IBDP Internal Assessments Relating to Hitler

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When did Adolf Hitler first exhibit anti-Semitic views?

A. Plan of Investigation – 151 words
When did Adolf Hitler first exhibit anti-Semitic views? This investigation will examine the origins of Hitler’s anti Semitism, considered herein as “actions and attitudes against Jews based on the belief that Jews are uniquely inferior, [...] by their very nature,”[1] focussing primarily upon three primary sources from Hitler himself. These become increasingly public over time, starting with what is considered his “first anti-Semitic writing”[2] – a letter written in 1919. Another crucial source from the following year will be a speech delivered at the Hofbräuhaus in which he publicly expresses his anti-Semitism from personal initiative. Finally, ‘Mein Kampf’, both political testament and auto-biography nationally published in Munich in 1925, will be analysed. English, French, and German secondary sources, such as August Kubizek (described as “a personal – and exclusive – friend” to Hitler) will be interpreted, to such respected authorities as Kershaw and Rosenbaum, to test Hitler’s personal writings against his own conscious bias.[3]


B.   Summary of Evidence - 439 words
Hitler first attended Linz Realschule at the age of 11 in May 1900 – three months after his brother’s death[4], followed by his father’s in 1903. The identification of his mother’s incurable cancer was announced by the family’s private doctor - Dr. Eduard Bloch, a Jew[5]. Her death in 1907 was followed by Hitler’s move to Vienna to begin his 6 year old dream, at the Academy of Fine Arts: to become an artist[6]. In 1909 he faced failure in the artistic examination[7] however in 1910 Reinhold Hanisch acted as a salesman for Hitler’s first artworks – postcards, paintings, and advertising posters - first selling on February 9th 1910, until 1913[8].
In 1914, Hitler was rejected by the Austrian army for being “too weak”[9]. As WWI broke out, he was accepted in the German army, after volunteering.[10]  Hitler was a successful corporal during the war[11], proven by the iron cross he was awarded.[12] After WWI, in March 1919, Hitler returned to Munich where he was confronted with the communist ‘Münchener Räterepublik’, which initiated his political engagements[13]. Within the Bavarian revolution of the Räterepublik, “the notion of an international Jewish conspiracy could be made to sound plausible”[14]. In June 1919 in the Reichswehr-Gruppenkommando 4, sponsored by the military, he was trained as a soldier, taking a “political re-education course for demobilizing soldiers after the Munich uprising.”[15] He joined the ‘Deutsche Arbeiter Partei’ in the summer of 1919, in which he soon took a leading role[16] meeting influential figures such as Alfred Rosenberg[17] and Dietrich Eckart[18]. In September 1919 he was chosen to answer a letter of Adolph Gemlich, in regard to the role of Jews in Germany, in the name of the Bavarian Reichswehr[19] - as Karl Mayr[20] considered him an “expert” on the question.[21]
While Hitler began to develop the culture of his speeches in 1920[22], which he explained later in Mein Kampf: „people are influenced less by the written word than by the spoken word“. Between April and August the Jew gradually became the focus of his discourses, until the 13th of August where he presented “Warum sind wir Antisemiten?”[23] Hitler, developing into a significant figure of the DAP, was a main transmitter of ideas of the party’s program[24] and was chosen chairman on July 29 1921, giving him ultimate authority.[25]In February 1924, the DAP was renamed the ‘National Sozialistische DAP’, publishing the “25-Punkte Programm” – in which Jews are firstly referred to as foreign.[26]  Points 4, 5, and 6, define a “Staatsbürger”, however clearly present the “Jude” as non-fitting to the German people: “Kein Jude kann daher Volksgenosse sein.”[27]
 


C.              Evaluation of Sources – 450 words
The ‘Gemlich Brief’, by Adolf Hitler, written on the 16 of September 1919.
Karl Mayr chose Hitler to reply to a letter aiming to clarify the so-called Jewish question to German soldier Adolph Gemlich[28] given Hitler was “so passionate” on the subject and “had done so well” in the military’s re-education course[29], and also because he was seen as an “expert regarding Karl Marx’s work ‘On the Jewish Question’”[30].  Written in Munich, it called for 'rational' anti-Semitism, respecting a planned idea of resolving the “Jewish Question” [31].  Rabbi Marvin Hier[32] declared it "[t]he most significant historic document ever acquired by the Simon Wiesenthal Center” as the first documented and published source in which Hitler displays anti-Semitism[33]. Written shortly after the initiation of Hitler’s political activities for the military, it already portrays extreme views later reflected in Nazism and his ’25-Punkte-Programm’. However, Hitler was ordered to write it[34], forcing him to respect certain boundaries and ideas followed by the military; this source thus is not a voluntary personal statement. Furthermore, it is argued that Hitler follows the diction resembling Gottfried Feder’s, to prove his rationalised presumptions scientifically, to be more persuasive, but also less reliable[35], as this possibly hints towards the weakness of his personal ideas.
‘Mein Kampf’ by  Adolf Hitler, published in Munich by the Eher Verlag in 1925.
Written whilst imprisoned in Landsberg Prison after the failure of the so-called “Hitlerputsch”, this source presents Hitler’s ideology in an almost autobiographical structure. The purpose was, as stated in the prologue, to “clarify the aims of the movement”, “sketch a picture of its development”, “depict his own development”[36], and portray his personal convictions about Germany and its National Socialist future, free of Jews[37]. He himself also addresses “not the foreign, but the followers of his movement” with his work[38]. Furthermore, he clearly positions himself as a right-wing, authoritarian leader with clear anti-Semitic aims. The date this piece was published is vital, showing that Hitler is attempting to build on the reputation gained from his Putsch. This is an “indispensable source”[39]  as it is one of Hitler’s few published works[40]. He highlights the origins of his anti-Semitism, thereby directly giving his answer to this investigation. However, it presents Hitler’s past and himself in a heroic manner[41]. Kershaw argues that it “is inaccurate in detail and coloured in interpretation.”[42]; being the leader of a radical political party will surely have led him to idealise the published ideas, aims, and visions. As Hitler dictated the book to his “loyal follower” Rudolf Hess[43], it is also argued that Hess “helped Hitler to write” Mein Kampf, and “made up for his lack of intelligence, oratorical ability or capacity for political intrigue by a dogged subservience and devotion to Hitler which was as naive as it was sincere.”[44]


D.             Analysis – 756 words
Hugh Trevor-Roper, the Author of Hitler’s first biography, regarded Hitler as a “mountebank” – “a figure of public life who practices his charlatanry from a public platform.”, without “real conviction”, which would make any of his actions and decisions inexplicable, as these would only be taken as a matter or popularity and power.[45]. Volker Ullrich supports this idea, by describing how he became a “radical anti-Semite” during the revolution in the Bavarian Räterepublik in Munich between 1918 and 1919, “which he experienced firsthand and first swung very far to the left, then back very far to the right.”[46]
However, Hit­­­­­­­­­ler himself claims his anti-Semitism began in Vienna when he “ceased to be a weak-kneed cosmopolitan and become an anti-Semite.”[47] Although there is “no direct evidence” for him being “virulently” anti-Semitic during these years[48], clearly it was then present in Vienna[49]. Anti-Semitism was a subject Hitler studied, led by four political figures[50] described as his “political models” who were all “radical anti-Semites.”[51] This was exacerbated by his rejection by the Academy of Applied Arts in 1909 which led to an intensification of his anti-Semitism[52] for which he blamed “the four of seven Jewish examiners who graded his drawings.”[53]  Indeed, Hitler sent a protesting letter to the director of the academy threatening “that the Jews will pay for this.”[54] Yet, this seems illogical if one considers how subsequently Hitler managed to have “amicable” relationships with Jews[55], also seen by the “warm correspondence with his family’s old Jewish doctor”[56], and Jews being the main buyers of his artwork[57].  Fischel argues that at Hitler’s arrival in Vienna “he was already receptive to the racist literature that permeated the right-wing circles” of the “Volkisch nationalist movement.”, therefore arguing that his time there only “strengthened” his anti-Semitism[58], proving “useful as an excuse to justify his personal failures”, but not initiating his “dämonisierung”[59].
Several factors support Fischel’s argument, beginning with the deaths within his family which were said to be the root of his anti-Semitic perspective through finding a responsible for these occurrences[60]. In 1907 due to mistreatment by Dr. Bloch, his beloved mother – who he would protect at every price[61] - died suffering unnecessarily. Bloch was seen as responsible[62], moreover the hate against Bloch is supposedly the origin of a global hatred against Jews[63]. The thankfulness of Hitler towards the doctor e.g.: “Your ever grateful patient Adolf Hitler”[64] is seen as “psychological substitution” for his anti-Semitism[65]; a personal automatism substituting his political convictions. Cornish argues that his hatred originates from Linz Realschule, through interaction with Jewish classmate Ludwig Wittgenstein[66]. Clearly, Hitler does not deny the influence of this relationship as he refers to him in the chapter “Die Judenfrage” of Mein Kampf: “In der Realschule lernte ich wohl einen jüdischen Knaben kennen, der von uns allen mit Vorsicht behandelt wurde,”[67]. In 1945, the “Anthropologische Commission“ discovered that Hitler was a “Bastard of a ­not very regarded Jew.” Apparently in primary school he was called a “Judenbengel,”[68] an idea Mein Kampf directly contradicts in which he argues that not until he was fourteen to fifteen he came across the word Jew, without seeing them differently from Germans until coming to Vienna[69].
It is the date of the fundamental Gemlich letter[70] which is remarkable, showing by that time a clear awareness of anti-Semitic ideas, yet it does not prove Hitler developed anti-Semitic ideas earlier, leading one to question why they were published in 1919. Weber claims his anti-Semitism developed during WWI[71], however his service in the war is known to have increased but not initiated it[72]. This idea is denied in Mein Kampf  in which Hitler argues that during the war he did not wear his Iron Cross (First Class), as it had been recommended by Hugo Guttmann, a “Jewish regimental adjutant”[73], described as "the most terrible coward. He has the Iron Cross, First Class. It was revolting.”[74] - it was an idea he was already convinced of.  Yet, the vast majority of his regiment in WWI were Jews with which he met no conflict[75]. Marks argues that his anti-Semitism initiated in 1919 and developed by 1921 through contact with Eckart and Rosenberg, “who discovered Hitler,” which lead him from an “angry but directionless young man” to a “virulent and politically successful racist rabble-rouser.”[76]  This is widely reflected in his speeches held in the Munich Hofbräuhaus from 1920, which articulated an Aryan culture, hatred against the Jews as a race, and solutions to their removal[77].


E.              Conclusion – 198 words
 Ullrich argues that anti-Semitism “was the core” of Hitler’s personality whose actions show him to have been “an obsessive anti-Semite” [78]. While Kershaw warns that we cannot be certain “precisely when and why Hitler became a pathological anti-Semite” [79], one can reasonably estimate how and when this initiated. Clearly he was in contact with Jews in his childhood, with classmates or his family doctor, however there seems to have been more of a general separation of Jews by the society at that stage, rather than a clear focussed developed hatred. Similarly was the influence that Hitler encountered in the trenches during the War, which was a general distinctive view on Jews he met but did not heavily pursue. As Mein Kampf and the Gemlich letter demonstrate, it was Hitler’s life in Vienna which contributed to his anti-Semitism; “before 1919 there is no reliable evidence of the hatred and hostility towards Jews of his later years.”[80] The Gemlich letter certainly shows that by September 1919, Hitler was already known as an expert in this domain, and that by 1920 he held open speeches, convincing audiences of his ideas, which developed further and more explicitly until the publication Mein Kampf.

F.     List of Sources:
"Historian Interview: New Book Explores Personal Charm of Hitler." SPIEGEL ONLINE. N.p., n.d. Web. 10 Nov. 2013.
Augstein, Rudolf. "Die Abstammung Hitlers." SPIEGEL-Verlag Rudolf Augstein GmbH & Co. KG [Hamburg] 1967, 31st ed. Print.
Berding, Helmut, and Olivier Mannoni. Histoire De L'antisémitisme En Allemagne. Paris: Ed. De La Maison Des Sciences De L'Homme, 1991. Print.
Bertin, Francis. Secret, Initiations Et Sociétés Modernes. Paris: L'Âge D'homme, 1991. Print.
Birzer, Tobias. Adolf Hitlers Aufstieg in Der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei. 2001: Universität Karlsruhe, n.d. Print.
Böckelmann, Janine. Politik Der Gemeinschaft: Zur Konstitution Des Politischen in Der Gegenwart. Bielefeld: Transcript, 2008. Print.
Bruppacher, Paul. Adolf Hitler Und Die Geschichte Der NSDAP: Eine Chronik. Norderstedt: on Demand, 2008. Print.
Cornish, Kimberley. The Jew of Linz: Wittgenstein, Hitler, and Their Secret Battle for the Mind. London: Century, 1998. Print.
Davidson, Eugene. The Making of Adolf Hitler: The Birth and Rise of Nazism. Columbia: University of Missouri, 1997. Print.
Degeorge, Gérard. Damas: Des Origines Aux Mamluks. Paris: L'Harmattan, 1997. Print.
Dorst, Tankred. Die Münchner Räterepublik. Zeugnisse Und Kommentar. (Frankfurt A.M.): Suhrkamp, 1968. Print.
Dupeux, Louis. Aspects Du Fondamentalisme National En Allemagne De 1890 À 1945: Et Essais Complémentaires. Strasbourg: Presses Universitaires De Strasbourg, 2001. Print.
Eberle, Henrik, and Hans-Joachim Neumann. War Hitler Krank?: Ein Abschließender Befund. Köln: Bastei Lübbe, 2011. Print.
Effects: An Analysis and Chronology of 1900 Years of Anti-Semitic Attitudes and Practices. New York: Philosophical Library, 1983. Print.
Fischel, Jack. Historical Dictionary of the Holocaust. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow, 1999. Print.
Fischel, Jack. The Holocaust. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1998. Print.
Fischer, Klaus P. Hitler & America. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2011. Print

Hamann, Brigitte. "Jews in Vienna." Hitler's Vienna: A Portrait of the Tyrant as a Young Man. London: Tauris Parke Paperbacks, 2010. Print.
Hitler, Adolf. Mein Kampf. München: Eher, 1925. Print.
Hoffmann, Barbara. Adolf Hitler - Die Anfänge 1889-1935. N.p.: GRIN Verlag, 2004. Print.
Housden, Martyn. Hitler: Study of a Revolutionary? London: Routledge, 2000. Print.
Kershaw, Ian. Hitler. New York: W.W. Norton, 1999. Print.
Kubizek, August. The Young Hitler I Knew. London: Greenhill, 2006. Print.
Lavroff, Dmitri Georges. Les Grandes Étapes De La Pensée Politique. Paris: Dalloz, 1993. Print.
Lennig, Arthur. Stroheim. Lexington: University of Kentucky, 2000. Print.
MacDonogh, Giles. 1938: Hitler's Gamble. New York: Basic, 2009. Print.
Maddison College. “The Madison Quarterly, Band 2”. 1942. Print
Marks, Steven G. How Russia Shaped the Modern World: From Art to Anti-semitism, Ballet to Bolshevism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2003.Print.
Marrus, Michael Robert. "Part 2: ´The Origins of the Holocaust." Nazi Holocaust. Westport, CT: Meckler, 1989. Print.
Neumann, Hans-Joachim, and Henrik Eberle. War Hitler Krank? Ein Abschliessender Befund. Bergisch Gladbach: Lübbe, 2009. Print.
Nicholls, David. Adolf Hitler: A Biographical Companion. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2000. Print.
Nicosia, Francis R. "The Weimar Years." Zionism and Anti-semitism in Nazi Germany. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2008. Print.
Petitfrère, Ray. Pas À Pas Avec Hitler [T. 1]. Paris: Presses De La Cité, 1973.  Print.
Phelps, Reginald H. Hitlers "grundlegende" Rede über Den Antisemitismus. N.p.: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag GmbH, Oct. 1968. Print.
Scharfstein, Sol, and Dorcas Gelabert. Understanding Jewish History. Hoboken, NJ: KTAV Pub. House, 1996. Print.
Schulz, Hans, Otto Basler, and Gerhard Strauss. Deutsches Fremdwörterbuch. Berlin: W. De Gruyter, 1995. Print.
Slozberg, Miriam. "The Poisonous Seed." Stars behind the Tortured Soul: Using Astrology to Heal past Life Memories of the Holocaust. San Francisco, CA: DreamSculpt Media, 2011. N. pag. Print.
Strauss, Herbert Arthur. Hostages of Modernization: Studies on Modern Antisemitism, 1870-1933/39. Berlin: W. De Gruyter, 1993.  Print.
Taguieff, Pierre-André. Introduction. La Judéophobie Des Modernes: Des Lumières Au Jihad Mondial. Paris: Jacob, 2008. Print.
Tofahrn, Klaus W. Das Dritte Reich Und Der Holocaust. Frankfurt Am Main: P. Lang, 2008. Print.
Tyson, J. H. Hitler's Mentor: Dietrich Eckart, His Life, times & Milieu. New York: IUniverse, 2008. Print.
Vander, Hook Sue. Adolf Hitler: German Dictator. Edina, MN: ABDO Pub., 2011. Print.
Verus, Americanus. "The Family Contribution." Adolf Hitler, Religionist: Naziism as a Genuine Religion. Bloomington, IN: IUniverse, 2010. Print.
Weber, Thomas. Hitler's First War: Adolf Hitler, the Men of the List Regiment, and the First World War. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2010. Print.
Welch, David. Hitler. London: UCL, 1998. Print.
Wistrich, Robert S. Who's Who in Nazi Germany. New York: Macmillan, 1982. Print.
Zalampas, Sherree Owens. Adolf Hitler: A Psychological Interpretation of His Views on Architecture, Art, and Music. Bowling Green, OH: Bowling Green University Popular, 1990. Print.
"| Simon Wiesenthal Center." | Simon Wiesenthal Center. N.p., n.d. Web. 10 Nov. 2013


Who Set Fire to the Reichstag?

A. Plan of the investigation  
The investigation assesses the crime of the Reichstag Fire on February 27th in 1933.[1] In order to examine and conclude who is to be held responsible for the fire, the investigation will briefly look at the essential role the fire played in Hitler’s rise to power and the consequences such as the Reichstag Fire Decree and the Enabling Act leading to an authoritarian state.[2] Additionally the origin of the fire and the reaction of the government will be considered to evaluate the responsibility of the Reichstag Fire. Evidence, which is to be analyzed includes primary sources such as Van Der Lubbe’s statement to the police, confessing his crime and German secondary sources such as “The Reichstag Fire” by Tobias Fritz and “Der Reichstagsbrand: die Karriere eines Kriminalfalls” by Sven Felix Kellerhoff, which confirm Marinus van der Lubbe’s sole responsibility based on his already existing criminal record.[3] Furthermore to gain a different perspective and to analyze primary evidence from the 1930’s, which was put together by William Shirer, an American journalist who was working in Germany at the time of the Reichstag Fire[4] in his book “The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich”. In contrast to Kellerhof, he puts the blame on the Nazis due to an underground passage to the Reichstag.[5] Nevertheless the search for the arsonist remains therefore the question that arises is, who is to blame for the burning of the Reichstag?  
Word count: 235 

B. Summary of Evidence  
On February 27th 1933 the Reichstag in Berlin was set ablaze.[6] This occurred while it was known that Hitler attended a dinner at Goebbels’s residence[7], from which “an underground passage” connected to the Reichstag was built[8]. Their meal was interrupted by an important  telephone call from Dr. Hanfstaengel stating that the Reichstag was on fire.[9] Following this message Hitler and Goebbels immediately made their way to the crime scene. Meanwhile President Hindenburg and the vice-chancellor Von Papen have also received the same notification and raced to the burning of the Reichstag straight away. [10]  The “night watchman Rudolf Scholz had started his customary round of inspection”[11] after the last meeting had taken place in the Reichstag. “At 20:30 he passed the Session Chamber” reassuring himself “that everything was in order”.[12]Additionally the Reichstag Postman, Willi Ott, who was also in the building around that time “had not noticed anything suspicious” either.[13] He was the last person to leave the Reichstag at about 20:55.[14] Shortly after 21:00, the theology student Hans Flöter passed by the southwestern side of the Reichstag on his way home from the State Library. A sound of breaking glass, which came from the Reichstag building, startled him. He immediately alerted the main staff sergeant Karl Buwert, claiming that he saw a figure holding a burning object.[15] At 21:10 another Student, who also claimed to have seen someone, perhaps even more than one person, notified the Brandenburg Gate Guard Station about the fire.[16] At 21:14 the first fire truck arrived.[17] Right after Lieutenant Lateit peeked into the Chamber of the Reichstag, he was convinced that only one person could not have started so many individual fires.[18] The right-winged political leaders where confident that the arsonist was a Communist.[19] This accusation was confirmed initially when  “the police arrested a young Dutch Communist, van der Lubbe, who was found in the deserted building in circumstances which left little doubt that he was responsible.”[20] It was 21:27. During van der Lubbe’s interrogation, the young man confessed that: “something absolutely had to be done in protest against this system. I considered arson a suitable method.”[21] Although Lubbe was blamed for the arson, some believe the Nazis exploited the fire to their advantage as they introduced an Emergency decree to suspend civil rights.[22] Despite this decree the Nazis failed to get a majority in the March Election.[23] The Enabling act on March 5th in 1933 was introduced, to effectively dissolve the Reichstag and ban all Communist parties.[24]  
Word count: 415 

C. Evaluation of sources  
Kellerhof, Sven Felix. "Die Brandstiftung." Der Reichstagsbrand Die Karriere Eines       Kriminalfalls. Berlin-Brandenburg: Be.bra Verlag GmbH, 2008. Print.  
This source was written by a German journalist in 2008[25],providing a detailed analysis of the Reichstag Fire. Regarding his academics, he studied modern and ancient history, media law and journalism.[26] As the renowned historian Hans Mommsen explains in the preface, Kellerhof aims to analyze the origins as well as the procedure of the fire, the arsonist’s confession and the consequences of this crime in order to support his argument of the sole perpetration of Marinus van der Lubbe.[27] The source is valuable because the author gives the reader a reliable representation of events[28]in favor of Marinus van der Lubbe being solely responsible for the fire. The source is also valuable because as a journalist, Kellerhof had the access to a variety of German files such as archives and newspapers from 1933 to evidence that the Dutchman was the only arsonist. Since the source was written in 2008, more evidence and research opportunities were available for the journalist. Additionally well-known historians such as Fritz Tobias and Hans Mommsen support his theory and according to Mommsen he examines the events in an unbiased manner.[29] However this source also has limitations because the Kellerhof based his work on the historian Fritz Tobias, who according to Hans Schneider, active for the Institute for Contemporary History is known for manipulating his evidence to prove his point of Marinus van der Lubbe acting alone.[30] This portrays itself as one of the major limitations of the source as it is to a significant extent based on false information, meaning that the source includes personal theories and shortened quotes.[31] 

Shirer, William L. "The Nazification of Germany:1933-34." The Rise and Fall of the Third           Reich; a History of Nazi Germany. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960. Print.  
This source was written by an American journalist and first published in 1960, with the purpose of providing a historical interpretation and an analysis of the Third Reich[32], including Hitler’s origins and early life, rise to and consolidation of power and the course of the second world war.[33]  The source is valuable because the author of the book lived and worked as a reporter during the Third Reich in Germany and therefore he has witnessed the former situation.[34] As a journalist located in Germany between 1934 and 1940 Shirer had the access to a range of secret archives and the opportunity to interview political or military leaders of that time.[35] Even though the title of the work indicates that the analysis of the Third Reich is rather general than specifically focused on the Reichstag Fire it is valuable because the work sets the Reichstag Fire into context. In addition Shirer backs up his facts with the evidence and the testimony of the Nuremberg trials, numerous footnotes and thorough research, making the source valuable with regard to the topic of the Reichstag Fire.[36] However the source is limited, as Shirer was a journalist and not an academic historian, he may have lacked in skills to produce a detailed account based on the evidence he has used. This source may also be slightly out of date, as more recent research might have made his interpretation of the Third Reich less relevant.   
Word Count: 503 

 D. Analysis  
It is important to consider the context of the burning of the Reichstag, as it catalyzed several reactions such as the Reichstag Fire Decree, the Enabling Act and ultimately Hitler’s rise to power, giving rise to the question of who was responsible for this crime. There are three main arguments, which are debated until today; these include the involvement of the Nazis, the sole guilt of Marinus van der Lubbe and whether or whether not the crime had been a communist plot.  
The Nazi involvement in the Reichstag Fire is supported by the fact that the Nazis built an underground passage to the Reichstag in which storm troopers dispersed “gasoline and self-igniting chemicals”[37] on the night of the arson under the order of the S.A leader Karl Ernst. Even though the locksmith Herr Wingurth declared that the tunnel into the Reichstag had many locked doors, which where found to be closed after the fire, one must know that the Nazis have asked him to advocate their innocence at the Nuremberg Trials.[38] Even the official of the Prussian Ministry testified at the Nuremberg trials that Goebbels had the initial idea of burning down the Reichstag.[39] Additionally General Franz Halder witnessed Goering shouting "The only one who really knows about the Reichstag is I, because I set it on fire!"[40] However Goering denied his participation in the Fire at the Nuremberg Trials. It seems most reasonable blaming the Nazis for the burning of the Reichstag as according to Seftan Delmer “the fire was started by the Nazis, who used the incident as a pretext to outlaw political opposition and impose dictatorship.”[41]   
Furthermore Shirer, who worked as a reporter during the Third Reich in Germany and had access to firsthand information,[42] argues that Van der Lubbe was a “godsend to the Nazis.”[43] He was used as a scapegoat by the Nazis and “encouraged to try to set the Reichstag on fire.”[44] At the trial at Leipzig enough evidence suggested that van der Lubbe “did not possess the means to set so vast a building on fire so quickly.”[45] The testimony of experts at the trial shows that more than one person must have set the fire, as such a widespread fire would have required large quantities of chemicals and gasoline. It was therefore obvious “that one man could not have carried them into the building alone.”[46]   However the van der Lubbe, who already had a criminal record[47], has attempted a several times earlier to arson different buildings [48] in order to protest against the German government.  These failures could have encouraged the 24-year old Communist to aim other sites such as in this case the Reichstag. 
Additionally van der Lubbe was caught with “flammable materials”, “sweating” and “breathing heavily” during his interrogation as if he just came from the crime scene.[49] Lubbe’s behavior during his interrogation and his items he was carrying with him clearly show that he had to do something with the Fire. Why otherwise would he have carried around flammable materials on that particular day? Furthermore Kellerhof supports the theory of van der Lubbe being solely responsible for the fire as an own initiative to protest against the German system.[50] He claims that a few flammable materials would have been enough to conduct the fire in the Reichstag alone, as the breaking of the glass of the dome of the Reichstag encouraged the contact between fire and oxygen, spreading the fire even more.[51] This is also supported by  Dr. Walter Zirpnis claiming at the Nuremberg trials that van der Lubbe acted by himself[52], even though Ernst Togler, Dimitroff, Popov and Tanev gave themselves up to the police. They only did this as a trigger to the police’s announcement to hang Marinus van der Lubbe.[53]  
Word count: 625

E. Conclusion  
The Nazi Party had strong motives to set the Reichstag on fire because this event allowed them to arrest more than 4000 communists and this crime occurred coincidentally right before the Reichstag elections.[54] Additionally Nazi generals and members themselves declared several times that they were involved in this crime act, however at the Nuremberg trials they denied what they have said. This change in statements questions the reliability of the declarations the Nazis made at court. After examining different sources, I think Shirer’s argument that the Nazis were involved in the fire is the most reasonable as this even gave Hitler the power of a dictator. Furthermore it seems plausible that Marinus van der Lubbe was used a scapegoat by the Nazis to cover up their guilt.[55] Although due to the growing Bolshevik revolution it could have been possible for the Reichstag Fire to have been a plot organized by the KPD, the German Communist Party or Lubbe acting alone, the Nazis had the most plausible intentions in setting the fire.  
Word count: 171 

F. Sources  
Bahar, Alexander, and Wilfried Kugel. Der Reichstagsbrand: Wie Geschichte Gemacht Wird. Berlin: n.p., 2011. Print.  Bullock, Alan. Hitler: A Study in Tyranny. New York: Harper & Row, 1962. Print.  Evans, Richard J. The Coming of the Third Reich. New York: Penguin, 2004. Print.  Fergusson, Gilbert. A Blueprint for Dictatorship: Hitler's Enabling Law of March 1933. Vol.            40. [S.l.]: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1964. Print.  Giblin, James. "11. One Nation, One Party, One Führer." The Life and Death of Adolf Hitler.       New York: Clarion, 2002. Print.  Gisevius, Hans Bernd, and Richard Winston. To the Bitter End. Boston: Houghton Mifflin,       1947. Print.  Irving, David John Cawdell. Göring: A Biography. New York: Morrow, 1989. Print.  Kellerhof, Sven Felix. "Die Brandstiftung." Der Reichstagsbrand Die Karriere Eines       Kriminalfalls. Berlin-Brandenburg: Be.bra Verlag GmbH, 2008. Print.  Kershaw, Ian. Hitler. New York: W.W. Norton, 1999. Print.  Lewis, Jon E. The Mammoth Book of How It Happened. New York: Carrol & Graf, 2006.         Print.  Manvell, Roger, and Heinrich Fraenkel. Doctor Goebbels, His Life and Death. London:       Heinemann, 1960. Print.  Rosenfeld, Gavriel D. "The Reception of William L. Shirer's The Rise and Fall of the Third       Reich in the United States and West Germany,1960-62." UCSB Department of History.           The Regents of the University of California, n.d. Web. 5 Feb. 2013.  Schneider, Hans, and Dieter Deiseroth. Neues Vom Reichstagsbrand?: Eine Dokumentation :       Ein Versäumnis Der Deutschen Geschichtsschreibung. Berlin: BWV Berliner Wiss.-Verl.,       2004. Print.  Shirer, William L. "The Nazification of Germany:1933-34." The Rise and Fall of the Third       Reich; a History of Nazi Germany. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960. Print.  Stackelberg, Roderick, and Sally Anne. Winkle. The Nazi Germany Sourcebook: An       Anthology of Texts. London: Routledge, 2002. Print.  The Enabling Act of 23 March 1933. N.p.: Administration of the German Bundestag, Mar.         2006. PDF.  Tobias, Fritz. "The Criminal Case." The Reichstag Fire. New York: Putnam, 1964.Print.  Ottaway, Susan. Hitler's Traitors. Barnsley, South Yorkshire: L. Cooper, 2003. Print.  Welch, David. Hitler. London: UCL, 1998. Print. 

 Was Hitler responsible for the assassination of Engelbert Dollfuss?



SECTION A: PLAN OF THE INVESTIGATION

This investigation will be exploring whether or not Hitler ordered the assassination of Engelbert Dollfuss. To do so, a variety of sources from newspapers of the time to recent works by recognised experts will be consulted. Chief among these will be Kershaw, whose expertise of Hitler has been highly acknowledged here in Germany, through his informative work on Hitler. As well as Kershaw, Shirer will be of crucial use due to his experience as an American reporter in Berlin and Vienna from 1934 until 1940. As a result of Shirer’s first-hand experience of the lead up as well as the beginning of the Second World War, he has the advantage of being able to portray the Third Reich in great detail and the hindsight that came along with the access to German documents after the end of the war.


Word Count: 139

SECTION B: SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE
Beginning his career as a secretary of the Lower Austrian Farmers League, Engelbert Dollfuss became Chancellor of Austria and Foreign Minister by 20 May 1932 [1]. Dollfuss was very opposed to the beliefs of the Nazi Party and Hitler’s Anschluss, which is probably what led to his friendship with the Italian dictator, Benito Mussolini [2]. Shortly after Dollfuss accepted the role of Chancellor [3], he followed Mussolini’s lead and became a dictatorial power himself. As they were both against the Nazi beliefs [4], Mussolini and Dollfuss schemed in secret ways to prevent the Nazis from rising anymore to power. Their “K plan” was simple: Austria would act as the go-between for Mussolini [5]. Following his assumption of Chancellorship of Austria, Dollfuss banned the Nazi Party from Austria in June 1933 [6] “driving the movement underground” [7]. In response to the Socialist movement that occurred shortly after his admission to office in February 1943 [8] , and as a result of his abuse of the emergency decree much like Hitler, Dollfuss turned Austria into an austrofascist state. During his rule as a dictator, he was viewed by many, in particular the NSDAP and the Social Democrats, with much aversion.     

In February 1934, the Social Democrats staged an uprising to try and overthrow the Austrian government [9]. This attempt was terminated through the use of military force and led to many of the Social Democrat leaders being imprisoned [10]. Although it was the Social Democrats who staged the uprising against the Austrian Government, it was the Austrian Nazis in June 1934 who began a civil war against the government [11]. On 25 July 1934, 154 members of SS Standarte 89 invaded the Federal Chancellery disguised as officers of the Heimwehr (Fascist Home Guard) and fatally shot the Austrian Chancellor in the neck and armpit [12]. They left him to lie in pain without any sort of medical help for seven hours, after which Dollfuss died. In spite of the fact that Dollfuss had died, the Austrian army remained loyal to their government and so, led by Dr Kurt von Schuschnigg, they put an end to the attempted coup d’état [13]. Soon after Dollfuss’ assassination, Mussolini found out and angrily claimed to Starhemberg, Austrian Vice Chancellor, that Hitler was to blame for it [14].     

In order to avenge his ally’s death, Mussolini threatened to declare war on Hitler if he attempted to try to invade and take control of Austria [15]. Mussolini publicised his intentions towards keeping Austria an independent country shortly thereafter [16]. Upon seeing Mussolini’s reaction to Dollfuss’ death, Hitler made sure to deny any ties he may have had in regards to the murder of the Austrian Chancellor and declared his innocuousness in the whole matter. To further prove his innocence, Hitler banned Dollfuss’ assassins from Germany, and they were later tried and hanged for the assassination of Engelbert Dollfuss [17]. Hitler’s contribution to Dollfuss’ murder was never fully determined and the actual individual responsible for his assassination has never been ascertained, with multiple accounts providing different sources of evidence that is not necessarily accurate. Mussolini was adamant that Hitler was to blame for Dollfuss’ murder; however, whether or not his theory is true has yet to be determined. Based on the German Chancellor’s actions following Dollfuss’ murder, it seems quite likely that he is to blame, however this could be argued due to the lack of evidence.



Word Count: 604


 SECTION C: EVALUATION OF SOURCES


Kershaw, Ian. Hitler. New York: W.W. Norton, 1999. Print.


Kershaw is a world-renowned historian whose expertise is the Third Reich. The purpose of the biography is to provide a background and source-based account of Hitler’s life and career, described by him as “a study of Hitler’s power”. The value of this source is that he has access to a substantial range of sources, primary as well as secondary, on which he bases many of his conclusions. As well as this, Kershaw has the benefit of hindsight with which to be able to impartially judge many of the events that transpired. Kershaw examines Dollfuss’ assassination from Hitler’s perspective, which is useful in its provision of information of the extent at which the German dictator was aware of the staged coup d’état. The limitations of this source, however, are that it is a condensed edition and therefore may be lacking information that would have possibly been considered as lacking importance. Another limitation of Kershaw is that, as he was born in 1943, he doesn’t have the benefit of having experienced the reaction provoked by the assassination of Dollfuss, whereas Shirer does.
Word Count: 180

Shirer, William L. The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich; a History of Nazi Germany. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960. Print.


Shirer, having been present in Berlin during the assassination of Dollfuss as an American journalist writing about the rise of the Reich, is famous for being known as “a witness to history rather than a professional historian”. The purpose of his work is to chronicle the events affiliated with the rise of the third Reich under the rule of Hitler. As Shirer was in Germany at the time of Dollfuss’ murder, his work has particular value due to the access the journalist had upon German defeat, of the countless sources of German documents. Another value of Shirer’s work is that, as a result of its publishing being in 1960, the author has the benefit of hindsight to support the authenticity of his opinions on the causes as well as effects of the events. The limitations of Shirer’s work is that, as he originally was a journalist, he takes a journalistic point of view on the events, and therefore conclusions he has reached may be based more on a purpose of entertainment rather than informing.


Word Count:  174
SECTION D: ANALYSIS

Following Engelbert Dollfuss’ assassination by the Austrian Nazis on 25 July 1934, the blame immediately fell onto Hitler. Upon hearing of the Austrian Chancellor’s death, Mussolini is known for having angrily declared to Starhemberg, “Hitler is the murderer of Dollfuss” [18]. As well as this, Mussolini threatened Hitler if he attempted to make any move towards claiming Austria [19]. Due to Mussolini’s angry outburst and the ironic convenience the situation provided for Hitler, considering that Dollfuss was the person standing in the way of Hitler’s policies of Anschluss, naturally Hitler received the blame for the occurrence. When referring to the assassination Kershaw states “Hitler was aware of it, and gave his approval” [20], however “on the basis of a flawed understanding” [21], whilst Shirer explains how, according to Wagner’s granddaughter, the news of Dollfuss’ assassination “greatly excited” Hitler [22].     
Considering the situation at the time, Kershaw’s theory seems quite plausible as “Hitler did seem intent on seeing Austria’s Chancellor, the pro-Mussolini Engelbert Dollfuss, removed from office, and on having Nazis installed in the Austrian government” [23], however murdering Dollfuss would not have been in his best intentions, taking into account the alliance he was trying to procure with Mussolini. Mussolini and Dollfuss were known for having a close relationship and so, if Hitler wanted to forge an alliance with Italy, the assassination of Dollfuss would have been detrimental to his purpose. Kershaw speaks of Hitler’s reaction to finding out of the assassination of Dollfuss, “Papen found Hitler in a near-hysterical state, denouncing the idiocy of the Austrian Nazis for landing him in such a mess” [24], strengthening the argument that Hitler’s intention had only been to remove Dollfuss from power rather than murdering him, and therefore causing “damage to relations with Italy” [25].     
Shirer’s argument, however, seems also reasonable. Dollfuss was the only figure standing in between Hitler and his aims of Anschluss; it seemed in tone with his goals for Hitler to have wanted to somehow eradicate the problem the Austrian Chancellor created for him. An Italian historian, Franco Selleri, agrees with Kershaw saying, “Hitler fa assassinare il cancelliere austriaco Dollfuss con il chiaro intento di annettersi l’Austria”, the literal translation being “Hitler had the Austrian Chancellor Dollfuss assassinated with the clear intention to annex Austria” [26]. Most historians support Shirer’s perspective on the responsibility of Hitler for assassinating Engelbert Dollfuss, due to the fact that Dollfuss was preventing Hitler’s aims being accomplished. Public opinion at the time of the assassination was also in favour of blaming Hitler, which is shown through the New York Times explicitly mentioning, “Revolt is laid to Hitler” [27].
Word Count: 459



SECTION E: CONCLUSION


Both Kershaw and Shirer agree that Hitler was aware of and supported the Austrian Nazis coup d’état that later turned into the Austrian Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss’ assassination. Kershaw states that Hitler’s understanding of the coup d’état was based on a misunderstanding, and had originally believed that the coup d’état had resulted in Dollfuss’ removal from office, later realising that it had progressed into a murder. However, as Shirer explains, it seems unlikely that Hitler was aware of the coup d’état, had furnished the Austrian Nazis with the weapons required to stage their rebellion and had been misled on the aspect of Dollfuss’ assassination. By playing such an influential role in the progression of the rebellion it seems implausible that Hitler wouldn’t have been prepared for or had expected the assassination of the Austrian Chancellor during the process of maintaining power in the Federal Chancellery, meaning Hitler was responsible for the assassination of Engelbert Dollfuss.


Word Count: 154


SECTION F: LIST OF SOURCES
-       Bell, P. M. H. The Origins of the Second World War in Europe. London: Longman, 1986. Print.  -       Blamires, Cyprian, and Paul Jackson. World Fascism: A Historical Encyclopedia. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2006. Print.  -       Burgwyn, H. James. Italian Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period, 1918-1940. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997. Print.  -       Burleigh, Michael. The Third Reich: A New History. New York: Hill and Wang, 2001. Print.  -       Corvaja, Santi, and Robert Miller. Hitler & Mussolini the Secret Meetings. New York: Enigma, 2012. Print.  -       "Dollfuss Assassination...." Timothy Hughes - Rare & Early Newspapers. N.p., n.d. Web.  -       He, Fengshan, and Monto Ho. My Forty Years as a Diplomat. Pittsburgh, PA: Dorrance Pub., 2010. Print.  -       Kemp, Arthur. March of the Titans: A History of the White Race. Burlington, IA: Ostara, 2006. Print.  -       Kershaw, Ian. Hitler. New York: W.W. Norton, 1999. Print.  -       Lightbody, Bradley. The Second World War: Ambitions to Nemesis. London: Routledge, 2004. Print.  -       Lowe, C. J., and F. Marzari. Italian Foreign Policy, 1870-1940. London: Routledge & Paul, 1975. Print.  -       Mallett, Robert. Mussolini and the Origins of the Second World War: 1933 - 1940. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. Print.  -       Noakes, Jeremy, and Geoffrey Pridham. Nazism, 1919-1945. Vol. 3. Exeter, England: U of Exeter, 1983. Print.  -       Sachar, Howard Morley. The Assassination of Europe, 1918-1942: A Political History. N.p.: n.p., n.d. Print.  -       Selleri, Franco. Fisica Senza Dogma: La Conoscenza Scientifica Tra Sviluppo E Regressione. Bari: Dedalo, 1989. Print.  -       Shell, Kurt Leo. The Transformation of Austrian Socialism. Albany: State U of New York, 1962. Print.  -       Shirer, William L. The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich; a History of Nazi Germany. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960. Print.  -       Waldheim, Kurt. The Austrian Example. Trans. Ewald Osers. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973. Print.

 What motivated foreign SS divisions to fight the Battle of Berlin when the war was already lost?

Part A – Plan of the Investigation  
What motivated foreign SS divisions to fight the Battle of Berlin when the war was already lost?  To understand the mindset of these soldiers, I will analyze the recruitment process and development of the formations. The scope will be limited to foreign SS divisions that took part in the Battle of Berlin.  Two of the sources used in this investigation, Hitler’s Empire: Nazi Rule in Occupied Germany by Mark Mazower and Reichsführer-SS Himmlers speech held in Kharkov, 1944. As I focused this investigation primarily on the divisions involved in the battle for Berlin, Mazower provided a valuable source.  Another resource I investigated is NS music and the role the lyrics played in the motivation of foreign SS divisions. Laying particular focus on the notorious Horst Wessel Lied and analyzing how the lyrics were modified for the use in France, as well as considering the insignia and uniforms of the foreign divisions. In addition I shall visit the Reichstag in Berlin which was primarily defended by the Charlemagne division.

Part B – Summary of Evidence  
In 1929 Himmler massively expanded the SS and boosted the number of troops to 150.000 when the war began.[1] Before the invasion of the Soviet Union, Hitler combined the SS-VT, LSSAH and all armed units of the SS-TV into the Waffen-SS.[2]  During the late 1930s, Himmler was facing increasing recruitment difficulties, as the Wehrmacht possessed exclusive conscription rights within Germany. In August 1940, soon after the invasion of the Nordic states, Hitler therefore authorised the recruitment of ethnic Germans and Germanic populations within all newly occupied regions. Obergruppenführer Gottlob Berger, with the collaboration and support of the governments of the respective countries began heavy recruitment. At this time, volunteers would only be accepted if they complied with the Nazi doctrine.[3]  After the horrendous losses at Stalingrad in 1943, Himmler was no longer able to rely on German volunteers alone and expanded the recruitment throughout Europe. The SS Hauptamt prepared a specially tailored program for each national or ethnic group[4].  Many of these divisions not only shared ideologies but during the 1930s many European fascist groups adapted the Horst Wessel Lied to appeal to their soldiers. The song itself, written by SA commander Horst Wessel is known to have been very effective in encouraging the masses[5]. 
 By the end of the war, some 500.000 foreigners served in the SS and outnumbered native Germans[6]. Western nationalities made up roughly 125.000 most of which were volunteers joining to acquire status, glory or material benefits[7]. French SS consisted primarily of right wing intellectuals, workers and reactionary aristocrats, united by their ferocious anti-Communism[8]. Most non-German SS men were eastern Europeans who were either conscripted or coerced into the SS[9] and “fought primarily for the independence of their countries”[10]. However, the official ideological goal of the SS was never to stir pan European nationalistic feelings but “to subordinate [the] national ideal to… the German Reich”[11] and operate the SS merely for the benefit of Germany.  The largest non-German SS formations that are historically verified to have taken part in the battle of Berlin (not scattered troops) are: 11th SS Volunteer Panzergrenadier Division Nordland (attached to LVI Panzer Corps)[12], 23rd SS Volunteer Panzer Grenadier Division Nederland (attached to XI SS Panzer Corps),[13] 33rd Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS Charlemagne[14],15th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS[15], Waffen Grenadier Regiment of the SS (attached to III Germanic SS Panzer Corps).  
Whilst German soldiers and civilians fled Berlin en masse, foreign soldiers were ready to die in the Ruins of the Third Reich [16]. The SS Charlemagne were the only reinforcements arriving during late April. By April 28, the Charlemagne Sturmbataillon destroyed 62 of 108 Soviet tanks in the southeast sector of Berlin alone. Latvian, French, and a “large portion of foreign SS” were among the last to defend the government district.[17]

Part C – Evaluation of Sources  
Hitler’s Empire: Nazi Rule in Occupied Germany by Mark Mazower is a straightforward historical text, dedicating a large section to the Nazi recruitment of foreign SS soldiers, laying particular focus on the Charlemagne division that was the last to fight in the battle of Berlin. It is part of extensive research done by the British historian Mazower about the Second World War. It is said to be “a tireless, immensely valuable reassessment of the entire Nazi edifice and its breakdown”[18]. The text is written to describe and inform about the racial contradictions under NS rule and evaluate Germany’s downfall.[19]  The author uses primary documents, such as illustrations and unpublished accounts on which he founds his understanding of the foreign SS. It gives a generalized insight into the mentality and structural organization of the troops, especially the SS Charlemagne[20]. In addition he has been able through the use of retrospect and evidence that has become accessible in the last decades to gain a much more sophisticated understanding of the downfall of the NS regime. Although Mazower devotes a sizeable part of his book to the SS, in particular the foreign divisions Hitler’s Empire: Nazi Rule in Occupied Germany was primarily written to offer an understanding of the downfall of Germany under Hitler and the NS regime.  
The second source is a speech held by SS Reichsführer Heinrich Himmler on January 28, 1944.  The purpose of the speech was to administer the creation of specialized training modules in order to allow soldiers of different ethnicities and nationalities to serve in the SS. It marks a change in the SS recruitment, which used to forbid the enlistment of men that failed to meet Nazi regulations to qualify as Aryan[21]. At the same time, it shows Himmler’s longing for more military control and shows Germany’s increasing desperation to replace its dwindling manpower. [22]  Therefore the speech is important as it shows that SS recruitment was willing to acquire people’s loyalty by dropping racist or prejudicial Nazi doctrine.  However, the speech cannot be taken entirely as matter of fact, as by 1944 the outcome of the war had become apparent and Germany was merely trying to prolong her war efforts through the call for man power, even cannon fodder.[23]

Part D – Analysis  
If Mazower is right in asserting that foreign volunteers in the SS fought until the end simply "out of the desperation of men who had nothing to return to,"[24] what motivated them to join is of utmost importance if one is to understand their presence in the first place. Although many joined due to ideological conviction, this was not always centered on Nazi belief. Before the invasion of Russia began in June 1941, Himmler further extended his recruitment program to the Baltics and Eastern countries.[25] He changed the ideological focal point for these new recruits from Aryan supremacy (Slavs being seen as 'inferior') to their common struggle against Bolshevism which Mazower was effective as many had “suffered at the Bolsheviks’ hands” prior to the German occupation.[26] This is supported by Beevor who states “these volunteers ready to die in the ruins of the Third Reich were all fanatical anti-Bolsheviks, whether they believed in New Europe or `viedle France'”. Himmler’s recruitment strategy was to exploit the fears and anxieties of those directly in the path of the red army[27]. This can be seen in the recruitment posters used in the eastern countries[28]. However Nazi recruitment posters played on anti-Bolshevism even in the western countries from Scandinavia, Netherlands and Latvia respectively, all of which had strong anti-Russian sentiments before and during the war.[29]  In addition the anti-Bolshevik tone is supported in the marching music of the different divisions. When analyzing the various translations of the Horst Wessel Lied, one finds the shared themes of pride, glory and comradeship. Whilst the original German version primarily focuses in the victory over the Rotfront,[30] the French version's violent and aggressive lyrics begin “we shall smite the Jews and the Marxists”[31]. This anti-communist theme continues as they sing “We shall avenge our brothers killed by them”[32], hostile lyrics echoing La Marseillaise and therefore speak to the French divisions rather than directly translating the German lyrics. Such changes suggest that each division fought for the glory of their own country and to fend off a common threat rather than welcome a German leadership.  
Another large percentage of eastern recruits fought for purely nationalistic reasons, hoping their countries would be granted some form of autonomy in Hitler’s post-war Europe. Mazower states that Hitler had ruled out political autonomy for the Baltic countries in November 1943.[33] However as Himmler feared this would jeopardize his recruitment efforts, Hitler’s decision was not made public[34]. The Baltic divisions were not volunteers in direct sense of Western or Nordic volunteers. In the Baltics, primarily Latvia and Estonia, Germany had denied them their own military so volunteers and existing armed formations joined the Wehrmacht, later being forced into the SS. These transferred conscripts saw themselves as nationalists fighting for their countries as seen by the names given to their divisions- Nordland, Nederland, Latvian, etc.[35] It is telling that the Ukrainians, denied any notion of self-determination and to whom arming was described as "idiocy" by Hitler as late as March 1945, were simply designated Galician.  The divisions that fought in Berlin shared their struggle against Bolshevism. Their prospects should they surrender was torture and annihilation[36]. Most of these troops were not fundamental Nazis, but extremely patriotic and had anti-Bolshevistic sentiments[37]. “Later, the few foreign SS volunteers who survived tried to rationalize their doomed battle as the need to provide an anti-Bolshevik example for the future”[38]. Beevor tells of “an extraordinary comradeship of the damned had grown up among the foreign volunteers defending the last bastion of German nationalism”[39].





Part E – Conclusion  
The primary reason why these foreign SS divisions fought in the Battle of Berlin can be found in their ideological history. The Scandinavian and Dutch divisions consisted of volunteers that believed they were fighting alongside their ally in a struggle against Imperial Russia.[40] The Latvian division, fought to gain post-war autonomy from Russia and could therefore not surrender to the Red Army. The French and Bulgarian divisions were made up of right-wing intellectuals, aristocrats and supporters of the Nazi regime. Regardless of their personal goal, its soldiers could not surrender to either side without the risk of being tortured or executed.[41] All of these divisions had been exclusively fighting the Red Army throughout the war, and saw their struggle as a bulwark against the archenemy of Bolshevism.[42] The Latvian, French and Bulgarian formations especially, could not hope to survive after surrendering to either side and were therefore determined to fight Russia until the end.


Part F – Bibliography  
Books  Baxter, Ian. Into the Abyss: The Last Years of the Waffen SS 1943-45 : A Photographic  History. Solihull, England: Helion &, 2006. Print.  Beevor, Antony. Berlin: The Downfall, 1945. Australia: Penguin, 2003. Print.  Dželetović, Ivanov Pavle. 21. SS-divizija Skenderbeg. Beograd: Nova Knjiga, 1987. Print.  Kallis, Aristotle A. Nazi Propaganda and the Second World War. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. Print.  Littlejohn, David. Foreign Legions of the Third Reich, Vol 1: Norway, Denmark, France. San José: R. James Bender Publ., :. Print  Littlejohn, David. Foreign Legions of the Third Reich. Vol 3: Albania, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Hungary and Yugoslavia. San Jose, Californien: R. James Bender, 1985. Print.  Littlejohn, David. Foreign Legions of the Third Reich. Vol.2: Belgium, Great Britain, Holland, Italy and Spain. San José, Californien: R.James Bender, 1981. Print.  Littlejohn, David. Foreign Legions of the Third Reich, Vol.4: Poland, the Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania, Free India, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland and Russia. San Josè, Californien: R. James Bender Publ., 1987. Print.  Mazower, Mark. Hitler's Empire Nazi Rule in Occupied Europe. London: Penguin, 2009. Print.  McNab, Chris. World War II Data Book: the SS, 1923-45. London: Amber, 2009. Print.  Murdoch, Brian. Fighting Songs and Warring Words: Popular Lyrics of Two World Wars. London: Routledge, 1990. Print.  Parrish, Michael. The Lesser Terror: Soviet State Security : 1939 - 1953. Westport, Conn. [u.a.: Praeger, 1996. Print.  Rigg, Bryan Mark. Hitler's Jewish Soldiers: the Untold Story of Nazi Racial Laws and Men of Jewish Descent in the German Military. Lawrence, Kan.: University of Kansas, 2002. Print.  Stackelberg, Roderick, and Sally Anne. Winkle. The Nazi Germany Sourcebook: An Anthology of Texts. London: Routledge, 2002. Print.  Stein, George. Waffen-SS: Hitler's Élite Guard at War, 1939-1945. Bristol: Cerberus, 2002. Print.  Steiner, Felix. Die Freiwilligen Der Waffen-SS: Idee Und Opfergang. Rosenheim: Dt. Verlagsges., 1992. Print.  Trigg, Jonathan. Hitler's Flemish Lions: the History of the 27th SS-Freiwilligen Grenadier Division Langemarck (Flämische Nr. 1). Stroud [England: Spellmount, 2007. Print.  Trigg, Jonathan. Hitler's Gauls: the History of the 33rd Waffen-Grenadier Division, Der SS (Französische Nr 1) Charlemagne. Stroud: Spellmount, 2006. Print.  Welch, David. The Third Reich: Politics and Propaganda. London: Routledge, 1993. Print.  Weinberg, Gerhard L. A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II. Cambridge [England: Cambridge UP, 1994. Print.  Werther, Steffen. Dänische Freiwillige in Der Waffen-SS. Berlin: WVB, Wiss. Verl., 2004. Print.  Winchester, Charles, and Charles Winchester. Hitler's War on Russia. Oxford, U.K.: Osprey, 2007. Print.  
Online  "Antony Beevor | Berlin The Downfall 1945." Antony Beevor | Home. Web. 30 Jan. 2012. .  "Antony Beevor, Berlin 1945. Das Ende." Arlindo Correia's Home Page. Web. 13 Nov. 2011. .  "Die Fahne Hoch." / Horst Wessel Lied / Horst Wesselliedfree Midi Mp3 Download Strand Hotel Sechelt Bed Breakfast. Deutsche Volkslieder. Web. 15 Mar. 2012. .  "Europaische Freiwillige - Marches And Songs Of The Waffen SS Europe." Nazi.org. Web. 23 Feb. 2012. .  "Hitler's Empire: How The Nazis Ruled Europe." Indigo. 2010. Web. 18 Jan. 2012. .  Thomas Darnstädt, Klaus Wiegrefe. "DER SPIEGEL 13/2002 - Vater, Erschieß Mich!" SPIEGEL ONLINE - Nachrichten. Web. 30 Jan. 2012. .  Pipes, Jason. "Research on the German Armed Forces 1918-1945." Feldgrau.com - The German Armed Forces 1919-1945. Web. 16 Oct. 2011. .  Willemar, Wilhelm. "The German Defense of Berlin." Naval History and Heritage Command. Web. 02 Nov. 2011. .  
Speech  "Reichsführer-SS Himmler at Kharkov, April 1934." 27 Oct. 2011. Speech.  "Reichsführer-SS Himmler Auf Der Tagung Der RPA-Leiter Am 28. Januar 1944." 25 O




Did Hitler Have Parkinson's Disease? 

A.Plan of Investigation

Hitler’s decision to invade Russia 66 years ago shocked not only the Russians with whom he had signed a non-aggression pact carving up Poland nearly two years previously, but also to the world at large. Hitler up to this time had been a coldly calculated man, and his biggest gamble according to Hitler himself was the invasion of the Rhineland on March 7, 1936. Historians thus have long been argued over the logic behind his decision to launch the invasion on the USSR that led Germany to a two-front war. In a provocative charge, world renowned Parkinson’s disease specialist Dr. Abraham Lieberman made the claim that Hitler’s Parkinson’s disease was responsible for “changing the whole course of World War II.” This investigation is aimed to examine the possibility that it was Hitler’s health that led to such a monumental decision, starkly illustrating the idea of a ‘Great Man’ manipulating the course of history. Focusing on the extent Hitler’s apparent Parkinson’s disease played a role in the decision-making may provide a solid ground to determine if Operation Barbarossa was indeed inevitable using records by Hitler’s physician and book by Dr. Lieberman main sources.


B.Summary of Evidence

1.Mein Kampf: Hitler’s Aims
a.To abolish the Treaty of Versailles. Militarily, Treaty of Versailles limited the German army to 100,000 men, conscription abolished, and tanks and aircrafts were prohibited. However, Hitler announced rearmament in 1935 and was left unpunished, and Anglo-German naval agreement was signed in the same year. Furthermore, Rhineland was agreed to be demilitarized in the Treaty of Versailles. However, on March 7, 1936, Hitler ordered the invasion of the Rhineland, and it was re militarised. League of Nations did nothing to punish him. Additionally, Anschluss was prohibited in the Treaty, yet in 1938, Hitler fulfilled his promise in stated Mein Kampf, “German-Austria must return to the great German mother country,” the League did not punish him.
b.To include all German-speaking people in the Third Reich and LebensraumBecause of the Anglo-French policy of appeasement, from 1936 to 1939, Germany gradually annexed its neighboring area—from Rhineland to Austria, to Sudetenland and Czechoslovakia. Finally, when Germany invaded Poland on September 1, 1939, Britain and France declared war on Germany, marking the beginning of World War II.
According to Record, “World War II could have been avoided had the democracies been prepared to stop Hitler’s remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936 or to fight for Czechoslovakia in 1938; instead, they did nothing.”

2.Ideological differences between the Soviet Russia (Communism) and Nazi Germany (Fascism)Communism and fascism are similar in that both were determined to destroy parliamentary democracy and its bourgeois values, and replace it with different political systems based on single party rule. They differed in the following aspects. Firstly, on the ideological front, communism has a systematic doctrine with clear origins, whereas, fascism lacks coherent and disciplined ideological structures. Its main theories are based on the two fascist leaders’ works according to Todd (214-217) as shown in Mussolini’s article in Encyclopedia Italiana and Hitler’s Mein Kampf. Secondly, theoretical communism was grounded on internationalism; contradictorily, fascism focused on glorifying the nation and calling for national rebirth. Thirdly, attitudes towards the state and its citizens are fundamentally different. Communism suggests state should ‘wither away’ as soon as the workers had taken power, but in fascism, state should be everything, and individual hold no importance when comparing to state. Fourthly, even though both detest capitalism, communism was committed to overthrow capitalism, but fascist government never promised to destroy capitalism.

3.Hitler’s Medical History 
Hitler was a “pronounced hypochondriac,” it was evident from the fact that since “his earliest youth he rarely travelled without his medicine cabinet and willingly believed himself incapable of survival without pills, injections and battalions of attendant doctors.” During the First World War, Hitler wounded his leg and was temporarily blinded by British gas attack. In his later life, it was said that he suffered from many different medical issues, e.g. skin lesions, irritable bowel syndrome and irregular heartbeats. It was even rumoured that he had syphilis because Dr. Morell, Hitler’s most trusted physician, was a renowned venerologist. However, there is no concrete evidence that supports Hitler was definitely suffering from syphilis, but it was sure that his health slipped as World War II came to an end. He had tremors in his hands, his body was stiff, and he could not walk briskly as before. His handwriting became scrawnier and smaller (Appendix A), he was more lethargic and seldom appeared in front of the public.

4.Parkinson’s disease
“Parkinson’s disease was described by James Parkinson in 1817 as a ‘shaking palsy’,” and it is a “chronic, progressive neurodegenerative disease caused by decreased production of dopamine,” and the lack of dopamine “disrupts [patients’] motor control, causing anything from uncontrollable tremor to muscular stiffness to slow as-molasses motions.” As the disease progresses, patients will “develop a peculiar shuffling walk and may suddenly freeze in space for minutes or hours at a time.” The criteria to diagnose Parkinson’s disease from the Core Assessment Program for Intracerebral Transplantations (CAPIT) “require a patient to have at least two of its four cardinal symptoms: resting tremor, bradykinesia, cogwheel rigidity and postural instability and at least one of the symptoms must be resting tremor or bradykinesia.”

C.Evaluation of Sources

-Irving, David. The Secret Diaries of Hitler’s Doctor. London, United Kingdom: Focal Point Publications, 2005.
Dr. Theodor Morell was Hitler’s personal and most trusted physician from 1937 till the end of April in 1945 Hitler did not like doctors to see his body. Only “Morell seems to have examined him in detail.” Besides showing the level of trust Hitler had in him, the resulting medical diaries provide invaluable information and the most authentic records regarding to Hitler’s health.
David Irving, “knows more about National Socialism [Nazism] then most professional scholars in his field.” His breadth of knowledge in the subject has been acknowledged over the past 25 years. However, he is now arrested for distorting history. History Professor Michael Greyer of the University of Chicago “believes that Irving’s bias is responsible for serious ‘flaws in his work,’” while Professor Lipstadt “had written that Irving was ‘one of the most dangerous spokespersons for Holocaust denial.’” Irving is a knowledgeable Nazi historian, although his bias in the Holocaust made him controversial and his opinions untrustworthy, he can still provide useful information regarding to Hitler’s health. However, it is also questionable as in how Irving chose the excerpts of Morells’s diaries: what was left out, and how important was the left out information.

-Lieberman, Abraham N. “Hitler, Parkinson’s Disease and History.” BNI Quarterly 11 (1996). 31 Jan 2007 Abraham Lieberman is an authority and an “internationally recognized expert on Parkinson disease and is the author of six books on the topic.” While his diagnoses are worthy of respect, he is only in the position to focus on the question about whether Hitler had Parkinson’s disease through eye-witness reports, photos and the Newsreels. He does not appear to offer other possibilities which could cause Hitler’s Parkinson’s symptoms. For example, General Anxiety Disorder (GAD) is caused by excessive anxiety and worry for at least 6 months, and the symptoms include fatigue, irritability, muscle tension and depressive symptoms. There is a possibility that Hitler was suffering from GAD than Parkinson’s disease, and his anxiety could be caused by the war pressure and assassination attempts.
His attempts at diagnosing Hitler are based on the scant and unreliable information available, dismissing diagnoses when there is too little evidence (much of which is hotly debated by Hitler scholars) or the known symptoms are inconclusive, although given that there is so little information and that neither Hitler nor anyone surrounding him is a reliable source, it is still primarily speculation.

D.Analysis of the sources

Dr. Morell had never explicitly stated that Hitler was a Parkinson’s disease (PD) sufferer. However, he had subjected Hitler to daily doses of Homburg-680, a belladonna-type drug specifically indicated in cases of PD in Hitler’s last two weeks of life in April 1945. By then, he was demonstrating serious PD symptoms: “right hand shook uncontrollably…[and his facial expression was] mask-like.” This was resonant in Albert Speer’s memoirs, where one year before he noticed that “Hitler was shrivelling up like an old man. His limbs trembled, he walked stooped with dragging footsteps…His uniform, which in the past he had kept scrupulously neat… was stained by the food he had eaten with a shaking hand.” In fact, Schellenberg maintains that “from the end of 1943 [Hitler] showed progressive symptoms of Parkinson’s disease.” Bullock (who wrote the introduction to my edition of Schellenberg) in his own book uses Guderian to support this view. Redlich goes as far as to state matter-of-factly that Hitler suffered two somatic illnesses, “temporal arteritis” and PD. Hitler developed PD symptoms as early as 1934, “the initial symptom, bradykinesia of his left arm.” As Lieberman said, these symptoms “strongly suggest” that Hitler did have PD.
Lieberman also pointed out that “Professor Maximilian de Crinis, a German neurologist, after seeing a German newsreel in 1944 and without examining Hitler, informed W. Schellenberg, Himmler’s Chief of Staff, that Hitler had Parkinson’s disease.” Here we have the first example found of someone during Hitler’s lifetime reaching such a conclusion. Ironically, the person who apparently first diagnosed Hitler with PD was not even a personal acquaintance. Could it have been possible that Hitler and his physicians sought to cover up Hitler’s tremor because “Tremor, in the public mind, is erroneously associated with senility” ? For instance, in an earlier example of physical infirmity, when he had an attack of hysterical blindness several weeks after being wounded by poison gas in the trenches, his "miraculous" recovery of his sight added with auditory hallucinations contributed to Hitler’s delusions. This shows how he took steps to cover up the episode.
Furthermore, Morell continue testing new methods on Hitler with many different kinds of medicine and injections. “Morell administered tablets and gragess, uppers and downers, leeches and bacilli, hot compresses and cold poultices, and literally thousands of injections-litres of mysterious fluids that were squirted into his grateful and gullible Fuhrer each year, whose arms were punctured so often that even Morell sometimes could not find anywhere to insert the needle into the scarred veins.” With such a large amount and variety of medicines, Hitler’s tremor or sickness could be resulted from the reaction between these medicines. Although Morell had mostly prescribed harmless medicines to Hitler, it is unknown what could the mixture of these harmless medicines do to a patient.
Furthermore, Hitler had reasons to be stressed after Operation Barbarossa in 1941 because it was now having a two-front war. The combination of the stress coming from the reverses at Stalingrad and the July Plot with all the medicine he took and injected daily could cause side effects and affect the Fuhrer’s health and mental capacity, which might result in the symptoms of PD.


E. Conclusion

All the evidence seems to point to the conclusion that Hitler was very likely a sufferer of PD. “Although the disease did not incapacitate Hitler mentally, tremors, and the lack of muscular control must have impeded his ability to mange the many details involved in directing the war.” At that time, being told as a PD sufferer was to have a sentence of death imposed. Without appropriate and effective medication at that time, he would have had four years to fulfil his plans as laid out in Mein Kampf. This would certainly have affected Hitler’s decision in attacking the Soviet Union on 22 June, 1941.


F. Bibliography
Books in Print  1. Brezina, Corona. The Treaty of Versailles, 1919. New York, U.S.A.: The Rosen Publishing Group, Inc., 2006.  2. Broxmeyer, Lawrence. Parkinson’s Another Look. Chula Vista, U.S.A.: New Century Press, 2002.  3. Bullock, Alan. Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives. London, United Kingdom: Fontana Press, 1998.  4. Bullock, Alan. Hitler: A Study in Tyranny. New York, U.S.A.: Harper & Row Publishers, 1964.  5. Dull, Ralph. Nonviolence Is Not For Wimps. U.S.A.: Xlibris Corporation, 2004.  6. Dunn, Walter Scott. Heroes or Traitors: The German Replacement Army, the July Plot, and Adolf Hitler. Connecticut, U.S.A.: Praeger Publishers, 2003.  7. Gottfried, Ted. Deniers Of the Holocaust: Who They Are, What They Do, Why They Do It. Connecticut, U.S.A.: Twenty-First Century Books, 2001.  8. Gun, Nerin E. Eva Braun: Hitler’s Mistress. London, United Kingdom: Leslie Frewin Publishers, 1969.  9. Irving, David. The Secret Diaries of Hitler’s Doctor. London, United Kingdom: Focal Point Publications, 2005.  10. Lieberman, Abraham N. Shaking-Up Parkinson Disease: Fighting Like a Tiger, Thinking Like a Fox. London, United Kingdom: Jones and Bartlett Publishers, 2002.  11. Macdonald, Hamish. Mussolini and Italian Fascism. United Kingdom: Stanley Thornes (Publishers) Ltd, 1999.  12. Mandell, Richard. The Nazi Olympics. New York, U.S.A.: Macmillan, 1971.  13. Maris, Ronald, Alan Berman, Morton Silverman, and Bruce Bongar. Comprehensive Textbook of Suicidology. New York, U.S.A.: Guilford Press, 2000.  14. McDonough, Frank. Conflict, Communism and Fascism: Europe 1890-1945. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2001.  15. Mera, Steven L. Understanding Disease: pathology and prevention. London, United Kingdom: Nelson Thornes, 2003.  16. Nutt, David, Karl Rickels, and Dan J. Stein. Generalized Anxiety Disorder: Symptomatology, Pathogenesis and Management. London, United Kingdom: Martin Dunitz, 2002.  17. Pleshakov, Constantine. Stalin’s Folly: the tragic first ten days of World War II on the Eastern Front. New York, U.S.A.: Houghton Mifflin Books, 2005.  18. Plotnik, Rod. Introduction to Psychology. Belmont, U.S.A.: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1999.  19. Record, Jeffrey. Appeasement Reconsidered: Investigating the Mythology of the 1930s. U.S.A.:DIANE Publishing., 2005.  20. Saunders, Christopher D, and Kathleen Cahill Allison. Parkinson’s Disease: A New Hope. Boston, U.S.A.: Harvard Health Publications, 2000.  21. Schellenberg, Walter, and Louis Hagen. The Schellenberg Memoirs. A Deutsch, 1956.  22. Todd, Allan. The European Dictatorships: Hitler, Stalin, Mussolini. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2002.  23. Victor, George. Hitler: pathology of Evil. Virginia, U.S.A.: Brassey’s, 2000.  Book Online1.Hitler, Adolf. Mein Kampf. 1st ed. Vol. 1. 18 Mar.

Was the Gestapo involved in Georg Elser’s attempt to assassinate Adolf Hitler on the 8th of November 1939?

A: Plan of Investigation

The exact motivations and planning of the bomb plot on the 8th of November 1939, are still today unclear. The following investigation will answer the question “Was the Gestapo involved in Georg Elser’s attempt to assassinate Adolf Hitler on the 8th of November 1939?”  PUT THIS AT THE START by taking into two contrasting views. With the view of Best, who argues that the Gestapo was indeed behind the plot, , and contemporary newspaper articles offering a completely different stance, the investigation will be able to holistically analyze all perspectives of the plot.  Supplementary to this, sources like the Official Gestapo Protocol of 1939 will be used WHY. Additionally, being fluent in both English and German, the investigation will have access to a larger quantity and variety of sources, allowing a more nuanced conclusion to be reached.

B: Summary of Evidence

Evening of 8th of November
On the 8th of November, the sixteenth anniversary of the 1923 Beer Hall Putsch, Hitler traveled to Munich in order to hold a speech at the „Bürgerbräukeller“. Arriving at 20:00 with a group of 3000 supporters, Hitler began his speech at exactly 20:08. Hitler’s previous speeches had lasted two hours on average, however on this evening his speech was cut short due to a note addressed from Göring, in which it stated that Hitler should “shorten his speech” and return to Berlin “by the quickest means possible”[1]. Finishing his speech at 20:58 and leaving at 21:09 in order to catch a 21:31 train to Berlin, Hitler managed to get out of the Bürgerbräukeller prior to the powerful bomb detonation at 21:20. Apparently placed by carpenter Georg Elser, the bomb was hidden inside a “pillar that was a main support for the roof”[2].  The explosion lead to the death of eight individuals and the injury of sixty-three[3]. On the next day two British Agents operating for Germany in Holland, Agent Payne Best and Agent Stevens, were kidnapped by an SS-Officer called Walther Schellenberg who had been working with them undercover in Venlo. They were arrested under suspicions OF BEING INVOLVED WITH of the bomb plot, and ON at the same day Elser was arrested trying to cross the boarder Switzerland. Officials found evidence including plans and leaflets from FROM the Red Front Fighters[4], EXPLAIN MAYBE FOOTNOTE and “confessed to setting the bomb but refused to implicate anyone else”.[5]

Days after the Assassination Attempt and Joseph Goebbels.
On the days following the assassination attempt, rumors about the involvement of the British Secret Service[6], Communist Party[7] and even the Gestapo themselves began to surface. Writing in his personal journal following the Attentat, Joseph Goebbels stated “like the Reichstag fire, London and Paris is trying to blame this on us”[8].  Goebbels, with a noticeable increase of suspicion, noted  that the “real assassin behind the attack is a creature of Otto Strasser”[9] and that “Otto Strasser and the secret service are behind everything”[10].

Time at Dachau and Evolution of “Mythos Elser”
 Following his statement and confession of guilt, Elser was sent directly to the Concentration Camp “Sachsenhausen”. According to Best, he was treated in a “friendly manner” and was even allowed to smoke and see friends. Elser remained imprisoned in Sachsenhausen and was eventually transferred to the Dachau KZ. Elser, known in the camp under the name “Eller”, was supposed to be executed following the “Endsieg”[11] with Admiral Wilhelm Canaris in a show trial. With the Allied front moving in in 1945, Elser was sentenced to death with “Liquidierungsbefehl”[12] on the 5th of April, 1945. Executed on the 9th by SS-Oberscharführer Theodor Bongartz[13] only 20 days before the liberation of the camp. The fact that Elser was kept alive for six years following the Attentat and not executed in 1939 contributed to the suspicions of Gestapo involvement.

C: Evaluation of Sources
 

Captain Sigismund Payne Best’s book “The Venlo Incident”(1950)
A recollection of events, the book bases on Best’s memories of his time and eventual arrest  as an MI6 agent in Germany during World War II. With the aim to describe a “true story of double-dealing, captivity and a murderous Nazi Plot”, Best acts as a link to the conspiracy theory that the British Secret Service was behind the plot while at the same time hinting at the Gestapo’s involvement. Best was arrested and put into 5 years of solitary confinement due to the suspect that he was involved in the bomb plot. The Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung’s article in 1939 called Best the “criminal mastermind” of the Georg Elser plot.

  A large section of the book includes a description of his relationship with Resistance-Fighter Elser and his observation of incidents in KZ-Sachsenhausen. In his writing, Best describes his observation of Elser and their dialogues.. Furthermore, a major limitation of the book is the shortage of evidence to support claims, such as the latter, made. Best admits in his book that he and Elser ““never met or spoke to each other.” The events in the book are described in great detail, which has lead to reviews calling the book “a fascinating story.”[14] These reviews that call the book a “story” indicate that Best may have exaggerated . In some reviews, he is even accused of “fabricating intelligence”[15] and his explanations consisting “anecdotes[16]”. Another major limitation lies within the fact, that the book is not about Elser, and that Best is a highly skilled diplomat, rather than a historian.

 As the book was published in 1950, Best was not able to use the files published in 2009 by the British Foreign Ministry on the Venlo Incident. With a large controversy with Best’s publication of names of British Intelligence officers, Best was given permission to publish his book by the had of the SIS, Steward Graham Menzies.  Initially planned to be published in 2015, Document “FO 371/23107” is considered one of the vital official files outside the Gestapo.


Front Page Newspaper, Berlin 22nd November 1939,  Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung  titled“Georg Elser the Murderer, Intelligence Service the commanders, Otto Strasser the Organiser”
In April 1945, the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung was the last German newspaper to still print daily papers. Known for its changing political stances over time, it was initially established by Heinrich Brockhaus with a conservative national/liberal perspective. With Hitler’s usurp of power, complete newspapers and articles oft he „DAZ“  were censored.  After being forced to hire national-socialistic editors and writers from Das Reich newspaper, “DAZ”[17] evolved to become a right-wing paper.  The aim of the newspaper article is to explain the events of the 8th of November and to offer an clarification to the public as to what who was responsible for the bomb plot.

 The newspaper article’s value lies with the fact that it reflects the spirit of the time and was a direct contemporary response to the explosion.  It is the information that the public received, and furthermore, one can identify a clear limitation with the restrictive nature of the NSDAP-controlled newspaper. The chief-editor in 1939, Karl Silex, was fired in 1943 as he was blamed for being be friends with Resistance-fighter  and plotter of the 20th of July Plot, Henning von Tresckow. Another obvious limitation of the article is the condition, under which it was published. Fourteen days after the bomb plot, and just having both the suspect Georg Elser, as well as two intelligence officers, the NSDAP was trying to figure how Elser could have gotten through with his plot. Furthermore, the article is trying to divert the focus from Elser’s  to the two British Officers, distorting the reader’s impression. It states that “the true criminals are those who plotted rather than those who planted the bomb”.

The statements made in the article involving the third-party involvement in the bomb plot were assumed to be  valid until 1969,  and the article is very useful for the study of Elser’s plot as it represents the knowledge and beliefs of the public until Anton Hoch’s  published the official Gestapo protocol in 1969, 30 years after the Attentat.

D: Analysis

As the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung portrays the plot of Georg Elser as the work of the “criminal masterminds” of the British Intelligence, the increase in information and files available have been vital to the entire investigation.

One of the principal points of evidence that suggests the Gestapo involvement is Sigismund Payne Best’s article in which he gives first hand evidence of Elser’s treatment and relationship with the Gestapo in the KZ Sachsenhausen and Dachau. Even though “never directly talking with Elser” Best claims that he was able to “establish relations with Elser” and that Elser told him through “many letters” his story. It is interesting how Best explains how Elser “admitted to planting the bomb in the pillar” but “denied that he had any accomplices.”[18] William Shirer supports Best’s beliefs by stating that Elser was told by the Nazis that it is “necessary to eliminate traitor’s of the party”. Hans Rothfels, ironically the publisher of Anton Hoch’s seminal article about Elser’s plot without third-party involvement, explains that without the Gestapo’s involvement “an installation as such would have never been possible.[19]”

Indeed, Elser’s unspectacular background as a carpenter has been the source of skepticism for his statement denying third-party involvement.  Best quotes in Sigmund Rascher, who after explaining the unlikelihood of Elser outsmarting the security of the SS, exclaims, “Everyone knew that it was a Gestapo fake”[20]. Best claims that the Gestapo arranged the Attentat on Hitler, and that he had been arrested after he had been “mixed up with a band of communists”[21]. Allan Bullock, agreeing to Rascher’s statement saying that  “the assassination on Hitler was organized by the Gestapo”[22] argues that its entire purpose was to “raise the Führer’s popularity[23]”. Roger Moorhouse agrees to the Bullock’s statement by saying that the DAZ-article specifically was aimed to “boost Hitler’s popularity.”[24]

The turning point of the theories involving the plot was the moment when Lothar Gruchmann was enabled access to 203 pages Gestapo Protocol files on the bomb plot of the 8th of November. Anton Hoch, who was the first to publish Gruchmann’s findings in his article in the “Viertelsjahrsheft für Deutsche Zeitgeschichte“in 1969. The information given in Hoch’s article is the source of modern-day historians’ knowledge on the Elser Attentat, making it, after the DAZ-article and Best’s book, one of the most valuable sources in the entire investigation.  Considering the limitations of both Best’s book, with the possibility of personal exaggeration in order to glorify personal experiences, and the censorship and conditions of the publication of the DAZ-article, the validity of the statements made in each can be questioned. With the personal examination of the official Gestapo Files in the Museum of German Resistance in Berlin, Georg Elser’s plotting without the Gestapo was proven by the documentation of his ability to completely reconstruct during interrogative conditions. Personally explaining in a step-by-step methodology, the Gestapo Protocol assures of Elser’s “solitary working[25]” backed up with James Duffy’s explanation of Elser “accomplishing the task by himself[26]”. After conducting a personal interview with controversial historian David Irving, he believes that “Elser was a lone assassin”, referring back to Anton Hoch’s 1969 article. Furthermore, with the 2009 publication of National Archives file “ FO 371/23107” in London on the case of Elser, reassurance that Elser worked by himself is ensured.

E: Conclusion

After carefully taking into perspective the reasoning for why the Gestapo may have been involved in the assassination attempt on the 8th of November 1939, the investigation will conclude with the acknowledgement of Elser’s working without the involvement of any third-parties. With the two conflicting views involving the plot, it can be observed that the argument, that Elser worked alone, can be supported by official documents and files. All other accounts rely, such as that of Best, rely on personal interpretations, speculations and do not have hard evidence as backing. The conducting of interviews and personal evaluation of documents that were not available to some historians, has avoided a nuanced result of the investigation.

With the careful analysis of sources and the consideration of current files and evidence, it has become apparent that Elser alone was capable of almost assassinating Adolf Hitler. Considering that the importance of Elser’s Attentat, it could not have only changed the lives of those falsely convicted, but could have also changed the entire German history.


Bibliography:    
1.  Allen, Martin. “Hidden Agenda” : Rowman and Littlefield, Print  2.  Best, Sigismund Payne. “The Venlo Incident”. 2009 ed. London: Pen & Sword, 1950. Print    3.  Bullock, Alan “Hitler; a Study in Tyranny” London: Odhams, 1952. Print.    4.  Duffy, James P., and Vincent L. Ricci. “Target Hitler: The Plots to Kill Adolf Hitler” Print. Page 36    5.  Gisevius, Hans Bernd. “Bis Zum Bittern Ende” Zürich: Fretz Und Wasmuth, 1946. Print    6. Goebbels, Joseph. "Er Steht Doch Unter Dem Schutz Des Allmächtigen." Letter. 9 Nov. 1939. Http://www.georg-elser-arbeitskreis.de Web.      7. Good, Meaghan. "ExecutedToday.com." ExecutedToday.com. Web. .    8. Haasis, Hellmuth G. "Georg Elsers Ende Im KZ Dachau." Georg Elsers Ende- The Man Who Killed Elser.. .    9.  Hoch, Anton. "Das Attentat Auf Hitler Im Münchner Bürgerbräukeller 1939." Ed. Hans Rothfels and Theodor Eschenburg. Viertelsjahrsheft Für Zeitgeschichte [Stuttgart] Oct. 1969: 1-34. Print    10. Kershaw, Ian, Gerhard Von Spörl, and Klaus Wiegrefe. "Dem Führer Entgegen Arbeiten." DER SPIEGEL.. Web. 21 Aug. 2000. .    11. MacDonald, Callum. The Venlo Affair. Vol. 8. London: European Studies Review, 1978. Print    12. Malzahn, Claus Christian. "A German Hero: The Carpenter Elser Versus the Führer Hitler." SPIEGEL ONLINE. Web. .    13. Moorhouse, Roger. “Killing Hitler: The Third Reich and the Plots against the Führer” London: Jonathan Cape, 2006. Print.    14.  National Archives, “ Doc. No. FO 371/23107” Kew, London http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/SearchUI/details/C6429165?descriptiontype=Full&ref=FO+371/23107/item    15.  Official Rep. No. 19 November-22/3100 at 230 (1939). Print.Verhörprotokoll Gestapo (Gestapo Documents from the Reichsjustizministerum)    16.  Rothfels, Hans. “Die Deutsche Opposition Gegen Hitler. Eine Würdigung”. Frankfurt: 1949. 58-84. Print    17. Sicherheitspolizei, Deutsche. "Liquidierungsbefehl Georg Elser." 1945. TS. Berlin. Web. .    18.  Shirer, William L. “The rise and fall of the Third Reich; a history of Nazi Germany” New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960. Print.    19. West, Nigel. "Slightly Less Secret." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (2011). Web     [1] (Page 143)  Allen, Martin. Hidden Agenda. N.p.: Rowman and Littlefield, n.d. 142. Web.  [2] (Page 28) Duffyy2, James P., and Vincent L. Ricci. Target Hitler: The Plots to Kill Adolf Hitler. N.p Print.  [3]  (Page 31) Duffy, James P., and Vincent L. Ricci. Target Hitler: The Plots to Kill Adolf Hitler. N.p Print.  [4] „Roter Frontkämpfer-Bund RFB“, Kommunist Group established in 1924  [5] (Page 32) Duffy, James P., and Vincent L. Ricci. Target Hitler: The Plots to Kill Adolf Hitler. N.p Print.  [6] Mentioned in Best, Sigismund Payne. The Venlo Incident.  [7]  Argued by Malzahn, Claus Christian in "A German Hero: The Carpenter Elser Versus the Führer Hitler.", he states that for an individual like Elser, external political motivation must have been vital  [8] Goebbels, Joseph. "Er Steht Doch Unter Dem Schutz Des Allmächtigen." Letter. 9th  Nov. 1939.  [9]   Ibid  (Letter. 17th  Nov. 1939)  [10]   Ibid  (Letter. 19th  Nov. 1939)  [11] Term used by Adolf Hitler to describe the German victory of WWII  [12] Sicherheitspolizei, Deutsche. "Liquidierungsbefehl Georg Elser."  [13] Haasis, Hellmuth G. "Georg Elsers Ende Im KZ Dachau."  [14] Soldier Magazine Comment  "Pen and Sword Books: The Venlo Incident by Captain Sigismund Payne Best, Nigel Jones." Pen and Sword Books: The Venlo Incident by Captain Sigismund Payne Best, Nigel Jones. http://www.pen-and-sword.co.uk/The-Venlo-Incident/p/2027/    [15] West, Nigel. "Slightly Less Secret." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (2011). Web    [16] I MacDonald, Callum. The Venlo Affair. Vol. 8. London: European Studies Review, 1978. Print  http://www.mythoselser.de/texts/macdonald.htm    [17] Abbreviation “DAZ”  frequently used to call the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung  [18] “  (P128) Best, Sigismund Payne. The Venlo Incident. 2009  London: Pen & Sword, 1950. Print.  [19] (Page 58) Rothfels, Hans. Die Deutsche Opposition Gegen Hitler. Eine Würdigung. 58-84. Print  [20] . (Page 187) Best, Sigismund Payne. The Venlo Incident. 2009 ed. London: Pen & Sword, 1950. Print.  [21] .  (Page 127) Page Best, Sigismund Payne. The Venlo Incident. 2009 ed. London: Pen & Sword, 1950. Print.  [22] (Page 572) Bullock, Alan. Hitler; a Study in Tyranny. London: Odhams, 1952. Print.  [23] Ibid  [24] (Page 53) Moorhouse, Roger. Killing Hitler: The Third Reich and the Plots against the Führer. London: Jonathan Cape, 2006. Print.  [25] Official Rep. No. 19 November-22/3100 at 230 (1939). Print.Verhörprotokoll Gestapo (Gestapo Documents from the Reichsjustizministerum)  [26] Duffy, James P., and Vincent L. Ricci. Target Hitler: The Plots to Kill Adolf Hitler. N Print.



How enthusiastic was Erwin Rommel about “Operation Walküre” in July 1944?

 Section A – Plan of Investigation              
 In October 1944, General Rommel was charged with supposed involvement in the Stauffenberg coup and given a choice: to be found guilty and executed through trial, or to take his own life; Rommel chose the latter.[1] But How Far did Rommel Support the Plot? To determine this, three aspects will be examined: an examination of the possible military involvement Rommel may have provided, his attitude towards the idea of assassinating Hitler, and the motives of his possible involvement or rejection of the Stauffenberg’s plans. A variety of sources will be examined. As a German, I have access to German-language articles, such as “Der Spiegel” to determine the latest controversy, as well as a British biography of Rommel, which includes interviews with Rommel’s son, and a variety of other accounts from letters to recordings of conversations from the time.  (138)

 Section B – Summary of Evidence 
Political and Public Standing  
Rommel,  regarded as  Hitler’s “favourite General,”[2] enjoyed great popularity within the National-Socialist government and the German people. [3] Göbbels used him for propaganda purposes, re-writing his life story as an early member of this Nazi party.[4]  In fact, considered politically unengaged, Rommel never joined the NSDAP, focussing solely on the military. He refused to allow his son Manfred to join the Waffen-SS, referring to rumours of mass-shootings and murders committed by the SS in the East. Rommel’s primary concern was to maintain or implement the honour, safety and success of his troops.[5] 
Clashes with Hitler  
In 1942, Rommel had defied Hitler’s orders concerning the battle of El Alamein of the Western Desert Campaign during the Second World War, in which his tank division fought against British General Montgomery’s troops, concerned that Hitler’s orders would worsen the situation for his troops in Egypt[6].  By 1944, Rommel was actively engaged against Hitler concerning the battle proceedings at the Western front.[7] In the same year, Rommel was made responsible for the prevention of the landing of allied forces as well as the Army Group B on the Western Front.[8] After D-Day Germany’s military situation changed drastically. Rommel desired peace negotiations with the enemy to end the war, and considered opening the front to let enemy forces trigger the overthrow of Hitler’s regime.[9] Speaking with Karl Strölin, mayor of Stuttgart at the time, Rommel declared he had to act in support of a “German rescue”.[10] This clashed severely with Hitler’s orders.[11] Operation Walküre  
Rommel was introduced to the plans of Operation Walküre and the following coup which aimed to bring about revolution[12] and hopefully end the war through negotiations with the enemy,[13] presenting an alternative to war for Rommel.[14]  During Colonel Lattman’s visit to Rommel in hospital, Rommel stated that war had to be ended under whatever circumstances,[15] leading Rommel to agree to meetings and talks with Stauffenberg’s men,[16] who required a popular face to represent the coup.[17] During a meeting with conspirator Caesar von Hofacker, Rommel stated that “Germany had made enough sacrifices” agreeing to collaborate with the plan and give support, according to the men Hofacker conversed with after the meeting.[18] Finally, the Eberbach Protocol supposedly records Rommel’s clear desire for the assassination of the Führer, reporting him as having said “there is no other opportunity for Germany other than to kill the Führer and his clanship as quickly as possible.”[19]  According to his son, Rommel was always strictly against an assassination[20], but supportive of a coup.[21] After the assassination failed, Rommel wrote to his wife expressing his shock at hearing about the attempt.[22] Rommel preferred the idea of putting Hitler on trial[23] as the General remained loyal to the dictator, owing him the success of his career.[24]  
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 Section C – Evaluation of Sources   
Rommel – David Fraser, 1993, Original: Knight’s Cross: A life of Field Marshall Erwin Rommel   
Fraser, a British Army Officer who had served between 1940 and 1980 intended to investigate Rommel, with focus on his standpoint to Hitler. He aimed to determine to what extent he was a national-socialist and to what extent he was involved with the resistance against Hitler. The majority of the credentials are interrogations from during and after Hitler’s regime, testimonies as well as witness reports from several accused Generals and of those who knew Rommel and worked with him. Fraser also used interviews and explanations from Manfred Rommel, Rommel’s son, adding to the analysis. Peter Badastelli, describes Fraser’s work as "outstanding", tackling the myths through primary sources and accounts of those at the time.[25]  However, Fraser leaves the portrait of Rommel somewhat incomplete, by dedicating many chapters to general history of the time (although this is helpful in providing context). Fraser also does not write objectively, describing statements by Rommel to suggest active engagement in the resistance as weak or not giving similar attention to statements that imply otherwise. Most of his evidence relies only on the memories of people involved as well as second-hand translations from the original German which could affect nuance.

“Die Kraft des Bösen” (The Power of the Evil), Spiegel Edition Nr. 44/29.10.12, Jan Fleischhauer, Jan Friedmann   
Der Spiegel is a renowned German news magazine, which is sold worldwide and has become famous for having fought for freedom of the press in the late 1940’s, not unnecessarily embellishing important information, and for the unveiling of political affairs[26]. The purpose of the article is to inform the public about the General, who, although he was Hitler’s favourite, is never directly associated with being a Nazi and discusses the debate about his character - whether he should be considered a Nazi-criminal, or as the General who tried to end the war, defying Hitler’s orders in the process. The value of the article is the criticism with which the authors approach the myth of Rommel, as they do not make him a hero, but neither do they consider him a firm Nazi-General. Furthermore, it is vital to see how the propaganda figure during WWII is presented in the media today to understand his reputation then and now, as this can cloud perceptions of his involvement. Additionally, the article writes in hindsight, allowing for new evidence, in particular the Eberbach Protocol, which is missing from all other sources.  However, this article cannot be compared to an actual history book, as it is directed at a broad audience who may have limited understanding of history. By its nature, its investigation is much less in depth, presenting a broader view. 
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 Section D – Analysis   The initial sources of conflict in answering this investigation lie in Goebbels's use of Rommel to create the perfect example of a Nazi-General, describing him in his diary as an “almost mythical figure.”[27] This makes it difficult to analyse Rommel, given his persona was increasingly manipulated for public purposes. As Fraser relies on opinions from the time, the article from Der Spiegel becomes all the more important, as it recognises this limitation and attempts to overcome it.  The plan itself had two intentions, a coup, and an assassination. The idea that Rommel saw the coup as his chance to end the war (which had been his intention since D-Day) is strongly debated [28]. The “Der Spiegel” article concludes that he was faithful to Hitler’s regime,[29] however concur that Rommel was never a member of the NSDAP, and therefore both the article and Fraser make it clear that Rommel never was and is still not seen as a real Nazi. His defiance of Hitler’s orders during the battle of El Alamein in 1942, and similar rejection of Hitler’s plans in 1944 on the Western Front could work with this to suggest his attitude towards the plans were positive.  Primarily, the conspirators saw the perfect face of the coup in Rommel, suggesting they tried to persuade him extensively. Several talks between the conspirators and Rommel took place,[30] in one of which he told Colonel Lattmann that the war had to be ended, under whatever circumstances.[31] Whether with “circumstances” Rommel simply meant a coup or the assassination is not clear, yet the word “whatever” implies that Rommel was capable of going to extreme lengths to end WWII. There had also been meetings in May, earlier that year between several resistors, in which Rommel agreed to collaborate, as “Germany had made enough sacrifices.”[32] Another meeting with conspirator Ceasar von Hofacker was held on the 9th of July[33]. According to the men Hofacker spoke to after the meeting, he informed Rommel about Stauffenberg’s assassination plans, the plans for the coup and revolution in Berlin. These men later stated that Rommel replied that the “war was lost anyway”, and gave his support.[34] This evidence, however, can be considered weak, as the content of the meeting between Hofacker and Rommel was never officially divulged by either participant. However, as this evidence was provided after 1945, fear of speaking out in support of Rommel should have been eradicated, lending slightly more weight to these allegations.   
For Rommel therefore, the Operation meant the end of the war and the possibility to save the last of German honour. This did not mean, according to Lieutenant Speidel, assassination of Hitler.[35] Clearly, Rommel experienced a clash between the two significant components of Stauffenberg’s operation. Most evidence presented in the sources agree Rommel was not anti-Hitler and did not support assassination. On July 21 Rommel was first informed about the attempted assassination by his adjutant Hellmuth Lang, who later described Rommel's clear shocked;[36] indeed, in a July 24 letter to his wife he declared “thank God that the assassination attempt failed”.[37] Although Fraser argues that Rommel had no choice but to speak out against the assassination in a letter that could be screened, Rommel appeared to prefer the idea of a trial for Hitler.[38]. Manfred Rommel has always maintained that his father had been strictly against an assassination[39] although whether his view on his father is objective is arguable as at the time of his father’s death he was only a teenager.  Further evidence for the General’s belief in the man to whom he owed his career were seen in his final days, where Rommel told the men in charge of his forced suicide that he “loved the Führer and still does”.[40] Whether it was an act of helpless self-defence, or to ensure the protection of his family, the truth cannot be known - but when Rommel was accused of holding back his tank division to support the coup, those who knew him, including Lieutenant Speidel, gave passionate testimonies in Rommel’s defence, stating these claims were incorrect.[41] This suggests that Rommel’s final testimony to his love of Hitler was not unsubstantiated, and he knew that there would be support to back up these words.  The only evidence that outright declares Rommel’s support of an assassination is referenced in Der Spiegel, discovered in 2005; the “Eberbach Protocol.” This record of his desire for an assassination of Hitler is based solely on what a British General overheard whilst listening in on a German officer in the autumn of 1944. [42] Although the Spiegel writes in hindsight, with access to evidence Fraser was not privy to, the tone of this statement and clear antipathy towards Rommel’s  “beloved” Hitler are not in accordance with the General’s normal manner.  Therefore it is not in line with the rest of the evidence provided by the bulk of sources. 
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 Section E – Conclusion   
Rommel was clearly unhappy with Germany’s situation by 1944, especially after D-Day, and sought an end to the war. Appearing unwilling to participate in talks with resistors, one could say that he saw “Operation Walküre” as the opportunity to realize this. Clearly, one must determine his enthusiasm for such a plot by considering differentiate between its two components: the coup and the assassination. There is no clear evidence that suggests Rommel was strictly against a coup; several sources state that he saw it as a way to end war. The only evidence that suggests he supported an assassination is the “Eberbach Protocol”, which contradicts other pieces of evidence which otherwise agree that Rommel had always spoken out against an assassination. One can come to the conclusion that Rommel was enthusiastic about “Operation Walküre” in terms of the coup it would result in, and the positive consequences this would have on the army but less so about assassinating Hitler, and almost always made this point clear. 
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 Section F – Works Cited   
Battistelli, Pier Paolo. Erwin Rommel: Leadership, Strategy, Conflict. Oxford: Osprey,  2010. Print.  Carell, Paul. Die Wüstenfüchse - Mit Rommel in Afrika. Berlin: Ulstein Buchverlage GmbH &              Ko. KG, 1971. Print.  Charles, Marshall F. Discovering the Rommel Murder: The Life and Death of the Desert Fox.              Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole, 2002. Print.  "Der Spiegel." Süddeutsche Der Spiegel RSS. Sueddeutsche Zeitung Digitale Medien GmbH,              n.d. Web. 11 Nov. 2013.               Dimbleby, Jonathan. Destiny in the Desert: The Road to El Alamein : The Battle That Turned              the Tide. London: Profile, 2012. Print.  Fleischhauer, Jan, and Jan Friedmann. "Die Kraft Des Bösen." Der Spiegel 44 (2012): 60-69.              Print.  Fraser, David. Rommel: Die Biographie. Berlin: Siedler, 1995. Print.  Horstmann, Harry. Walküre: Claus Schenk Graf Von Stauffenberg Der 20. Juli 1944.              Norderstedt: on Demand, 2008. Print.  Lieb, Peter. Konventioneller Krieg oder NS-Weltanschauungskrieg?: Kriegführung und  Partisanenbekämpfung in Frankreich 1943/44. München: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag GmbH, 2007  Mitcham, Samuel W. Retreat to the Reich: The German Defeat in France, 1944. Westport, CT:              Praeger, 2000. Print.  Remy, Maurice Philip. Mythos Rommel. München: List, 2002. Print.  Ueberschär, Gerd R. Stauffenberg – und das Attentat vom 20. Juli 1944. Frankfurt am              Main: S. Fischer Verlag, 2006  Watson, Bruce. Exit Rommel: The Tunisian Campaign, 1942-43. Mechanicsburg, PA:              Stackpole, 2007. Print.
  
 Did Adolf Hitler have Parkinson’s disease?   

A: Plan of Investigation  
Recent medical theories claim that Hitler’s uncharacteristically rushed decisions of the last war-time years can be put down to his diminishing health, specifically Parkinson’s Disease. This investigation will therefore attempt to answer the question “Did Hitler have Parkinson’s Disease?” To do this, Hitler’s health from 1934 – 1945 will be analysed, using sources by contemporaries like Albert Speer, whose observations are crucial in identifying Parkinsonian symptoms, as well as modern historians like David Irving and Parkinson specialist Abraham Lieberman, so as to offer a well-rounded assessment of Hitler’s condition. 
Two of the sources used in the essay, The Secret Diaries of Hitler’s Doctor by David Irving, and Abraham Lieberman’s Furor: Hitler and the Frog: A Medical Murder Mystery and Fairy Tale primarily feature. Irving offers primary sources on Hitler’s medical health, while Lieberman concentrates specifically on the Parkinson’s theory. Each will be investigated to find any correlating proof of Hitler’s Parkinson’s. 
Word Count: 150

B: Summary of Evidence 
 Parkinson’s Disease 
First mentioned in James Parkinson’s Essay on the Shaking Palsy in 1871, Parkinson’s disease is a “progressive neurological disorder that results from the degeneration of neurons in a region of the brain that controls movement”, creating “a shortage of dopamine, causing the movement impairments that characterise the disease.” The main motor symptoms that characterise the disease are progressively developing tremors that “often begin on one side of the body, frequently in one hand”, rigidity, slowness of movement and postural instability.  
Signs of Hitler’s Parkinson’s before 1940     
The first signs of Hitler’s symptoms start occurring in 1934. During the early 1930s, he gesticulates wildly with both hands, showing no signs of motor impairment or rigidity in movement. Photos from 1932 often show him with his left arm crossed over his right. However, come 1934, the first signs of Hitler’s symptoms are recognisable. Noticeably, he now always covers his left hand with his right, as opposed to his usual positioning, most likely to repress the trembling that has started to occur in his left hand. The first obvious occurrences of a trembling left hand and a rigid walk from 1934 onwards, shown in various video footage and increasing in severity throughout the years. 
 Signs of Hitler’s Parkinson’s after 1940 
By 1940, Hitler’s health was deteriorating. He now no longer used his left hand – instead, it was often concealed behind his right arm, placed on his front, in a pocket or clenched in a fist. Consequently, he developed “micrographia, the cramped handwriting characteristic of PD”, seen in the evolvement of his signature over the years. By 1942, Hitler became “an ever more remote figure, making fewer major speeches. ” His contemporaries within the party started to take note of Hitler’s crumbling health. Albert Speer, Hitler’s Minister of Armaments and “the nearest thing to friend Hitler ever found” wrote in 1944: “Hitler was shrivelling up like an old man. His limbs trembled; he walked stooped with dragged footsteps. His uniform, which in the past he’d kept scrupulously clean, was stained by the food he’d eaten with shaking hands.” German neurologist Maximilian de Crinis declared Hitler had Parkinson’s based on a German newsreel in 1944, informing Schellenberg, Himmler’s Chief of Staff. Notably, however, after the July 1944 bomb plot, Hitler’s tremor reportedly vanished temporarily. Meanwhile, Dr. Theodor Morell, Hitler’s personal physician, also took note of his client’s illness. In his diaries, there is evidence of Hitler’s Parkinsonism; Irving writes of Morell treating Hitler “regularly during the last two weeks of his life with a medication used only against Parkinsonism, daily increasing doses of a drug called Homburg 680.”  Daily entries into Hitler’s diary indicate for two to three daily injections of Homburg 680.” Irving further evidences that Hitler’s doctors, including Morell, observed the symptoms, and that Morell diagnosed Hitler with Parkinson’s: “All the doctors – Löhlein, Morell, and Stumpegger – noticed that during examinations of his retina Hitler kept his left hand quite still; the left leg’s tremor also ceased. Morell diagnosed these tremors as the first symptoms of Parkinson’s Disease, and on April 8 1945 he began electrogalvanic therapy.”  
Word Count: 495 

C: Evaluation of Sources 
 Irving, David. The Secret Diaries of Hitler’s Doctor. Macmillan, 1983. Print. 
Discovered only in 1981 by the German Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the diaries and correspondence of Hitler’s personal doctor, Theodor Morell, were accessed and translated by David Irving, in which he offers his own insight interwoven with observations of his staff, colleagues and other doctors on Hitler’s health.  The openness of a doctor-patient relationship means that the diaries could provide valuable information about his condition.  With this new information, parallels between Hitler’s health and the Nazi’s military success can be drawn, revealing a Hitler severely weakened by dysentery during the Battle for Russia in 1941, as well by hepatitis before the Battle of the Buldge in 1944. His paranoia about his own imminent death also becomes apparent, showing Hitler “obsessed by the idea that he did not have long to live.” Meanwhile, contemporary observations and medical reports that suggest drug abuse are crucial, as they do not limit themselves to symptoms of Parkinson’s but offer another important factor in understanding Hitler’s health.  Irving is a British historian specialised on WWII. However, Irving’s denial of the Holocaust, leading to a 13-month sentence in Austria, makes his work controversial and has led to doubts about his opinions. Evans expresses that “Irving was never a reasoned historian. His falsification of history and his obsession with denying the Holocaust was motivated by an uncontrollable hero-worship of Hitler.” Taking this into consideration, one questions the extracts chosen to be included, and what he may have left out. This source may therefore have severe limitations when considering Irving’s possible selective attitude towards the facts.  

 Lieberman, Abraham. Furor: Hitler and the Frog: A Medical Murder Mystery and Fairy Tale. Publish America, 2009. Print
 Lieberman’s book draws an interesting connection between modern neurology and Hitler’s corresponding thinking, mood, behaviour and physical appearance. Doctor Abraham Lieberman is an internationally recognised leader in Parkinson’s and the Medical Director at the Muhammad Ali Parkinson Centre. His contemporary medical knowledge and technology give him an advantage in his assessment of Hitler’s health, while his respected status gives him the notion of credibility. In his preface, he writes of his professional motivation as a Parkinson’s specialist, to investigate the effects the disease had on this particular case. His Jewish background and resultant “fascination of Adolf Hitler” also play a role in the creation of the book; Lieberman concluding that the message he wishes to convey is that, “Disease humbles everyone, even awful people.” However, without examining Hitler directly, Lieberman is not necessarily in a position to make such medical claims.  He is limited to individual reports and footage, neither of which guarantee reliability and could be considered insufficient evidence – making his analysis nothing more than speculation. 
Critically, being a Parkinson’s specialist, Lieberman’s book lacks any alternative illnesses that may have been the reason behind Hitler’s symptoms. 
Word Count: 448

D: Analysis  
Lieberman’s theory is based on Hitler’s deteriorating physical health, notably the tremor in his left hand. He sources this on individual accounts of Hitler’s contemporaries and on video footage, having studied approximately 300 hours of video material to pinpoint Hitler’s symptoms, example being Hitler’s previously mentioned habit of clenching his right fist, which Lieberman recognises as a common method among Parkinson’s sufferers to supress visible trembling. For Lieberman, the tremor, rigidity, and slow movement are indications of Parkinson’s. Various other historians have taken up this theory to explain Hitler’s condition; such as Evans’s description of Hitler’s “Parkinsonian tremor.” While the temporary disappearance of his tremor after the previously mentioned failed July 1944 bomb plot seem at first to point against Parkinson’s, several cases have shown that after sudden, traumatic events, Parkinson tremors can cease for a period of time.
Based on Crinis’s analysis, obtained from newsreels of Hitler’s tremors of the left hand and his general motility, Klaus Fischer states “Hitler definitely had Parkinson’s.” Irving’s book further confirms this, in which Morell’s regular prescription of the drug Homburg 680, used only for treatment against Parkinson’s, supporting Lieberman’s theory. His book is therefore crucial in its synthesis of all available evidence of Hitler’s Parkinson’s.
Others, however, disagree, arguing that there are a number of other reasons for Hitler’s poor condition. Martyn Housden dismisses the Parkinson’s theory by saying that tremor was only noticeable on the left side of his body, while Parkinson’s affects both. Instead, he suggests a cardiac condition, which symptoms include “a strong heart beat, troubled breathing, sweats, pressure in the chest and throat, and the sensation that the heart could stop.” Proof of this is an examination conducted in 1940 that “indicated high blood pressure associated with some damage to the heart. The next month an electrocardiograph indicated progressive arteriosclerosis.”  Another school of medical thought is that Hitler suffered from tertiary syphilis, which shows similar symptoms to those of Parkinson’s. This claim originates from Ernst Hanfstängl, who writes that Hitler contracted syphilis in Vienna around 1908. However, the credibility of Hanfstängl’s original argument is questionable, considering that he continues to accuse Hitler of being a “repressed homosexual”, a “sadist and masochist”, and of having an “Oedipus complex.” Furthermore, neither Hanfstängl nor any other historian writing about this provides any scientific evidence to this claim. Once more in support of Lieberman, Irving condemns Hitler’s syphilis as an “American myth”, providing urinalyses and blood serologies that rule out any such infection, while Kurt Krüger, a doctor who had inspected Hitler for the disease, also dismisses it.
Hitler’s mental instability is a further argument supported by Lieberman that corresponds with the mental symptoms of Parkinson’s. In June 1944, Hitler’s contemporaries complained of their leader’s loss of “mental flexibility” during the Allied D-Day attacks in Normandy. By this time, 12 years of Parkinson’s would have taken its toll, clouding his judgement and remaining adamant that the attack would occur in Calais, refusing to move his Panzer divisions.  According to Dr Hutton of the Neurology Research Centre in Texas, "Hitler's slowness to counterattack at Normandy may have been secondary to mental inflexibility and difficulty in shifting concepts due to Parkinsonism." Characteristically, Hitler had always been a careful strategist, his slow consolidation of power and strategically timed invasions illustrating his patience: As AJP Taylor argues, “Hitler was unusually cautious and unprovocative in every outstanding step he took” It therefore seems illogical for him to have suddenly changed his plan of action – unless one recognises it as a common symptom of advanced Parkinsonism. However, Morell’s diaries are vital in giving a broader view of Hitler’s medical situation, rather than a narrow focus on Parkinsonian symptoms. Evidence given in Irving’s book additionally suggests a possibility of drug dependency and abuse, fuelled by Morell, “administering liberal amounts of sulphonamide drugs to treat even the common cold.” Instead of supporting the mental impact of Parkinson’s disease, Irving declares, “It is certain that the daily dose of drugs hastened the collapse of Hitler’s personality.” In particular, his possible misuse of cocaine has been a source of great speculation, Hitler becoming increasingly reliant on Morell’s cocaine-infused concoctions to relieve him of his physical and mental complaints. Personal correspondence with David Irving, however, has confirmed the historian’s belief in the Parkinson theory despite the various possibilities offered in his book, saying that based on Morell’s diaries, “there is no doubt” about it.  
Word Count: 733

E: Conclusion     
While no definite proof of Hitler’s Parkinson’s exists, the personal observations of his contemporaries, modern medical evaluation of his posture, tremor and mental instability, and particularly Morell’s administration of Homburg 680, all strongly imply Parkinson’s. Furthermore, the medical advancement on Parkinson’s has provided experts with knowledge about the illness that now corresponds with Hitler’s symptoms. This revelation perhaps offers a reason behind Hitler’s baffling decision to launch Operation Barbarossa in 1941. However, although there is no doubt that Hitler was sick, other medical conditions should not be ruled out. While his supposed syphilis may well have simply been an Allied myth and has been disproved by Morell’s medical examinations, stress induced conditions such as General Anxiety Disorder or cardiac problems also seem probable. With no officially documented diagnosis of any specific illness, there can be no certainty in answering this question, but Hitler’s specific symptoms and their progress over time certainly seem to point towards Parkinson’s Disease. 
Word Count: 157

F: Bibliography   
Barrow Neurological Institute. Abraham Lieberman, MD. 23. Oct. 2012 http://www.thebarrow.org/Neurological_Services/Muhammad_Ali_Parkinson_Center/Movement_Disorders_Clinic/211729   Bullock, Alan. Hitler: A Study in Tyranny. Harper Row, Publishers, Inc., 1964. Print  Evans, Richard J. Telling Lies about Hitler: The Holocaust, History and the David Irving Trial. London: Verso, 2002. Print.  Dull, Ralph. Nonviolence Is Not For Wimps. U.S.A.: Xlibris Corporation, 2004. Print.  Evans, Richard J. The Third Reich at War. London: Penguin Books Ltd., 2009. Print.  Fischer, Klaus. Hitler and America. U.S.A.: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011. Print.  Gray, Charles High Court Judge. The Ruling against David Irving: Excerpts from High Court Judge Charles Gray’s Ruling in the David Irving Libel Suit. The Guardian, 2000.
23. Oct. 2012 < http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2000/apr/11/irving1>  Hutton, Thomas. Parkinson’s Part in Hitler’s Downfall. BBC News: Health, 1999
24. Oct. 2012 < http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/406713.stm>  Irving, David. The Secret Diaries of Hitler’s Doctor. London: Focal Point Publications, 1983. Print.  Irving, David. Hitler’s War and The War Path. London: Focal Point Publications, 2000. Print.  Jablonsky, David. Churchill and Hitler: Essays on the Political-Military Direction of Total War. Routledge, 1994. Print.  Kurt Krüger and Sinclair, Upton. I Was Hitler’s Doctor: His Intimate Life. U.S.A.: Kissinger Publishing, 2005. Print.   Lieberman, Abraham. Adolf Hitler had Post-encephalitic Parkinsonism. Parkinsonism and Related Disorders Vol. 2, 1996. 24. Oct. 2012  Lieberman, Abraham. “Hitler, Parkinson’s Disease and History”. BNI Quatery 11 (1996). 21 Oct. 2012  Lieberman, Abraham. Shaking up Parkinson Disease: Fighting Like a Tiger, Thinking Like a Fox. Jones and Bartlett Learning, 2002. Print  Lipstadt, Deborah. History on Trial: My Day in Court with David Irving. New York: ECCO, 2005. Print.  Lönker, Julia. Personal Interview. 21. November, 2012.  Nicholls, David. Adolf Hitler: A Biographical Companion. California: ABC-CLIO, 2000. Print.  Portman, Michael E. Generalised Anxiety Disorder Across the Lifespan. U.S.A.: Springer, 2009. Print.   Raico, Ralph. AJP Taylor and the Causes of World War II. New Individualist Review, 1961. 24. Oct. 2012  Ronken, E., and G.J.M. van Sharrenburg. Parkinson’s Disease: Volume I of Solvay Pharmaceuticals Conferences. IOS Press, 2002. Print.  Winters, Adam. Syphilis. U.S.A.: The Rosen Publishing Group, 2006. Print.


How Does the Film “Triumph of the Will” by Leni Riefenstahl Address the Night of the Long Knives?

Plan of Approach
I will compare the film Triumph of the Will to the original itinerary of the Nüremberg Party Rally as well as transcripts of Hitler’s speeches. I will read William Shirer’s eye-witness accounts of the 1934 Nüremberg Rally as recorded in his Berlin Diary. I will read The Perfect Nazi by Martin Davidson, a biography of the author’s grandfather, a member of the SS who attended the 1934 Nüremberg Rally. Additionally, I will examine photographs of the filming and of the Nüremberg Rally itself. I will go to the Reichsparteitagsgelände in the Luitpoldhain in Nüremberg in order to gain a genuine sense of the scope and perspective of the event, beyond the images shown in the film.

Summary
William L. Shirer describes the 1934 Reichsparteitag des deutschen Volkes in Nüremberg as a pseudo-pentecostal event in which the masses viewed Adolf Hitler “as if he were Messiah, their faces transformed into something positively inhuman”
. Despite the official purpose of strengthening the liaison between the Nazi Party and the German people and exemplifying the “unfolding glory and power” of the Third Reich, the annual NSDAP Nüremberg Rallies, as eminent historian Richard J. Overy claims, mainly served to foster Hitler’s cult of personality. Hitler desired the Nüremberg Rally of 1934 to be immortalized in recording and assigned his protégée, prominent filmmaker Leni Riefenstahl, the duty. The result was the groundbreaking masterpiece, Triumph des Willens, a motion picture that, despite its close association with Nazism, is still considered a keystone and “breathtaking” role model of modern cinema. Up to her death in 2003, Riefenstahl has consistently denied her alleged sympathy with the Nazi Party and has insisted that “Triumph of the Will” be regarded as a work of art rather than propaganda.
Every party rally was orchestrated thematically, yet the September 1934 Nüremberg Rally was the exception; only later, after Riefenstahl’s film, was it declared to be the “Rally of Power”
. However, this Rally posed a challenge for the dictator that unintentionally ironized the theme: just three months earlier, Hitler had took action against the Sturmabteilung (SA) and its leader, Ernst Röhm, in the infamous Night of the Long Knives, an operation involving at least 85 extra-judicial killings
, spanning the 30th of June until the 2nd of July. Now, facing the entire Party, including the SA, as well as a crowd of several thousand civilians at the Nüremberg Rally, Hitler encountered the task of publicly rationalizing Operation Hummingbird. This would suggest that his position as leader in 1934 was not as solid as commonly assumed.
Triumph of the Will addresses the Night of the Long Knives through several significant details. It strikingly captures the grave moment Adolf Hitler walks through an immaculate formation of 150,000 SS and SA troops, flanked by Heinrich Himmler and Victor Lutze. The latter was the new appointed leader of the brown-shirts, having just replaced the defamed Ernst Röhm after Operation Hummingbird. Being his first official appearance as Stabschef, Lutze encountered an aura heavy with the suppressed memory of the Party’s recent exploits and the violent riddance of his predecessor. In his eye-witness account, William L. Shirer notes that “the SA boys received him coolly”. In one of the final scenes, Hitler holds a speech with references towards “unity” and “loyalty”, alluding to the reason for the Night of the Long Knives.
It is important to note that the planning and organisation for the 1934 Nüremberg Rally took into account the making of Triumph of the Will and was designed to allow effective filming, always bearing in mind the resolute goal of publicizing the event to the broader German public. For instance, her crew was ensured to have ruts and space for camera tracks. Therefore, to an extent, many of the visual arrangements were suited to the filming, making practicality a secondary concern.

Evaluation of Sources
Triumph des Willens - film by Leni Riefenstahl
Whether Triumph of the Will should be viewed as a documentary, a work of art or a piece of propaganda is matter of debate. These different stances have an effect on its suitability and value as a historical source. The Wagnerist music, aptly matching the ideology, appeals to the viewers’ emotions and thus poses an obstacle to the objective interpretation of the Rally. The fact that there are only shots of crowds, not of individuals (with the exception of Party officials) further presses the ideological concept of a homogenous population showing wholehearted support for the NSDAP, classifying the film, although not official propaganda, as a work with National Socialist sympathies. Riefenstahl had some of the official speakers reenact their speeches in studios when the cut during the actual Rally was not suitable. This indicates that the Riefenstahl did not attempt to portray the Rally as it happened, but had artistic priorities. It is not useful to a historian wishing to learn about the nature of the speeches at the event itself. Regardless of this however, Triumph of the Will is useful as evidence of how the Nazi Party portrayed itself to the broad German public, as well as the world outside of Germany.
When regarded as a work of art rather than an objective account of the Nüremberg Rally, one would assume that the film does not guarantee a realistic portrayal of the events, but rather manipulated them in order to achieve the greatest aesthetic effect. Similarly, if one considers it an element of Nazi propaganda rather than an independent documentary, one would conjecture that the design to convey political messages outweighed the notion of portraying the events of the Rally soberly. This is confirmed by the camera angles chosen to depict Hitler; Riefenstahl used techniques such as camera angles and clear sky backgrounds to bestow on the Führer a superhuman, larger-than-life quality. However, it is important to note that the Nüremberg Party Rally of 1934 was organised bearing in the mind the making of the film and that therefore, the itinerary of the event was adapted to suit the filming. The position of troops and officers, for example, was planned to create a visual aesthetic effect, rather than have a practical purpose. It is appropriate to examine the Nüremberg Party Rally and Triumph of the Will as one unit, because one was outlined with respect to the other. Hence, although aspects such as music and camera angles may manipulate viewers’ perception of events, the film does not necessarily warp the reality of the Nüremberg Party Rally itself.

Berlin Diary - witness account of the Third Reich 1934-41 by William Shirer
In his Berlin Diary, William Shirer, an American radio journalist broadcasting to the Amercian public, gives palpable, insightful descriptions of many events between 1934 and 1941, including detailed accounts of the 1934 Nüremberg Rally. It is useful as evidence of a detached observer’s perception of the events, especially as his tone is generally sober. However, at times, Shirer’s language is passionate and discloses emotional involvement. The name “Diary” already suggests a personal connection to the events he describes, indicating not only valuable, intimate knowledge, but also personal inclination. As the Berlin Diary was written as a journal during his stay in Germany, Shirer offers in-the-moment accounts of events, lacking reflective hindsight. This is useful to a historian wishing to grasp the nature of the Nüremberg Party Rally from the perspective of an observer, but is not useful as evidence of its context and consequences.
Additionally, Shirer uses numerous German witnesses as sources, but disguises their identity in order to leave no clues for the Gestapo. This makes it extremely difficult to evaluate the accuracy and reliability of the information he published. It is unclear to what extent the sources sympathised with or disliked the regime and thus how biased their statements are. Shirer only moved to Germany in 1934, so was still relatively new to the country, culture and language at the time of writing his Berlin Diary, which may have inhibited his understanding of society and may have led to misinterpretations on his side. 
Analysis
Sir Ian Kershaw argues that, although following the Night of the Long Knives the Sturmabteilung was forfeited its importance, Hitler could now have confidence in the freshly cleansed bloc. However, Triumph of the Will points to the opposite. The position of the SS and SA troops while the men address the crowds spotlights the atmosphere following the purge: during Hitler’s speech, the SS surround him in an escort fashion, assuming a protective stance, thus indicating subtle apprehension; perhaps a revenge attack from the brown-shirts was not inconceivable. This bespeaks Hitler’s precarious standing and continuous mistrust of the paramilitary group; it shows that, despite the hazardous purge, the brown-shirts’ adherence was still doubted. William Shirer confirms this in his “Berlin Diary”. He states that “there was considerable tension in the stadium and I noticed that Hitler’s own SS bodyguard was drawn up in force in front of him, separating him from the mass of the brown-shirts. We wondered if just one of those fifty thousand brown-shirts wouldn’t pull a revolver, but not one did”. This demonstrates that, despite the purge of the SA during the Night of the Long Knives, Hitler still mistrusted the group, choosing instead to emphasize the SS’s role as his protective squad and placing them directly opposite the SA. Martin Davidson, in his account of his grandfather’s life as an SS man, asserts that there existed considerable animosity between the two groups, culminating in fights and brawls under the influence of alcohol behind the scenes of the 1934 Rally. He also believes that Hitler was vulnerable at a time so soon after the Night of the Long Knives.
Yet the fact that, to a considerable extent, the Rally was organised according to the filming indicates that the positions of the SS and SA men may have nothing but aesthetic significance. In fact, by going to the Rally grounds in Nüremberg, one can see for oneself that the position the SS bodyguard took around Hitler was not practical, but rather served a visual purpose.

Conclusion
The post-Operation Hummingbird aura is explicit in Triumph of the Will, and is especially heavy in the scene depicting Hitler’s address to the Schutzstaffel and the Sturmabteilung. Despite their positions and formations having aesthetic purposes, it is still evident that there was a rift between the two groups, the former being closer to Hitler than the latter, resulting in drunk quarrels during the Rally. These were, needless to say, excluded from the film. Nevertheless, the cold animosity and tension is evident.

Bibliography
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Stackelberg, Roderick; Winkle, Sally A. Page 180. Taylor and Francis Group. New York: Routledge, 2002. 21 Davidson, Martin. The Perfect Nazi: Uncovering my SS Grandfather’s Secret Past and How Hitler Seduced a Generation. Page 161. Penguin Group. London: Penguin Books, 2010.