From the November 2017 and May 2023 IBDP History Paper 2 Examinations
EXAMPLE I:
The Cold War, stretching from the close of the Second World War to the early 1990s, is a defining period in the global political landscape, marked by polarisation and ideological clashes. The quote, "Confrontation rather than reconciliation ended the Cold War", invites a thorough examination of the years 1980-1991, focusing on whether the eventual dissolution was indeed a result of confrontation or perhaps, counterintuitively, reconciliation. This period encompasses significant events like Reagan's presidency, Gorbachev's reforms, and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Evaluating the impact and influence of these aspects will facilitate a balanced understanding of the dissolution of the Cold War era.
John Lewis Gaddis, noted for his 'long peace' argument, puts forth the notion that the Cold War period was predominantly peaceful due to the strategic avoidance of direct military confrontation between the superpowers. However, in the 1980s, this strategy seemed to transform. The inauguration of Ronald Reagan in 1981 marked a shift from détente, with Reagan's overtly confrontational stance on the 'Evil Empire' of communism. In his 'Star Wars' speech in 1983, Reagan escalated the arms race, announcing the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), a space-based missile defence system designed to neutralise the Soviet nuclear threat. Despite some scholars like Jack Matlock arguing that this strategy was largely rhetorical, the evidence shows that Reagan's administration increased military spending, reaching a peak of $456.5 billion in 1987, an increase of about 43% from 1980. This confrontation and economic pressure arguably contributed significantly to ending the Cold War by stretching Soviet resources thin.
Reagan's confrontational stance was met with a surprising turn in Soviet leadership. Mikhail Gorbachev, coming to power in 1985, embodied a dramatic departure from traditional Soviet leaders. He brought a new approach of reconciliation through his policies of 'glasnost' (openness) and 'perestroika' (restructuring), aimed at reforming Soviet society and economy. Gaddis argues that these reform policies, albeit unintentionally, catalysed the dissolution of the Soviet Union and thus, the end of the Cold War. Gorbachev's policies made it increasingly difficult for the Soviet Union to maintain its grip on satellite states, evidenced by the surge of revolutions in Eastern Europe in 1989. Even if it's valid to state that Gorbachev's intention was to reform rather than dismantle, his actions undeniably instigated a process of reconciliation with the West that eventually led to the Soviet Union's downfall.
Nevertheless, the role of confrontation must not be underestimated. The geopolitical tensions witnessed in Afghanistan and Central America during this period suggest that these confrontations significantly influenced the course of the Cold War. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, followed by a decade-long conflict, exacerbated relations between the superpowers. Matlock asserts that this confrontation further alienated the Soviet Union from the international community, contributing to its eventual collapse. Similarly, the Iran-Contra affair during Reagan's administration demonstrated the ongoing ideological battles between the United States and Soviet Union. This contentious atmosphere, far from reconciliatory, seemed to permeate the international relations of the era, reinforcing the argument for confrontation as a driving force behind the end of the Cold War.
In concluding, it appears that the end of the Cold War cannot be attributed to either confrontation or reconciliation alone. Both aspects played crucial roles in shaping the events of 1980-1991. Reagan's confrontational approach, epitomised by the military escalation and 'Star Wars' rhetoric, undeniably put immense pressure on the Soviet Union. Yet, without Gorbachev's reconciliatory policies of 'glasnost' and 'perestroika', it is questionable whether this confrontation would have led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Similarly, the geopolitical confrontations in Afghanistan and Central America highlight the persisting ideological battles, challenging the concept of a 'long peace'. Thus, it seems that the end of the Cold War was the result of a nuanced interplay between confrontation and reconciliation. By understanding this, we gain a deeper and more nuanced appreciation of the complexity of this transformative period in world history.
EXAMPLE II:
The period from 1980 to 1991 witnessed a dramatic escalation in tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, followed by an unexpected thaw that culminated in the dissolution of the Soviet Union on December 25, 1991. Ronald Reagan assumed the presidency on January 20, 1981, inheriting a Cold War landscape marked by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on December 24, 1979, which had prompted President Jimmy Carter to boycott the Moscow Olympics in July 1980 and impose a grain embargo. Reagan's administration adopted a confrontational stance, increasing military spending from $134 billion in fiscal year 1980 to $253 billion by 1989, a rise of 89 percent that aimed to challenge Soviet parity in nuclear and conventional forces. This policy was exemplified by the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe starting in November 1983, a move that prompted Soviet walkouts from arms control talks in Geneva. The Strategic Defence Initiative, announced by Reagan on March 23, 1983, proposed a space-based missile defence system costing an estimated $26 billion in initial research, which Soviet leaders viewed as an attempt to achieve strategic superiority, forcing them to allocate scarce resources to countermeasures. Meanwhile, the Soviet economy stagnated, with growth rates falling to 1.6 percent annually by 1980, exacerbated by oil price declines from $35 per barrel in 1980 to $12 in 1986, reducing hard currency earnings by 30 percent. Mikhail Gorbachev's ascension on March 11, 1985, introduced perestroika and glasnost, but these reforms were responses to internal crises rather than proactive reconciliation. The Chernobyl disaster on April 26, 1986, exposed systemic inefficiencies, costing 18 billion rubles in cleanup and displacing 116,000 people, further straining resources. Diplomatic engagements, such as the Reykjavik summit on October 11-12, 1986, where Reagan and Gorbachev discussed eliminating nuclear weapons but deadlocked over SDI, highlighted persistent confrontation. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty signed on December 8, 1987, eliminated 2,692 missiles, yet it followed years of U.S. pressure. The fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, and German reunification on October 3, 1990, reflected Soviet weakness rather than mutual goodwill. The Gulf War from August 2, 1990, to February 28, 1991, saw Soviet acquiescence to U.S.-led actions, signaling diminished influence. Ultimately, the Cold War ended not solely through confrontation or reconciliation but through a combination where U.S. pressure accelerated Soviet collapse, while limited dialogues prevented escalation. Gaddis has argued that Reagan's strategy of strength compelled Gorbachev to seek arms reductions, noting that by 1988, Soviet military spending consumed 15-17 percent of GNP, compared to 6 percent for the U.S. Leffler emphasises that leaders' perceptions of threats perpetuated the conflict until economic realities forced change. Brown contends that Gorbachev's ideological shifts towards "new thinking" enabled peaceful resolution, rejecting Marxist-Leninist dogma and withdrawing from Afghanistan on February 15, 1989, after 14,453 Soviet deaths. The thesis posits that confrontation, manifested in military and economic pressures, played a predominant role in ending the Cold War by exposing Soviet vulnerabilities, though elements of reconciliation facilitated the non-violent conclusion.
Reagan's confrontational policies in the early 1980s revitalised American military posture and directly challenged Soviet expansionism, setting the stage for the eventual unraveling of the communist bloc. Upon taking office, Reagan authorised the production of the MX missile system on October 2, 1981, deploying 50 missiles by 1986 at a cost of $10 billion, which aimed to counter the Soviet SS-18 intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of carrying 10 warheads each. This build-up was part of a broader strategy outlined in National Security Decision Directive 75 on January 3, 1983, which sought to exploit Soviet economic weaknesses through technology export controls, restricting sales of advanced computers and oil-drilling equipment, reducing Soviet access to Western innovations by 50 percent. The Polish crisis, where martial law was imposed on December 13, 1981, by General Wojciech Jaruzelski, suppressing Solidarity's 9.5 million members, prompted Reagan to impose sanctions on December 23, 1981, halting $100 million in food aid and suspending Aeroflot flights. Gaddis highlights how Reagan's rhetoric, such as his Westminster speech on June 8, 1982, predicting Marxism-Leninism's relegation to the "ash heap of history," demoralised Soviet leadership, contributing to the ideological erosion that accelerated by 1989. The Soviet response included deploying SS-20 missiles targeting Europe, with 441 launched by 1983, escalating tensions and leading to NATO's dual-track decision of December 12, 1979, implemented under Reagan. Heath asserts that such military escalations forced the Soviets into an unsustainable arms race, noting that Soviet defence expenditures rose from 12 percent of GNP in 1980 to 18 percent by 1985, diverting funds from consumer goods and contributing to shortages that fueled dissent in Eastern Europe. The invasion of Afghanistan continued to drain Soviet resources, with annual costs of $3 billion and casualties mounting to 13,310 killed by 1988, while U.S. support for mujahideen via Operation Cyclone provided $630 million in aid by 1987, including Stinger missiles that downed 270 Soviet aircraft. This proxy war exemplified confrontation, as Reagan's directive on March 9, 1985, authorised covert operations to roll back Soviet influence in the Third World, including Angola where UNITA received $15 million annually from 1986. The Able Archer 83 exercise from November 2-11, 1983, simulated nuclear release, alarming Soviet intelligence and nearly triggering preemptive action, underscoring the risks of confrontation but also its role in demonstrating U.S. resolve. By 1984, Soviet leader Konstantin Chernenko's death on March 10, 1985, paved the way for Gorbachev, whose initial policies continued confrontation, such as boycotting the Los Angeles Olympics in July 1984 in retaliation. However, the economic toll was evident in the Soviet Union's foreign debt, which grew from $25 billion in 1981 to $54 billion by 1989, prompting Gorbachev to seek relief through diplomacy. Leffler points out that Reagan's team, including Secretary of State George Shultz, recognised Soviet vulnerabilities after intelligence reports in 1983 estimated a 2 percent annual growth rate, far below the 7 percent claimed. The deployment of 572 intermediate-range missiles in Europe by 1987 pressured Gorbachev to negotiate, but the core driver remained U.S. confrontation, as evidenced by the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act reorganising the military for greater efficiency. In Central America, Reagan's support for Contras in Nicaragua, funded through $19 million in aid approved on August 8, 1985, confronted Soviet-backed regimes, leading to scandals like Iran-Contra where $18 million was diverted illegally. Gaddis evaluates this as part of a grand strategy that weakened Soviet global reach, with proxy conflicts costing the Soviets $1 billion yearly in Cuba alone. Heath further analyses how confrontation manifested in cultural spheres, with Reagan's Voice of America broadcasts increasing to 1,000 hours weekly by 1985, disseminating anti-communist messages that inspired dissidents like Lech Walesa, who met Reagan on January 20, 1989. The Star Wars program, despite technical doubts, consumed Soviet research efforts, with estimates of 100 billion rubles spent on countermeasures by 1990. Brown critiques this view by suggesting Gorbachev's willingness to reform was internal, but the pressure from confrontation undeniably accelerated the timeline, as seen in the Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe following the Sinatra Doctrine announced on October 25, 1989, allowing satellite states independence. The Hungarian border opening on May 2, 1989, led to 13,000 East Germans fleeing by September, triggering mass protests in Leipzig on October 9, 1989, with 70,000 participants. Confrontation's role is thus evident in forcing Soviet retrenchment, with U.S. economic sanctions contributing to a 40 percent drop in Soviet trade with the West by 1986. The period's end saw the START I treaty signed on July 31, 1991, reducing nuclear warheads by 30 percent, but this followed years of U.S. leverage gained through military superiority. Gaddis concludes that without Reagan's confrontational approach, the Soviet system might have persisted longer, supported by statistics showing Soviet GNP at 33 percent of U.S. levels by 1990, down from 44 percent in 1980. Heath reinforces this by noting the psychological impact, with Gorbachev admitting in his December 25, 1991, resignation speech that "old structures" had collapsed under pressure. The arms race's culmination in the 1980s, with U.S. forces reaching 2.2 million personnel by 1985, contrasted with Soviet conscription struggles amid demographic declines of 1 million draft-age males annually. Confrontation, therefore, served as the catalyst for change, compelling the Soviet Union to confront its internal contradictions without direct warfare.
The economic strain imposed by confrontation further manifested in the Soviet Union's inability to sustain its empire, leading to pivotal reforms that, while intended as reconciliation, stemmed from weakness. Gorbachev's perestroika, launched at the April 1985 Plenum, aimed to decentralise planning, but confrontation had already exacerbated deficits, with food shortages causing queues for 40 percent of consumer goods by 1987. U.S. grain embargoes, lifted in April 1981 but replaced with credit restrictions, forced the Soviets to spend $2 billion on imports from Argentina in 1982. Leffler argues that leaders' misperceptions prolonged the Cold War, but by 1988, Gorbachev's "new thinking" acknowledged the need for detente, influenced by U.S. pressure. The Geneva summit on November 19-21, 1985, established personal rapport between Reagan and Gorbachev, leading to 50 percent reductions in strategic arsenals proposed, though SDI stalled progress. Brown emphasises Gorbachev's role in initiating reconciliation, noting his unilateral troop cuts of 500,000 announced on December 7, 1988, at the UN, reducing Warsaw Pact forces by 10 percent. This gesture facilitated the INF Treaty, destroying 846 U.S. and 1,846 Soviet missiles by June 1, 1991. However, such moves were responses to confrontation, as Soviet military doctrine shifted from offense to defense in 1987 amid budget constraints. The Afghanistan withdrawal, completed on February 15, 1989, after Geneva Accords signed on April 14, 1988, saved $3 billion annually but followed U.S. Stinger supplies that increased Soviet helicopter losses to 333 in 1986-1987. Gaddis evaluates this as a victory for confrontation, with Reagan's NSDD-166 on March 27, 1985, escalating aid to $280 million. Heath points to the economic domino effect, with Polish debt reaching $40 billion by 1989, prompting Round Table talks from February 6 to April 4, 1989, leading to semi-free elections on June 4, 1989, where Solidarity won 99 of 100 Senate seats. Hungarian reforms, including multi-party laws on January 11, 1989, reflected Gorbachev's non-intervention, but stemmed from U.S. economic isolation. The Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia from November 17, 1989, saw 800,000 protesters in Prague on November 25, forcing communist resignation on December 10, 1989. Brown credits Gorbachev's refusal to use force, contrasting with 1968 Prague Spring suppression, but the context was U.S. confrontation weakening Soviet capacity. The Malta summit on December 2-3, 1989, where Bush and Gorbachev declared the Cold War over, followed Bush's pause in engagement until May 1989, ensuring Soviet concessions. Leffler notes that domestic U.S. politics, with Reagan's approval at 68 percent in 1988, allowed flexible diplomacy, but confrontation laid the groundwork. The CFE Treaty signed on November 19, 1990, limited NATO and Warsaw Pact tanks to 20,000 each, reducing Soviet advantage. Internal Soviet unrest, with miner's strikes in July 1989 involving 500,000 workers demanding better wages, highlighted perestroika's failures amid confrontation-induced inflation of 20 percent by 1990. Gaddis argues Reagan's strategy bankrupted the system, with Soviet oil production peaking at 12.5 million barrels daily in 1988 before declining 5 percent yearly. Heath examines how confrontation amplified dissent, with Sakharov's release on December 19, 1986, symbolising glasnost but prompted by Western pressure. The August 19-21, 1991, coup attempt against Gorbachev, involving KGB chief Vladimir Kryuchkov, failed due to Yeltsin's resistance on August 19, leading to the ban on the Communist Party on August 23, 1991. Brown views this as Gorbachev's reconciliation enabling democratic transitions, but the underlying cause was confrontation eroding authority. The Belavezha Accords on December 8, 1991, dissolved the USSR, with 11 republics forming the CIS. Leffler balances this by noting mutual threat perceptions eased through summits, but statistics show U.S. GDP growth at 3.5 percent annually versus Soviet 1.8 percent. Confrontation thus dominated, with reconciliation as a secondary mechanism for orderly retreat.
Reconciliation efforts gained momentum in the late 1980s as Gorbachev's reforms intersected with U.S. diplomatic overtures, creating opportunities for de-escalation that complemented confrontational pressures. The Washington summit on December 7-10, 1987, not only produced the INF Treaty but also included cultural exchanges, with 1,000 U.S. students visiting the USSR in 1988. Brown highlights Gorbachev's ideological evolution, abandoning class struggle for "universal human values" in his February 1986 CPSU Congress speech, facilitating arms talks. The Reykjavik discussions, though failing on SDI, reduced Euclidean missiles by proposal, with Gorbachev conceding verification on October 12, 1986. Leffler analyses how Reagan's shift from confrontation to engagement after 1984, influenced by Shultz's memos, led to 35 meetings with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. The Moscow summit on May 29-June 2, 1988, saw Reagan declare the "evil empire" phase over, ratifying INF and expanding human rights dialogues, releasing 200 political prisoners. Gorbachev's UN speech cut troops unilaterally, withdrawing 50,000 from Eastern Europe by April 1991, enabling German reunification. Heath notes that reconciliation was pragmatic, with Bush's "beyond containment" speech on May 12, 1989, offering trade normalisation for Soviet reforms. The Paris Charter on November 21, 1990, signed by 34 CSCE states, declared the Cold War ended, promoting democracy and market economies. Brown argues Gorbachev's non-use of force in 1989 revolutions was decisive, with East German leader Erich Honecker's resignation on October 18, 1989, amid 300,000 Leipzig protesters. The Bulgarian communist fall on November 10, 1989, and Romanian execution of Nicolae Ceaușescu on December 25, 1989, after 60,000 deaths in Timisoara uprising, reflected this. Gaddis counters that reconciliation succeeded because confrontation had weakened the Soviets, with U.S. aid to Poland's $1 billion stabilisation fund in 1990. The Two Plus Four talks from February 13, 1990, unified Germany in NATO on October 3, 1990, with Soviet troops withdrawing by 1994 for $8 billion German aid. Leffler emphasises emotional barriers overcome, but facts show Soviet concessions like renouncing Brezhnev Doctrine on July 6, 1989, in Bucharest. The START I accord reduced warheads to 6,000 each, signed after 9 years of talks. Brown credits Thatcher's "we can do business" comment on December 17, 1984, bridging leaders. Internal Soviet referendums on March 17, 1991, showed 76 percent favoring union preservation, but Baltic independence declarations on March 11, 1990 (Lithuania), ignored by Gorbachev until January 1991 crackdown killing 14 in Vilnius. Reconciliation's limit was evident in the coup's failure, leading to Ukraine's independence vote on December 1, 1991, with 90 percent approval. Heath evaluates reconciliation as enabling peaceful transition, but rooted in confrontational exhaustion, with Soviet debt at $70 billion by 1991. The Alma-Ata Protocol on December 21, 1991, expanded CIS to 11 states. Gaddis notes the absence of violence, contrasting with 1917 revolution's 5 million deaths.
The final years illustrated the interplay of confrontation and reconciliation, with events like the Berlin Wall's fall symbolising Soviet capitulation under pressure yet managed through dialogue. Mass exodus via Hungary saw 200,000 East Germans flee by November 1989, prompting border opening announced by Günter Schabowski on November 9, 1989. Brown stresses Gorbachev's approval on November 10, 1989, preventing military response. The Camp David meeting on June 2, 1990, advanced economic ties, lifting U.S. trade barriers after Soviet emigration laws passed on May 20, 1991, allowing 185,000 Jews to leave in 1990. Leffler views this as reconciliation triumphing over suspicion, but confrontation's legacy included U.S. intelligence aiding dissidents via Radio Free Europe, broadcasting to 25 million listeners daily. The London G7 summit on July 17, 1991, offered Soviet associate IMF membership, but conditions required market reforms amid 240 percent inflation. Gaddis argues the dissolution was inevitable due to confrontation, with Yeltsin's election on June 12, 1991, as Russian president challenging Gorbachev. The Novo-Ogarevo process for a new union treaty collapsed with the August coup, where 250,000 Muscovites defended the White House. Heath analyses the coup's failure as exposing regime fragility, leading to Gorbachev's resignation and Yeltsin's recognition of independence for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania on August 24, 1991. Reconciliation appeared in the U.S.-Soviet joint statement on September 6, 1991, supporting Middle East peace, but the core was Soviet implosion. Brown notes Gorbachev's Nobel Prize on October 15, 1990, for reducing tensions, yet statistics reveal 15 republics declaring sovereignty by 1991. The Minsk agreement formalised dissolution, with nuclear weapons transferred to Russia by December 1991. Leffler concludes that shared interests in stability enabled peaceful end, but confrontation defined the dynamics.
In conclusion, confrontation rather than reconciliation primarily drove the Cold War's end by crippling the Soviet system economically and ideologically, though reconciliation ensured a non-catastrophic resolution. The period's events, from Reagan's build-up to Gorbachev's reforms, demonstrate that U.S. pressure forced change, while dialogues mitigated risks. Historians like Gaddis and Heath underscore confrontation's decisiveness, balanced by Brown's emphasis on leadership. The outcome reshaped global order without direct conflict.
