Notes and IB Essays on South Africa

South African History Timeline
Zulu and Xhosa tribes establish large kingdoms in the South Africa region.
The Dutch establish the port of Cape Town. They are the first Europeans to settle in South Africa.
The British take control of Cape Town.
Gold is discovered in Johannesburg, making the city rich.
Dutch settlers fight the British in the Boer War. Britain eventually gains control of South Africa.
South Africa becomes an independent nation.
Rolihlahla Dalibhunga Mandela is born on July 18 in a small village in South Africa. A teacher later gives him the English name Nelson.
Apartheid is introduced. Laws legally and physically separate different racial groups.
The African National Congress, a black civil rights group, begins a Campaign for Defiance of Unjust Laws as a protest against apartheid. Nelson Mandela is one of its leaders.
In the town of Sharpeville, 67 Africans are killed while protesting Apartheid.
Mandela is arrested for plotting against the government. Though he stays active politically, he will spend 27 years in prison.
Hundreds of black protesters are killed in an uprising in Soweto.
President F.W. de Klerk announces the end of apartheid. Mandela is freed from prison after serving 27 years.
De Klerk and Mandela are jointly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.
South Africa holds its first elections in which all races can vote. Nelson Mandela is elected President.
South Africa hosts and wins the World Cup rugby tournament.
Mandela steps down as President.
The African National Congress wins a landslide election, gaining almost 70% of the votes. Thabo Mbeki begins his second term as president.
Stages of the Boer War
Stage 1 - Boer offensive. At first, the Boer republican fighters were successful in three major offensives. Their commandos invaded northern Natal and besieged the town of Ladysmith, invaded Cape Colony to lay siege to the British garrisons in Kimberley and Mafeking. While the British did achieve some tactical victories at Talana, there were serious defeats at Stormberg, Magersfontein and Colenso which became known as 'Black Week' (10th - 15th December 1899).
Stage 2 - British response. With heavy reinforcements and the assumption of overall command by Lord Roberts with Lord Kitchener as his Chief of Staff, the British turned the situation around. Imperial troops eventually relieved the besieged towns of Ladysmith (28th February 1900), Kimberley (15 February 1900) and Mafeking (18th May 1900). On 13th March 1900 Roberts occupied Bloemfontein, the capital of the Orange Free State, and on 28th May the province was annexed and renamed the Orange River Colony. On 31st May, British troops entered Johannesburg and, on 5th June, Pretoria was taken. The Transvaal was annexed on 1st September 1900. To many it seemed that the war was over. At the end of November, Roberts made a triumphal return to England.
Stage 3 - Guerrilla war. Under the leadership of Louis Botha, Christiaan de Wet, Jan Smuts and de la Rey, the Boers abandoned the British style of warfare and increased their reliance on small and mobile military units. The mobility of these units enabled them to capture supplies, disrupt communications and undertake raids on the army of occupation. They were very successful in evading capture. In response, the British embarked on a scorched earth policy to deny supplies to the fighters. Approximately 30,000 farms were burnt. In March 1901 the need to restrict the movement of the Boers brought the development of 8,000 blockhouses and 3,700 miles of wire fencing guarded by 50,000 troops. This was followed by a number of 'drives' which had the intention of cornering the Boers but the operations mainly produced large numbers of displaced Boer and African families.

Unlike most of the rest of Africa, South Africa was very sparsely populated at the time when the first Europeans arrived. They came, not to settle, but to resupply their ships on long voyages from Europe to southern Asia. When the first European settlement was created, it faced little opposition, and it took several generations for African opposition to become significant. In the end, the conflict for control over South Africa involved both foreign and "indigenous" European powers as well as Africans.
Southern Africa became the site of the earliest European settlement in modern African history in 1652, when employees of the Dutch East India Company established a supply base on the shore of Table Bay, the site of the modern city of Cape Town. Over the next 150 years, Dutch settlers settled on the land surrounding Table Bay and to the east along the coast, creating Cape Colony.
As the Dutch settlements expanded, they encountered both indigenous Stone-Age Khoisan and Iron-Age Bantu African peoples. The earliest encounters were with Khoisan who were decimated, enslaved or forced to flee. As subsequent generations of Europeans expanded further to the east, they encountered Bantu (mostly Xhosa) who became trading partners as well as armed opponents. The Dutch settlers, called Boers (from the Dutch word for farmer), created very large farms and found it necessary to import labour, so Cape Colony imported slaves while much of the rest of Africa exported them.

During the Napoleonic Wars, the administration of Cape Colony changed. The British seized control in 1795, returned it to the Dutch in 1803 and seized it again in 1806. After 1806, they gradually extended their control along the coast to the east. The Boers resented British rule, even though British control brought economic benefits to the Boers.
British control increased the opportunities for farmers to export sheep and wool, and hunters to export ivory obtained from the interior. On the other hand, the British angered Boers by abolishing slavery in 1807, even though they mitigated the effect by passing the "Hottentot Law" in 1809 to require blacks to carry passes when moving about in public. Under this law, any black found without a pass (which listed the name of employer and location of residence) could be taken by any white for labour.
The Hottentot Law was controversial in Britain, so the Cape Colony administration added provisions that required whites to provide a written contract to their black workers and gave blacks the right to sue their employer in court for breach of contract. In 1812, a British judge toured rural areas to hear lawsuits brought by African workers, but that provoked Boer opposition. Boers were further angered when Christian missionaries, who arrived from Britain after 1815, championed African rights and got the government to pass Ordinance 50 in 1828, which removed the most restrictive provisions of the 1809 "Hottentot Law."
The final straw for many Boers came in 1833 when the British parliament outlawed the ownership of slaves throughout the empire. Poorer Boers who owned only a few slaves could not pay enough in wages to attract replacement labour. Meanwhile richer Boers protested the loss of slaves that represented a huge capital investment. The new law prompted a mass migration of Boer farmers (known as Trekboer), first towards Natal, which the British annexed in 1845, then towards the interior in Orange Free State and eventually the region of Transvaal (literally "beyond the Vaal River," a tributary of the Orange River).
The British did not try to stop Boers from moving into the interior, since it reduced friction in their own territory. Tensions remained, however, between the Boers who remained behind in Cape Colony and the British administration. Tensions were increased by the Boer attitude towards the remaining independent African kingdoms, which the British perceived as provocative. Some British living in Cape Colony even joined the Boers in their resentment of the "imperial factor"--i.e. meddling by London in local affairs. The tension increased even further in the 1870s when the British annexed West Griqualand, site of the Kimberley diamond discoveries. When Disraeli's Colonial Secretary Lord Carnarvon tried to organize a federation of the British and Boer territories in 1875 (modelled after the 1867 federation of French and English provinces of Canada), the Boer leaders turned him down.
The discovery of diamonds in 1870 near the Vaal River, some 550 miles northeast of Cape Town, ended the isolation of the Boers and changed South African history. The discovery triggered a "diamond rush" that attracted people from all over the world and turned Kimberley into a town of 50,000 within five years. At first, both whites and blacks worked independent claims in four areas surrounding Kimberley, but as the mines went deeper, they became more difficult to work, and a number of businessmen managed to consolidate them into larger mines. One of them was Cecil Rhodes who arrived in South Africa at age 16 and eventually gained control over most of the mines through his De Beers Consolidated Company. Another was Barney Barnato, the son of a London pub owner who arrived in 1873 at age 21 with a small amount of cash and "forty boxes of cheap cigars" which he used to buy mining claims. A third was Alfred Beit, the son of a Hamburg merchant who arrived in 1875 and stayed on to organize the consolidation of small mines so they could be exploited with heavy mining equipment.
In 1886, a second major mineral find was made along a large cliff thirty miles south of the Boer capital at Pretoria. The cliff, known locally as the "Witwatersrand" (literally "white water ridge") contained the world's largest deposit of gold-bearing ore. Although it was not as rich as gold finds in Canada and Australia, its consistency made it especially well-suited to industrial mining methods.
Although the "Rand" became covered by small claims just like Kimberley, men like Rhodes, Barnato and Beit immediately invested their diamond profits in gold-mining. Due to the relatively low quality of the ore, large quantities were required to produce acceptable amounts of gold, and that could only be accomplished through large investments in heavy machinery. Other Europeans with access to capital became involved in gold mining too, and the diamond moguls were never able to achieve the same level of control as they had at Kimberley. By 1889, 124 companies, organized into nine "groups" based on their sources of financing, controlled the South African gold mines.
Both mining regions faced the same problem with labour--how to find enough workers and how to keep their cost low. In each case, local governments passed laws at the insistence of the mining companies that limited the right of black Africans to own mining claims or to trade their products. Ultimately, black Africans were relegated to performing manual labour while whites got the skilled jobs or positions as labour foremen. In addition, black workers were forbidden by law from living wherever they wanted, and instead forced to stay in segregated neighbourhoods or mining compounds. The political power of the mining companies became so great that once the Kimberley area was annexed by Cape Colony in 1880, it took only a decade before diamond "baron" Cecil Rhodes was elected prime minister of Cape Colony.
Although they resisted federation with the British, the Transvaal Boers could not ignore the threat possessed by the independent Zulu state to the southeast. The Zulu were a subgroup of the Nguni Bantu who occupied the eastern slopes and coastal plain of South Africa, a dry region with numerous small rivers that provided relative prosperity. The Nguni were semi- nomadic pastoralists who also planted staple crops during the winter rainy season and lived in small, independent homesteads that were loosely organized into relatively small states. That began to change at the beginning of the 19th century when a series of dry years followed decades of good rainfall, population growth and territorial expansion. The result was overcrowding that culminated in conflict over access to water and good land.
By the 1870s the Zulu, led by King Cetshwayo, occupied a kingdom located between British Natal and the Boer Transvaal Republic. For a time, Cetshwayo maintained good relations with Natal in an effort to counter Boer encroachment on Zulu land, but in 1877, Sir Theophilus Shepstone, the British Secretary for Native Affairs in Natal, convinced the Transvaal government to accept British annexation. Concerned about Boer resistance to this move, Shepstone convinced the British High Commissioner for Cape Colony, Sir Bartle Frere, that the Zulu posed a threat to the peace. In December 1878, Frere ordered Cetshwayo to disband his army.
Cetshwayo refused and mobilized 30,000 soldiers instead. On January 11, 1879, the British invaded Zululand with about 7000 regular troops, a similar number of black African "levees" and a thousand white volunteers. Ignoring advice from a number of Boer authorities, the British lost more than 1600 soldiers at the battle of Isandhlwana on January 22, 1879. A British outpost at Rorke's Drift on the Zululand-Natal border withstood a second Zulu attack, however, and after reinforcements arrived, the British managed to conquer the Zulu capital at Ulindi by July 1879.
As long as the Zulu remained a threat, the Boers accepted British annexation. However, once the Zulu were defeated, the Transvaal Boers demanded their country back. Boer forces defeated the British at Majuba Hill in 1881. The British relented and signed the Convention of Pretoria in 1881 and the Convention of London in 1884. These agreements restored Transvaal autonomy but did not specifically recognize Transvaal independence.
The British attempt to annex Transvaal was their biggest incursion into the area, but there were others. In 1868, the British annexed Basutoland in the Drakensberg Mountains following an appeal from Moshesh, the leader of a mixed group of African refugees from the Zulu wars, who sought British protection against the Boers. In the 1880s, Bechuanaland (modern Botswana, located north of the Orange River) became the object of dispute between the Germans to the west, the Boers to the east, and Cape Colony to the south. Although Bechuanaland had no economic value, the "Missionaries Road" passed through it towards territory farther north. After the Germans annexed Damaraland and Namaqualand (modern Namibia) in 1884, the British annexed Bechuanaland in 1885.
In 1886, the balance of power in the region started to tip towards the Boers thanks to the gold discoveries at Witwatersrand. Although older Boers were displeased because the gold rush threatened their pastoral way of life, younger Boers saw the gold as a means to obtain real political power.
With the major African kingdoms out of the way and the Boer Republics under British authority, the way was clear for British imperialists to carry out their plans. Perhaps the greatest of all British imperialists was Cecil Rhodes, the dominant European figure in southern Africa in the late 19th century. He came to Natal in 1869 to recover from tuberculosis at his older brother's farm. Instead of farming, Rhodes spent most of his time at Kimberley seeking diamonds. Over the next decade, Rhodes commuted between Kimberley and Oxford to earn a university degree at the same time he amassed a fortune in Kimberley diamonds.
Besides being a shrewd businessman, Rhodes was also a dreamer who wanted to unite the world under an Anglo-Saxon empire. He considered the American War for Independence to have been an enormous tragedy because of the way it divided English-speaking peoples, and he hoped that the English in Europe and America would eventually reunite. Rhodes even wrote in 1877 about his vision of an empire that included Africa, South America, the East Asian Coast, most of the Holy Land, and South Pacific islands.
By 1880, Rhodes was a multi-millionaire and well-known enough to run for election as an Member of Parliament in the Cape Colony. He became interested in the land north of the Transvaal, specifically Matabeleland and Mashonaland in the modern country of Zimbabwe. Originally, the land was occupied by the Shona people, but about 1840 the Matabele people conquered it as part of the Zulu wars. By the 1880s, Europeans believed that there was gold in Matabeleland, since it was located between rich mineral deposits in Katanga and Witwatersrand. The Matabele leader Lobenguela used diplomacy to pit European powers against each other, and eventually granted all mining concessions to Cecil Rhodes in the mistaken belief that all he wanted was gold.  Rhodes wanted gold, but he also wanted to extend the British empire in order to create a continuous land route from Cape Town to Egypt, which came under control of the British in 1882. Rhodes promoted his plan for the "Cape-to-Cairo route" as a means to strengthen the British position in two critical locations and a way to provide work for England's unemployed.
Rhodes' next step was to charter a mining company, but first he had to get several other companies--notably the Bechuanaland Exploration Company--to sign over their interests to him or withdraw. Rhodes had many enemies in Britain where his ardent defence of Cape Colony interests was perceived as anti-imperial, and he faced opposition from missionaries, the London Chamber of Commerce and many members of the South African parliament. Despite their efforts, Rhodes received a charter for the British South Africa Company in October 1889 because the government thought this was a low-cost way to prevent Germans, Boers or Portuguese from occupying Matabeleland.
In September 1890, Rhodes' company established a fort at Salisbury in Mashonaland, but within three years, the British government concluded that Rhodes had lied about the gold, Lobenguela's authority and how the costs of administration would be paid. By then, it was politically impossible for the government to repudiate Rhodes' charter because it would have meant giving up control over the area. Lobenguela tried to repudiate the agreement by returning Rhodes' payment and killing the counselor (Lotje) who had arranged it, but Rhodes ignored him. Lobengula eventually died (probably from smallpox) while fleeing Rhodes' forces.
Rhodes' reputation in Britain was furthered damaged by the Jameson Raid in 1895. It resulted from conditions in the Witwatersrand goldfields where the Transvaal government, having learned from the example at Kimberley, denied civil rights and the vote to the thousands of foreigners who rushed to the goldfields. The British expected these uitlanders (literally "outlanders") to revolt, and the commander of the British South Africa Company's police force, Leander Starr Jameson, led a column south from Bechuanaland to assist the uprising. Jameson learned too late that the revolt failed and on January 2, 1896, his force surrendered to the Transvaal authorities 25 miles short of Johannesburg.
Jameson's surrender embarrassed both Rhodes and the British government. Rhodes was forced to resign as the Cape Colony prime minister. Joseph Chamberlain, the British Secretary of State for the Colonies, had to hide his involvement in the affair. Jameson's capture also triggered a revolt in Matabeleland, and after the raid, the German Kaiser Wilhelm II sent a telegram of congratulations to President Paul Kruger of the Transvaal. That increased British fears of a Boer-German alliance, as did the completion of a railroad in 1894 from the Transvaal to Delagoa Bay, which provided access to the sea through Portuguese Mozambique. British fears were further heightened when the Transvaal government began to buy large quantities of modern weapons from German firms.
Cecil Rhodes' South African Company survived until 1923 as the sole remaining British chartered company after 1900. Rhodes died in March 1902, a few months before the end of the Anglo-Boer War. He was 49 years old.
With tensions between the British government and the two Boer Republics at an all-time high after the Jameson Raid, the appointment of Alfred Milner as High Commissioner for South Africa in 1897 was the equivalent of throwing kerosene on a fire. Milner had been a brilliant student at Oxford University and had served in Egypt where he developed a reputation as an authoritarian leader. Milner believed that the British were a moral right and duty to rule inferior peoples and his job was to reverse the decline of Britain's influence in world politics. As a result, he paid no attention to local views and ignored moderates on both sides. Instead, he encouraged the most radical of the Transvaal "uitlanders" to call for British intervention and used that to justify an ultimatum issued in September 1899. Transvaal's President Kruger responded with his own ultimatum, and after it expired on October 11, the two sides went to war.
The Boers struck first. Boer Republican commandos attacked Natal and Cape Colony in three directions and won battles against the British on all three fronts in December 1899. The following year, they got bogged down while besieging British garrisons at Ladysmith (Natal), Kimberley and Mafeking (Cape Colony). British reinforcements began to arrive in large numbers and by the end of the year, they had ended the sieges, captured 4000 Boers and occupied the Boer cities of Bloemfontein, Pretoria and Johannesburg. Transvaal President Kruger fled into exile through Mozambique and the British took over the entire railroad network. In December, the British annexed the two Boer Republics and the British commander returned to England.
His return was premature. The Boers continued to fight a guerrilla war by seizing supplies, cutting rail lines and staging raids into the coastal colonies. A new British commander, Lord Kitchener, resorted to scorched earth tactics to stop them, including the use of concentration camps and the destruction of 30,000 Boer farms. Captured Boer fighters were exiled to Ceylon, Bermuda and St. Helena while nearly 28,000 Boer civilians, mostly children, died in the camps of dysentery, measles and other diseases. By 1902, the surviving Boer fighters were exhausted and by a vote of 54 to 6, their leaders agreed to sign the Peace of Vereeniging on May 31, 1902 in Pretoria.
The Anglo-Boer War raised questions at home and abroad about British imperial policy. Some opponents criticized the enormous cost of the war while others questioned what British interest was served by conquering European farmers who were fighting for their independence. The civilian death toll in the concentration camps also cast doubt on the morality of British imperialism. An English historian, J. A. Hobson, wrote a critique of the war in 1902 that suggested British industrialists had taken control of the government and used taxpayer money to further their own interests. In 1916, V. I. Lenin expanded on Hobson's criticism to denounce imperialism as "the highest stage of capitalism."
Unit 1 Study Notes South Africa 1880-1910
The earliest people
The earliest groups we can name were the San and Khoikhoi. The hunter-gatherer San ranged widely over the area; the pastoral Khoikhoi lived chiefly along the southern and western coastal strips, where adequate grazing was to be found. So it was with the latter that the early European settlers first came into contact – much to the disadvantage of the Khoikhoi.
As a result of diseases such as smallpox imported by Europeans, assimilation with settlers and especially with slaves who were to arrive in later years, (and simple extermination), the Khoi have disappeared.
Other long-term inhabitants of the area that was to become South Africa were the Bantu-speaking people who had moved into the north-eastern and eastern regions from the north, starting at least many hundreds of years before the arrival of the Europeans.
Settlers and slaves
Jan van Riebeeck and his 90 men landed in 1652 at the Cape of Good Hope, under instructions by the Dutch East India Company to build a fort and develop a vegetable garden for the benefit of ships on the Eastern trade route. Their relationship with the Khoi was initially one of bartering, but a mutual animosity developed over issues like cattle theft – and, no doubt, the growing suspicion by the Khoi that Van Riebeeck's outpost was becoming a threat to them.
Colonial expansion
As the colonists moved east, they met the Xhosa. A situation of uneasy trading and more or less continuous warfare began to develop. By this time, the second half of the 18th century, the colonists had begun to lose their sense of identification with Europe. The Afrikaner nation was coming into being.
As a result of developments in Europe, the British took the Cape over from the Dutch in 1795. Seven years later, the colony was returned to the Dutch government, only to come under British rule again in 1806, recaptured because of the alliance between Holland and Napoleon. The way the British tried to improve the conditions under which Khoi servants were employed angered the colony's white inhabitants.
The Great Trek
This and, in particular, the emancipation of slaves in 1834 led to the Great Trek north and east of about 12 000 discontented Afrikaner farmers, or Boers. These people were determined to live independently of colonial rule and what they saw as unacceptable racial egalitarianism.
The early decades of the century had seen another event of huge significance: the rise to power of the great Zulu king, Shaka. His wars of conquest and those of another general who broke away from Shaka in the north caused a calamitous disruption of the interior known as the mfecane.
Initially, many Trekkers moved east into the Natal area, today the province of KwaZulu-Natal, under the leadership of Piet Retief. Intending to negotiate for land, Retief was murdered with a party of followers and servants at the kraal of Dingane, Shaka's successor.
The Battle of Blood River
In the war that followed, the Boers won the Battle of Blood River. They began to settle in Natal, but smaller conflicts followed and the British – fearing repercussions in the Cape Colony – annexed Natal, where a small British settlement called Port Natal (later Durban) already existed.
Meanwhile two Boer republics were formed: the central Orange Free State and South African Republic (Transvaal or ZAR – Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek) to its north.
By the mid-1800s, the tiny refreshment post at the Cape of Good Hope stretched over virtually all of what is today South Africa.
In some areas the Bantu-speakers kept their independence, mostly in northern Natal, which was the kingdom of the Zulu. Almost all would lose their freedom to whites- British or Boer.
The discovery of diamonds
The Cape Colony was granted representative legislature in 1853 and self-government in 1872. Between these two dates, a dramatic new element was introduced to the economic, and consequently political, balance – the discovery of diamonds and subsequent establishment of Kimberley. As a British territory, it was a perfect proving ground for the young Cecil John Rhodes, one of the many thousands to be attracted by the diggings, and one who made his fortune there.
The colony had started recognising political equality among the races based on economic qualifications, which ended up excluding most non-whites. Among those who did qualify, many became politically active across colour lines. The promise existed of progress towards full political inclusion of the population.
Natal, and the Battle of Isandhlwana
The Colony of Natal, however, was different, with the size of the Zulu nation becoming more threatening to the colonists. Economically, Natal had the advantage of being ideal for the cultivation of sugar cane. The consequent labour requirements led to the importation of indentured labourers from India, many of whom – in spite of discrimination – remained in the country after their contracts had expired: the forebears of today's significant and influential Indian population.
The late 19th century was an area of aggressive colonial expansion, and the Zulus were bound to come under pressure. But under King Cetshwayo, they delivered resounding proof at Isandhlwana in 1879 that the British army was not invincible. However, they were defeated in the following year, leading to Zululand eventually being incorporated into Natal in 1897.
Gold and war
Britain then annexed the Transvaal in 1877. It lost control again after Majuba when qualified independence in 1881 and full internal autonomy in 1884 were given. Paul Kruger had been elected president of the poor republic. Two years later, when gold was discovered on the Witwatersrand, Kruger presided over a financial turnaround of spectacular proportions – but he also saw a serious threat to Afrikaner independence develop as huge numbers of newcomers, mostly British, descended on the gold fields.
These people (the uitlanders, or foreigners) would soon qualify for the vote but Kruger created a 14-year residence stipulation.
Rhodes and the Jameson Raid
In the Cape, however, Cecil John Rhodes had become Prime Minister. He wanted Britain to control all the states in southern Africa and used the growing discontent of the uitlanders and mining companies in the ZAR. His first attempt at takeover was a disaster when his plan to have Leander Starr Jameson lead a raid into Johannesburg in response to a planned uitlander uprising failed. The uprising did not happen: Jameson rode into the Transvaal only to surrender. Rhodes resigned.
The Jameson Raid had a polarising effect. Afrikaners in the Cape and the Orange Free State, though disapproving of Kruger in many ways, became more sympathetic to his anti-British stance. The Orange Free State formed a military alliance with the Transvaal.
The Anglo-Boer War
In Britain, however, Rhodes and Jameson were popular heroes. It kept up the pressure on Kruger, and the Anglo-Boer/South African War began in October 1899. Up to half a million British soldiers squared up against some 65 000 Boers; black South Africans were pulled into the conflict on both sides.
Again, Britain's military reputation suffered a blow as the Boers set siege to Ladysmith, Kimberley and Mafeking.
Under Major General Herbert Kitchener and Field Marshal Sir Frederick Sleigh Roberts, however, the British offensive gained force, and by 1900 Bloemfontein, Johannesburg and Pretoria were occupied. Kruger fled for Europe.
The Boer reply was to intensify guerilla war – General Jan Smuts, who had been Kruger's state attorney, led his troops to within 190 kilometres of Cape Town – and in response Kitchener adopted a scorched-earth policy and set up racially separate civilian concentration camps in which some 26 000 Boer women and children and 14 000 black and coloured people were to die in appalling conditions.
The war ended in Boer defeat at the Peace of Vereeniging in 1902.
Union 1910
Many blacks saw the British victory in the Anglo-Boer war as the hoped-for opportunity to put all four colonies on an equal and just footing, but the treaty left their franchise rights to be decided by the white authorities. The ex-Boer republics retained the whites-only franchise. When the Union of South Africa came into being on 31 May 1910, the only province with a non-racial franchise was the Cape, and blacks were barred from being members of parliament. Of the estimated 6-million inhabitants of the Union in that year, 67% were black African, 9% coloured and 2.5% Asian.
The South African Party, a merging of the previous Afrikaner parties, held power under the premiership of General Louis Botha.

End of Unit Notes
The Lead-up to Apartheid
As we’ve discussed, many blacks saw the British victory in the Boer war as the chance to put all four colonies on an equal and just footing, but the treaty left their rights to be decided by the white authorities. The ex-Boer republics retained the whites-only franchise.
In 1909 a delegation appointed by the South African Native Convention, including representatives of the coloured and Indian populations, went to London to plead the case of the country's black population- their photo is in the textbook.
But when the Union of South Africa came into being on 31 May 1910, the only province with a non-racial franchise was the Cape, and blacks were barred from being members of parliament. Of the estimated 6-million inhabitants of the Union in that year, 67% were black African, 9% coloured and 2.5% Asian.
The South African Party, a merging of the previous Afrikaner parties, held power under the premiership of General Louis Botha.
The 1913 Land Act and the ANC
Repressive measures to entrench white power were not long in coming – the Masters and Servants Act, the reservation of skilled work for whites, pass laws, the Native Poll Tax and the 1913 Land Act which reserved 90% of the country for white ownership.
By the time this Act was passed, the African National Congress (ANC) had come into being on January 8 1912, in Bloemfontein, in an act of unity joining an educated elite, the rural classes and tribal structures. As you found out through the chart you did, this was not a successful strategy. The committee included Sol Plaatje as secretary; the first president of the ANC was the Rev John L Dube. Both formed part of a second unsuccessful delegation to London, this time to protest the land grab.
Resistance started to assume a more outspoken and militant form, especially when several hundred black women marched in Bloemfontein to protest against being forced to buy passes every month. Similar protests were held in other places, and participants arrested. The women were harshly treated in jail. But you’ll remember that they were ultimately successful.
Mohandas Gandhi
The Indian community were also suffering under viciously racist treatment – in 1891 they had been expelled from the Orange Free State altogether. Mohandas Gandhi, then a young lawyer who had arrived in South Africa in 1892, had become a leading figure in Indian resistance.
The struggle against the £3 Indian poll tax in Natal involved a mass strike in which a number of Indians were killed, but achieved success when the tax was removed in 1914 – the year Gandhi, then known as Mahatma (regardless of what Marcus says), left the country.
Afrikaner polarisation
Botha and Smuts wanted reconciliation with English South Africans but the still-angry Afrikaners didn’t, and JBM Hertzog formed the Nationalist Party. This rift between the two white groups became worse when South Africa entered the First World War in support of Britain and anti-British Afrikaners unsuccessfully rebelled; this is like what happened in Canada where the French minority fought to keep out of the war, and with the Irish in the UK.
Still hoping for support from the British government – there had been further delegations – the ANC supported involvement in the war and unknown numbers of black soldiers died.
(South Africa gained control over the previously German-held South West Africa – now Namibia – as a result of the war; the territory became a Union mandate.)
Black workers, white workers
With the inspiration of the October Revolution in Russia (the 94th anniversary was Monday), the post-war period was marked by strike action. In 1918, a million black mine workers went on strike for higher wages, and 71 000 did the same in 1920 – the latter strike successfully extracting a wage increase which Valentin refused to mention in his homework.
Between those strikes, 1919 saw the formation of the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union of South Africa and the convening of the South African Indian Congress. In the same year, Botha died and Smuts became Prime Minister.
If official (white) South Africa was taking its place in the wider world as a result of the First World War, the ANC was beginning to see itself as part of the wider African efforts against colonialism in Africa. In its 1918 constitution it referred to itself as a "Pan African Association" and the organisation attended the second congress of the international Pan African Movement in 1921 (not to be confused with the later South African Pan-Africanist Congress).
Another strike was looming on the mines – by a different group of miners. Rising costs and a falling gold price led the Chamber of Mines to allow the lower-paid African miners to do semi-skilled work. White miners reacted violently in a 1922 strike, militarily suppressed by Smuts. Hertzog's Nationalists found increased support in the white Labour Party, and an election pact saw Smuts ousted and Hertzog as Prime Minister in 1924.
The next decade saw Hertzog successfully working for increased independence from British control and greater job reservation security for whites. Franchise acts extended the vote to all white men and women, but left the still existing black vote in the Cape restricted to men. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, seven out of eight black South Africans lived in rural areas. Many were successful small farmers. The growth of towns and cities and the rising population meant that there was a good market for the food they produced. Black Africans often farmed more successfully than Afrikaners. One reason for this was that they simply had more labour: it was part of the African tradition for women to work on the land, while Afrikaner women did not. Many blacks also farmed as share croppers, a system in which the share cropper gave part of his crop (usually half) to the white landowners in return for the land he used.
Africans were very reluctant to give up farming, but the mine owners and farmers wanted their labour, in the mines and on the land. So the 'alliance of gold and maize' got the white government to pass the Natives Land Act of 1913. According to this Act:
· Blacks could not own or rent land except in the black RESERVATIONS. These made up only 7 per cent of the land, although the area was extended to 13 per cent by the 1936 Natives Land Act. They were far away from towns and cities.
· Share cropping was banned. Blacks could only occupy white owned land if they worked for the farmer.
The view of most whites was that Africans were rural people, not suited to urban life. Nevertheless, they wanted black people to come and work in their mines and factories, and as domestic servants. More and more Africans moved into the towns and particularly to those areas where poor white people lived. There was a single but powerful difference between poor whites and poor blacks: the whites had the vote. Politicians had to pay attention to their problems. This was why they decided to segregate housing: so that poor whites could be housed at the expense of blacks.  The government set up the Stallard Commission to look into the situation. The result was the Urban Areas Act of 1923. This allowed local councils to segregate housing in towns into 'black' and 'white' areas and to build new black townships.  Inside the towns, the more desirable areas were allocated for ‘whites only' housing. The houses available to Africans were often run-down, older properties and their yards. Town councils demolished black housing in areas declared 'white'. The inhabitants had to move, often many kilometres away, to segregated 'black locations'. Here, cheap new housing was built to very basic standards. Africans living in these new townships faced long, tedious and expensive journeys to work.  The government set up many miles away from the towns into townships.  This led to the passing of the Stallard Commission.  This allowed towns to be ‘whites only’ housing.  The best areas were for long, difficult journeys to work.  The houses for Africans the Urban Areas Act, 1923  Many Africans had to move were run down and old. This meant that they had segregated into black and white areas.

There had always been separate jobs for whites and blacks in South Africa. In the mines, for example, whites had supervisors' jobs, while black workers could only be labourers at a much lower rate of pay. Separation was extended in the decades before 1948.  In the 1920s poor white farmers, found themselves unable to make a living. There were droughts and epidemics of disease. More and more of them gave up farming and drifted to the towns. Here, they could only afford the cheapest housing in areas where blacks also lived.  As with housing, the Government passed laws to ensure job separation too.  · The Industrial Conciliation Act, 1924. This allowed white workers to join trade unions, but stopped black workers from doing so. This meant that blacks could not argue for better pay or working conditions.  · The Mines and Works Act, 1926. This restricted a whole range of jobs to whites only. It was called a ‘civilised labour policy'. Most famously, jobs on the railways were restricted. Every railway worker, from management to drivers, clerks, fitters and labourers, was for whites. By 1942 it was estimated that one in eleven working white males worked for the South African Railways.

Birth of the Nationalist Party
The government's popularity with its voters declined, however, with economic depression in the early 1930s, forcing Hertzog into a Smuts coalition government in 1933 (the year before South Africa became independent from Great Britain). Their parties fused as the United Party, but Hertzog's move was balanced by the breaking away on the right of DF Malan's new Nationalist Party as a political home for the more extreme Afrikaner nationalists.
The new government however was hardly liberal: in 1936 black Cape voters were removed from the common roll; the next year laws were passed to stem black urbanisation and compel municipalities to segregate black African and white residents.
The Hertzog-Smuts coalition fell apart with the Second World War, Smuts winning the power battle to form a government that took South Africa into the war. Afrikaner opposition to the war strengthened Malan's support base.
Because of the war, this was a time of rapid industrial expansion, but skilled work remained the domain of whites. On the other hand, the black influx into urban areas combined with the continuing repression strengthened black resistance. A Bill introduced by Smuts in 1946, for instance, aimed at curtailing the movement, residence and property ownership of Indians led to mass defiance and the rapid expansion of the Natal Indian Congress.
Apartheid entrenched
The ideals of the United Nations cast a spotlight on the country's racial inequity, and the first of many attacks on the country in the General Assembly came from the Indian government in 1946.
The Nationalist Party, however, was gathering strength and, in a surprise result, gained power in the 1948 election – power that it would not relinquish until 1994. Apartheid became official government ideology.
Apartheid in the 1950s
As your chart outlining the various acts passed throughout the 1950s showed, increasingly repressive laws against black South Africans expanded. This led to its obvious response – greater resistance. Amongst these acts, the main ones to know are the Group Areas Act (page 47), rigidifying the racial division of land and the Population Registration Act (46), which classified all citizens by race, were both passed in 1950. The pass laws, restricting black movement, came in 1952 (50). (I think it’s pretty ironic that it was officially called the Abolition of Passes Act). Finally, the Separate Amenities Act of 1953 (46) introduced "petty apartheid" segregation, for example, on buses and in post offices. In that year Dr. Malan retired and Strijdom became Prime Minister (who isn’t even mentioned in the textbook as he was PM for only two years).
The Defiance Campaign (pp 67-68)
In reaction to all this came the mass mobilisation of the Defiance Campaign, which began in 1952. Based on non-violent resistance, it nevertheless led to the gaoling of thousands of protestors. In fact, this achieved the opposite of what the government wanted, because it ended up increasing unity amongst resistance groups with the forming of the Congress Alliance, which included black, coloured, Indian and white resistance organisations as well as the South African Congress of Trade Unions.
In 1954 a campaign against the deliberately inferior Bantu Education System (49) was launched.
The Freedom Charter (pp 68-70)
1955 saw two of the most significant events of the decade. The first occurred after the government was unable to gain the 2/3 majority required by the 1910 constitution to remove coloureds from the common voters' roll and so simply changed the composition of the Senate by increasing its size (and consequently Nationalist Party majority) to give it the required majority in a joint sitting of the Senate and the House of Assembly. This isn’t really covered in the book, but it shows another way in which the government dealt with resistance as dealt with in pages 74-75. When Strijdom died in 1958 and was succeeded by Verwoerd, the following year representatives of black Africans were removed from both houses of parliament and the Cape provincial council.
The second crucial event was when the Freedom Charter – based on the principles of human rights and non-racialism – was signed on June 26 1955 at the Congress of the People in Soweto. The book quotes Mandela as calling this “a spectacular and moving demonstration” (69). This led the next year to 156 leaders of the ANC and its allies being charged with high treason in the longest trial in South African history. Everyone ended up being acquitted in 1961.
Nevertheless, the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), founded by Robert Sobukwe, broke away from the Congress Alliance. PAC was fed up by the ANC’s lack of real success and how they were willing to work with other races and groups rather than fight for a “Government of the Africans by the Africans and for the Africans” (p.76)
The stage was set for the even more polarised 1960s.

To what extent was the outcome of the Anglo-Zulu War a British strength or a Zulu weakness?- IB Extended Essay
The Anglo-Zulu War was fought between Britain and the Zulus in 1879. On the 17th of March, 1820, the first British settlers arrived in South Africa and approximately 4,000 arrived in Cape Town between April and June of that year[1]. As more and more settlers began to arrive, evidently more land would be required for not only houses and towns but vast stretches of land for farming. In turn this would eventually bring the settlers into contact with the native Africans. Consequently this would create conflict between the British and the African peoples. At this point in time the Zulu kingdom was one of the most powerful tribes in Southern Africa. Inevitably the British would come into contact as well as conflict with the Zulus and sure enough in 1879, Sir Bartle Frere, the British High Commissioner triggered war between the Zulu kingdom and the British Empire[2]. The British were off to a bad start on the 22nd of January, 1879, at the battle of Isandhlwana, about 16 km into Zulu territory from Rorke’s Drift, where approximately 1,200 or more British soldiers were killed and only a small amount escaped[3]. The Zulus had planned to attack at a later stage due to the orders of their chief, Cetshwayo, but a small group of British soldiers discovered the main Zulu army camped close by. This prompted the Zulu army to attack earlier than planned. Not only had chief Cetshwayo ordered his officers not to attack first, but the 22nd of January was also the day of the full moon and the Zulus considered this to be an unlucky day for battle. Yet the Zulus had no choice but to attack on that day or else their element of surprise would have been lost[4].
Although the Zulus had won the battle of Isandhlwana, they still allowed some British soldiers to escape thus enabling them to inform other British camps, such as Rorke’s Drift, that the Zulus were on their way and prepared for battle. On that same day the 22nd of January, 1879 the Zulu army penetrated the boundaries to the fort at Rorke’s Drift. The outcome of the Anglo-Zulu War was a result of the Zulu weakness instead of British strength when considering the question ‘to what extent was the Anglo-Zulu War a British strength or a Zulu weakness’. The British did have many strengths especially during this time period, yet so did the Zulus. The British had various weaknesses but the Zulus had countless weaknesses. There are several reasons as to why the result of the war was due to the weakness of the Zulus. The Zulus had various strengths, for example, having an enormous army, especially in comparison to that of the British can be extremely advantageous. In addition, the Zulus were native to Southern Africa which is an extremely beneficial when it come to combat and war. The Zulu Kingdom also had multiple weaknesses. For example the battle strategies used by the Zulus as well as their weaponry used was a major disadvantage. Although the British did have a large amount of strengths and weaknesses, such as the size of the British army being a disadvantage while the use of their arms and weaponry may be a major advantage, the Zulus weaknesses outweighed the British strengths. The Zulus should have found these weaknesses and used them to their own benefit as well as prepare for the strengths of the British army.
The Anglo-Zulu War of 1879 was the very last war fought by the Zulus and led to the decline in the Zulu Kingdom[5].The Zulu Kingdom previously grew due to multiple wars across Southern Africa under the strong leader known as, Shaka, who enabled the Zulu Kingdom to grow tremendously. By mid-19th century the Zulu Kingdom covered a vast area of what is now known as the country, South Africa. This shows how the Zulus were a great, powerful, dominant as well as influential Kingdom in Southern Africa. Having control over this wide area of land increases the vigour of the Zulus because they have more land to grow and prosper. Furthermore being in control of this entire land means that the Zulus must be familiar with and knowledgeable about the landscape around them. Being familiar with the landscape can be extremely beneficial when in battle because one needs to be aware of the surrounding dangers as well as useful aspects. For example there can be dangerous animals and insects that the British may not be familiar with, which could possibly cause them great harm. Also, the conditions under which the Zulus are used to living in but the British may not be used to can cause diseases which could lead to death. The Zulus being the experts of the land should also know what foods are nourishing, where to find them and how to get them. Not only is this a major benefit but they also know which foods to avoid because of poisonous effects. Therefore, the Zulu army, knowing the landscape better, should be physically as well as mentally a stronger army than the British. If the Zulus had so many strengths, then how did they manage to lose the war?
As the Zulu Kingdom expanded over the years during the 19th Century, the tribes that they fought, defeated and accumulated, expanded the size of not only the Zulu people but the Zulu army as well. In 1816, Shaka seized the throne to become the king of the Zulus and within a few years he managed to turn the minor Zulu tribe into a powerful empire. He did this by introducing a number of new military changes in order to create ‘the most highly trained and disciplined fighting force that had ever been seen in the region’[6]. He changed the way in which battles were fought in this area and was exceptionally successful and dominating other tribes. He used techniques that that were previously used but developed them further into an effective and cohesive military strategy. Even though Shaka’s reign only lasted until 1828, he was able to build up and strengthen the Zulu Kingdom. Also, although his successors were not as great of a leader as he was, they still managed to expand the Zulu Empire slowly but surely. Before 1872 the leader of the Zulus was named Mpande who may have come to power with the assistance of the Europeans but still slowly resuscitated the power of the Kingdom[7]. Mpande died in 1872 and his son, Cetshwayo, the leader who ended up fighting the British, came to power and continued to strengthen the Zulu Kingdom. At this point in time, the Zulus still had a vast stretch of land and were still considerably powerful. The Zulu army was immensely large in comparison to that of the British. For example, when the two enemies met at the Isandhlwana hill, the main Zulu army consisted of more than twenty thousand men while the British had approximately 1700 men based at Isandlwana[8]. This shows how the Zulu army almost outsized the British army four to one. Therefore the Zulu Army should have been much more powerful and hence more dominating. Although they were successful in winning the battle at Isandhlwana, they still managed to make mistakes such as allowing British soldiers to escape the battle as well as later losing the battle to the British at the battle of Rorkes Drift. With all the strengths listed and pointed out above, how and why did the Zulu army manage to lose the Anglo-Zulu War to the British? Even though the Zulus had all these strengths, they were still unable to exploit the use of these strengths against the British Army which in turn becomes a major weakness.
The Zulus had plenty of other weaknesses that from the beginning of the Anglo-Zulu war had a major impact on the outcomes and results. For example, the fall of Shaka, in the early 19th century was extremely detrimental. Although this may have been long before the Anglo-Zulu War, it still had a key role in the outcome due to multiple reasons. Similarly to other great leaders, such as Genghis Kahn, the loss of the King Shaka had a great impact on the growth, military strength as well as willpower of the Zulu Kingdom. Since Shaka only lasted until 1828 when he was assassinated by his half brothers[9], this brought about, at least one could argue, a decrease in strength in the Zulu army. Each successor after Shaka, hence became paranoid about being assassinated and began to kill off each half brother and sometimes even full brothers. For instance Shaka’s successor, Dingane, “commenced his career as king by killing all his brothers... also his brothers principle chiefs and friends, with all their women and children... At least eighty men thus perished”[10]. Since these leaders were paranoid about the fate of their lives, they may have then focused more on the security of their own lives rather than building up the military forces of the Zulu Empire. Also these successors of Shaka were not nearly as fierce and talented of a leader as he was. He developed and changed methods in order to adapt to the fighting styles of his enemies. When Shaka became leader of the Zulus, they were not an exceptionally powerful tribe. Yet, when the dominating tribe at the time, the Ndwandwe, tried to forcibly destroy the Zulus, Shaka strategically held back to avoid a battle because he knew that a battle with the Ndwandwe at this time would destroy the Zulus. Instead he held back and trained his soldiers with new weapons as well as new tactics that changed the whole dimension of the battle. The Zulu warriors learned from Shaka, how to fight more effectively and were considered more disciplined men. From this, they were able to defeat the Ndwandwe and continued to prosper in dominating land across Southern Africa. Thus, had Shaka been leader at the time of the Anglo-Zulu War, he may have possibly been able to defeat the British. Since he was an extremely gifted and ruthless military leader, he may have once again changed and adapted his military enabling the defeat of the British. Therefore, the loss and absence of Shaka had a major impact on the Zulu development resulting in a significant weakness.
Before the battle conflict with the British settlers began, the Zulus had many conflicts with not only other smaller tribes but also the Boers. The Boers were originally Dutch settlers that migrated north and east from Cape Colony where British settlers had taken over control and became known as voortrekkers. These Dutch settlers left to avoid being under the control of the British and became farmers in areas distant from British authority. Hence the name Boer, which in Dutch means farmer, used to label these Dutch settlers. As the voortrekkers approached the Drakensburg Mountains in 1837, they came into conflict with the Zulus. In 1838, a well infiltrated Boer army of 500 men with superior gun power demolished more than 3,000 Zulus at the Battle of Blood River[11]. This of course has a major impact on the Zulus, not only is it damaging the size as well as might of their army, but it also has an impact on the future population of the Zulus. Since a great deal of men were lost due to the battles fought against the Boers, there will successively be a decrease in birth rates since there will be far less partnerships. One of the Zulus great strengths was its tremendous size of army and ability to continuously send in more warriors. Therefore the conflicts and battles between the Zulus and the Boers further weakened the Zulu army which sequentially had an effect on the Anglo-Zulu War.
As shown from the battle between the Boers and the Zulus at the Battle of Blood River, the Boers were able to defeat the Zulus due to gun power. This shows how the Zulus suffered from a lack of sufficient weapons adequate for a battle against European powers. The Zulus used basic weapons such as spears and shields. This is a major weakness because although a spear can be thrown from a distance, it is rather inaccurate and ineffective especially in comparison to the arms used by the Boers and the British. The Zulu battle tactics were also not very effective. The Zulu warriors were known for their stealth when approaching a battle area quietly[12]. Yet, a large army of Zulus was found by British scouts before the Battle of Isandhlwana. Although they were able to steadily send out scouts to locate as well as exploit the weaknesses of the camp without the British noticing, they still failed to be invisible to the British forces. The fact that they were able to exploit the weaknesses of the camp at Isandhlwana was a main reason as to why they were able to defeat the British. This is because they were able to discuss and plan their attack which in the end had a major benefit. Even though they did win the Battle at Isandhlwana, they still managed to make multiple mistakes which lead to crucial weaknesses. The fact that the Zulus were found meant that the Zulus had to attack sooner than they had planned. Therefore, they may not have been completely prepared for the attack and are vulnerable for mistakes. As a result, they allowed many British soldiers to escape, which at the time seemed harmless, but it had a major impact on the following battle. This shows how the Zulu army was not cautious enough which consequently impacted their conditions. Another factor that caused a strong weakness in the Zulu plan, was the fact that the Zulus believed that they should not fight on the day of a full moon because it was believed to result in bad luck[13]. Had they not believed this and had they fought a day earlier or even that night, possibly before the British had found them, then they may have been able to completely annihilate the British forces preventing them from escaping and informing the other camps about the Zulu attack, for example those at Rorke’s Drift. Then they would have been able to once again stealthily approach the British camp, exploit the weakness in the camp layout and once more defeat the British at another crucial battle. The fact that those who escaped at the Battle of Isandhlwana were able to inform those at Rorke’s Drift enabled them to prepare fort unwaveringly as well as prepare their arms and ammunition for an attack. Hence, the fact that the Zulus allowed those British soldiers to escape shows their flaw as an army. However this was not their only flaw, the Zulus tended to rely on their well known “buffalo horns” attack which became rigid and predictable for the British forces[14]. Although this was a strong formation that generally worked but the British became familiar with it while the Zulus continued to use. This repetitive use of one formation battle tactic is a clear indication to the flaw behind the leadership of the Zulus.
Although the Zulus had many weaknesses, the British had multiple weaknesses as well. One instant weakness of the British is the fact that their army capacity was significantly smaller. Although, in their case, it was more important to have arms and gun power than men but it still can be a major weakness when in combat. For instance, gun power was only practical for relatively long range and not particularly useful for close range combat, which the Zulus were specialists at. Therefore, if the Zulus were to overwhelm them in number in close combat then the British forces would have been terminated rather rapidly. Yet the Zulus were unable to use this to their own advantage. They were unable to defend from the gun power and unable to surround the British with close combat battles. Also, even though the British had a major flaw in the use of guns and arms, when they lost a large supply of weaponry to the Zulus at the Battle of Isandhlwana, the Zulus were still unable to make compelling use of these weapons against the British and thus lead to another Zulu weakness. Chelmsford, the commander-in-chief of the British Forces in Natal[15], learned from his own mistakes made at Isandhlwana and decided that there would be no more open formations and not more exposed flanks. Instead, the use of a solid concentration of men, which would meet the Zulus on every side, and in turn demonstrate the one solid Zulu weakness- its inability to respond to concentrated firepower[16].
The British had only recently settled in South Africa in the year 1820 so could still be considered foreign and somewhat unfamiliar with the surroundings in which they live in, whereas the Zulus had been in Southern Africa for generations upon generations. This is a disadvantage to the British because they lack certain knowledge that comes with experience and practice. For example, when in war, food and water can be scarce and becomes a key element that each soldier relies off of, meaning that the importance of food and water become increasingly more significant. Thus, when searching for a certain food type or a place for clean drinkable water, the British may be clueless as to where fresh water may be found as well as what foods are suitable for a large army. Therefore the Zulus should have had a major advantage over the British and could have deceived the British army into thinking that a certain food in edible, when it is actually poisonous or deadly. Yet the Zulus did not take this into consideration and resulted in a major weakness. Had the Zulus found all the weaknesses of the British and used them to their own advantage, they may have been more successful when it can to the battles.
Although the British did have many strengths, they could all arguably be considered strengths due to the weakness of the Zulus. For example, the British had a large amount of arms, firepower and machinery as well as completely different styles and techniques to fighting than the Zulus, which enabled the British more power over the Zulus, but only because they were more advanced. If the Zulus were just as advanced as the British, then the outcome of the war may have been the complete opposite. Had the Zulus adapted to the change in fighting style with a European power, instead of continuously using the same battle technique, then they may have been radically more effective. However the Zulus did not use any of the British weaknesses to their own advantage, they did not try to improve their weaknesses and they did not attempt to alter or even revolutionize their way of attacking in order to better suite a battle against a European power with heavy firepower. Perhaps the belief that the night of the full moon is an unlucky night for battle is correct or even questionable.

-Rattray, David, and Adrian Greaves. David Rattray's Guidebook to the Anglo-Zulu War Battlefields. Barnsley: Cooper, 2003. Print.
-"The Heroic Defence of Rorke's Drift." Squidoo : Welcome to Squidoo. Web. 16 Dec. 2011.
-New World Encyclopedia Contributors. "Anglo-Zulu War - New World Encyclopedia." New World Encyclopedia. 14 Jan. 2009. Web. 6 Feb. 2011.
-Weltig, Matthew Scott. "The Battle at Isandhlwana." The Aftermath of the Anglo-Zulu War. Minneapolis: Twenty-First Century, 2009. Print.
-Kennedy, Denis. "The Great Trek" History of Southern Africa. New York: Facts on File, 2003. Print.
-Ross, Robert. "Unification." A Concise History of South Africa. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1999. Print.

[1] "17 March 1820 - The First 1820 British Settlers Arrive in South Africa | South African History Online." South African History Online. Web. 28 Nov. 2010.
[2] Ross, Robert. "Unification." A Concise History of South Africa. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1999. 63. Print.
[3] Weltig, Matthew Scott. "The Battle at Isandhlwana." The Aftermath of the Anglo-Zulu War. Minneapolis: Twenty-First Century, 2009. 26-28. Print.
[4] Weltig, Matthew Scott. "The Battle at Isandhlwana." The Aftermath of the Anglo-Zulu War. Minneapolis: Twenty-First Century, 2009. 27-29. Print.
[5] Weltig, Matthew Scott. "The Anglo-Zulu War." The Aftermath of the Anglo-Zulu War. Minneapolis: Twenty-First Century, 2009. 6-7. Print.
[6] Kennedy, Denis. "Zulu Warriors." History of Southern Africa. New York: Facts on File, 2003. 60. Print.
[7] Ross, Robert. "Unification." A Concise History of South Africa. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1999. 60. Print.
[8] Weltig, Matthew Scott. "The Battle at Isandhlwana." The Aftermath of the Anglo-Zulu War. Minneapolis: Twenty-First Century, 2009. 26. Print.
[9] Kennedy, Denis. "Zulu Warriors." History of Southern Africa. New York: Facts on File, 2003. 60. Print.
[10] Weltig, Matthew Scott. "The Anglo-Zulu War." The Aftermath of the Anglo-Zulu War. Minneapolis: Twenty-First Century, 2009. 9. Print.
[11] Kennedy, Denis. "The Great Trek" History of Southern Africa. New York: Facts on File, 2003. 54. Print.
[12] New World Encyclopedia Contributors. "Anglo-Zulu War – Strategy and tactics." New World Encyclopedia. 14 Jan. 2009. Web. 26 Jan. 2011.
[13] Weltig, Matthew Scott. "The Battle at Isandhlwana." The Aftermath of the Anglo-Zulu War. Minneapolis: Twenty-First Century, 2009. 27-29. Print.
[14] New World Encyclopedia Contributors. "Anglo-Zulu War - New World Encyclopedia." New World Encyclopedia. 14 Jan. 2009. Web. 6 Feb. 2011.
[15] "The Heroic Defence of Rorke's Drift." Squidoo : Welcome to Squidoo. Web. 16 Dec. 2011.
[16] Rattray, David, and Adrian Greaves. David Rattray's Guidebook to the Anglo-Zulu War Battlefields. Barnsley: Cooper, 2003. 131. Print.

How significant were the roles played by individuals such as Paul Kruger and Cecil Rhodes with regard to the increase in conflict between white South Africans?
This paper will investigate the roles played by the individuals Paul Kruger and Cecil Rhodes, each having incredible personalities, in the conflict between white South Africans, more specifically the British and the Boers, during the remarkable events that occurred in Southern Africa between 1880 and 1910.
In order to be able to investigate the significance of the two individuals, we must first assess the situation in South Africa from between around 1880 to the Union which occurred on the 31st of May 1910. Tensions had been stirring for some time between the Boers or Afrikaners, who were originally Dutch settlers from the first colonisation of South Africa in 1652 with Jan van Riebeeck, and the British, who came to South Africa in the late 18th Century. The discovery of Diamonds in 1870 attracted the businessman Cecil John Rhodes who later made his fortune there. Britain returned Transvaal, which they had annexed in 1877, to the Boers following their defeat at Majuba hill in 1881 against the Boers in the 1st Boer war which had started in 1880. The situation intensified as there was an increasing population of uitlanders, who came from Britain to work in the mines after the discovery of diamonds and then later gold in 1886. By 1895 the uitlanders made up half of the Transvaal population. This was seen as a threat to Paul Kruger. Cecil Rhodes, Prime Minister of the Cape colony, had Jameson lead a raid into Johannesburg, during which the uitlanders were supposed to have uprisen. The raid failed miserably as there was no uprising by the aggravated uitlanders and Jameson was forced to surrender. This led to an Ultimatum sent by Kruger to the British demanding that they took their troops away from the border. The British rejected it and the second Anglo-Boer war started in 1899.
Paul Kruger’s intense personality certainly left its mark on history. Born on the 10th of October 1825 in the Cape Colony, Paul Kruger was a devout Calvinist, who only read the bible and claimed to have learned it by heart. This shows his strength of character, determination and will. His having been deeply involved in the military, along with his reputation as a ‘coolheaded leader in battle and in peace, as an administrator’ led to him becoming president of the South African Republic (ZAR). Over the course of his career as a politician he was elected four times (1883, 1888, 1893, and 1898). He has been noted in South African history as the builder of the Afrikaner nation because of the critical role he played in the struggle for Boer independence and his part in the tensions leading up to and including the outbreak of the second Anglo-Boer war. After he had led the Boers into active opposition against the British in the first Boer war, and negotiated peace with limited independence, he visited England. He negotiated and concluded a new convention in London in 1884, which rectified the western border and removed British administration and control from the Transvaal. The rising population of uitlanders in the Transvaal area was seen by Kruger as a great threat to the independence of the Boers in the Transvaal and he consequently taxed them highly and gave them no political vote. His absolute determination and strength of character meant that he remained, throughout most of his career in political and military affairs, the wall that stood in the way of Cecil Rhode’s dream of empire in South Africa despite the growing opposition from some of his own people. However, he then later gained full support from his people as he had dealt with the Jameson raid against the republic with great success in 1895. In 1899 Kruger sent England an Ultimatum demanding they remove their troops from the border, otherwise seen as a declaration of war. After the British rejected this Ultimatum, war broke out between the Boers and the British. Being too old to keep up with the guerrilla struggle, he was delegated to Europe. He died in Switzerland in July 1904.
Turning towards a polar opposite personality with different aims entirely, we come to Cecil John Rhodes. Born on the 5th of July 1902, Cecil Rhodes was an English-born businessman, mining magnate, and a politician in South Africa, who spent the latter half of his teens in South Africa due to his serious asthma as it was thought that the climate there would help his illness. His character is one where there is something missing, and to an extent an insecurity, which has caused him to feel as if he had to prove something, more specifically to England. He had great ambition, but at the same time aspiration and a will to carry out his lifelong dreams. His ambition led to him founding the DE Beer mining company which at one point marketed 90% of the world’s rough diamonds and currently 40%. One of his dreams was of empire, more specifically a united British South Africa. He supported the uitlander movement against Kruger’s regime. As well as extensive gold interests, Rhodes was an imperialist Prime Minister of the Cape colony with much political influence. Rhodes wanted to expand the British Empire as he believed the Anglo-Saxon race was destined to greatness. In his last will and testament Rhodes wrote, “I contend that we are the first race in the world and that the more of the world we inhabit the better it is for the human race.” This statement proves his nationalism and firm belief in colonialism and imperialism. Over the course of his career as a political leader he annexed many parts of South Africa as he wanted it united under British rule. One of his other aims was to help create the Cape to Cairo or “Cape to Cairo Railway” which was the plan to establish a route through Africa controlled by the British to foster trade. After he failed to persuade Kruger to join a South African customs union, he finally decided to bring matters to a head. He attempted this by sponsoring the Jameson Raid against the republic. Following the failure of the Jameson raid he was forced to resign as Prime Minister. Although one might view this as a failure, one could not disagree that this figure played a significant role as an individual in the tensions in South Africa as he clearly heightened the conflict through his actions.
One would argue that the impact of these two individuals was great enough for it to be a valid statement to say that the conflict wouldn’t have occurred anyway without these two individuals. This is because the individual personalities of Kruger and Rhodes were so strong that there was no room for compromise between the Boers and the British and ultimately the only outcome was the consequent second Boer war between 1899 and 1902. Further results of the determination of the two characters were; in Kruger’s case his will to gain and retain independence for the Boers and in Rhodes’ case his ambition to do anything he could to become prosperous in the mining industry and annex all he could of Southern Africa and hence expand the British Empire. However, on the other hand one must give thought as to whether the wants of the Boers and British would have caused conflict between white South Africans anyway. I would have to agree with the latter as even without the great Cecil John Rhodes, the British wanted to annex as much of South Africa as they could as the British government and the queen back in England had agreed to send troops to the Transvaal border in 1899 which ultimately caused the second Boer war. They wanted South Africa for other reasons as well as resources, such as, “the Cape to Cairo”, and if they lost South Africa they might lose Australia and New Zealand. The Boers would also have still fought the British without Paul Kruger, as they had already defeated them at Majuba hill in 1881. They were against the uitlanders inhabiting the Transvaal and were against British control over their territory and didn’t want to live under British rule as they had already escaped from British rule in the Great Trek away from the Cape Colony. Furthermore they had already fought the black tribes in Southern Africa on numerous occasions for control over land and resources.
The significance of the roles played by Cecil Rhodes and Paul Kruger is important with regard to the increasing conflict between white South Africans as their wants contrasted with each other. With regard to Paul Kruger, taking into account that he was a strong freedom fighter, he did play a significant role as his visits to England, his negotiations with the British, and his constant struggle for independence in Transvaal leading to the ultimatum he sent to England in defence for his republic, led to the conflict in the second Boer war. Cecil Rhode’s actions were also significant in the increase in conflict as his constant annexations and negotiations to further expand British governance in South Africa and his will to do so finally led him towards his last attempt at stirring up conflict against Kruger’s regime and hence annexing Transvaal, which was the failed Jameson Raid. This was his last action as Prime Minister of the Cape Colony. But nevertheless it increased tensions between white South Africans which to a certain extent brought about the second Boer war.
Source Analysis
Source 1: Walker, John Brisben. "Cecil Rhodes South African Diamond Mines Groote Schuur." Editorial. Cosmopolitan May 1902. Http:// 10 Sept. 2011. Web. 8 Oct. 2011.
This article was published in May 1902 in cosmopolitan magazine by John Brisben Walker. The purpose of this article is to analyse Cecil John Rhode’s character. One value of this article is that it was published in 1902, meaning it must have been written during or before the Second Boer war. This is an advantage to historians as the source could be more reliable because it was written during the time when the events in question occurred and the author of the source was alive during the actions. This could aid him in creating a more accurate, specific account of the events in question. However contemporary sources also have limitations. One of these limitations is that because it was written at the time, the author of the source may have been subject to propaganda by the government or by other organisations during the events his source relates to. Therefor the author’s account may be unreliable, misleading, and inaccurate as it may have been and coloured (affected) by the propaganda. A historian using this source must be aware of this possibility.
Source 2: Pretorius, Fransjohan. "The Boer Wars." Http:// 29 Mar. 2011. Web. 9 Oct. 2011.
This article was last updated online on the 29th of March 2011 by Fransjohan Pretorius, at the University of Pretoria, South Africa. Its purpose was to describe the Boer wars and the events and situation during and between the Boer wars. The value of this source for the historian is that it was not written to persuade. This means it is useful to the historian as it is more likely to look at both sides of an argument and it is likely to be more open-minded. Another value to the historian is that it is a current source, not a contemporary one. A current source could be more reliable because a historian (and indeed anyone) writing currently will have more information elsewhere e.g. books written by other people, other sources etc., to base their research, account and interpretation on. However, being a current source also means that it could be slightly inaccurate less detailed and therefore less reliable because as information and accounts are passed down from 1st account to 2nd account and so on from person to person, through different books, websites and articles, information and accounts can lose certain details and can change from their original state.
During 1880-1910 in the colonies of South Africa, two very powerful, very important and very contrasting men were sparking an interesting series of significant events. The young, bold, determined Cecil Rhodes and the conservative, experienced, nostalgic Paul Kruger both had their own aims and their own ideas, however the same land to carry them out on.
1880-1910 was most likely the most violent and turbulent years when considering the conflicts between the British and the Boers in South Africa. There was constant, quick change going on in this year and power was being tossed back and forth between the two leaders. In 1881 the Boers won the battle of Majuba through which they claimed back Transvaal. However, they still had the ever-lasting issue of uitlanders flooding their mines, which only got worst as gold was discovered in Johannesburg in 1886. The Uitlanders of course also had a voice, and their leader, Cecil Rhodes, in 1895 proceeded with the Jameson Raid, that turned out to be a great humiliation for the British Empire. Shortly after this raid, feeling very threatened and irritated, Paul Kruger ordered British troops to leave the area. This is what led to the 2nd Anglo-Boer war in 1899-1902, which the British won. Nevertheless one must mention that during this process the British used the frowned-upon scorched earth policy, as well as concentration camps in which they killed 50,000 non-combatants[1]. The victory was concluded through the treaty of Vereeniging. Despite this treaty, it was not until the year 1910 that all four colonies finally united to become British colonies under the name of South Africa.
Stephanus Johannes Paulus Kruger was born on a farm near Transvaal in the year 1825. He had very strong religious beliefs and relied solely on them having not received a proper education. Due to his strong leadership qualities and experience, Kruger was elected president of Transvaal in 1882, after 8 years of vice-presidency. Having first hand experience of rivalry against the British after successfully governing through the battle of Majuba, Kruger always kept a dislike for the British. In the Nazi propaganda film Ohm Krüger (Uncle Kruger, 1941)[2] Kruger’s character was described to “promote a virulently anti-British message”[3]. This was very true to his real character as he was aware of the British threat to the Boer independence. Therefore he mainly based his governing with the aim of driving them away and giving them the least rights possible. He made this official through the 14-year citizenship stipulation after the flood of Uitlanders arrived for the discovery of diamond and gold in Transvaal, Johannesburg and Kimberley between 1867 and 1886. Krueger’s disgust for the British increased a lot after the Jameson Raid in 1895, and in 1898 he finally ordered all British troops to leave Transvaal, resulting in the break out of the 2nd Anglo-Boer war.
Cecil Rhodes was born in the year 1853 in Bishop’s Stratford, England. As a young child he suffered from tuberculosis and in order to recover from this illness was sent to South Africa to join his brother, at the age of 17. Rhodes’s was a very ambitious young man, with strong determination and buckets of energy and passion. From a young age he was very much interested in the fortunes that could be brought in through the newly discovered diamonds in Kimberley and Transvaal. In contrast to Kruger, Rhodes was well educated having in fact successfully studied at Oxford. His political career began in 1881 when he was elected into the Cape Colony parliament, and soon enough became the prime minister of the Cape Colony. Cecil Rhodes’ main and most famous goal was to cover the map of the world pink, “from Cape to Cairo”[4]. He desired to possess all colonies from Cairo down to the Cape in order to construct an electrical telegraph line down through Africa, creating excellent trading routes and opportunities for the British Empire. The editorial cartoon drawn by Edward Linley Sambourne very much literally depicts Rhodes’ great plan, which had also been announced to the public by himself. Rhodes’ independence became a slight issue as he introduced the Jameson Raid of 1895. By his own will, he sent Leander Starr Jameson in order to create an uproar among the Uitlanders in Transvaal, only thinking about using this situation to grasp the diamond mines and control over Transvaal. Rhodes’ did not have support of the British Empire in this cause, not to mention the disapproval of neighbouring empires such as Germany and France, however “he considered himself so entirely superior to the rest of mankind”[5] as explained in one of the many books written about him, that he went along with his selfish plan, ending his political career. 

The clashing actions of both these two important men, Kruger and Rhodes contributed significantly to the tension build up, which resulted in the 2nd Anglo-Boer war. Kruger’s 14year citizenship stipulation increased conflict between the Uitlanders and the Boers, as the Uitlanders had less rights and could not use the newly discovered diamonds fully to their advantage. This of course provoked Rhodes who had been hunting for wealth through the diamonds as well as the taking over of Transvaal, therefore he responded with the Jameson Raid in 1895. This raid not only failed, but also proved to Kruger that the British were in fact as much of a threat to Boer independence as he had suspected. As result of this tension had risen even more and Kruger felt the need to demand British troops out of Transvaal once and for all. This was one of the last actions that lead to the 2nd Anglo Boer war.
Whether all these major events in history would have happened even without the influence of Cecil Rhodes and Paul Kruger is very hard to tell. After all, historians do not necessarily see the ‘great man theory’ as very sensible in this day and time. It is likely that if Cecil Rhodes were not Prime Minister, perhaps the Jameson Raid would not have been carried out, which may have postponed the build up of tension between the British and the Boers for a couple more years, however a war was more or less unavoidable. As the Latin saying goes, “si vis pacem, para bellum” if you seek peace, prepare for war. Though the 2nd Anglo-Boer war did not exactly result in peace, it was quite obvious that after the battle of Majuba, the British would seek revenge eventually and would not settle before they had avenged themselves. Therefore though the two leaders may have influenced the orders of events or the times in which they took place, nevertheless the situation would have more or less developed the same way.
Radziwill, Catherine, 1846, Cecil Rhodes Man and Empire-Maker, Project Gutenberg
Scott, John Lamont, 2008, British Concentration Camps of the Second South African War (The Transvaal, 1900-1902), FSU Libraries Digital Library Center
Winkel, Roel Vande, 2009, Historical Reflections, Berghahn Journals
(Editorial Cartoon) Sambourne, Edward Linley, 1892, Rhodes Colossus, Punch Magazine
(Propaganda Film) Steinhoff, Hans, 1944, Ohm Kruger

Source Analysis
1. The book ‘Cecil Rhodes Man and Empire-Maker’ was written by Princess Catherine Radzewill and published in the year 1846 by the Project Gutenberg. Radzewill was a polish princess who grew up mostly in Berlin. She was known to be Cecil Rhodes’ “stalker” and apparently had also many times asked for his hand in marriage, however he had rejected her. Due to her upset feelings she had his signature forged on a promissory note, this act resulted in her being sent to jail in South Africa.
This source is very biased because of its origin; nevertheless it is quite valuable as it is likely to provide two different perspectives of Rhodes, (as well as the fact that it is a primary source). On one hand, Radzewill admired him to a heroic extent, on the other hand she loathed him for rejected her and letting her end up in jail, this way her writing may have an interesting balance of opinion.
Nonetheless, as an infatuated young woman writes this source, it is not very reliable and it will also not provide the reader with much factual evidence as it is so emotionally driven. 

2. Historical Reflections published in 2009 by Berghahn Journals is a collection of texts by different historians analysing important events in history. I used a text by Roel Vande Winkel, Ohm Krüger's Travels: A Case Study in the Export of Third-Reich Film Propaganda. This text analyzed the symbolism and messages portrayed through the Nazi Propaganda Film, Ohm Kruger. Winkel is a professor who researches on media and visual culture in regards with history. He has published many books such as Swastika, 2011 and The Vlaaschard 1943, 2007. This is a secondary source, which is a limitation, as Winkel could not have had first hand experience or knowledge of the situation in South Africa and the two important men. Despite this, it is a valuable source because Winkel has received an education, which may always be slightly biased, however not as strongly as one would be living in the situation at the time. Also, having lived long after these events, Winkel can analyse the situation better as he has learned about the whole picture through which he can pull conclusions. This source is better for factual research as well as philosophical views of Kruger and his actions.

[1] Scott (pg1)
[2] Hans Steinhoff
[3] Winkel (p108)
[4] Sambourne (Punch Magazine)
[5] Radziwill (p28)

Internal Assessment:
To what extent was the defeat of the British Army by the Zulu at Isandlwana in 1879 due to the mistakes made by Lord Chelmsford?

A Plan of investigation (2 marks)
To what extent was the defeat of the British Army by the Zulu at Isandlwana in 1879, due to the mistakes made by Lord Chelmsford?
The defeat of the British at Isandlwana on 22 January 1879 by the Zulu was a great shock for the British army, government and public. Many people then, and later, attributed much blame to the general commanding the British forces, Lord Chelmsford. The aim of this investigation is to find out how far this blame is justified. The investigation will cover the causes of the Zulu War (briefly in the first section on Chelmsford and the situation in southern Africa), the composition and nature of both the British and Zulu armies, and the events of 22 January 1879. An analysis of these sections should indicate the extent of Chelmsford’s responsibility for the defeat and other factors that contributed to the Zulu victory. Much of the research will be from letters written by soldiers who took part in the Zulu War.

B Summary of evidence (5 marks)
1. Chelmsford and the situation in southern Africa
In the 1870s southern Africa was troubled, with Boers (Dutch), British and African peoples disputing land, which was scarce due to drought and farming methods.1 Lord Chelmsford (1827–1905), an experienced soldier, regarded as a reliable commander2 was sent to the Cape in 1877 to command British troops fighting the rebellious Ngquika and Gcaleka in the Ninth Frontier War, which lasted longer than expected because of the difficulty of bringing the enemy to battle. This experience affected Chelmsford’s conduct of the subsequent Zulu War. The general realized that the Zulu would be a much harder enemy to beat, but did not comprehend that modern weaponry, especially the Martini- Henry rifles would not automatically defeat the Zulu.
After victory over the rebels in June 1878, Chelmsford was ordered to Natal to prepare for the expected war against the Zulu.3 Although the Zulu king Cetshwayo regarded himself as a friend of the British, they either regarded his army as a danger to peace,4 or wished to use border disputes and incidents as an excuse to bring the Zulu Kingdom under British rule. The new British High Commissioner Bartle Frere favoured confederation for South Africa, and is blamed by many for instigating the war.5

The British forces
Chelmsford assembled the available forces, equipment and means of transport in strategic places in Natal. He had five battalions of regulars, two companies of engineers, and two artillery batteries, but no regular cavalry. Volunteer and irregular units were formed to overcome this serious problem. Mounted infantry were used, and the Natal mounted Police and a naval battalion were called to action. Black levies were raised and trained hastily. Estimates vary, but the number probably exceeded 17 000. Chelmsford decided that he could not invade with his force in one column, partly because of the transport necessary to carry his equipment which in spite of recent improvements was still impossibly weighty, and partly because he also had to defend the Natal border. He divided the force into five columns, each with their own commander. Chelmsford and his staff accompanied Number 3 Column, or the Central Column, that was defeated at Isandlwana.

3. The Zulu forces
The Zulu nation and army was feared throughout Southern Africa since its foundation by Shaka (1816–1828). All men were divided into regiments according to age, each with its own uniform and kraal. Army life dominated the social system and the warriors were not allowed to marry until they had proved themselves and were given permission by the king. Much time was spent in military training, and the men reached a high standard of physical fitness. They travelled barefoot, without baggage except for their weapons, traditionally a shield and assegai (although by 1879, some had guns). The impi was fast and mobile.6 Its battle formation was crescent formation, likened to a charging buffalo. Defence was not understood, but bravery, discipline and scouting was excellent. In 1879 the army numbered about 40 000, and was divided into 33 regiments.7

4. Isandlwana
On 11 January 1879 Chelmsford conducted the Central Column across the Buffalo river into Zululand. He had received much advice on route, including the necessity to laager at every step,8 and probably felt confident. Progress was hampered by heavy rains. On 20 January, most of the column reached Isandlwana, the site chosen by the general for the first camp. It was not laagered [fortified]. The next day patrols were sent out to reconnoitre. One led by Dartnell saw groups of Zulu and mistaking them for part of the main impi asked for reinforcements in order to attack. A second message reached camp at 1.30 am, 22 January. Clery, the staff officer, took it to Chelmsford who decided to take half the force out of camp to join Dartnell.9 The general also decided to send for the Second Column under Durnford to reinforce the camp. Just before the men marched out at daybreak, Clery realised that nothing had been said to Pulleine, the senior officer left in camp. Clery rectified this, with instructions, written and oral, to defend the camp.10
Chelmsford did not find the enemy, but he received various messages which he or his staff ignored, reporting Zulu near, then attacking, the camp. Finally at 3.30 pm, he received a report which convinced him. He marched back to the devastated camp.
Meanwhile, in response to the British invasion, the Zulu impi travelled for three days from Ulundi to near Isandlwana, and were concealed in dongas waiting for a propitious moon11 before they attacked. Durnford arrived in camp, sent a patrol out to reconnoitre, which stumbled upon the concealed Zulu, who rose, attacked and engulfed the camp. Their vastly superior numbers ensured victory.

C Evaluation of sources (4 marks)
Two of the sources used were:
Clarke, Sonia, ed. 1979. Invasion of Zululand 1879. Johannesburg. The Brenthurst Press.
This book was based on previously unpublished material from the Brenthurst Library, Johannesburg.
Although the book deals with the entire war, there are important sections concerning Isandlwana, letters from Colonel Arthur Harness R.A., an article from him rebutting charges made by a war correspondent, Archibald Forbes, against Chelmsford, and letters by the Lieutenant Governor of Natal, Sir Henry Bulwer. Harness’s letters, written to his sister and father, a former Royal Engineer, are valuable as an eyewitness account of the campaign. He was encamped at Isandlwana and marched out with four of his guns, with Chelmsford, at daybreak on 22 January. Their limitations could be that he was not actually in camp for the battle and he appears as a supporter of Chelmsford. But perhaps this makes his criticism of the general even more telling. Bulwer wrote of the difficulties he encountered dealing with Chelmsford and his staff before the war commenced.
Coupland, R. 1948. Zulu Battle Piece: Isandlwana. London. Collins.
The main value of this source is that apart from introductory material it only covers events relating to Isandlwana. It was written by an eminent British historian who specialised in colonial history. Its limitations could be its early date: much of the material in the Brenthurst library was unknown to Coupland, and to a certain extent it was written with the aim of presenting a true picture after a book had severely criticized Chelmsford.12 However it presents a very balanced view of both Chelmsford, and the battle, with numerous references to sources, including war office material.

D Analysis (5 marks)
The first area to analyse is Chelmsford’s preparations for the campaign. He cannot be criticized for the number of British troops. They were probably sufficient anyway if deployed properly, and the general did request reinforcements especially cavalry. Transport and the commissariat were problems, but Chelmsford and many officers spent much time procuring horses, mules carts, and supplies.13 It could be argued that far too much baggage was taken, but this was how the army worked, and it was not Chelmsford’s task to remedy it. Did Chelmsford listen to advice? He received much, that the Zulu were excellent fighters, and he must make a laager [fortified camp]. Bulwer thought that his ‘military arrangements are good and sure to succeed... I should think that he is a good general officer, very very careful very painstaking, very thorough.’14 But he added, ‘He and Major Crealock his military secretary are not very pleasant to deal with.’15 Here was undoubtedly a problem, Crealock was considered a snob—Wolsley called him a military wasp,16 and he was perhaps incompetent. Critics such as Clery deplored Chelmsford’s weak staff,17 but it is clear from letters written by Crealock and Clery to the chief of intelligence18 that these two officers disliked each other.
It is difficult to judge if dividing the force into five columns was a mistake. The fear of an invasion of Natal and hence the need to guard the border was probably unnecessary. It is doubtful if Cetshwayo had planned to invade.
Perhaps the most serious mistake made by Chelmsford was his failure to make a laarger or otherwise defend the camp at Isandlwana, in spite of the advice he had received from experienced colonists including Paul Kruger.19 On 18 March Clery wrote that Glyn, the nominal commander of the central column, had suggested forming a laager, but the general had rejected the idea with ‘why it would take a week to make one.’20 Was this true or was Clery covering his own position? It is impossible to say. Although Harness did his best in his article written in 1880 to justify Chelmsford’s choice of Isandlwana with its grass and water.21 In his letter home on 12 February he wrote, ‘We have [at Helpmekaar] a large wagon laager... It is the way the Dutch Boers always entrench themselves and which if we had had at Isandlwana camp on the fatal 22 January we should have beaten the Zulus completely.’22
The next point to assess is Chelmsford’s direction of events on the 21 and 22 January. He sent out various patrols but failed to spot the enemy. His intelligence failed to inform him of Zulu movements.23 He ordered the patrols to return, but Dartnell did not and asked for reinforcements. It was said at a later enquiry that Chelmsford was annoyed,24 but with Dartnell’s second message, he took half the force out of camp. This suggests a misreading of events. It was a sensible precaution to order Durnford’s column to reinforce the camp, but the message as written by Crealock was ambiguous25 and when Durnford reached camp, he rode out to reconnoitre. Finally, it appears that Chelmsford failed to instruct Pulleine about what to do in his absence, and that Clery did it on his own initiative.26 Later when Chelmsford found out that instructions had been given to Pulleine, he was relieved and took credit for them. But that is Clery’s interpretation.
Chelmsford was also criticised for ignoring signs and messages that the camp was under attack. He felt confident that the force left behind was adequate to repel the Zulu.27 There was a report, perhaps apocryphal, that when Crealock was told of an attack he retorted, ‘Actually attacking our camp, how amusing!’28 Harness actually turned round his guns to return to help when he heard gunfire but was stopped by one of Chelmsford’s aides. ‘It is all bosh, I do not hear big guns!’29 Was this the general’s order? Again it is impossible to tell. It must be said that it would have been too late to save the camp except after the first message received at about 8 am, saying that a force of Zulu had been sighted. Chelmsford’s conduct suggests at best a misreading of the situation, at worst arrogance and complacency. The men he had left behind fought bravely,30 but they were too few and too exposed. Chelmsford had left them exposed to Zulu attack—and death: very few escaped.
Finally it must be said that the Zulu victory was due to their overwhelming superior numbers, scouting, intelligence, knowledge of the terrain, bravery and tactics. They also possessed more firearms than expected. No one can judge if the situation would have been different if Chelmsford had been present and in command, but after Isandlwana he changed tactics and the British won the war.

E Conclusion (2 marks)
Lord Chelmsford, the British commander, must bear some responsibility for the British defeat at Isandlwana. In spite of advice from those who lived in southern Africa, he failed to understand the fighting strength of the Zulu, partly because of his experiences fighting the Ninth Frontier War. He was not necessarily arrogant but had misconceptions.
He was probably not an imaginative general (unlike Wood, one of the few British soldiers to emerge with an increased reputation from the Zulu War).
Chelmsford should have laargered his camp and constructed other defences. The later British successes at Rorkes’ Drift and Kambula, showed that it was possible for a smaller British force to defeat a much larger one from behind a solid defensive position. His scouting and intelligence was weak and he should not have left his camp with so few men to defend it. But credit must also be given to the Zulu forces for their positive fighting qualities. It could be argued that the Zulus won the battle rather than that the British, under Chelmsford’s command, lost it. But after this salutary lesson Chelmsford changed tactics and won the war.

F List of sources (2 marks)
1. Clarke, Sonia, ed. 1979. Invasion of Zululand, 1879. Johannesburg. The Brenthurst Press. P 17.
2. For details of Chelmsford’s career, ibid. P 240.
3. Ibid. P 35.
4. Morris, Donald. 1966. The Washing of the Spears. London.
Jonathan Cape. P 268.
5. Coupland, R. 1948. Zulu Battle Piece: Isandlwana. London.
Collins. Pp 30–32.
Barthorp, Michael. 1980. The Zulu War. Poole. Blandford Press. Pp 9–12.
6. Clarke, Sonia, ed. 1984. Zululand at War, 1879. Johannesburg. The Brenthurst Press. P 20.
7. Clarke. Invasion. P 56. 8. Ibid. P 65.
9. Clarke, Zululand. P 83. 10. Ibid.
11. Clarke, Invasion. P 63.
12. The book heavily critical of Chelmsford’s conduct is
French, G, 1939, Lord Chelmsford and the Zulu War,
London: John Lane, The Bodley Head.
13. Clarke. Invasion. P 48.
14. Ibid. P 213.
15. Ibid. P 214.
16. Preston, Adrian, ed. 1973. The South African Journal of Sir
Ganet Wolseley, 1879-1880. Cape town. Balkema. P 52. Wolseley superceded Chelmsford, and was very critical of him. But the majority of soldiers were glad that Chelmsford had defeated the Zulu at Ulundi before Wolseley arrived.
17. Clarke. Zululand. P 53.
18. Zululand at War is based on a collection of letters written
from officers serving in the Zulu War, mainly to Alison. It is
interesting to see how the officers are critical of each other. 19. See above, note 11.
20. Clarke. Zululand. P 75.
21. Clarke. Invasion. P 254.
22. Ibid. P 95.
23. Chelmsfordfailedtotrytowintheconfidenceofneighbouring
Zulu, especially those who did not regard Cetshwayo so highly, and thus gain intelligence, as Evelyn Wood, commander of Number 4 Column and victor of Kambula, did.
24. Coupland. P 76.
25. For the full text of the message see Clarke, Zululand, P 76. 26. Ibid.
27. Coupland. Pp 70–76 for full details of Chelmsford and the
28. Clarke. Zululand. P 78.
29. Ibid.
30. For an eye witness description of the battle from a survivor,
see Emery, Frank, 1977, The Red Soldier; letters from the Zulu War, 1879, London, Hodder and Stoughton, p 88.

Barthorp, Michael. 1980. The Zulu War. Poole. Blandford Press.
Clarke, Sonia, ed. 1979. Invasion of Zululand,1879. Johannnesburg. The Brenthurst Press.
Clarke, Sonia, ed. 1979. Zululand at War, 1879. Johannesburg. The Brenthurst Press.
Coupland, R. 1948. Zulu Battle Piece: Isandlwana. London. Collins.
Emery, Frank. 1977. The Red Soldier: Letters from the Zulu War, 1879. London. Hodder and Stoughton.
Morris, Donald. 1966. The Washing of the Spears. London. Jonathan Cape.
Preston, Adrian, ed. 1973. The South African Journal of Sir Garnet Wolseley, 1879-1880. Cape Town. Balkema.

Why did the Zulu impi defeat the British Army in the battle of Isandlwana, 1879?

A Plan of the investigation (2 marks)
Why did the Zulu impi defeat the British Army in the battle of Isandlwana, 1879?
The defeat of a large well equipped British Army by the Zulu impi mostly armed with traditional weapons, at Isandlwana, in 1879, has always caused interest and criticism. The aim of my Internal Assessment is to find out why this defeat took place. I will research my investigation in some of the many books published about the Anglo Zulu war since 1879, including some which include material written by soldiers taking part in the war. In B, I will describe why the war took place, write a brief account of the battle, and note the composition and mistakes of the British and the strength and success of the Zulu. I will analyse my findings in D and reach a conclusion as a result of this analysis in E.

B Summary of evidence (5 marks)
In the 1870s the racial situation in southern Africa was complicated. There were four main colonial territories ruled by two European races—the Dutch now called Boers, and the British. The two did not trust each other. There were also various Black peoples who outnumbered the Whites. Some of these lived in independent kingdoms, and others lived in the colonial territories (Clarke Invasion page 17). The Zulu nation ruled by King Cetshwayo, was the strongest race, and although they and the British were usually on good terms, tension was increasing, partly because several years of drought had caused a land shortage, and partly because the British policy in South Africa was becoming more aggressive (Clarke Invasion page 19).
There had been various border incidents between the British and the Zulu, and the new British High Commissioner, Bartle Frere, probably wanted to use these as an excuse to get control of Zululand to include it in his scheme for confederation in southern Africa. He set up a boundary dispute and when it found in favour of the Zulu he kept this quiet and raised other issues such as atrocities committed by Zulu against Blacks living in Natal, a British colony. Cetshwayo was then sent an impossible ultimatum, and told that if he did not comply with its terms, the British would invade (Barthorp page 13).
The British forces
The British troops were commanded by Lord Chelmsford. He had not seen much active service, but was considered a reliable commander (Coupland page 45). He was also liked by his troops, but after the disaster at Isandlwana, many blamed him.

He had led the British forces to victory in another war in South Africa against the Ngqika and Gcaleka, 1877–1878. Immediately after this war he prepared his forces and plans ready to fight the Zulu. Chelmsford had various regular British regiments, half a company of Royal Engineers and a Royal Artillery gun battery, but he had no regular cavalry. He did have some mounted infantry, some volunteer cavalry and the Natal Mounted Police. He also had various native levies. He did not consider these numbers were adequate so he asked for more troops to be sent.
Chelmsford thought that his force would be too large to invade Zululand in the same place, and he also had to defend the border, so he divided the force into five columns. It was the Third or Central Column which Chelmsford accompanied and the Second which arrived as reinforcements, that were defeated at Isandlwana.
The Zulu forces
The original founder of the Zulu nation and army was Shaka, (1816–1828). All men were divided into regiments according to age, and each regiment had its own kraal and uniform (Barthorp pages 16–18). Army life dominated the whole Zulu social system (Clarke, Invasion page 57). Much time was spent practising and skirmishing. The impi’s battle formation was crescent shaped, rather like a charging buffalo. The Zulu travelled lightly and fast, barefoot carrying their weapons, a shield and assegi. As there was no other baggage, they were very mobile. They did not understand defence, but by 1879, some had guns, and the whole army probably numbered 40,000, divided into 33 regiments. Discipline was excellent due to devotion to the king and belief in their customs.
The Battle of Isandlwana
The British army faced immediate difficulties when they began the invasion, because of heavy rain and too much baggage. These two factors made the advance slow. The Central Column crossed the border on 11 January 1879, and reached the first camp at Isandlwana on 20th January. The troops did not entrench it or make a laager [fortified camp] as they had been advised by Boers en route. The camp had adequate water and grass for the horses, but the north was not secure, and it could be surrounded. The next day the general sent out patrols to reconnoitre. Meanwhile the main Zulu impi of about 35,000, was on its way. After travelling for three days from the capital Ulundi, it hid in dongas a few miles from Isandlwana to wait until the moon was favourable (Clarke Invasion page 65). This main impi was not seen by the British, but other Zulu from nearby were seen by British patrols. On 21st January, a patrol leader asked Chelmsford for reinforcements, so that he could engage the enemy the next day. Chelmsford sent some, then received another request at 1.30 am on the 22nd. Chelmsford decided that as there was an opportunity for battle he would march out with half his force. He also decided to send a message
to the relief column and ask its commander Durnford to bring it to reinforce Isandlwana. Clery, a staff officer, wrote a message to Pulleine, the senior officer left in camp, telling him to defend it if attacked. The men marched out at daybreak.
Later that day Chelmsford received various messages that there were problems, but he did not believe them until it was too late. There had been confusion in camp between Durnford and Pulleine. Durnford wanted to go out and find the enemy, so sent out some of his horsemen. They stumbled upon the hidden impi. The Zulu thus discovered, rose and attacked the camp, surrounding it with their overwhelming numbers. The British troops fought well, but without a laager or other defensive position, stood no chance against the large numbers. After about two hours a retreat was sounded, and those who were still alive tried to flee, but even most of these were killed by Zulu who pursued them.

C Evaluation of sources (4 marks)
Two sources I used are:
Clarke, Sonia, ed. 1979. Invasion of Zululand 1879. Johannesburg. The Brenthurst Press.
This book is based on previously unpublished letters, and a diary, of soldiers who took part in the Zulu War. The main writer was Colonel Arthur Harness who commanded a battery of artillery. He was camped at Isandlwana, and marched out with Chelmsford, so he did not actually fight in the battle. The book covers the whole war, so only part of it is concerned with Isandlwana, but Harness was later part of a court of inquiry that investigated the defeat, and after the war wrote an article defending Chelmsford. There are many interesting personal details as well as researched commentaries.
Coupland, R. 1948. Zulu Battle Piece: Isandlwana. London. Collins.
The main value of this source is that it only covers the battle that I have been investigating, although of course there is some background. It seems to be quite balanced and points out the failures of the general, Lord Chelmsford, but also where he could not have acted in any other way. It is probably quite favourable to him overall. It is quite a small therefore manageable book with 143 small pages. As it was published in 1948, it could be out of date.

D Analysis (5 marks)
The first point to consider is the British preparation and deployment of forces. The general, Lord Chelmsford, had to make the best of what was available in South Africa at the time. This force had spent 1877 and 1878 fighting and suppressing a rebellion in the Cape. This took longer than expected. It also gave everyone the wrong idea about fighting Black troops, because unlike the Zulu the Ngqika and Gcaleka, did not fight open battles. They attacked and disappeared into the bush. This was the first reason for the British defeat. Although they knew that the Zulu were much stronger and better fighters, they were not prepared for the great difference. Also many soldiers from the commander down, felt that the first task was to get the enemy to fight openly (Coupland page 47). Throughout the move from the Cape to Natal, to prepare for the new war, Chelmsford was told by many people that all camps had to be laagered (Morris page 329-331).
Chelmsford was criticised for dividing his force. His critics say that he should have kept his force together (Clarke Invasion 253). His defenders say that as he had not only to invade, but also prevent the Zulu invading Natal, he followed the correct course. He was also worried about the state of the terrain with a large force and even larger baggage train. The ground would have become too beaten up. Logistics and transport were always difficult for the nineteenth century British army. Chelmsford cannot be blamed for all its problems. The whole system and the weather were partly responsible for the British defeat.
The next reason for the British defeat was the failure to laager the camp. Two reasons were given for not laagering it, the difficulty in digging defences in the heavy ground, and the fact that it was only intended to be a short stay camp. The person commanding the Third Column was theoretically Colonel Glyn and his staff officer Clery wrote that Glyn did suggest it but Chelmsford refused (Clarke Zululand page 75). Who was at fault was not clear, but the failure to laager and form a strong defensive position enabled the Zulu to capture the camp. Previous battles in which the Boers had fought the Zulu, and later battles in the Zulu War such as Rorkes’ Drift and Kambula, show that a small force in a well fortified position could win.
Another reason for the British failure was weak scouting. Patrols of scouts were sent out, but they failed to spot the main force. They were not told to cover a wide enough area. Also the British were unfamiliar with the terrain and of course the Zulu knew it well.
Chelmsford not only divided his force at the beginning but also took half of the men out of Isandlwana, thus leaving a small force in camp, which proved unable to defend it. To compound this problem, when messages were sent to the general during the 22nd of January, that the camp was being attacked, he did not believe them. If he had turned round and led the force back when he received the first message, the result might have been different. He and his staff considered that the men in camp would be able, with their superior fire power, to repel the attackers (Coupland page 75). There is no doubt that the men left behind in camp fought bravely and did not disgrace their general, but they were too few and too exposed, and Chelmsford had at least some responsibility for getting them into this situation.

Of course the final reason for the Zulu success was their great numbers, their fighting skills and clever tactics. They knew the ground well and their scouting was excellent. They knew exactly what the British were doing and where they were going. Also they had more guns than the British thought they had and they used them better. Their bravery in facing the British fire power was incredible. They too suffered a large number of casualties, but with their numbers, just pressed on and on until the small British force was overcome.

E Conclusion (2 marks)
The Zulu defeated the British because they were excellent fighters, well trained, mobile and fit. Their scouting was excellent and they understood the ground. Their far superior numbers made it certain that they would overcome a much smaller force that was not defending a fortified position. The fact that the camp was not fortified was probably because of misconceptions held by the general, Lord Chelmsford, and many of the British soldiers after their previous experiences fighting in southern Africa.

F List of sources (2 marks)
Barthorp, Michael. 1980. The Zulu War. Poole. Blandford Press. Clarke, Sonia, ed. 1979. Invasion of Zululand,1879.
Johannesburg. The Brenthurst Press.
Clarke, Sonia, ed. 1984. Zululand at War, 1879. Johannesburg.
The Brenthurst Press.
Coupland R. 1948. Zulu Battle Piece: Isandlwana. London.
Emery, Frank. 1977. The Red Soldier; Letters from the Zulu War,
1879. London. Hodder and Stoughton.
Morris, Donald. 1966. The Washing of the Spears. London.
Jonathan Cape.