From the May 2011 Paper 3 HL History exam
From the markscheme:
The question requires that candidates offer a considered and balanced review of the factors that led to the collapse of the Provisional Government in October/November 1917. Some may argue that the Provisional Government was weakened initially because of Dual Power, but that its overthrow was the result of a coup carried out by the Bolsheviks. Other factors that may have undermined the Provisional Government were its lack of legitimacy (it was self-appointed). Additionally, its failure to implement popular policies, such as dealing with the land question and the decision to continue with the war, was in contrast to Bolshevik policies of Peace, Land and Bread. There may be consideration of the extent of popular support for the Provisional Government by October 1917; it was only able to survive the Kornilov affair with the help of the Red Guards, whereas the Bolsheviks had majorities on the Petrograd and Moscow Soviets.
Timed in-class essay (click to enlarge)
Playing it safe, but at this stage think it's crucial we really focus on the descriptors to prevent any surprises down the line.
Intro is great- again, fluent use of English, the quote shows understanding of demands of the question, and Pipes and Figes shows opposing perspectives. Textbook stuff- want to show the class how it's done using this.
I thought you did a really good job comparing Pipes’s and Figes’s perspectives with specific evidence, such as the scale of the October insurrection and peasant seizures. I worry about the tangential references, like the 1904–1905 uprisings which has nothing to do with the topic- focus on 1917. I think at times an examiner would feel there's a lack of coherence/clarity as he'd be scratching his head.
Above all, especially given your focus on that quote in the intro, develop your analysis by exploring concepts like legitimacy in detail—for example, discuss how the Provisional Government’s unelected status affected specific policies or public trust. You mention the issue of legitimacy in that Figes section: “its lack of popular legitimacy, combined with its failure to end the war, resolve the land question, and feed the cities, eroded support.” OK, but HOW was this lack of legitimacy manifested- think in terms of specific government actions (I mentioned its failure to hold elections), public reactions, or comparisons to the Soviet’s perceived authority. Similarly, Pipes’s reference to the Constituent Assembly elections- which is the topic for next class- is cited but not analysed for how it reflects legitimacy beyond vote percentages. You could have gone deeper into how the PG’s unelected status affected its ability to implement policies or how Bolshevik propaganda exploited this. This superficial treatment I think aligns with Markband 2’s “some understanding” rather than Markband 1’s “clear understanding” of historical concepts.
Also, substantiate claims like “grain deliveries fell by one-third” with inferred context, such as war-related disruptions. You offer stats, but without context they seem unexplored,undeveloped, unevaluated. Here's an example- you write of how “42% of estates had been seized”- that I feel is a description rather than explicit evaluation for their role in the government’s collapse. Nevertheless, I was very impressed by the specific factual information you provided showing real research- to give me an understanding of the scale of the October insurrection you wrote how “only around 25,000 soldiers and sailors actively participated” in a city of two million, the Constituent Assembly election results “40% for SRs, 24% for Bolsheviks”, and peasant land seizures (“42% of estates had been seized by peasants in Tambov province alone”). You also contextualised these details by linking Order Number 1 to the erosion of military authority: “required soldiers to obey Soviet orders rather than government ones, effectively nullifying the government’s military authority.”
Another timed, in-class essay
Example I:
The collapse of Tsarist authority in February 1917 created a political vacuum that the Provisional Government attempted to fill, yet within eight months Lenin's Bolsheviks had seized power in what became known as the October Revolution. The fundamental weakness of the Provisional Government stemmed from its inherent structural contradictions and its failure to address Russia's most pressing concerns during wartime. From its inception on 2 March 1917, the Provisional Government lacked legitimacy, having emerged from the Duma Committee rather than popular mandate, whilst simultaneously competing with the Petrograd Soviet for authority in what Trotsky termed 'dual power'. Prince Lvov's administration, followed by Kerensky's from July 1917, consistently postponed land reform, maintained Russia's participation in an unpopular war, and failed to convene the Constituent Assembly, creating conditions that enabled the Bolsheviks to present themselves as the sole alternative to governmental paralysis.
The Provisional Government's structural weaknesses manifested immediately through the dual power arrangement that emerged following Nicholas II's abdication on 2 March 1917. The Petrograd Soviet, established on 27 February 1917, commanded the loyalty of soldiers and workers through Order Number One, issued on 1 March, which instructed military units to obey the Soviet rather than the Provisional Government in matters of political significance. Pipes argues that this arrangement rendered the Provisional Government impotent from its inception, as it lacked control over the instruments of coercion necessary for effective governance. The Soviet controlled railway communications, postal services, and telegraph systems throughout Petrograd, whilst the Provisional Government possessed formal authority but no mechanism for enforcement. When War Minister Guchkov attempted to restore military discipline in April 1917, garrison soldiers refused his orders and appealed directly to the Soviet, which backed their insubordination. The April Crisis of 18-21 April, triggered by Foreign Minister Miliukov's note confirming Russia's commitment to the Entente's war aims, demonstrated this fundamental weakness when mass demonstrations forced both Miliukov and Guchkov to resign without the Provisional Government being able to deploy troops to maintain order. Figes contends that the Provisional Government's inability to establish monopolistic control over state apparatus during March and April 1917 predetermined its eventual collapse, as competing power centres prevented the implementation of coherent policy. The formation of the first coalition government on 5 May 1917, incorporating six socialist ministers including Kerensky as War Minister, represented an attempt to bridge this divide but merely institutionalised the paralysis, as socialist ministers remained accountable to the Soviet Executive Committee rather than cabinet collective responsibility. Between March and July 1917, the Provisional Government issued over 2,000 decrees and regulations, yet local soviets ignored or countermanded most of these orders, creating what Sukhanov described as 'anarchy from above'. The Moscow Soviet, for instance, established its own militia force of 6,000 men in March 1917, refusing to recognise the authority of the government-appointed city commandant, whilst in Kronstadt naval base, sailors arrested and executed over forty officers between March and May without government intervention. Smith demonstrates that factory committees in Petrograd enterprises assumed management functions from March 1917 onwards, setting production quotas and dismissing engineers without reference to government labour policy. By June 1917, over 400 factories in Petrograd operated under worker control, whilst the government's attempts to regulate wages through the Ministry of Labour were simply ignored. The proliferation of local committees, numbering over 700 in Petrograd alone by July 1917, created parallel administrative structures that bypassed government authority entirely. When Kerensky became Prime Minister on 8 July 1917 following the July Days uprising, he inherited a governmental apparatus that existed largely on paper, with real power dispersed amongst countless revolutionary committees and soviets that recognised no central authority.
The government's continuation of Russia's participation in the First World War proved its most catastrophic policy failure, alienating soldiers, workers, and peasants whilst providing the Bolsheviks with their most effective propaganda weapon. Wildman's analysis of army committees reveals that by April 1917, over two million soldiers had deserted, with entire regiments abandoning frontline positions and returning to their villages to participate in land seizures. The Provisional Government's commitment to the Entente, formalised through Miliukov's note of 18 April confirming Russia would fight until 'decisive victory', contradicted the widespread expectation that revolution would bring immediate peace. Kerensky's June Offensive, launched on 18 June 1917, resulted in over 400,000 casualties within three weeks and triggered the complete disintegration of military discipline on the Southwestern Front. Regiments of the 11th Army murdered thirty-five officers who attempted to enforce attack orders, whilst the 607th Regiment arrested its entire command structure and elected soldiers' committees to negotiate directly with Austrian forces. Wade argues that the government's determination to maintain Russia's international obligations reflected its bourgeois composition and dependence on Allied financial support, with loans from Britain and France totalling 6.5 billion roubles by October 1917. The government's inability to supply adequate provisions to the army - with daily bread rations reduced to 400 grams by September 1917 compared to 1,200 grams in 1916 - accelerated military collapse. General Kornilov reported to the government on 3 August 1917 that the Northern Front had ceased to exist as a fighting force, with soldiers' committees voting to abandon positions and fraternise with German troops. The Provisional Government's response to military disintegration through the restoration of capital punishment on 12 July 1917 proved entirely ineffective, as frontline units refused to carry out executions and instead arrested officers who attempted to implement the decree. Between July and October 1917, military authorities recorded over 2,000 instances of soldiers attacking officers, whilst regimental committees increasingly aligned with Bolshevik demands for immediate peace. The government's failure to initiate peace negotiations despite controlling evidence that Russia lacked resources to continue fighting - munitions production had fallen by 60 per cent compared to 1916 levels whilst transport infrastructure neared complete collapse - demonstrated its fundamental disconnection from popular sentiment. Ferro's examination of soldiers' letters reveals that by September 1917, over 90 per cent expressed hostility to the war's continuation and support for any party promising immediate peace. The Kornilov Affair of 25-30 August 1917, when the Supreme Commander attempted to march on Petrograd, further undermined government authority as Kerensky was forced to arm the Bolshevik Red Guards and release imprisoned Bolshevik leaders to defend against the coup attempt. This decision provided the Bolsheviks with 40,000 armed supporters in Petrograd and rehabilitated their reputation following the July Days suppression, whilst exposing the government's complete dependence on revolutionary forces it could not control.
The Provisional Government's postponement of land reform until the convocation of a Constituent Assembly that never materialised during its tenure created a revolutionary situation in the countryside that undermined state authority and economic stability. Peasants constituted 80 per cent of Russia's population in 1917, yet the Provisional Government's Land Committees, established on 21 April 1917, were instructed merely to collect data rather than implement redistribution, whilst maintaining that property rights remained inviolable pending constitutional resolution. Gill's research documents 4,954 incidents of peasant land seizures between March and October 1917, affecting over 30 million hectares of gentry estates, church lands, and state properties. The government's deployment of military units to suppress rural unrest proved counterproductive, as peasant soldiers deserted en masse to participate in seizures within their own villages, with the 436th Infantry Regiment disbanding entirely in August 1917 when ordered to act against peasants in Tambov province. Minister of Agriculture Chernov's attempts to legalise peasant cultivation of fallow land through the decree of 12 July 1917 were blocked by other cabinet members, particularly the Kadet ministers who insisted on compensation for landowners, paralysing government response to agrarian revolution. By September 1917, grain deliveries to cities had fallen to 30 per cent of requirements, with Petrograd receiving only 12,000 poods daily compared to the minimum requirement of 40,000 poods, creating bread queues that stretched for several blocks and required overnight waiting. The Main Land Committee, meeting on 18 September 1917, reported that peasant communes had assumed complete control over land distribution in 92 per cent of European Russia's districts, rendering government authority non-existent in rural areas. Peasant violence against landowners intensified from July 1917 onwards, with 3,000 manor houses burned between July and October, whilst local land committees, supposedly subordinate to government authority, actively organised expropriations and redistributed estate inventories. The government's inability to maintain grain procurement whilst simultaneously protecting property rights created urban food shortages that radicalised workers, with daily bread rations in Moscow falling to 100 grams by early October 1917. Shanin demonstrates that peasant communities developed sophisticated organisational structures independent of state authority, with volost committees coordinating seizures across entire provinces and establishing peasant militias that numbered over 100,000 armed members by October 1917. The Provisional Government's agricultural policy consisted entirely of postponement and prevarication, issuing seventeen different circulars on land policy between March and October without implementing any substantive reform. When the government finally attempted to address rural anarchy through the declaration of martial law in grain-producing provinces on 27 August 1917, military commanders reported that enforcement was impossible as garrison troops sympathised with peasant demands. The September harvest saw peasant committees commandeer the entire grain surplus in provinces like Saratov and Samara, refusing to release supplies to government procurement agents despite threats of military intervention. Minister of Food Supply Peshekhonov resigned on 31 August 1917 after acknowledging that the government controlled food distribution in no major agricultural region, whilst urban mortality from malnutrition-related diseases increased by 300 per cent compared to 1916 levels.
The Provisional Government's repeated postponement of elections to the Constituent Assembly, initially scheduled for 17 September but delayed until 12 November 1917, denied it democratic legitimacy whilst allowing the Bolsheviks to position themselves as defenders of popular sovereignty. The government's claim that administrative preparations required extensive delays appeared increasingly hollow as months passed without tangible progress, whilst revolutionary expectations for immediate constitutional settlement intensified. Radkey's analysis reveals that the government's electoral commission, established on 25 March 1917, had completed voter registration in only twelve of ninety-three electoral districts by August 1917, reflecting deliberate procrastination rather than technical difficulties. The Kadets within the government feared that immediate elections would produce a socialist majority that would implement radical economic reforms, leading them to obstruct electoral preparations whilst publicly maintaining commitment to democratic principles. Prime Minister Lvov admitted to the British ambassador Buchanan on 20 June 1917 that the government hoped military victory would strengthen moderate forces before elections occurred, revealing the anti-democratic calculations underlying postponement. The July Crisis demonstrated popular impatience with governmental delays, as 500,000 demonstrators demanded 'All Power to the Soviets' partly from frustration that the Constituent Assembly appeared indefinitely deferred. Kerensky's assumption of near-dictatorial powers following the Kornilov Affair, ruling through a Directory of five members from 1 September 1917, contradicted the government's supposed commitment to democratic transition. The Pre-Parliament, convened on 7 October 1917 as a consultative body pending the Constituent Assembly, lacked any legislative authority and was boycotted by the Bolsheviks who denounced it as an anti-democratic manoeuvre. Local government elections in August and September 1917 showed socialist parties commanding overwhelming majorities, with the Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks receiving 70 per cent of votes in municipal elections, yet the Provisional Government refused to transfer power to democratically elected bodies. The Moscow City Duma elections on 25 June 1917 saw the Kadets receive only 17 per cent whilst socialist parties secured 75 per cent, demonstrating that postponement of national elections prevented the expression of clear popular preferences. Rosenberg argues that the Provisional Government's failure to convene the Constituent Assembly reflected fundamental fear of democracy amongst liberal ministers who recognised their minority status within Russian society. The government's creation of numerous preparatory commissions and committees - over forty by September 1917 - served to obscure rather than advance electoral preparations, whilst consuming resources that might have been deployed for actual administration. When the Bolsheviks seized power on 25 October 1917, they justified their action partly as ensuring the Constituent Assembly would actually convene, exploiting the government's democratic deficit. The Provisional Government had existed for 238 days without securing any popular mandate, relying on the fiction that it represented national will whilst systematically avoiding electoral verification of this claim.
Heath's interpretation emphasises that the Provisional Government's weakness stemmed not merely from structural problems but from its fundamental misunderstanding of revolutionary dynamics, attempting to impose liberal parliamentary norms on a society experiencing social revolution. The government's insistence on legal continuity with Tsarist institutions, maintaining the Senate and most ministerial departments unchanged, prevented it from harnessing revolutionary energy that might have sustained its authority. Between March and October 1917, the government changed composition four times, with forty-three different ministers serving in various coalitions, creating administrative chaos that prevented coherent policy implementation. The financial crisis deepened continuously, with inflation reaching 1,000 per cent by October 1917 whilst government revenues covered only 15 per cent of expenditure, forcing reliance on unsupported currency emissions that further destabilised the economy. Industrial production collapsed by 36 per cent compared to 1916 levels, with over 800 factories closing between March and October, creating mass unemployment that reached 300,000 in Petrograd alone. The government's attempt to maintain normal administrative procedures whilst revolution raged around it produced surreal situations, such as continuing to pay pensions to Tsarist officials whilst revolutionary committees seized their former departments. Hasegawa demonstrates that the government's police apparatus never recovered from its destruction during the February Revolution, with the militia established to replace it numbering only 6,000 for all of Petrograd compared to 13,000 Tsarist police previously. Crime increased by 800 per cent in major cities between March and October 1917, with the government unable to maintain basic public order whilst armed groups affiliated with various political factions operated with impunity. The railway system approached complete breakdown by October 1917, with only 30 per cent of locomotives operational whilst track maintenance ceased entirely, preventing effective governance across Russia's vast territory. When the Bolsheviks launched their insurrection on 24 October 1917, the Provisional Government could mobilise only 2,000 loyal troops in Petrograd, consisting mainly of officer cadets and the Women's Death Battalion, whilst claiming to represent state authority. The Winter Palace's defence on 25 October involved fewer than 3,000 defenders against 20,000 Red Guards and revolutionary soldiers, symbolising the government's complete isolation from organised social forces.
To conclude, the existence of two revolutions in Russia during 1917 resulted directly from the Provisional Government's comprehensive failure across every dimension of governance. Its structural weakness through dual power, continuation of unpopular war, postponement of land reform, and delay of democratic elections created conditions enabling Bolshevik success. The government's eight-month tenure demonstrated that formal authority without popular support, coercive capacity, or revolutionary legitimacy could not survive in a society undergoing fundamental transformation. Rather than weakness causing two revolutions, the Provisional Government's weakness was itself revolutionary, destroying residual state authority whilst creating the power vacuum that October 1917 would fill. The Bolsheviks succeeded not through overwhelming strength but because the Provisional Government had eliminated all alternative sources of authority whilst proving incapable of governing itself. The February Revolution destroyed Tsarism but failed to create viable replacement institutions, whilst October represented less a second revolution than the final collapse of an already moribund governmental structure. The Provisional Government's historical significance lies not in what it accomplished but in its comprehensive demonstration that liberal parliamentary democracy could not be transplanted onto Russian soil without consideration of social revolutionary forces that would ultimately determine political outcomes.
Example II:
The assertion that the two revolutions of 1917 in Russia were primarily caused by the weakness of the Provisional Government invites critical examination. While the government's inherent fragility undeniably created the vacuum that revolutionaries filled, the phenomena of February and October represented distinct events driven by a complex interplay of long-term structural pressures, the unforeseen pressures of total war, and the specific agency of revolutionary organisations, not merely the passive failure of a nascent regime. Agreeing solely with the statement risks oversimplifying the profound societal transformations and the deliberate actions that capitalised on the prevailing chaos.
The collapse of the Autocracy in February 1917 was a direct consequence of its inability to manage the crises precipitated by the First World War, a factor that exposed and amplified its deep-seated weaknesses. Decades of autocratic rule had fostered deep social fissures, suppressed political participation, and created a burgeoning industrial working class concentrated in potentially explosive urban centres like Petrograd. The war acted as a catalyst, straining resources, mobilising millions of discontented peasants into the army, and disrupting essential supplies, leading to acute shortages of food and fuel in the capital. The Zemmlyachovskiis and protests of workers, coupled with the mutinous mood within the Petrograd Garage, reflected widespread war-weariness and anger. The Autocracy's response was inept: Tsar Nicholas II, absent from the capital, failed to grasp the severity of the situation, dismissed competent ministers like Goremykin and replaced them with figures like the ill-fated Protopopov, further eroding confidence. The decisive factor, however, was the defection of the Petrograd Soviet Garage to the side of the striking workers and the refusal of the Volynskiis Regiment to fire on demonstrators on February 27th, signifying the terminal collapse of autocratic authority rather than the weakness of a non-existent alternative. Figes observes that the February Revolution was largely an improvisation, a spontaneous uprising fuelled by popular hatred of the Autocracy and war, not a premeditated coup against a stable government.
The Provisional Government (PG) that emerged faced an impossible task defined by its inherent structural weakness, a factor that critically shaped the subsequent trajectory towards October. Formed initially as a dual authority shared uneasily with the Petrograd Soviet (the 'Dual Power'), the PG lacked genuine popular legitimacy or a solid power base. Its composition, dominated by liberal professors and moderate socialists like Lvov and, later, Kerensky, represented only a narrow segment of society. Crucially, it inherited the immense burdens of the disintegrating Russian state: the ongoing war, the land question, national minorities demanding autonomy, and economic collapse. The decision, heavily influenced by the Soviet's Order No. 1, to postpone fundamental issues like the transfer of land to the peasants and the negotiation of a democratic peace until a Constituent Assembly could be elected proved disastrous. This delay, intended to stabilise the situation, instead加深了 (shenhua) popular frustration. Peasants seized land autonomously throughout the spring and summer, notably in provinces like Tambov and Saratov, demonstrating the PG's inability to enforce its decrees or provide stable governance. Simultaneously, the military situation deteriorated catastrophically, culminating in the catastrophic June Offensive, meticulously planned by Kerensky but collapsing due to army demoralisation and desertion rates exceeding 1.5 million by mid-1917. The PG's authority bled away as it appeared incapable of solving the country's existential crises. Pipes argues that the PG's fundamental error was its belief in the possibility of a 'revolutionary democracy' managing the transition while maintaining the old state apparatus, a contradiction that paralysed its authority from the outset.
The October Revolution, however, cannot be attributed solely to the PG's weakness; it was the result of the deliberate, calculated actions of the Bolshevik Party, led by Lenin, exploiting the existing chaos and offering simplistic, compelling solutions. The PG's frailty created the opportunity, but the Bolsheviks provided the organisation, the ideology, and the decisive push. Lenin's April Theses, demanding "Peace, Land, and Bread" and the transfer of power to the Soviets (which the Bolsheviks were increasingly winning), provided a clear, popular alternative to the PG's vacillation. Despite internal opposition, Lenin navigated the complexities of Russian politics, returning from exile via Germany in a sealed train in April, and meticulously rebuilt the party, capitalising on the PG's failures. The disastrous July Days uprising, spontaneously initiated by workers and soldiers but lacking clear leadership, allowed the Bolsheviks to distance themselves temporarily while blaming the PG for provocations, further destabilising Kerensky. Lenin's insistent push for insurrection in September and October, against the cautious instincts of figures like Kamenev and Zinoviev, was driven by the recognition of the PG's terminal vulnerability but also by the Bolsheviks' own growth. By October, the Bolsheviks had secured a majority in key soviets, including Petrograd and Moscow, through effective agitation promising immediate solutions the PG could not deliver. The military revolutionary committees established by Trotsky meticulously planned the takeover of key infrastructure in Petrograd on October 25th-26th (O.S.), encountering minimal resistance from forces demoralised by the PG's failures and swayed by Bolshevik propaganda. Service highlights Lenin's genius not merely in diagnosing the PG's weakness but in channelling popular discontent into a disciplined, centralised bid for power, transforming a chaotic situation into a successful seizure.
Furthermore, the depth of societal disruption caused by the war and the failure of successive regimes to address fundamental grievances created a revolutionary situation independent of any single government's strength. The war had shattered the old social order, mobilising the masses and intensifying class conflict. The experience of hardship, loss, and disillusionment – felt acutely by soldiers enduring trench warfare, peasants seizing initiative, and workers facing factory closures – fostered a radicalised populace increasingly receptive to revolutionary slogans. The PG's weakness was a symptom of this deeper societal rupture, not its sole cause. The Bolsheviks succeeded because their demands resonated with this profound exhaustion and desire for radical change. Heath suggests that the revolutionary fervour of 1917 was less about embracing Marxism-Leninism specifically and more about a desperate demand for order, peace, and justice after years of mismanagement and sacrifice, a vacuum the PG proved utterly incapable of filling despite its initial ideals. The collapse of public order, with crime rates soaring in cities like Moscow and Petrograd by late 1917, and the complete breakdown of the transportation system, exemplified the state's disintegration, creating conditions where only a highly disciplined, centralised force like the Bolsheviks could impose control, exploiting the PG's inherent incapacity to do so.
Therefore, while the weakness of the Provisional Government was an absolutely critical factor in the unfolding of 1917, providing the essential vacuum and demonstrating the failure of moderate, democratic solutions, it was not the sole cause of the dual revolutions. The February Revolution stemmed directly from the Autocracy's collapse under war pressure, a different regime altogether. The October Revolution was the consequence of the Bolsheviks' strategic agency, organisational skill, and potent slogans effectively channelling deep-seated popular discontent born of war, social inequality, and the PG's specific inability – rooted in its composition, ideology, and the intractable problems it inherited – to provide stable, effective governance or meet the urgent demands of the populace. The PG's fragility was the stage upon which the tragedy played out, but the script was written by the deep currents of Russian history, the catastrophic impact of total war, and the decisive actions of a determined revolutionary vanguard seizing the moment. The extent of the PG's responsibility is thus profound yet incomplete; its weakness was the necessary condition that allowed the second revolution to occur, but the sufficient conditions lay in the complex interplay of long-term structural forces and the calculated strategies of the Bolsheviks.
Explain the change in fortunes for the Bolsheviks during the time of the Provisional Government up to its takeover of power
After 'July Days', the Provisional Government appointed Kornilov as Commander in Chief to reassert discipline in the army. There had been continuous strikes afterward and there seemed to be coup organised by Kornilov himself. The Provisional Government had no other alternatives but to ask help from the Bolsheviks. Thus, the Bolsheviks came to aid Kerensky, and Kornilov was arrested. This became to be known as a great success to the Bolsheviks, while it shows great disadvantage towards the Government, Mensheviks, and Social Revolutionaries. The Provisional Government became undermined.
The Constituent Assembly was a parliament, which was to be elected, and which would have ruled according to the wishes of the people. This would have had legitimised the government's power and introduced land reform. However, Kerensky delayed the set up of this assembly. The peasants would not wait any longer, and many of those who have deserted the army returned home and seized the land from the landlords. The government was not able to control what was happening. This was disadvantageous to the Provisional government, for they had lost the support from the peasants. Instead, for the Bolsheviks it became a chance to earn their support.
To conclude, the 'July Days' did discredit the Bolsheviks, but this was only for a short period of time, since soon afterwards, in debt to the 'Kornilov Coup', they were able to show their power and the Provisional Governments futility. The delay of the Constituent Assembly, served as a fine start for the Bolsheviks, where peasants had lost their faith in the Provisional Government and joined them instead.
