Guide to IBDP History Paper 1

Paper 1: Peacemaking and Peacekeeping 1919 – 1935 – Review

Paper 1 Tips:

Paper 1 is formulaic – questions always follow the same format. 1 hour (+5 mins reading time), 4 questions – DON’T RUN OUT OF TIME, DON’T OVERTHINK THINGS

Question 1 – Source interpretation - Maximum 7 minutes!

a) “What, according to Source X…?” – Worth [3 marks] – just pull out information from the source – no explanation, just fact

b) “What is the message conveyed by Source Y? [2 marks] – pull out key points from your interpretations, back up with information from the source.

Question 2 – Compare and Contrast Sources – Maximum 10 minutes!

Two structures:

“Compare and contrast the views expressed in X with those in Y” – Don’t describe the view of the sources. Simple – 2 paragraphs, one comparing (similarities) and one contrasting (differences) – ALWAYS BACK UP WITH INFORMATION FROM THE SOURCES.

“To what extent do X and Y support the views expressed in Z?” – briefly summarize the views expressed in Z and then do 1 paragraph comparing and contrasting X with them, then another paragraph comparing and contrasting Y with them. [6 marks]

Question 3 – Source Evaluation – Maximum 15 minutes

“With reference to their origin and purpose, assess the value and limitations of Source A and Source B for historians studying…”

Do 1 paragraph about one source, then 1 paragraph about the other – DO NOT COMPARE/CONTRAST.

Remember Origin and Purpose – must reference the two when analyzing the sources’ values and limitations – e.g. Because this source is a speech by a government official… , Because the source aims to persuade, it may…

[6 marks]

Question 4 – Essay Question – 20 minutes

“Using the sources and your own knowledge, analyze...”

Structure your answer as a mini essay – remember to reference all of the sources, naming them – In source A…. Source B states that… etc.

You must include a balance of your own knowledge about the issue being discussed as well – this knowledge will come in the form of the revision that you have done for Paper One using the following notes. Make sure that you reach a conclusion and have an argument, and, for full marks, refer or acknowledge the other side of the argument. [8 marks]

Woodrow Wilson’s 14 Points, 8^th January 1918

·       Woodrow Wilson (US President) outlined his idealistic aims for the Treaty of Versailles in a speech to the US government – his ideas for worldwide peace, to “make the world safe for democracy”

·       Wilson wanted a “just and secure peace” and not merely “a new balance of power”

·       Formed the basis of the peace that came out of the Treaty of Versailles

·       Included disarmament, freedom of navigation of the seas (which Britain didn’t like), no secret treaties, autonomy for Austria Hungary, Alsace Lorraine returned to France, no economic barriers, self determination, adjustment of colonial claims – basically, by eliminating all of the causes of WW1, he hoped to prevent another war.

·       Flaws: it would be impossible to enforce some of the terms, such as splitting up the Habsburg Empire. Economic hardships following the war meant that countries would not be willing to abandon tariffs. Clemenceau found the terms too unrealistic (although he was getting A-L back). Foreign leaders were skeptical as to whether they could be applied to the ‘real world’.

·       Wilson referred to his vision of the post war settlement as “peace without victory” – his terms, such as disarmament, became the basis of the covenant of the League of Nations.

·       Lenin – “landmark of enlightenment in international relations”

·       Fourteen Points still stand as the most powerful expression of the idealist strain in American diplomacy.

·       Robert Wohl – “Wilson made too many promises, and had to negotiate a peace settlement with leaders who were intent on preventing German hegemony, and not world peace”

·       Ruth Henig: “the 14 points appeared to promise some protection against punitive French and British demands”

Article 231 (of the T.O.V) – June 1919

·       More commonly known as the War Guilt Clause, or Kriegsschuldfrage here in Germany

·       Stated that “Germany accepts the responsibility of her and her allies for causing all of the loss and damage” to the victorious powers, to whom “war was imposed on… by the aggression of Germany and her allies” – Forced Germany to take the blame for the outbreak of WW1, and was used to justify the extortionate £6.6 billion reparations sum. Ironic because Lloyd George had stated previously that WW1 was nobody’s fault, and that it was “stumbled into”

·       Created hostilities in Germany – very controversial, Germans wanted revenge. Was used to placate the British and French public, with cries of ‘hang the Kaiser’ and Eric Geddes (first lord of admiralty) – “squeeze the German lemon until the pips squeak!”

·       Perceived in Germany as inaccurate, led to the TOV being branded as a ‘diktat’

·       If Germany didn’t agree to it, war would reconvene – they had no other choice.

·       War cannot be blamed on one person, can it?

·       “Germany’s death sentence” – historians such as Martin Gilbert argue that this led to the rise of Nazism in Germany, a claim that Margaret Macmillan brands “erroneous”.

·       Led to anger within the Germans – newspaper headings such as “we will never stop until we get back what we deserve.. treaty is only a scrap of paper – we will seek revenge, it is full of injustices, brutalities and exploitations”

·       Count Brockdorff Rantzau – “Those who sign this treaty will sign the death sentence of a million Germans… may the hand that sign this treaty wither”

·       Dylan Thomas – “The hand that signed the paper felled a city, and locusts came”

Treaty of Versailles, 28^th June 1919

·       Peace Treaty between the victorious powers – Britain, France, Italy and USA dictated to Germany

·       440 clauses – very extensive, too much so?

·       Signed in Hall of Mirrors in Palace of Versailles where the proclamation of the German Union was signed in 1871 after the Franco-Prussian War, to rub it in France’s face – now it was Germany’s turn to be humiliated – it was also the anniversary of the assassination of the Archduke of Franz Ferdinand in 1914, which was the catalyst of WW1. Rushed into? Wilson and Lloyd George openly stated that they hadn’t read all the clauses, for that would take a “lifetime”

·       TRAWL – Territories (Germany lost 13% of territories, AL went back to France), Reparations (£6.6 billion – weren’t actually specified until the London Conference in 1930 – Germany felt like she was signing a ‘blank cheque’ – again ironic, it is what they offered AH after the assassination), Army (disarmed to 100,000 men and 6 battleships – Germans sunk most of their fleet because they didn’t want the British to benefit from it), War Guilt clause (Article 231, see above), League of Nations (set up from Wilson’s 14 points, again see above)

·       Humiliated Germany – seen as a Diktat. Also lost 12% of population.

·       Ruth Henig – “TOV wasn’t excessively harsh on Germany”

·       Lenin – “This is no peace, but terms dictated to a defenseless victim by armed robbers”

·       Lloyd George knew that “Germany could not pay anything like the indemnity which the British and French demanded”

·       Harold Nicolson – “We left the conference conscious that the treaty imposed upon out enemy was neither just nor wise”

·       German MP – “shameless blow in the face of common sense”

·       Lloyd George – “I didn’t do too bad considering I was sat between Jesus (Wilson) and Napoleon (Clemenceau)”

·       Clemenceau – “there are 20 million Germans too many”

·       Germany didn’t pay off the reparations until 2010

·       Lloyd George – “we want to protect the future against a repetition of the horrors of war”

·       Terms weren’t really stuck to by Hitler – he found it a godsend for propaganda. Some argue that appeasement found its roots in 1919 through the guilty consciences created at Versailles.

Treaty of Trianon, 4th June 1920

·       Between B&F and Hungary (who were undergoing a communist takeover). Hungary had been a peaceful multi ethnic state for over 1000 years until the treaty. Branded “The greatest tragedy to have befallen Hungary”

·       Obliged to pay reparations but went bankrupt before the reparations were agreed

·       Lost ¾ of its territory, and more than 60% of its population – population reduced from 21 million to 7.5 million, many Magyar speakers now part of neighbouring countries

·       Two of the three newly created countries carved out of Hungarian territory no longer exist. (Slovakia became part of Czech Republic and Yugoslavia suffered from civil war and ethnic cleansing) –may never have happened if the treaty hadn’t taken place.

·       Throughout the 1920s and 30s, the Hungarian F.P was dominated by a desire to revise the Treaty and reunite Magyar speaking lands – in pursuit of this, she signed a treaty with Mussolini’s Italy in 1927

·       Wilson: “The proposal to dismember Hungary is absurd” Winston Churchill: “Ancient poets and theologians could not imagine the suffering that Trianon brought to the innocent”

·       Effects of treaty are still strongly felt today

·       Treaty restricted Hungary economically and militarily, causing aggression

·       Caused the formation of the Little Entente (Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Romania) who feared that Hungary might go to war in order to reclaim the territories that Trianon took away and gave to the members of the little entente.

·       The new Hungary was a landlocked state with no access to the Mediterranean Sea, which weakened economy, and could have been the reason for her later association with Nazi Germany

·       Army reduced to 35,000 men with no more conscription, air force was banned, and, as a land locked nation, she was not allowed a navy.

Treaty of Sevres, 10^th August 1920

·       Signed between B&F and the Ottoman Empire (Turkey)

·       Carved up as the ‘sick man of Europe’ – took 15 months to draft.

·       Abolished the Ottoman Empire, which left lots of small party states becoming mandates. Britain took control of Iraq and Palestine whilst France took control of Syria and Lebanon – a lot of the problems going on with the Syrian conflict today can be traced back to this treaty

·       Countries such as Armenia were recognized as independent states.

·       Dardanelles straits were opened up and made an international waterway with Turkey having no control over it

·       Army limited to 50,000 men. Navy limited to 13 boats and an air force was forbidden.

·       Financial control handed over to the allies – control of banks, imports and exports, loans and the tax system

·       Lost all rights to Sudan and Libya and had to recognize French Morocco, British Egypt and Cyprus

·       Eastern Thrace, Aegan Islands and Dodecanese Islands went to Italy.

·       Terms were overthrown as the result of the revival of a Turkish nationalist movement – new treaty of Lausanne was drawn up in 1923 in which Greece returned Eastern Thrace and 2 Aegan Islands to Turkey, in which they also gained the right to close the straits to enemy warships in the time of war. The supervision of finances was also ended.

Treaty of St Germain, 10^th September 1919

·       Between B&F and Austria

·       Dissolved the Austro-Hungarian Empire – Austria was to be treated as a new state, and Hungary had their separate treaty (Trianon)

·       Army limited to 30,000 men

·       Reparations were declared to start in 1921 and last for 30 years but they were never enforced so never paid. Payments in animals to Italia, Romania and Serbia were, however, set out (milk cows, bulls, sheep, horses)

·       Empire reduced from 30 million to 6 million, now land locked

·       Lost industrial areas

·       Forced to accept some War Guilt just like Germany did

·       Unification (Anschluss) with Germany was forbidden

·       Lost land to Czechoslovakia, Poland, Italy, Romania and Yugoslavia

·       Austro-Hungarian navy was split up and distributed between the allies

·       The Austria created by the treaty was financially and militarily weak and therefore a chronic force of instability in Europe between the two World Wars.

Treaty of Neuilly, 27^th November 1919

·       Between the allies and Bulgaria

·       Reparations of £90 million to be paid, which they actually did pay because 75% of the reparations were later remitted

·       Western Thrace handed over to ‘Big Three’ and eventually to Greece – this lost Bulgaria’s Aegan coastline and access to the seas, so weakened her

·       Army limited to 20,000 men

·       When World War Two broke out, Bulgaria sided with Nazi Germany and reclaimed all the land taken from her by the Treaty of Neuilly.

·       Land also given to Romania and Yugoslavia

The Little Entente, 1921

·      Protective military and political alliance between Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania (+France and Poland), who had profited from the dissection of Hungary in the Treaty of Trianon (June 1920) but realized their vulnerability and feared that Hungary might try and seek revenge to regain their territories. Also result of UK and US betrayal – isolationist? Secured France and the Eastern Powers against an attack from Germany

·      France backed the little entente with its alliance with Czechoslovakia – this would, in turn, protect them from Germany and reinforce encirclement.

·      Left Britain confused – France had gone against the covenant of the LON by forming a secret alliance. Distrust against collective security.

·      The alliance was destroyed when the 1938 Munich Pact delivered the Sudetenland (Czechoslovakia) to Germany, and land in Slovakia and Ruthenia to Hungary, who were very much part of the Nazi Camp.

The Treaty of Rapallo, 16^th April 1922

·       Between USSR and Germany – both had been excluded from the League of Nations, formed the basis of Russo-German friendship. Signed in Rapallo, Italy during the Genoa Conference . Negotiated by Germany’s Walther Rathenau and USSR’s G Chicherin. Dealt with outstanding questions and tension after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk which removed USSR from the war in 1918, in which Germany were very harsh towards Russia.

·       Agreed to cancel territorial claims against each other and to co-operate economically. Treaty strengthened military and economic ties with each other. Agreed to "co-operate in a spirit of mutual goodwill in meeting the economic needs of both countries".

·       Allowed German factories producing military goods (which was banned by TOV) to be produced in Russia – because it wasn’t in Germany it evaded the TOV terms. Allowed Germany to make weaponry and train soldiers (rearming – breaking TOV), whilst allowing Russia to see and use Western Technology and engineering techniques (which Germany are still infamous for), which they had been deprived of since the 1917 Revolution – these terms were, however secret.

·       First agreement concluded by Germany as an independent agent after WW1, and angered the allies.

·       Intended to form as an anti-Versailles axis against the West, since both groups lost a considerable amount of territory and political power under the treaty. In the West, it was viewed with alarm as strengthening the international position of both governments. Many conservative and far-right elements with the Weimar Republic were also alarmed by the government's decision to negotiate and maintain good relations with a communist state.

·       Reaffirmed in the 1926 Treaty of Berlin and the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact. Also agreed to co-operate against Poland because both Germany and the USSR had lost land to Poland – wanted to gain it back, which was the basis of the Nazi Soviet Pact.

Washington Conference, 12^th November 1921 – 6^th February 1922

·       Convened by Charles Hughes, the Secretary of State of the USA to consider naval armaments – it was an agreement outside of the LON and it actually worked, whilst the agreements in the LON were mostly unsuccessful because of the absence of the USA.

·       US government were also seeking to reduce naval expenditure, and wanted to avoid a new naval race in the Pacific.

·       Proposed naval disarmament and the end of Britain’s naval domination – another step to prevent the possibility of future war.

·       Resulted in two treaties: the 4 power and 9 power treaties.

·       Four Power Treaty (Dec 13^th 1921) – USA, Britain, France and Japan agreed to recognize each others possessions in the Pacific and in an event where there rights were threatened, they would consult each other rather than fight. Replaced the Anglo Japanese Treaty of 1902. Japan seen as a rising military threat by USA, so naval ratio dampened their worries. Would consult each other if there was any “Pacific Question”.

·       Five Power Treaty – USA, Britain, Japan, France and Italy (5:5:3:1.75:1.75 naval ratio set up, No battleships or cruisers to be built for 10 years – ‘building holiday’, Ships are to be destroyed until ratio is reached)

·       Nine Power Treaty – USA, Britain, France, Japan, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Portugal and China. Led to the ‘Open Door Policy’ being reinforced – Agreed to respect Chinese territorial integrity and independence. Agreed to discuss problems of common interest. Gave all nations to do business with China on equal terms. Guaranteed Financial assistance to China, and the Shantung Penninsula was returned by Japan. China had been unstable in the early 1920s after death of President Yuan Shi-kai in 1916 and rival generals in China were competing for power.

·       Results: Constituted a positive step towards preventing a naval arms race, signaled end of Britain’s naval domination as they accepted parity with the USA. Progress in terms of arms limitations and regional co-operation.

·       Problems: Did not lay down any mechanism for enforcement in the event of a country breaching their terms, failed to prevent Japanese aggression from 1931 onwards. USSR not invited, even though they were potentially a major force in the Pacific.

·       Hughes: “we have gone further in the direction of securing an enduring peace than by anything that has yet been done”

Corfu Incident, 1923

·       On 27^th August 1923, four Italian ambassadors (Including General Tellino) were assassinated on Greek soil after being sent there by the LON to survey a border dispute between Greece and Albania.

·       Mussolini demanded an apology and 50 million lire in compensation from the Greek government. Greece refused and appealed to the LON (Mussolini was a member of the council). The LON condemned Mussolini (it was all they could do) and refused to make Greece pay compensation.

·       In response, as soon as the Greeks had rejected Italy’s demands, Mussolini invaded Corfu (31^st August).

·       The LON then tried to push Greece into apologizing and, if a commission of enquiry found evidence to support Italy’s claims that the assassins were Greek, pay the compensation. Under pressure from Britain, Mussolini agreed on the 27^th September to withdraw his forces, and in exchange received the 50 million lire compensation from Greece.

·       Results: the credibility of the LON went down because the aggressor won – they had no force to stop Mussolini. Mussolini had dipped his feet into the water – he knew what he could get away with, so went on to invade Abyssinia in 1935, during which again the League did nothing. Appeasement, AJP Taylor “Hitler Watched” – one of the early failures of the LON.

·       Also boosted Mussolini’s image – the Italian press presented it as a ‘triumphant’ return of Italy to the international scene as a nation that got its way

Ruhr Crisis, 1923 - 1925

·       Germany, Belgium and France. France didn’t believe that the Rapallo treaty contained no secret agreements, and took a harder line on Germany.

·       In Germany in the 1920s, economic activity decreased, unemployment increased and productivity fell. Germany missed an installment of her reparations payments in 1922 (which were decided at £6.6 billion, Germany to pay 2 billion gold marks per year after the decision at the Reparations Committee of 1921), so France and Belgium invaded the coal rich region and took raw materials as a form of compensation. Their aim was to force Germany into paying the installments, but in the mean time, coal and timber were seized.

·       In retaliation, the Germans put up passive resistance and refused to comply with orders. They also destroyed the goods that the French had intended to ship over to France. This further postponed the payments, led to violent conflict, and, eventually inflation – the German government printed more money to support the workers, and this resulted in hyperinflation, which devalued German currency (1 loaf of bread – 2 million marks)

·       Passive resistance eventually called off by Stresemann, who obliged to terms of the TOV and solved the financial problem with the Dawes Plan, which stabilized the currency and enabled Germany to start reparations payments again.

Dawes Plan, April 1924

·      Charles Dawes’ USA’s attempt to solve the reparations problem – implemented to ensure recovery and solve the hyperinflation in Germany – Dawes won a Nobel Prize in 1925 and his innovation has been branded a “milestone” in history.

·      New currency – the Reichsmark.

·      German banks were whittled down, the Reichsbank was reorganized.

·      Loan of 800 million marks to Germany intended to restabilise currency.

·      In the terms, it stipulated the evacuation of the Ruhr, and that reparations payments should start at 1 billion marks per year (£50 million), increasing to 2.5 billion after 5 years (£125 million)

·      Brought respite from reparations and brought Germany back to her feet, allowing for recovery during the ‘Golden Years’ – again, it was outside of the LON, showing just how influential the USA were, and how detrimental their absence from the LON was. It did, however, make Germany over-reliant on foreign financial aid, and, as the US developed economic problems, Germany suffered as an onset. Despite US isolationist policy, they could not turn their back on European economic affairs. Allowed Germany to repay B&F, who could then repay their war loans back to the US – everyone benefited. 22.9 billion marks were paid in reparations during this period.

Locarno Treaties, 6^th – 15^th October 1925

·       Drawn up at Locarno, Switzerland and signed in London.

·       Marked a breakthrough in German relations with Britain and France. Germany accepted her borders with Belgium and France, and agreed to arbitration in any future border quarrels with Poland and Czechoslovakia.

·       Germany, France and Belgium signed mutual guarantees – this time, everyone had to make the promise – action would be taken if either side broke the term – Germany no longer treated differently.

·       This was a step towards Franco-German reconciliation and it meant that Germany could start to grow economically again without being a threat to Western Europe. It also meant that France and Britain could reconcile over the differences that drove these two apart (how to deal with Germany)

·       Germany’s eastern borders were less secure – left room for expansion in the east.

·       Germany were treated as equals again after accepting border terms of the TOV and were allowed to join the LON

·       Talks and conference took place outside of the LON – shows that the terms of the TOV weren’t binding unless supported by another treaty outside of the league.

·       Seen as the ‘climax of fulfillment’ and a step towards world peace – resulted in excitement and optimism. Supervision of German disarmament was stopped – there was a level of trust, and by 1930 Germany was an independent state again.

·       Was ripped up by Adolf Hitler

Kellogg-Briand Pact, 27^th August 1928

·       Signed on August 27^th 1928 between Germany, France, the USA and 12 other nations (Britain, Belgium, Poland, Australia) and 47 other nations later followed suit, joining together to renounce the use of aggression as a means of solving disputes. Prohibited the use of war as an “instrument of national policy”. Was approved overwhelmingly in the senate with an 85-1 vote.

·       Signed in Paris, so sometimes called the Pact of Paris

·       Aimed to stop militarism from rising and causing another world war.

·       Again, this was outside of the LON – showed just how powerless they were.

·        Named after authors – US Secretary of State Frank B Kellogg and French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand

·       Problems: there were no provisions for any kind of sanctions if the terms of the treaty were broken. Also, there was no definition of the “aggressive war” that the Pact was renouncing – countries could interpret it as they liked. Some just see it as “a statement of good intentions” as when Germany, Japan and Italy broke the terms in the 1930s, nothing could be done to stop them – the pact simply stated that parties failing to abide by this promise "should be denied the benefits furnished by this treaty"

·       An example of collective security – the best way to prevent conflict was if all nations acted collectively to renounce individual use of force.

·       A similar pact, the Litvinov Pact, was signed in Eastern Europe in 1929. Again, it renounced war but had flaws.

·       Served as the legal basis for the creation of the notion of ‘crime against peace’ (war in violation of international treaties) which was used to punish the people guilty for starting WW2 in the Nuremburg Tribunal.

The Young Plan, 1929

·       Commissioned by Owen D Young, a contribution to the continuing peace, helped Weimar Germany significantly.

·       Reduced the pressure on Germany to pay a large amount of reparations payments, because Germany could still not fulfill her financial requirements even after the Dawes Plan – they were too demanding.

·       Reduced German reparations to 121 billion marks, payable over 59 years (660 million marks paid per year, the remainder of the payment could be postponed for up to 2 years, which would enable Germany to overcome any temporary economic problems/times of economic hardship)

·       As a result of German acceptance, the Allies agreed to evacuate the Rhineland by June 1930.

·       Germany were paying back less than they had been under the Dawes Plan, which relieved the strain on her economy and allowed for further financial recovery.

·       Unfortunately, between the presentation of the plan and its formal adoption, the Wall Street Crash occurred in October 1929, which forced the USA to recall their loans, plunging Germany into financial turmoil (because they had been too reliant on the USA financially), leading to extremism in Germany and the appointment of Hitler as chancellor.

·       Nevertheless, the Dawes and Young Plans were important U.S. efforts that had lasting consequences. Coming so soon after the American rejection of the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations, the Dawes and Young Plans were significant instances of U.S. reengagement with European affairs. The Young Plan also had a more lasting effect: the Bank for International Settlements, or BIS, continues to operate to this day as a forum for central bank consultation and cooperation.

London Naval Conference, 1930

·       Aimed towards taking further steps in naval disarmament, including submarines and smaller warships that were not covered in the 1921 Washington Conference. Basically extended reviewed the treaties of the Washington Conference

·       Between USA, Britain, Japan, Italy and France

·       Continued the moratorium on building capital ships (‘building holiday’) for five more years

·        April 22^nd – USA, Britain and Japan signed treaty moving the naval ratio from 5:5:3 to 10:10:7 (10:10:6 for heavy cruisers) – France and Italy excluded themselves from the ratio – France didn’t want to accept parity with Italy – she felt like her defense requirements in the North Sea, Atlantic and Mediterranean meant that she needed sufficiently more naval forces than Italy, who was only a Mediterranean power.

·       Because of the depression it wasn’t problematic to enforce – countries didn’t have the money to keep on building ships, but wanted to secure peace and no naval race.

·       Made progress with regards to peace and disarmament.

·       Met again in 1935 – Japan walked out because they were denied the parity with the USA and Britain that they insisted upon.  USA, Britain and France did agree to a 6-year moratorium on building light large cruisers.

The Manchurian Crisis, 1931-1933

·       September 1905 – the Treaty of Portsmouth granted Japan control of the South Manchurian Railway in China

·       September 17^th 1931 – Mukden Incident: Japan occupied Manchurian towns, claiming that China had sabotaged their part of the South Manchurian Railway (historians suspect that the Japanese Kwantung Army did it themselves)

·       By February 1932, the Japanese had set up a puppet state of Manchukuo – they had complete control over Manchuria and the Manchurian people. The Chinese government did not put up much resistance, because their main priority was defeating Mao’s communists – preoccupation of this crisis meant that the LON was their only help. They did, however, appeal to the LON (of which Japan was a member of the council), who ordered the Lytton Commission to investigate the incident – it took them a year to report back that Japan were the aggressor (they did not respond quickly or effectively enough – the situation in the area was already quite complex – Japan had a significant presence in Manchuria after the 1905 Russo Japanese War, and China’s control in Manchuria was limited since a revolution against the Emperor in 1911)

·       By February 1932, the Lytton Commission reported back that Japan had been the aggressor, and that they should leave the area, and that the state of Manchukuo should not be recognized by other nations. Japan used their VETO powers to block the league’s resolution, withdrew from the LON and went on to continue invading Manchuria and went on to bomb Shanghai. Further Japanese atrocities showed complete disregard for China (e.g. the Rape of Nanking)

·       The LON had failed – Britain and the USA were more concerned with their own economies after the depression, and Japan was a vital trading partner so they didn’t want to be too harsh on them – they also had no military force so could only condemn Japan, which didn’t work. The LON were completely powerless, and Eurocentric. They were also scared of Japanese aggression.

·       Tony Howarth: “the LON was powerless in the face of a determined aggressor”

·       Start of appeasement, although this type of crisis was exactly what the LON was there for – to prevent. Decision was too late, by the time a decision had been made the troops were already mobilized and stable. Collective security in the Far East was dead. Some historians (Samuel Bernis) argue that the crisis was a direct cause of WW2.

Disarmament Conference (Geneva Conference), 1932-1933

·       After the effects of the Manchurian crisis had put countries more on the defensive than ever

·       60 nations were represented, including he USA, USSR and Germany. Germany (under rule of Hitler) demanded equality of armaments, and the French refused to consider reducing their armaments until security was assured.

·       Set up by the LON, wanted to create a military balance between France and Germany – wanted to disarm to the lowest level – German Government (pre-Hitler) wanted France (600,000) to disarm to Germany’s 100,000, or Germany should be able to rearm. Neither scenario was acceptable to France, because French politicians were aware of Germany’s larger population and industrial capacity. Ramsay MacDonald proposed that all armies should be reduced to 500,000 men, and that France and Germany should have parity.

·       Second meeting in Feb 1933 – USA persuaded the four leading European powers to sign an agreement promising “not in any circumstances to attempt to resolve any present or future differences between them by retort to force”.

·       Another meeting in June – Britain, France, Italy and USA agreed to sign a four year moratorium on armaments, at the end of which Germany would be allowed equality of armaments – this was not good enough for Germany who demanded parity immediately, so they walked out of the conference

·       Problems: The depression reduced the optimistic atmosphere that had been present in the other conferences, Nations were fearful for their own security after the Manchurian Crisis so were not willing to disarm, there was no enforcement or power to observe compliance, all nations would only reduce their weapons if they felt safe enough to do so – when others reduced theirs, there was a lack of co-operation due to other things going on. Disarmament Conference was killed by the German walk out, which was followed by Germany leaving the LON – France was determined to maintain its forces higher than Germany’s. Hitler felt free to rearm openly, which he proceeded to do – conscription was reintroduced in 1935, and he announced that he would build up a peacetime army of 550,000 men.

·       Instead of continuing disarmament, it marked the end of disarmament – however, this time Germany were not appeased.

The Abyssinian Crisis, 1935-36

·      LON acted more quickly when Mussolini’s Italian army invaded Abyssinia (Ethiopia) after a humiliating defeat in the Battle of Adowa in which they lost 6000 men to a backward, technologically inferior army. Mussolini saw himself as a modern day Julius Caesar, and wanted to re-boost Italy’s image like he had done during the 1923 Corfu Incident.

·      August 16^th 1928 – two countries signed the Italo-Ethiopian friendship agreement. Already on 1906 B&F had agreed that Ethiopia should be under a minor sphere of Italian influence.

·      In 1934, there was a Somalian/Abyssinian border clash at the Wal-Wal Oasis, which was 150km inside Abyssinia. 30 Italian soldiers died, Mussolini demanded the Oasis as compensation– the Abyssinian Emperor Haile Selassie appealed to the LON and Mussolini went on to invade Abyssinia. The LON sent out a commission and declared that Italy had broken Article 12 of the LON Covenant by “retorting to war within three months of a dispute being referred for arbitration”. Italy was declared the aggressor and the assembly voted to impose sanctions on Italy –the LON banned weapons sales and put sanctions on rubber and metal, as well as prohibiting the import of Italian goods and financial support to Italy.

·      The LON didn’t, however, ban steel and oil selling because they were scared of what Mussolini would do.

·      This was, however, the harshest action that the LON had taken out upon an aggressor – they had learnt something from the Manchurian incident.

·      Mussolini did not like the sanctions and was becoming closer to Hitler, who “watched”. Mussolini left the LON in 1937.

·      The Suez Canal, vital for trading, was kept open – Britain and France could have closed it but didn’t want to, because they feared losing him as an ally to Hitler. Sanctions also placed on Abyssinia, who were innocent – this meant that they couldn’t obtain weapons to fight the Italian army.

·      European powers were more concerned with Hitler’s troops in the Rhineland than the incident in Abyssinia – Eurocentric, selfish.

·      Marked Chamberlain’s abandonment of collective security and the beginning of appeasement.

·      AJP Taylor – “The LON died in 1935… it was a useless fraud…Hitler watched”

·       JR Western – “The crisis was fatal to the LON, nobody took it seriously again”

·       AP Adamthwaite – “Abyssinian Crisis delivered the death blow to the LON… while Britain and France were distracted Hitler was sending 22,000 men into the Rhineland”

The Hoare-Laval Pact, 8^th December 1935

·       Secret agreement between Samuel Hoare (British Foreign Sec) and French Premier Pierre Laval, in an attempt to solve the Abyssinian Crisis

·       Proposed to offer Mussolini 60% of Abyssinia – gave two large areas to Italy and left a ‘camel corridor’ in the middle for Abyssinia. This was done without the consultation of Haile Selassie, the Abyssinian Emperor. In return, Italy would have to stop the war. Some parts would be under Italian control, and some under Italian economic influence.

·       The details were leaked, causing public furor.

·       Mussolini went on to completely invade Abyssinia, which shattered the hopes and confidence in the LON acting against aggression. The fact that two major LON members were prepared to negotiate with the aggressor was also shocking – B&F didn’t want to get on Mussolini’s bad side.

·       Gave Mussolini the impression that Britain and France would not try to stop him if they were offering him Land – AJP Taylor blames this for the reason that the LON was a “sham” and a “failure” – the start of appeasement

·       Counter Argument: The pact offered to keep 40% of Abyssinia – without it, Mussolini would have taken 100%, which was what he did. Proposed to give Selassie a part of British Somaliland which would have given Abyssinia access to the sea – trade, imports.

·       Italy approached Germany and signed the Rome-Berlin Axis in 1936 – this was what the allies didn’t want, and why the Hoare-Laval Pact was made: as a desperate measure to keep Mussolini apart from Hitler. It failed.

To what extent should Germany be held responsible for causing both the First and Second World Wars?

 
To what extent should Germany be held responsible for causing both the First and Second World Wars?
From IBDP History 1998 Exam—Paper II

Example I:

In 1961, German historian Fritz Fischer published a book, “Germany’s Aims in the First World War”, that sparked a furious debate amongst historians inside and out of Germany. In this book, Fischer argues that Germany was responsible for the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, thus justifying the claim of the War Guilt clause in the treaty of Versailles that Germany was solely responsible for the damages the war had caused. Fischer’s argument conflicted with the belief of both the German public and academia at the time, as most Historians prior to Fischer agreed with the arguments of the revisionist historians of the 1930s, such as Sidney Bradshaw Faye, who argued that although Germany may have been partly to blame for the start of World War 1, the other major superpowers in Europe were equally to blame. Fritz Fischer presented in his book, as well as in his sequel “World Power or Decline”, a number of theses which he uses to argue that Germany had actively and aggressively planned for a world war since 1912 and as a result should be blamed for starting one, yet simultaneously many other historians, notably Gerhard Ritter, refute Fischer’s claims by presenting equally compelling evidence to argue that Germany wasn’t trying to be aggressive in its policies, but instead was being defensive and only engaged in war mistakenly and spontaneously as opposed to Fischer’s view that the Germans’ declarations of war had been the result of deliberate planning. In order to fully evaluate to what extent either view can be justified and thus decide whether or not Germany should be considered solely to blame for the outbreak of War in 1914, both the strengths and weaknesses, the accuracies and the oversights of each of the arguments should be assessed. This essay shall analyse both the revisionist views of Ritter and the Anti-Revisionist views of Fischer in order to come to a balanced conclusion as to what extent Germany was to blame for the outbreak of one of the deadliest wars in human history. 

A point argued by Fischer extensively in conjunction with his thesis that Germany was guilty of the outbreak of war in 1914 was that Germany’s militarism during the build up to war signals Germany’s aggressive, war-mongering intent. Fischer points out that between 1910 and 1914, German military expenditure rose by 73%, significantly more than the 10% increase of spending over the same time period of Germany’s greatest enemy, France. Using this as evidence, Fischer argues that this shows that post 1910 – and especially post 1912 – Germany had clearly decided to go to war sooner rather than later and had as a result increased military spending by this huge amount. Fischer continues by stating that the – in comparison – negligible increase in French military spending shows that France was not expecting to go to war and as a result had chosen not to prepare by increasing its military expenditure by as much as Germany had. From these observations, Fischer argues that the huge increase in the military spending of Germany between 1910 and 1914 was a signal of their preparations and intent to embroil Europe in War sooner rather than later. Fischer, with this argument however, fails to take a number of key points into account. First, Fischer fails to mention that France may well have wanted to increase military spending but were not able to, as their democratic parliamentary system would never elect a leader whose intention were to raise taxes on the poor in order to fund, to a greater extent, the militarisation of France. This means that although the relatively low French increase in military expenditure may not have been due to a lack of aggression and intent for war, but instead due to the restrictions that its political system lays upon the government, unlike the system in Germany, which is Autocratic and thus the public opinion has far less sway. Furthermore, it is worth noting that Germany had had far less time to build up its army and thus the rapid increase of military expenditure may well be seen as a defensive policy aiming to merely allow Germany to build up its army to the level where it can effectively defend itself from its aggressive Neighbours, rather than as an aggressive policy looking for war. Thus, although the excessive increase in German military expenditure between 1910 and 1914 may be a signal of Germany’s aggressive intent over its neighbours, it could also, upon reflection, be regarded as a purely defensive manoeuvre. 

Another central argument that Fischer uses in order to convince historians that Germany was to blame for the outbreak of the First World War is that by 1912, many of Germany’s military officers and most powerful politicians had decided that war with Russia was inevitable. This was primarily due to the reforms that the Russian army was undergoing following their defeat in the Russo-Japanese war. These reforms would transform the Russian army into a far more modern and thus potent threat to Germany and, due to Russia’s alliance with Germany’s highly antagonistic neighbours France, the reformed army could well crush Germany. As a result, German politicians believed that war with Russia prior to the reforms being completed in 1917 would be beneficial for German growth and thus the German high command, according to Fischer, actively sought war with Russia before 1917. In the words of the head of Army van Moltke in 1912: “I hold war [with Russia] to be inevitable and the sooner the better.” Fischer argues that this attitude of the German generals and politicians shows that Germany was aiming to go to war as early as 1912. Indeed, the Bosnian crisis already showed Germany’s willingness to go to war and it was only Russia backing out when none of its allies backed it that caused war to have been averted. Fischer also uses this attitude of the German politicians to justify his claim that it was Germany who pushed Austro-Hungary to go to war with Serbia, thus starting the series of events that lead to the start of the First World War. Fischer claims that the murder of the Archduke gave Germany an opportunity to both support Austria and, potentially, initiate the war with Russia, through a war with Serbia, that Germany had been seeking. Thus Germany encouraged Austria by handing them the infamous blank cheque. On the other hand, the series of desperate telegrams sent between Tsar Nicholas II and Kaiser Wilhelm II, on the advent of the start of the war, urging one another to not mobilise indicates that German leadership (ie the Kaiser), was reluctant to go to war with his cousin the Tsar and his people, contradicting Fischers’ argument. As a result, although Fischer argues that the Russian military reforms prompted German officials to actively seek war with Russia, by, for example, encouraging Austria with their blank cheque agreement, other evidence points towards Germany, and in particular the Kaiser, being reluctant to declare war on Russia. 

A final argument that Fischer used to blame Germany for the start of the war was that Germany actively sought the outbreak of war in order to cover up and suppress internal social and political tensions. Following the turn of the 20th century and the widespread reforms throughout Europe, many high ranking German officials, especially the conservative Junkers, became worried about the increasing power of socialist parties and workers’ unions within the Reich, considering them a rot to society. In order to stop this rot, the Junkers wanted to arrest the leaders and suppress these parties by force. However, in order to do this effectively, the Junkers needed an effective cover to distract attention away from these events. The primary opportunity for this was war. Hence, Fischer argues that many of the powerful Junkers within the German government were, if not actively seeking, then not careful to avoid the outbreak of war. Fischer reasons that Germany’s drive for war was in part due to the powerful Junkers looking for the most suitable cover so that they could settle their own internal affairs (i.e. motivated by self-interest). However, to what extent these internal quibbles had upon foreign policy beyond perhaps a slight change in mentality is unclear, and consequently the argument that the socio-political unrest within Germany motivated the powerful and conservative Junkers to start a war in order to provide cover for the suppression of unrest, although credible, is not an obvious reason as to why the war started, nor a particularly convincing argument that Germany was to blame. 

When, in the 1960s, Fischer published his books arguing Germany’s guilt for the outbreak of the First World War, he garnered a fair following amongst German historians, however he also had his fair share of critics. An argument that his critics point out is that prior to 1914, German foreign policy was oft contradictory and with no clear aim, especially not the aim of going to war with its neighbours. Kaiser Wilhelm the II was a very fickle man, so as an autocratic leader his policies were inconsistent. In 1895, Kaiser Wilhelm declared his support for Russia in the triple intervention that settled the first Sino-Japanese war. Germany thus seemed to support Russia, almost, but not quite, as an ally. However, five years previously, Kaiser Wilhelm had decided to let the Russo-German Re-insurance treaty lapse, causing Russia to feel frightened that Germany may be hostile towards it (due to expansionist policies) and thus sign an alliance with Germany’s greatest enemies France. Historians argue that this evidences Germany’s inconsistent policies: that they first let relations with Russia to break down to such an extent, that Russia sign a treaty with Germany’s greatest enemy, France. Yet, upon seeing this alliance, Germany then, and only then, try to win back Russia’s favour by supporting them in the Far East. Thus, historians conclude that Germany had no clear aim of whether it wanted to antagonise its Neighbours in the search of war, or whether they were trying to appease them in order to prevent war. Fischer may state, however, that as these events took place long before the start of the War and thus Germany’s attitude and direction may have changed later on, specifically in 1912. However, chaotic German policies followed on all the way to 1914. For example, in 1905 Germany provoked a crisis by protesting the French having colonised Morocco, something that had been agreed between France and Britain within their Entente Cordiale. Germany, by getting involved in an agreement between France and Britain immediately seemed overly aggressive, forcing the British and French to become even closer to one another, thus posing a greater threat to Germany, as opposed to a lesser one. This was a political miscalculation, as Germany had sought to drive France and Britain apart. However, this event again indicates that German policy making was not as carefully planned and meticulously thought out as Fischer described in his books, but instead the policy making by the Kaiser seemed naïve and rushed, something that seems unlikely to be the case for a nation that in a few years would be planning for war. Through this, historians argue that it seems unlikely that the German government and the Kaiser in particular, in a matter of five years, changed his policy making from a naïve and rushed, chaotic and contradictory style to a carefully planned war strategy. As a result, critics of Fischer argue that the German policy making was too inconsistent in the years prior to the outbreak of World War 1 to countenance the idea that Germany then made a careful plan to go to war. Thus they argue Germany’s innocence as they point out that Germany signalled no clear intention of war prior to 1914, indeed they, in many cases, seemed confused as to what policy to follow. 

One of the foremost critics of Fischer was the conservative German historian Gerhard Ritter. Ritter’s main counter against Fischer’s arguments focussed on why Germany were not intentionally causing war through their actions in 1914, thus being innocent of the charges put forward by Fischer. Ritter’s argument is that Germany’s starting of a world war was not the result of a predetermined intention, but rather due to a catastrophic evaluation of European politics at the time. The argument states that Germany regarded itself as coming to the defence of a brother empire that had been attacked by terrorists. Thus, Ritter justifies the blank cheque agreement by saying that its intentions were meant as a deterrent to Serbia and to intimidate them. Ritter particularly stresses that Germany agreed to invade Serbia because it did not think that Russia was willing to support a terrorist state who had just assassinated an “innocent”, nor did Germany believe that Russia could mobilize with any speed anyways. Naturally, Ritter concludes it was these miscalculations that caused Germany to become involved in a World War, as opposed to Fischer’s view that these actions were part of a deliberate Russian war strategy. Ritter further opposes Fischer’s argument that German politicians desired war in and around 1914 with their neighbours, in particular France. Ritter points out that the German chancellor ordered the governor of Alsace Lorraine in 1914 to prevent the German-speaking press from printing Francophobic remarks. This indicates that rather than being aggressive towards their neighbours in an expansionist way, as Fischer described, the German government instead sought to make peace with its neighbours, if at first merely on a social level as opposed to a political one. Finally, Ritter refutes Fischer’s claim than van Moltke refusing to comply with the Kaiser’s last minute suggestion to call off the invasion of France was an indication of Germany’s willingness and intent to cause a World War. Ritter states that in fact, Moltke merely had refused to comply due to the logistics nightmare that this would cause. Although neither party has many facts to back this up, Ritter argues throughout that Fischer’s view is wrong due to his extremely biased interpretation of events during 1914 and that, upon revision, Germany can be seen not as directly intent on causing a war, but rather as having gotten itself involved in a situation that spiralled out of control and towards World War due to a series of mistaken judgements rather than any direct desire for war. 

Fritz Fischer argued in 1961 that Germany had been to blame for the outbreak of World War 1 as it had directly planned to go to war with its neighbours, whom it felt threatened by, by 1917, due to a mixture of military pressure from its Generals who saw war as inevitable and thus readied themselves accordingly, not least by handing a blank cheque to an aggressive Austria, an increase in military spending that had signalled an intent for war and due to internal conflicts motivating high ranking politicians to, if not actively seek war, then not to try hard avoiding it. Other historians, notably Gerhard Ritter, criticise Fischer’s arguments, pointing out that Germany’s contradictory policy making prior to 1914 was at odds to Fischer’s vision of a deliberate plan for war being formulated as well as that Fischer’s interpretations of events in 1914 were one sided and unbalanced. Personally, although I agree to some extent with Fischer that Germany may well have been overly aggressive and thus has to bear some of the responsibility for the outbreak of war, at the same time I disagree that Germany were solely to blame, as stated by the Treaty of Versailles. Instead I believe that while the actions of Germany may have been questionable, I highly doubt that there was a specific intent to start a war that would, over four years, kill six million people across Europe.  

Example II:

Upon signing the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, Germany agreed to a section that has caused much speculation since then. Article 231, also known as the War Guilt Clause, states that Germany was to blame for the full extent of the Great War. However, with hindsight, historians such as Ritter and Schroeder disagree with this conclusion, they believe that Germany was not to blame for the outbreak of war. The following essay will discuss how Germany, though not innocent, was not the sole cause for the breakdown in International Relations before the Great War. 

The first argument to support this deduction is the idea that tensions in the 1900s were already very high. After Germany defeated France in 1870 and took Alsace-Lorraine, France’s pride was wounded. Alsace-Lorraine was one of her more industrial regions, thus, when Germany took it, France suffered a substantial blow to their economy. Not only that, but they were humiliated to the point where they wanted revenge and they would stop at nothing to get it. This seems like the attitude of a nation willing to risk war just to salvage their pride, which is shown a few years later, when, in 1894, France and Russia create the Franco-Russian Dual Alliance. The sudden alliance, at the time, looked like an attack on Germany. It was only natural for Germany to feel encircled by the two countries, which led to the Germans beginning to build up their army. Germany did what any other one of the nations, who, put in the situation, would have done. The tensions between the European countries were escalating rapidly to the point where any sudden attack on one of the allies would cause an immediate response in the shape of a war. 

Another event that created plenty of tension in Europe, and led to the brink of war, was the Bosnian Crisis in 1908. The Bosnian Crisis is where the initial conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia began, and led to Austria declaring war on Serbia after Archduke Franz Ferdinand was murdered on 28th June 1914. The rising tension between the two countries led to the other nations coming to support their allies. The rush to aid their allies was not caused by Germany, as they weren’t even expecting Russia to go to aid Serbia against Austria-Hungary. When they did, Germany had to rush to Austria-Hungary’s aid. Germany was even less to blame for this event, as it wasn’t even involved until Austria-Hungary asked for its aid against Russia and Serbia. The conflict between Serbia and Austria-Hungary continues to strengthen the fact that Germany wasn’t the sole reason behind the outbreak of the Great War. One of the main reasons behind why Germany was seen as such a ‘bad guy’ in the outbreak of the First World War, was due to the amount of propaganda made at the time. The Daily Mail newspaper in 1911, after the second Moroccan Crisis printed a feature saying, “Germany is deliberately preparing to destroy the British Empire. Britain alone stands in the way of Germany’s path to world power and domination.” In this quote, the British propaganda spins the Agadir Crisis completely out of proportion to make Germany seem like the antagonist in the situation. The statement is only partly true, as Germany had become the second largest industry in the world by then, second to America. Britain had a larger empire than Germany and a larger navy, but Germany had the upper hand in a war situation, as it had a larger army. Germany quickly became the antagonist during the early 1900s and therefore was an easy target to put all the blame on when the war ended, however they didn’t deserve all of it. A further example of propaganda displaying Germany as the ‘enemy’ is when the Kaiser’s words were twisted and put together to portray him as such. The Kaiser wasn’t even in an interview when a journalist used some of the Kaiser’s quotes and portrayed him as if he was in an interview. In 1908, the Daily Telegraph ‘quoted’ the Kaiser saying, “You English, are mad, mad, mad as March hares.” These words made the Kaiser seem as if he were being hostile towards the British and were successful in portraying the Kaiser as the antagonist in the war. This would have helped in the argument of Germany being the sole blame for the outbreak of the Great War, however this so-called ‘interview’ was falsely portrayed and so is another point that supports the argument that Germany was not to blame for the collapse in International Relations before the Great War. When the supposed long-term enemies, France and Britain, signed an Entente Cordiale or a ‘friendly understanding’ in 1907, Germany saw this as threatening. As the two nations continued to team up against Germany, tensions continued to rise. Tensions reached a peak in 1905 for the 1st Moroccan Crisis and then again in 1911 for the 2nd. Germany was humiliated and began to see that the two recently become allies were teaming up to prevent Germany from expanding and becoming more powerful. This was crucial in directing the blame to Germany, as the two allies were able to portray Germany as the aggressor. However, Germany by itself was not to blame, other nations were as much a factor in the outbreak of the Great War as Germany. 

Among the many historians who are opposed to the theory that Germany was not to blame for the outbreak of the Great War, Fritz Fischer caused the most controversy. In 1961, Fischer wrote Griff nach der Weltmacht. In his book, he argued his opinion on how Germany was to blame for the war due to its aggressive pursuit of its Weltpolitik. He also discussed how aggression from Germany might have sparked due to fear of encirclement by France and Russia and this could have led to Germany wanting the war. However, shortly after the book was published, many historians argued against Fischer. Of the more respected, Professor Gerhard Ritter “has not only suggested that Fischer misinterprets documents but has also implied that he has a political purpose in doing this”, this was taken from an excerpt in H W Koch’s book The Origins of the First World War. One of Ritter’s main arguments is that he was present during the war and experienced it first-hand, whilst Fischer was only a child at the time, therefore Ritter “has a view of the origins of the First World War which is entirely different from Fischer’s”. Professor Gerhard Ritter has the upper hand in this debate, as he was present for both the war and the ‘hindsight’. This is supported by the fact that German policy before 1914 was vague and doesn’t support the idea of Weltpolitik. Although Fritz Fischer provides substantial arguments, it is Ritter’s that gain the upper hand, as it was proven when in 1965, Fischer published another book, Weltmacht oder Niedergang, to counteract the criticism. Ritter succeeded in arguing against Fischer to support the idea that Germany was not the sole nation to blame for the outbreak of the First World War.

An example of an event that could be used to blame Germany for the breakdown in International Relations before the Great War is the formation of the Drei Kaiser Bund in 1881. The Drei Kaiser Bund itself wasn’t to blame, but when, in 1890, Kaiser Wilhelm let the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia lapse, Russia was annoyed and therefore went and joined France in the Franco-Russian Dual Alliance in 1892. This led to Germany feeling encircled by the two nations and it also felt threatened by a possible attack. Although this contributed to the outbreak of war, it wasn’t the only cause, otherwise war would have broken out in the 1890s instead of 1914, however, it is important to remember that it may have been a significant factor in increasing tensions in Europe. Another event that might aid in blaming Germany for the First World War is the German naval law in 1900. This is important as it showed Britain, for the first time, that Germany might be a threat to their empire. The naval law led to a naval race between Germany and Britain, which caused a lot of tension between the two countries. Although it caused a lot of tension, the naval race was caused by both Britain and Germany, meaning the blame would have been distributed to both of the countries, not just to Germany. 

In conclusion, Germany may have been a significant factor in the outbreak of the First World War, but was not the only factor. The other European nations played as much a part in causing the War as Germany, meaning that it was unfair for Germany to have had to take all of the blame for it. The events leading up to 1914 were crucial in causing the war and were not due to Germany. As this essay has shown, historians such as Professor Gerhard Ritter and Professor Fritz Fischer have disagreed about which nations were the cause of the War. However, out of the two, Ritter has the benefit of first-hand knowledge and hindsight, which gives him the advantage. Propaganda also played a large role in giving Germany the blame as it spun events out of proportion to make Germany seem like the antagonist. Therefore, Germany was not to blame for the breakdown in International Relations before the Great War. 

Works Cited: [1] Badsey, Stephen. The Franco-Prussian War, 1870-1871. Oxford: Osprey, 2003. Print. [2] "Fischer." Fischer. N.p., n.d. Web. . [3] Fischer, Fritz. Germany's Aims in the First World War. New York: W.W. Norton, 1967. Print. [4] Fischer, Fritz. Griff Nach Der Weltmacht; Die Kriegszielpolitik Des Kaiserlichen Deutschland 1914/18. Düsseldorf: Droste, 1964. Print. [5] Fischer, Fritz. Weltmacht Oder Niedergang. Deutschland Im Ersten Weltkrieg. [Frankfurt A.M.]: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1968. Print. [6] Hamilton, Richard F., and Holger H. Herwig. The Origins of World War I. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2003. Print. [7] Herrmann, David G. The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1996. Print. [8] Koch, H. W. The Origins of the First World War: Great Power Rivalry and German War Aims. London: Macmillan, 1984. Print. [9] Macdonald, David M. United Government and Foreign Policy in Russia: 1900-1914. Cambridge, Mass. U.a.: Harvard Univ., 1992. Print. [10] Padfield, Peter. The Great Naval Race: The Anglo-German Naval Rivalry, 1900-1914. New York: D. McKay, 1974. Print.

Example III:
The German question’ began in 1871 on how to handle the huge power that is Germany, and has been continuing ever since. Germany has always been a main power within Europe, and it can be argued now more than ever. With Germany having one of the strongest industrial bases in Europe, some countries rely on her, for instance Greece with its economy in shambles. Germany can manipulate international relations at will; it can refuse to pay aid to Greece, weakening these relations and creating tension, or it can help Greece and strengthen European country’s relationships. Fritz Fischer argues Germany did just this in the years leading to WW1, with its aggressive policy of ‘Weltpolitik.’ In order to fulfill ‘Weltpolitik’ Germany, specifically the Kaiser, manufactured hostility to eventually conquer Europe instead of using diplomacy, the ways of Bismarck before him. This will examine not only the ways in which the Kaiser’s foreign policy broke down international relations prior to WW1, but also how other countries and world leaders were at fault as well.


Weltpolitik was the foreign policy adapted by Kaiser Wilhelm II in 1890, which contrasted Otto von Bismarck’s policy of creating a balance of powers to keep peace and isolate France. One of Bismarck’s main ways to do this was to be peaceful with Russia, a very large and growing nation at the time. The thinking was that it was better to be together with the other strong power in Europe, than to oppose and create tension within the continent. One of his most famous quotes concerns this; ‘The secret of politics? Make a good treaty with Russia.’ When the Kaiser came to power, he did not renew this treaty and thus abolished the alliance between the countries, which was the start of the breaking of international relations as Russia would now be against Germany and vice versa.
The First Moroccan crisis was part of this policy to advance their control and influence in Europe as well. The crisis involved Germany declaring to Morocco that they supported their independence from Britain and France. This made the two countries furious at Germany and severely worsened their relations together. Both France and Germany threatened war at this time over the crisis. France, not wanting a war with Germany was going to back down, but Britain made it clear to France that it wanted it to stand up for itself. Some historians argued that this worsened relations between these two countries too as France felt almost threatened by Britain and created a weaker Triple Entente.
Germany also destroyed any relationship between themselves and Britain, which as a result rose tensions in Europe and broke international relations further. The Kaiser wanted to expand his oversees empire, but the issue was that France, and Britain particularly had already dominated most parts of the world by the late 1800s and early 1900s. To do this, he enacted the ‘Naval Law’ in 1900, which would have Germany build up its Navy to be in competition with Britain’s (the largest at the time). This made Britain uneasy and suspicious as they didn’t understand why Germany would need such a Navy if they were almost land-locked. As Germany’s navy grew, Britain did too as a consequence. Robert Wilde argues that this destroyed Germany and Britain’s relationship further than ever before. What he neglects is that it was also a large part the interview with the Kaiser and the Daily Telegraph in 1908. The Kaiser said that his people were not friendly to Britain and it put himself in a bad situation as he wanted to keep the relationship with Britain, but he couldn’t ‘due’ to his own people. This was seen as aggressive in Britain and caused alarm, which further divided the two countries.

Certain historians say that this rise in tensions was the fault of Britain, specifically the Daily Telegraph, as they exaggerated the interview so more people would read it. You can argue this, however you can only exaggerate something so far from the facts. If the Kaiser hadn’t said anything bad about Britain, the Daily Telegraph could not make something up and say that he had said something he didn’t and as a result the argument is flawed. The Kaiser seemed to not be careful about what he says and that itself lead to him breaking international relations further as well.
Nevertheless, some historians argue that other countries and even Europe as a whole were responsible for the breakdown of the relations in the continent, not particularly Weltpolitik and the Kaiser. Serbia and the Balkans created a large amount of tension and ruining of international relations, not Germany specifically. After Serbia had defeated Bulgaria in 1885, their prime minister of Serbia said, ‘The first round is won, now for the second war against Austria-Hungary.’ This outright showed that Serbia had intentions to go to war with Austria, but Russia supported them in any event. This support from Russia hurt relations between Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Serbia, as now there is a possible war hanging over their heads.

Many historians blame Germany for the Bosnian Crisis and raising the tensions during, but you can blame almost all countries in Europe during the Bosnian crisis. Russia called a conference to discuss and try to find a solution to the crisis. The problem was that no one showed up other than Russia. This shows that the countries In Europe didn’t necessarily want to solve their issues peacefully. Also, since no one showed, tensions grew as their was no official discussion about how to solve the problem. Along with this, Russia felt like a fool as they had been just defeated by Japan, and had surrendered. Russia felt it wasn’t being taken seriously anymore and as a result said that next time they would not back down. This also significantly rose tensions in Europe at the time, as they nations knew Russia would go to war if something similar would happen again.

As a result, the exponential breakdown of international relations due to Germany and Europe as a whole were one of the driving reasons as to why the Great War had begun. The countries did not trust one another and felt threatened. Fritz Fischer’s argument on that Germany should be to blame is flawed, as it only looked at Germany and its Weltpolitik and denied to look at other factors that could have broke international relations as well, such as the Balkans and the Bosnian Crisis in depth. This doesn’t mean he is entirely wrong however; Germany is certainly to blame for a good part of the breakdown, but not fully.

To what extent were the policies of Germany responsible for the outbreak of war in 1914?

From November 2013 IBDP PAPER 3 exam – ASPECTS OF THE HISTORY OF EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST  

 EXAMPLE 1:
 "The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage […] as a consequence of the war imposed […] by the aggression of Germany and her allies." In the famous and highly controversial War Guilt Clause of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany is assigned complete blame for causing the First World War, even though this decision isn’t justified in the Treaty itself and therefore gives room for different and debatable interpretations. Many historians agree with this concept of guilt blaming, but having grown up in Germany and experienced the German point of view first hand, it is clear that Germany isn’t a nation that deserves all the blame.

The German historian Fritz Fischer was the first to blame solely Germany for causing the Great War. His thesis was that Germany was aching for a war since 1912 and that it’s militarism provides clear evidence for that. Many other historians and British officials argue the same point, that Germany’s militaristic expenses, which grew 73% over the cause of 4 years, 1910-1914, and were therefore the highest in Europe, provided undoubted evidence that Germany was eager for war. However, contributing one specific characteristic like militarism to an entire nation can be somewhat problematic. Kaiser Wilhelm II became a representation for the entire German people, especially to the British. His public speeches were often rather bellicose and not though through, like his statement “The soldier and the army, not parliamentary majorities and decisions, have welded the German Empire together. I put my trust in the army.” Such statements show how militaristic the German leader was, but they do not represent the entire German population, as thought by many. Even today, 25 years after the unification, there are severe differences in the thinking and living habits inside Germany itself. In north Germany, for example, people are more open and modern, whereas the south is more conservative. Such differences haven’t just developed in the past few years, but have always been there, which supports the thesis that one man could’ve hardly represented the thinking and feelings of an entire nation.

Another problem with the thesis that Germany was more militaristic and eager for war than any other nation is that before the First World War broke out, the act of going into war and defending the father-or motherland was glorified by many European nations, not just Germany. Nearly every European country had poems and songs about heroic sacrifice and the glory and beauty of war, especially the British. The first verse of Owen Seaman’s Pro Patria states: “England, in this great fight to which you go/Because, where Honour calls you, go you must,/ Be glad, whatever comes, at least to know/You have your quarrel just.” This poem is one of many British poetry pieces that glorify the war and strongly trust and believe in the thesis “Dulce et Decorum est pro patria mori [It is sweet and proper to die for one's country]”. That statement became motto and inspiration for the British during World War One and it makes the explanation that Germany is to blame for the Great War, because it was most militaristic, seem less effective and too simplistic overall.

A different reason why historians like Fritz Fischer might have argued that Germany is to blame is that they developed their thoughts in the time period after the Second World War. Even though there are many debates and uncertainties as to who started the Great War, it is clear that Germany, with the help of Adolf Hitler, is to blame for the Second World War, so when looking back at 1914, it lies close to assume that with her war-starting history, Germany can be easily made responsible for causing both wars. However nowadays, a century after the start of the First World War, the causes can be analyzed from a much clearer and less bias perspective. Therefore more and more historians today try to explore a different side to who caused the Great War, and less make Germany fully responsible.

A common justification that is given for blaming Germany is that after Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated, Germany gave Austria-Hungary a “Blank Check”, which as many say, promised full support if there would be a resulting war. Historians argue that without the German support Austria-Hungary wouldn’t have declared war on Serbia and that Germany encouraged Austrians to fight. However, having read the telegram that was sent from German Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg to the German Ambassador in Vienna, it is clear that the arguments regarding Germany wanting a war are just assumptions. The telegram itself says nothing about a potential war that would be encouraged by the German parliament. It simply states: “as far as concerns Serbia, His Majesty cannot interfere in the dispute now going on […] as it is a matter not within his competence. The Emperor Francis Joseph may, however, rest assured that His Majesty will faithfully stand by Austria-Hungary, as is required by the obligations of his alliance and of his ancient friendship.” The telegram clearly says that Germany has no influence and does not want to get involved in the decision-making regarding the conflict between Serbia and Austria-Hungary. This is really important because it makes the argument of Germany being eager for war invalid. This specific passage from the Telegram is often used out of context and has therefore been misinterpreted. Adding onto that the idea that Germany would want a war, especially a World War, makes very little sense, as Germany was just starting to build up it’s economy after the unification and rather then sending troops off to fight and spending large amounts of money on the army, it would make more sense to invest in the state itself and make it’s world markets stronger. Assuming that that was the case, Germany would’ve then given Austria-Hungary full support in what they did in hopes that there wouldn’t be a war, which is a much more considerate interpretation of the telegram.

With all these points made, it is clear that even though Germany does deserve some blame for the war, it can’t be made fully responsible. Other nations contributed to the tension between the European powers, such as Austria-Hungary for demanding too harsh conditions from the Serbs, France declaring war on Germany and Russia starting it’s pre-mobilization even before Serbia had responded to the Austria-Hungarian demands. Germany might have played an important role in the Great War, but so have nearly all European powers at that time.

MY COMMENTS:
Good introduction- it's just like I had spoken of in class. Start with a relevant quote showing judgement and reading, develop it, and then move on to the theme.
It still needs development- you end by writing that "having grown up in Germany and experienced the German point of view first hand, it is clear that Germany isn’t a nation that deserves all the blame." That isn't an argument; it tells me nothing. There is a danger therefore that you are intimating that you are writing as a biased observer- "I'm German, so I know it's wrong." You must be specific in how you intend to challenge the question, and not simply by saying you're German.

You are very wrong in claiming that Fritz Fischer "was the first to blame solely Germany for causing the Great War"- you began with a quote doing just that dating from 1919. EVERYONE blamed Germany after the war. Maybe you mean he was the first GERMAN historian to have done so PUBLICLY.

Throughout, as in the introduction, you show you understand the structure to follow when writing the essay; now you need to put meat on the bones. For example, you tend to throw out quotes here and there and then conclude simply "this shows how militaristic the German leader was, but they do not represent the entire German population, as thought by many." Is it fair to selectively choose a single quote out of context? WHO thinks the entire German population was militaristic? What is your point? Instead of explaining it and using it to answer the question, you then go on to describe how, TODAY, "people are more open and modern, whereas the south is more conservative." I understand why you're doing this, but look at your paragraph- it is short, consists of a quote halfway after first giving ONE statistic and ONE historian (doing justice to neither) before offering a description of Germany 100 years later.

Your second paragraph is even shorter, and you use a single poem written DURING the war to ... to do what? There is no reference to the cause of the war. Certainly, the quote you give discusses why Britons MUST get involved in the war, (which could be used to argue the opposite of what you are) but not they cause it. That's the question- did Germany start the war? Were they to blame? EVERY country (including Germany) had such poems- why are you picking on the British? Are you claiming Germany didn't employ bloodthirsty art and poetry? And then there's the reference to “Dulce et Decorum est pro patria mori"- this, the opening lines to Owen's poem, simply write about the futility of the war and how the soldiers are against it- it's clear you are not familiar with the works you are discussing. 

The next poem focuses on WWII through a handful of simple statements. Not one line is relevant to the question; in fact, besides serving no purpose it hurts you by showing the examiner you are unclear about the question.

Your last paragraph looks ONLY at the blank cheque. it's jarring given what came before- there is no link to anything you mentioned, it serves no overall theme or argument... look at every sentence- most are just the thoughts of a teenager and not a fact, event, statistic, historian...
"The idea that Germany would want a war, especially a World War, makes very little sense, as Germany was just starting to build up it’s [sic] economy after the unification and rather then [sic] sending troops off to fight and spending large amounts of money on the army, it would make more sense to invest in the state itself and make it’s [sic] world markets stronger."
Says who? Is that YOUR opinion? Who are you? That you throw all these things into a single line not only betrays a lack of critical thought to each point, but a simplistic understanding of the world.

Thus knowledge is weak.
Analysis is there, but not tied to specific understanding of the historical period.
Reference is made to historiography, but more in the form of name-dropping than actual consideration of the value, origin and purpose of such arguments.
Organisation is poor, and not in the service of the question.
next time focus on this one area- topic sentences. Instead of beginning a paragraph with "A different reason why historians like Fritz Fischer might have argued that Germany is to blame is that they developed their thoughts in the time period after the Second World War," ANSWER THE QUESTION. It is NOT "Why did historians blame Germany after WWII", but based on the available evidence, is it right to blame Germany today? 

Example 2:

To excuse Germany from being the preliminary culprit of the outbreak of war in 1914 would be, as Sir Max Hastings put it, “unfounded and illogical”. One could assign the blame to various nations and individuals, but none in my opinion held the same amount of influence and grasp over European matters as Germany and perhaps Great Britain, and as Uncle Ben Parker famously said “with great power comes great responsibility”. This is highly applicable in the case of Wilhelm and his Generals reacting sluggishly and indecisively in the face of a crisis, not to mention obvious signals of aggression and schizophrenia from the German Reich in the years prior to 1914. In this essay we will delve into how painfully clear it is that Germany could have at various times throughout the early 20^th century reacted more appropriately to prevent a European bloodbath.

Those that seek to dismiss the notion of German aggression prior to the first shots being fired must simply look at the Schlieffen-plan. Designed to take Paris in a matter of weeks, it was an offensive plan designed for rapid European expansion and invasion. It bares an awful lot of similarity to Hitler’s blitzkrieg and even employed strategies including the invasion of neutral countries; of course Britain was to get involved as a response. The United Kingdom realized it should no longer use “splendid isolation” as an out for getting involved in European politics. The argument could be made on behalf of Germany that with the signing of the 1904 Entente Cordial, the Reich needed to protect itself. This argument however falls flat, as this was merely an agreement between Russia, Great Britain and France, as they did not have an alliance; it was simply assurance designed as an attempt to stabilize the growing tension in Europe. Germany further responded by engaging Britain in a naval race, which it had clearly lost by 1910. This is, logically, not the response a passive and peace-seeking nation would have had in response to the slightest indication of a threat in its vicinity.

The Blank Cheque of July 5^th 1914 was yet again, another wrong step on Germanys part in preventing war across Europe. Taking the fact that it wasn’t even the Kaiser to hand over this insurance of force into account, one must ask themselves as Austro-Hungary did; who is in-charge in Berlin? To answer them, it was either a paranoid, self-conscious war-mongerer, who felt he had something to prove, or hyper aggressive generals and foreign ambassadors such as Moltke or Zimmerman. Either way, now with Austria-Hungary assured in that it would be protected from Russia due to the aid of its natural ally, it felt free to wage war.

Germany is to be blamed to a great extent for the outbreak of the war, as it could have at so many times in the year’s prior done so much to stop the bloodshed. Historian Tim Cook argues feverishly in his novel “The Necessary War” that the First World War was bound to happen. I have to disagree, as I cannot concur with the notion that the most powerful and influential nation of its era was futile in its attempts to halt the looming disasters to come. Of course, each country and empire played its role, but none can be convicted in the same light as Germany was in the treaty of Versailles, which in rightfully saw Germany as the primary instigator of the war.

  
6/20
"Indicates some understanding of the question but historical knowledge is limited in quality and quantity. Historical context may be present as will understanding of historical processes but underdeveloped. The question is only partially addressed."

MY COMMENTS:
Apart from the bizarre reference to "Uncle Ben Parker", a fine introduction; just what I want to see- Starts well with a relevant quote showing judgement and reading, developed, and then move on to the argument.
The focus is far better than your previous essay. It's just far, far too short and lacking in sufficient factual information and support.
The main area of focus (understandable at this stage of the course) is putting meat to the bones. Your paragraphs are too short and lack sufficient evidence or support. They tend to consist of simple statements followed by bold claims with nothing in between. Consider: "Germany further responded by engaging Britain in a naval race, which it had clearly lost by 1910. This is, logically, not the response a passive and peace-seeking nation would have had in response to the slightest indication of a threat in its vicinity." Your point about the naval race is not only lacking in any real analysis or development, but the point (Germany lost the naval race 4 years earlier) seems to contradict the next point you make.
   Your next paragraph, about the blank cheque, is promising but is so devoid of explanation or development that it is of little use. IT CONSISTS OF ONLY FOUR SENTENCES! No historiography, no discussion of what you are actually referring to (how is it a "fact"t that "it wasn’t even the Kaiser to hand over this insurance of force into account"- what does that even mean? What is the basis for the question "who is in-charge [sic] in Berlin?"- the Kaiser, no?)- it's not enough to simply offer claims- you need EVIDENCE through EXAMPLES!
Then, that's it. 1 1/2 paragraphs. You conclude by referring to how "feverishly" the "historian Tim Cook argues in his novel “The Necessary War” that the First World War was bound to happen" without explaining what the hell he actually says! You can't conclude by throwing out new ideas, let alone leave them unexplained so the reader has no idea what you're on about. And what is an historian doing writing novels? If it is a novel, why refer to it?
START with an historian, clearly explain his argument (and explain why he believes it as if you were giving a debate on his behalf)- don't throw out an historian's name in such a way that it's clear you never read the man's work before.