From the May 2025 IBDP History paper 3 Examinaton
Example 1:
The economic policies implemented by Adolf Hitler's regime between 1933 and the outbreak of war in 1939 have been subject to extensive debate regarding their "success." Judged by the regime’s own explicit aims – the eradication of mass unemployment, the comprehensive rearmament of Germany, and the achievement of national economic self-sufficiency (autarky) – a superficial assessment might suggest considerable achievements. Unemployment figures plummeted, military capacity expanded dramatically, and certain strategic industries saw significant growth. However, a more critical analysis reveals that these apparent successes were often built upon unsustainable foundations, involved severe distortions of the economy, relied on the expropriation of assets and the suppression of living standards for many, and were inextricably linked to preparations for an aggressive war. The "success" was, therefore, partial, unevenly distributed, and ultimately geared towards objectives that would prove catastrophic. This essay will argue that while Hitler's economic policies did achieve notable short-term successes in reducing unemployment and rapidly rearming, these came at the cost of genuine consumer welfare, economic freedom, and long-term stability, ultimately creating an economy primed for war and plunder rather than sustainable prosperity.
The most immediate and politically potent success claimed by the Nazi regime was the dramatic reduction in unemployment. When Hitler became Chancellor in January 1933, Germany was reeling from the Great Depression, with official unemployment figures standing at over six million, representing roughly a third of the workforce. The Weimar governments had struggled to cope with this crisis, and the Nazis inherited an economy already showing nascent signs of cyclical recovery. Nevertheless, the regime launched a series of initiatives aimed at job creation and economic stimulation. Hjalmar Schacht, initially as President of the Reichsbank and later as Minister of Economics, played a crucial role in the early years, employing unorthodox financial methods, such as the use of MEFO bills, to fund public works and rearmament without immediately causing rampant inflation. Large-scale public works programmes, some of which had been planned under previous administrations, were expanded and aggressively promoted. The construction of the Autobahn network, for example, initiated by the "Law for the Establishment of the Reich Autobahn Company" in June 1933, became a powerful symbol of national revival and technological prowess, directly employing, at its peak in 1936, around 125,000 workers, with many more indirectly benefiting in ancillary industries like cement, steel, and motor vehicle production. The "Reinhardt Programme" of June 1933 allocated one billion Reichsmarks for public works, including road construction, bridge building, and land improvement schemes. Further measures included marriage loans, introduced in June 1933, which provided interest-free loans of up to 1,000 Reichsmarks to newly married couples on the condition that the wife left employment, thereby removing women from the official labour statistics. The establishment of the Reich Labour Service (Reichsarbeitsdienst, RAD) in June 1935, made compulsory for six months for young men aged 18-25 (and later for young women), absorbed hundreds of thousands into quasi-military manual labour projects, such as land reclamation and forestry work. By 1936, official unemployment had fallen to 1.6 million, and by 1939, the regime claimed a state of full employment, even labour shortages in certain sectors. Conscription, reintroduced in March 1935, also played a significant role, removing vast numbers of young men from the labour market and placing them into the rapidly expanding Wehrmacht; by 1939, the armed forces numbered approximately 1.4 million men. Evans contends that while the drop in unemployment was genuine, the statistics were manipulated to present an overly favourable picture. He points out that the official figures did not count those women who were persuaded or compelled to leave their jobs, Jews who were progressively dismissed from civil service and other professions (beginning with the Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service in April 1933), or those temporarily engaged in RAD schemes or short-term relief work as fully or meaningfully employed. Furthermore, many of the jobs created were in sectors directly or indirectly related to rearmament, rather than in sustainable consumer industries, skewing the nature of the recovery. The reduction in unemployment, while a significant political victory for Hitler, was thus achieved through a combination of direct state intervention, statistical manipulation, and the reorientation of the economy towards military preparedness, with the quality and freedom associated with employment being severely compromised by the abolition of independent trade unions in May 1933 and their replacement by the German Labour Front (Deutsche Arbeitsfront, DAF).
The nature of the employment created and the methods used to achieve this reduction warrant closer scrutiny. While the Autobahnen were a visible achievement, their direct economic impact in terms of job creation was significant but not the sole driver of recovery, and their primary military utility in 1939 was less than often portrayed, with rail remaining far more crucial for military logistics. Their propaganda value, however, projecting an image of a modern, dynamic, and unified Germany, was immense. The expansion of the armed forces and the industries supplying them became the true engine of job creation. By 1938-39, an estimated 20-25% of the German workforce was engaged in armaments-related production. This focus had profound implications for the overall health and balance of the economy. The suppression of independent trade unions and the establishment of the DAF, under Robert Ley, meant that workers lost their rights to collective bargaining and to strike. Wages were largely frozen or controlled by state-appointed "Trustees of Labour," and while some workers, particularly skilled labour in armaments industries, saw improvements, the general purchasing power of many did not significantly increase due to rising prices for some consumer goods and increased deductions for taxes and various contributions. The DAF did implement programmes like "Strength Through Joy" (Kraft durch Freude, KdF), offering subsidised holidays, leisure activities, and cultural events, and "Beauty of Labour" (Schönheit der Arbeit), which aimed to improve working conditions. These initiatives were designed to foster worker loyalty and improve morale but couldn't fully compensate for the loss of genuine economic agency or the stagnation of real wages for a significant portion of the workforce. For instance, while KdF offered affordable holidays, including sea cruises on ships like the Wilhelm Gustloff, only a minority of workers could actually partake, and the heavily promoted Volkswagen ("People's Car") scheme, where workers paid instalments via stamps, failed to deliver a single car to a paying customer before war redirected production entirely to military vehicles; the accumulated savings were effectively expropriated. The "battle for work" also involved pressuring businesses to take on more labour, sometimes irrespective of strict economic need, further subordinating economic efficiency to political objectives. The agricultural sector, vital for the regime's autarkic ambitions, was also subject to significant intervention. The Reich Food Estate (Reichsnährstand), established in September 1933 under R. Walther Darré, controlled agricultural production, prices, and distribution, aiming to ensure food self-sufficiency and protect farmers. The Hereditary Farm Law (Reichserbhofgesetz) of September 1933 aimed to preserve small and medium-sized farms by making them indivisible and heritable, intended to create a stable peasant base, but it also tied farmers to their land and sometimes hindered agricultural modernisation and efficiency. Despite these efforts, Germany remained reliant on food imports for certain commodities. Therefore, the "success" in reducing unemployment was multifaceted, achieved through a massive state-led rearmament drive, public works, the removal of specific groups from the labour market, and an increase in state control over labour and industry, rather than through organic growth in the consumer sector or a genuine improvement in broadly based economic freedom.
A central pillar of Hitler's economic policy was rapid and extensive rearmament, coupled with the pursuit of autarky, or national economic self-sufficiency, to prepare Germany for a future war. From 1933 onwards, military expenditure rose dramatically, initially concealed through mechanisms like the MEFO bills. These were essentially IOUs issued by a dummy company, Metallurgische Forschungsgesellschaft (MEFO), which allowed the government to finance rearmament off-budget, with the bills discounted by the Reichsbank. Between 1933 and 1938, an estimated 12 billion Reichsmarks were financed through MEFO bills. By 1935, with the public announcement of rearmament and the reintroduction of conscription, spending became more overt. Military expenditure as a percentage of national income rose from under 5% in 1933 to approximately 23% by 1939. This massive diversion of resources transformed key sectors of German industry, particularly steel, chemicals, and engineering, which saw booming production and employment. The Four Year Plan, launched in late 1936 under the authority of Hermann Göring, was explicitly designed to make Germany war-ready within four years. Its primary objectives were to increase agricultural production, achieve self-sufficiency in essential raw materials such as rubber, oil, and iron ore, and to further expand armaments production. This involved significant state investment and direction of industry. Ambitious targets were set for the production of synthetic materials (ersatz). For example, the Buna Werke was established to produce synthetic rubber, and plants for the hydrogenation of coal to produce synthetic fuel were heavily subsidised, such as the Leuna works. Significant efforts were made to increase domestic iron ore production, even from low-grade deposits, and to develop aluminium production as a substitute for other metals. However, the pursuit of autarky proved immensely challenging and was only partially successful by 1939. Despite substantial investment in synthetic production, Germany remained heavily reliant on imports for many crucial raw materials. In 1939, it still imported around 33% of its iron ore requirements, approximately 66% of its oil, and over 80% of its rubber (natural and synthetic combined did not meet demand). The production of ersatz materials was often far more expensive and resource-intensive than importing the natural equivalents, placing a further strain on the economy. For instance, synthetic fuel was several times more costly than imported petroleum. The agricultural sector, despite the efforts of the Reich Food Estate, failed to achieve complete self-sufficiency in foodstuffs, particularly fats and proteins. Germany continued to depend on international trade, which Schacht had tried to manage through complex bilateral trade agreements and currency controls (the "New Plan" of 1934), often involving barter systems with countries in Southeastern Europe and Latin America to secure raw materials without depleting foreign currency reserves. These agreements did provide some relief but could not fully overcome Germany's fundamental resource deficiencies. A pedagogical approach, such as one an educator like David Heath might employ, would encourage a critical examination of the rhetoric versus the reality of autarky. Heath has prompted an inquiry into whether the enormous expenditure on often inefficient ersatz production represented a rational economic choice or a politically driven imperative that ultimately weakened Germany's overall economic position by diverting capital and labour from other potentially more productive areas, including the consumer goods sector. Students might be asked to consider the opportunity costs involved and whether the focus on autarky, while boosting certain industries, created inherent vulnerabilities due to the high cost and limited output of synthetic substitutes.
The intense focus on rearmament and the partial pursuit of autarky had significant consequences for other aspects of the German economy and for the living standards of the population. The prioritisation of "guns over butter" became an explicit policy, articulated by figures like Göring. This meant that resources – capital, labour, and raw materials – were systematically channelled towards military-related industries at the expense of consumer goods production and public services not directly related to the war effort. While there were no widespread, acute shortages of basic necessities for most of the period up to 1939, the availability and quality of many consumer goods stagnated or declined. The production of items like textiles, household appliances, and even certain foodstuffs was constrained. This limited the material improvement in living standards that might otherwise have resulted from the fall in unemployment. The regime's financial policies, while initially successful in stimulating demand and funding rearmament without immediate runaway inflation, were inherently unstable. The massive increase in government spending, financed heavily through borrowing (like MEFO bills which were due for repayment from 1938) and the anticipation of future revenues (including from conquered territories), created immense fiscal pressure. By 1938-1939, the German economy was showing signs of overheating: labour shortages were acute, some raw material bottlenecks were appearing despite autarkic efforts, and inflationary pressures were mounting, suppressed only by stringent wage and price controls. Schacht himself became increasingly concerned about the inflationary risks of this rapid rearmament and clashed with Göring over the pace and scale of military expenditure, leading to Schacht's resignation as Minister of Economics in 1937 and as President of the Reichsbank in January 1939. His departure signalled the triumph of more radical elements within the regime who prioritised rapid rearmament above all considerations of fiscal prudence. The economy was increasingly becoming a command economy, with the state dictating production priorities, allocating resources, and controlling prices and wages. Private businesses, while often profiting from rearmament contracts (such as IG Farben, Krupp, and Rheinmetall), found their autonomy increasingly curtailed. They were subject to state directives regarding investment, production quotas, and raw material allocation. The "primacy of politics" meant that economic decisions were subordinated to the ideological and military ambitions of the Nazi leadership. The annexation of Austria in March 1938 (the Anschluss) and the Sudetenland in October 1938 provided temporary economic boosts, bringing in gold reserves, industrial capacity, and raw materials, but these were essentially acts of plunder that foreshadowed the regime's longer-term economic strategy of exploiting conquered territories to sustain its war machine. By 1939, the German economy was not geared for a protracted war of attrition; it was better prepared for short, sharp Blitzkrieg campaigns that would rely on quick victories to seize resources and prevent the full strain of war from falling on the domestic economy. The drive for rearmament, therefore, while achieving its immediate goal of creating a formidable military, did so by creating an economy that was imbalanced, reliant on continued expansion, and unsustainable in the long term without conquest.
The impact of Hitler's economic policies on the living standards of the German population up to 1939 was varied and complex, and the extent to which the economy was truly prepared for war remains a subject of debate. While the eradication of mass unemployment was a tangible benefit felt by millions who regained employment, the quality of this employment and the overall improvement in material well-being were not uniform. For many German workers, particularly those in non-essential industries or with less sought-after skills, real wages (wages adjusted for inflation and deductions) showed little to no significant increase between 1933 and 1939. Official statistics often presented a rosier picture than the reality experienced by households. While nominal wages rose, this was often offset by longer working hours, increased contributions to various state and party organisations (including the DAF, Winter Relief, etc.), and rising prices for some essential goods due to the diversion of resources to rearmament. Access to a wider variety of quality consumer goods was limited, as the "guns over butter" policy deliberately constrained their production. The previously mentioned KdF programmes did offer some tangible benefits and a sense of improved well-being for a segment of the working class, providing affordable leisure opportunities that were previously out of reach. However, participation was not universal, and these programmes also served a crucial propaganda function, fostering loyalty to the regime and compensating psychologically for stagnant material gains. For specific groups, economic conditions worsened dramatically. Jewish citizens faced systematic economic persecution, starting with boycotts of Jewish businesses in April 1933, progressive exclusion from professions, and culminating in the "Aryanisation" of Jewish property – the forced sale of Jewish-owned businesses and assets at drastically undervalued prices, particularly accelerating after the Kristallnacht pogrom of November 1938. These expropriated assets provided a significant financial windfall for the regime and for non-Jewish Germans who benefited from acquiring them. Farmers, while initially courted by the regime with promises of security and ideological valorisation as the "blood source of the German people," experienced mixed fortunes. The Reich Food Estate provided price stability and protected them from foreign competition, but it also subjected them to rigid production quotas and controls, limiting their entrepreneurial freedom. The Hereditary Farm Law, while offering security of tenure for some, could also lead to indebtedness and restricted the movement of labour out of agriculture, contributing to labour shortages in other sectors. Overy argues that by 1939, the German economy was not fully mobilised for a total war of the kind that would later unfold. He suggests that the rearmament programme was impressive in scale but had not yet peaked in many areas, and there were still significant limitations in terms of raw material stockpiles and the capacity to sustain very high levels of armaments production over a prolonged period. The economic strategy seemed geared more towards a series of short, decisive campaigns (Blitzkrieg) where initial successes would allow for the plunder of resources from defeated enemies to fuel further war efforts, rather than a deep, sustained mobilisation of the entire domestic economy from the outset.
The increasing state control over the economy was a defining feature of the Nazi system by 1939, fundamentally altering the relationship between government, business, and labour. While private property ostensibly remained, the autonomy of businesses was severely curtailed. The Four Year Plan Organisation under Göring wielded immense power, directing investment, allocating scarce raw materials, and setting production targets, particularly in industries deemed vital for rearmament and autarky. This created a complex bureaucracy and often led to conflicts between different state and party agencies vying for control over economic resources (e.g., the Wehrmacht, Göring's organisation, and various ministries). Price and wage controls were extensive, attempting to suppress the inflationary pressures generated by massive state spending and resource scarcity. These controls, however, often distorted market signals and could lead to inefficiencies and black markets, although the latter were less prevalent before the war than during it. The preparation for war by 1939 was significant, especially in terms of the Wehrmacht's offensive capabilities for rapid campaigns. The Luftwaffe had become one of the world's most formidable air forces, and the army possessed modern equipment, particularly in its panzer divisions. However, the depth of economic preparedness for a long, drawn-out conflict, akin to the First World War, was questionable. For example, stocks of essential war materials like rubber, oil, and certain metals were not sufficient for years of sustained conflict without replenishment from external sources, reinforcing the idea that Hitler's economic and military planning envisaged quick victories. The German economy in 1939 was, in many respects, a "pressure-cooker" economy, operating at full capacity, heavily reliant on state direction and borrowing, and geared overwhelmingly towards military expansion. The "successes" in rearmament and creating a degree of employment were achieved by mortgaging the future and suppressing domestic consumption. The drive for autarky had yielded some results in synthetic production but had not freed Germany from critical import dependencies, implying that war and conquest were seen as integral to securing necessary resources. Thus, while Hitler's economic policies could be deemed "successful" in the narrow sense of achieving the regime's immediate political goals of reducing unemployment and rearming Germany for aggressive war, they failed to create a balanced, sustainable, or prosperous economy for the majority of the German people in the long term. The system was inherently unstable and predicated on continued expansion and exploitation.
To conclude, the economic policies pursued by Hitler's regime up to 1939 yielded a mixture of conspicuous short-term achievements and profound underlying failures. The drastic reduction in official unemployment figures was a significant political triumph, restoring a sense of purpose to millions and bolstering the regime's popularity. Similarly, the rapid and extensive rearmament created a formidable military machine, positioning Germany for its aggressive foreign policy objectives. These apparent successes, however, were achieved at a considerable cost. The "employment miracle" was partly a result of statistical manipulation, the exclusion of women and persecuted minorities from the workforce, and the direction of labour into state-controlled schemes and armaments industries, often with limited improvement in real wages or working autonomy for many. The pursuit of autarky, while fostering some innovation in synthetic materials, fell far short of its goals, leaving Germany still reliant on crucial imports and distorting the economy with inefficient, high-cost production. The overwhelming focus on "guns over butter" suppressed the consumer goods sector, limiting improvements in general living standards and creating an economy heavily skewed towards military production. Financially, the regime's policies were unsustainable, relying on unorthodox measures like MEFO bills, increasing state debt, and the eventual plunder of occupied territories. By 1939, the German economy was not a model of sustainable prosperity but rather a highly controlled, militarised entity, geared for short, expansionist wars. Therefore, while Hitler's economic policies were "successful" in meeting the immediate, aggressive aims of the Nazi leadership, they failed to build a sound or equitable economic foundation and instead laid the groundwork for a war that would ultimately devastate Germany and much of Europe. The extent of their success is thus heavily dependent on the criteria applied: politically expedient and militarily enabling in the short run, but economically unbalanced, repressive, and ultimately catastrophic.
Example 2:
Social division was a critical but not exclusive factor in the emergence of authoritarian regimes in the twentieth century, functioning as both a symptom and a catalyst of deeper systemic crises. In interwar Germany, the fragmented social structure inherited from the Wilhelmine Empire and exacerbated by the economic and political turmoil of the Weimar period created fertile ground for the Nazi Party’s rise. Similarly, in Argentina during the mid-twentieth century, entrenched socio-economic inequalities and regional disparities enabled Juan Domingo Perón to mobilise mass support through a populist platform that simultaneously addressed and manipulated class divisions. In both cases, social division interacted with institutional fragility, elite miscalculation, and external pressures to facilitate authoritarian consolidation, though the precise mechanisms and outcomes differed significantly. The extent to which social division was the most significant factor must be assessed alongside political instability, economic crisis, and the agency of individual leaders.
Germany’s transition from a fragile democracy to a totalitarian dictatorship under Adolf Hitler between 1930 and 1933 illustrated how acute social fragmentation could undermine parliamentary legitimacy and empower extremist movements. Following the abdication of Kaiser Wilhelm II in 1918 and the imposition of the Treaty of Versailles, German society was deeply polarised along class, religious, and ideological lines. The Weimar Republic inherited a polity fractured between industrial workers aligned with Social Democracy, conservatives rooted in the Prussian aristocracy, Catholic centrists, and a growing radical right disillusioned with liberal democracy. These divisions were institutionalised through proportional representation, which ensured parliamentary fragmentation and chronic governmental instability; between 1919 and 1933, no fewer than twenty different cabinets held office, none lasting more than 2.5 years on average. Historians such as Eric D. Weitz have emphasised that the structural weaknesses of the Weimar Republic, particularly its inability to forge a cohesive national identity amid deep-seated social cleavages, made it uniquely vulnerable to authoritarian takeover. Weitz notes that the Republic’s reliance on emergency decrees under Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution eroded democratic norms and set a precedent for authoritarian governance that Hitler would later exploit.
The economic dislocation following the Great Depression further magnified existing social divisions and discredited mainstream political parties. By 1932, unemployment in Germany had reached six million, with industrial output declining by over 40 per cent since 1929. The agrarian crisis, which had begun earlier in the 1920s, continued to impoverish rural communities, while middle-class shopkeepers and artisans faced extinction in the face of department store competition and inflationary pressures. These disparate grievances were channelled into support for radical alternatives, with the Nazi Party achieving electoral breakthroughs in rural Protestant areas and among the lower middle class, groups that felt abandoned by both traditional conservatism and Marxist socialism. Richard Hamilton’s statistical analysis of Nazi voting patterns reveals that support for the NSDAP was highest in regions characterised by economic insecurity, low unionisation, and Protestant religious affiliation, suggesting that social divisions provided a crucial demographic base for Hitler’s ascent. The Nazis’ appeal lay in their ability to synthesise disparate grievances into a cohesive narrative of national renewal, blaming Jews, communists, and the political establishment for Germany’s decline.
However, the Nazi Party’s consolidation of power cannot be attributed solely to social division; it also depended on strategic manipulation of institutional mechanisms and elite accommodation. Following the July 1932 elections, in which the Nazis became the largest party in the Reichstag but lacked a governing majority, Hitler initially refused a subordinate role in a coalition government. His persistence appeared politically suicidal until conservative elites, alarmed by the growing influence of the Communist Party and hoping to harness Nazi popularity to preserve the existing social order, persuaded President Paul von Hindenburg to appoint Hitler as Chancellor on 30 January 1933. This decision reflected a fatal miscalculation by traditional power brokers, including Franz von Papen and Alfred Hugenberg, who believed they could contain Hitler within a presidential cabinet. As Ian Kershaw has argued, the Nazi seizure of power was not inevitable but was contingent upon elite complicity and the collapse of constitutional norms. Kershaw emphasises that Hitler’s appointment represented a conscious decision by conservative elites to sacrifice democracy in favour of authoritarian stability, viewing the Nazis as a bulwark against Bolshevism. Thus, while social division created conditions conducive to extremism, the actual transition to dictatorship required the active participation of established institutions.
The role of social division in Argentina’s descent into authoritarianism under Juan Domingo Perón between 1943 and 1946 exhibits different dynamics, highlighting the importance of contingent political factors alongside structural inequality. Argentina in the early twentieth century was among the wealthiest nations in the world, benefiting from agricultural exports and foreign investment, but its society was deeply divided along lines of class, ethnicity, and regional development. The oligarchic landowning elite, concentrated in Buenos Aires and the Pampas, dominated political life and excluded the burgeoning urban working class from meaningful representation. Labour migration from Europe, particularly Italy and Spain, had created a large industrial proletariat concentrated in Buenos Aires and Rosario, who faced poor working conditions, inadequate housing, and exclusion from the political process. Political scientist Guillermo O’Donnell has characterised this configuration as “populist exclusion,” in which the state relied on clientelist networks to co-opt selected sectors while denying broader democratic participation. The failure of traditional parties such as the Radical Civic Union (UCR) and the Conservative Party to address working-class grievances created a political vacuum that Perón skillfully exploited after his rise to power as Minister of Labour in 1943.
Perón’s political strategy was predicated on the systematic incorporation of organised labour into the state apparatus while simultaneously suppressing opposition through authoritarian methods. His appointment as President in 1946 followed a carefully orchestrated campaign that portrayed him as the champion of the descamisados (shirtless ones), a term he used to symbolise the dignity of the working class. Perón’s reforms, including the establishment of a labour court, wage increases, and paid holidays, earned him widespread support among industrial workers, who became the core constituency of his populist movement. Yet these gains were accompanied by the erosion of civil liberties, censorship of the press, and the persecution of political opponents, particularly members of the Communist Party and conservative factions. Tulio Halperin Donghi, a prominent Argentine historian, argues that Perón’s rise exemplifies the paradox of populism in Latin America, whereby the empowerment of marginalised groups occurred through the centralisation of executive power and the weakening of institutional checks. Halperin contends that social division provided the emotional and ideological fuel for Peronism but that its institutionalisation required the active manipulation of state structures and the construction of a cult of personality around the leader.
The consolidation of Peronist rule also depended on the strategic use of nationalist and anti-imperialist rhetoric to obscure internal divisions and consolidate legitimacy. Perón positioned himself as the defender of Argentine sovereignty against foreign economic domination, particularly from Britain and the United States, whose influence in the Argentine economy had long been resented by nationalist sectors. His nationalisation of the British-owned railways in 1947 and the promotion of import-substitution industrialisation were framed as acts of national redemption, appealing to both working-class solidarity and middle-class aspirations for modernisation. At the same time, Perón sought to neutralise elite resistance through selective concessions, such as maintaining agricultural export subsidies that benefited large landowners. This dual strategy of empowering the masses while co-opting elites allowed Perón to maintain a tenuous balance between populism and authoritarianism. Yet the social divisions that had once facilitated his rise also contained the seeds of future instability, as the exclusion of conservative sectors and the radicalisation of labour militancy eventually provoked a military coup in 1955. David Rock, a leading historian of Argentina, has described Peronism as a “revolution from above,” arguing that its achievements in social welfare were undercut by its repressive political practices and failure to institutionalise democratic participation. Rock emphasises that while social division created the conditions for mass mobilisation, the authoritarian trajectory of the regime was determined by the choices of its leader and the limitations of its social base.
Comparative analysis of Nazi Germany and Peronist Argentina reveals that social division functioned as a necessary but insufficient condition for the emergence of authoritarianism. In both cases, entrenched inequalities and fragmented societies created opportunities for charismatic leaders to present themselves as solutions to national crises. However, the consolidation of authoritarian rule required additional factors, including institutional decay, elite accommodation, and the construction of coercive apparatuses capable of suppressing dissent. In Germany, the interaction of economic collapse and elite miscalculation enabled Hitler to dismantle democratic institutions with relative ease, whereas in Argentina, Perón’s ability to balance populist appeals with state repression allowed him to maintain power for a decade. The divergent outcomes highlight the importance of context-specific variables, even as social division remains a recurring theme in the origins of twentieth-century authoritarianism. The extent to which social division can be considered the most significant factor thus varies depending on the interplay of structural pressures and political agency within each national setting.
