From the May 2009 IBDP History Paper 2 exam
The immediate aftermath of the Second World War saw Europe become the principal fault line along which the Grand Alliance fractured, laying the groundwork for the Cold War's inception. The Soviet Union's westward advance during the war, coupled with its ideological commitment to establishing friendly, communist-led governments along its border, inevitably clashed with Western desires for self-determination and democratic principles in liberated territories. Stalin’s actions in Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria, where Soviet influence was consolidated through manipulation, intimidation, and the suppression of non-communist political forces, directly contravened the spirit of the Yalta Agreement of February 1945, which pledged free elections. The imposition of communist regimes in these nations, often referred to as the "salami tactics" by Hungarian communist Mátyás Rákosi, involved gradually eliminating opposition, culminating in totalitarian control. By 1948, states like Czechoslovakia had fallen under complete communist rule, marked by the February coup, solidifying the Eastern Bloc and raising alarm in Western capitals. The establishment of the Cominform in 1947 further signalled Moscow’s intent to exert tighter control over the international communist movement and consolidate its Eastern European sphere. This aggressive assertion of Soviet power was perceived by the West as expansionism, rather than legitimate security concerns, fundamentally altering the post-war relationship. The division of Germany was arguably the most potent symbol of the Cold War's European origins. Although initially divided into four occupation zones, the differing aims of the Soviet Union and the Western Allies (Great Britain, the United States, and France) soon led to a practical bifurcation. Soviet reparations policies, particularly the dismantling of industrial infrastructure in their zone, contrasted sharply with Western efforts to rebuild and integrate their sectors. The introduction of a new currency, the Deutschmark, into the Western zones in June 1948 without Soviet consultation, was seen by Moscow as a hostile act aimed at undermining the Soviet-controlled East German economy. This precipitated the Berlin Blockade, initiated by Stalin in June 1948, attempting to force the Western powers out of Berlin by cutting off all land access. The Western response, the Berlin Airlift, demonstrated Western resolve and commitment to the divided city, ultimately forcing Stalin to lift the blockade in May 1949. The subsequent establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in May 1949 and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in October 1949 cemented the division of Germany and, by extension, the European continent. This division became the enduring physical manifestation of the Cold War's ideological and strategic fault lines. The Truman Doctrine, articulated in March 1947, represented a significant shift in American foreign policy, explicitly committing the United States to assisting nations resisting Soviet influence. This was followed by the Marshall Plan, announced in June 1947, which provided substantial economic aid for European reconstruction. While ostensibly humanitarian, the Marshall Plan was also a strategic tool to prevent economic collapse that might foster communist movements in Western Europe. Heath, in his analysis of the period, highlights the significance of these events, arguing that the Soviet drive for security through expansion into Eastern Europe and the Western response, driven by ideological opposition and economic concerns, created the conditions for the Cold War. He posits that the post-war power vacuum in Europe, coupled with the breakdown of wartime cooperation and the stark ideological differences, made the continent the inevitable battleground. The Soviet perspective, often articulated by Moscow, viewed Western actions, particularly the Marshall Plan and the formation of NATO, as aggressive encirclement. Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, consistently argued that Western policies were designed to isolate and weaken the Soviet Union. However, the factual evidence of Soviet actions, such as the suppression of democratic elements in Eastern Europe and the Berlin Blockade, strongly suggests that Soviet expansionism was a primary driver of the escalating tensions in Europe. The creation of NATO in April 1949, a collective defence alliance initially comprising twelve Western nations, was a direct response to the perceived Soviet threat in Europe, further institutionalising the division.
The European landscape remained the central theatre for Cold War tensions throughout the mid-20th century, witnessing numerous crises that solidified the bipolar structure and demonstrated the potential for direct superpower confrontation. The formation of the Warsaw Pact in May 1955, a military alliance comprising the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellite states, was a direct countermeasure to NATO, formalising the military division of the continent. This act solidified the Soviet sphere of influence and ensured military coordination under Moscow's command. Within the Eastern Bloc, Soviet dominance was maintained through a combination of political repression, economic control, and military intervention when necessary. The Hungarian Uprising of October-November 1956 provides a stark example of this Soviet control. When Hungarian reformers, led by Imre Nagy, sought greater independence and neutrality, Soviet forces brutally suppressed the movement, killing thousands and reaffirming Moscow's control over its sphere. Similarly, the Prague Spring of 1968, a period of liberalisation in Czechoslovakia under Alexander Dubček, was crushed by a Warsaw Pact invasion in August of that year, demonstrating the Brezhnev Doctrine (later articulated) which asserted the Soviet Union's right to intervene in any socialist country where socialism was deemed to be threatened. Both events underscored the limits of autonomy within the Eastern Bloc and heightened Cold War tensions, particularly in Europe where these interventions directly occurred. The Berlin Wall, constructed by the East German government in August 1961, became a visceral symbol of the Cold War's physical division and ideological chasm within Europe. Its purpose was to prevent the mass emigration of East Germans to the West, a severe drain on the GDR's economy and legitimacy. The Wall's construction trapped millions within the Soviet sphere and served as a tangible barrier between the two halves of Europe, reinforcing the division that began in 1949. The Berlin Crisis of 1961, marked by Khrushchev's ultimatum demanding Western withdrawal from Berlin, nearly led to direct military confrontation, highlighting the city's precarious position as a flashpoint. The standoff at Checkpoint Charlie in October 1961, where Soviet and American tanks faced each other, demonstrated the immediate danger posed by the European theatre. Gaddis emphasizes the importance of these European crises in shaping the Cold War's trajectory. He argues that while the Cold War had global dimensions, it was the European front, particularly the German question and the status of Berlin, that consistently posed the most significant risk of escalation and direct superpower conflict. The physical presence of massive military forces on both sides of the Iron Curtain, the constant ideological struggle for influence, and the proximity of the two superpowers' interests made Europe the primary focus of strategic planning and military readiness for both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The concept of 'flexible response' adopted by NATO in the 1960s, which involved a range of military options from conventional defence to nuclear deterrence, was largely formulated in response to the perceived Soviet conventional superiority in Europe. Conversely, the Soviet Union maintained large conventional forces in Eastern Europe and deployed intermediate-range nuclear missiles (like the SS-20s in the 1970s) specifically targeted at Western Europe. The deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles by NATO in response further underscored Europe's centrality as the primary military theatre. The continent was not merely a passive backdrop; it was the dynamic stage where crises erupted, alliances were forged, and the fundamental nature of the Cold War was repeatedly tested and defined. The physical and psychological barrier represented by the Iron Curtain, running from the Baltic to the Adriatic, epitomised the deep ideological, economic, and military division of Europe, confirming its status as the primary arena of the Cold War.
The Cold War’s denouement was equally, if not more profoundly, rooted in European developments, particularly the systemic failings and subsequent collapse of Soviet control over Eastern Europe. The economic stagnation experienced by the Soviet Union and its satellite states throughout the 1970s and 1980s played a crucial role in undermining the legitimacy of communist regimes. Compared to the relative prosperity and technological advancement of Western Europe, the Eastern Bloc suffered from inefficient centrally planned economies, chronic shortages of goods, and a widening technological gap. This economic disparity became increasingly apparent to citizens of Eastern Europe, fostering discontent and undermining the ideological claims of communist superiority. The Solidarity movement in Poland, beginning in 1980, was a pivotal example of this mounting internal pressure. Led by Lech Wałęsa, the independent trade union challenged the authority of the Polish communist government, gaining widespread popular support and demonstrating the potential for organised opposition to communist rule. Although initially suppressed under martial law in 1981, Solidarity's emergence signalled the fragility of Soviet control and the power of popular resistance within the Eastern Bloc. Gorbachev's assumption of power in 1985 brought a crucial shift in Soviet policy. His reforms, Glasnost (openness) and Perestroika (restructuring), were intended to revitalise the Soviet system but inadvertently accelerated its disintegration. Glasnost allowed for greater freedom of speech and political discussion, empowering dissenting voices and exposing the failures of the Soviet system. Perestroika attempted to introduce market mechanisms into the planned economy, but its implementation proved chaotic and ineffective. Crucially, Gorbachev signalled a change in Soviet foreign policy, abandoning the Brezhnev Doctrine and adopting the 'Sinatra Doctrine', which allowed Eastern European states greater autonomy to pursue their own paths. This non-interventionist stance proved catastrophic for the communist regimes in Eastern Europe, removing the threat of Soviet military intervention that had previously guaranteed their survival. Heath emphasizes the significance of Gorbachev's policy changes, arguing that the withdrawal of the implicit Soviet security guarantee was the primary factor enabling the revolutions of 1989. Without the fear of Soviet tanks, popular movements could openly challenge and ultimately overthrow their communist governments. The chain reaction began in Poland in June 1989 with semi-free elections that saw Solidarity candidates achieve a landslide victory, leading to the formation of the first non-communist government in the Eastern Bloc since 1948. Hungary followed, opening its borders with Austria in May 1989, allowing East Germans to escape to the West and physically breaching the Iron Curtain. The culmination came in East Germany in November 1989, when mass protests led to the spontaneous opening of the Berlin Wall. This event, perhaps more than any other, symbolised the end of the Cold War's division of Europe. Within months, communist regimes collapsed in Czechoslovakia's Velvet Revolution, Bulgaria, and Romania. These revolutions, driven by popular dissent against political repression and economic stagnation, were fundamentally European events. They were not orchestrated by the United States, although Western support for democratic movements played a role; rather, they were internal upheavals facilitated by the Soviet Union's changed stance under Gorbachev. The reunification of Germany in October 1990 further solidified the end of the Cold War's physical manifestation in Europe, removing the central symbol of the continent's division. The Soviet Union itself dissolved in December 1991, partly as a consequence of the loss of its European empire and the internal pressures unleashed by Gorbachev's reforms. Therefore, the Cold War began in Europe with the ideological and physical division of the continent and ended with the collapse of that division, driven by European popular movements and Soviet policy changes originating from internal European failures.
In conclusion, the Cold War's origins and its ultimate demise were fundamentally European phenomena. The post-Second World War power vacuum, the ideological clash between Soviet communism and Western liberal democracy, and the subsequent division of Germany and Europe into opposing blocs, solidified by alliances like NATO and the Warsaw Pact, ensured the continent became the central battleground. European crises, from the Berlin Blockade to the Hungarian Uprising and the Prague Spring, consistently heightened tensions and defined the Cold War's trajectory. However, it was equally within Europe that the seeds of the conflict's end were sown. Economic stagnation within the Eastern Bloc, popular dissent exemplified by movements like Solidarity, and Gorbachev's crucial policy shifts, particularly the abandonment of the Brezhnev Doctrine, created the conditions for the revolutions of 1989. These dramatic events, culminating in the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of Germany, symbolised the collapse of the Soviet sphere of influence and the Cold War's end. Europe was not merely a theatre; it was the epicentre, where the defining struggles of the Cold War unfolded and were resolved, making its history inseparable from the conflict itself.
