IBDP History Extended Essay
The Turning Point of Hitler’s War with the Soviet Union; August-October 1941
Abstract (word count: 255)
This
essay concerns one of the greatest military reversals in history. After
half a year of stunning victories, a dominant army was forced into
retreat for the first time in its history. Being a German history
enthusiast, the question of why the German Wehrmacht failed
in its invasion of the Soviet Union by December 1941 has always been a
topic I was very interested in, as I believe Operation Barbarossa to be
one of the 20th, if not the 20th century’s
greatest and most important military campaigns. The orthodox explanation
for Hitler’s defeat in this crucial venture always seemed “too easy” to
me. I knew there must have been more to the defeat of the Wehrmacht than
simply mud, snow and logistical shortcomings. As I dove deeper and
deeper into the mountains of research that has been made on this topic, I
came across a book called Hitler’s Panzers East: WW2 reinterpreted,
written by R.H.S Stolfi. This book explored a theory for Hitler’s
defeat in the east that intrigued me. Coupled with the well researched
and presented nature of the book, I came to take this theory to be the
truth. The thesis of this book is that Adolf Hitler is the sole culprit
of Germany’s failure to win the war in Russia, and as a consequence WW2
as a whole. At the focal point of this failure by Hitler lie a number of
decisions he made from July to September 1941 (the turning point of Hitler’s War with the Soviet Union) which doomed the operation to failure. This is the thesis my essay follows.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction…(pg.5)
2. Start of Blitzkrieg in the East…(pg.5)
3. Mud, snow and bad weather…(pg.6)
4. My thesis…(pg.7)
5. Führer Directive 33-35…(pg.8)
6. Hitler disperses his forces…(pg.10)
7. The Kiev Encirclement…(pg.12)
8. The dangers of a war of attrition…(pg.14)
9. Failure of Operation Typhoon…(pg.15)
10. Hypothetical outcome of earlier German advance…(pg.17)
11. Significance of Germany capturing Moscow…(pg.18)
12. Conclusion…(pg.19)
13. Appendix…(pg.21)
14. Bibliography…(pg.23)
Introduction
The
“turning point” of a war is the point, after which, the course of the
rest of the war is pre-determined and one side is assured victory. The Ostfront, or Eastern Front was, in my mind, the most important theatre of the Second World War in Europe. Inspired
either by aspirations of world dominance, racial ideology or economic
necessity, Adolf Hitler and the German High Command set in motion with
their invasion of the USSR a conflict that would last four years, would
take the lives of roughly 4,300,000[1] German and 11,500,000[2] Russian soldiers, and would feature some of the harshest fighting conditions and worst acts of brutality and savagery in history. Fall Barbarossa or Operation Barbarossa was the codename given to Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22nd.
Named after the crusading German King Frederick I of the Holy Roman
Empire, this was the single greatest land invasion in history with
regard to the amount of personnel and war material involved. This essay
will answer the question of when the turning of this war was.
Start of Blitzkrieg in the East
On June 22nd
approximately 4 million soldiers of Germany and her allies (most
notably Hungary, Bulgaria, Finland and Italy) crossed the 2,900[3]
km long frontier between Nazi Germany and Soviet-occupied Poland. The
majority of this gargantuan force was organized into three army groups;
Army Group North, Centre and South, with objectives Leningrad, Moscow
and the capture of the Ukraine respectively (Appendix 3). By 1941, the
German Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe had
established themselves as being the most co-efficient and effective
combined armed force in all of Europe, defeating and occupying Poland,
Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Netherlands, France, and crushing the British
Expeditionary Force. As the ferocity of Barbarossa unfolded to the eyes
of the world, it looked as if the German war machine would again achieve
success with their innovative use of deep-thrusting armoured spearheads
independent of slow-moving infantry combined with superbly coordinated
tactical air support offered by the Luftwaffe.
Mud, snow and bad weather
Despite numerous early warnings to Stalin, tactical surprise was absolute on the morning of June 22nd. Border defences were easily overrun and Soviet forces were thrown into disarray and confusion. By 3 October, when Operation Typhoon,
the final assault on Moscow began, German armor had encircled huge Red
Army forces at Minsk, Kiev, Smolensk and Uman, each time destroying or
forcing the surrender of numerous Soviet field armies. The Kiev
encirclement alone had yielded the massive number of roughly 600,000[4] prisoners, comprising four Soviet armies and virtually erasing an entire Soviet Front (1
Front consisted of roughly three armies). In light of these
astronomical achievements, how was it possible that Hitler’s armies were
stopped and eventually defeated by the Red Army at the gates of Moscow
and beyond? Over the past 70 years following the conflict, most
historians have come to agree that a combination of bad weather (mud,
snow and freezing temperatures), Russian manpower and material
stockpiles, and German economic shortcomings brought the formerly
“invincible” German war machine to a standstill with reconnaissance
units in December 1941 looking at the glinting spires of the Kremlin.[5]
My thesis
My thesis is not to discredit these reasons completely. In my opinion, these factors all contributed to the eventual German
defeat in 1945. It was indeed the freezing cold and snow that played a
major role in stopping Hitler from seizing both Moscow in 1941 and
Stalingrad in 1942. Also, it was the vast reserves of manpower and
industrial resources that made a German victory impossible after 1941. Lastly, I do believe that the very limited and underutilized German economy did
prevent Germany from ultimately supplying their troops on the front
lines of the Eastern Front with what they needed, and eventually the
ability to fight a war on multiple fronts and in multiple theatres of
operations. The thesis of this essay is that Barbarossa
and the opening stages of this campaign were the turning point of the
war and that they were of the utmost importance when considering the
possibility of a German victory against the Soviet Union, and a
favorable conclusion of the war as a whole.
Führer Directive 33-35
When
considering turning points in the war in the East, turning points after
which it is believed that Germany could not have won the war, the
battles of Stalingrad (1942), Kursk (1943) and Moscow (1941) come to
mind. These were all decisive battles in their own right that helped
crush Hitler’s ambitions, but I believe the turning point of this war to
be much earlier. I believe the turning point of this war to be in the
period between August-October 1941, in the immediate wake of Barbarossa.
In this brief time period, Hitler made what I believe to be the
greatest strategic blunder in 20th century military history. On 19th July to 21st August Hitler issued his directives 33-35, dictating that the advance on Moscow was no longer to be the Schwerpunkt or
focus of the army’s effort (as it had been before with most of
Germany’s tank and mechanized forces being deployed in Army Group
Center) and that the seizure of Leningrad and the Ukraine were now the
priorities.[6]
What this meant on the battlefield was that insurmountably valuable
time and effort was wasted with, in my mind, fruitless ventures that did
nothing to improve Germany’s strategic position in its war with Russia.
With General Heinz Guderian’s 2nd Panzer Group (The Panzer
Groups held between 4 and 5 Panzer Divisions, and roughly 5 motorized
infantry and regular infantry divisions) being diverted to the Ukraine
and General Hoth’s 3rd Panzer Group being diverted to Leningrad, Army Group Centre would not continue its advance on Moscow until early October[7],
having given Stalin two whole months to prepare for the resumed German
onslaught, and wasted valuable men and equipment as a result of Hitler’s
lack of strategic understanding and foresight. The simple delay of
these two months meant Soviet defences around Moscow could be improved
and prepared in more depth. I believe this to be the
turning point of the Second World War’s Eastern Front since after this
particular strategic folly Hitler’s and his armies would not be able to
seize the heart of the Soviet Union in Moscow due to Soviet preparations
and the onset of winter. This meant that all impetus and momentum
gained from Barbarossa’s early successes was lost hereafter, making a
German victory impossible.
Hitler disperses his forces
Having
established the fact that the opening stages of the war were crucial, I
believe the battle outside Moscow in the winter of 1941 to be the most
important battle of the Nazi-Soviet war, although I believe its outcome
was pre-determined by preceding events i.e. Directives 33-35 and
Hitler’s meddling in military matters of which he knew little. As already discussed, the German war machine had made short work of all Soviet forces the Stavka (Red Army High Council) had thrown against it in the opening stages of Operation Barbarossa.
Since the beginning of the campaign, Army Group Centre had always been
the focus of the main German effort in Russia. It had been the most
successful army group in terms of the number of Soviet units it
destroyed and encircled, and the distance it had advanced into the USSR.
Military wisdom dictates it also had the most important strategic
objective; Moscow. Unfortunately for Germany, Adolf Hitler who had made
himself the de facto supreme commander of the Wehrmacht, disagreed with the OKH (German
Army High Command) and his generals over the strategic and operational
objectives multiple times throughout the war. Most importantly, he
suddenly, in the middle of the campaign, disagreed on the matter of
Moscow as being the primary strategic object of Barbarossa..Hitler,
instead, stressed and lectured his generals on the importance of
seizing Soviet industry and economic assets to assist Germany’s already
ailing economy, and depriving the Soviets of these same assets.[8]
He therefore thought the objectives of the seizure of the Leningrad
industrial region and the agriculturally rich Ukraine to be of more
importance than, in his mind, the mere “trophy city” of Moscow. This
culminated on July 30, 1941, with Führer Directive 33. It instructed the
OKW to
switch Army Group Centre to the defensive and for nearly all armoured
elements of this army group to be transferred to assist in the seizure
of Kiev and Leningrad. Bypassing military structure and professional
military advice, Hitler personally ordered Generals Heinz Guderian and
Hermann Hoth[9]
to move their Panzer Groups 2 and 3, which were already exhausted and
depleted from the heavy fighting around Smolensk, to the South and North
respectively to satisfy Hitler’s thirst for economic conquest. Specifically, on the 15th of August Hitler ordered that Army Group Center’s advance on Moscow be halted and the 39th Motorized Corps to be diverted from the 3rd Panzer Group in the Centre to Leningrad. By the 24th of August, after both Guderian and Halder (head of the OKH) had tried in vain to persuade Hitler to reconsider his orders, Guderian had been forced to direct the whole of his 2nd
Panzer Group to help Army Group South in its encirclement of Kiev. This
is the decision which ultimately caused Hitler and Germany to lose its
struggle with Joseph Stalin and the USSR.
The Kiev Encirclement
At
the end of July, Army Group Center was stopped dead in its tracks just
east of Smolensk and the Desna River, unable to advance and forced to
switch over to the defensive.[10]
This was not due to stiff Soviet resistance, mud, snow, cold or lack of
fuel or supplies. No, this tragic waste of a golden opportunity to
advance further and to capture Moscow after the Soviets had been so
soundly beaten and routed after the Smolensk fiasco[11]
was Hitler’s fault alone. But did Hitler’s economic obsession pay off?
Some would say “yes”, as it did create one of the greatest military
feats in history. The mechanized divisions which were dispatched to Army
Group North played a largely minimal role, only helping to defend
against increasing Russian counterattacks in the Staraia Russa region
East of Leningrad and not bringing about the capture of Leningrad for
which Hitler had hoped. 2nd Panzer
Group, on the other hand, achieved astounding success on an operational
level. After reluctantly starting his offensive to the south, Guderian
met relatively light resistance penetrating the point between the Soviet
Briansk and Southwestern Fronts. General von Kleist’s 1st Panzer Group had already gotten behind the Soviet Southwestern Front and on the 16th
of September, both armored spearheads met in the town of Lokhvitsa,
approx. 120 miles behind Kiev, encircling a force of roughly 5 Soviet
armies and their equipment.[12]
Despite a few thousand Russian soldiers escaping the ever-thin panzer
defensive perimeter around the “Kiev Pocket” (See Appendix 4), this was
the single largest encirclement and was one of the most spectacular
single victories in history. 616,304 Red Army soldiers were either
captured or killed in the encirclement[13] (compared with the comparatively feeble 90,000 German prisoners captured at Stalingrad in November 1942)[14].
As spectacular as the victory had been, encircling battles take time.
As had been the case with previous encirclements at Minsk, Smolensk and
Uman, once the enemy had been completely encircled, the mobile panzer
and motorized infantry units had to wait and defend a defensive
perimeter around the encirclement, as not to let any enemies escape,
until the regular infantry units could march up with their artillery and
reduce the trapped foe until he forced himself into suicidal frontal
assaults or surrender. Although Hitler’s Southern venture and the
ensuing battle won a clear victory for the Wehrmacht, I believe it was a victory that was at the wrong place and the wrong time.
The dangers of a war of attrition
With
my argument claiming that this period was the turning point of Hitler’s
war with the USSR, I must also disprove the arguments that the battles
of Stalingrad and Kursk were the turning points of the war. Both battles
were confrontations of huge proportion, but as in the case of the
battle of Moscow, their outcomes were already determined before the
first German soldier ever entered Stalingrad or the first tiger tank
attacked at Prokhorovka. What we know today as “Blitzkrieg”, which more accurately was the way in which the Wehrmacht drastically and decisively destroyed (and
not simply routed) its enemy’s armies in the opening battles was
Germany’s secret to success in the Second World War. It was a way of
waging war in which operational success, the art of winning battles, was
everything and the economic effects of a drawn out, prolonged war were
negated to a point where it did not matter that Germany had less
industrial capacity compared to her enemies. What this meant was that in
1941, when the boost offered by “Blitzkrieg” was most needed by Germany
to defeat the industrial giant that was the USSR, Hitler wavered and
sought, instead of pursuing strategic goals such as the destruction of
Soviet Armies and the capture of the Soviet capital, to pursue economic
goals which would help him in the long term (a point at which Germany
would lose the war anyway), he made the decisive mistake of the war. As
soon as Hitler slipped into this mindset in which he was no longer
trying to crush his enemy, but only trying to improve Germany’s long
term economic position, victory was virtually impossible for the Wehrmacht, as
Germany could not hope to match the USSR’s industrial capacity, let
alone the massive support offered by “Lend-Lease” from Great Britain and
the USA. The impact this had on the battlefield was that Russian
superiority in both men and machines became apparent as early as 5
December when the Russians launched their own Winter offensive,
immediately after six whole months of almost uninterrupted German
offensive actions, which pushed Army Group Centre practically back to
the positions where it had started Operation Typhoon in early October. As a consequence of this failure by Hitler, all future German offensive operations hereafter (Fall Blau (the 1942 Summer Offensive), Fall Zitadelle (Kursk)), were doomed to failure.
Failure of Operation Typhoon
During
the generous time period of two months given to the Soviet High Command
by Hitler through his diffusion of strategic objectives, the Stavka was
able to raise and place no less than nine armies opposite Army Group Centre and mobilize thousands of peasant reserves (an ability the USSR
had which would inexorably doom Germany’s efforts in the future)
dedicated to the defence of Moscow. Knowing full well that an assault on
Moscow was soon to commence, Stalin also employed thousands of Moscow
civilians to dig anti-tank ditches, pillboxes, bunkers and trench
systems for the defense of the capital. During this time the German
tanks and mechanized units that would eventually be used to assault
Moscow were being progressively worn down in strategic military
sideshows in the north and south. The Germans did achieve notable
success during Operation Typhoon,
creating yet another enormous encirclement of Russian soldiers at
Briansk-Vyazma and coming within artillery range of Moscow, but the
Russian defenders had been given too much time to prepare and withstood
the German onslaught. Guderian’s 2nd Panzer Army, which was
the southern arm of the planned encirclement of Moscow, was repulsed
three times from the key town of Tula and was then forced to give up the
offensive.[15] Hoepner’s 4th Panzer Army fared slightly better and reached as far as Istra and a motorcycle patrol from Reinhardt’s 3rd
Panzer Army reach as far as the town of Khimki (6km from Moscow
outskirts) but came no further, condemning the northern pincer of the
offensive to failure as well.[16]
Hypothetical outcome of earlier German advance
But
what if the Germans had started their offensive on Moscow in early
August, instead of October, and not diverted Army Group Centre’s tanks
north and south? On 5th August, the Soviets could field an
estimated 63 divisions in front of Moscow, 28 of which were fresh
conscripts and 35 were remnants and escapees from the previous failures
of Smolensk and Minsk[17]. Opposed to this were roughly 60 well-equipped, victorious and veteran German divisions poised to advance. Whereas on 2nd
October the Russians fielded 100+ divisions supported by numerous tank
brigades opposed to 70 German divisions, most of which had just arrived
from the south or north and the rest of which had been sitting in
waiting for the last two months[18].
Taking into account the contribution that mud, snow and the freezing
cold had on the German offensive of October, which would not have been
present in August, based on these figures it is hard to escape the
conclusion that a German offensive launched in August 1941 would have
fared far better than the one in October, and most probably would have
captured the Soviet Capital and destroyed the 60 odd divisions defending
it.
Significance of Germany capturing Moscow
What
this would have signified for Joseph Stalin’s USSR is another question.
Moscow is the quintessential heart of European Russia. It had been the
Russian seat of Government since 1917, and housed the Politburo and the
dictator, Stalin himself, in the Kremlin. The Soviet State Committee of Defence and the General Staff of the Red Army were also located in Moscow during this time, including most other
essential military organs of the country. Compared with Moscow’s
infrastructural and industrial significance, the damage to the
governmental structure and dictatorship of Stalin appear negligible. In
1941, Moscow was the communication and transportation hub of the USSR,
being used to receive and re-direct most resources from the Far East and
Asia and through its central position being the nucleus of the
intricate web of rail lines that connected Leningrad, Moscow and the
Ukraine. Besides it and its surrounding area accounting for more than
18%[19]
of the industrial output of the entire Soviet Union, Moscow was also
the most populated city. The psychological shock to government and
people alone is worth taking into account when considering the effect
the fall of Moscow would have on the USSR and its war-fighting
capability. Undoubtedly, the fall of Moscow would have been a
catastrophic blow to the Soviet Union and a monumental victory for the Wehrmacht. A blow that I do not think the USSR would have easily recovered from and might have spelt its demise as a free nation.
Conclusion
The
reasons for Hitler’s August-October 1941 folly are mostly unclear,
although it is clear from examining the decisions he made all throughout
the war, most significantly in August-October 1941, Russia, but also in
France (failure at Dunkirk) the year before and in the latter part of
the war that Hitler was simply not the strategic mastermind of war he
has been made out to be. He understood the necessities of starting wars
while his Wehrmacht
was in a dominant position, but did not grasp the necessity of clear
objectives and deliberate aggressiveness on the battlefield, something
his generals on the battlefield (Von Bock, Guderian, Hoth, Hoepner) and
high command (Halder, von Brauchitsch) grasped very well, but whose
efforts where ultimately undermined by Hitler’s paranoia and stubborn
ignorance. Either because of his arrogance or his racial ideology,
Hitler came to believe he had the leisure on the Eastern Front to pursue
goals that would improve his own economy, while the enemy was left
unbeaten! This was a mistake the Supreme-Commander of any armed force
cannot make, especially considering the scale and gravity of the war
with the USSR. Barbarossa was
meticulously planned in every detail. I wholly disagree with the common
belief that Germany’s invasion of the USSR was a mistake. The Wehrmacht
was a superb fighting machine whose peak was July 1941, when innovative
use of tactics and technology had made total domination of Europe a
possibility by virtually opening the road to the Soviet capital Moscow
and dealing blow after blow to the colossus that was the Red Army. It
had the chance to defeat Stalin’s Union of Socialist Republics after the
fall of Smolensk, and where it for one fateful decision probably would
have done so. After August 1941, when Hitler had, perhaps inadvertently,
changed the nature of the Eastern Front from a war of aggressive
advance, into a war of attrition, the possibility of victory was lost
forever and the turning point of the war with the Soviet Union had passed.
Appendix
1.
“After previous findings the importance of Moscow to the survivability
of the Soviet Union has been put in third place.” – Adolf Hitler
(translated) Conversation between Hitler and Chiefs of Staff at Army Group Center HQ 4. August 1941.[20]
2.
“…1.The most important missions before the onset of winter are to seize
the Crimea and the industrial and coal regions of the Don, deprive the
Russians of the opportunity to obtain oil from the Caucasus and, in the
north, to encircle Leningrad and link up with the Finns rather than
capture Moscow.” – Adolf Hitler Order from the OKW to the OKH 21 August 1941[21]
3. German movements from June-September
4. The Kiev Encirclement
Bibliography
Books
Carell, Paul. Unternehmen Barbarossa. Frankfurt/M: Verlags Ullstein GmbH, 1963
Downing, David. The Moscow Option. London: New English Library, 1980
Forczyk, Robert. Moscow 1941. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2006
Glantz, David M. Barbarossa Derailed Solihull: Helion & Company, 2010
Glantz, David M. Before Stalingrad. Gloucestershire: Stroud, 2003.
Kirchubel, Robert. Operation Barbarossa 1941 (1). Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2003
Kershaw, Ian. Hitler 1936-1945 Nemesis. London: Allan Lane The Penguin Press, 2000
Kirchubel, Robert. Operation Barbarossa 1941 (2). Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2005
Kirchubel, Robert. Operation Barbarossa 1941 (3). Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2007
Magenheimer, Heinz. Hitler’s War - Germany’s Key Strategic Decisions. New York: Barnes & Noble, 2003
Mitcham, Samuel W. The Men of Barbarossa Havertown: CASEMATE, 2009
Schramm, Percy E. Kriegstagesbuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht 1940-1941. Berlin: Bernard & Graefe Verlag GmbH, 1976
Stahel, David. Kiev 1941: Hitler’s Battle for Supremacy in the East Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012
Stolfi, R.H.S. Hitler’s Panzers East. Norman: Publishing Division of the University of Oklahoma, 1993
Swanston, Alexander/ Swanston, Malcolm. The Historical Atlas of World War II. New York: Chartwell, 2010
Overhues, Bernd. Die Wehrmacht – 5 Jahrgang, Nr. 10-20. Berlin: Eisnerdruck Berlin, 1941
Piekalkiewicz, Janusz. Der Zweite Weltkrieg. Duesseldorf and Wien: ECON Verlag GmbH, 1985
Piekalkiewicz, Janusz. Die Schlacht um Moskau. Regensburg: Gustav Luebbe Verlag, 1981
Electronic
DVD. Through Enemy Eyes – A Newsreel History of the Third Reich at War Volume 5-6. Chicago: International Historic Films, 1995
[1] Overmans, Rudiger: Deutsche Militarische Verluste im Zweiten Weltkrieg. pg. -
[2] Swanston, Alexander & Malcolm: The Historical Atlas of World War II. pg. 382
[3] World War II Chronicle, 2007. Legacy/ Publications International, Ltd. Page 146
[4] Stahel, David: Kiev 1941: Hitler’s Battle for Supremacy in the East pg. 209
[5] Carell, Paul: Unternehmen Barbarossa pg. 186
[6]Carell, Paul: Unternehmen Barbarossa pg. 96
[7] Glantz, David M. Barbarossa Derailed pg. 396
[8] Carell, Paul: Unternehmen Barbarossa. Pg. 100.
[9] Mitcham, Samuel W. The Men of Barbarossa pg. 165
[10] Schramm, Percy E. Kriegstagesbuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht pg. 546
[11] Glantz, David M. Barbarossa Derailed pg. 329
[12] Carell, Paul: Unternehmen Barbarossa. Pg. 117
[13] Glatz, David M. Before Stalingrad. pg. 129
[14] Stolfi, R.H.S. Hitler’s Panzers East. pg. 225
[15] Piekalkiewicz, Janusz. Die Schlacht um Moskau pg. 234
[16] Piekalkiewicz, Janusz. Die Schlacht um Moskau pg. 222
[17] Stolfi, R.H.S. Hitler’s Panzers East. pg. 182
[18] Forczyk, Robert. Moscow 1941. Pg. 28-29
[19] Magenheimer, Heinz. Hitler’s War – Germany’s key strategic decisions. Pg. 143
[20] Piekalkiewicz, Janusz: Die Schlacht um Moskau pg. 58
[21] Glantz, David M. Before Stalingrad. pg. 281
[22] Opening stages of Barbarossa (14.11.2011)
[23] The Kiev Encirclement (14.11.2011)
Why was, in 1937 Nationalist
Germany, Max Bergmann´s painting
“Frühling”, 1925, labelled as
politically correct, while Max Bergmann´s “TanzBar in Baden-Baden”, 1923, labelled as Degenerate?
ABSTRACT
In this essay I will concentrate on
the two National Socialist Exhibitions will attempt to prove that although the
Nazi tried to manipulate public opinion by labelling Art politically, they were
unable to curtail the creative spirits of artist like Max Beckmann, who had to
go into exile after the Degenerate Art Exhibition in Munich 1937. However also
Max Bergmann, who had official Nazi approval of being painter of the German
“Volk” after the simultaneous Große Deutsche Kunstausstellung, also had a
style, which the Nazi, had they known, would have found subversive.
INTRODUCTION
Can one put a political label on art?
In National Socialist Germany during the 1930s, the German Chancellor Adolf
Hitler, devised a scheme to use art as a tool to spread Nazi ideology by
labelling thousands of modern paintings as “Degenerate”. The idea of “true art” enforced in form of two
simultaneous exhibitions in 1937. In Munich the magnificent Haus der Kunst was
built to house works marked as politically correct, while the “Entartete”
exhibition took place in a small building nearby. The sheer difference of
location conveys the National Socialist message. For my investigations, I have
chosen two contemporary paintings, which were exhibited in each of the two
venues. Within the research question “Why
was, in 1937 Nationalist Germany, Max
Bergmann´s painting “Frühling” (“Spring”) labelled as politically correct,
while Max Beckmanns “Tanzbar in
Baden-Baden” (Dancing Bar in Baden-Baden”), 1923, as degenerate, I will
investigate the justification of labelling art, and the choice of art and
culture to represent Nazi Germany. My point of view is that art cannot fairly
be designated as being the right or the wrong kind. Hitler specifically chose
the traditional, classical artistic styles, whilst shunning diversions from the
art he wanted to represent his ideology. As I have been living in Germany for
several years and am very interested in Art as well as History, this topic is
significant to me by giving insight into
both the development of modern art in Germany and the country itself.
THE IDEA OF DEGENERATE ART
Degenerate Art was the term used by
the Nazis to denote everything in modern art movement. Modernism was being
pushed by the likes of Otto Dix, George Grosz, Max Beckmann and Emil Nolde. It
took the form of Dada, Surrealism, Expressionism and Cubism, which had begun to
emerge during the avant-garde years of the Weimar republic. The art blossomed
into pieces containing the political views of the artist, his expressions and
even pieces daring to criticize the government. However, Expressionism was
shunned by the Nazi party, branded a threat to German culture and ultimately banned.
Over 20,000 pieces of art were removed and
confiscated from galleries, museums and private collections. Some were then
displayed in the 1937 Degenerate Art exhibition that was made to insult and
ridicule their style. The artists where also banned from painting and
prosecuted. Max Beckmann escaped to London, while others, like Nolde, stayed
but were banned from buying painting equipment.
NAZI CULTURAL IDEOLOGY
Hitler’s statement “Anyone who sees
and paints the sky green and fields blue ought to be sterilized” (http://thinkexist.com) was far from
exaggerated. The Nazi party went out of its way to ensure that the “original”
German spirit of art was preserved and presented. The ideal, perfect picture,
in Hitler´s and Goebbels opinion, was that it would contain the attributes of
their ideology to portray, such as national pride, family, duty, discipline,
heroism and moral purity. The paintings would often feature the countryside. Peasant
life was displayed as wholesome and preserving rural values, the people typically
beautiful, proud Aryans, or the “Volk”, Hitler’s perfect race, shown in
everyday situations to display Germany as peaceful and traditional. The Nazi
Party used Art as weapon to manipulate the public. It had essentially become
propaganda.
Haus der Kunst is a huge museum in the centre of Munich.The
venue was a masterpiece of German culture itself, built to house German art. It
is an imposing building stretching down the prominent Prinzregentenstraße. However,
if one is to walk a little further and cross into the narrow and well hidden Galeriestraße
behind Hofgarten, one will come across
the inconspicuous, small building where the “Entartete” art was been carelessly,
overcrowded and crammed into narrow rooms for public ridicule.
Enartete opened 19th July
1937. The Nazi painter Adolf Ziegler announced in his in his opening speech
that: “We now stand in an exhibition that contains only a fraction of what was
bought with the hard-earned savings of the German people and exhibited as art
by a large number of museums all over Germany. All around us you see the
monstrous offspring of insanity, impudence, ineptitude, and sheer degeneracy.
What this exhibition offers inspires horror and disgust in us all”.
On the walls mocking, derogative messages
and texts were scribbled around the paintings. These terms accused the
paintings of insulting German War heroes, being anti-governmental and marked
them as “Perverted Jewish spirit” and a danger to German culture. Five rooms
within the exhibit had themes where pictures had been grouped. One room was preserved
for the paintings guilty of insulting woman, another for farmers and German soldiers,
in another the paintings were to have a religious or blasphemous theme, while a
third contained specifically art by the Jewish painters, even though only six
out of the selected 112 artist were Jewish. The show described the modern art
movement as a conspiracy and tried to convince the German public that this art
was inferior to that of the officially approved works by artists such as Adolf Ziegler
and Arno Breker. The close proximity of the two exhibitions gave the public
opportunity to experience the right and the wrong kind of art at the same time.
Interestingly, the “Entartete” Exhibition
became a blockbuster, with around three million visiting Germans, three times
as many as the Große Deutsche Kunstausstellung. This could hint that the
general public had a genuine interest in different, modern art, despite the
opinions of the regime.
THE POWER OF THE VENUES
“Die Grosse Deutsche Kunstausstellung”
was held in the House der Kunst, parallel to the exhibit of degenerate art and
opened the day before. The magnificent building that was designed by Paul
Ludwig Troost housed the artwork
approved by Hitler and Goebbels. As Hitler said, “With the opening of this
Exhibition, the end of the cultural destruction of our people has started.” The
museum is a monument to Nazi propaganda. Nazi symbols are still visible
engraved into the marble inside the building.
The building is still used today
to house exhibits of mainly modern art. This shows Germanys evolution in art,
and how modernism overcame the very forces that opposed them. These are now
presented in the structure built to rival the degenerate art. When one inspects
the avenues of presentation there are hints of the actual art and the
difference between the two groups created in Germany. On one hand, there is the
colossal majestic building, built in stone and with enormous pillars as show of
power. The very ideals that the Nazi Party were trying to convey though
architecture and many sculptures and paintings, were like those of ancient
Rome, thus also the Roman, classical inspired temple design for Haus der Kunst.
On the other hand it is a paradox that the “Entartete” building also contained
massive amounts of German culture. This building is also symbolic for the art
it presented, with both the exhibits and the way they were presented as being
surreal and expressionistic. In both venues the visitor was experiencing the hidden
ideologies.
PROBLEMS OF RESEARCH
In my hunt to find paintings to
compare I began to research types of Nazi art. Following research about the
some of, I found that these paintings had been archived in different museums
around German. I then searched for the triptych “The Four Elements” by Adolf
Ziegler, which is in Munich city archive. After sending a letter to the
“Pinakothek der Moderne”, the most important modern art museum in Munich, I
discovered that these paintings where not allowed to be shown to the public
because of the history behind them. The labelling of art by Hitler, and the act
of forcing his ideology onto paintings, had caused the German government to stop
these works of art from being seen in public..
Fortunately,
as I discovered, the grandson of Max Bergmann, one of the approved Nazi
painters, lives in his grandfather’s gallery and studio, which lies just
outside my home village. Although Max Bergmann was not part of the National Socialist
Party, the Party approved his style of painting, accurate scenes of heroic
farmers and rural beauty. One of his paintings,
“Frühling”, which I will discuss later, was exhibited in Haus der Kunst in 1937
and is now owned by his grandson. I was granted a visit to view this in his
home.
COMPARISONS OF THE ART WORKS OF
BERGMANN AND BECKMANN
To show the difference between the
two types of arts, and why one was treasured by the Nazi party, I will compare
the painting “Tanzbar in Baden-Baden” by Max Beckmann with the Nationalist Socialist
approved painting “Frühling” by Max Bergmann. “Tanzbar”, now on display in Pinakothek
der Modern in Munich, was painted in 1923. It is in oil on canvas and measures
100.5cm x 65.5cm making it quite a large piece. “Tanzbar”, as well as other works by Max
Beckmann, were hung in Room five in the “Entartete”, which catalogue described
as: “This section of the exhibition affords a survey of the moral aspect of
degeneracy in art. To those “artists” whom it represents, the entire world is
clearly no more or less than a brothel and the human race is exclusively
composed of harlots and pimps. Among these works of painted and drawn
pornography there are some that can no longer be displayed, even in the
“Degenerate Art” exhibition, in view of the fact that that women will be among
the visitors.” It shows how the Nazi propagandists were imposing their uncompromising
opinions on what harmful art.
INTERPRETATION, BECKMANN´S “TANZBAR
BADEN-BADEN”
“Tanzbar” was painted during the Weimar Republic,
at the time when the Expressionist style picked up in Germany. It shows a scene
from the 1920s and depicts the upper social class. The format of the painting
is high and narrow, showing two couples dominating the centre, with people
squashed in around them, pressing against the frame. The figures fill the whole
space, making it cramped and unnatural scene. The unreality is enforced with
the multiple perspective being very steep and exaggerated. The figures appear like
they are pushed towards the viewer. It is painted this way to make the viewer
feel claustrophobic and uneasy, thus criticising the top of society, accusing
the rich of inhabiting their very own little privileged world, not caring
about, the bad things that happen outside, like the massive problems in society
after the First World War.
“Tanzbar” is painted in an
expressionist style, which evokes mood and promotes feelings. The scene is non-fictional,
but the reality is that it a political, emotional statement. The expressionist
painters used these kinds of work to oppose the impressionist and realistic style
of the Nazi artists, in order give social criticism. Looking at the painting,
there are seven hands and arms are pointing to the bottom right corner, cutting
the painting into diagonals. This is to give an idea of the rhythm and dance,
portrayed in the piece. The angle of the floor and the man in the left bottom
corner both act as counter movements to balance the picture. The red and black
colours create another pattern. The red dress, then a black smoking, followed
by a red bow tie and the red stocking with a white shoe all further create a
cadence. The source of light in “Tanzbar” is rather diffuse. It seems that it comes
from the left, even though there are no real shadows cast by the characters, making
make them seem to float, all adding to the nightmarish feel. The couples are
very close but it seems there is no real connection, shown by the woman looking
away. It could be a comment on how the upper class was united only by their ego.
“Tanzbar” was painted during the pinnacle of
the Weimar inflation. Put together with the jewellery and clothes of the
characters, it gives a sense of how well off and uncaring the upper class was
about the people suffering outside and the massive problems in society after
the First World War.
However, as the steep perspective
indicates, which makes it look as though the character might slide off, their
way of life is about to come to an end. Max Beckmann has made a very critical
prediction of, what social instability would cause.
INTERPRETATION, BERGMANN´S “FRÜHLING”
The painting “Frühling” by Max
Bergmann was painted in 1925 and exhibited in the Grosse Deutsche
Kunstausstellung. Painted in oil on canvas, like ”Tanzbar”, and measuring 120x90
cm, it depicts two cows dragging a load. In the background are trees. It is
painted in an exact, naturalistic style, but with loose, energetic brushstrokes
like the Impressionists. The cows are facing directly out of the picture. It is
a classic Bavarian scene where the artist has attempted to convey the beauty of
the farmland. On the right hand side, part of the farmer is seen. He is driving
his cows in the lovely weather. The sun is shining, which is why he is wearing
a hat and the shadows appear purple. The light is coming directly from the
front, this is evident of the way the shadows hits the ground, emphasizing the
highlights on the cows, and giving the scene a naturalistic feel. There is no
sky to be seen, so it is a very intimate painting. Because of the extreme
foreshortening of the cows and the linear one-point perspective it gives the
viewer the viewer a sense of engaging directly with the scene and being,
standing on the pathway, directly confronting the cows.
It is important that the painting is painted outdoors or “en plain air”
which means open-air, and derives from French impressionist artists like Monet
and Renoir. Hitler and Goebbels approved
this style of art because it depicted the Völkisch tradition, is very rural, serene
and adheres to the old traditional values of people tending to their own
business. It also signifies that the Germans should get back to nature and
basic existence. The Nazi party wanted these original peaceful scenes to
represent their culture, in “Frühling” enforced by the fact how fat and well
tended the cows are. The contentment on the farmer’s face shows there is no
hint of war or tension outside the picture. These kinds of paintings were after
all used by the National Socialists to deceive the public. They tried to convey
that Germany was still beautiful and well tended, and the brutal acts, which
they were committing, where not really happening. Or it could be an apology for
committing atrocities in order to preserve these values from outside threats,
like the Jews and the Communists. Art
was used as an illusion by Hitler created to convince the public that the goal
was the old moral values, in comparison to the decadence of the Weimar culture.
DIFFENENCES AND SIMELARITIES OF THE
TWO WORKS
Both Max Beckmann and Max Bergmann were
contemporary and practiced painting at almost to the same time. “Tanzbar” and “Frühling” are similar in size,
and both are painted in very traditional medium of oil on canvas. The oil
medium means great artistic diversity and a beautiful shiny surface is created,
also when it is dry. A multitude of tones and shades can be created. Both
artists rely on “chiaroscuro”, which comes from the Italian and means strong
contrast between light and shade. This effect is used to create depth and
strong three-dimensional image. Max Beckmann uses this cleverly by having the
woman wear bright colours in contrast to the gentleman’s black smoking, making
the painting bold and striking. Max Bergmann likewise uses strong tonal
contrasts to emphasize his figures in sunlight. Where
Beckmann uses multiple perspectives like
the Cubists, making the scene unreal, while Bergmann uses one point
perspective, which is very traditional and realistic. “Frühling” gives an
atmosphere of rural peace while “Tanzbar” gives a noisy crammed almost eerie
ambience. The painting by Beckmann seems to be swirling and contained, spinning
in circles around itself, while Bergmann’s is open and free. It is interesting,
however, that the viewer is unable to enter either painting. In “Tanzbar” entry
is impossible because of the self-sustaining whirl and the naked arms, which
are pushed against the picture plane, barring entry and only allowing the
viewer to observe the decadent rich from the outside. It is an obvious social criticism of a social
world, which is only open to a few, selected and arrogant people. Equally in
“Früling” the viewer cannot enter the painting. The cows, in effect a peaceful
scene, faces the viewer straight on and approaches with what actually seems to
be in a disconcerting, slightly threatening, way. The noses of the animals are touching the
picture plane, and if the viewer does not move he or she will be trampled on.
It could be an image of the fact that rural life is perhaps not that romantic
as the Nazi wanted people to believe, and everything is an illusion. The fact
that the cows are so extremely foreshortened is first of all to show off the artist’s
skill in drawing and observation, but also to create an unusual, staged
atmosphere. Maybe this is an inherent criticism of the social conditions.
MAX BECKMANN BIOGRAPHY
Max Beckmann was born in 1884 in
Leipzig and was the youngest of three children of a merchant family. After the
death of his father he moved to Braunschweig, and went to the Art Academy in
Weimar. In Berlin he encountered the emerging German impressionist painters and
began to paint in this style as well. During WW1 he became involuntarily a nursing
officer on the Eastern Front. In 1915 he had a nervous breakdown because of his
war experiences and was sent to a Hospital in Frankfurt. The paintings he did
during the War were exclusively Expressionist, which he continued after
discovering “Die Brücke”, an Expressionist movement from Dresden. It became a
way of expressing the horrors of the War, no longer realistic but with more
extreme emotions and scenes. 1925 he married Quappi, who features in a lot of
his paintings. He taught at the art academy in Frankfurt and became quite famous,
with exhibits in America and in Europe. In 1933 with the Nazi Party taking
power, he lost his job, was banned from painting and his art labelled as Degenerate.
Between 1993-1936 over 800 of his works were confiscated from exhibits all over
Germany. One week after the exhibition in Munich he felt forced to flee to
London. He passed away December 1950 in New York, but as a very famous,
renowned artist.
MAX
BERGMANN BIOGRAPHY
The German artist Max Bergmann was born
the 2nd of December, also in 1884, in Fürstenberg. His parents owned
a dyeing factory and were quite wealthy. He started painting early and quickly
became very good at portrait drawings. He visited the “Fine Art Academy
Schalottenburg” in Berlin where he could further progress in his work. In 1907 he studied figure drawing and animal painting
at the Art Academy in Munich. Like Bergmann, he was also sent to the Front
during WW1. In his house his I saw old photographs of him as a dashing young
officer, a post he became straight away because family’s social standing. Unlike
his artist colleague, he came out of the War unscathed, but with a lot of
sketches of the local people in Hungary. Bergmann then began to travel to
Paris, where he became a close friend of Marcel Duchamp, the later famous
Dadaist. In Bergmann’s house, I was allowed to see original postcards and
sketches, which Hans Peter Bergmann’s grandfather had received from Duchamp. Later
he married Dorothea Karstadt, heiress to the huge Munich Karstadt dynasty. They
moved to Haimhausen, my village, where he formed an art school, focusing on
painting outside in the open air. Bergmann is probably mostly known within
Germany, but his paintings stand now in high regard. Because of his
impressionist style and content of his paintings he was presented in the first Große
Deutsche Kunstausstellung. It was his life on the country that inspired his
paintings. Max Bergmann did not have his work confiscated, but was made to
report many times during the War to an “Internat”, checking if his art appropriately
conveyed the message that the National socialists wanted it to.
VISIT TO MAX BERMANN´S STUDIO
I visited the grandchild of Max
Bergmann, Hans Peter Bergmann, on Monday 10th August 2011. He still
to this day lives in the house, where Max Bergman lived and worked. The old,
imposing artist villa, which before 1919 belonged to the well-known landscape artist,
Buttersack, is local Haimhausen. Max Bergman wanted to be away from the bigger
cities and have freedom and peace to paint. The huge garden also allowed him
and his art student to paint outside. Hans Peter Bergmann allowed me to see the
original, amazing art studio which still stands like it has done for almost over
ninety years. The paintings he had
inherited from his grandfather were displayed everywhere and were absolutely incredible.
Max Bergmann had an unbelievable skill of direct observation of nature and
people, and he used very rich and colourful oil paint. His style was often
sketchy, where only a few brushstrokes indicated his subject, capturing the
form and colour and giving a realistic and lively effect . The figure paintings,
his portraits and his nudes were powerful, several almost expressionistic in
colour and brush strokes and with strong emphasis on light and shade. Some of
the works, like “Salome “ and “The Sirens” were staged with a gloomy, sinister,
frightening theme. The expression of obvious,
aggressive female sexuality was rather striking, considering the time, when
they were painted. These two paintings, as the grandson said, would have been just
as extreme and outrageous for the National Socialists as Max Beckmanns
paintings. In comparison, Beckmann´s “ Parisian Carnival”, which was also
included in the Degenerate Art Exhibition, likewise shows female promiscuity.
This painting is just as constructed and theatrical with extreme colour scheme
as the “Salome” painting. Looking at the two works in Max Bergmann’s studio, you
got a feeling that he artist was perhaps not quite the artist that Hitler perceived
him to be. Most of his landscape and
animal works were done in an impressionist style, mainly because of the
influence from Paris. He also confirmed that his grandfather publicly remained
with his well-known impressionist style, which he exhibited in Haus der Kunst,
but kept, during the time, when artists were in danger of having their works
confiscated, the more extreme and expressionist paintings hidden from the
authorities. During the 1930s and until the end of the War Bergmann continued
to paint as the Nazis wanted. This was for financial reasons and to secure that
he and his family were left in peace. The Nazi party approved of him as an
artist because they did not know about his private works, and because he was
already been included in the Große Kunstausstellung to denote true German art,
they never ransacked his home. His grandchild also showed me his sketchbook,
which was a present to his father. This sketchbook showed the talent of the
artist, he had 500 sketches of characters in restaurants, farm animals and caricatures.
It was very interesting to see the environment he painted in how he recorded his
experiences and his life of an artist. I also saw photos of Max Bergmann that
he was able to sustain a comfortable life during the War as an artist and was
able to exhibit and sell his own painting and those of his art students.
CONCLUSION
The reason why Max Bergmann he was
never thoroughly investigated by the Nazis, although the farming community of Haimhausen
apparently found the wild parties and the nude models running around outside, rather
outrageous, was that his landscape paintings had got a certain status in promoting
the true Völkish tradition. In contrast, Max Beckmann was disgraced as a German
artist and had to escape to London in order to avoid being arrested and sent to
concentration camp. Interestingly, as the grandson mentioned, the paintings of
Max Bergmann and Max Beckmann both increased and kept their values also after
the War, especially because of the, in our eyes nowadays, controversial
cultural politics of the National Socialists. The inclusion of “Frühling” as true to German, Aryan values
and the “Tanzbar” as dangerous, subversive and degenerate for the German
spirit, secured the fame and value of both artists until our present day. It
also means that the Nazi labelling of art is not effective. They selected art
which did not adhere to classical or traditional moral valued, using the two
contrasting exhibitions in 1937 purely for furthering their own apology for
exterminate what they saw as threatening to Germany. It is nice to see,
however, that the artistic spirit, in both Max Beckmann´s case, who continued
his work abroad, and in the case of Max Bergmann, who like Emil Nolde, continued
his passionate work in secrecy, cannot be broken by any political censorship.
Peter-Klaus Schuster: “Die
“Kunststadt” München 1937, Nationalsocialismus und Entartete Kunst”, Prestel
Verlag 1987
Steve Barron: “Degenerate Art, the
Fate of the Avantgarde in Nazi Germany,” Los Angeles Museum of Art, 1991
Birgit Schurerth: Geniewahn: Hitler
und die Kunst, Böhlau 2009
George Heard Hamilton: “Painting
and Sculpture in Europe 1880 to 1940”, Pelican 1983
Royal Academy of Arts: “German Art
in the 20th Century” Prestel Verlag
1985
Stephen Lackner: “Max Beckmann”,
Dumont 1979
Wilhelm Weber: “Max Bergmann”,
Pfälzer Kunst, 1984
