Extended Essay in History
Research Question: Did
the Bosnia Crisis of 1908 - 1909 strengthen the Triple Entente between Russia,
Britain and France?
Abstract
This essay investigates the impact that the Bosnia Crisis,
resulting from the decision of Austria-Hungary to annex Bosnia-Herzegovina in
contravention of international treaties in 1908, had on the “Triple Entente”, a
collection of agreements between Russia, Britain and France, in order to answer
the question: “Did the Bosnia Crisis of 1908 strengthen the “Triple Entente”
between Russia, Britain and France?”. In
the process, it will challenge commonplace assumptions about the nature and
role of the “Triple Entente” in the events leading to the “Great War”.
The research in this paper is qualitative, originating from
a selection of primary and secondary sources. Given the volume of sources for
the First World War, primary sources have been limited to memoirs and relevant
treaties and agreements, whilst secondary sources are either specific to the
Bosnia Crisis or address the broader origins of the war. To compensate for the
limit on the extent of sources that it is possible to consult, documents from
differing time periods and national perspectives are considered. An additional
dimension is given to the analysis by the application of certain concepts from
international relations theory.
The essay will argue that the conventional assumption that
the “Triple Entente” as a well-developed and cohesive unit in 1908 does not
reflect the real nature of the “Entente” whose bonds were not as strong as is
often supposed. The analysis will show
that the effects of the Bosnia crisis on the “Triple Entente” varied in
function of the different agreements amongst the partners. Further, detailed
examination of France, Britain and Russia’s behaviour during and after the
crisis will demonstrate that there is no overwhelming evidence to suggest a
strengthening of the alignment between 1908 and 1909. In fact the opposite seems more likely.
Word Count: 289
Introduction
Nearing the Centenary of the First World War, the
publication of influential works by two prominent academics, the Canadian Margaret
MacMillan and the Australian Christopher Clark have invigorated the debate on
the causes of the cataclysm of 1914 - 1918.[1] With perspectives from opposite sides of the
globe, both historians devote considerable discussion to the role of alliances
throughout the crisis-ridden years of the early 20th century.[2] The Bosnia
Crisis from October 1908 to February 1909 is situated at the very beginning of
a time period often characterised as being dominated by a rigid alliance
system,[3] meaning it is of
great significance in analysing the nature and development of the “Triple
Entente” between Russia, France and Britain. The crisis resulted from the
failed endeavour of Austro-Hungary’s and Russia’s Foreign Ministers to carry
through a secret agreement on the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by
Austria-Hungary and free passage though the Dardanelles for Russia. As this
bargain constituted a breach of the Treaty of Berlin,[4]
Austria-Hungary and Russia’s decisions had wide-reaching consequences for the
harmony of Europe. Nonetheless, there remains controversy about the
significance of the Bosnia Crisis for the “Triple Entente”. Whilst in the words
of Robert Frank and Catherine Horel, in the preface of a recent French study on
the event, “la crise de 1908 joue le role de révélateur, voire catalyseur”[5], and according
to MacMillan the crisis had the consequence of proving the strength of the
“newly formed” “Triple Entente”[6], Clark does not
assign it any such role, arguing it had no clear influence on the development
of the “Triple Entente”.[7] This raises the
central question: Was the “Triple Entente” strengthened by the Bosnia Crisis?
The investigation of both the crisis and its effect on the
“Triple Entente”, as a component of the alliance system, is valuable for various
reasons. Firstly, the remarkable similarities with the July Crisis in 1914 have
led it to be named the “Dress Rehearsal”.[8] Examining the
role played by alignments between the Great Powers, specifically the “Triple
Entente”, not only sheds light on the outbreak of the First World War but may
also have implications for the way we view and handle today’s international
political crises. Furthermore, although one might reflect that the study of
“old diplomacy”, as typified by the Bosnia Crisis,[9]
is no longer important in the context of twenty-first century politics, where
“new diplomacy” institutions, such as the United Nations, attempt to replace the
anarchy of the international order with international cooperation, nonetheless concepts
such as “balance of power” and “balance of threat” still seem relevant to
current events, such as the crisis in the Ukraine. Finally, detailed investigation
of the diplomatic developments between the great powers in the context of the
Bosnia Crisis gives the lie to the textbook interpretation of the alignments in
the final years before the war as “two armed camps”.[10]
It is vital to understand that the triple Alliance was not a “cohesive” [11] entity,
comparable to the “Triple Alliance” but a collection of very different
agreements between three powers that were simultaneously making agreements with
other exterior states.
Investigation
Methodology
This essay will address the question “Did the Bosnia Crisis
of 1908 strengthen the “Triple Entente” between France, Britain and Russia?” in
three steps.
Firstly, a selection of primary sources such as memoirs and
legal treaty documents, as well as secondary sources, such as historical works
focused specifically on the event and broader historiographical analysis of the
origins of the First World War, will be used to establish the historical fact
of the crisis.
Secondly, the validity of the principal views on the effects
of the Bosnia Crisis on the “Triple Entente” as expressed by MacMillan and
Clark, will be evaluated by analysing the reactions of the three countries
concerned during and after the crisis. To add depth to this analysis, elements
of International Relations theory, such as the differences between alliances
and ententes, will also be considered.
Finally, based on the first two steps, conclusions will be
drawn about whether the Bosnia Crisis strengthened the “Triple Entente”.
Evaluation of Sources
Given the limitations of time and space available for this
essay compared to the legendary extent and diversity of source material
available on this period of history, [12]
it is impossible to ensure a comprehensive survey of all the evidence, meaning
it is imperative to make a selection.
To this end, use of primary sources has been restricted to:
memoirs and official treaties. Memoirs by the French Taube, British Nicolson
and Russian Miliukov, written within 30 years of the crisis by participants in
the event, are valuable as they constitute first hand evidence and they paint a
picture of the mood and views of the time from the perspective of the three
principal countries involved. However, as their purpose is not to inform
readers objectively, but to portray the authors and their countries in a
positive light as self-justification, this limits their value to this research
and requires that they be cross-referenced with other sources. The texts of
treaties and alliances, although having the advantages of presenting official
policies are also limited, as they do not provide any facts about the reasons
behind them or their success in implementation.
As far as secondary sources are concerned, an attempt has
been made to mitigate the necessity of selection and ensuring breadth and
objectivity by choosing works from different time periods, from different national
perspectives and in different languages.
Some of these sources, focusing specifically on the Bosnia
Crisis, aim to understand the issue in a detailed and unbiased way, meaning
that the information they provide is relevant to the question and more
objective. However, as such a focused approach might constrain the knowledge
about the broader context, this could be considered a limitation.
Broader works, such as the recently published writings of
MacMillan and Clark, the latter received with great appreciation here in
Germany[13], offer
recognised arguments and reliable synthesis of many primary sources. Therefore
they have value in this essay as the views of relevant academics. Nonetheless
one could claim that as popular historians these authors would attempt to
create a book pleasing to the public, perhaps through over-dramatization, as
well as to focus primarily on supporting their “theory” by employing events
such as the Bosnia Crisis as a means to an end in proving their point.
Background
Before attempting to understand the Bosnia Crisis of 1908,
it is important to comprehend the framework of international relations at the
time: the European alliance system.
In 1882 Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy joined in the
Triple Alliance[14] and in 1887
Russo-German collaboration was formed through the defensive Reinsurance Treaty.[15] At the time
Britain was only loosely tied in to the European alliance system via the
Mediterranean Agreement with Italy to check France and Russia in the Balkans
and Mediterranean.[16] Following the
German refusal to renew the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia in 1890[17] the European
system began to shift, and in 1894 France and Russia were able to form an
alliance[18] which committed
each to the provision of military aid to the other in the case of a
mobilisation by any member of the Triple Alliance.[19]
The Entente Cordiale between France and Britain was signed on 8th April 1904 to
settle colonial disputes in North Africa.[20]
Lastly, the Anglo-Russian Convention regarding the limits of Russian influence
in Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet was signed on 31st August 1907.[21] From this stage
onwards, the term “Triple Entente” is frequently employed in describing the triangle
of agreements linking France, Russia and Great Britain.
Although she does highlight scepticism of this concept
amongst certain politicians and draws attention to its looseness through
Russia’s new agreement with Germany concerning the Baltic, MacMillan argues
that in 1907, the “Triple Entente” was underway to becoming a fully-fledged
“armed bloc”. Britain’s hope for improved security, France’s enthusiasm for the
building up a of stronger military alliance and soon Russia’s firm decision to
stand on the side of Britain and France all go to support Macmillan’s “classical”
view of pre-war Europe.[22] However, if one
allows for the fact that the First World War influences our view of the pre-war
years because, to quote Clark, it seems “to command the horizons of the
preceding decade”, the “Triple Entente” at this time system appears more as a “loose
network” [23] of alignments.
In addition to the alliances described above, two agreements
governed international politics in South-East Europe. With the Treaty of Berlin
in 1878, Austria-Hungary received the right to occupy and administer the
Ottoman Province of Bosnia-Herzegovina and to maintain garrisons in the Sandjak
of Novi Bazar.[24] The treaty also
concluded that the Dardanelles should be closed to all warships in times of
war.[25] In another
treaty between Austria-Hungary and Russia in 1897, both states agreed to recognise
the autonomous development of the Balkans, dismissing any notion of territorial
acquisition in the area.[26]
The Crisis
Two factors are generally accepted as the main causes for
changes in Austro-Russian relations in the Balkans: Firstly, having been
defeated in the Russo-Japanese war in 1905, Russian foreign policy had been
redirected toward the Balkans and the Dardanelles.[27] Secondly the gradual disintegration of the
Ottoman Empire in Europe increased Austro-Hungarian concern with security along
its southern borders.[28] As a result
both powers were keen to find ways to effect changes to the status quo
established under the Berlin Treaty in 1878.
Diplomatic exchanges between the Foreign Ministers of the
two countries, Izvolsky and Aehrental, were carried on through the summer of
1908.[29] Austria-Hungary
proposed that its annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina would be offset by its
withdrawal from the Sanjak,[30] Izvolsky that
Russian acceptance for annexation should be in return for Austro-Hungarian support
for the opening of the Dardanelles to Russian ships.[31]
Negotiations were concluded secretly at Buchlau Castle in Germany on 16th
September 1908.[32] Izvolsky assumed
there was enough time to secure support from the “Entente” partners on the Dardanelles
issue.[33] However, subsequent
to the Bulgarian declaration of independence on 5th October 1908,[34] on 6th October Emperor
Franz Ferdinand announced the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by
Austria-Hungary, noting Russia’s “friendly agreement”.[35]
There was general outrage among other European states, [36] at these acts,
which in addition to the Treaty of Berlin, also infringed the London Convention
of 1871 on the sanctity of treaties[37].
Demands for a conference to allow the European powers to agree on compensation
for states whose interests were affected,[38]
were rejected by Austria-Hungary, which, with German backing, maintained it had
the right to settle the issue bilaterally. [39]
The crisis went on for six months during which the armies of five countries
were at least partially mobilised,[40]
until it was brought to an abrupt end in March 1919 by a German ultimatum to
Russia to accept the annexation.[41]
The significance of this crisis, according to MacMillan, is
a considerable strengthening of the already consisting “Triple Entente” as it
strained the alignment without seriously damaging it.[42]
She contends that having withstood the first international crisis, the
“entente” was drawn closer together in cooperation meaning it was one step
nearer to the situation in July 1914, where the partners would’ go through
thick and thin for each other”. [43] On the other
hand, Clark presents the very different view that, although it might be
tempting to consider the upheavals of the Bosnia Crisis as the birth of the
“Triple Entente”, it was still far from clear that the new “alliances” would
take Europe to war.[44] In order to
evaluate the validity of these conclusions, this essay will now analyse, with
the additional help of some concepts from international relations theory, the
behaviour of the three members of the “Triple Entente”, France Britain and
Russia, during and after the crisis.
Theory
As the “Triple Entente” consisted of both ententes and an
alliance, it is first essential to understand the differences in the nature of
these two types of alignment.
An alliance is defined by political scientist A. Wolfer as
“a promise of mutual military assistance between two or more sovereign states”.[45] An entente on
the other hand, according to Austro-American historian R. Kann, is “a flexible
agreement of cooperation between two sovereign powers”.[46]
Kann argues that the “airtight
commitment”[47] typical of an
alliance will encourage a “centrifugal” tendency - whereby he claims that
partners attempt to minimise their obligations – whereas in an entente, “where
no firm commitments exist”[48], there is a “centripetal”
tendency – whereby partners tend to seek a greater level of commitment.[49]
The concept of “Balance of Power”, developed by political
scientist K. Waltz,[50] is defined as
the allying of one state with another to balance out the greater power of
another state or alliance[51], which builds
on the view put forward by Morgenthau that such alliances are means to
maintaining equilibrium.[52] This concept is contrasted with the “Balance
of Threat” theory established by Harvard professor of International Relations Stephen
Walt, whereby states form alliances to balance not against power alone but
against “threat” which is affected by geographic proximity, offensive capabilities
and perceived intentions.[53]
These concepts will now be applied in the analysis of the
reactions of the individual states to the crisis.
France
When the announcement was made on 6th October, French Prime
Minister Clémenceau denounced the annexation calling for a conference.[54] However France’s
commitment to Russia did not reach beyond this mild diplomatic involvement.[55] As the crisis
deepened and Russia sought her military support, France stated clearly that she
was not prepared to intervene in this way. According to Henri Soutou of the
Sorbonne, this unresponsiveness toward her ally on France’s part could be
traced back to the concept of “intérês vitaux”[56]
established within the Franco-Russian alliance. Thus France’s denial of
military aid against Austria-Hungary was justified by the fact that France did
not consider that Russia’s vital interests were at stake.[57]
Ralph Menning, writing in the “Journal of the Historical Society”, emphasises
the financial issues influencing France’s decision to withhold itself from the
crisis and deny military support to Russia. He contends that since French banks
owned 75% of Serbian, Bulgarian and Ottoman Empire debt[58],
as well as having to refinance Russian 5-year bonds from the Russo-Japanese War[59], France’s main
objective was to avoid a war in the Balkans involving Russia. Yet another reason
for Frances distraction from the crisis[60]
was provided by the Casablanca incident on the 25th of September 1908, which
saw a renewal of tensions between France and Germany over Morocco. [61] Menning argues
that Germany’s willingness to conclude an agreement with France in February
1909 recognising French economic supremacy in Morocco was a deliberate ploy of
Germanys to draw French support away from Russia in the crisis, leading to
French Foreign Minister Pichon’s assurance to Germany that France would take
all means to avoid a war in the Balkans.[62]
France’s reaction appears to support the notion of the
centrifugal nature of alliances explained by Kann. It can be argued that the
Bosnia Crisis caused France to seek to minimise its commitments to Russia,
which Kann describes as behaviour characteristic of an alliance. Further, as
argued by G. Miller, the concept of “Balance of Power” may apply here as France
sought out diplomatic rapprochement with Germany, which would have had the
effect of balancing against the greater combined power of Britain and Russia.[63] These theories
help distinguish the forces that lead to the apparent weakening of the
Franco-Russian Alliance during the Bosnia Crisis.
Britain
Like France, Britain rejected the annexation, on the ground
that it infringed upon international treaties, and called for a conference.[64] On 13th October,
Foreign Secretary Grey and Izvolsky produced a nine points programme for a
conference on the crisis.[65] This programme
demanded compensation for Serbia and did not mention the Dardanelles, despite
the fact that in 1907 in London, Sir Edward Grey had encouraged this Russian
interest with Izvolsky.[66] The crisis set
Britain in a complicated position forcing it to support Russia diplomatically
with the bid for a conference, although it was in no way encouraging of Russian
freedom of the seas in the opening of the Dardanelles.[67]
In addition, as Macmillan points out, the crisis came at a bad time for Britain
coinciding as it did with the “Naval Scare”, which had begun in April 1908 and emphasised
the sense of German threat to Britain.[68]
This sense of threat was increased by Germany’s use of an “ultimatum” to force
Russian acceptance of the annexation on 22nd March 1909.[69]
Despite Russia’s capitulation, Britain stuck to its course and demanded that
Austria-Hungary also obtain Serbian acceptance of the annexation before Britain
herself would acknowledge it.[70]
Britain’s behaviour toward its “entente” partner Russia
supports Kann’s analysis of the centripetal tendency of ententes, as there was
closer cooperation between the two states in the crisis, although Britain would
only support Russia as far as those actions would concur with her own
interests, as is for instance seen with the Dardanelles question. Concerning
the concept of balance, it seems that Britain’s behaviour points in the direction
of the “Balance of Threat” theory, as it was aligning itself against the “German
threat” [71], as perceived
both in the naval scare and in the German “Ultimatum” to Russia. It is clear, that although Britain and Russia
cooperated closely over the crisis, as Macmillan claims, Britain was in no way
prepared to go to war for Russia. The Bosnia Crisis does therefore not seem to
have seriously affected the “Entente”, at least from Britain’s perspective, as
Britain’s commitment to Russia does not seem to have increased or decreased through
the crisis.
Russia
The Austro-Hungarian decision to go ahead with their share
of the “Buchlau Bargain” by annexing Bosnia-Herzegovina provoked sharp
reactions with Russia.[72] Not only was
the Russian public outraged at this appropriation of territory aspired to by
their fellow slavy in Serbia,[73] but also the
government was unprepared, as Izvolsky had been acting almost independently. [74] After obtaining
support for a conference in Paris and London, Izvolsky visited Berlin on 24th of
October 1908 but Chancellor Bülow made it clear to him that if faced with
demands from France, Britain and Russia together, Germany had no choice but to
support its ally Austria-Hungary.[75] It was then
Germany’s “ultimatum”, sent in March 1909, which forced Russia to accept the
annexation or else face the possibility of an armed conflict with Austria-Hungary
which it had neither the internal resources[76]
nor the external support – from its allies – to contemplate. Not only had
Russia suffered diplomatic defeat, it had also been confronted with its own
military weakness.[77]
Russian realisation of its impotence to intervene militarily
caused a whole scale modification of its army organisation. As a result Russia “launched a major programme
of military investment”.[78] In addition,
according to McDonald, a further factor played on Russia’s foreign policy
decisions, namely the conviction that war would fuel domestic unrest, as it did
in 1905.[79] As Prime
Minister Stolypin stated in an interview in April 1909, “Russia needs twenty years
of peace”.[80]
In addition to these steps to strengthen itself, Russia also
attempted to improve its relations with members of the “Triple Alliance”. On 24th
September 1909 at Racconigi Russia signed an agreement with Italy concerning
influence in the eastern Mediterranean.[81]
In November 1910 Russia began discussions on the Potsdam Accord with Germany,
settling issues on the Baghdad Railway.[82]
If these relations are considered from the theoretical
angle, it seems difficult to apply the concept of centrifugal or centripetal
force to Russian behaviour as it affected both and alliance (with France) and
an entente (with England). However, considering the theories of balance, it
does seem that “Balance of Power” is applicable as Russian perceptions of
support from its partners had weakened, meaning it sought to balance the
European system by allying with central powers such as Germany and Italy.[83] This would
support the conclusion that the Bosnia Crisis had the effect of loosening
Russia’s position within the “Triple Entente”.
Summary
The nation-specific analysis of reactions to the Bosnia
Crisis shows that the “Triple Entente” cannot be considered a homogenous
alignment. When France, Britain and Russia have been are analysed separately, this
reveals different reactions by each to the events, along with differing effects
on the various parts of the “Entente”.
In the crisis, France showed that it was prepared to let its
financial concerns and agreements with other foreign powers take precedence
over its alliance with Russia, hence remaining largely uninvolved. This proved
equivalent to a loosening of the oldest and only true alliance in the “Triple
Entente”. Britain showed stronger support for its newly found partner as it
gave strong diplomatic support to Russia although no European treaty
obligations linked both states. Nonetheless, British backing did not encompass
military assistance nor did it extend beyond the sphere of British interest, as
was clear with the Dardanelles. The fact that Russia reacted to the exposure of
its military weakness on the one hand by rearmament and reorganisation and on
the other by seeking new agreements outside of the “Entente”, shows a loss of
confidence in its partners, reflecting a weakening of the “Triple Entente”.
Conclusion
This essay has attempted to address the question “Did the
Bosnia Crisis of 1908 strengthen the “Triple Entente” between Russia, Britain
and France?”
An examination of the evidence has led to a first
conclusion, in demonstrating that at the time of the Bosnia Crisis, the “Triple
Entente” was not, as is often assumed, a closely linked alignment, but actually
made up of very different agreements between states with varying degrees of
commitment. This directed the exploration towards an analysis of the behaviour
of each member within the “Triple Entente” during and as a consequence of the
crisis. In this process, the concepts of “alliances” and “ententes” and balance
theories from international relations proved a useful aid in distinguishing and
explaining how the different states reacted. The analysis by country revealed
different dynamics in each case. Thus,
while France’s commitment to Russia appears to weaken as a result of the
crisis, the mixture in British interactions between strong support and
reticence amounts on balance to a relatively unchanged level of
commitment. For her part Russia is found
to have experienced a waning of her reliance on Britain and France as a result
of the crisis.
The results of this analysis are limited by the issue of the
extent of the sources in relation to the scope of the essay. Firstly, the sheer volume of primary and
secondary sources meant that it was for all practical purposes impossible for
the research to include all the potential evidence, thus exposing the resulting
examination to the risk of bias and subjectivity. Further, it should be noted
that this essay has concentrated on the relations within the “Triple Entente”
that related to Russia, as a primary participant, meaning that the “Entente
Cordiale” between Britain and France, which would have involved a whole new set
of sources, is not covered. Finally, this investigation has focussed solely on
evaluating the level of commitment demonstrated by the different states as a
measure of the strengthening or weakening of the “Entente”, excluding factors
such as changes in military power, economic development or social attributes
which would have required extensive quantitative analysis.
Notwithstanding these limitations, the fact that the
analysis by country demonstrates only maintenance of or reduction in the level
of commitment leads to the conclusion that there is no overwhelming evidence to
suggest that the “Triple Entente” was strengthened by the Bosnia Crisis. The hypothesis that it was actually weakened
by the crisis seems more convincing.
Combined with the conclusion that in 1908 the “Entente” was not a
cohesive unit, but a varied collection of alignments, the implication is that
in 1909 it was still far too early to consider this “Entente”, as suggested by
MacMillan, as a “bloc” of states that would go to war for each other. This
point is nicely reflected in a British Foreign Office circular from April 1909
asking British representatives to refrain from using the expression “Triple
Entente” in case it could be assumed to have “some special official meaning”.[84]
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[1] Economist (2014)
[2] see for example MacMillan (2014) p.
437- 438; Clark (2013) p. 166- 167
[3] See for
example Stieve (1927) p. 75 – 101; Schmitt (1971) p. 67 - 115
[4] <>Treaty of Berlin 1878; Seton–Watson (1931) p. 30
[5] “the crisis
of 1908 played a revealing, or even catalyzing role”, Frank (1911) p. 10
[6] MacMillan (2014) p. 437
[7] Clark (2013) p. 167
[8] Menning (2012) p. 1
[9] Géraud
(1945) p. 1
[10] Trueland
(2004) p. 15-17; Simpson (2000) p. 403
[11] Tomaszewsky (1999) p. 363
[12] See Clark (2013)
xxi – xxv, who maintains that the “First World War origins’ literature has
assumed such vast dimensions that no single historian […] could hope to read it
in a lifetime”
[13]
Augenstein (2014) p. 7
[14] Triple
Alliance, May 20, 1882; Afflerbach
(2002) p. 85
[15] Reinsurance Treaty 1887; Schmitt (1971) p. 30
[16] Gooch (1927)
p. 60
[17] Schmitt
(1971) p. 35
[18] Franco-Russian Alliance
Military Convention, France, Russia, Aug. 18, 1892.; Taylor (1971) p. 345
[19] Stieve
(1927) p. 180-181
[20] <>Entente cordiale, 1904; Taylor (1971) p. 415
[21] <>Anglo-Russian Convention, 1907; Clark (2013) p. 87
[22] MacMillan
(2014) p. 211
[23] Clark (2013)
p. 166 - 167
[24] Albertini (1952) p. 22-23
[25] Ibid. p. 13 n.1
[26] Carlgren
(1955) p. 16
[27] Clark (2012)
p. 84
[28] Bridge (1972) p. 306 - 307
[29] McDonald
(1992) p. 128 - 129
[30] Cooper (1964) p. 265
[31] MacMillan
(2014) p. 421
[32] ibid. p. 423
[33] Lee (1974) p. 189
[34] Sweet (1977)
p. 178
[35] Miliukov (1967) p. 183; McDonald
(1992) p. 127; Cooper (1964) p. 267
[36] see for example Nintchitch (1937)
pp. 337 – 338; Churchill (1923) p. 34; MacDonald (1992) p. 127
[37] Cooper
(1964) p. 267
[38]
Nicolson (1930) p. 322
[39]
Schmitt (1937) p. 125-229
[40] Cooper (1964) p. 275
[41] Miliukov (1967) p. 184); Stieve
(1927) p. 87; Bridge (1992) p. 319
[42] MacMillan (2014) p. 436
[43] ibid. p. 438
[44] Clark (2013)
p. 166
[45] Wolfer
(1968) p. 268
[46] Kann
(1976) p.611 n. 2
[47] ibid. p. 611
[48]
ibid. p. 612
[49] Berridge (1989) p 251.
[50]
Dwivedi (2012) p.224
[51] Waltz
(1979) pp. 102-109
[52]
Morgenthau (1973) p. 188
[53] Walt (1990) Kindle pos. 208
[54] Williamson (1991) p. 70; Lee (1974)
p. 192
[55] Nintchitch (1937) pp. 356-357
[56] “vital
interests”
[57] Soutou (2011) p. 32
[58] Menning (2012) p. 8
[59] ibid.
p. 9-10
[60] Lee
(1979) p. 192
[61]
Silberstein (1976) pp. 336 - 338
[62] Menning (2012) p. 15
[63] Miller (2012) Kindle pos. 3705
[64] Lee (1979) p. 193
[65] ibid. p. 195
[66] Clark (2013) p. 188
[67] Afflerbach (2002) pp. 634-635
[68] MacMillan (2014) p. 127
[69] Menning (2012) p. 5
[70] Lee (1979) p. 204
[71] Miller (2012) Kindle pos. 3822
& 3831
[72] Lee (1979) p. 193; Clark (2013) p.
188; MacMillan (2014) p. 425
[73] Nintchich (1937) p. 337 - 338
[74] Ardeev (1937) p. 63
[75] Lee
(1979) p. 195
[76]
Afflerbach (2011) p. 72
[77] Taube
(1928) p. 229
[78] Clark (2013)
p. 87; Churchill (1923) p.36; Miller (2012) Kindle pos. 3777
[79] McDonald (1992) p. 151
[80] ibid. p. 159
[81] <>Racconigi Agreement, 1909; Albertini (1952) p. 364
[82] <>Postdam Accord, 1910; Clark (2013) p. 189; Menning
(2012) p. 22
[83] Miller (2012) Kindle pos. 3770
[84] Menning
(2012) p.20
German foreign minister (Bulow) tells the Russian foreign minister (Isvolsky) to accept the Austrian annexation of Bosnia -- or else. This is because:
(a) Russia is in no position to fight;
(b) France and Britain will not support her if she goes to war;
(c) Isvolsky had cynically agreed with the Austrian foreign minister, Aerenthal, that Russia would not support the Serbs if Austria attacked Bosnia as long as Austria did not support Britain and France if Russia seized the Dardanelles.
(from "Fall of Eagles", 1974)
