely with the army without demanding any changes in its fiercely monarchist and ultra-conservative officer corps.” And so, the army acted against the President’s wishes on several occasions, one of which being the Kapp Putsch of 1923. The troops would not fire upon the Freikorps. As The Chief of the Army Command, General Hans von Seeckt stated at the time: “Reichswehr (army) do not fire upon Reichswehr.” After this putsch and future ones, there were many ineffective imprisonments as a large proportion of judges were right wing and wanted to destroy the democratic government. Lastly, the German states had too much power and also often ignored the president. This mess impeded on the democratic aspects of the constitution, as the elected government was unable to create order.
I think Richard J Evans truly describes the heart of the issue when he says: "all in all, Weimar's constitution was no worse than the constitutions of most other countries in the 1920's, and a good deal more democratic than many. Its more problematical provisions might not have mattered so much had the circumstances been different. But the fatal lack of legitimacy from which the Republic suffered magnified the constitution's faults many times over."

The Weimar Republic, implemented shortly after the signing of the Armistice in 1918, was Germany’s first attempt at a republic as such, and was in place for a rough 15 years before Hitler took over. In order to evaluate whether or not the constitution of Weimar Germany was democratic one must first understand the context of the time; Germany had been demoralized after the war and many believed in the “stabbed in the back” myth and they blamed this stab on the newly formed government, later known as the “November Criminals”, as they had been the ones to sign the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 and many Germans did not approve of the new government while many simply did not care as much. As William Shirer stated in his book “The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich” the Weimar constitution was "on paper, the most liberal and democratic document of its kind the twentieth century had ever seen”; in his opinion the ideology behind the Weimar Republic was great and incorporated much democracy yet the problem which the government was faced with was implementing their constitution. How should they do this when the country itself was not united as a whole? Right wing and left wing strongly opposed each other and openly fought in cities making it nearly impossible for a clear, well functioning democracy to grow and sustain itself in Germany. The historian Richard J. Evans agrees with this, according to him “all in all, Weimar's constitution was no worse than the constitutions of most other countries in the 1920's, and a good deal more democratic than many. Its more problematical provisions might not have mattered so much had the circumstances been different. But the fatal lack of legitimacy from which the Republic suffered magnified the constitution's faults many times over"; while the set up of Weimar contained good ideas; having a president elected by the people, having a universal suffrage for both sexes and a proper bill of rights could have created an amazingly democratic state yet there were problems. Implementing the constitution was the problem – a fact, which I mostly agree with. The chaos in Germany at the time, the hate between different groups of people and different parties and the little support of the public and army the government had, made the troubles in the constitution much worse than they actually were.
            One of the main features of the constitution was that for the first time Germany had a President of state. This president was elected every seven years by the general public of Germany giving them the total power to choose their head of state and already resulted in a feel of democracy in the newly written constitution. Yet seven years are an extremely long time for one president to serve – the president was in charge of appointing and dismissing a chancellor that would have the support of the Reichstag, the president was the head of the army, this however did not work out very well as the army itself was right winged and did not support the president, for example Friedrich Ebert, who had not been supported by the army when it came to fighting the Kapp Putsch revolt in Berlin. The power to appoint and dismiss the chancellor, which the president had was in a way a limiting factor of democracy as the president himself was almost more of a figurehead position while the chancellor was the one who did most of the work. As a result, the German population had little to no say when it came to choosing their chancellor – they had to trust in their president to appoint someone who was capable and wouldn’t abuse his powers but as one can see in the case of Hindenburg who appointed Hitler as chancellor the president did make mistakes – and this lack of voting freedom in the case of the chancellor made the Weimar constitution less democratic. The president also had another power in the form of Article 48; under this article the president could declare a state of emergency and rule by decree, which happened quite often like in the case of the Spartacist uprising in January 1919. This article could easily be abused as a “state of emergency” is interpreted differently by everyone and under it the president had the sole power in the country – here democracy was completely ignored as the president functioning as a dictator would not rule in a democratic way even if it was for the good of the people.
            Another part of the Weimar Constitution was that a Reichstag was to be formed. Here, seats were giving to different parties on the basis of proportional representation – each party received the number of seats according to the percentage of votes they obtained. Proportional representation was a good ideology in its roots, yet the way it was implemented was not too successful; obviously this way of obtaining a place in parliament was democratic, as each party could receive a set however, due to the vast number of different parties, from right-winged ones like the DVP who did not trust the democracy over the Zentrum Partei, a catholic party set up to defend and represent the catholic church’s interests to the left-winged party KPD who did not want a republic and were strongly united with Moscow to form a communist Germany,  there was great instability in the Reichstag. This instability caused little things to be able to be passed and approved by the parliament and thus show that even though very democratic the constitution of Weimar which had allowed proportional representation was hindering itself by allowing “too much” democracy, resulting in much bickering but no major changes. The Reichstag was also elected by the general public of Germany, however not every seven years like the president but every four years. Under the Weimar Republic universal suffrage was implemented, every German over the age of twenty, no matter of sex, was allowed to vote making the voting itself rather fair as one was no longer discriminated by sex, there were however, also problems with this. Even though there were plenty of parties in existence who put themselves up for election there were none to represent the women. So whom would they vote for if there was not a specific women’s party, or a party that represented they wishes? Often, this resulted in women voting for the same party as their husband without putting into consideration any other parties or they voted for the Central Party, which often represented their wishes if they were catholic. The large number of political parties in Germany also led to many coalition governments as no party could secure fifty percent of votes for themselves to become the sole party in power – during the fourteen years of Weimar rule there were twenty different coalitions, the longest government being in power for two years. This absolute chaos, even though built on democracy, made it nearly impossible for a government to fulfil the wishes of the people and thus allowed little democracy.
            The Weimar Republic included a bill of rights for the first time in German history. Under this bill of rights Germans were promised equality before the law as long as political and religious freedom this however was not carried out as planned. As Rosa Luxenburg stated "freedom only for the supporters of the government, only for the members of one party” this showing how differently this bill of rights was actually carried out. Taking the Spartacus movement of 1919 and the Kapp Putsch in March 1920 as an example, the left-winged Spartacus movement was crushed and the leader, Rosa Luxenburg and Karl Liebknecht, were killed along by the army along with the support of the Free Corps together with many other Spartacists. When the right-winged Kapp Putsch came in 1920, the army refused to help and even supported Kapp and his men with weapons and the movement was only stopped when Ebert called trade unions and workers to go on strike. After 100 hours in power in Berlin, Kapp fled to Sweden, leaving a total of 770 people to be arrested of which only one was actually tried. This is a perfect example of how the bill or rights were not applied equally to everyone in Germany at that time; the left-wing uprising was slaughtered, as well as the leaders of the Ratrepublik in Munich in addition to other communists at the time, while right-wing uprisings were met with much more lenient measures as the army supported them. This is quite a drastic example of how the constitution of the Weimar Republic was not democratic. Much like in George Orwell’s “Animal Farm” in the Weimar Republic “all animals were equal, but some were more equal than others”, in the case of Germany this conflict was in between the right-winged army and the left-winged communists, the right-winged parties being the more equal ones while left-winged party members would be beaten or even killed in the streets of, for example, Munich just because of a different political viewpoint which was allowed under the constitution. Another example of a fail of democracy of the bill of rights is the number of political assassinations in Germany between 1919 and 1922 – a rough total of 356, most carried out by right winged extremists who wanted to get rid of the by them unwanted Weimar Republic and who would use any means to do so.
            All in all I believe the Weimar Republic’s constitution to be democratic in its roots, yet it failed to fully carry out its democratic building blocks and hindered itself from fulfilling its true potential through the division of parties, with none standing up to represent Germany as a whole. Also the bill of rights, which was not applied to some people made the level of democracy in Weimar Germany less than it could have actually been. Due to this I believe that while the ideology behind the Weimar constitution was truly democratic its enactment was not.

William Shirer in his highly regarded book, Rise and Fall of the third Reich wrote about the Weimar constitution "on paper, the most liberal and democratic document of its kind the twentieth century had ever seen ... full of ingenious and admirable devices which seemed to guarantee the working of an almost flawless democracy.” However in action the years that the Weimar system was implemented were wrought with violence and discontent with the government and the democratic system. It seems amazing that such a “liberal and democratic” document could lead to such disaffection and apparently  lead to the rise of national socialism, which ideals seemingly are the polar opposite to those of the Weimar Republic. Due to this I will attempt to argue that the constitution of the Weimar Republic was in fact highly democratic and it was the context that it was implemented and not the un democratic nature of it that lead to discontent.

The voting system enacted by the Weimar government was one of proportional representation, its apparent merits are well summed up in the words of Desmond Tutu who wrote "The system of proportional representation ensures that virtually every constituency in the country will have a hearing in the national and provincial legislatures." I however would argue that by representing everyone's views to some extent It becomes somewhat undemocratic as it inevitably ends up that the government represents no ones. Another problem with this system of government is that it naturally leads to a divided government and coalitions which in turn lead to very little being done because of the opposing views of the parties. This in the instance of the Weimar Republic lead to people voting for more radical parties in the hope that they wouldn’t compromise thus adhering to the policies that the people voted. However despite the fact that It doesn’t seem proportional representation would work in any country I feel that It was a obvious attempt by the Weimar Republic to ensure that their constitution was highly democratic.

The Weimar republic was also one of the first instances of universal suffrage as it gave the vote to all men and women aged 20 or over. Due to this It seems very difficult to argue that the Weimar constitution wasn’t a very forward thinking document composed with the intention of having a highly democratic system. This however contributed to its downfall, as it was to much at odds with the previous system of government and was therefore not accept by the general populace of Germany.

Article 48 seemingly is the least democratic component of the constitution as it gave the president dictatorship like powers in a state of emergency. This I however would argue was entirely necessary as without such an article the government would have collapsed long before 1933. It was a long standing defence against the military wing of the KPD, the Spartacists, who attempted numerous times to take control of Germany and without article 48 it would have been almost impossible for the German government to combat this threat as they had a very small army due to the sanctions of the Treaty of Versailles. For these reasons it seems inevitable that without being able to easily mobilize the army and give the police more power the Weimar government would have struggled to keep power. Therefore in conclusion It seems that although Article 48 obviously was not entirely democratic without such an article the democratic Weimar Republic would have collapsed long before 1933 therefore it was entirely necessary to ensure that democracy didn’t collapse in Germany.

In conclusion the Weimar Republic constitution could not be argued to be anything other than an attempt at creating a very forward thinking democracy. This is most apparent in the introduction of proportional representation and universal suffrage. Despite the fact that Article 48 is often argued to have been the downfall of the Weimar Republic and undemocratic it seems to have been entirely necessary at the time to ensure that democracy didn’t collapse in Germany before 1933.

            The fundamental theory, on which the Weimar Republic was planned to be built upon expressed the principal objectives of a democracy. However, this essay will argue whether the main features of the constitution were indeed democratic or, in the words of Lenin, if they merely looked democratic but were in fact a mirage using two main examples: Article 48 and the powers of the president, the political system including proportional representation and the Bill of Rights. The Germany that emerged from the Great War was crippled and demoralized. It had lost over two and a half million men to the war and four million were wounded. The forced abdication of the Kaiser was met with high discontent of the society and thus, the new democratic constitution was what Germany needed to get back on its feet.
            Article 48 gave the President of the Weimar Republic dictatorial powers should an emergency situation demand this, meaning it allowed the President to override the Reichstag to pass laws. This provided the opportunity for the country leader to solve possible harming disputes that may have otherwise not been solved due to opinions within the Reichstag that were not unanimous. However, the first president of the Republic, Friedrich Ebert, used the powers of the Article 136 times. Historian Richard Evans states that Ebert misused the Article in non-emergency situations to simply get his political desires passed through the Reichstag without any opposition. This was of course not what the article was designed for and therefore Ebert's actions "became a potential threat to democratic institutions." This provides evidence that Article 48 was in fact not very democratic as it shows how easy it was for a President to dictate a country, possibly against the will of the people, without much justification. As well as this the president was elected by the people for seven years. In seven years a lot of things could happen to make the view of the people change. They are not able to vote for the party they believe to be the best for their country and fellow citizens and they have no say in political affairs for seven years, which shows again that democracy was not exactly at its best state in the new Republic.
            Proportional Representation is a political system still used in Germany today and as a German I believe it is rather effective. It is highly democratic as it allows all parties to have a say, not just the major ones. During the Weimar Republic, people aged 20 and above were allowed to vote, even women, giving an equal chance to the people of Germany. However, during the Weimar time period this system created more problems than it solved. Firstly, it made the Republic politically weak due to a vast number of completely different parties, where each represented very narrow selectional interests such as religion, regions or social class. Thus, there were frequently changing coalitions. The people of the Republic suffered from a constantly changing leadership, denying them stability and reassurance during a time where they needed it most to build up the country from the ruins caused by the Great War. This was evidently not good for the German society but if a democratic government is not able to give its people the chance to be successful then is it still democratic? As well as this women were allowed to vote, which is again extremely democratic, but there was an issue with this as well and that was the fact that no party truly represented them and their desires, suggesting that the new constitution did not create a democratic republic as it failed to offer representation for half the population.
            Finally, the Bill of Rights protected the freedom of the people and their equality before the law. Again, this is very democratic, however, this was not exactly carried out. Between 1919 and 1922 there were 356 political murders. For example Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, who lead the Communist uprisings in Germany during this time were brutally murdered. Where was their equality before the law and freedom of speech? This evidently shows that the Weimar constitution consisted of qualitative democratic principles that were simply not carried out correctly or followed.
            Therefore I believe that the key principles of the Weimar Republic, such as Article 48, proportional representation and the Bill of Rights, would have been ideal to construct and rebuild a new republic as they were all extremely democratic in theory. However, the way they were carried out, or not even followed, during the Weimar period was far from democratic. A president using the dictatorial powers to get his will, a government consisting of a vast number of parties representing many different groups of people throughout the German society and the Bill of Rights that was ignored for many cases does not make up a democratic republic where the people are supposed to be free to choose what is best for themselves. Thus, the key principles of the constitution were only democratic in theory and on paper, however, when carried out they failed to create a state strong enough to rebuild what had been shattered by the Great War.

When the new German Constitution, the “Verfassung des Deutschen Reichs” was created in the city of Weimar in Germany, 1919, Germany was in a state of Turmoil, Hyperinflation and Chaos. It could be considered a “Democratic Experiment.” The government was split and both radical right-and left wing parties were using violence in order to gain control of a country that was shaken to its core by the Loss of the First World War. The constitution of the Weimar Republic, which was in action until 1933, had flaws and weaknesses. This Constitution of the German Reich could be considered democratic and it can be argued to what extent the Constitution of the Weimar Republic really was democratic.

“On Paper, the most liberal and democratic document of its kind the twentieth century had ever seen (…) full of ingenious and admirable devices which seemed to guarantee the working of an almost flawless democracy.”  These are the words used by historian William Shirer in his book “The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich” to describe how democratic the Weimar Republic was for its time.  This is true if one considers the conditions previous to the Weimar Constitution, and even though the Weimar Constitution is often criticized for its articles, the constitution a large step forwards in matters of Democracy for Germany. Taking a closer look at the actual constitution, we can see almost immediately the liberal changes brought forward with the constitution, taking in example article 126,

[1]“Every German is entitled to address the respective authority or parliament with petitions or grievances.”
The fact that even women were allowed to vote shows how liberal and democratic the constitution was. This constitution allowed women to vote almost 20 year before any woman in France was allowed to vote, a country, which has a reputation for being revolutionary, modern and liberal. In order to recognize how valuable and democratic this article is we must put it into context, remember that this is 1919 and not the twenty-first century.  Women had never received suffrage before and this can also be seen what period of change Germany was going through, changing from centuries of Monarchy to a somewhat Involuntary Democracy.

Another feature of the constitution would be the “Reichstag” and its Proportional Representation.  The fifth chapter of the Weimar Constitution, the “Verfassung des Deutschen Reiches” concerns about the German Parliament that would run by a system of Proportional Representation.  This can be an important factor of how democratic the new Constitution was. This system would be considered democratic because it ensured a fair vote and that the people’s views get represented. The Reichstag would consist of different parties, which get voted by the public, and the more votes they would receive from the folk, the more seats would they get in the Reichstag. This would show that the Weimar Constitution was democratic to a great extent because it ensured that citizens’ views are represented by not only one ruling monarch but by many different parties.  This system, nowadays called the “Bundestag”, is still used in Germany today and its success is visible by Germany’s strong economy and democracy.

On the other hand however it can be argued if the Weimar constitution really was democratic, or if it was just supposed to look like it was.  An example for this would be Article 48.  Article 48 read that in emergency situations the ruling power would be given dictatorial powers, and this clause especially is criticized by many.  Many blame the Weimar constitution for being a window in letting Hitler gain power over Germany.  Joseph W. Bendersky comments about Article 48 in his book “A History of Nazi Germany: 1919-1945”: “The Latter held that the constitution had in fact granted the president such extensive authority and that any attempts to restrict his powers would be contrary to the original intent of article 48”.
Article 48 is an excellent example to show that the Weimar Constitution of 1919 was democratic to a minimal extent because it basically ignored the democratic clauses it stated and returned the power back to one individual, just like it had previously been with monarchy. This article therefore is not in any way democratic due to the fact that it gives power to the president, and not to the people, the “Volk”.

The Weimar Republic could be considered democratic to a medium extent because even though it did have many very democratic articles it also had articles such as Article 48, which gave dictatorial powers to an individual, which is heavily contradictory to a democracy. We are not allowed to forget however what conditions Germany was in and we must put into context that this constitution was created almost one hundred years previous to the time we are currently living in; Democracy was still in its making and Germany was somewhat a Pioneer for European Democracy at the time.  Coming back to William Shirer’s praising words of the Constitution,  even though it “seemed to be flawless”,  there were faults in the constitution, however it cannot be denied that his was indeed a democratic document.

[1] Website with Complete Weimar Constitution Chapter : Life within a Community

What were the problems in Weimar Republic from 1919-1923?

The problems that occurred in Weimar Germany were unavoidable, considering the drastic different changes of the government before and after 1919. Before 1919, the government of Germany was almost a military autocracy under Kaiser Wilhelm II; after 1919, it was a parliamentary democracy. The drastic change from one pole to the other in such a short period did not allow people to adapt the changes and thus create a ground for conflicts. The problems occurred could be classified into different categories.
Militarily, army leaders created the "stab in the back" myth and did not support the new government. After the defeat of Germany, the right blamed all Germany's problems on the new democratic Weimar government. The army leaders in order to protect their reputation devised a myth called Dolchstosslegende , the "stab in the back" myth. They blamed the revolutionary socialists and the Jews for destroying Germany. This not only undermined the social stability between different groups of people, but also undermined the position of Weimar Germany. Weimar Republic was seen to be the result of the defeat of Germany and it was led by a socialist, Ebert. The action from the military created the foundation of problems to occur in Germany. The bigger problem the military posed to the government was the lack of support. The best example was 1920's Wolfgang Putsch, during which when the Defence Minister Gustav Noske called General Seeckt, one of the Reichswehr's senior commanders, to suppress the putsch, he refused and stated that, "Reichswehr does not shoot on Reichswehr" Although the putsch was collapsed by the general strike, it showed the tension between the army and the newly formed government, and how the government was at a great risk by not being backed up by the army. However on the other hand, the collapse of the putsch also showed that not everyone was against the government. Furthermore, the fact that some of the senior commanders of the Freikorps refused to join the putsch also revealed the potential strength the government might have. The support for Mr. Bush nowadays is only 50% maximum, which means there are 50% of the people against him, and this does not create a serious problem for him. Therefore, for Weimar Republic, the lack of support for the government could create problems but it would not be a huge issue if it were the only reason.
Politically, the different ideologies collided and created conflicts, which induced the social instability. Before 1919, Germany was using a hereditary monarchy system, where Kaiser Wilhelm II controlled everything, from controlling the army to appointing the government, to calling and dismissing of the Reichstag. Basically, he had the absolute power. However, after 1919, the government became a parliamentary democracy, where everything was elected. Many were indignant with this drastic change, and they thought that Weimar Germany was not as good as it could be. The coup d'etats from both sides, left and right, only made the situation worse. In 1919, the Spartacists led by Marxists Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg in the wish of turning Germany into a soviet-based republic like Russia was crushed mercilessly by the regular troops and Freikorps. A suppression over the Bavarian Soviet Republic was carried out and it held a bitter grudge against the new SPD government. On the other hand, the Right also started a coupdetat, best shown in 1920's Dr. Wolfgang's Putsch. The attempts to overthrow the government from both sides undoubtedly weakened the government. In addition, the Treaty of Versailles also undermined the support of
Furthermore, the Weimar Constitution did not create a strong government. From the Article 48 to the proportional voting, they were all undermining the power of the weak Weimar Germany. Article 48 stated that the President could have sole power during the "time of emergency" , which the President often took. It allowed the President to bypass the government or Reichstag if he wished. It was very much like the Fundamental Law of Tsar Nicholas II in 1906 as a supplement to the October Manifesto created in 1905 as a response to the revolution. This Article 48 could easily aid the ruler to turn the parliament democracy into another autocracy, and therefore the power of the government was weak. Moreover, the system of proportional voting led to a state with 28 parties and it was impossible to establish a majority in the Reichstag. This led to a frequent change in the government and thus made many to lose faith in it. Thus, the Weimar Constitution under these circumstances was weak.
In addition, the Treaty of Versailles also undermined the position of Weimar Democracy. In 1919, the Allies were discussing the post-war settlements and they imposed their decision on Germany without even negotiating with it. They presented Germany two choices: whether accept the terms or go back to war. Germany had no choice but to accept the harsh terms. The people who signed the Treaty of Versailles were labeled as the "November Criminals". The Germans were angry at this and further create social instability from this political factor.
Economically, the hyperinflations totally ruined the economies of Germany and worsen the lives of the Germans. Germany had agreed to pay 6.6 billion pounds for reparation according the Treaty of Versailles, and when it failed to make its payment on 1923, France and Belgium invaded the Ruhr to make Germany pay. The government ordered the workers in Ruhr to go on paid strike. Ruhr being the most economically and industrially developed area in Germany hurt the economies of Germany greatly by stopping all of its production; plus, the government had to print more money in order to pay the workers, the price of goods went up as the money meant less and less. This led to a hyperinflation . At the situation worst period, the Germans would rather burn the money to sustain their warmth than buying coal or woods because burning money was much cheaper. The bad situation only led the civilians to be angry and bore grudge against the government, and therefore created problems for the new government.
The problems mentioned above from economic, military and political standpoints are only the primary problems that occurred in Weimar Germany. Although there were more problems, they could best represent the threats Germany was facing at that time.

How Did Hindenburg Undermine German Democracy in 1925-33?

"...Instead of working to achieve power by an armed coup we shall have to hold our noses and enter the Reichstag against the Catholic and Marxist deputies. If outvoting them takes longer than outshooting them, at least the results will be guaranteed by their own Constitution! Any lawful process is slow. But sooner or later we shall have a majority - and after that Germany."Adolf Hitler stated the above while he was serving his sentence for the Munich Beer Hall Putsch in Landsberg Prison. This statement signified his dramatic changes in his policies for his attempts to become the leader of Germany. Before the sentencing, he wished to use a coup to take control of the German government, but the Nazi’s failure of the Beer Hall Putsch imparted him a great lesson- that the only approach for the Nazis and himself to capture Germany was by the democratic process, elections. Approximately 4 years later in the German election of 1928, the Nazis only gained 2.6% of the popular vote and a total of 12 representations seats in the Reichstag, which was actually a decrease from 14 seats in December of 1924. Hitler’s support jumped from 6000 members to 55,000 members in 1923, and yet their support did not similarly ascend exponentially between 1924 and 1929. Hitler didn’t have support of the mass population between 1924-1929 because of the improvement of the German economy between 1924 and1929, the social stability between this period, and the political limitations and reorganization of the Nazi Party during this period of time.
The first reason why Hitler did not have support between 1924 and 1929 was because of the dramatic recovery of the German economy from the hyper-inflations and the unemployment after World War One. The German floating debt was about 191 trillion marks in 1923 and the unemployment was standing at 9.6% . Hitler used the instability of the economy as examples of failures of Weimar Germany, and one of his goals centralized around the takeover of the Weimar government. The economy condition completely changed in 1924. Gustav Stresemann, the German Foreign Minister, controlled the hyper-inflation by replacing the mark with Rentenmark in November of 1923. An American banker named Charles G. Dawes presented the Dawes Plan to the Reparations Commissions of the Allied Nations in 1924, and it was later accepted by the Allies and Germany. The plan planned the evacuation of Allied troops from the Ruhr. It gave Germany more breathing space by allowing the German reparations to start at $1 billion mark on the first year and gradually increase in the following years. Stresemann also achieved in the negotiation of borrowing 25,000 million gold marks. The money was primarily used to build basic infrastructures like roads, as well as 3 million new houses and many modern factories. Before 1924, the German economy was collapsing and Hitler used the economic failures to show the incompetence of Weimar Republic and gain support for himself. 33% of Nazi members were skilled workers while 18% were lower professionals. Many of these workers were working in horrible conditions and Hitler exploited this problem by saying that he was capable of solving all the problems if he was elected. However, when the economic turnaround began to take place, many Germans would simply ignore Hitler Hitler’s speeches before 1924 stated that if he was supported, the horrible conditions would be eliminated. Since the economic problems disappeared, reasons for citizens to support Hitler drastically decreased. These economic reforms had brought Germany’s unemployment and inflation under control while stabilizing the currency. The German industries were re-equipped and foreign investments in the economy increased. Many German citizens became satisfied with their lives, and they no longer focused their attention on a crazy guy who wanted to overthrow the government. Hitler didn’t have support between 1924 and 1929 because the members of society were satisfied with the society.
The second reason why Hitler did not gain support between 1924 and 1929 was because of the social stability in the Weimar Republic. Before 1924, the Weimar Republic was in chaos and Hitler utilized the chaos to gain public attention and verbally attack the incompetence of the Weimar Republic. He proclaimed that by eradicating the Jews, the Communists, and any non-Aryan foreigner, he was capable of making all the social problems go away. There were 376 politically motivated murders between 1918 and 1922 while revolutions, invasions, and revolts like the Spartacist Revolt, the French and Belgian Invasion, and the Kapp Putsch consumed the republic. Between 1924 and 1929, the chaos dramatically diminished as the Locarno Treaty was signed and Germany entered the League of Nations. Under the Locarno Treaty, Germany recognized the western frontiers to be permanent, and the nations of Germany, France, and Belgium promised not to attack as each others while Britain and Italy were the guarantors. The Locarno Treaties eased the tensions between Germany and the other European powers and it allowed Germany to enter the League of Nations and become a superpower once again. In 1925, Paul von Hindenburg was elected to be the president. Many conservative parties and “middle of the road” parties supported him and promised to stop from any radical party to take over the government. At the same time, the German army conciliated with the government, and the Army-supported paramilitary organizations protected democracy for the period of time between 1924 and 1929. Not only did Germany’s economic improvement prevent Hitler from gaining support between 1924 and 1929, Germany’s social order contributed to the fact that Hitler did not have support during this period of time. As invasions and revolts faded in the memories of the citizens, many citizens would turn their heads away from Nazi propaganda and accidentally view Hitler as the popular Charlie Chaplin. The citizens could enjoy their lives through entertainment and sports so they would try their best to prolong the social stability that Weimar Republic provided, rather than to listen to same lunatic who wanted to overthrow the government. Germany became a superpower once again and the citizens became contented with their balanced lives. Hitler was disregarded because many citizens lost their hatred and dislike for the Weimar Republic, the Treaty of Versailles, and the League of Nations. The Nazis no longer attracted the citizens as much as they did when Weimar Republic was in social disorder and this directly resulted in the fact that Hitler did not have support between 1924 and 1929.
The third reason why Hitler did not have support between 1924 and 1929 was because of the political limitations on Hitler and the reorganization inside the Nazi Party. Hitler was sentenced to 9 months in Landsberg prison after the Munich Beer Hall Putsch and he came out on December 20th 1924 as a free man who, however, could not make public speeches for the next five years. Although Joseph Goebbels was a talented publicist, the meetings he organized, the newspapers he published, and the posters he posted were still not as influential as Hitler’s speech. Due to continuing violence, the Nazi Party was outlawed in Berlin and Nazi speeches were completely banned in the entire German state of Prussia for a period of time. Even when the government of Bavaria and Saxony allowed Hitler to publicly speak in 1927 and he did for 56 times in the last 10 months, Hitler’s support was still concentrated in north-west Germany and it did not disperse to other German regions. At the same time, Hitler focused a lot of attention at restructuring the Nazi Party between 1924 and 1929. Although he easily took control of the Party after he came out of jail since Alfred Rosenberg, the man who was in charge of the party while Hitler was in prison, had no administrative ability, the Party almost dissolved because moderate parties inside the nation attracted more citizens since the nation’s economy was improving. In order to expand the Nazi Party, Hitler reorganized the SA, set up the SS, merged with other right-wing parties, and started to receive essential financial support. Though Hitler had spoken numerous times after the ban was lifted, the time which Hitler was not allowed to publicize had considerably taken Hitler out of the sight of the public. This delay directly affected the fact that Hitler did not gain mass support of the entire nation. Also, Hitler’s reorganization of the Nazi Party was proven to be effective after 1929, but it did not immediately gain Hitler lots of support. The reorganization took an extremely long process, and it took years for all the new organizations to be integrated into the Main Party and adjust to the new atmosphere. Hitler’s limitation of publicity and the restructuring of the party directly resulted in the party receiving only 12 Reichstag seats in 1928 and 2.6% of popular vote in the national election.
“Support for the Nazi Party had grown due to the country's problems of hyperinflation and the French invasion of the Ruhr. By 1928 Nazism appeared to be a dying cause. Now that Germany's outlook was suddenly bright, the Nazi Party was rapidly withering away. One scarcely heard of Hitler or the Nazis except as a joke.”William Shirer, an American journalist, said this in The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich to describe the declining status of the Nazis and Hitler in 1928. Indeed, Hitler didn’t have mass support between 1924 and 1929 because of the dramatic economic improvement of the Weimar Republic, the social stability in the nation, and the political limitations on Hitler and the reorganization inside the Nazi Party. Although the economic and social stability would instantly disappear after the Great Depression and the Nazis would ultimately take control of Germany, Hitler’s support between 1924 and 1929 only earned him a popular vote of 2.6% in Germany’s national election in 1928. This statistic extensively displays the fact that Hitler did not have support between 1924 and 1929.


During the spring of 1930, President Hindenburg, at the urging of Reich chancellor Brüning, overruled the Reichstag through the usage of article 48. Soon after, on July 18th, the Reichstag voted as a majority to repeal this, nullifying the presidential decree and forcing Brüning to dissolve the parliament, calling for re-elections that allowed politically extreme parties such as the communists and, most notably, the national socialists huge gains of influence. This breakdown in the democratic system marked the beginning of the end for the Weimar republic, as three years of political deadlocks between extremists would result in the eventual rise of one Adolf Hitler and the establishment of a totalitarian state. The end of the Weimar democracy, however, as is argued by Eric Weitz in his book “Weimar Germany: Promise and Tragedy”, took place three years earlier, when, following the above incident, President Hindenburg established what Weitz describes as a “Presidential Dictatorship” and indeed, it was this “Coterie of the Elite”, as Weitz describes it, that led to Hitler taking power, as opposed to the democratic system voting him in. The real question is why was this the case? How did a system that was experiencing huge economic and cultural success as late as the beginning of 1929 collapse only a year later? To answer this, historians have examined the weaknesses of the Weimar Republic and, when regarding the literature, three major areas seem to be repeatedly identified as weak: the constitution, the economic crises and the political extremism within the system.

            The Weimar constitution, upon its conception in 1919, was met with mixed reactions, ranging from outright rebellion as seen by the Kapp Putsch, to simple indifference, however it governed the way that Germany was run up until, technically, 1945. The document itself was described by William Shirer as “on paper, the most liberal and democratic document of its kind the twentieth century had ever seen ... full of ingenious and admirable devices which seemed to guarantee the working of an almost flawless democracy…", however in practice this document yielded some weaknesses that, as is argued by some historians, constitute some of the key causes of the collapse of the Weimar democracy. The most obvious weakness of the Weimar constitution was the infamous Article 48, that granted the President the right to use military strength and overrule the Reichstag in times of emergency. In itself, the philosophy of this clause is a weakness, as by providing the circumstances where a leadership figure may assume dictatorial rights, one undermines, ideologically, the concept of a free democracy. Then again, this evidence is shaky, as the parliamentary sovereignty of the United Kingdom allows the legislature to achieve similar powers to overrule fundamental freedoms, however the United Kingdom has been able to maintain its basic governmental structure for centuries, where Germany was unable to do so for two decades. Thus, it seems unlikely that the pure ideology of the Article would be a cause for the collapse of the Republic. Richard J. Evans considers not the concept of Article 48 to be a weakness, but instead the implementation of it. He argues that as there was no clear method for the return to legislative powers in place, allowing President Ebert to repeatedly use the Article a total of 136 times in a mere five years, even in non-emergency situations, thus causing the potential for application of this clause to widen beyond what would be democratically sustainable, thus posing a potential threat to the democracy. However, while this does perhaps explain why Brüning was able to so easily use Article 48 and in the process destroy democracy, the question remains why in 1930? Surely, if Article 48 was such a great threat, the Republic would’ve imploded much sooner. This implies that while Article 48 may have facilitated the collapse of the Weimar democracy, other factors most likely caused it. The other weakness of the constitution that Historians argue may have caused the collapse of democracy is that it implemented a proportional representation system, where the percentage of votes a party gets directly corresponded to the number of seats in the Reichstag the party receives, with no minimum percentage of votes required  to gain access. This allowed even small parties, with potentially extremist views, access to the Reichstag, as demonstrated by the fact that the relatively unknown Bavarian Peasants’ League gained access to the Reichstag despite only garnering 0.7% of the vote in 1924. Additionally, proportional representation meant that a huge number of parties gained access to the Reichstag, as seen by the 28 parties, according to Shirer, who were voted into the Reichstag in 1930, resulting in there never being a one party majority, slowing down decision making processes and creating a Parliament fractured by far too many different opinions. This plethora of multiple opinions, as argued by Erich Eyck, resulted in an inherent instability, which caused the policies put out by this system to be at best compromises, at worst contradictions. Proportional representation may thus have caused the collapse of the Weimar democracy through the creation of an inherent instability within the system that constantly threatened it. Nevertheless, the Weimar Republic was able to survive with this system for over a decade and even, during the late 1920s, flourish. This indicates that, like Article 48, while proportional representation may have provided the conditions for failure, the actual root cause for the collapse of democracy must be found elsewhere.

            When regarding the collapse of the Weimar Republic, one tends to often immediately regard the influence of the politically extreme parties on the system. During its early years, the Weimar Republic was plagued by constant attempts at revolution and change from democracy. The Spartacist uprising of 1919, the Kapp Putsch of 1920, the short-lived Räterepubliks in Munich and Bremen as well as the uprisings in the Rhineland, Thuringia, Saxony and Munich in 1923 all are examples of situations where a number of the population attempt to overthrow the democratic regime of the Weimar Republic. Although these all failed, often due to police brutality, as Paul Bookbinder argues, this indicates that the atmosphere within Germany was on the side of the political extremes and thus not receptive to democracy.  Additionally, during this early period, 356 of the young and promising politicians who supported the Republic, foremost amongst the Walther Rathenau, were assassinated by politically extreme groups, resulting in a situation where those who seek to support the Republic are often scared away, leaving those who are too fanatical or stupid to care in power. As Yeats put it: “The best lacked all conviction, while the worst are filled with passionate intensity,” accurately describing the weakness in leadership that the Weimar faced due to early political extremism, a weakness that might in part be seen as responsible for allowing the collapse to happen. At the same time however, following this argument, one would expect that during the time leading up to the collapse of democracy, one would see multiple leaders elected and discarded, as the weakness of these leaders would be rejected by a populace unwilling to accept them and their democracy. Instead, we observe that up until 1929, Germany had one chancellor, Streseman, under whom it has been observed by many, including Eric Weitz, that politics of the people became more moderate as living standards and economic stability increased. Furthermore, noting that the most dangerous of the early attempts to overthrow the Weimar democracy, the right wing Kapp Putsch, was not overthrown through military force, but by a general strike of the workers, one gets the impression that this rejection of democracy was not the opinion of the majority, as one might initially believe, but instead merely the belief of a radical minority. Indeed, as Weitz remarks, even at the height of their popularity in 1933, the radical national socialist party was only able to garner 37% of the votes, further cementing the idea that these political extremists always were fringe parties. Considering that the democracy was supported by the silent majority and that it was the democratically elected successors to a strong leader in Streseman that initiated the collapse (Hindenburg primarily), during a time period where National Socialist influence was still based on the 1928 elections at a mere 2.8% of the Reichstag, one must consider the political extremists as, although a cause for disturbance, more a symptom of the collapse rather than the cause of it.

            A final reason that historians, perhaps most famously AJP Taylor, attribute to the collapse of democracy is the economic crisis of 1929, which, as stated by Taylor, “put the wind into Hitler’s sails”. This implies that it was the economic crisis of 1929 that allowed Hitler to gain enough public support to push towards power, as seen by the giant leap in votes between the 1928 elections, where the Nazis got a mere 2.7% and the 1930 elections, where Hitler’s party got 18.3% of the votes. This leap in support closely correlates with the leap in unemployment figures, with Germany’s unemployment level doubling to 3 million between 1928 and 1930. Richard J Evans points out how the suffering of the German people went beyond the statistics, with many millions of those who could retain their jobs being underpaid or working only part time. As a result, it is hardly surprising that the majority, now suffering due to the 1929 economic collapse, would view the Democratic Experiment, as Michael Brooks describes it, as a failure, thus leading a movement towards alternative ideologies (i.e. the political extremes). Nevertheless, it has already been noted that, even by 1933, none of the extremist parties were able to take advantage of this polarisation of politics to the extent, where they could take power through democratic means. Indeed, in 1932, the old stalwart president Hindenburg was re-elected, beating his extreme reformist competitor Hitler, implying that this polarisation of politics may not have lost the Weimar so much support so as to initiate its collapse. What then caused this implosion of democracy in 1930? Perhaps, it is due to the fact that, following Weitz’s argument, the Weimar system was unable to quickly, nor effectively provide a solution with the speed needed to satisfy the people. As a result, Brüning and Hindenburg were forced to resort to alternative methods of passing laws, invoking article 48 and thus destroying democracy in the process. This seems to explain why democracy imploded prior to the influence of a polarisation in politics as well as despite the majority still siding with the “old guard”. What this fails to explain however is why the 1929 economic disaster was so politically devastating to the republic, while other economic disasters weren’t. In 1923, Germany experienced, due to an inability and refusal to repay the Treaty of Versailles’ war reparations, a period of hyperinflation and mass poverty. In 1923, the working class were just as poor as in 1923, perhaps even more so, the economy was in worse shape and, unlike in 1929, Germany’s borders had been violated and its industry raided, further heightening the level of strife. There was a polarisation of politics in 1923 and multiple uprisings, however the democracy survived, unlike in 1929. So why was 1929 so much more devastating? What differentiated it from 1923 to cause a collapse in democracy? As historians such as Ian Kershaw argue, there are a number of differences that made 1929 so much more damaging. First, 1929 was a second economic crisis. Prior to 1923, the situation in Germany was hardly better, so the economic crisis was as much blamed on the Treaty of Versailles and on the Dolchstoßlegende as it was on the regime. In 1929, however, the Treaty was long since past, the Republic had been experiencing a now illusory success and as a result the blame for ills Germany was experiencing was attributed, unlike in 1923, primarily onto the democratic system itself, thus causing it to implode. Furthermore, the 1929 economic crisis was a global economic crisis, meaning that, unlike in 1923, there was no rich foreign investor such as the US to haul Germany out of its misery. Finally and perhaps most importantly, the 1929 crisis, unlike 1923, effected the banks in that it caused many of them to fold. As a result, unlike in 1923, where primarily the working class suffered, in 1929 the Middle Class began to suffer, as their savings were lost and there jobs destroyed. This caused the politics of the middle class to polarise, as their demands for action from the government were not met by any tangible response. The government, alarmed by this dissatisfaction from the far more influential bourgeoisie, were rushed into action through this panicked use of Article 48, thus initiating the collapse of the Weimar democracy.

            In conclusion, when considering why the Weimar democracy collapsed, we regard the ideas of a weak constitution, influence of political extremists and the effects of multiple economic crises. Upon careful analysis, it appears that it was the economic crises that seemed the most likely cause of initiating this collapse, as although the constitution provided the conditions that made this collapse possible, there’s little evidence to suggest that it was the constitution that initiated the failure, while the presence of political extremists seemed much more a symptom of this collapse than a cause. As a result, one can conclude that it was most likely the 1929 economic collapse, with specific regard for the effect it had on the Mittelstand that resulted in the disintegration of the Weimar democracy and Adolf Hitler’s eventual rise to power.


Many factors were significant in the downfall of the Weimar Republic, however it was the economic crisis stemming from the Wall Street Crash that, according to AJP Taylor, gave in to the collapse of the Weimar democracy. AJP Taylor states that, “Only the Great Depression put the wind into Hitler’s sails”. The Wall Street Crash was a disaster for all of Europe, but it was Germany who suffered the most after the Treaty of Versailles, and it was America who had helped them survive. After the Wall Street Crash however, all the loans that were given to Germany to help them survive were withdrawn, which meant that the Weimar Republic was unable to cope anymore, leading to its collapse in 1930.

The Hyperinflation in 1923 led to a great deal of suffering for Germany, and it wasn’t until America got involved that their burden became lightened. After realising that Germany would be unable to pay the reparations cost from Article 232 of the Treaty of Versailles and stabilise their economy, America decided to lend them money. This meant that Germany had to become reliant on America; therefore, when the Wall Street Crash occurred in 1929 and America withdrew their loans, the Weimar Republic was unable to continue. Richard J. Evans supports this theory in The Coming of the Third Reich, “the economic difficulties that the Republic experienced almost from the outset placed a burden on its welfare system that it was simply unable to sustain”. The Great Depression was a substantial hit to unemployment, where it increased from 1.6 million unemployed in 1929, to 6.12 million unemployed in 1932. The Weimar democracy was already under a lot of pressure and was disliked by many Germans, the Depression was the last blow and led to extreme parties such as the NSDAP coming into power. As AJP Taylor mentions, the Great Depression was the most significant factor that led to the collapse of the Weimar Republic.

Another feature that contributed to the fall of the Weimar Republic was its weak constitution. When the Weimar democracy had been sent up in 1919, it was set up to try and recover what was left of the powerful country that had been present before the First World War. Many Germans, due to them not being in favour of democracy, disliked the Weimar Republic. The main two drawbacks of the Weimar constitution were Article 48 and proportional representation. Article 48 stated that, under a state of emergency, the President could rule by decree without needing consent from the Reichstag. In principle, this was a good idea, however, during the Weimar’s existence, the first Weimar President, Friedrich Ebert, abused this power on 136 occasions. Richard J. Evans mentions, in reference to President Ebert, “Ebert’s excessive use, and occasional misuse, of the Article widened its application to a point where it became a potential threat to democratic institutions”. President Hindenburg and then later on Hitler were also known for misusing this Article. Article 48 basically gave the President of the Weimar Republic dictatorial powers. This showed the Weimar Republic’s weakness, as it showed that it was a failing democracy and could be taken advantage of. Proportional representation was also significant in the Weimar Republic’s downfall, as it led to many disagreements among the parties, which dramatically delayed any chance at making decisions. Proportional representation was where the percentage of votes a party won in the Reichstag corresponded directly to the amount of seats they would receive. The system seemed efficient and fair in theory, as it directly represented the nation’s support for each party. However, when put into practice, many problems were seen to arise, including the difficulty for the parties to reach a conclusion in regards to a dilemma. This inability to quickly make decisions on courses of action meant that a lot of time was wasted and coalitions always had to be formed in order to reach a conclusion. Due to the abuse of Article 48 and the extensive problems encountered through proportional representation, the Weimar constitution was seen as weak and ineffective by many members of the public, and showed the Germans’ lack of belief in their new democracy.  

As well as having to deal with its crumbling democracy, the Weimar Republic also had to face repetitive political extremism, which was pivotal in its downfall. The German people witnessed constant opposition against the Weimar Republic, which, after the various economic crises, showed them that the Weimar democracy was weak, and that it would only be through extreme parties that they could witness change. This mind-set led to the rise in support of Hitler after the exponential rise in unemployment between 1929 and 1932. The first such example of political extremism was manifested in the form of the Spartacist uprising. On 5th January 1919, Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, founders of the Spartacus League, staged an uprising in Berlin led by the USPD. This was in response to the recently appointed Weimar Republic. The aim of the Spartacist uprising was to overthrow the provisional government and create a Soviet republic. The Freikorps was called in to intervene and both Luxemburg and Liebknecht were murdered. Leonard V. Kaplan mentions in his book The Weimar Moment that “the Spartacist uprising in Berlin betrayed the instability of the new democracy”. More than a year later, in March 1920, another uprising occurred. Known as the Kapp Putsch, 12000 troops were encouraged to march on Berlin and overthrow the government. This uprising was staged by Wolfgang Kapp leading the Ehrhardt Brigade, which was a unit of the Freikorps that had refused to disband, and its main aim was to install a new government in place of the failing Weimar Republic. To stop this, the trade unions went on strike, and the Kapp Putsch ended up being called off. With the continuous revolts against the government, the Germans began to doubt the efficacy of this new type of government, and soon after the Wall Street Crash began to believe in political extremism.

The constitution and political extremism were very influential in the downfall of the Weimar democracy, however it was the economic crisis manifested through the Wall Street Crash that led to the collapse of Weimar. The German people were not forthcoming in their belief in this new type of democracy in 1919, and the rise in unemployment, due to the Wall Street Crash, combined with the many staged uprisings against the Weimar Republic led to a complete loss of faith on behalf of many Germans in the democracy. Although the Weimar Republic did have a few successful years under Stresemann’s rule, it all collapsed after the Wall Street Crash, where the Germans began to vote for extremist parties in order to see whether the parties could solve the massive unemployment rate. on at Versailles. Allied ultimatum concerning acceptance of peace treaty. Scheidemann Cabinet resigns; government formed by Bauer (SPD and Centre). Peace treaty signed at Versailles. Weimar constitution comes into force. Allies withdraw intervention forces from Russia. Peace treaty between Austria and the Allies (St Germain). Beginning of civil warfare in China (to 1926). Electoral victory of Bloc National in France. Hindenburg’s evidence to National Assembly committee of inquiry (‘stab in the back’ legend). Peace treaty between Bulgaria and the Allies (Neuilly). Treaty of Versailles comes into force. Admiral Horthy elected regent of Hungary. Kapp–Lüttwitz putsch; government flees to Dresden and Stuttgart; general strike proclaimed by unions; putsch collapses. Fighting in the Ruhr district and central Germany. US Senate refuses to ratify Treaty of Versailles or approve US member- ship of League of Nations. Russo-Polish war. Peace treaty between Hungary and the Allies (Trianon). Reichstag election (‘Weimar coalition’ suffers considerable losses); bourgeois minority government formed by Fehrenbach (Centre, DDP and DVP [National Liberals]). Peace treaty between Turkey and the Allies (Sèvres). Formation of the ‘little Entente’ (Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia), joined by Romania in June 1921. Split of the USPD. Left wing of the USPD joins the KPD. Greco-Turkish war (to 1922). Paris conference: German reparations payment set at 269,000 million gold marks. Franco-Polish treaty of mutual assistance. London conference on reparations; threat of sanctions against Germany. Allied troops occupy Duisburg, Ruhrort and Düsseldorf. Russian Communist Party congress adopts New Economic Policy. Polish–Soviet frontier fixed by peace treaty of Riga. Plebiscite in Upper Silesia; KPD’s ‘March operation’ (Märzaktion) in central Germany. German reparations fixed at 132,000 million gold marks. Fighting breaks out in Upper Silesia. The Weimar Republic (German: Weimarer Republik [ˈvaɪmaʁɐ ʁepuˈbliːk] ( listen)) is a name given by historians to the federal republic and semi-presidential representative democracy established in 1919 in Germany to replace the imperial form of government. It is named after Weimar, the city where the constitutional assembly took place. During this period, and well into the succeeding Nazi era, the official name of the state was German Reich (Deutsches Reich), which continued on from the pre-1918 Imperial period. Following the First World War, the republic emerged from the German Revolution in November 1918. In 1919, a national assembly was convened in Weimar, where a new constitution for the German Reich was written, then adopted on 11 August of that same year. In its fourteen years, the Weimar Republic faced numerous problems, including hyperinflation, political extremists (with paramilitaries – both left and right wing) and continuing contentious relationships with the victors of the First World War. However, the Weimar Republic successfully reformed the currency, unified tax policies and the railway system and it did eliminate most of the requirements of the Treaty of Versailles, in that Germany never completely met the disarmament requirements, and eventually only paid a small portion of the total reparations required by the treaty, which were reduced twice by restructuring Germany's debt through the Dawes Plan and the Young Plan.[4] While the Western borders of the Weimar Republic were accepted by Germany under the influence of Gustav Streseman as German foreign minister in the Locarno Treaties, the Eastern border remained debatable for the Weimar German governments. The ensuing period of liberal democracy lapsed by 1930, when President Hindenburg assumed dictatorial emergency powers to back the administrations of Chancellors Brüning, Papen, Schleicher, and finally Hitler. Between 1930 and 1933 the Great Depression, even worsened by Brüning's policy of deflation, led to a surge in unemployment.[5] It led to the ascent of the nascent Nazi Party in 1933. The legal measures taken by the new Nazi government in February and March 1933, commonly known as the Machtergreifung (seizure of power), meant that the government could legislate contrary to the constitution. The constitution became irrelevant, so 1933 is usually seen as the end of the Weimar Republic and the beginning of the Third Reich. Allied ultimatum demands acceptance by Germany of ‘London payments plan’. Wirth government; Reichstag accepts London ultimatum. Beginning of ‘policy of fulfilment’. USA signs peace treaties with Germany and Austria. Erzberger murdered. League of Nations Council partitions Upper Silesia between Germany and Poland. ‘Great coalition’ government (SPD, Centre, DDP, DVP) formed in Prussia under Otto Braun (SPD). Washington conference (naval limitation agreement; independence of China guaranteed). Cannes conference (decision to hold a world economic conference at Genoa). Poincaré government in France. Genoa conference. Treaty of Rapallo between Germany and the Soviet Union. German Foreign Minister Rathenau murdered by right-wing extremists. Reichstag approves Law for the Protection of the Republic. London conference; Poincaré demands ‘productive pledges’ from Germany in return for a moratorium. Accierated inflation in Germany. Remnant of USPD merges with SPD. Greco-Turkish armistice after Greek defeats; failure nto the train of such capitalist and feudal reactionaries. Therefore Hitler refused ministry under Papen, and demanded the chancellorship for himself, but was rejected by Hindenburg on 13 August 1932. There was still no majority in the Reichstag for any government; as a result, the Reichstag was dissolved and elections took place once more in the hope that a stable majority would result. The Schleicher cabinet The 6 November 1932 elections yielded 33.1% for the Nazis,[47] two million voters fewer than in the previous election. Franz von Papen stepped down and was succeeded as Chancellor (Reichskanzler) by General Kurt von Schleicher on 3 December. Schleicher, a retired army officer, had developed in an atmosphere of semi-obscurity and intrigue that encompassed the Republican military policy. He had for years been in the camp of those supporting the Conservative counter-revolution. Schleicher's bold and unsuccessful plan was to build a majority in the Reichstag by uniting the trade unionist left wings of the various parties, including that of the Nazis led by Gregor Strasser. This policy did not prove successful either. In this brief Presidential Dictatorship intermission, Schleicher assumed the role of "Socialist General" and entered into relations with the Christian Trade Unions, the left-wing members of the Nazi party, and even with the Social Democrats. Schleicher planned for a sort of labour government under his Generalship. But the Reichswehr officers were not prepared for this, the working class had a natural distrust of their future allies, and the great capitalists and landowners also did not like the plans. The SPD and the Communists could have achieved success building on a Berlin transport strike.[citation needed] Poster for the nationalist "Black–White–Red" coalition of Alfred Hugenberg (DNVP leader), Franz von Papen and Franz Seldte. Hitler learned from Papen that the general had no authority to abolish the Reichstag parliament, whereas any majority of seats did. The cabinet (under a previous interpretation of Article 48) ruled without a sitting Reichstag, which could vote only for its own dissolution. Hitler also learned that all past crippling Nazi debts were to be relieved by German big business. On 22 January, Hitler's efforts to persuade Oskar von Hindenburg (the President's son) included threats to bring criminal charges over estate taxation irregularities at the President's Neudeck estate; although 5,000 acres (20 km2) extra were soon allotted to Hindenburg's property. Outmaneuvered by Papen and Hitler on plans for the new cabinet, and having lost Hindenburg's confidence, Schleicher asked for new elections. On 28 January, Papen described Hitler to Paul von Hindenburg as only a minority part of an alternative, Papen-arranged government. The four great political movements, the SPD, Communists, Centre, and the Nazis were in opposition. On 29 January, Hitler and Papen thwarted a last-minute threat of an officially sanctioned Reichswehr takeover, and on 30 January 1933 Hindenburg accepted the new Papen-Nationalist-Hitler coalition, with the Nazis holding only three of eleven Cabinet seats. Later that day, the first cabinet meeting was attended by only two political parties, representing a minority in the Reichstag: The Nazis and the German National People's Party (DNVP), led by Alfred Hugenberg, with 196 and 52 seats respectively. Eyeing the Catholic Centre Party's 70 (plus 20 BVP) seats, Hitler refused their leader's demands for constitutional "concessions" (amounting to protection) and planned for dissolution of the Reichstag. Hindenburg, despite his misgivings about the Nazis' goals and about Hitler as a personality, reluctantly agreed to Papen's theory that, with Nazi popular support on the wane, Hitler could now be controlled as Chancellor. This date, dubbed by the Nazis as the Machtergreifung (seizure of power), is commonly seen as the beginning of Nazi Germany. However, the moment in German history when the democratic principles of the constitution and personal liberty came to an end was Hindenburg's appointment of Brüning as Chancellor. End Hitler's chancellorship (1933) Hitler was sworn in as Chancellor on the morning of 30 January 1933 in what some observers later described as a brief and indifferent ceremony. By early February, a mere week after Hitler's assumption of the chancellorship, the government had begun to clamp down on the opposition. Meetings of the left-wing parties were banned and even some of the moderate parties found their members threatened and assaulted. Measures with an appearance of legality suppressed the Communist Party in mid-February and included the plainly illegal arrests of Reichstag deputies. The Reichstag Fire on 27 February was blamed by Hitler's government on the Communists. Hitler used the ensuing state of emergency to obtain the presidential assent of Hindenburg to issue the Reichstag Fire Decree the following day. The decree invoked Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution and "indefinitely suspended" a number of constitutional protections of civil liberties, allowing the Nazi government to take swift action against political meetings, arresting and killing the Communists. Hitler and the Nazis exploited the German state's broadcasting and aviation facilities in a massive attempt to sway the electorate, but this election yielded a scant majority of 16 seats for the coalition. At the Reichstag elections, which took place on 5 March 1933, the NSDAP obtained 17 million votes. The Communist, Social Democrat and Catholic Centre votes stood firm. This was the last multi-party election of the Weimar Republic and the last multi-party all-German election for 57 years. Hitler addressed disparate interest groups, stressing the necessity for a definitive solution to the perpetual instability of the Weimar Republic. He now blamed Germany's problems on the Communists, even threatening their lives on 3 March. Former Chancellor Heinrich Brüning proclaimed that his Centre Party would resist any constitutional change and appealed to the President for an investigation of the Reichstag fire. Hitler's successful plan was to induce what remained of the now Communist-depleted Reichstag to grant him, and the Government, the authority to issue decrees with the force of law. The hitherto Presidential Dictatorship hereby was to give itself a new legal form. On 15 March, the first cabinet meeting was attended by the two coalition parties, representing a minority in the Reichstag: The Nazis and the DNVP led by Alfred Hugenberg (288 + 52 seats). According to the Nuremberg Trials, this cabinet meeting's first order of business was how at last to achieve the complete counter-revolution by means of the constitutionally allowed Enabling Act, requiring a 66% parliamentary majority. This Act would, and did, lead Hitler and the NSDAP toward his goal of unfettered dictatorial powers.[48] Hitler cabinet meeting in mid-March At the meeting of the new cabinet on 15 March, Hitler introduced the Enabling Act, which would have authorised the cabinet to enact legislation without the approval of the Reichstag. Meanwhile, the only remaining question for the Nazis was whether the Catholic Centre Party (Zentrum) would support the Enabling Act in the Reichstag, thereby providing the ⅔ majority required to ratify a law that amended the constitution. Hitler expressed his confidence to win over the Centre's votes. Hitler is recorded at the Nuremberg Trials as being sure of eventual Centre Party Germany capitulation and thus rejecting of the DNVP's suggestions to "balance" the majority through further arrests, this time of Social Democrats. Hitler however assured his coalition partners that arrests would resume after the elections and, in fact, some 26 SPD Social Democrats were physically removed. After meeting with Centre leader Monsignor Ludwig Kaas and other Centre Trade Union leaders daily and denying them a substantial participation in the government, negotiation succeeded in respect of guarantees towards Catholic civil-servants and education issues. At the last internal Centre meeting prior to the debate on the Enabling Act, Kaas expressed no preference or suggestion on the vote, but as a way of mollifying opposition by Centre members to the granting of further powers to Hitler, Kaas somehow arranged for a letter of constitutional guarantee from Hitler himself prior to his voting with the centre en bloc in favour of the Enabling Act. This guarantee was not ultimately given. Kaas, the party's chairman since 1928, had strong connections to the Vatican Secretary of State, later Pope Pius XII. In return for pledging his support for the act, Kaas would use his connections with the Vatican to set in train and draft the Holy See's long desired Reichskonkordat with Germany (only possible with the co-operation of the Nazis). Ludwig Kaas is considered along with Papen as being one of the two most important political figures in the creation of a National Socialist dictatorship.[49] Enabling Act negotiations On 20 March, negotiation began between Hitler and Frick on one side and the Catholic Centre Party (Zentrum) leaders—Kaas, Stegerwald and Hackelsburger on the other. The aim was to settle on conditions under which Centre would vote in favour of the Enabling Act. Because of the Nazis' narrow majority in the Reichstag, Centre's support was necessary to receive the required two-thirds majority vote. On 22 March, the negotiations concluded; Hitler promised to continue the existence of the German states, agreed not to use the new grant of power to change the constitution, and promised to retain Zentrum members in the civil service. Hitler also pledged to protect the Catholic confessional schools and to respect the concordats signed between the Holy See and Bavaria (1924), Prussia (1929) and Baden (1931). Hitler also agreed to mention these promises in his speech to the Reichstag before the vote on the Enabling Act. The ceremonial opening of the Reichstag on 21 March was held at the Garrison Church in Potsdam, a shrine of Prussianism, in the presence of many Junker landowners and representatives of the imperial military caste. This impressive and often emotional spectacle—orchestrated by Joseph Goebbels—aimed to link Hitler's government with Germany's imperial past and portray National Socialism as a guarantor of the nation's future. The ceremony helped convince the "old guard" Prussian military elite of Hitler's homage to their long tradition and, in turn, produced the relatively convincing view that Hitler's government had the support of Germany's traditional protector—the Army. Such support would publicly signal a return to conservatism to curb the problems affecting the Weimar Republic, and that stability might be at hand. In a cynical and politically adroit move, Hitler bowed in apparently respectful humility before President and Field Marshal Hindenburg. Passage of the Enabling Act The Reichstag convened on 23 March 1933, and in the midday opening, Hitler made a historic speech, appearing outwardly calm and conciliatory. Hitler presented an appealing prospect of respect towards Christianity by paying tribute to the Christian faiths as "essential elements for safeguarding the soul of the German people". He promised to respect their rights and declared his government's "ambition is a peaceful accord between Church and State" and that he hoped "to improve our friendly relations with the Holy See." This speech aimed especially at the future recognition by the named Holy See and therefore to the votes of the Centre Party addressing many concerns Kaas had voiced during the previous talks. Kaas is considered to have had a hand therefore in the drafting of the speech.[49] Kaas is also reported as voicing the Holy See's desire for Hitler as bulwark against atheistic Russian nihilism previously as early as May 1932.[50] Hitler promised that the Act did not threaten the existence of either the Reichstag or the Reichsrat, that the authority of the President remained untouched and that the Länder would not be abolished. Of course, all the promises would be broken soon enough, but they served their purpose. During an adjournment, the other parties (notably the Centre) met to discuss their intentions.[51] In the debate prior to the vote on the Enabling Act, Hitler orchestrated the full political menace of his paramilitary forces like the storm division in the streets to intimidate reluctant Reichstag deputies into approving the Enabling Act. The Communists' 81 seats had been empty since the Reichstag Fire Decree and other lesser known procedural measures, thus excluding their anticipated "No" votes from the balloting. Otto Wels, the leader of the Social Democrats, whose seats were similarly depleted from 120 to below 100, was the only speaker to defend democracy and in a futile but brave effort to deny Hitler the ⅔ majority, he made a speech critical of the abandonment of democracy to dictatorship. At this, Hitler could no longer restrain his wrath.[52] In his retort to Wels, Hitler abandoned earlier pretence at calm statesmanship and delivered a characteristic screaming diatribe, promising to exterminate all Communists in Germany and threatening Wels' Social Democrats as well. He did not even want their support for the bill. "Germany will become free, but not through you," he shouted.[53] Meanwhile Hitler's promised written guarantee to Monsignor Kaas was being typed up, it was asserted to Kaas, and thereby Kaas was persuaded to silently deliver the Centre bloc's votes for the Enabling Act anyway. The Act—formally titled the "Act for the Removal of Distress from People and Reich"—was passed by a vote of 441 to 94. Only the SPD had voted against the Act. Every other member of the Reichstag, whether from the largest or the smallest party, voted in favour of the Act. It went into effect the following day, 24 March. Consequences Main article: Nazi Germany The passage of the Enabling Act of 1933 is widely considered to mark the end of the Weimar Republic and the beginning of the Third Reich. It empowered the cabinet to legislate without the approval of Reichstag or the President, and to enact laws that were contrary to the constitution. Before the March 1933 elections, Hitler had persuaded Hindenburg to promulgate the Reichstag Fire Decree using Article 48, which empowered the government to restrict "the rights of habeas corpus [...] freedom of the press, the freedom to organise and assemble, the privacy of postal, telegraphic and telephonic communications" and legalised search warrants and confiscation "beyond legal limits otherwise prescribed". This was intended to forestall any action against the government by the Communists. Hitler used the provisions of the Enabling Act to pre-empt possible opposition to his dictatorship from other sources, in which he was mostly successful. The process of bringing all major organisations into line with Nazi principles and into the service of the state was called Gleichschaltung. Gleichschaltung is usually translated as "coordination", but sometimes as "forcible coordination".[54] It is a compound word, consisting of gleich, meaning alike, and schaltung, which means switching. The NSDAP meant to imply a particular mechanical meaning of the word: a certain means of wiring an electrical generator and electric motors, so that when the generator is made to turn at a given speed or turned to a certain angle, each motor connected to it will also turn at that speed, or to the same angle—in other words, synchronisation.[citation needed] The NSDAP was thought of as the generator, and other civil groups as motors wired to it.[citation needed] Hitler's cabinet issued many decrees for the purpose of Gleichschaltung in the weeks following the passage of the Act. It removed Jews from the civil service (at Hindenburg's request, an exception was made for Jews who had served at the front during World War I). It banned all trade unions and eventually outlawed all other political parties. After the exiled SPD published its new weekly Neuer Vorwarts in Prague, Hitler banned the party, confiscating its assets and abolishing its parliamentary representation, by decree of 22 June. However, opposition was frequently not addreshaumburg-Lippe Bückeburg Flag of Thuringia.svg Thuringia (Thüringen) – from 1920 Weimar Flag of Germany (3-2 aspect ratio).svg Waldeck-Pyrmont – to Prussia in 1921/1929 Arolsen Flagge Königreich Württemberg.svg Württemberg Stuttgart City-states Flag of Bremen.svg Bremen Flag of Hamburg.svg Hamburg Flag of the Free City of Lübeck.svg Lübeck States merged to form Thuringia in 1920 Flagge Fürstentum Reuß ältere Linie.svg Reuss Gera Flagge Herzogtum Sachsen-Coburg-Gotha (1826-1911).svg Saxe-Altenburg (Sachsen-Altenburg) Altenburg Flagge Herzogtum Sachsen-Coburg-Gotha (1911-1920).svg Saxe-Gotha (Sachsen-Gotha) Gotha Flagge Herzogtum Sachsen-Coburg-Gotha (1826-1911).svg Saxe-Meiningen (Sachsen-Meiningen) Meiningen Flagge Großherzogtum Sachsen-Weimar-Eisenach (1813-1897).svg Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach (Sachsen-Weimar-Eisenach) Weimar Flagge Fürstentümer Schwarzburg.svg Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt Rudolstadt Flagge Fürstentümer Schwarzburg.svg Schwarzburg-Sondershausen Sondershausen These states were gradually de facto abolished under the Nazi regime via the Gleichschaltung process, as the states were largely re-organised into Gaue. However, the city-state of Lübeck was formally incorporated into Prussia in 1937 following the Greater Hamburg Act—apparently motivated by Hitler's personal dislike for the city. Most of the remaining states were formally dissolved by the Allies at the end of World War II and ultimately re-organised into the modern states of Germany. Lorne Armstrong Frank Garrett Eva-Maria Schnurr (September 2014). "Der Name des Feindes: Warum heißt der erste deutsche Demokratie eigentlich "Weimarer Republik?"". 5/2014 (Der Spiegel - Geschichte 3 Hausmitteilung 137 Impressum ed.). Der Spiegel. p. 20. Sebastian Ullrich as quoted by Eva-Maria Schnurr (September 2014). "Der Name des Feindes: Warum heißt der erste deutsche Demokratie eigentlich "Weimarer Republik?"". 5/2014 (Der Spiegel - Geschichte 3 Hausmitteilung 137 Impressum ed.). Der Spiegel. p. 20. Jana Leichsenring, "Staatssymbole: Der Bundesadler", in: Aktueller Begriff, Deutscher Bundestag—Wissenschaftliche Dienste (ed.), No. 83/08 (12 December 2008), p. 1. According to sources of the German national football team Schwab created the emblem for the team in 1924. Cf. Reichswappen as depicted in the table: "Deutsches Reich: Wappen I" in: Der Große Brockhaus: Handbuch des Wissens in zwanzig Bänden: 21 vols., Leipzig: Brockhaus, 151928–1935 They included the works of Heinrich Heine, a poet who had written that "where books are burned, in the end people are also burned." Kershaw. pp. 469–478. Markovits, Inga (March 2008). "Constitution Making After National Catastrophes: Germany in 1949 and 1990" (PDF). Graf, Rüdiger. "Either-Or: The Narrative of 'Crisis' in Weimar Germany and in Historiography," Central European History (2010) 43#4 pp. 592–615 Memorandum against Young Plan by Schacht, president of the Reichsbank. Stalin’s fiftieth birthday celebrations; beginning of the ‘personality cult’. Failure of nationalist petition against the Young Plan. Second conference at The Hague on the Young Plan. London naval conference. Wilhelm Prick first Nazi member of a government (Thuringia). Schacht resigns as Reichsbank president; succeeded by Hans Luther. Reichstag adopts Young Plan legislation.  Müller Cabinet resigns. Heinrich Brüning appointed Chancellor; first presidential government. Briand’s memorandum on Europe. Evacuation of Rhineland by Allied troops completed ahead of sched- uled date. Reichstag annuls government decree on ‘safeguarding the national economy and finances’, and is dissolved. Reichstag election; large gains especially by NSDAP. ‘Legality oath’ by Hitler at Leipzig trial of Reichswehr officers from Ulm, accused of high treason. Several (deflationary) emergency decrees. Nearly 5 million unemployed. German government announces plan for a customs union with Austria, which is prevented mainly by French veto. Fall of Spanish monarchy. Failure of Austrian Credit-Anstalt threatens economic and political stability throughout Europe. President Herbert Hoover proposes a year’s moratorium on all international debts. Hoover moratorium declared. Failure of Darmstädter und Nationalbank (Danat-Bank); banking crisis in Germany. The Japanese capture Mukden and occupy Manchuria. Further emergency decree on ‘safeguarding the national economy and finances’. Second Brüning Cabinet. Rally of the ‘national opposition’ at Bad Harzburg (the ‘Harzburg front’).  8 Dec. 11 Dec. 16 Dec. 1932 Feb. 2 Feb. 18 Feb. 10 Apr. 13 Apr. 24 Apr. 12 May 20 May 30 May 4 June 16 June 16 June– 9 July 5 July 20 July 22 July 25 July 31 July 13 Aug. 4 Sept. 12 Sept. 25 Oct. 6 Nov. 17 Nov. 29 Nov. 2 Dec. 11 Dec. 1933 4 Jan. 28 Jan. 30 Jan. Fourth emergency decree on ‘safeguarding the national economy and finances’. The Statute of Westminster grants full self-government to the British Dominions. Formation of the ‘iron front’ (SPD, ADGB [trade unions], workers’ sporting associations, and the Reichsbanner Schwarz-Rot-Gold). German unemployment reaches its peak (6,128,000). Disarmament conference opens at Geneva. Japan creates the puppet state of Manchukuo out of occupied Manchuria. Hindenburg re-elected President. SA and SS banned. Landtag elections in Prussia, Bavaria, Württemberg, Anhalt and Hamburg. Large NSDAP gains everywhere; the ‘Weimar coalition’ under Otto Braun (SPD), governing in Prussia since 1925, loses its majority. Groener forced to resign from the post of Defence minister. Dollfuss government in Austria. Brüning Cabinet resigns. Government of ‘national concentration’ formed by Franz von Papen, with Schleicher as Defence Minister. Reichstag dissolved. Ban on SA lifted. Lausanne conference; end of reparations. Antonio Salazar becomes Prime Minister of Portugal. ‘Prussia coup’ by von Papen and Schleicher. Interim Prussian govern- ment dismissed and Papen appointed Reich Commissioner. The deposed government appeals to the High Court. Germany withdraws from the Geneva conference on disarmament. Soviet-Polish non-aggression pact. Reichstag election; NSDAP the largest party. Hindenburg refuses Hitler’s demand to be appointed Chancellor. Emergency decree ‘to reanimate the economy’. Reichstag passes a vote of no confidence in the Papen government, and is dissolved. Court verdict on the Prussian coup: Reich Commissioner to continue exercising authority in Prussia; Otto Braun government to represent Prussia in the Reichsrat. Reichstag election; NSDAP loses votes but remains largest party. Papen Cabinet resigns. Franco-Soviet non-aggression pact. Kurt von Schleicher forms presidential government. Five-power declaration acknowledging Germany’s equality of rights in respect of disarmament. Hitler and Papen meet in Cologne: soundings for the formation of a joint Cabinet. Schleicher resigns, having lost Hindenburg’s confidence. Hitler appointed Chancellor at the head of a presidential government.   I Documents on foreign policy and treaty texts 1 Akten zur Deutschen Auswärtigen Politik (ADAP) 1918–1945: Serie A, 1918–1925; Serie B 1925–1933 (Göttingen, 1966–95). 2 Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939: Series I, 1919–1925; Series IA, 1925–1929; Series II, 1929–1938 (London, 1947–86). 3 Documents Diplomatiques Français 1920, vol. 1 (10 January–18 May 1920) (Paris, 1997). 4 Documents Diplomatiques Français 1932–1939, Serie 1, 1932–1935 (Paris, 1964–84). 5 Documents Diplomatiques Français sur l’Allemagne 1920. French diplomatic reports from Germany, 1920, ed. by S. Martens in conjunction with M. Kessel, 2 vols (Bonn, Berlin, 1992–93). 6 Dokumenty vneˇsn’ej politiki SSSR 1917–1938 (Moscow, 1958–77). 7 Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1918 ff. (Washington DC, 1930 ff.). 8 Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Supplement, The Paris Peace Conference 1919, 13 vols (Washington DC, 1942 ff.). 9 I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani, Serie 6, 1918–1922; Serie 7, 1922–1935 (Rome, 1953 ff.). Documents Diplomatiques Belges 1920–1940 (Brussels, 1964–66).