For what reasons, and with
what results, were there disagreements between participants at the conferences
of Yalta and Potsdam in 1945?
From May 2009 Paper 2 examination
[17 + marks] for perceptive analysis and perhaps different interpretations.
From the markscheme:
Candidates
should be able to explain why there were disagreements or grounds for
possible antagonism between Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin at the
conference of Yalta, and Attlee, Truman and Stalin at Potsdam, which
took place in order to plan for the situation at the end of the Second
World War. The meeting at Yalta in the Crimea took place between 4–11th
February 1945. Among matters agreed were the disarmament and partition
of Germany, the establishment of the United Nations, and the declaration
by USSR of war on Japan after Germany was defeated. The Potsdam
Conference lasted from 17th July to 2nd August, 1945. It was confirmed
that Germany should be temporarily divided into four occupation zones,
but political differences began to emerge. Reasons for disagreements
could be: clash of personalities; different ideologies; past actions,
before and during the war; mutual suspicion and fear; illness; change of
participants at Potsdam.
Policies which caused disagreement included: post-war settlement of Europe; treatment of Germany; reparations; Poland.
Results could include: break up of war time alliance; increase of mutual fear and suspicion; onset of the Cold War; division of Germany; establishment of Soviet satellite states.
N.B. if only one conference is mentioned mark out of [12 marks].
[0 to 7 marks] for vague general sweeping assertions.
[8 to 10 marks] for narrative accounts of the conferences, with implicit disagreements.
Policies which caused disagreement included: post-war settlement of Europe; treatment of Germany; reparations; Poland.
Results could include: break up of war time alliance; increase of mutual fear and suspicion; onset of the Cold War; division of Germany; establishment of Soviet satellite states.
N.B. if only one conference is mentioned mark out of [12 marks].
[0 to 7 marks] for vague general sweeping assertions.
[8 to 10 marks] for narrative accounts of the conferences, with implicit disagreements.
[11 to 13 marks] for focus on reasons and result with explicit attention to disagreements.
[14 to 16 marks] for structured analysis of reasons, results and differences.[17 + marks] for perceptive analysis and perhaps different interpretations.
EXAMPLE 1:
The norm in History has been, over the past decades, to blame certain events on certain parties. This can be particularly seen in the historical study of the cold war, where orthodox historians such as the notoriously biased George Kennan seek to blame the radicalism of the Soviet Union, while revisionists such as William Williams seek to point the finger at American foreign policy. While both sides agree that the Yalta and Potsdam conferences of 1945 played a crucial role in the breakdown in relations between the former World War II allies, the partitioning of blame, which makes up the focus of most historical essays on this subject, remains divided. This essay shall attempt to avoid this blame game, instead focusing it’s analysis of the disintegration of these relationships at Yalta and Potsdam on the thesis put forward by the post-revisionist Ernest May: That the antagonism following the conclusion of the First World War was, for a number of reasons including differing ideologies, opposing attitudes regarding the treatment of Germany and the conflicting visions of the political restructuring of Eastern Europe, inevitable.
The norm in History has been, over the past decades, to blame certain events on certain parties. This can be particularly seen in the historical study of the cold war, where orthodox historians such as the notoriously biased George Kennan seek to blame the radicalism of the Soviet Union, while revisionists such as William Williams seek to point the finger at American foreign policy. While both sides agree that the Yalta and Potsdam conferences of 1945 played a crucial role in the breakdown in relations between the former World War II allies, the partitioning of blame, which makes up the focus of most historical essays on this subject, remains divided. This essay shall attempt to avoid this blame game, instead focusing it’s analysis of the disintegration of these relationships at Yalta and Potsdam on the thesis put forward by the post-revisionist Ernest May: That the antagonism following the conclusion of the First World War was, for a number of reasons including differing ideologies, opposing attitudes regarding the treatment of Germany and the conflicting visions of the political restructuring of Eastern Europe, inevitable.
The Yalta and Potsdam
conferences both dealt in part with how the (former) allies would handle a
defeated Germany. At this stage (1945), Germany’s various sieges of Russian
cities, such as Stalingrad and Leningrad had broken. Demoralised, the German
troops were on the retreat. On the Western front, D-Day had proven successful,
pushing German troops fairly rapidly out of France. Although Germany had yet to
formally lose the war at Yalta, Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill were already
aware at this stage that the German defeat was only a matter of time. Thus,
answering the “German question” once again was an issue: how to prevent a
resurgence of Nazism? How to treat the defeated German people? How to replace
the now destroyed political institutions? On some points the allied leaders,
especially at Yalta, appeared to agree. Decisions regarding a guarantee for an
at least partially co-ordinated assault and eventual defeat of Germany, and the
decision to split Germany into four occupied zones following this defeat
appeared to have been made quickly. Initially this indicates a united front of
world leaders, who, through their rapid decision making processes, appear to be
acting together and in agreement. As Laurence Rees points out, however, many of
these points had been discussed extensively amongst the allied leaders during
November 1943 Tehran conference. Therefore, following Rees’ argument, Yalta
presented us with little more than the image of these world leaders formally signing
and announcing these agreements, while the actual negotiations of these
agreements had occurred away from the public scrutiny in the 15 months prior to
the Yalta conference. The implication of this is that any major disagreements
present within Yalta between the allied leaders would’ve been hidden from view,
as they would only have been visible in effect prior to the conference during
these negotiations at Tehran and beyond. Indeed, at the Potsdam conference,
where the now slightly altered personages present (Truman replacing the now
deceased Roosevelt and Atlee replacing Churchill midway through the conference)
did not have an extended period of negotiation prior to the conversation and,
under this more pressured, less pre-formulated and extremely volatile
conditions, divides in the relationships of the formerly allied leaders
immediately began to appear, with the now far more pressing question (as
Germany had at this point formally surrendered), of how, exactly, the allied
powers were going to treat Germany and punish its sins being a central cause
for contention between the negotiators. Naturally, on some points the
negotiators agreed, not least on the manner in which the victors would split up
Berlin. On many other issues, even extremely foundational issues such as
reparations, there were very broad differences. This was particularly well
elaborated upon in Ian Bickerton’s recent “The Illusion of Victory”, where he
clearly shows how the Western allies, most notably Churchill, Truman and later
Atlee, asserted that, due to the memories of the “failure” of the Treaty of
Versailles, the west would attempt to rebuild Germany economically, if not
militarily. This was initially and in no uncertain terms asserted at Potsdam,
however it was very rapidly made clear that Stalin had no intentions of
complying with this mentality, instead seeking to destroy Germany still further
by demanding reparations, distinctly harkening back to article 232 of the
Treaty of Versailles. It is very telling, that even on an issue as central and
important, as how to deal with Germany, there was such an obvious political
divide between Stalin and the West. This political fissure resulted,
eventually, into the division of Germany, as failures to agree on political
policies irreparably divided the Soviet occupied zone from the other three
ones. This tension and fissure in political strategy, even on a socio-economic
scale, in Germany would over the next 45 years come to be one of the enduring
images of the cold war in Western perception, an image that was initiated by
the disagreements at Potsdam. These disagreements do, however, beg a few key
questions. Surely, in a conference following a war to defeat Germany, the
question of how to resolve political strife within Germany would be considered
important above all else. It seems incredible, then, that disagreements of such
a magnitude could occur on a such debated and central issue such as the German
question, especially considering the speed that relatively cordial agreements
had been made at Yalta a few months prior. It seems near impossible to believe
that such great fissures had developed so quickly. Instead, these occurrences
point towards the idea that, within the closed circles of these political
negotiations, their had never been an agreement of how to resolve the German
question, despite the illusion provided by Yalta. It seems obvious that neither
party had ever intended to agree on how to treat Germany, but had merely put
off dealing with these circumstances until later. Thus, it was near inevitable
that, following the defeat of Germany, these unaddressed fissures in
understanding between these key players would cause overt political tension, as
would eventually prove to be the case at Potsdam. Although the failure of the
German question did seem inevitable, and would cause much of the political
tension that would come to be known as the cold war, when we ask why these
issues had been unable to be resolved anyways, we come to see that although
this issue was contentious and had serious implications on global international
relations, it was more a symptom of deeper rooted issues, than itself a root
cause of the cold war. In our search for these root causes of the disagreements
at Yalta and Potsdam, and the consequent cold war, we need to look elsewhere.
Another hugely
contentious issue, especially at Potsdam, that occupied the “Allied” leaders
both prior to and after the conclusion of the Second World War, was the
question of how to deal with the liberties and territories of the now Soviet
occupied Eastern European states. At Yalta, agreements had been reached
regarding the treatment of the various states in Eastern Europe. Therefore, on
the surface it would appear that all that was required at Potsdam was a few
finalising touches on these plans that, apparently, had already been agreed
upon. This would not prove to be the case. At Yalta a central topic of debate
was the fate of Poland and the Eastern bloc. Churchill remarked then, despite
his oft open hostility towards Stalin, that "Poor
Neville Chamberlain believed he could trust Hitler. He was wrong. But I don't
think I'm wrong about Stalin." This is rather incredible to hear from a
man who saw political events of the 1930s somewhat more lucidly than the
majority and who undoubtedly knew that Stalin had, along with Germany, invaded
Poland in 1939. This came from a man who had been confronted by Stalin as early
as 1943, with Stalin seeking firm assurances that the Soviet Union would get
Russia. In retrospect, it seems obvious that Stalin’s more imperialistic view of
the Eastern bloc clashes absolutely with Churchill and the Americans’
expectations of a Wilsonian process of democratic self-determination.
Nevertheless, despite this apparently clear disagreement of ideals concerning
the Eastern Bloc, a number of initial agreements appeared to have been reached.
Stalin was given some of the eastern portion of Poland, in what was known as
Churchill’s great betrayal of the Polish people, who had sacrificed their lives
fighting key battles for the British, only for Churchill to arbitrarily give
their own land away to Poland’s worst enemy, Stalin, as part of some political
agreement in which the Poles had no choice. Similarly, although the other
states of the Eastern bloc were “guaranteed” their independence (although the nature
of this supposed independence remained unclear, at least in written terms),
Stalin was allowed a “Soviet Sphere of Influence” encompassing these “nations”,
of whose nature was left ambiguous. Here we see some ideological disagreements,
if not personal ones. Despite the apparent Wilsonian ideals embodied by the
West, to paraphrase Christopher Catherwood, in his recent biography of Winston
Churchill, the betrayal of the West and the handing of the Eastern bloc into
the willing hands of the dictatorial Stalin hearkened back to the betrayal at
Munich of Czechoslovakia in 1938. This seemed a betrayal of these Wilsonian
ideals, instead appeasing the demanding Stalin, albeit in a slightly different
(post-war) context. Perhaps, upon the analysis of this issue at Potsdam and the
far more explicit disagreements there, the nature of this ostensible betrayal
shall become clearer. At Potsdam, it seems that Truman does a bit of a U-turn
from Roosevelt’s ideas. Whereas Roosevelt seemed willing to allow Stalin a fair
amount of flexibility in his dealings with the Eastern bloc, Truman remained
steadfast in his pro-democratic ideals, harshly criticizing Stalin’s policies
in the Eastern bloc, which seemed to be pointing towards more than just guaranteeing
the “liberties” of these states. Indeed, Stalin, through both his covert
operations within these nations and his overt support for the communist parties
in these states that seemed to be pointing towards an attempt from Stalin’s end
to establish a series of autonomous regions and thus expand his communist
Soviet empire into the east of Europe. Truman’s passionate, if somewhat
diplomatically inadvisable criticism of Stalin’s policy only resulted in the
highlighting of the extent of the disagreements between east and west on these
matters, further widening the fissures in their relationship. This fissure
would lead Churchill to define, in 1946, the Iron Curtain that politically and
socially would split East and West Europe for 44 years and come to define the
very nature of the cold war within Europe. But what was the nature of this
disagreement at Potsdam? Had not the agreements already been made at Yalta?
Here, as has been discussed by many modern historians, notably Eduard Mark, was
the key disagreement at Yalta at work. This disagreement was a difference of
interpretations of the “agreements” laid out at Yalta. As has already been
remarked upon, these agreements were, by nature, rather vague. Mark argues that
there were two distinct interpretations of these agreements, as demonstrated in
the example of the “Soviet Sphere of Influence.” Stalin believed that this
Sphere of Influence allowed him to become politically involved in the actions
of these relevant nations. Conversely, the American view was that this Sphere
of Influence remained a mere protection guarantee, where Soviet influence would
remain severely limited. These differences in interpretations were not resolved
prior to them being put into practice. The consequences of this were then seen
with the disagreements at Potsdam. Here we again perceive a fundamental flaw
between Stalin and his “allies”. Even on matters, which had been agreed upon,
these leaders failed to agree due to their failure to unify their
interpretations of these agreements. This points towards a central difference
in attitudes that implies a near impossibility of agreement on key matters such
as the Treatment of the Eastern bloc. These differences would, inevitably, lead
to conflict, political or otherwise, again implying that the breakdown in relations
between the “former” allies was, in many cases, destined to be. Similar to the
disagreement over Germany, however, this fails to explain the very nature of
this essential disagreement, instead providing simply another context in which
this disagreement would bear a serious impact. Nevertheless, the disagreements
over the troublesome Eastern bloc remain more of a symptom, than a cause for
the deep-rooted distrust and source of divergence that would escalate into the
cold war.
Perhaps the most popular source of
disagreement at both Yalta and Potsdam, and one heavily popularized by the
popular media of all parties, was the differences in political ideologies. When
put under consideration, America, Great Britain and the Soviet Union made for
rather unlikely allies. The United States considered itself to be a capitalist
democracy, set against all forms of Imperialism, with an economic system that
set it’s foundations on the principles of Thomas Malthus’ Free Market. The
United Kingdom was a monarchy and although it’s values were more libertarian
than what is generally associated with the classical model of a monarchy, with
power more concentrated in the parliament than in the ruling class itself, the
United Kingdom remained the largest colonialist Empire of the time. The Soviet
Union was based on Leninism, a more violent interpretation of the traditional
Marxist socialism. At this time, however, the Soviet Union was absolutely ruled
by Stalin under his slogan “socialism in one country”. Despite this slogan, Stalin
demonstrated, following internal consolidation, imperialist tendencies that in
part influenced his agreement to the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939, which allowed
him to seize parts of Poland. Stalin also was a totalitarian dictator, who
ruled based on fear and the strength of his army and secret police. The economy
was entirely nationalized, while traditional civilian liberties such as the
freedom of the press and the right to gather was totally denied. Thus we can
see three divergent political ideologies that defined both the nations that
represented them, the people who represented these nations and the manner in
which these people and these nations approached the negotiations at Potsdam and
Yalta. To take the previously described example of the discussions regarding
the treatment of the Eastern bloc, we see that Stalin’s imperialist and
communist motivated attitudes push him to seek the global revolution that Lenin
had glorified in 1917. Thus, to him, due to his political beliefs, and as
argued by his biographer Robert Service, he believed it to be his duty to seek
a communistical control over the politics of the neighbouring Eastern bloc
nations. Admittedly, contextual concerns
such as the damage suffered by Russia from the war and his interest in
establishing a buffer to the west that he himself controlled hugely influenced
his policies, but on a deeper level, as Service points out, it is his
ideological beliefs that inform his interpretations of events and his resultant
reactions on these policies. It is also the manner in which he reacts based on
these ideologies that so clearly sets Stalin into conflict with the Western
powers, ideologically reacting so as to profess their disgust at Stalin’s
policies, instead advocating democracy and self-determination, ideological
themes that suit their political basis, but not Stalin’s. We see this conflict
and thus these disagreements at the negotiation table repeated with the
antagonism between the characters at Yalta and Potsdam. At Yalta, Churchill and
Stalin and a great deal of animosity between them. Churchill, politically, had
always been wary of Stalin’s Russia, while Stalin had become infuriated by
Churchill’s refusal to open a second front during 1942 and 1943, fuelling
Stalin’s paranoid suspicions that Churchill was abandoning Russia to be
defeated by the Nazis. F. D. Roosevelt, on the other hand, was desperate to
appease Stalin, whom he felt should be reasoned with, much like how Chamberlain
sought to reason with Hitler. In his attempts to appease Stalin, Roosevelt went
so far as to alienate Churchill. This backfired spectacularly, breeding still
more suspicion in the air. Similarly at Potsdam, there was a great deal of
animosity between the staunchly pro-capitalist Truman and the staunchly
anti-capitalist Stalin. Truman sought a firm and unyielding approach when
dealing with Stalin, something the Stalin undoubtedly failed to appreciate.
Additionally, both Truman and the British Prime Minister Atlee were politically
inexperienced, easy prey for Stalin were it not that Truman had a secret weapon
for the negotiation table: the atom bomb. All this aided to create an
atmosphere of suspicion and paranoia. Indeed, the American most able to advise
regarding dealings with Russia, George Kennan, stated that Russia was paranoid
and schizophrenic, unable to be trusted. This only added to the anti-Soviet
American stance, which in turn only further fuelled Stalin’s resolve to turn
against the West. What we see here is how both the political ideologies of the
various nations, and the people influenced by these ideologies, approached the
conferences at Yalta and Potsdam unable to trust any other party, to the extent
where this cloud of suspicion prevented any form of compromise, due to fear of
betrayal of both morality or from some other party, not to mention creating the
disagreements broached above, that would lead to the splitting of Europe, the
creation of a military standoff and the beginnings of the cold war. In essence,
it was these disagreements in political attitudes that prevented the
negotiators from finding solutions, thus creating conflicts. Due to the deep
roots that these ideologies have in the culture and political system of the
nations they represent, by extension we can thus state that it appears, that
the inflexibility of these unlikely allies and the differences that would thus
arise caused the rise of a political standoff such as the cold war to be
inevitable.
In conclusion, we see that at both the
Potsdam and Yalta conferences, there were disagreements between the negotiators
on key issues. The disagreements, remaining largely cooperatively unresolved,
escalated into the beginnings of the cold war. Analysing these disagreements in
detail, we perceive a fundamental misunderstanding and inability to effectively
cooperate between all of the negotiating parties. At the very core of the
disagreements lies the thorny issue of political attitudes, ideologies and how
these translate into real life. The inflexibility of all the parties within
their own ideologies meant that conflict would be inevitable. An alliance
between nations so opposed in their views could only have been forged by the
extremes of the Nazi threat and, as shown, the falling out of these allies, the
dissolving of the alliance and the rise of a new conflict between these former
allies that would prove to be known as the cold war was never a question of if,
but instead only a question of when.
-->
Closing in on the end of the Second World
War (WW2) tensions between the allied leaders (Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt)
were at a peak. The nations were united by their quest to defeat Hitler’s
Germany and rid the world of the Nazis; as well as securing the future of
Europe and the world so that a war on this scale would never break out again.
The “Big Three” met in February 1945 in Yalta, Crimea, and again in July at
Potsdam, Germany. However at Potsdam Churchill had lost the election and been
replaced by Atlee and Roosevelt had died and had been replaced by his Vice
President Harry Truman. While both conferences were supposed to smooth the
transition into the post war phase the two the two conferences differed greatly
from one another although they were intended to accomplish the same things. The
main differences between Yalta and Potsdam was the fact that Churchill and
Roosevelt (FDR) were no longer there but instead Atlee and Truman, two people
who had been kept in the dark not only about Yalta but also about what had been
agreed upon in Teheran. The only constant figure at Yalta and at Potsdam was
Stalin the leader of the most controversial nations in the “Big Three”. The
results of the disagreements were that what was agreed upon at Yalta had to be
discussed again at Potsdam, Trumann was an anti communist and therefore had
problems with Stalin and his ideas about what should be done.
Although Germany was on the verge of
surrendering when the “Big Three” met at Yalta tensions were high. With
Churchill making statements behind the scenes such as “ The Soviet Union has
become a danger to the free world”. He argued this before the most devastating
enemy the world has ever faced had been defeated. Churchill believed that
Stalin and the Soviet Union were such a threat that even before Yalta in 1944
he had British paratroopers drop behind enemy lines at Arnhem to try to get to
Berlin first, however the paratroopers were cut off and completely whipped out.
However there were also important agreements made at Yalta that would then be
followed up at Potsdam. There would be a United Nations and the Soviet Union
would join but other nations had not been decided upon. The fact that the
Soviet Union were going to join the United Nations (UN) meant that one of the
most powerful nations in the world was going have a say in international matter
but on the other had it also meant that Communist ideologies and Stalinist rule
would have a major say in international decisions; meaning that if the USSR
didn’t want something to happen then they would fight it (something that
western nations such as Britain and America did not want). They agreed to
divide Germany into occupational ‘zones’. However the division of Germany was
one of the main disagreements at Yalta and Potsdam; because the big three could
not agree upon who would get what parts of Germany. A prime example of this is
the fact that France got Ruhr the most industrialised part of Germany, this
infuriated Stalin as the USSR had defeated Germany and faced far more casualties
than the French and still they had not surrendered like the French who did in 6
weeks. They also agreed that they would bring Nazi war criminals tor trial,
then they faced the dilemma of they were going to do this; if they would make
it a show trial like the Soviets did in the 1930’s or if it would be closed off
for the public. Stalin also agreed to join the war against Japan within 2 or 3
months of the defeat of Germany, and that the USSR were to regain all territory
lost to Japan in the 1905 Russo Japanese war, however by the time Germany had
been defeated and the time had come for Stalin to help in the Japanese theatre
they Americans no longer needed or wanted them there as they had fought hard
and faced catastrophic losses for islands such as Iwogima and they had
developed the Atomic Bomb a weapon that would forever shape the future of human
warfare.
At Potsdam Germany had been defeated and
now it was time for the Big three to decide what would become of Hitler’s
failed Germany. However at Potsdam Churchill had been replaced by Atlee as he
had lost the election and Roosevelt had died and had been replaced by Trumann.
Both Trumann and Atlee had been kept in the dark about what had been agreed
upon at Teheran and at Yalta. this lead to many additional disagreements that
altered what had previously been agreed upon. The disagreements about how
Germany was to be divided continued as Stalin still disagreed that he would be
getting the worst part of Germany and the French who surrendered in 6 weeks
were getting the most industrious part of the nation. Russia was allowed to
take the reparations from the Soviet Zone in Eastern Europe. However it was
still not clear how much Germany was to pay in reparations in total. This would
later become an especial problem because of the very poor state of the German
economy and Britain and the Americans did not want a repeat of hyperinflation
after Versailles. The involvement of the Russians in the Japanese theatre was
no longer necessary as the Americans dropped the first Atomic Bomb at Hiroshima
showing their complete dominance technologically over Russia. This greatly
increased tensions between Trumann and Stalin, as he had not told his Russian
counterpart that they had developed such a powerful weapon. It also showed the
deep distrust between America and the Soviet Union after Germany had been
defeated.
EXAMPLE 3
-->
Leading up to the end of the Second World War, the future of
the world rested in the hands of Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin. Even though
the actual winner of the war was still uncertain at this point, the Big Three
decided upon having a conference at Yalta to decide what would occur in the
event that Germany was defeated. After the victorious end of the war, the three
allies were faced with the anticipated post-war issues that required the
realisation of the solutions discussed at the Yalta Conference. When the Second
World War officially ended on 14 August 1945, the leaders of Russia, Britain
and America came together again to finalise the actions decided in the Yalta
Conference of 4 February 1945, but instead in the 17 July 1945 Potsdam
Conference. As each country had different political purposes and there was a
leader replacement with Britain and America, coming to a final conclusion at
the conferences meant a lot of “hard bargaining”.
With the end of the war nigh, the three unlikely allies met
on the 4 February 1945 to attend a conference that would last eight days at
Yalta. The main aim of the conference was to discuss how to recover from the
Second World War. Unlike events that occurred with the Treaty of Versailles in
1919, Britain and America adamant not to treat Germany in the same manner that
helped cause the Second World War. Churchill distrusted Stalin, however they
had a mutual respect for one another. Roosevelt was, on the other hand, driven
to finding a conclusion for the end of the war, and despised arguing about
events post-war. To prevent this, the Big Three met up at the Yalta Conference,
where they reached some agreements. The first was in the form of dividing
Germany. Germany was able to create a lot of damage in the Second World War,
and the Big Three resolved that the only way to prevent this from happening
again would be to divide it and split it among the allies. The next agreement
was of creating a United Nations, an organisation very similar to the League of
Nations; however, it would include both the Soviet Union and America. Another
agreement was where, due to the inconceivable acts performed by many during the
war, the Nazi war criminals would be punished as a consequence. Introducing
free elections in Eastern Europe, named as the “Declaration of Liberated
Europe”. In order to promote their newfound alliance, the Soviet Union conceded
to aiding America’s war against Japan, in return for some of their conquered
Japanese land. The final point that caused the most disagreement however, was
the aim to set up a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. This point
caused a lot of debate between the countries’ leaders, as Stalin had already
set up a communist government in Lublin when there was a Polish government in
exile in London, waiting for its return. Stalin would not remove the government
he set up in Lublin, however, to appease Britain and America, he did promise to
allow a select number of members to join the communist government. The
disagreement was laid to rest as the Big Three continued to work on finding a
solution to win the war.
Upon 14 August 1945, the Big Three won the war and were
faced with the reality of having to actually deal with the post-war issues they
had discussed about in Yalta. At the Potsdam Conference, which lasted from 17
July to 2 August 1945, situations changed drastically. Each country, having
eradicated the problem with Germany, now had no real common aim. Russia,
Britain and America all had different intentions, which led to many
disagreements when it came to the Potsdam Conference. To worsen the situation
even further, Churchill and Roosevelt were no longer in power. Churchill lost
the election and was replaced by Clement Attlee, who also distrusted Stalin.
The other great power that was replaced was Roosevelt. On 12 April 1945,
Roosevelt died and Churchill said he felt as if he had been “struck a physical
blow”. Truman replaced Roosevelt as President. President Truman was known for
his anti-Communism nature, and despised working so closely with the Soviet
Union. Unfortunately, as Truman hadn’t been included in the Yalta Conference,
he had very little idea of the goings about. Stalin knew that he could take
advantage of this new change of leaders and so he did. Poland became victim to
Stalin’s intentions and so did the rest of Eastern Europe. Truman felt
particularly threatened by Stalin’s actions and so, upon finding out of the
first successful atomic bomb launch in Hiroshima, Truman decided to use it to
his advantage. After finding out about the atomic bomb, Truman arrived to
Potsdam the day after, as Churchill described it, “a changed man”.
The agreements at Potsdam were very similar to the ones set
up in Yalta. Germany was to be divided into four “zones of occupation”, which
would be separated between Britain, USSR, America and France. Nazi war
criminals were brought to trial through the Nuremberg Trials. The Polish
Provisional Government of National Unity would be set up and would be ruling.
Also, much to the benefit of the Soviet Union, they were allowed to take
reparations from their zone in East Germany and 10% of West Germany’s
industrial equipment. Although most of the same agreements as Yalta were agreed
upon, due to the recent change in participants, many disagreements came forth
as well. Upon the subject of dividing Germany, they came across a disagreement
of how to do so. This was resolved however so that, although the Soviet Union
would have the zone with Berlin, Berlin would also be subject to zones for each
of the allies. Another point of contention was the debate of the size of
reparations Germany would have to pay. Britain and America, as a consequence of
the Treaty of Versailles and due to the state the German economy was in, were
reluctant to demand too high of an amount. Therefore the allies agreed upon a
system of trading their products, which later became a large issue. The source
of much of Truman’s anger was as a consequence of the Soviet policy occurring
within Eastern Europe.
The disagreements at Potsdam were amplified mainly due to
the fact that there was a change in leadership with America and Britain, and
because, as a result of the defeat of Germany, the Big Three no longer had a
common purpose. At Yalta, although they all had a common purpose, they still
were subject to the fact that each had different intentions, and these would be
influential in the decision-making after the end of the Second World War.
Truman’s threat of the atomic bomb also strained the relations with Stalin and
was a crucial factor in causing some of the disagreements during the
conferences as well.
Works Cited:
Miscamble, Wilson D. From
Roosevelt to Truman: Potsdam, Hiroshima, and the Cold War. Cambridge:
Cambridge UP, 2007. Print.
Plokhy, Serhii. Yalta:
The Price of Peace. New York: Viking, 2010. Print.
Whitcomb, Roger S. The
Cold War in Retrospect: The Formative Years. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998.
Print.
Woodward, E. L. British
Foreign Policy in the Second World War. London: H.M.S.O., 1970. Print.
EXAMPLE 4
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The 8th of May sounded the end
of World War 2, for only two of the major powers as Stalin only signed the
ending of war on the 9th of May. This is the first example of cracks
beginning to show in the relationship between the three major powers. There
were many differences of opinion on how to deal with Germany, Stalin saw the
conferences as a chance to display how crippled his country was after the war,
therefor hopefully supporting his point that Germany should be dealt with
strongly. He choose Yalta specifically because it had been ravaged during the
war. This shows how geography or the economic aspect varied between the powers
as Russia had been significantly more damaged than Britain or America. For
example the 300,000 men that Britain lost during the war seems minuscule in
comparison to the 27 million that perished for Russia. The countries were also
based on very different political structures and there was always the risk that
something would happen to a leader either through death or being discharged
from office. The regional aspect of how Germany should be divided was another
stumbling block for the allies as it was agreed that France would receive some
of the best areas of Germany whilst Russia would receive poorer less
resourceful areas of Germany. The obvious reason for this was the geographical
locations of the areas of Germany however there a slight undertone that it was
that France would be able to recover faster and be able to support nations
against the communist threat.
Tensions between France Britain and Russia
remained high during the war as even though they appeared to be a united front
behind the scenes there was still many issues. For example after the First
World War many French investors lost money in Russia leading them to put
pressure on the government. As a conclusion to the civil war the Czar of
Russia, Nicholas II was murdered. Nicholas was the cousin of King George
meaning Britain was reluctant to communicate with Russia. This lead to “mutual
mistrust and hostility”. The issues remained during the conferences, for
example the mutual suspicion that surrounded the conference. This is proven by the powers used devious tactics such as making
deals behind each others back. According to Henry Kissinger’s “Diplomacy”, he
states that Stalin’s approach reflected both his communist ideology and
traditional Russian foreign policy. This highlights the major differences from
Churchill and Roosevelt who wanted to rebuild Europe and work together with
collective security. “This meant rebuilding Great Britain, France, and even
defeated Germany so that, along with the United States, these countries could
counter balance the soviet colossus to the east”. These were joint aims which
would eventually turn into the Marshall plan. However both sides had reservations
which meant neither was fully committed. Churchill always feared that if
Roosevelt left office and the Republicans took over and returned to
isolationism leaving Britain stranded.
Where as Roosevelt had concerns and memories of the depression fresh in
his mind and feared another Wall Street Crash. The aims of the Western
Countries resulted in the Dawes Plan and Marshall aid, the aim of these two initiatives was to halt
the sphere of Russian Influence and provide countries with aid and allow them
to build up and become a united strong Europe. One of the countries to benefit
from this was Greece, as a Greek national I should feel gratitude towards the
actions of the Western Countries at this time as without this aid Greece would
be a very different nation to what it is today. There were also economic
differences which played a major part in the conferences, many in the east saw
capitalism as “responsible for the division of society” (Cold War Steve
Phillips). They argued it was because of the rich factory owners and the
divisions between them and their workers that caused some of the issues leading
to the war. Communism stood for equality and they believed the best way o
achieve this was by having a state owned economy meaning in principle that it
would be equal. Even today we can see how major corporations are influencing
the decisions of the American government and the concept of a state owned
economy would bring about anarchy in an American system as it would wipe away
wealth and status for many Americans.
It is argued that this is because of the
political differences. The two governments stood for very different things, the
“USA saw itself as the upholder of liberal democracy. Liberal democracies stood
for free press, the right to vote, freedom of speech and freedom to vote. The
majority of these would be taken away under a communist sate. This was bound to
end to disagreements between the countries. The only major difference apart
from those factors being taken away was that they hoped for a classless society
thus needing no other political parties. Meaning there was potential for it to
be turned into a dictatorship very quickly. The tensions leading up to the cold
up can be traced back to these conferences because this was the chance to exude
their nations dominance and some especially Stalin as written about in the
novel “Diplomacy” display that Stalin thought these conferences where about
political power rather than the future of Germany. The political systems are
and were very different at the time and they had very different ideology’s and
what would work best for their countries. The ideology behind Stalin was
furthering on from leader Lenin and his Bolshevik revolution in 1917 based on
ideas and principles of Karl Marx. These ideas and principles represented what
Roosevelt and Churchill feared the most; a threat to capitalism and democracy. As
written by Phillip Stevens “communism was to provide a source of fear”, this
was one of the ideology’s behind the communist state because they fathomed that
conflict was “inevitable” as they represented very different systems and they
enjoyed very little common ground. Lenin once said “it is inconceivable that
the Soviet republic should continue to exist for a long period side by side
with imperialist states” This highlights how hostile the communist philosophy
was towards Capitalists and these principles were still prominent in the
conferences at Yalta and Potsdam. Even to some extent today leaving in Germany
when travelling to Munich, one can still see the differences that 40 years of
communism can bring to a land. However the conflict wasn’t purely one sided
during the civil war conservative forces in Russia also known as “Whites”
received support from allied governments however after the end of the first
world war the support dwindled and Lenin took over and set Russia on her new
course. This again highlights the political differences between the countries
and that the West would even consider using military force. This was reinforced
when Harry S Truman stated “if Germany is winning the war we ought to help
Russia, and if Russia is winning we ought to help Germany”. His opinion was not
shared with Roosevelt however I sizeable portion of the American public.
From this we can see that there were
differences in every major part of the principles of each system be it
capitalism or communism. Even though these issues had began with the Bolshevik
revolution it is hard not to recognize these peace conferences as the seeds of
the cold war. As three superpowers collided head first with neither willing to
move past the differences and both simply wanting to protect their interests or
expand on their already large spheres of influence. It is also argued that the
final breakdown in relations was due to the attitudes and policies of the
nations. These disagreements lead to
what has become known as the cold war. This was an arms race of astronomical
proportion. To conclude from the opinion of Stalin it was inevitable that the
powers would collide and that a power struggle would ensue. Others issues would
also arise such as the Cuban Missile crisis in October 1962. Tensions would
again rise and nearly result in war, all of this can be followed back to these
conferences and how the ideologies economic standing and political views
influenced the decisions in Yalta and Potsdam and how the influenced our world
today and how they nearly ended in catastrophe.
EXAMPLE 5
-->
Question:
For what reasons, and with what results, were there disagreements between
participants at the conferences of Yalta and Potsdam in 1945?
“With
the defeat of the Reich… there will remain in the world only two great powers
capable of confronting each other, the United States and Soviet Russia. The
laws of both geography will compel these two powers to a trial of strength,
either military or in the fields of economics and ideology” stated Adolf Hitler
in his testament in April 1945. In this essay I will argue that as soon as Germany
had surrendered; the common enemy was no longer a binding force, the Grand
Alliance starting off in Yalta Conference (4-11th
of February) and then succeeding to Potsdam (17th of July till 2nd
of August) fell apart. This disintegration continued from 1945
until its climax at the Berlin Blockade of 1948. Moreover, I will argue that
there were disagreements between the Grand Alliance due to the military,
economic and ideologist impediments.
The
first genuine conference of the Grand Alliance was in Yalta on the 4th
of February 1945. The Yalta Conference was the final summit held before the end
of the war, and was attended by Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt. The four main
points that were discussed in this conference were quite frankly that Germany
would be occupied by the allies meaning split in four, the USSR would join in
the war against Japan, the Soviet-Polish border would be moved Westwards, and
Stalin agreed to free elections in Poland. Yalta is a very controversial
conference. Charles L. Mee states in his book “Yalta” I came to see it as a
betrayal of smaller powers especially to Poland, which was essentially handed over
to the USSR.” The disagreement in Yalta was therefore that Stalin did not
liberate the countries in Eastern Europe, but instead occupied them with his
troops, much to the pique of the Western allies. While examining Yalta one
could clearly see some “Versailles” attributes and similarities. This was that
due to the fact it became established Soviet policy to make them ‘voluntary’
satellite states throughout Eastern Europe, while Britain and the US called for
self-determination. One could state that Stalin’s stance was much like George
Clemenceau during the Versailles peace talks due to the fact that he demanded
80% reparations from Germany as well a few other demands. However, what is
often ignored by this simplistic argument is that Stalin lost 25 million
people, 1,700 cities were destroyed and 70% of their industry vanished all from
the cause of World War 2. In addition one could not solely haul the largest
army in history back to the destructed USSR. Furthermore, tensions occurred
between the Grand Alliance as according to the Percentages Agreement Churchill
made with Stalin in 1944, it was decided to split countries in Eastern Europe
such as Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia, into spheres of influence. Not only
did this lead to conspiracy theories however due to the fact that Roosevelt
wasn’t present which lay the cornerstone of agitation. Moreover, Britain and
the US could care less whether the countries of Eastern Europe remained under
Communist occupation; their interests were concentrated in Greece and Turkey.
However, the factor that did motivate the Western allies to stand up to the
Soviet Union was Moscow’s control of Poland. The reason for this dispute was
quite clearly that Britain had gone to war and lost five hundred thousand men
for Polish liberation from Nazi occupation and could not now lose it to the
Soviets. This was the primary reason for British opposition to Soviet influence
in Eastern Europe, particularly Poland and certainly not the ideals of
self-determination. Therefore, one would agree with Charles L. Mee that after
all, at Yalta, while it was declared that Poland would be “independent and
democratic”, the rest of Eastern Europe was merely suggested to be “liberated
from Nazi occupation”.
As
Hitler had stated in his testament it the war resulted in two superpowers with
totally opposing ideologies. The US had a nuclear monopoly while Russia’s aim
was to liberate Eastern Europe. One can forget though that the atomic age had a
profound effect on international relations. It
is an arguable statement that this resulted in the statement from Carr “From
Friends to Foes” as he argues that the Cold War and especially the Atomic Bomb
was an act of aggression against the Soviet Union. Carr argues that it was the
United States acquirement, especially its first dentation on the 15th
of July 1945, just two days before Potsdam commenced. The Atomic Bomb quite
clearly showed that the results of the Yalta conference alarmed Stalin, to modernize
and catch up to the West, “making good the hundred year gap in ten years”. Secondly,
the fact that the Americans now had the Bomb meant that the Soviet Union did
not have to join the effort against Japan, as had been determined at Yalta. As the
German threat was gone that unified the allies, now the Japanese was too,
rendering further partnership between the USA and USSR meaningless.
Nevertheless ascribe to the USA and Britain having atomics weapons stationed in
Western Europe, Stalin had to occupy more land in Eastern Europe in order to
increase the distance between the weapons and Moscow. All in all, the fact that
Britain and the USA worked closely together in the Manhattan Project from 1942 did
not only isolate Stalin but also sett a foundation for the Arms Race.
When
the three powers met again, at Potsdam in July and August 1945, the situation
was different. The war in Europe was over, Truman was now the American
President, and Clement Attlee replaced Churchill during the Potsdam Conference.
Truman took a much tougher line than Roosevelt, especially on Poland. The major
issue at Potsdam was the question of how to handle Germany. As at Yalta, the Soviets had requested for heavy postwar reparations
from Germany, half of which would go to the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, Roosevelt had died, and America had a new president,
Truman, who was inclined to ‘get tough’ with the Russians. While Roosevelt had acceded to such demands, Truman and his
Secretary of State, James Byrnes, were determined to diminish the treatment of
Germany. The main reason why Truman and Byrnes encouraged this position was
because they wanted to avoid a repetition of the situation created by the
Treaty of Versailles, which had caused high reparations from Germany following
World War One. Nevertheless, the main vexation was the
American confidence, which the possession of the Atom Bomb now gave them. Truman
stated, “The Russians only understand one language
- ‘how many armies have you got?’ I’m tired of babying the Soviets” which
clearly shows us that he was the one making decision and wouldn’t take order
not even from the Soviet Union. Moreover, the US had experienced a
wartime economic boom. The industrial output of the US grew by 90% between
1940-1944. Therefore, taking this into consideration, and the fact that the US
had a nuclear monopoly; it can be argued that the Americans have never been as
strong as they were just after war.
All
in all, I would absolutely agree with the statement from Hitler, which he had
written in his testament in April 1945. As soon as the “Reich” fell there will remain in the world only two great powers capable of
confronting each other, the United States and Soviet Russia. Quite clearly if
you look into the issues they faced you would clearly determine the military exhibits
whit the nuclear monopoly, the economical boom and with the different
ideologies of each nations both Yalta and Potsdam couldn’t not have been held
without any issues. To summon both conferences and the start of the “Cold War”
I would like to quote Thucydides who stated, “War broke out because of the
growth and power in Athens (America) and the fear that it inspired in Sparta
(Soviet Union)”.
-->
To
truly understand the disagreements that arose between “The Big Three” one must
understand the conflicting views and understandings of the three nations whom
brought an end to the Second World War. With each side of the allied forces
fearing the others intentions, appeasement and intimidation occurred from both
sides of the conference room creating what would result as the distrust and
disloyalty between the participants. Robert Vincent Daniels was an American historian
who concentrated mainly on Soviet history and also wrote the book ‘Red
October’. Daniels states that “the Yalta treaty was what changed wartime collaboration into post-war
confrontation”. In
Yalta decisions for post war Europe began: the division of Germany into
different districts, Germany’s reparations and Stalin’s promise to join the war
in the east. In this essay we will analyze the reason and results of these main
decisions, and see how it would lead to further antagonism and disagreements in
Potsdam.
February 4th 1945, Churchill and Roosevelt arrive at to
meet Stalin at the former Tsar’s vacation retreat, Yalta. With the war close to
ending, and the USSR losing around 24 million casualties, resulting in around
10% of its population, and destroying its infrastructure and industry, from the
bombing of major cities like Leningrad and Stalingrad. Hunger was also rampant;
Alexander Werth a correspondent for the London Sunday Times Reported: “Some people
in the streets went quite insane from the hunger”.
With the situation in Russia dire, Stalin was ready to unleash his
wrath on Germany with him even offering to punish and execute 100,000 German
officers after the war. Churchill later strongly denounced the remark. Stalin
took his chance at Yalta to make demands and to see them carried out. “The Big Three” agreed to continue with decisions
made at The Teheran Conference which was held two years prior to that.
Decisions like: recognizing the communist provisional government to govern
Poland, strengthening democracy in the region, adding territories from East
Germany to Poland, and some from east Poland to the USSR. The trio also added
the agenda of dividing Germany, reparations to be paid by Germany and adding
territories to the USSR which were taken in 1939 by Hitler.
Roosevelt, who came to the conference weakened and sick by his
physical state, reflected the United Sates situation in the east. With the US, only
at this stage of the war process managing to regain a foothold in the peninsula,
similarly requested the assistance of a second front like Stalin did in
Teheran. Stalin took advantage of this request and required that Southern
Sakhalin, Kuril Islands and the former Russian Port Arthur would be under
Soviet control. Roosevelt agreed to these offers having no other alternative.
At the end of the Yalta Conference it seemed that Russia
gained the upper hand in the agreements made. Whether it was in the territorial
aspect in which its territories grew not only in the west but also in the east,
or in its sphere of influence where communist governmental satellites were
already implemented, or economically in which the Soviet Union would receive
reparations for its losses in the war. Churchill distastefully wrote to
Roosevelt after the Yalta conference on how: “the Soviet Union has become
a danger to the free world.” This quote demonstrates Churchill’s concern
towards the growing influence of the Soviet Union and how a rift began to
emerge between the figures in which that what was until then a “friendship” or
at least a cooperating alliance between “The Big Three” evolved into antagonism
and suspicion.
On May the 8th, Wilhelm Keitel the Nazi War
Minister signed the German instrument of unconditional surrender in Berlin on
behalf of the German people. “Potsdam marked the start of the new Europe”,
stated Paul Reynolds, an orthodox historian for the BBC, in which he argued
that the implications of the changes made at the conference shaped what we
consider today as Europe. It is also there where he mentions that relations
“fell out of love” between “The Big Three”. By this time, Churchill was
replaced by Clement Attlee (heading the Labor Party which replaced the conservatives),
Harry S. Truman succeeded Roosevelt following his death in April, and Stalin,
the leader of the USSR.
With these leaders arriving to the conference table,
different ideologies also applied. With Clement Atlee appointed as Labour party
official, this decision met the needs of his people back in Britain who sought
social reform in the style of a welfare state in post-war Britain. With Clements’s
socialist views came a new restrained foreign policy in the British government.
With Clement being considered moderate, Harry S. Truman, a former KKK member
from Missouri, arrived with a hardheaded attitude against Communism. The born
Polish turned American diplomat and political scientist, George Lenczowski, analysed Truman’s negotiation tactics at Potsdam and concluded that: “Truman had the
courage and resolution to reverse the policy that appeared to him naive and
dangerous." This statement of course needs to be taken in hindsight but it
does seem that a change in foreign policy was changed in comparison to
Roosevelt who stated: “Stalin is not that kind of man” with regards to Stalin’s
aggressive stance in Europe.
Disagreements started to emerge in Potsdam starting
with the issue of Poland. At Yalta it was decided that that although the
communist party would be recognized in Poland, there would be a more
pluralistic approach to democracy. Stalin ignored these agreements and was
already implementing a soviet controlled government, practically eliminating
the prior exiled Polish Government or as they were cynically known: “the London
Poles”. Moreover, Stalin ordered the exile of roughly 3 million ethnic Germans from
Poland into the now occupied Eastern Germany. This was not only insulting but a rather cruel
conclusion for Britain given it went to war and lost almost half a million
lives to fight for the independence and freedom of Poland. This was a clear
statement from Stalin manifesting his dominance in the region with complete
disregard to whatever was decided prior to Potsdam.
The best example substantiating the answer to this
essay’s question can be the “German question”, the reason for and the
subsequent results of this disagreement. The “German Question” is the
conflicting course of action that both Truman and Stalin tried to implement.
Namely, what will be done with Germany? Stalin eagerly sought revenge and
control over Germany punishing her through reparations (e.g. 60% of industry
and 20% heavy industry products) to be claimed by the Soviet Union. These were
estimated to worth app. 100 billion German Marks. The worth of return
investment from East Germany would have amounted to 15 times the west’s return investment.
In addition, a 10 Billion dollar reparations scheme was devised in which only
3.6 bn. was to be paid until 1950 mostly because of the horribly hindered
retail market controlled by the GDR which
was closed off to the west. A final act of dominance was the annexation of 25%
of eastern German territory (1937 borders) to the soviet controlled Poland. While
Stalin’s Aim was to punish the Hun, the Allies stance was to kiss it.
At Potsdam it was decided to divide Germany into
different “occupied zones” which would decentralize and decartelize the
government. Thus, for example, Frankfurt was to become the economic centre,
Rhineland the political and Hamburg the Media and Press. Nevertheless, Truman’s
course of action was to ironically finance and invest in Germany rather to
deflate and exploit its condition. This culminated in 1947 in what was to be
called the “Marshal Plan” named after secretary of State George Marshall. This favourable
course of action towards Western Germany pumped into its industry around 17
billion dollars (around 160 $ in today’s values) worth of economic aid and
investment. Truman’s willingness to contribute to the newly formed German state
continued when in January 1948 renewed negotiations with foreign secretary
Molotov and administration officials came to talk about a complete and free German
market to allow German economical growth. Disagreements continued, while the
Soviet agenda was to delay rather to accelerate growth demanding unconditional fulfilment of German reparations. The offer was rejected and continued
polarization and rejection continued.
Yalta and Potsdam signalled a renewed opportunity of world collaboration
and cooperation after the Axis tyranny and destruction. While this was a possibility,
factors which where hopefully conveyed in this essay, hindered the development
of cooperation in Europe and Asia. Ideology and power struggles all came to play
at the two conferences and created an unmanageable condition that would only be
solved if only one super power collapsed, in the end this occurred in 1991 in
the fall of the USSR.
Example 7
-->
Question:
For what reasons, and with what results, were there disagreements between
participants at the conferences of Yalta and Potsdam in 1945?
“With
the defeat of the Reich… there will remain in the world only two great powers
capable of confronting each other, the United States and Soviet Russia. The
laws of both geography will compel these two powers to a trial of strength,
either military or in the fields of economics and ideology” stated Adolf Hitler
in his testament in April 1945. In this essay I will argue that as soon as Germany
had surrendered; the common enemy was no longer a binding force, the Grand
Alliance starting off in Yalta Conference (4-11th
of February) and then succeeding to Potsdam (17th of July till 2nd
of August) fell apart. This disintegration continued from 1945
until its climax at the Berlin Blockade of 1948. Moreover, I will argue that
there were disagreements between the Grand Alliance due to the military,
economic and ideologist impediments.
The
first genuine conference of the Grand Alliance was in Yalta on the 4th
of February 1945. The Yalta Conference was the final summit held before the end
of the war, and was attended by Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt. The four main
points that were discussed in this conference were quite frankly that Germany
would be occupied by the allies meaning split in four, the USSR would join in
the war against Japan, the Soviet-Polish border would be moved Westwards, and
Stalin agreed to free elections in Poland. Yalta is a very controversial
conference. Charles L. Mee states in his book “Yalta” I came to see it as a
betrayal of smaller powers especially to Poland, which was essentially handed over
to the USSR.” The disagreement in Yalta was therefore that Stalin did not
liberate the countries in Eastern Europe, but instead occupied them with his
troops, much to the pique of the Western allies. While examining Yalta one
could clearly see some “Versailles” attributes and similarities. This was that
due to the fact it became established Soviet policy to make them ‘voluntary’
satellite states throughout Eastern Europe, while Britain and the US called for
self-determination. One could state that Stalin’s stance was much like George
Clemenceau during the Versailles peace talks due to the fact that he demanded
80% reparations from Germany as well a few other demands. However, what is
often ignored by this simplistic argument is that Stalin lost 25 million
people, 1,700 cities were destroyed and 70% of their industry vanished all from
the cause of World War 2. In addition one could not solely haul the largest
army in history back to the destructed USSR. Furthermore, tensions occurred
between the Grand Alliance as according to the Percentages Agreement Churchill
made with Stalin in 1944, it was decided to split countries in Eastern Europe
such as Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia, into spheres of influence. Not only
did this lead to conspiracy theories however due to the fact that Roosevelt
wasn’t present which lay the cornerstone of agitation. Moreover, Britain and
the US could care less whether the countries of Eastern Europe remained under
Communist occupation; their interests were concentrated in Greece and Turkey.
However, the factor that did motivate the Western allies to stand up to the
Soviet Union was Moscow’s control of Poland. The reason for this dispute was
quite clearly that Britain had gone to war and lost five hundred thousand men
for Polish liberation from Nazi occupation and could not now lose it to the
Soviets. This was the primary reason for British opposition to Soviet influence
in Eastern Europe, particularly Poland and certainly not the ideals of
self-determination. Therefore, one would agree with Charles L. Mee that after
all, at Yalta, while it was declared that Poland would be “independent and
democratic”, the rest of Eastern Europe was merely suggested to be “liberated
from Nazi occupation”.
As
Hitler had stated in his testament it the war resulted in two superpowers with
totally opposing ideologies. The US had a nuclear monopoly while Russia’s aim
was to liberate Eastern Europe. One can forget though that the atomic age had a
profound effect on international relations. It
is an arguable statement that this resulted in the statement from Carr “From
Friends to Foes” as he argues that the Cold War and especially the Atomic Bomb
was an act of aggression against the Soviet Union. Carr argues that it was the
United States acquirement, especially its first dentation on the 15th
of July 1945, just two days before Potsdam commenced. The Atomic Bomb quite
clearly showed that the results of the Yalta conference alarmed Stalin, to modernize
and catch up to the West, “making good the hundred year gap in ten years”. Secondly,
the fact that the Americans now had the Bomb meant that the Soviet Union did
not have to join the effort against Japan, as had been determined at Yalta. As the
German threat was gone that unified the allies, now the Japanese was too,
rendering further partnership between the USA and USSR meaningless.
Nevertheless ascribe to the USA and Britain having atomics weapons stationed in
Western Europe, Stalin had to occupy more land in Eastern Europe in order to
increase the distance between the weapons and Moscow. All in all, the fact that
Britain and the USA worked closely together in the Manhattan Project from 1942 did
not only isolate Stalin but also sett a foundation for the Arms Race.
When
the three powers met again, at Potsdam in July and August 1945, the situation
was different. The war in Europe was over, Truman was now the American
President, and Clement Attlee replaced Churchill during the Potsdam Conference.
Truman took a much tougher line than Roosevelt, especially on Poland. The major
issue at Potsdam was the question of how to handle Germany. As at Yalta, the Soviets had requested for heavy postwar reparations
from Germany, half of which would go to the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, Roosevelt had died, and America had a new president,
Truman, who was inclined to ‘get tough’ with the Russians. While Roosevelt had acceded to such demands, Truman and his
Secretary of State, James Byrnes, were determined to diminish the treatment of
Germany. The main reason why Truman and Byrnes encouraged this position was
because they wanted to avoid a repetition of the situation created by the
Treaty of Versailles, which had caused high reparations from Germany following
World War One. Nevertheless, the main vexation was the
American confidence, which the possession of the Atom Bomb now gave them. Truman
stated, “The Russians only understand one language
- ‘how many armies have you got?’ I’m tired of babying the Soviets” which
clearly shows us that he was the one making decision and wouldn’t take order
not even from the Soviet Union. Moreover, the US had experienced a
wartime economic boom. The industrial output of the US grew by 90% between
1940-1944. Therefore, taking this into consideration, and the fact that the US
had a nuclear monopoly; it can be argued that the Americans have never been as
strong as they were just after war.
All
in all, I would absolutely agree with the statement from Hitler, which he had
written in his testament in April 1945. As soon as the “Reich” fell there will remain in the world only two great powers capable of
confronting each other, the United States and Soviet Russia. Quite clearly if
you look into the issues they faced you would clearly determine the military exhibits
whit the nuclear monopoly, the economical boom and with the different
ideologies of each nations both Yalta and Potsdam couldn’t not have been held
without any issues. To summon both conferences and the start of the “Cold War”
I would like to quote Thucydides who stated, “War broke out because of the
growth and power in Athens (America) and the fear that it inspired in Sparta
(Soviet Union)”.
Example 8
After the end of WWII, several problems had to be solved, like what to do with Germany and Europe after 60 million people being killed. In 1945 the conferences of Yalta and Potsdam were held, Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill were to meet and discuss the future of Europe. The question asks, what disagreements were between Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin and what results did they have. Stalin was the leader of Russia, Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman was the leader of The United States and Clement Attlee and Churchill were the leaders of Britain. The best way to approach this essay is to look at all three leaders and their desires at each conference because the disagreements were only the leader’s faults. This essay will discover some the reasons that caused the disagreements between the three major powers during 1945, like the different aims that the leaders wanted to achieve and the situations they were facing. After looking at the leaders desires and reasons of disagreements, the essay will talk about the results of the disagreements like the Cold War and the annexing of Poland.
The Potsdam conference was held from the 17th of July to the 2nd of August in Potsdam, German occupied territory, the final goal that the three powers wanted to achieve was to administer punishment against the defeated Nazi Germany. Since the Yalta conference earlier in the year, Stalin was occupying a large amount of eastern Europe (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Baltic states and parts of Germany), he set up a communist government in Poland, Stalin himself said “The Soviet government cannot agree to the existence in Poland of a government hostile to it.”, which showed how much Stalin wanted to hold the Eastern line against Western Europe so he could have his “Soviet sphere of influence” in his hands. This caused problems that G. Kennan and H. S. Truman would see as a threat to western safety and Britain found Stalin’s actions unfair due to the amount of effort that the western powers have given to protect Poland. This already caused unbalance in the conference and it clearly showed that Stalin had the stronger hand against the amateur and fresh Harry S. Truman and Clement Attlee unlike the experience Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill. Harry S. Truman had a very negative view on the Soviets, he was born in Lamar, Missouri, with his dad being a farmer, he had very little experience of having power in politics and knowing about international relations because Roosevelt did not take Harry S. Truman as a serious Vice President. Walter LaFeber commented in one of his interviews how Truman about how insecure Truman was after talking to Molotov. The results of the problems caused by Soviet’s hunger for power and Truman’s view on the Soviets was the Iron Curtain and the Truman Doctrine that would aid any country that would be attacked by Communist powers and bring Truman’s famous speech on how the Soviets can not be trusted.
The results of the Yalta conference were demilitarization, denazification, a fixed reparations bill and the status of Poland being changed. The Yalta conference was held on the 4th of February until the 11th of February in Yalta, Crimea, which Stalin used as an advantage to make already poorly Churchill travel all the way by ship and rail. Today, with conferences being held in Germany and Brussels, it takes a few hours in a luxury plane for the American officials to get there, but in 1945 travel was slow and uncomfortable. Roosevelt and Churchill were forbidden to travel, but they still went all the way to the USSR, while Stalin’s forces were still pushing until Berlin. This however was not a major reason for disagreement at the Yalta conference, It is important to mention that the physical and mental ability of the two other powers would have been weaker, hence that Roosevelt did die due to health problems shortly after the conference in April. However, all three leaders had three different agendas in mind, Stalin wanted communist victory, Churchill came to Yalta with concern about what the red army was doing with Poland and Roosevelt came to Yalta to be friends with “Uncle Joe” Stalin, hoping he would help out in the Pacific war against Japan. Churchill had very little power in the conference, it was evident because he dismissed the American’s as “profoundly ignorant of the Polish situation” because he knew that Roosevelt only cared about the Japanese war between the Americans. Roosevelt knew he only had 3 million soldiers against 10 million Russians that were marching into Berlin, he needed to prioritize friendship with Stalin over anything else so Stalin would not attack the American land. The result of this disagreement between Churchill and Stalin with Roosevelt was that the Red Army was to join America against the Japenese, Churchill could only sit, watch and wave along with the other two great powers. The personality clashes during the Conference would fall apart during the Potsdam conference after Churchill would lose his position as Prime Minister and Roosevelt would die.
The result of the Yalta conference was in some ways a disaster, eastern Europe was to be swallowed by the red army, all the effort that the British put into Poland would be thrown away. However there were a few good things, the United Nations were created that would provide peace until today onwards and America were provided time, time to complete the atomic bomb, so Stalin could not be a threat against Western Europe. At Yalta, the U.S and the Russia’s would become allies to fight against the Japanese in the pacific, Churchill was left out, however the Russia-US alliance proved to be near useless, Roosevelt proved to “hold hands with the devil” if necessary in 1939, U.S. plans on building atomic bombs were kept secret and the Russians still spied on the U.S. because there was the lack of trust. The results of the Potsdam conference were brought from the Yalta conference in some ways, it was the continuation of the Yalta conference, war criminals would be put on trials in Nuremberg and reparations would be shifted to the USSR because they had more power in Europe than the other powers. The reparations were set to 20,000,000,000 dollars, Stalin demanded that he wants half of the reparations for the damage that the Soviets suffered, like the battle of Stalingrad where according to Anthony Beevor 1.1 million soviet Russians died.
To conclude, the Yalta and Potsdam conference was never there to create perfect results. The three personalities of the different powers from all over the world had different demands and objectives. The reasons of disagreement mainly include Stalin’s and Roosevelt’s demand for peace and power and the U.S. opinion on Stalin’s future moves. The results of the Yalta and Potsdam conference would later cause many more problems and it would lead to a cold war and disagreement between the USSR and the U.S. Like today, the conferences for the Russia crisis have been a clash of many leaders, with many disagreements and we can only hope for good things to come.