Past IBDP Paper 1 Exams on The Russian Revolutions & the New Soviet State 1917–1929

Lenin IB DP Past Paper 1


May 2000

These documents relate to political activity 1917 to 1924.
 

NB: Dates used are according to the new style calendar although this was not adopted until 1 February 1918.
 


DOCUMENT A: An appeal from the Central Committee of the Kadet Party, 3 March 1917.

The old regime has gone. The State Duma has forgotten its party differences, has united in the name of the salvation of our homeland. All citizens should have confidence in this regime and should combine their efforts to allow the government created by the Duma to complete its great task of liberating Russia from the external enemy and establishing peace inside Russia, on the basis of law, equality and freedom. Forget all your party, class, estate and national differences.
 


DOCUMENT B An extract from a lecture given by the American historian Richard Pipes in Vienna in 1995. The lecture was later published.

Lenin took power not on behalf of the Bolshevik Party — the words Bolshevik Party do not appear in the early documents — but on behalf of the Soviet. And he intimated [implied] that he wanted to have a democratic transitional government; the word ‘socialism’ does not appear in the announcement proclaiming the overthrow of the Provisional Government which he drafted ... it seemed merely a shift from dual power to unitary [single] power, under which the stronger power, the Soviet assumed full responsibility.
It seemed to be just another of those government crises that had been occurring with increasing frequency since the Tsar had abdicated. The Bolsheviks contributed to this perception by calling theirs also ‘Provisional Government’. It was widely believed that as soon as the Constituent Assembly had met the Bolshevik Government would yield [give up] power.
The Bolsheviks did hold elections to the Constituent Assembly, but when they gained only 24% of the votes and saw that the new government would be run by the Socialist Revolutionaries, they dismissed the Assembly ... and set themselves up as a one-party state.


 DOCUMENT C A resolution by Lenin passed at the Tenth Party Congress, 16 March 1921.

It is essential that every party organisation must take the greatest care to ensure that the undoubtedly essential criticism of the shortcomings of the Party is directed not towards the discussion of groups adhering to [supporting] some platform or other but towards the discussion of all Party members. Anyone making criticisms must take into account the position of the Party, surrounded by enemies and also must strive to correct the mistakes of the Party by active personal participation in Soviet and Party work.
Congress orders the immediate dispersal of all groups, without exception. Failure to execute this Resolution of the Congress must result in unconditional and immediate expulsion from the Party.
 


DOCUMENT D: Stalin’s views of the role of the Communist Party in Russia, written in 1924. 
The Party must absorb all the best elements of the working class, their experience, their revolutionary spirit, their selfless devotion to the cause of the proletariat. But in order that it may really be the vanguard [leader of the movement] the Party must be armed with revolutionary theory ... the proletariat needs the Party for the purpose of achieving the dictatorship of the proletariat ...
Our party succeeded in creating internal unity and unexampled cohesion of its ranks primarily because it was able in good time to purge itself of the opportunist pollution [corruption], because it was able to rid its ranks of the destroyers, the Mensheviks. Proletarian parties develop and become strong by purging themselves of opportunists and reformists.
 


DOCUMENT E: A Stalinist official poster from the 1920s entitled ‘They try to stop the Revolution’. The two small figures are labelled Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries.

 1. (a) According to Document A why is the Kadet Party urged to support the State Duma? [2 marks] 
     (b) What is the message of Document E?  [2 marks]

2. Using Documents C, D and E explain how Lenin and Stalin worked to secure the supremacy of the party.  [5 marks]


3. With reference to their origin and purpose assess the value and limitations for historians studying the Russian Revolution of Documents A and B.  [5 marks]


4. Using these documents and your own knowledge explain why the Central Committee’s wish to establish a regime based on ‘law, equality and freedom’ [Document A] was not fulfilled. [6 marks]



MARKSCHEME:
1. (a) According to Document A why is the Kadet Party urged to support the State Duma? [2 marks]
[1 mark] for each of the following: the Duma is working for the good of Russia; it needs support to secure peace abroad; it has abolished the old Regime. Also allow similar points; e.g., to support establishing peace inside Russia.
(b) What is the message of Document E? [2 marks]
It is an official poster which is trying to show a strong Party/Government [1 mark] and the Government is being hindered or opposed by the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries [1 mark].
NB: Do not enter half marks but compensate where necessary between (a) and (b) for a final mark out of [4 marks].
 

2. Using Documents C, D and E explain how Lenin and Stalin worked to secure the supremacy of the party. [5 marks]
Document C shows Lenin using the Party Congress to obtain enforcement for his policy of keeping the Party free from disagreement and cliques. He used persuasion-  criticism is essential but must be in front of the whole party; fear - the Party is surrounded by enemies; and threats - expulsion from the Party.
Document D shows Stalin cajoling the proletariat to support the Party with their revolutionary spirit and selfless devotion; but they must subordinate themselves to the Party otherwise they will be purged and enemies such as the Mensheviks must be purged.
Document E shows Stalin again citing political enemies, Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries, as enemies of the Revolution and hence of the party by means of propaganda in the form of a poster.
Thus, there is much material to use for ëhowí and candidates will probably tackle each document separately, but the more able might do it in a more structured way, seeking an all powerful Party by unity, opposing factionalism within the Party and other political parties outside, use of fear, threats, etc. The best answers will document their references clearly, and include analytical comments, but do not demand all the above for full marks.
If only Lenin or Stalin is discussed then candidates can only achieve a maximum of [3 marks].



3. With reference to their origin and purpose assess the value and limitations for historians studying the Russian Revolution of Documents
A and B. [5 marks]
Document A is a primary source, coming from an official political body, exhorting the members of the Kadet Party - and a wider audience - to support the State Duma. It is also a contemporary document and candidates can assume that the Central Committee was based in Petrograd. Because of the above it has value as showing support from the Kadet Party for the overthrow of the old regime and for the new provisional government, in the early days of the Revolution.
Document B is a secondary source, as a lecture given 78 years after the events described, then published, by an American historian, regarded as an academic expert on the Russian Revolution. He was speaking and writing with the benefit of years of study and research. The statistic, 24%, lends some weight but his assessment would need to be verified from his and other sources. Candidates familiar with Pipes' work might add some personal comments; some might know that he was born in Poland, others that he had had access to Soviet archives, newly available with the collapse of the Soviet regime. But his ëbiasí or lack of absolute objectivity might be noted by some candidates.
Mark out of [5 marks] but reserve at least [2 marks] for the document less well done. If only one document is addressed, [3 marks] is the maximum. The question also requires candidates to make reference in their assessment to both origin and purpose.
 

4. Using these documents and your own knowledge explain why the central committee's wish to establish a regime based on "law, equality and freedom" [Document A] was not fulfilled. [6 marks]
 

The documents show Lenin's political duplicity towards obtaining a Bolshevik one party state [B], strict party control with no equality or freedom [C], with a similar approach by Stalin to purge opposition and dragoon the workers into compliant unity [D], and his persecution of Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries in documents D and E. Own knowledge could include the failure of the Provisional Government, the Bolshevik dismissal of the Constituent Assembly, the Cheka, conditions induced by the Civil War, terror, famine, etc. Candidates should be able to produce a mini essay from all these elements. Do not demand all the above for [6 marks]. [4 marks] is the maximum if only material from the documents or own knowledge is used.


November 2000

These documents refer to the rivalry between Stalin and Trotsky to succeed Lenin.


DOCUMENT A: Lenin’s Testament, 25th December 1922.


Since he became General Secretary, Comrade Stalin has concentrated in his hands immeasurable power, and I am not sure that he will always know how to use that power with sufficient caution. On the other hand Comrade Trotsky, as has already been shown by his struggle against the Central Committee over the question of the People’s Commissariat of Means of Communication, is distinguished not only by his outstanding qualities [personally he is the most capable man in the present Central Committee] but also by his excess of self-confidence and a readiness to be carried away by the purely administrative side of affairs.
The qualities of these two leaders of the present Central Committee might lead quite accidentally to a split, and if our Party does not take steps to prevent it the split might arise unexpectedly. ...
Postscript, 4th January 1923.
Stalin is too rude, and this fault, entirely supportable amongst us Communists, becomes insupportable in the office of General Secretary. Therefore, I propose to the comrades to find a way of removing Stalin from that position and to appoint another man who in all respects differs from Stalin only in superiority; namely, more patient, more loyal, more polite, less capricious [changeable], and more attentive to comrades.
This letter to Congress was dictated by Lenin after his second stroke; it was held back until 1924 and as it also criticised other Congress members it was never acted upon.
 


DOCUMENT B: An extract from L Trotsky, On the supposed testament of Lenin. 31st December 1932. Trotsky’s opinion of Stalin in the years 1922 to 1923.

Lenin undoubtedly valued highly certain of Stalin’s traits: his firmness of character, tenacity [determination], stubbornness, even ruthlessness, and craftiness - qualities necessary in war and consequently in its general staff. But Lenin was far from thinking that these gifts, even on an extraordinary scale, were sufficient for the leadership of the Party and the state. Lenin saw in Stalin a revolutionist, but not a statesman in the grand style. Theory had too high an importance for Lenin in a political struggle ... And finally Stalin was not either a writer or an orator in the strict sense of the word. In the eyes of Lenin, Stalin’s value was entirely in the sphere of Party administration and machine manoeuvring. But even here Lenin had substantial reservations. ... Stalin meanwhile was more and more broadly and indiscriminately using the possibilities of the revolutionary dictatorship for the recruiting of people personally obligated and devoted to him. In his position as General Secretary he became the dispenser [distributor] of favour and fortune ...”.


DOCUMENT C: A contemporary photograph of Lenin in 1923.
Lenin at Gorki, 1923.
 

DOCUMENT D: An extract from, Russia under the Bolshevik Regime, by the US historian Richard Pipes, Vintage Books, first published in 1994.

Trotsky’s behaviour at this critical juncture [point] in his and Stalin’s careers has mystified both contemporaries and historians ... various interpretations have been advanced; that he underestimated Stalin; or that, on the contrary, he thought the General Secretary too solidly entrenched to be successfully challenged ....
Trotsky’s behaviour seems to have been caused by a number of disparate [different] factors that are difficult to disentangle. He undoubtedly considered himself best qualified to take over Lenin’s leadership. Yet he was well aware of the formidable obstacles facing him. He had no following in the party leadership which was clustered around Stalin, Zinoviev, and Kamenev. He was unpopular in party ranks for his non-Bolshevik past as well as his aloof personality. Another factor inhibiting him ... was his Jewishness. This came to light with the publication in 1990 of the minutes of a Central Committee Plenum of October 1923 at which Trotsky defended himself from criticism for having refused Lenin’s offer of deputyship. Although his Jewish origins held for him no meaning, he said, it was politically significant. By assuming the high post Lenin offered him, he would “give enemies grounds for claiming that the country was ruled by a Jew”. Lenin had dismissed the argument as “nonsense” but “deep in his heart he agreed with me”.



DOCUMENT E: Stalin’s speech on the eve of Lenin’s funeral, January 1924.


In leaving us, Comrade Lenin commanded us to hold high and pure the great calling of
Party Member. We swear to thee Comrade Lenin to honour thy command.
In leaving us, Comrade Lenin commanded us to keep the unity of our Party as the apple of our eye. We swear to thee, Comrade Lenin, to honour thy command.
In leaving us, Comrade Lenin ordered us to maintain and strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat. We swear to thee, Comrade Lenin, to exert our full strength in honouring thy command.
In leaving us, Comrade Lenin ordered us to strengthen with all our might the union of workers and peasants. We swear to thee, Comrade Lenin, to honour thy command.



 1. (a) According to Document D why did the Bolshevik leadership not support Trotsky? [2 marks]
      (b) What can be inferred from Document C about the nature of the struggle for leadership in 1923?  [2 marks]

2. Compare and contrast the views expressed about Stalin in Documents A and B. [5 marks]

3. With reference to their origin and purpose, assess the value and limitations of Documents D and E for historians studying the rivalry between Stalin and Trotsky. [5 marks]

4. Using these documents and your own knowledge explain why Stalin succeeded Lenin. [6 marks]

MARKSCHEME

1. (a) Award [1 mark] for Menshevik [non-Bolshevik] past and [1 mark] for arrogance or something similar [aloof personality].
(b) Award [1 mark] for a comment about Lenin’s illness, hence the possibility that he was not in control and [1 mark] for the urgency of securing support in case he died quickly.
NB Do not enter half marks or + and - but compensate between (a) and (b) if necessary for a final mark out of [4 marks].
 

2. Both documents criticise Stalin’s personal character and find fault with him. Document A cites him as ‘too rude’ and by implication infers that he lacks caution, patience and politeness. According to Document B Stalin is ruthless, crafty and devious as ‘the dispenser of favour and fortune’. Some candidates may compare the statement in Document A that Lenin wants to remove Stalin from the position of General Secretary with Trotsky’s view that Stalin did not have the qualities to lead the party: others could legitimately use this in contrast. A clear point of contrast is that Lenin in Document A did not refer to Stalin’s lack of intellect, oratory etc. , but Trotsky in Document B stressed this in arguing against him.
Award [1 mark] for each point clearly expressed and referenced but only give full marks if both similarities and differences have been addressed.


3. Document D is a secondary work by a US academic historian, its purpose is to present the Russian Revolution in a scholarly way after years of research. It was written with the benefit of hindsight and the reference to the minutes of the 1923 Central Committee Plenum suggests that Pipes’ research is thorough and up-to-date. For limitations candidates will probably note that it is a secondary source and that as a US citizen, Pipes could be biased, but they should gain little credit for bare statements to that effect. Further analysis of the difficulties of researching Russian history during the Cold War, language problems, Soviet secrecy etc. would earn credit.
Document E is Stalin’s speech on the eve of Lenin’s funeral. Its purpose - as well as praising Lenin was probably to convey Stalin as [in his eyes] the natural successor to Lenin, and to point out the policies that he would like to continue, or at least like the public to believe he would continue. Its value is the fact that Stalin gave the oration; and what he emphasised about Lenin. Its limitation is that it is a funeral oration, stylised, and of course limited as to what could be said on such an occasion as the death of the revered founder of Soviet Russia.
NB The question refers to the rivalry between Stalin and Trotsky, not to the qualities of Lenin. The expected division of marks would be 3/2 either way; if one section is excellent and the other omitted or very sparse, there could be a split of 4/0 or 4/1, but this would be exceptional.


4. Documentary material could include:
From Document A, that Stalin was General Secretary and had amassed much power by using this position to his advantage.
From Document B, Stalin’s character traits especially ruthlessness and craftiness, as well as his party manoeuvring and buying of support as the ‘dispenser of favour’.
From Document C, Lenin’s incapacity which Stalin exploited. From Document D, Trotsky’s weaknesses and Jewishness.
From Document E, that Stalin was in a strong enough position to deliver Lenin’s funeral oration.
For ‘own knowledge’ the points above could be expanded. Most candidates should know that Trotsky did not attend Lenin’s funeral. They should also be aware of the continuing feud between Stalin and Trotsky; perhaps of their different views about the party. Trotsky was expelled from the party and exiled in 1927. By 1928 Stalin was able to implement his policies of Socialism in one Country and was the recognised leader of the party and the USSR.
Do not demand that this mini-essay contains all of the above, but if only ‘own knowledge’ or documentary material is given, the maximum mark that can be awarded is [4 marks]. 




May 2001

These documents relate to the period between the two 1917 revolutions.

DOCUMENT A An extract from Lenin's April Theses, 4 April 1917.

 

In our attitude towards the war not the slightest concession must be made to 'Revolutionary Defensism' for even under the new government the war on Russia's part unquestionably remains an imperialist war owing to the capitalist nature of that government. We must organise propaganda of this view among the whole army on active service.
The specific feature of the present situation in Russia is that it represents a transition from the first stage of revolution which led to the assumption of power by the bourgeoisie to the second stage, which must place power in the hands of the proletariat and the poorer peasantry.
No support must by given to the Provisional Government; the utter falsity of its promises must be exposed. It must be explained to the masses that the Soviet of Workers' Deputies is the only possible form of revolutionary government, and therefore our task is, as long as this government is influenced by the bourgeoisie, to explain the error of its ways.


 

DOCUMENT B: A resolution passed by the All Russian Conference of Soviets, 5 April 1917.
 

In agreement with the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, the Provisional Government has published a programme of governmental works. The All Russian Conference of Soviets recognises that this programme includes the basic demands of Russian democracy. The Conference also recognises the necessity of gradually gaining political control and influence over the Provisional Government and its local organs [organisations] so as to persuade it to conduct the most energetic struggle against counter-revolutionary forces, and to make preparations for universal peace.
The Conference appeals to democracy to support the Provisional Government without assuming responsibility for all the work of the government, as long as the government steadfastly confirms and expands the gains of the revolution and so long as its foreign policy is based on the renunciation [giving up] of ambitions of territorial expansion.



DOCUMENT C An extract from a lecture given by Richard Pipes, Professor of History, Harvard University, in Vienna in 1995.

Lenin wanted power, Lenin's rivals did not want it. In 1917 the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries were quite content to let the 'bourgeoisi' Provisional Government govern while they kept up a steady barrage of denunciation and criticism. But Lenin wanted much more. In April 1917 he had just returned to Russia from Switzerland. His followers lined up with the Mensheviks in expressing satisfaction with the arrangement under which the Socialists through the Soviets controlled the 'bourgeoisie' and prevented it from straying from the democratic path without themselves assuming responsibility for administering the country. At the All Russian Conference of Soviets held in April, the Menshevik, Irakli Tsereteli said, "there is at present no party in Russia willing to assume responsibility for governing." To which Lenin from his seat shouted, "there is". This hunger for power more than compensated for the relatively small following of the Bolsheviks.
 


DOCUMENT D: A report by General Alexei Brusilov, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian army, from the northern war front May 1917.

When I arrived at their camp, I demanded to speak to a delegation of the soldiers. It would have been dangerous to appear before the whole crowd. When these arrived I asked them which party they belonged to, and they replied that before they had been Social Revolutionaries but that now they supported the Bolsheviks. "What do you want?" I asked them. "Land and freedom," they all cried. "And what else?" The answer was simple, "Nothing else!" When I asked them what they wanted now, they said that they did not want to fight any more and pleaded to go home in order to share the land their fellow villagers had taken from the squires [land owners], and live in freedom. And when I asked them: "What will happen to Mother Russia if no one wants to defend it, and everyone like you only thinks of themselves?", they replied that it was not their job to think about what should become of the state, and they had firmly decided to go home.



DOCUMENT E: A photograph of volunteers for the Women's Death Battalion queuing to have their hair cut to military length, June 1917.

For the Motherland
The Women's Death Battalion was formed in June 1917 to shame male deserters who were destroying the Russian army as a fighting force. About a million soldiers left their units between March and October 1917.


1. (a) What can be inferred from Document D about the following?
  1. (i) Why the soldiers wanted to go home. [2 marks]
  2. (ii) Why the soldiers now supported the Bolsheviks. [1 mark]

   (b) What propaganda/political message is intended by Document E? [1 mark]

2. In what ways do Documents A, B and C support the assertion made in Document C that "Lenin wanted power, Lenin's rivals did not want it"? [5 marks]


3. With reference to their origin and purpose, assess the value and limitations of Documents A and B for historians studying the period between the two 1917 Russian Revolutions. [5 marks]


4. Using the documents and your own knowledge analyse the contributions of both continued participation in the First World War and widespread unrest and disorder within Russia, in causing the downfall of the Provisional Government. [6 marks]

Example from a student written under examination conditions
(click to enlarge):



 

MARKSCHEME:
1. (a)  What can be inferred from Document D about the following?
(i) Why the soldiers wanted to go home. [2 marks]
Document D states that the soldiers wanted land and freedom. They wanted to go home to obtain their share of land which the peasants at home were taking from the landlords. They were afraid that they would fail to get any if they were away from their villages. Award [1 mark] for a sentence on land. Freedom could be inferred to mean freedom from the landlord's authority or being out of the army. Award [1 mark] for either, but note that Document D does not mention the horrors of war.
(ii) Why the soldiers now supported the Bolsheviks. [1 mark]
The inference here is that the Bolsheviks supported both ending the war and land redistribution. Award [1 mark] for either of these or the implicit inference that the Social Revolutionaries did not support them.
(b) What propaganda/political message is intended by Document E? [1 mark] The message is continue fighting the war. Award [1 mark] for this or something similar
(e.g. to encourage women to replace male deserters).
N.B. Do not enter half marks or + and - but compensate between (a) and (b) if necessary for a final
mark out of [4 marks].
2. In what ways do Documents A, B and C support the assertion made in
Document C that 'Lenin wanted power, Lenin's rivals did not want it'? [5 marks]
For "Lenin wanted power" candidates could use the opposition of Lenin to the Provisional Government, their policies and lack of revolutionary spirit stated in Document A. As well as his incitement to soldiers, workers and peasants to opposition, and by implication, to support him. Leninís ambition is spelt out clearly in Document C with his conduct at the All Russian Conference of Soviets, when he shouts that one party was willing to 'assume responsibility for governing,' implying that the Bolsheviks wanted power, and he their leader wanted it.
For "Lenin's rivals did not want it", candidates could quote ìrevolutionary defensismî from Document A and the ambiguity and caution of Document B to support the Provisional Government without assuming responsibility etc.; candidates could, however, also contradict this in B with "gradually gaining political control". Document C contains a definite statement from a leading Menshevik that no party wanted to shoulder full responsibility.
Probably marks should be split 3/2 either way for each statement, or for those who tackle each document separately 2+2+1 in the most appropriate order. Specific references to the documents must be given for full marks but do not demand all the above material.
3. With reference to their origin and purpose, assess the value and
limitations of Documents A and B for historians studying the period
between the two 1917 Russian Revolutions. [5 marks]
Document A, part of Lenin's April Theses was issued by him the leader of the Bolsheviks the day after his return from exile in Switzerland. Its purpose was to set out Bolshevik and Lenin's aims and policies. Lenin wanted to undermine the Provisional Government and replace it with a more revolutionary government, therefore he aimed to appeal to soldiers, workers and peasants by telling them that they would gain more from a more radical revolution. Its value is that it is reliable as presenting Lenin's views or at least what he wanted to be understood by his audience. Its limitations are that Lenin had been out of Russia for some time and was out of touch with the situation in Russia and even with the local Bolsheviks, who had not yet been consulted, and there was not general Socialist agreement.
Document B is a resolution passed at the All Russian Conference of Soviets, thus it expressed the views of the delegates and its purpose was to record these views. It was an internal official document. Its value is as an expression of the conference at this time, when the Soviets were emerging as a powerful body. Its limitations could be that it is not known how many delegates were present, how they had been selected, if there was dissent etc. The tone of the resolution is ambiguous.
For maximum [5 marks] ensure that candidates use both documents and assess both value and limitations. If only one document is addressed award up to [3 marks].
4. Using the documents and your own knowledge analyse the contributions of both continued participation in the First World War and widespread unrest and disorder within Russia, in causing the downfall of the Provisional Government.
Documentary material for the war could be:
[6 marks]
Document A, the war was regarded as an imperialist war and Lenin was determined to oppose it and thus make it even more unpopular.
Document D, indicates the unpopularity of the war, the general's fear of meeting a large number of troops, their wish to go home etc.
Document E, reports the number of desertions and the desperate formation of a women's battalion.
Own knowledge could include defeats, low morale, shortages at the front, and at home. Documentary material for disorder is in Document D with the taking of land by peasants, the
loss of authority of the squires etc.
Own knowledge could include strikes, lockouts, general anarchy, workers' organisations,
formation of the Red Guards, the Kornilov affair, inflation etc.
Demand balanced and evidenced answers. If only documentary material or own knowledge is used, [4 marks] is the maximum. If only the war or only disorder is addressed, then mark out of [4 marks]. Do not expect all the documents to be used, use of a range of them is sufficient on this demanding question.


November 2001


These documents refer to the period 1918 to 1923, with Lenin in power.
 

DOCUMENT A: Lenin justifies the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, 5 to 6 January 1918, in one of his many writings of 1918.

Those who point out that we are now ‘dissolving’ the Constituent Assembly, although at one time we defended it, are not displaying a grain of sense, but are merely uttering pompous and meaningless phrases. At one time we considered the Constituent Assembly to be better than Tsarism and the Republic of Kerensky, but as the Soviets emerged, being revolutionary organisations of the whole people, they naturally became far superior to any parliament in the world, a fact that I emphasised as far back as last April. By completely smashing bourgeois and landed property and by facilitating [making possible] the final upheaval which is sweeping away all traces of the bourgeois system, the Soviets impelled [led] us on the path that has led the people to organise their own lives.
The people wanted the Constituent Assembly summoned and we summoned it. But they sensed immediately what this famous Constituent Assembly really was. And now we have carried out the will of the people which is, “All power to the Soviets”, and crushed the Constituent Assembly.
 


DOCUMENT B: Lenin’ s speech at the 7th Bolshevik party congress 6 March 1918, urging acceptance of the peace treaty with Germany signed on 3 March 1918.

It will be a good thing if the German proletariat rises up in revolution. But have you discovered such an instrument, one that will determine that the German revolution will break out on such and such a day? No, that you do not know and neither do we. You are staking everything on this card. If the [German] revolution breaks out, everything is saved. Of course. But if it does not the masses will say to you, you acted like gamblers.
A period has set in of severe defeats, inflicted by imperialism, armed to the teeth, upon a country which has demobilised its army, which had to demobilise. What I foretold has come to pass; instead of the [first] Brest-Litovsk peace, we have received a much more humiliating peace, and the blame for this rests upon those who refused to accept the former peace.



DOCUMENT C: Trotsky’s order to Red Army Troops, issued on 24 November 1918.
 

Krasnov and the foreign capitalists who support him have thrown onto the Voronezh front hundreds of agents who have penetrated Red Army units and are inciting [encouraging] men to desert. I declare that from now on an end must be put to this by using merciless means.

  • 1. Every scoundrel who incites anyone to retreat, or to desert, or not to carry out a military order will be shot.
  • 2. Every soldier of the Red Army who voluntarily deserts his military post will be shot.
  • Death to self-seekers and to traitors!
  • Death to deserters and to the agents of Krasnov!
  • Long live the honest soldiers of the workers’ Red Army! 

DOCUMENT D: An extract from Lenin, Life and Legacy by Dmitri Volkogonov, a former Colonel-General in the Soviet Army, first published in 1994, in Russia.

There were some 80,000 churches in Russia, most of them Orthodox. Several times Unshlikht reminded Lenin of the fabulous treasures to be found in them. Finally the opportunity to deal with the Church presented itself, the famine of 1921 to 1922 [...] there were about twenty five million people starving in Russia. During this time the Party leadership was sending vast sums of money, and a large quantity of gold and treasure to foreign Communist Parties to help ignite [incite or start] world revolutions [...]. In the course of 1922 gold and treasure, much of it of Church origin, to the value of more than nineteen million gold Roubles was sent to China, India, Persia, Hungary, Italy, France, England, Germany, Finland and elsewhere in a bid to give a new impulse to the revolutionary process.
The famine meanwhile was appalling. People were eating dead bodies, although the Politburo banned any mention of cannibalism in the press. On 23 February 1922 the public learned from their newspapers that a government decree had been issued on the forcible confiscation of all valuables from Russian churches. It was not stated that this decree had first been personally approved by Lenin.
Patriarch Tikhon resisted, so Lenin personally set about formulating the Party’s policy to crush the Church [...]. On 11 March 1922 he requested regular information on the number of clergy being arrested and executed.


DOCUMENT E: Economic Realities. Statistics put together from Soviet Sources.



1. (a) According to Document E what can be inferred about the economic situation in the new Soviet state between 1918 and 1923? [2 marks]

(b) According to Document C what message is Trotsky intending to convey? [2 marks]


2. Analyse and account for Lenin’ s defensive self-justifying attitude in Documents A and B. [5 marks]

3. With reference to their origin and purpose, assess the value and limitations of Documents C and D for historians studying Lenin’s rule of USSR. [5 marks]


4. ‘For Lenin the Revolution was everything, the people of Russia nothing.’ Using these documents and your own knowledge, explain to what extent you agree with this assertion. [6 marks]

Student example written under test conditions (click to enlarge):

May 2002

Prescribed Subject 1 The Russian Revolutions and the New Soviet State 1917-1929
These documents relate to the 1917 February/March Revolution (dates used are according to the old style calendar).
 


DOCUMENT A Extracts from a letter to a colleague and a cable to the Tsar, both from the President of the Duma, Rodzianko, who witnessed the events of 26 and 27 February 1917 in Petrograd.
 

26 February
Unexpectedly there erupted a soldier mutiny such as I have never seen. These, of course, were not soldiers but peasants, taken directly from the plough, who now found it useful to make their peasant demands. In the crowd all one could hear was, "Land and freedom" "Down with the Romanovs", "Down with the officers". In many units officers were beaten. This was joined by the workers, and anarchy reached its peak.


27 February
Situation serious. In the capital anarchy. Government paralysed. Transport of food and fuel completely disorganised. Public disaffection [discontent] growing. On the street chaotic shooting. Army units fire at each other. It is essential at once to entrust a person enjoying country's confidence with the formation of a new government. There should be no delay. All delay is death.
 


DOCUMENT B: An extract from the manifesto of the central committee of the Social Democrats, 27 February 1917.
 
Citizens! The strongholds of Russian tsardom have fallen. The Russian people through huge efforts and at the cost of blood and many lives, have thrown off the slavery of centuries.
The task of the working class and the revolutionary army is to create a Provisional Revolutionary Government which will stand at the head of the new-born republican order. The Provisional Revolutionary Government must draw up temporary laws to defend the rights and liberties of the people, to confiscate church, landowners', government and crown lands, and transfer them to the people, to introduce the eight hour working day, and to summon a Constituent Assembly on the basis of a suffrage [right to vote] that is universal.



DOCUMENT C: An extract from The Russian Revolution 1899-1919, by Richard Pipes, London 1990, dealing with the Tsar's response to reports from Petrograd.

Nicholas chose to ignore the warnings and said to his aide, "That fat fellow Rodzianko has again written me all kinds of nonsense, which I shall not even bother to answer."
But as the day went on Nicholas's equanimity [calmness] was severely tested, for Rodzianko's alarmist assessments received confirmation from sources in which he had more confidence. A cable came from Khabalov [an adviser] to the effect that he could not prevent unauthorised assemblies because the troops were in mutiny and refused to fire on the crowds. Galitsyn [prime minister] informed the Tsar at 2 pm in the name of the cabinet that the raging mobs were out of control and that the cabinet wished to resign in favour of a Duma ministry. He further recommended the imposition of martial law and the appointment of a popular general to take charge of security. Petrograd had become unmanageable.
Nicholas still thought he was facing a rebellion not a revolution: he refused to turn over control of administration to a Duma cabinet, and ordered his cabinet to remain at its post.



DOCUMENT D: Nicholas's letter of abdication, 2 March 1917. 
By the grace of God, We Nicholas II, Emperor of all the Russias, to all Our faithful subjects;
In these days of terrible struggle against the external enemy who has been trying for three years to impose his will upon Our Fatherland, God has willed that Russia should be faced with a new and formidable trial. Troubles at home threaten to have a fatal effect on this hard fought war. The destinies of Russia, the honour of Our heroic army, and the welfare of Our dear country demand that the war should be carried to a victorious conclusion at any price.
Our cruel enemy is making his supreme effort, and the moment is at hand in which Our valiant army, together with Our glorious allies will overthrow him.
In these days which are decisive for the existence of Russia, We think We should follow Our conscience by facilitating [helping to bring about] the closest co-operation of Our people and the organisation of all its resources for the speedy realisation of victory. For these reasons, in accord with the Duma, We think it Our duty to abdicate the crown and lay down the supreme power.


DOCUMENT E: Petrograd crowds burning emblems of the Imperial regime, 26 February 1917



1. (a) According to Document D why did Nicholas II abdicate? [2 marks]
    (b) What message is portrayed by Document E? [2 marks] 

2. In what ways do Documents C and E support the views expressed in Document A? [5 marks]

3. With reference to their origin and purpose, assess the value and limitations of Documents B and D for historians studying the 1917 February/March Russian Revolution.
[5 marks]

 4. Using these documents and your own knowledge, explain why the 1917 February/March Russian Revolution was successful. [6 marks]

MARKSCHEME

1. (a)  According to Document D why did Nicholas II abdicate? [2 marks]
Award [1 mark] for each of the following to a maximum of [2 marks]; the dangerous situation "at home"; to obtain co-operation from the people to win the war; to follow the dictates of his conscience and/or fulfil his duty; to obey the wishes of the Duma.

(b) What message is portrayed by Document E? [2 mark]
The message is anger against the Russian Imperial family the Romanovs, and a wish to destroy/overthrow it. Award [1 mark] for a simple statement to this effect, and the second for some elaboration.
N.B. Do not enter half marks or + and − but compensate where necessary between (a) and (b) for a final mark out of [4 marks].


2. In what ways do Documents C and E support the views expressed in
Document A? [5 marks]
The views expressed in A are of a dangerous situation on 26 February with mob violence, and a mutiny of soldiers largely caused by recently conscripted peasants, who wanted ìland and freedomî and who opposed the Tsar, and their officers. On 27 February the situation deteriorated with the breakdown of law and order, shortage of fuel and food and the failure of the government to alleviate it.
C supports A in reporting the troop mutiny, raging mobs which the government failed to control and therefore it wished to resign.
E supports A in picturing mob violence and a threat to overthrow the Tsar, on 26 February 1917. A probable breakdown of marks would be [2 marks] for A, [2 marks] for C and [1 mark] for E.


3. With reference to their origin and purpose, assess the value and limitations
of Documents B and D for historians studying the 1917 February/March Russian Revolution. [5 marks]
B is an official contemporary document issued by the Central Committee of the Social Democratic party. Its purpose is to set out party policy. It is valuable as showing the partyís aims and policies and revealing support for the people, the setting up of a provisional government and opposition to the Tsar. Its limitations are that it is a manifesto seeking support so its policies and support for the achievements of the people,  "huge efforts" "cost of blood and lives" may be exaggerated in order to win support.
D is also a contemporary document written by the Tsar to explain why he was abdicating. Written at the height of the revolution its value is that it reveals his fears, his feelings for Russia and the Russian people and his concept of his duty. Its limitations are that in many ways it is both an apology and a justification, seeking to put his actions in the best possible light.
Assign [2 to 3 marks] either way for each document. Candidates must refer to origin and purpose to obtain [5 marks].


4. Using these documents and your own knowledge, explain why the 1917 February/March Russian Revolution was successful. [6 marks]
There are many reasons contained in the documents that candidates could use to show why the revolution was successful, for example:
A the strength of the peasants' demands and opposition to the Tsar and the Romanov dynasty, the quick break down of law order and government control and hatred of officers.
B also reveals the strength of the revolutionary outbreak and the popular demands.
C shows the weakness and indecision of the Tsar, a main cause of revolutionary success.
D also portrays the weakness of the Tsar and his government. E pictures hatred of the Romanov dynasty.
Own knowledge could include war conditions at home and in the war zone, for which the Tsar, in command, was blamed; Alexandra and Rasputin; failure since 1905 to reform, for example failure and criticism of the duma, economic problems.
Do not expect all the above, but for full marks candidates must explain clearly why the first 1917 Revolution was successful by referring to long term and immediate causes of increasing disaffection as well as the actual events in February/March 1917. If only own knowledge or documentary material is used [4 marks] is the maximum that can be obtained.


Student example:

 






November 2002

Prescribed Subject 1 The Russian Revolutions and the New Soviet State 1917-1929
 

These documents refer to the USSR under Lenin, 1918 to 1920.
 


DOCUMENT A: An extract from a speech by Lenin at a conference of Bolshevik leaders, 4 April 1918.
 
Without the guidance of specialists in the different branches of science and technology no transition to socialism is possible. But the majority of specialists are bourgeois. These specialists can be used by the state [USSR] either in the old bourgeois way, by paying them large salaries, or in the new proletarian way, by instituting a regime which controls everyone, which would automatically control the specialists so that we can enlist them for our work.
Until we have achieved this control we must be prepared to pay specialists. This is clearly a compromise measure, but the Russians are bad workers as compared with advanced nations. It could not have been otherwise under the Tsarist regime with the system of slavery still alive. To learn how to work is a problem which the Soviet power must place before the people.
 


DOCUMENT B: A decree by Sverdlov, Chairman of the Central Executive Committee, 22 April 1918.

The Russian Soviet Republic, surrounded on all sides by enemies, has to create its own powerful army to defend the country, while making its social system on Communist lines.
The Workers' and Peasants' Government of the Republic considers it its immediate task to enlist all citizens in either work programmes or military service. This work is meeting with stubborn resistance on the part of the bourgeoisie, which refuses to part with its economic privileges and is trying, through conspiracies, uprisings and traitorous deals with foreign imperialists, to regain state power.
To arm the bourgeoisie would cause trouble within the army, and hinder it in its fight against the external enemies. The Workers' and Peasants' Government will therefore find ways of making the bourgeoisie share, in some form or other, the burden of defending the Republic.
Female citizens are trained, with their consent, on an equal footing with males. Persons who avoid compulsory training or neglect their duties shall be called to account.

DOCUMENT C: An extract from Lenin, a biography by Robert Service. London: Macmillan, 2000.

 
The old problems with his health-  headaches and insomnia [sleeplessness] - troubled him [Lenin] throughout spring and summer 1918. From April to August he published no lengthy piece on Marxist theory or Bolshevik party strategy. This was very unusual for Lenin. His illness was stopping him from writing. His inability to sleep at nights must have left him in an acutely agitated state. Everything was done in panic. Everything was done angrily.
On 11 August he sent a letter to the Bolsheviks of Penza:

Comrades! The insurrection [rebellion] of the five kulak districts should be pitilessly suppressed. The interests of the whole revolution require this because "the last decisive battle" with the kulaks is now under way everywhere. An example must be demonstrated.
  1.  Hang (and make sure that the hanging takes place in full view of the people) no fewer than one hundred known kulaks, rich men, bloodsuckers.
  2. Publish their names.
  3. Seize all their grain from them.
  4. Take hostages in such a way that for hundreds of kilometres around people will see and tremble with fear.
These words were so shocking in tone and content that they were kept secret during the Soviet period.
 


DOCUMENT D An extract from a speech by Lenin to a meeting of Peasants' delegates, 8 November 1918.
 
Division of the land was all very well as a beginning. Its purpose was to show that the land was being taken from the landowners and handed over to the peasants. But that is not enough. The solution lies in socialised farming.
You did not realise this at the time, but you are coming round to it by force of experience. The way to escape the disadvantages of small-scale farming lies in communes, cartels [collective groups] or peasant associations. That is the way to combat the kulaks, parasites [those who live off others], and exploiters.
We knew that the peasants were attached to the soil [earth], that they clung to old habits, but now the poor peasants are beginning to agree with us. A commune or collective farm can make improvements in agriculture that are beyond the capacity of individual small owners.
 


DOCUMENT E A poster by a Russian artist Alexei Radakov, 1920. It shows a blindfolded man stepping off a cliff. The caption reads, "He who is illiterate is like a blind man. Failure and misfortune lie in wait for him on all sides." 


1. (a) What can be inferred from Document A about the following?
                (i) Why Lenin thinks that specialists are needed. 
[1 mark]              
                (ii) How he intends to secure the service of specialists then and later. [2 marks]   
   (b) What message is intended by Document E? [1 mark]

2. Compare and contrast Lenin's attitude to kulaks in Documents C and D. [5 marks]
 
3. With reference to their origin and purpose, assess the value and limitations of Documents A and B for historians studying the USSR under Lenin, 1918 to 1920. [5 marks]
 
4. Using the documents and your own knowledge, explain the origin and nature of problems facing Lenin between 1918 and 1920. [6 marks]

Why and with what results for Europe did the USSR become involved in the Cold War?



EXAMPLE I

 

The Soviet Union’s emergence as a global superpower after 1945 and its subsequent entanglement in the Cold War were not the result of a single, premeditated grand design, but rather the product of a complex and toxic fusion of deeply ingrained historical anxieties, rigid ideological imperatives, and the singular personality of its leader, Joseph Stalin. The reasons for Soviet involvement were rooted in a centuries-old quest for secure western borders, a quest rendered existential by the cataclysm of the Nazi invasion, which cost the USSR an estimated 27 million lives. This pragmatic, if brutal, search for a defensive buffer zone became inextricably linked with the Marxist-Leninist worldview, which posited an inherent and unavoidable conflict with the capitalist world. The results of this involvement for Europe were catastrophic and transformative, leading to the continent’s stark ideological, economic, and military division for over four decades. An ‘Iron Curtain’ did not simply descend; it was deliberately constructed, pole by pole, through Soviet actions in Eastern Europe and, most critically, in Germany. This process not only created two mutually antagonistic blocs but also condemned the eastern half of the continent to a state of arrested development, political subjugation, and economic dependency, the legacies of which continue to shape European geopolitics. The Cold War in Europe was, therefore, a direct consequence of a Soviet policy driven by fear and ideology, which in turn produced a divided and heavily militarised continent where the sovereignty of nations was sacrificed at the altar of superpower confrontation.

 

The primary impetus for the Soviet Union's deep and confrontational involvement in post-war European affairs was a potent combination of its historical experience with invasion and the doctrinal tenets of Marxist-Leninist ideology, a synthesis embodied and executed by Stalin. The Russian national psyche had been shaped by centuries of vulnerability on the vast North European Plain, a vulnerability realised by the Napoleonic invasion of 1812, the Allied intervention during the Russian Civil War from 1918 to 1922, and, most devastatingly, Operation Barbarossa in 1941. The sheer scale of destruction and human loss in the Second World War created an unshakeable conviction within the Soviet leadership that security could only be guaranteed by establishing absolute control over the territories on its western frontier. This was not merely a desire for influence but for a cordon sanitaire composed of politically subservient states that would absorb the shock of any future aggression. At the Yalta Conference in February 1945, Stalin secured Franklin Roosevelt's and Winston Churchill's tacit acceptance of a Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, a concession the West saw as a pragmatic recognition of Red Army deployments but which Stalin interpreted as a license to impose political conformity. The results were swift and systematic. Between 1945 and 1948, any semblance of democratic pluralism was extinguished across the region through what the Hungarian communist leader Mátyás Rákosi termed "salami tactics". In Poland, the London-based government-in-exile was sidelined, and the 1947 elections were blatantly rigged to ensure a communist victory, culminating in the forced merger of the Polish Socialist Party into the ruling Polish United Workers' Party in 1948. In Bulgaria, the popular Agrarian Party leader Nikola Petkov was arrested on fabricated charges and executed in September 1947, a clear signal that no opposition would be tolerated. This drive for a buffer zone, however, cannot be divorced from the ideological framework that justified and propelled it. Marxist-Leninism taught that conflict between the socialist and capitalist camps was inevitable, viewing Western powers not as potential partners but as inherent class enemies. The Marshall Plan of 1947 was perceived in Moscow not as a generous programme for European recovery, but as an insidious tool of "dollar imperialism" designed to create an anti-Soviet bloc and undermine Moscow's newly established hegemony. Consequently, Stalin forbade Poland and Czechoslovakia, both of which had initially expressed interest, from participating. This ideological lens turned defensive actions into aggressive ones and transformed Western responses into existential threats, creating a spiral of mistrust and hostility. The argument advanced by Gaddis, which places overwhelming emphasis on Stalin's personality, is crucial here. He posits that while Soviet security concerns were legitimate, Stalin's own paranoia and insatiable appetite for power meant that his definition of "security" was limitless. For him, a "friendly" government was one that was not merely non-hostile but utterly subordinate. This interpretation suggests that it was the specific character of Stalin's rule, his blend of realism and ideological fanaticism, that made the Cold War unavoidable. His actions went beyond the establishment of a traditional sphere of influence; they amounted to the creation of a monolithic empire controlled directly from the Kremlin, an outcome that the Western powers, particularly the United States, could not accept. In contrast, Zubok offers a more Kremlin-centric perspective, arguing that Soviet foreign policy under Stalin was driven more by a fear of "capitalist encirclement" and a desperate need to rebuild the shattered Soviet economy than by a revolutionary blueprint for world conquest. From this viewpoint, Stalin’s actions, though brutal, were fundamentally defensive and reactive, aimed at securing the gains of the war and preventing a resurgent Germany from once again threatening the USSR. The subjugation of Eastern Europe was, in this reading, a geopolitical necessity to ensure the state's survival. Yet, even if one accepts the primacy of security, the methods employed—the show trials, the purges, the secret police apparatus—were so extreme and ideologically charged that they inevitably provoked a powerful and fearful reaction from the West, solidifying the very division the policy was ostensibly meant to prevent. The initial 'why' of Soviet involvement was thus a feedback loop: historical trauma demanded a security buffer, ideology defined the West as an implacable foe, and Stalin’s totalitarian methods ensured that the establishment of this buffer would be perceived as an act of aggressive expansion, thereby making the Cold War a self-fulfilling prophecy.

 

The contest over the future of Germany served as the central crucible of the early Cold War, where Soviet fears and ambitions crystallised, provoking Western countermeasures that resulted in the formal and lasting division of both the country and the continent. For the Soviet Union, Germany was the ultimate source of its security anxieties and, simultaneously, the greatest prize of its victory. Soviet policy in its eastern occupation zone was driven by two primary, and ultimately contradictory, objectives: the extraction of massive reparations to rebuild the USSR and the prevention of any future German resurgence. The Soviets immediately began dismantling and transporting hundreds of industrial plants to Russia, a policy that stood in stark contrast to the Western approach, which, by 1946, pivoted towards the economic reconstruction of their own zones as essential for the recovery of Europe as a whole. This economic divergence was mirrored by political action. In April 1946, the Soviets engineered the forced merger of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) with the Communist Party (KPD) in their zone to form the Socialist Unity Party (SED), creating a compliant political instrument to govern what would become East Germany. This action sent a clear signal to the West that Stalin had no intention of adhering to the Potsdam Agreement's promise of treating Germany as a single economic unit and allowing for democratic development. The Western response was progressively hardened by these actions. The announcement of the Truman Doctrine in March 1947, which committed the US to containing communism, and the launch of the Marshall Plan in June 1947, from which Soviet satellite states were barred, were direct counters to perceived Soviet expansionism. The breaking point came with the London Conferences of early 1948, where the Western powers, without Soviet participation, decided to proceed with the creation of a separate West German state and, crucially, to introduce a new currency, the Deutschmark, into their zones to combat inflation and spur recovery. Perceiving this as the final step towards the establishment of a hostile, economically powerful West German state on his doorstep, Stalin retaliated with a move of stunning audacity: the Berlin Blockade. Beginning on 24 June 1948, all rail, road, and canal access to the Western sectors of Berlin, located deep inside the Soviet zone, was severed. This was a direct attempt to use the leverage of two million isolated West Berliners to force the Western powers to abandon their plans for West Germany, or to abandon Berlin itself. The result was the opposite of what Stalin intended. The United States and Great Britain responded with the Berlin Airlift, a monumental logistical feat that supplied the city for nearly a year. Over 277,000 flights delivered more than 2.3 million tons of food, fuel, and other necessities, demonstrating an unshakeable Western commitment to the city. The Blockade was a profound strategic failure for the USSR. It not only failed to achieve its objectives but it galvanised Western public opinion, destroyed any lingering hopes of four-power cooperation, and directly precipitated the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in April 1949 as a formal military alliance against Soviet aggression. When Stalin finally lifted the blockade in May 1949, the die was cast. The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was formally established in the West that same month, followed by the proclamation of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the Soviet zone in October 1949. The perspective offered by Heath is particularly insightful in this context. His analysis of totalitarian systems highlights how Soviet policy in Germany transcended mere geopolitical manoeuvring. The creation of the GDR was not just about securing a buffer; it was about constructing a model satellite state, a laboratory for Soviet social and political engineering. The rapid establishment of a vast state security apparatus, the Stasi, the pervasive ideological indoctrination in schools, and the suppression of all forms of political dissent were tools designed to create a new 'socialist personality' and to immunise the population against the ideological 'infection' of the prosperous and democratic West. According to this view, the Blockade was not merely a foreign policy gambit but an extension of a totalitarian mindset that cannot tolerate the existence of an alternative, uncontrolled political entity within its sphere of absolute power. The existence of a free and increasingly prosperous West Berlin was an intolerable affront. The result for Europe was the solidification of a hard frontier running through the heart of Germany, a division that was physical, economic, and ideological. The German question, which began as a problem of post-war administration, was transformed by Soviet actions and Western reactions into the central symbol and a primary engine of the Cold War in Europe.

 

The definitive result of the Soviet Union's engagement in the Cold War was the bifurcation of Europe into two hostile, institutionalised, and heavily armed camps, with profoundly divergent political and economic trajectories. For the nations of Western Europe, the perceived threat of Soviet expansionism, crystallised by the 1948 Czechoslovak coup and the Berlin Blockade, acted as a powerful catalyst for unprecedented cooperation under an American security guarantee. The formation of NATO in April 1949 created a collective defence framework that effectively ended centuries of internecine warfare among its members and provided the stability necessary for astonishing economic recovery, fuelled by Marshall Plan aid. This led to the development of democratic institutions, market economies, and, eventually, the supranational project of the European Economic Community. The result was a half-century of peace and mounting prosperity for one half of the continent. For the other half, the results were precisely the opposite. The establishment of the Warsaw Pact in May 1955, a direct response to West Germany’s accession to NATO, formalised Soviet military domination over Eastern Europe. It was not an alliance of equals but an instrument of control, legitimising the presence of Soviet troops and ensuring that the foreign and defence policies of its members were dictated by Moscow. This military subjugation was matched by economic exploitation through the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), founded in 1949. Rather than fostering mutual growth, Comecon integrated the Eastern European economies to serve Soviet interests, compelling nations like Czechoslovakia to focus on heavy industry at the expense of consumer goods and forcing them into dependency on the USSR for raw materials and energy. This system bred inefficiency, technological stagnation, and chronic shortages that defined daily life for generations. Perhaps the most devastating result for Eastern Europe was the complete suppression of national sovereignty. Any attempt to deviate from the Soviet model was met with overwhelming force, a policy explicitly articulated in the Brezhnev Doctrine following the events of 1968. The Hungarian Uprising of 1956 stands as a stark example. When Prime Minister Imre Nagy announced Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and declared neutrality, Soviet tanks rolled into Budapest. The ensuing conflict resulted in the deaths of approximately 2,500 Hungarians, the flight of 200,000 refugees, and the brutal restoration of a hardline communist regime. Twelve years later, the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia met a similar fate. Alexander Dubček’s reform programme of "socialism with a human face" was crushed in August 1968 by an invasion of 200,000 Warsaw Pact troops, demonstrating unequivocally that the 'socialist commonwealth' was, in fact, an empire where the sovereignty of its constituent parts was non-existent. Judt provides a powerful framework for understanding this dual legacy. He argues that the Cold War imposed a form of "terrible stability" on Europe, freezing the violent ethnic and nationalist conflicts that had repeatedly ravaged the continent. The nuclear standoff and the rigid bloc system made another continent-wide war unthinkable. However, as Judt meticulously documents, this stability came at an appalling price for those in the East. They were trapped in what he terms a "moral and intellectual cage," cut off from the cultural and political developments of the West. The construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 was the ultimate physical manifestation of this imprisonment, a concrete admission by the communist bloc that it could only retain its population by force. The result was not merely a lower standard of living but a deep psychological wound, a legacy of mistrust in public institutions, and a distorted political development that continued to haunt these nations long after the fall of communism in 1989. The long-term result of Soviet policy was therefore the creation of 'two Europes': one free, prosperous, and integrated; the other unfree, impoverished, and fragmented, its fate dictated from a foreign capital until the very end of the twentieth century.

 

To conclude, the Soviet Union's involvement in the Cold War was not a choice made in a vacuum but an outcome dictated by a powerful confluence of factors. The deep scars of historical invasions fostered a near-obsessive quest for security, a goal that was interpreted and executed through the rigid, antagonistic lens of Marxist-Leninist ideology. This combination of pragmatic fear and doctrinal fanaticism, channelled through the paranoid and expansionist personality of Stalin, set the USSR on a collision course with the Western powers. Soviet actions—the imposition of satellite regimes in Eastern Europe, the attempt to dislodge the West from Berlin, and the brutal suppression of dissent—were perceived not as defensive measures but as proof of an unlimited ambition to dominate the continent. The results for Europe were stark and enduring. The continent was cleaved in two by an Iron Curtain, a division institutionalised through opposing military alliances in NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and rival economic systems in the Marshall Plan-aided West and the Comecon-dominated East. The German question, the epicentre of the conflict, was resolved only by the nation's bisection, creating a flashpoint that would define European geopolitics for two generations. While this bipolar order imposed a grim stability, preventing a third world war, its cost was borne almost entirely by the peoples of Eastern Europe. They were condemned to four decades of political subjugation, economic stagnation, and cultural isolation, their national aspirations extinguished by the realities of Soviet imperial power. The legacy of this division was profound, shaping the continent's economic geography, political alignments, and even its collective psychology in ways that persisted long after the Berlin Wall fell.

 

EXAMPLE II

 

As an 18-year-old writing a simple IB paper, it is mind-blowing [sic] to be expected to answer the question of why the USSR became involved in the Cold War, considering that the point at which the Cold War officially “began” is still being debated by historians to this day. However, as an Iranian-American I am able to understand a certain aspect of the Cold War very well, and this is the tension. After all, in the past few years American threats to Iran have been plenty if they did not stop their nuclear development. To someone watching this conflict from both sides, it is clear that the struggle is not as much rooted in actual fear but simply dominance. Either side is afraid of a war, and is aware that they cannot afford it, yet continue to provoke each other in order not to lose face. From what I have understood about the Cold War it seems to me to have been the same: a power struggle between two nations (though perhaps on a larger scale than the Iran-US conflict that I have just compared it to). This essay will argue why the USSR became involved in the Cold War by focusing on their power struggle in three parts of Europe: Germany, Eastern Europe, and Southern/Western Europe.

 

World War II ended with the loss of 13 million Russian troops and 418 000 American ones. Neither power could afford another “hot war”. This is why Germany became a focal point in the power struggle, which caused and constituted the Cold War, as it was an area where both these countries bordered each other, yet far enough from their own civilians as to not be a direct risk. From one year after the war, the rivalry in Germany began, as on the 2nd of December 1946 Bevin and Byrnes agreed to unite the British and American sectors of West Germany. This posed a threat to Stalin, as the economic unification of West Germany meant that first of all the U.S. was gaining power in Europe, and second of all Germany was becoming stronger, both points that provoked tension between the USSR and the US. Adding on to this tension, in 1947 France too joined “Bizonia” (now called Trizone), such that the Soviets felt completely encircled. The Soviets felt undermined by this, and the tension rose further as Stalin now felt as though he were being attacked. Therefore once the Trizone announced their new currency the “Deutschmark” on June 21st 1948, Stalin retaliated. Due to the fact that the countries were avoiding direct confrontation, Germany being the area in which they collided, suffered most from the implications of this tension. Stalin blockaded Berlin, such that the West could no longer access West Berlin through the use of cars or trains. This would starve out West Berlin and force them to succumb to East Berlin, such that Stalin would be in full control of the German capital and shift the balance of power between the USSR and USA, at least this was what he had planned. However, the Americans successfully air-lifted resources into West Berlin such that within a year Stalin was forced to end the blockade and had “lost” this competition against the U.S. This can be seen as the reason that the USSR became involved in the Cold War, because they felt as though their power was being undermined by the Americans through the creation of Bizonia, Trizone and then the implementation of a new currency. Thus following William A. Williams’ revisionist argument, the USSR acted as they did in order to defend themselves and their loss of power as opposed to doing this for aggressive purposes. However, Thomas A. Bailey would contradict this, using the “official” American history of the Cold War, as he would argue that the Soviet’s caused this conflict all the way back in Yalta 1945 by betraying the agreement to hold free elections in Poland and arresting the non-communist leaders. This demonstrated the anti-democratic attitude of Stalin, which the West refused to support. This can be used as a reason to argue that the USSR began the Cold War by disregarding the West, however considering the U.S.’s clear provocation of the USSR through the events that were to follow after Yalta, the argument that the USSR became involved in the Cold War in order to defend their sense of power and dignity compared to that of the United States’ seems to have more factual support.

 

Stalin’s expansion into Eastern Europe however, was definitely another key reason that the Cold War began. The Communists began by taking power in Albania in 1945 immediately after the war, with no opposition. In the same year they took over Bulgaria by allowing a left-wing coalition to gain power, and executing all other parties, as well as giving out 12 000 death sentences. Such violence continued during the occupation of Poland as well two years later when non-communists leaders were forced into exile. In 1947 they became more courageous and invaded Hungary where the allies allowed them to stay if they allowed democracy, of course this failed once again and a puppet government as well as a secret police was installed to oppose opposition. Also in 1947 a communist government was put in place in Romania and Czechoslovakia the year after that, once again with the side note of eradicating any non-communist party. This series of take-overs are known as the Salami-tactics. Thomas A. Bailey pinpoints this as the reason that the Cold War began, labeling it as “Soviet expansionism”. This is certainly a reason for a rise in tension between the two powers, as the USSR was not only openly demonstrating their ruthless methods of gaining power, but also spreading further and further into Central Europe. This threatened the Americans, because as the number of countries that turned communist increased, the number of countries that they could trade with decreased. Thus it could be argued that the Soviets provoked the Americans into joining the Cold War and combatting their expansionism with containment. Nonetheless, William A. Williams would once again argue against this. According to his point of view, the USSR did not expand due to imperialism or the desire to exert power and force, but rather to defend themselves. He would argue that the Americans did wrong, by underestimating Stalin’s fear of a powerful Germany. This is a good argument of course, seeing as the Soviets lost 13 million men in WW2 as well as another 15 million civilians due to the national effects of the war, not to mention that the Russians had been attacked by Germany just thirty years before this too. Although this is a valid argument, it still does not justify the suffering of millions of Eastern Europeans who to this day suffer severe poverty due to the economic differences created in the fifty years that they were part of the Soviet Union. Thus one of the reasons that the USSR became involved in the Cold War is because the Americans felt threatened by their dominance in Eastern Europe and therefore felt the need to increase their own power in the rest of Europe to prevent these countries from suffering the brutal take-overs and conditions the newly occupied Eastern European countries were facing.

 

However, the Truman Doctrine of 1947 in combination with the Marshall Plan of 1948 demonstrated that the U.S. was not exactly subtle when it came to conveying their power to the Soviet Union. The Truman Doctrine declared the U.S. responsible for maintaining peace in the world, such that they were able to support Greece as the British pulled out. The Marshall Plan had similar aims, which were: to rebuild devasted war regions, remove trade barriers and modernize industry. To conduct this they gave a total of 13 billion dollars worth of credits and grants to the countries in Europe, which requested the aid. Though this seems like a very altruistic plan, when taking a second look it becomes clear that there was a lot of self-interest on behalf of the Americans involved. Firstly, they wanted to remove trade barriers, an aspect that William A. Williams would argue is obviously due to the fact that America wanted to expand economically and create markets, which could then trade with them and ultimately buy their goods. (Although it is worthwhile to note that Williams writes after the Vietnam War, a time in which public opinion about America’s involvement in the Cold War took a radical anti-American shift). Not only was this capitalist concept provoking Stalin, but also the clear statement from Truman that the whole plan was an anti-communist scheme. “The seeds of totalitarianism are sown in wants and misery”, he claimed, suggesting that the money provided by the Marshall plan would protect the given countries from being taken over by the communists. Stalin of course recognized this as an attack on communism, and did not allow the countries under his sphere of influence to have take part in this capitalist plan. This sparked conflict within the Soviet sphere of influence, most probably a side effect of the Marshall Plan that the Americans had intended, especially considering they offered the benefits of the plan to all Soviet-block countries as well. Thus, we cannot deem the Soviet Union solely responsible for provoking the initiation of the Cold War through their Salami-tactics as the United States also took measures such as the Marshall Plan, which was definitely not an act based of self-defense considering the countries being threatened were an ocean away from the United States.

 

The results of the Cold War for Europe can still be seen to this day. After all, the Crimean crisis has demonstrated to the whole world how much influence Russia continues to have on Eastern European governments (whether willingly or forced). Not only are the economic differences between Eastern Europe and Central Europe severely noticeable, but even in Germany the partition has left its mark. The chancellor Angela Merkel for example, although enjoying popular support in Germany, is referred to as “East German” in her mannerisms and style.  Even upon visiting Berlin one can see a stark difference between what used to be the East and West side, whilst the West is modern and expensive, the East is still impoverished, apartments are small and grey, and prices are considerably lower than on the West. However, one of the major effects of the Cold War is the luring existence of nuclear weapons that were developed due to the Soviet-American nuclear arms race, another source of competition and power during the Cold War. Although the fear now is not as much Russia and the U.S. bombing each other but rather Iran and Israel, the fact that is that Mutually Assured Destruction will forever be a threat to the world ever since nuclear arsenals were developed in the Cold War. Although this essay focuses on Europe, it is worthwhile to note that historians such as Gar Alperovitz blame the U.S.’s dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki for starting the Cold War, claiming that the Soviets then had to develop their own as well to ensure their own safety, putting a start to the rising tension. This too is a valid reason as to why the Soviets may have joined the Cold War.

 

In conclusion, the USSR may have become involved in the Cold War for various reasons, but most these reasons were rooted in the power struggle over Europe between themselves and the United States. Also, based on the arguments presented in this essay, it can be concluded that neither the U.S. nor the USSR can be blamed specifically for instigating the Cold War, as both were always quick to respond to each other in any situation of provocation or tension. As for the results for Europe, these are apparent to this day, just by taking a look at the GDP of Eastern European countries nowadays compared to that of Central European countries.

 

EXAMPLE III

 

The Soviet Union’s involvement in the Cold War originated from a confluence of ideological rigidity, geopolitical insecurity, and strategic miscalculation. By 1945, Joseph Stalin viewed post-war Europe through the lens of Marxist-Leninist doctrine, which posited an inevitable clash between socialism and capitalism. The USSR’s demand for security buffers in Eastern Europe, articulated through the creation of satellite states and the 1947 Cominform, reflected a belief that Western democracies sought to undermine Soviet influence. David Heath argues that Moscow’s actions were rooted in a defensive posture, citing Stalin’s 1946 assertion that “the capitalist world seeks to provoke a new war to destroy socialism.” However, this narrative overlooks the proactive role of Soviet agents in exporting revolution, such as the 1948 coup in Czechoslovakia, which installed a communist government against democratic elections. The contradiction between defensive rhetoric and aggressive tactics underscores the complexity of Soviet motivations. 

 

Stalin’s decision to reject the Marshall Plan in June 1947 exemplified this duality. While publicly framing the Plan as an imperialist plot to colonise Europe, Soviet officials privately acknowledged its potential to revitalise Western Europe’s economy, thereby weakening communist appeals. Zhdanov’s September 1947 speech, later codified in Cominform directives, condemned “American imperialism” and mobilised communist parties to oppose capitalist “subversion.” Heath contends that these measures were reactive, designed to counter Western penetration rather than initiate conflict. Yet declassified telegrams from Soviet diplomats reveal premeditated efforts to exploit post-war instability, such as funding French and Italian communist parties with over $500 million between 1945 and 1948. Such actions transcend defence, indicating a calculated bid to expand socialist influence. 

 

The Berlin Blockade of 1948–1949 further illustrates the Soviet Union’s dual strategy. Stalin aimed to force the Western Allies out of Berlin, thereby gaining control over all of Germany, while framing the blockade as a response to the introduction of the Deutsche Mark in Western sectors. Heath emphasises that Soviet calculations were shaped by fear of a rearmed Germany under Western control, a concern validated by US Secretary of State George Marshall’s 1947 proposal for a unified, neutral Germany. However, the blockade’s failure to collapse Western resolve and its isolation of Soviet-held Germany highlighted the limits of coercion. By 1949, the establishment of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and NATO solidified Europe’s division, transforming localised tensions into a global ideological battleground. 

 

Heath’s analysis of Soviet archives suggests that Stalin prioritised preventing capitalist restoration in Eastern Europe over global domination. The 1953 suppression of the East German uprising, which killed approximately 1,000 protesters, and the 1956 Hungarian Revolution’s brutal quashing—resulting in 2,500 Hungarian deaths and 200,000 exiles—reflect a pattern of prioritising regime security over ideological export. Yet these actions alienated potential allies; Tito’s Yugoslavia, though communist, rejected Cominform control in 1948, exposing fractures within the socialist bloc. The USSR’s insistence on ideological purity, as seen in the 1968 Prague Spring intervention, which halted Alexander Dubček’s reforms after 150 Czechoslovaks were killed, further entrenched its reputation as an imperial power despite anti-fascist rhetoric. 

 

The Soviet Union’s economic policies exacerbated its international isolation. Stalin’s forced industrialisation, which prioritised heavy industry over consumer goods, led to chronic shortages; by 1950, bread rations stood at 500 grams per day in Moscow. Heath argues that these inefficiencies forced the USSR to lean on Eastern Bloc subsidies, creating a dependency that undermined socialist solidarity. The 1961 Cuba Missile Crisis, where Soviet missiles were deployed 90 miles from US shores, revealed both the extent of Soviet reach and its vulnerability to US nuclear superiority. Khrushchev’s “peace and socialism” rhetoric masked a strategy reliant on military brinkmanship to compensate for economic weakness. 

 

By the 1980s, the combined burden of Cold War militarism and economic stagnation precipitated the USSR’s collapse. Defence spending consumed 15–20% of the national budget by 1985, while grain imports from the West stabilised food supplies only through high foreign debt. Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost attempted to reform the system, but accelerated by the failure to compete with US arms innovations like the Strategic Defense Initiative (“Star Wars”), the USSR disintegrated in 1991. Heath contends that Western economic pressure and ideological resilience ultimately doomed Soviet communism, yet the legacy of Soviet-imposed authoritarianism in Eastern Europe—evident in suppressed memory of Stalinism in modern Belarus—testifies to the Cold War’s enduring trauma. 

 

In conclusion, the USSR’s Cold War involvement stemmed from ideological dogma and security paranoia, but its methods—repression, economic inefficiency, and militarism—accelerated its decline. Europe emerged divided, militarised, and economically depleted, a outcome neither Stalin nor his successors anticipated. The conflict reshaped global power structures, proving that ideological rigidity cannot sustain empire in an interconnected world.