The Loughgall Ambush: Was There a "Shoot to Kill" Policy?
Section 1:
Was there a "Shoot to Kill" policy in Northern Ireland? To answer this question, a number of sources and perspectives will be presented, in particular two sources of similar type but of differing and conflicting information. Both are extremely relevant to the topic as they are specific to the policy. In fact, the first source was created solely to determine the validity of the claim. Most information about the topic is based on this source. Both sources allow us to dig deeper into information and insight of the policy, ultimately leading to us deciding the truth of the allegations of extrajudicial murder at the highest level.
Source 1: Stalker: Ireland, John Stalker, 1988
John Stalker was sent to Northern Ireland specifically for the purpose of investigating allegations that the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) was operating a shoot-to-kill policy which ignored elementary principles of justice. At the time, he served as the Deputy Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police, chosen because of his perceived integrity, professionalism, and experience in combatting terrorism through the Serious Crime Squad and Bomb Squad. Stalker openly condemned the actions of the RUC and, in return, was suspended by the British before the report was even completed over trumped-up charges ultimately dismissed. He was able to interview all responsible parties, and this indicated to many the spectacular significance of his findings. Throughout his account, Stalker outlines the obstacles that limited his ability to establish full content; he found his access to information limited, recounted numerous examples where the RUC evaded, slow-walked, obstructed, and openly misled his investigation. Such clear limitations actually provide valuable support to his conclusion that there was definitely such a policy. All this occurred before the event in question, but in fact, this is a value as it supports the argument that such a policy had long been entrenched. Stalker published his account the year after the Loughgall incident, which further makes it especially relevant as the event offered more support to his conclusions.
Source 2: A Secret History of the IRA, Ed Moloney, 2002
Moloney is a respected authority on the Troubles, first writing about the situation in Northern Ireland since 1978, going on to produce numerous documentaries for the BBC, Channel Four, and for RTÉ in Ireland. This particular book provides information on the actions and events conducted by the IRA, which is important to the investigation because he provides evidence that indicates the background to the event from the Republican perspective in a negative manner, attacking the folk view of the victims at Loughgall as heroic martyrs whilst emphasising the atrocities committed by the IRA. In doing so, the purpose of this book appears to have been to alienate the IRA and their supporters whilst showing much more sympathy for the RUC than many other accounts. In reading this book, one can clearly see the bias in favour of the British as there is constant denouncement of Gerry Adams, the leader of Sinn Féin. On the one hand, both the origin and purpose of this source seem limited; written 15 years after the event, it is more to provide an overview of the history of the IRA over decades than to examine the Loughgall incident in depth. However, it lets the reader understand the context through which the RUC was operating by putting the Troubles in perspective. Through his work, he was accused of putting the peace process in danger but maintained that his duty as a journalist to write a story overrides every other consideration and purpose and that he would never allow consequences for the peace process to get in the way; if the peace process was strongly rooted, it would survive even the most damaging story.
Section 2:
The Troubles in Northern Ireland was a bloody conflict which consisted of two main terrorist forces, the Unionists (Pro-Britain) and the Republicans/Separatists (Pro-Ireland). Since the 1920s, Ireland had sought peace and independence, but the northernmost province of Ireland, Ulster, wished to remain part of the United Kingdom. Terrorism within the borders of the United Kingdom meant that the British forces were involved. This brutal conflict ultimately established the border that is now seen on the island of Ireland. Therefore, this investigation is extremely relevant to both past and present Britain and Ireland. The reason for this relevance is that the tensions between these two nations are still extremely high as there are still disputes over certain actions, such as border control. This investigation will focus mainly on the Loughgall Ambush and the validity of the claim that the British Government established a "Shoot to Kill Policy" and will present numerous perspectives from both the Irish and British views. These two main perspectives are relevant to the initial question as they are the two affected nations. This investigation will firstly provide the context of the situation and then move on to explaining both the British and Irish perspectives respectively.
On 8 May 1987, a brigade of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) set out to Loughgall with a Toyota van and a digger. All eight IRA members were armed with bulletproof vests and standard-issue balaclavas. The members also had various rifles and enough ammunition for a brief attack. They were unaware that the Special Air Service (SAS), who, in turn, had similar British military standards of weapons, were lying in wait. The actual number of SAS members is still disputed. Nevertheless, this investigation will focus on the claim that there were at least 36 SAS members, all armed to kill. Prior to this event, the East Tyrone Brigade of the IRA had murdered many respected members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). They had recently conducted a similar attack with a bomb placed in the bucket of a digger and yet another attack with a mine; thus, they gained the name "invincible". The Brigade mainly targeted buildings which were empty, which leads to the question of why the IRA members supposedly shot first. Reports state that the RUC knew six weeks prior about the upcoming terror attack on the barracks located at Loughgall. The RUC traced the distributor of the bomb, who is kept anonymous, and discovered the intentions of the IRA. Immediately, the SAS were informed and began training. The targeted barracks was then emptied before the expected time, and the day before the ambush, 16 SAS members flew over from RAF base Brize Norton and took up their positions in the barracks and nearby buildings.
Focusing on the British perspective of the ambush, reports show that the digger first passed the barracks in order to scout ahead, and the Toyota van followed shortly after. According to many British sources, the digger then came back, the fuse on the bomb was lit, and the digger stormed through the security fence. The most controversial claim is that the IRA members from the van approached from the rear, and they all disembarked and began to fire upon the building, which they presumed was empty. Then the SAS returned fire with their standard-issue rifles, and the leader of the IRA brigade, Patrick Kelly, was hit in the head, killing him instantly. The other members were then simultaneously shot multiple times until there was no possibility of retaliation, hence the creation of the claim of the "Shoot to Kill Policy". During the ambush, a total of four civilian cars accidentally drove between the fighting forces. One car, carrying two brothers, was shot multiple times, and the driver, Antony Hughes, was shot and killed. His brother, Oliver, survived with a total of four wounds inflicted by gunfire. The British claim that the pair were wearing overalls similar to those of the fighting IRA, only without balaclavas and bulletproof vests. Another car containing a mother and daughter was stopped and held at gunpoint before either of them was injured. Two other cars were stopped before entering the area. Investigations into the incident state that the two brothers were indeed wearing overalls after previously fixing a lorry.
The Irish perspective differs in stating that the IRA members only opened fire after they were shot at, and most were killed before they could even grasp the severity of the situation. Nevertheless, both perspectives offer support for the idea that a "Shoot to Kill" policy existed at that time. After the ambush, the Irish government accused the British government of having a "Shoot to Kill Policy". This was not the first time that they had been accused of having this policy. After multiple killings of the RUC in 1982, the Deputy Chief of the Greater Manchester Police force, John Stalker, was sent in 1984 to investigate the killings. He was also tasked with considering whether or not the alleged "Shoot to Kill" policy existed. John Stalker concluded that the lower ranks of the RUC were not to blame, but people near the top of the ranks were very much to blame for the killings. The RUC denied any assertions made by John Stalker. As Mark Urban states, the police force and SAS were informally tasked with killing any people found with a firearm or explosive device. However, there was no written evidence or policy to back this up. After the Loughgall Ambush, the Irish Government repeatedly blamed the British Government for having such a policy and stated that the ambush was an act of revenge. This is also seen among the general Irish population, as in some Irish folk ballads, we can see that the Irish blame the "shoot to kill" policy on both England and Margaret Thatcher. For example, the Irish band Wolfe Tones, who sang The Loughgall Martyrs, expressed these views quite clearly and an intense and extreme view in favour of the Irish perspective. As one might say, "no smoke without fire", this band accused Margaret Thatcher without having indefinite proof, thus creating a national myth.
Throughout my research, it was clear that there still remain many differing viewpoints on whether a "Shoot to Kill" policy existed. Nonetheless, as Stalker and Urban would argue, there was undoubtedly justification for the claim to at least be considered. At the time of the shootings at Loughgall, both the Irish and British governments censored the release of official information to the public and the press. This censorship ultimately contributed to the sensitivity of the topic. This, in turn, led to the development of conspiracy theories and even paranoia on both sides of the border. Therefore, this investigation will conclude that there was an unspoken truth behind the claims of the Irish government, and a shoot-to-kill policy was set.
Section 3:
I feel unless you have actually lived in Northern Ireland, it is easy to take a simplistic view of the situation. Reading a single article about Loughgall might provide a different perspective than if you had a broader understanding of its place in context. The Troubles are difficult to understand because one wants to choose sides, and yet in such a conflict, both were capable of committing terrible atrocities. I can understand how one could read at the time in England one atrocity after another and just feel numb, not able to look at each on its own merits but instead offer sweeping judgements. How can one put a massacre or atrocity in context? When collecting the sources, I tried to use them in an emotionless way. However, if taking into account the actual horror during this time, this response would be completely different. The fact that ordinary citizens could become terrorists within the UK should be enough to fully understand the political and social issues that they were experiencing daily. The role of the historian ultimately depends on the audience. I could tell a book for a pro-Irish audience, where the historian would maintain a slight anti-British slant. For the pro-British audience, the historian's role is to emphasise the reasons for the British forces' actions. Both types of responses may deliberately exclude, downplay, or exaggerate certain information in an effort to whitewash controversial events. For example, during this period, the RUC removed incriminating police records. If history is an unending argument, such books favour persuasion over informing. Likewise, this affects the reliability of the sources about this era, which must be evaluated in order to be used effectively. Certain events are considered more significant than others given the huge split in public opinion, and each viewpoint provides different levels of significance. It is safe to say most sources have their own biases. However, some, such as the Stalker Inquiry, aim to limit personal bias. Still, it is hard to use the sources in a non-offensive manner because many of these sources are used and manipulated to fit a certain agenda. In fact, even today, there are still struggles between Ireland and Britain as the Brexit situation and the implications it has on the border have brought the Troubles back to public awareness when most forgot about it. The bias mentioned above with historians and their audiences is mirrored by politicians as Ireland and Britain seem to be using aggressive language against each other again, which might affect our understanding of Anglo-Irish relations. Therefore, the method of selecting certain information over others hugely affects the validity of the source.
Bibliography:
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- Figure 1: IRA gunmen in West Belfast (PACEMAKER BELFAST)
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