IBDP Internal Assessments and Extended Essays on Japan


Did Roosevelt Have Advance Warning of Pearl Harbour?

Plan of Investigation
This investigation seeks to address the extent to which President Roosevelt and his commanding authorities had foreknowledge of the December 7th attack on Pearl Harbour, specifically in terms of advance warning and code breaking. If the cover-up was to be true, FDR would be directly responsible for 2403 deaths, 1178 wounded, 18ships and 350 planes[1] damaged by the war. Two of the main sources used in the essay which both represents the main school of thought, Day of deceit: The Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbour by Robert Stinnett and At Dawn We Slept: the Untold Story of Pearl Harbour by Gordon W. Prange are then evaluated for their origins, purposes, value and limitations.


B. Summary of Evidence
Chronology of events before the attack
1904- The Japanese destroyed the Russian navy in a surprise attack in
undeclared war.[i]
October 7 1940 –McCollum proposes the 8 point memo to President Roosevelt[ii]
11 February 1941 - FDR proposed sacrificing 6 cruisers and 2 carriers at Manila to get into war.[2][iii]

June 14 1941 – FDR learns about Germany’s plans for attacking the Soviet Union by means of a Purple intercept[iv]
November 5 1914 – Emperor Hirohito in an Imperial conference decided on war and Japan’s military was given the go-ahead for the conquest of Southeast Asia.[v]
December 6 1941 –- FDR makes a final appeal to the Emperor of Japan for peace. [vi]
Chronology of events during the attack on December, 7th 1941
Sunday, December 7 - Washington D.C. - The last part of the Japanese message, stating that diplomatic relations with the U.S. are to be broken off, reaches Washington in the morning and is decoded at approximately 9 a.m. About an hour later, another Japanese message is intercepted. It instructs the Japanese embassy to deliver the main message to the Americans at 1 p.m. The Americans realize this time corresponds with early morning time in Pearl Harbour, which is several hours behind. The U.S. War Department then sends out an alert but uses a commercial telegraph because radio contact with Hawaii is temporarily broken. Delays prevent the alert from arriving at headquarters in Oahu until noontime (Hawaii Time) four hours after the attack has already begun.
Sunday, December 7 - Islands of Hawaii, near Oahu - The Japanese attack force under the command of Admiral Nagumo, consisting of six carriers with 423 planes, is about to attack. At 6 a.m., the first attack wave of 183 Japanese planes takes off from the carriers located 230 miles north of Oahu and heads for the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbour.
Pearl Harbour - At 7:02 a.m., two Army operators at Oahu's northern shore radar station detect the Japanese air attack approaching and contact a junior officer who disregards their reports, thinking they are American B-17 planes which are expected in from the U.S. west coast.
Near Oahu - At 7:15 a.m., a second attack wave of 167 planes takes off from the Japanese carriers and heads for Pearl Harbour.
At 7:53 a.m., the first Japanese assault wave, with 51 'Val' dive bombers, 40 'Kate' torpedo bombers, 50 high level bombers and 43 'Zero' fighters, commences the attack with flight commander, Mitsuo Fuchida.
Chronology of events after the attach
Monday, December 8 - The United States and Britain declare war on Japan with President Roosevelt calling December 7 “a date which will live in infamy.”
Thursday, December 11 - Germany and Italy declare war on the United States. The European and Southeast Asian wars have now become a global conflict with the Axis powers; Japan, Germany and Italy, united against America, Britain, France, and their Allies.
Wednesday, December 17 - Admiral Chester W. Nimitz becomes the new commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Both senior commanders at Pearl Harbour, Navy Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, and Army Lt. General Walter C. Short, were relieved of their duties following the attack. Subsequent investigations will fault the men for failing to adopt adequate defence measures.


C. Evaluation of Sources

Day of Deceit: the Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor by Robert Stinnett, a WWII naval veteran who served under Lt. George Bush, was the first revisionist to claim that President Roosevelt had foreknowledge of the attack on Pearl Harbor through decrypted Japanese naval messages. While Robert Stinnett himself claims his primary purpose as “to learn about the intercept procedures”[3] of the requested sources and to “disclose a story hidden from the public” which “should be told to the American people”[4], Library Journals claims it a book which “contemporary and classic Roosevelt haters would cherish”. The book’s value lies in the fact of Stinnett’s 20 years of archival research through the Freedom of Information Act and interviews with surviving U.S. Navy cryptographers. Earning a 70 percent public approval rating, Day of Deceit continues among the top 10 best-sellers in the non-fiction Pearl Harbour book category, according to Amazon.com and Barnes & Noble.com[5]. Immediately after its appearance in bookstores in 1999, over two dozen NSA withdrawal notices triggered the removal of Pearl Harbour documents from public inspection. Nevertheless, as the New York Times states the book will probably “elicit sceptical responses from other historians”[6]. According to Robert Bernstein, Stinnett as a journalist who plays amateur historian with the fact that most participants of the war are dead and cannot defend themselves[7], may take a “dogged and sometimes compelling” attitude when substantiating his conclusion. Moreover, the book failed to take account of less drastic possible analysis for the data it has covered and to some extent may reflect contemporary anti-government sentiment.

Whereas Day of Deceit was claimed to be “skeptical”, At Dawn We Slept: the Untold Story of Pearl Harbour is the first and most important volume, covering nearly the entire 12-month period leading up to the "day of infamy" that marked America's entry into World War II. It provides insights into both Japanese and American mindsets while attacking revisionists' views that Japan's attack succeeded because President Franklin D. Roosevelt withheld critical information from Army and navy commanders in Hawaii. Value of this book can be seen, as Prange was a military historian on MacArthur's staff who researched for military and government documents of both sides that participated in the war and interviewed key people involving Pearl Harbour for 37 years prior to his death. He never finished this book, leaving his collaborators Goldstein and Dillon to finish the book, so this is a composite production. The author is fair and presents the facts in a manner that allows the reader to draw his or her own conclusions. However, while the greatest strength of this book is the extensive Japanese information and interviews, those who had the greatest knowledge were almost all killed during the war or in the war crimes trials shortly thereafter. As well, the book lacks essential information, some of which only become available recently, with other material still locked up. Much was destroyed or disappeared at the orders of the accusers of General Short and Admiral Kimmel, the scapegoats. Therefore, some claimed that it should no longer be considered "definitive" or "authoritative."
D. Analysis
For nearly 60 years it had been bruited about, and for nearly 60 years unproved[8]. Revisionist historians have long argued that Roosevelt, by withholding critical information from commanders in the field, wanted, as Stinnett puts it, to ''ensure an uncontested overt Japanese act of war.''[9] Given that 2,273 American soldiers and sailors died at Pearl Harbour[10], this conclusion, if proven to be correct, would require some drastic rethinking about Roosevelt and the American entry into the war.

Historians of World War II generally agree that Roosevelt believed war with Japan was inevitable and that he wanted Japan to fire the first shot[11]. Yet, revisionist historians tend to demonstrate that to ensure that the first shot would have a traumatic effect, Roosevelt intentionally left Americans defenceless.

Stinnett’s view in the book focusses on three main points:

1.     McCollum Memo
One of the the centrepieces of Stinnett’s argument is an October 7, 1940 memorandum by Lieutenant Commander McCollum of ONI to Navy Captains Walter Anderson and Dudley Knox, which details eight actions which might have the effect of provoking Japan into attacking the United States. The memo was only classified until 1994. Sections 9 and 10 of the memo are cited as the "Smoking Gun", a line was written that “If by these means Japan could be led to commit an overt act of war, so much the better. At all events we must be fully prepared to accept the threat of war.” A primary thesis of Stinnett’s book suggests that the memorandum was central to the high level conspiracy to lure the Japanese into an attack and that it actually reached President Roosevelt, senior administration officials, or the highest levels of US Navy command.
However, orthodox historians claim that such misinterpretation exaggerated the impact of McCollum's memo and assuming Germany was bound to declare war on the United States once Japan did. The memo suggests that only a direct attack on U.S. interests would sway the American public or Congress to favour direct involvement in the European war, specifically in support of the British. An attack by Japan would not, could not, do that as history has proved. Stinnett improperly ascribes McCollum's office as "an element of Station US, a secret American cryptographic center located at the main naval headquarters" as a meaning of OP-20-G in an effort to tie McCollum closer to OP-20-G than he actually was before WW2. Furthermore, according to Stinnett, among the eight actions offered in the, only one was ever implemented in any fashion, and there is considerable doubt the memo was the inspiration. Nonetheless, as shown in Day of Deceit, Stinnett claims all action items were implemented. Lastly, although the memo was passed to Captains Walter Anderson and Dudley Knox, two of Roosevelt's military advisors, on October 7, 1940, there is no evidence available to suggest Roosevelt ever saw it, nor any he did not.

2.     Diplomatic Codes
“The most explosive controversy involving America’s foreknowledge of Japan’s attack on pearl harbor,” Robert Stinnett has written, “involved the Kaigun Ango [Navy code], a complex matrix of twenty-nine separate codes.”[12] To assemble and dispatch the first Air Fleet to Hawaii by radio, the Japanese Navy used four of these separate codes. By the fall of 1914, U.S. cartographers had solved them all.[13] A sixty-year cover-up has hidden American and Allied success in obtaining the solutions of the Kaigun Ango prior to Pearl Harbor.[14] “Naval intelligence records, deceptively altered, were places in the US Navy’s cryptology files to hide the cryptographic success.”[15] Moreover, the last intercept of a message from Yamaoto to the First Air Fleet was on December 2. It read:” Climb niitakyama[16] 1280, repeat 1280.” According to historian James Rusbridger, “(i)t hardly needed a code breaking genius to deduce that this was the date of the opening attack.”[17] This was the only radio message giving the date of the attack; previously, it had been mentioned only as Y-Day in the operational orders given to the First Air Fleet in Hitokappu Bay before it got underway.

Though significant, for Budiansky this was also one of the “most disturbing and irrational” argument by confusing intercepts, codes, and decryptions. As well assured by Wedemeyer, Stinnett used the subterfuge of referring the two completely different versions of the Japanese main administrative naval code as only one "5-Num" code. Thus, he imputed the U. S. Navy's initial success with the earlier and simpler one-part code and cipher, JN-25A (AN), which was implemented on 1 June 1939, to the much more complicated two-part code and cipher combination with a much larger dictionary of about 50,000 code values (by use of auxiliary tables) and a larger cipher additive book of JN-25B (AN-1) in effect at the time of Pearl Harbour[18], whereas the fact that JN-25B (AN-1) replaced JN-25A (AN) on 1 December 1940 was skimmed over.


E. Conclusion
It is difficult, after reading a whole bevy of suspicions and allegations thrown out by the revisionists, not to wonder at the "possibility" that U. S. had decrypted a substantial number of key JN-25B messages which gave a questionable forewarning of the planned attack on Pearl Harbour and that such "foreknowledge" was intentionally withheld to incite US into war.

However, the failure to take into account other, less drastic possible analyses and interpretations outweighed the assumption. Though interesting, the conspiracy theory shows a strong dose of scepticism.
Within the few decades, the holocaust denial, the 9/11 truth and the John F. Kennedy assassination have been dredged up. Pearl Harbour provides a less urgent lesson. The disaster there needs to be remembered, not for anything about Japanese treachery or U.S blunders. Its main lessons are about sacrifice, deception and political considerations as common features of military planning.
The sense of duty and regard for human life of President Roosevelt and his chief advisers should be understood. After all, so wrote the immutable warrior Winston Churchill: “No American will think it wrong of me if I proclaim that to have the United States in war on our side was to be the greatest joy…”[19]

F. List of Sources
Books
Carew, Michael G. The Power to Persuade: FDR, the Newsmagazines, and Going to War, 1931-1941. Unites States of America: University Press of America, 2005
Garrarty, John A. A Short History of the American Nation. Addison Wesley Educational Publisher Inc, 1987 Heardon, Patrick J. Roosevelt Confronts Hitler: America’s Entry into World War II. Northern Illinois University Press 1987 Jenkins, Roy. Franklin Delano Roosevelt. New York: Pan books, 2003 Odo,Franklin. No Sword to Bury: Japanese Americans in Hawaii during World War II. Philadelphia:Temple University Press, 2004 Prange, Gordon W. At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbour.  USA: Penguin, 1982 Ross, Stewart Halsely. How Roosevelt failed America in World War II. Mcfarland & Company: United States, 2006 Stinnett Robert. Day of deceit: The Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbour. Free Press 2000 Toland, John. Infamy: Pearl Harbor and its aftermath. New York: Berkley, 1986 The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of Japanese Empire, 1936-1945. New York: Random House, 1970 Victor, George. The Pearl Harbor Myth: Rethinking the Unthinkable. United States of America: Potomac Books, 2007 Wood, Edward W. Worshipping the Myths of World War II: Reflections on America’s declaration to war. Potomac books: Washington D.C, 2006 Yardley, Herbert O. The American Black Chamber. USA: Aegean Park Press, 1989
[1] Daniel J. McINERNEY. A Traveler’s History of the USA.2001.New York Interlink Books  [2] (Charles Beard PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND THE COMING OF WAR 1941, p 424  [3] Douglas Cirignano (March 11, 2002). Interview with Robert B. Stinnett - Do Freedom of Information Act Files Prove FDR Had Foreknowledge of Pearl Harbor?  [4] Stinnett, 412  [5] Stinnett (December 7, 2003). The Pearl Harbor Deception Independent Institute  [6] Richard Bernstein (December 15, 1999). Books of the Times: On Dec. 7, Did We Know We Knew? New York Times.  [7] Philip H. Jacobsen: A Cryptologic Veteran's Analysis of Day of Deceit  [8]  [9] Stinnett, 23  [10] Ross 75  [11] Wood, 134  [12] Stinnett, 30  [13] Ross, 68  [14] Stinnett, 69  [15] Stinnett, 71  [16] Niitakyama is a 130,000 –foot peak in formosa, the highest mountain in what was then part of Japan. Scaling it was considered a siginificant mountaineering feat. Inthis instance it was final confirmation that the First Air flett should attack pearl Harbour.  [17] Rusbridger, 125  [18] Stinnett, 22-3, 47-52, 71-82, 204, 231  [19] Toland, The Rising Sun, 146

[i] The Battle of Port Arthur starting the Russo-Japanese War began with a surprise night attack by a squadron of Japanese destroyers on the Russian fleet anchored at Port Arthur, Manchuria, and continued with an engagement of major surface combatants the following morning. This case was similar to the attack on Pearl Harbor.

[ii] As the Head of the Far East desk of Office of Naval Intelligence, Lt. Commander Arthur H. proposed a secret U.S foreign policy initiative that called for goading Japan into an overt act of war against an isolationist United States.
[iii] Navy Chief Stark objected by claiming that "I have previously opposed this and you have concurred as to its unwisdom. Particularly do I recall your remark in a previous conference when Mr. Hull suggested [more forces to Manila] and the question arose as to getting them out and your 100% reply, from my standpoint, was that you might not mind losing one or two cruisers, but that you did not want to take a chance on losing 5 or 6."
[iv] Japan’s preparation for war took an ominous turn in July 1941. That was the month Roosevelt put into place the last of McCollum’s action items, Action H- a strangling embargo that was intended to provoke strong counterstrokes by Japan. Intercepts of Purple code transmissions throughout the summer revealed Japan’s reaction to FDR’s tightening of the economic screws: 500,000 Japanese citizens were inducted into the armed services; Japanese merchant ships from all over the world were recalled to home water; and Japanese warships and air squadrons were withdrawn from china. War clouds were gathering

[v] Specifically, Admiral Yamamoto was charged with smashing the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor.

[vi] There is no reply. Late this same day, the U.S. code-breaking service begins intercepting a 14-part Japanese message and deciphers the first 13 parts, passing them on to the President and Secretary of State.


Nagasaki before and after the bomb

Was the 1945 nuclear attack on Nagasaki a military priority?

 Section A - Plan of Investigation (224 words)


    In order to investigate the question "Was the 1945 nuclear attack on Nagasaki a military priority?" one must consider the origin of the Manhattan project, President Truman's official military reasons for using atomic weapons, why it was decided to launch the bomb instead of an invasion and why Nagasaki was chosen as a target. In addition, it is important to observe Japan's capability to continue the war, its policies prior to and following the nuclear attacks and whether weapon impacted capitulation. Alternate reasons for accepting defeat will also be discussed in order to conclude if the Nagasaki bomb facilitated defeat and was therefore a military priority; the moral implications of the attack will not be considered.

    Evidence has been extracted from a variety of primary sources including Truman's diaries, telegrams and other military documents relating to the bombing. In particular, Stimson's justification of the attacks was crucial to this investigation because his strong personal control over the Manhattan project suggests understanding of both U.S. reasons for the bombing as well as the facts the USA wanted to propagate. Secondary material such as books and websites were selected as to how they supported or contradicted Stimson's view: Gordin's 2005 analysis was a useful source as his revisionist perspective presented alternative factors for Japanese surrender, arguing that the nuclear weapons were not necessary to induce defeat.

Section B - Summary of Evidence (647 words)

    The development of the atomic bomb under the U.S. Manhattan Project began in 1942 in case it would be of use against Germany. Following Germany's defeat in May 1945,  the weapon came into consideration for ending the Pacific War against Japan.

    Japan already perceived itself as a defeated nation: beginning in early 1945, the U.S. naval blockade imposed on Japan had diminished its industry, food supply and ability to continue fighting. Between July 11-26, the U.S. intercepted Japanese telegraphs expressing a hope to "terminate the war" with Russia helping to negotiate an favourable peace. However, the Potsdam Proclamation, issued on July 26, called for unconditional surrender including the removal of the emperor system. This was rejected because Japan wished to maintain its sovereignty, subsequently adopting the policy of fighting aggressively in the hope of discouraging the U.S. from invading until peace was declared.
    As a result, the U.S. anticipated a costly victory  and did not want to commit to a lengthy  invasion. Truman estimated a potential loss of  500,000 lives,  writing in his diary that he aimed for the bombs to "completely destroy Japan's power to make war... [shortening] the agony of war".  The Hiroshima attack on August 6 did not prove to be decisive: Japan did not surrender nor seem pressured by the nuclear attack.
    The choice to target Nagasaki was dictated by weather conditions preventing the planned attack on Kokura. Nagasaki was considered important as it was a major harbour, a densely populated area and home to heavy industry such as Mitsubishi factories, maximising the bomb's destructive potential. As an ancient city and religious centre with high literacy levels, it was anticipated that its residents would be "better able to appreciate the significance of the weapon", indicating that Nagasaki was chosen as a secondary target in order to exploit the psychological terror of the bombing. 
    On August 9, Nagasaki was bombed, killing 35,000 to 40,000 people. Following Hiroshima's death toll of 70,000, the Nagasaki bomb is said to have confirmed surrender: Emperor Hirohito believed that the emergence of "such a new weapon" made it "less possible" for Japan to continue the war  and the chief cabinet secretary later stated that the war could have ended in a similar way even if the Soviets had remained neutral .  American statesman Henry L. Stimson wrote in 1947 that the bomb had succeeded as a psychological weapon in bringing about Japanese surrender.
    The Japanese government, led by the war party, claimed that it would "never surrender as a result of air raids” even after the events of Nagasaki. As Hiroshima had not provoked surrender, U.S. decision-makers doubted that a second attack would be able to end the war immediately and anticipated that at least a third would be necessary before launching the scheduled invasion on November 1. At most, it was hoped that the war would be shortened by several months. While the bomb's scientific success was praised immediately, the role of the weapon in ending the war was emphasised only after Japan had surrendered. Prior to his, the U.S war cabinet similarly equated the bomb to previous firebombing campaigns.
    The Soviet declaration of war on Japan exerted pressure the bomb had not, causing the Emperor to urge the government to accept the Potsdam Declaration and surrender.  Its involvement meant that Japan could be fighting a two-front war as Soviets, already situated in Japanese-held Manchuria, were ordered to attack Japan's northern and southern isles. This influenced Japan's unconditional surrender as no strategy remained and it could no longer hope for the Soviet Union to mediate for an acceptable peace.
    On August 15, Japan accepted surrender based on Potsdam terms.


Section C - Evaluation of Sources (391 words)

Source A -  Five Days in August: How World War II Became a Nuclear War by Michael D. Gordin
Written by a professor of history at Princeton University in 2005, the source is a revisionist interpretation sixty years after the bomb was dropped: its purpose is to challenge the notion that nuclear weapons ended the Pacific War, suggesting that the bombs were never expected to end the conflict and that official statements claiming that the bombs had always been capable of doing so were generated after the war had ended. The source is valuable because it centres on alternative reasons for Japanese capitulation including the threat of Soviet entry to the war, an angle that the other Western sources used in this investigation did not suggest. Furthermore, Gordin's book is useful because it challenges the definition of whether or not the bomb "worked", writing that in the initial stages of war planning the bomb would be considered a success if it managed to detonate. The source mentions plans for further nuclear weapons, indicating that the Nagasaki attack was not anticipated to be decisive and therefore not militarily necessary.  However, it is limited in that it does not originate from Japan, which undermines the ability to take into consideration its political effect as well as that on morale in general.

Source B: The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb by Henry Lewis Stimson
Written by Stimson in 1947, who was secretary of war at the time of the dropping of the bomb, this article was released in response to "[comment
s] about 
the 
decision" to use atomic weapons in order to justify them. As a source released only two years after the end of the war, it is valuable because it is indicative of the mindframe of the U.S. government during this time: Stimson's account is crucial when considering the nuclear attacks because he led the project and his analysis details why the atomic bombs were used and how the project developed, providing insightful information on how the U.S. government wanted the bombing to be perceived as well as the psychological impact of the bomb on surrender. However, the source is limited in that it fails to acknowledge details pertaining to the Japanese perspective: although Stimson acknowledges intercepting telegrams, he emphasises the "Japanese
 determination
 to
 fight
" over Japan's desire for a mediated peace. Furthermore, the article was published at the beginning of the Cold War and may have been influenced by the implementation of propaganda; Stimson's purpose to defend the bombing would be unlikely to outline any governmental mistakes.

Section D - Analysis (582)
    This investigation is important within its historic context because the nuclear attack on Nagasaki was part of first atomic campaign ever used in warfare. As the final bomb used prior to Japan's surrender, Nagasaki generated much controversy as to whether or not the use of nuclear weapons concluded the Pacific War. Due to his personal control over the project, Stimson's explanation of factors prompting the USA to detonate the bomb is crucial when judging its military necessity. Furthermore, his 1947 justification of the attacks would influence memoirs later published by Truman and subsequently affect how the bomb was perceived by the U.S. public. Gordin deromanticizes the bomb's legacy and describes how Nagasaki was never anticipated to end the war, undermining its necessity the as the USA readied itself for a "November invasion" of Kyushu.
    Stimson claims that Nagasaki was militarily necessary because it achieved the
 "
intended" purpose of "[devastating] the Japanese homeland". Stimson cites the bomb's psychological impact as a means of achieving this: already crippled by blockades and military recession, "the 
experience 
of 
what 
an 
atomic 
bomb
 [would] 
actually 
do 
to
 a
 community, 
plus 
the 
dread
 of
 many
 more..." 
 would shatter the obstinacy of the Japanese War Party. Furthermore, Stimson writes that an invasion could "cost
 over
 a
 million
 casualties" and suggested that the bomb would conclude the war.
This estimate was echoed by Truman in his official memoirs - yet "military planners before Hiroshima had placed the number [between 20,000 and 46,000] American lives" . With each draft of Truman's book, these figures were progressively increased - "[the first draft estimating] a million... casualties with at least 300,000 dead..."- until set at 500,000 deaths upon its publication in 1955 . These discrepancies imply that the justification of the attacks was adapted to convincing the  West of their necessity.
    Nagasaki was not a military priority because Japan had long anticipated defeat. In February 1945, Prince Konoe declared this was "inevitable" and by July, Japan sought an opportunity to mediate for peace while maintaining sovereignty.  Despite intercepting telegrams detailing this wish, the U.S. did not initiate further negotiations, instead proceeding to plan nuclear attacks. Gordin stresses that atomic weapons were never considered to be decisive:  "after Hiroshima, 'work' meant shortening the war by a few months... only after 14 August did 'work' mean 'end the war'". While planning a third bomb, "the sudden surrender... caught Washington... off-guard" because the bombs were perceived as preparation for the scheduled invasion.
    Psychological warfare, although suggested by Stimson as an effective means to induce Japanese surrender, did not have a momentous impact: leaders found it "hard to differentiate" between firebombing and nuclear bombs, claiming Japan would "never surrender as a result of air raids". On the other hand, the Soviet declaration of war left Japan without a prospect of attaining favourable terms: it had lost a mediator and gained an enemy threatening to revive a multi-front war Japan could impossibly uphold. Emperor Hirohito urged the government to surrender as a result.
    The atomic bomb's "epochal" status can be attributed to the coincidence that it occurred parallel to the decisive Soviet entry. However, the Nagasaki attack did not impact any factors that would cause Japan to surrender and was instead regarded as a conventional bombing. Hiroshima had not induced surrender; there was no reason to believe Nagasaki - a target second to Kokura - would achieve this.

Section E - Conclusion (122 words)
    The 1945 attack on Nagasaki cannot be described as a military priority: while the use of a second nuclear weapon may have had a confirmatory impact on Japan's decision to accept unconditional surrender, it had long considered itself defeated. The U.S. decision to use the weapon was based on weakening Japan prior to an invasion rather than ending the war immediately. Despite its great destructive power, the Japanese response to the atomic bomb was similar to their regard of previous firebombing whereas the Soviet entry to the war brought about its strategic bankruptcy and eventual surrender. To conclude, neither the context nor the impact of the Nagasaki bomb justified its necessity and the idea that it was decisive is a post-war creation.


Section F - List of Sources

Asada, Sadao. "The Shock of the Atomic Bomb and Japan's Decision to Surrender: A     Reconsideration." The Pacific Historical Review 67.4 (1998): 477-512. University of     California Press, 16 Mar. 2009. Web. 12 Sept. 2012.     "Atomic Bomb Records & Newspapers." Atomic Bomb Records. Archives.com, n.d. Web. 25 Mar.     2013. .
Bernstein, Barton J. "A Postwar Myth: 500,000 U.S. Lives Saved." Bulletin of the Atomic     Scientists June-July 1986: 38-39. Print.
Dionisi, David J. American Hiroshima : The Reasons Why and a Call to Strengthen America's     Democracy. Victoria, B.C.: Trafford, 2005. Print.
Gordin, Michael D. Five Days in August: How World War II Became a Nuclear War. Princeton, NJ:     Princeton UP, 2007. Print.
"The Manhattan Project -- Its Long-term Influences." DOE Research and Development (R&D)     Accomplishments. DOE Research and Development (R&D) Accomplishments, 15 Oct.     2012. Web. 03 Nov. 2012. .
Marshall Cavendish Corporation. World and Its Peoples: Eastern and Southern Asia. New York:     Marshall Cavendish, 2008. 1075. Print.
Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: Norton, 2001. Print.
Morris, Peter W. G. "The Manhattan Project." The Management of Projects. London: T. Telford,     1994. Print.
"Nagasaki." Institute for Structure and Nuclear Astrophysics, n.d. Web. 20 Sept. 2012.     .
"Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender." Potsdam Declaration / Birth of the     Constitution in Japan. National Diet Library, n.d. Web. 23 Sept. 2012.     .
Stimson, Henry L. "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb." Harper’s Magazine Feb. 1947.      Columbia University. Web. 20 Sept. 2012.     .
Truman, Harry S., and Robert H. Ferrell. Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman.     New York: Harper & Row, 1980. Print.
Derry, J. A, and Ramsey, N. F. ."Memorandum for: Major General L.R. Groves. Subject: Summary     of Target Committee Meetings on 10 and 11 May 1945" The National Security Archive - The     George Washington University. The George Washington University. 12 May 1945. Web. 19     Sept. 2012.
Wilson, Ward. "The Winning Weapon? Rethinking Nuclear Weapons in Light of     Hiroshima."     International Security 31.4 (2007): 162-79. Print.
Yagami, Kazuo. "War and Its Aftermath." Konoe Fumimaro and the Failure of Peace in Japan:     1937-1941 : A Critical Appraisal of the Three-time Prime Minister. Jefferson, N.C. [u.a.:     McFarland, 2006. 141. Print.


Was the 1945 nuclear attack on Nagasaki a military priority?


Plan of Investigation:

During a press release by the Japanese government, Prime Minister Suzuki made a statement regarding the Potsdam Declaration, the United States terms for Japanese surrender, saying that with regards to the document the government of Japan would “mokusatsu-suru” it. This was translated to mean that the Japanese would ignore the ultimatum, unsurprising to some who had come to expect the suicidal “no-surrender” attitude from the Japanese. However, upon further reflection on the actual meaning of the word from a Japanese perspective and the actions taken by the Japanese to pursue peace since the beginning of 1945 this raises a question as to what had actually been meant by the word.  Did the Japanese intend to snub the Allies’ Potsdam Declaration by using the word “mokusatsu”?

I will examine what the meaning of the word mokusatsu actually means from a Japanese perspective as well as the context that the press conference was held in.  This will allow me to see if the statement was ever even meant to cross through diplomatic channels or whether it was only meant for the Japanese people. I will also examine the real reasons behind the Truman administration’s decision to deploy atomic weapons to see if the word actually had any influence on the decision or whether it was decided on from the start.
I will be using two primary sources: Alperovitz’s The Decision to use the Atomic Bomb and Torikai’s Voices of the Invisible Presence: Diplomatic Interpreters in Post-World War. Alperovits, has a special understanding of the intricacies of United States foreign policy and its history on account of his work in the State Department and US House of Representatives.  His book, which has been cited by over 70 similar books, details the rationales of the Truman administration to drop the bomb.  Being a veteran Japanese diplomatic interpreter, Torikai provides a crucial cultural knowledge of the word and it’s meaning within Japanese society and also on the difficulties and pitfalls of diplomatic interpretation she has knowledge of due to her experience. 

Summary of Evidence:

Before the US dropped the bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, Japan was effectively defeated and ready to capitulate . As early as January of that year, Japanese intermediaries were expressing an interest in agreeing on the Atlantic Charter’s terms of surrender, as it would allow them to keep the Imperial system intact .  Alperovitz writes that “there could no longer be any real doubt as to the Japanese intentions; the manoeuvres were overt and explicit and, most of all, official acts1.”  Following the bombings, the Lord Privy Seal Koichi Kido, a close advisor to the Emperor, stated, “Our decision to seek a way out of this war, was made in early June before any atomic bomb had been dropped and Russia had not entered the war. It was already our decision .” 

    Formal diplomatic channels between the United States and Japan had been closely maintained by Foreign Minister Togo. However, on July 27, Japanese officials heard Captain EM Zacharias, acting official spokesman for the United States Army, issue a broadcast statement threatening Japan with virtual destruction unless there was “unconditional surrender with its attendant benefit as laid down by the Atlantic Charter”.    In addition, the broadcast contained a veiled threat that the Soviet Union would enter the war if Japan did not surrender quickly.  On one hand, the broadcast served as a way to give the war-weary Japanese people hope that the costly war would be coming to an end and despite their defeat, the Imperial dynasty would be preserved under the Atlantic Charter.  However, President Harry S. Truman and Secretary of State James Byrnes had altered the language of the Potsdam Treaty to read, “… eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan in embarking on world conquest”, which could be broadly interpreted as not only fingering the military as being responsible for the war but also the “God-Emperor who’s authority and influence had been used at every stage to lead the Japanese people into conquest .” 

    The change came as a shock to Japanese diplomats and was seen as a “counter blast” to their initiatives to find peace with the United States. In addition, the sudden change put a tremendous burden on Foreign Minister Togo who now needed more time to clarify what the change would mean for Japan and to investigate the possibility of a Soviet invasion.   Additionally, he had to satisfy the conflicting goals of the Emperor to find peace at all costs and the Japanese military heads who demanded an honorable surrender that retained the Imperial system, or at least the Emperor.   In an effort to buy time for the cabinet to clarify their position on the new treaty, Prime Minister Suzuki responded to an eager press with the word “mokusatsu” in a rushed press conference.  The foreign press translated the word to mean that the Japanese government was “ignoring” the declaration and were determined to fight to the end.  Truman, fearful of the growing Soviet threat and wary of an invasion to take over the country, authorized the use of atomic weapons. 

Evaluation of Sources:

    The book Voices of the Invisible Presence: Diplomatic Interpreters in Post-World War II Japan was published in 2009 and written by Kumiko Torikai.  The book analyzes the training and function of diplomatic interpreters in post-war Japan and their importance in translating the social, political, and economic aspects of the post-war years.  Pages 33 and 35, focusing on the Potsdam Declaration were of particular interest to this investigation as they focused specifically on how the word “mokusatsu” was interpreted and on how it was seen from a Japanese perspective verses a Western one. The author, Japanese women, is the Director of the English Language Program at Rikkyo University and has been a professor since 1997.  Torikai has over 30 years of experience as an interpreter and interviewer. However, Torikai is not a historian and does not have access to the archive. That being said, her expertise as a diplomatic interpreter who is Japanese fills a niche that is vital to this investigation.

   The author of The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, Gar Alperovitz, is a political economist and president of the National Center for Economic Alternatives.  He also served as Senior Research Scientist in the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland and is a Fellow of the Institute for Policy Studies. As a Fellow of King’s College, Cambridge, and the Institute of Politics at Harvard, he has served as Legislative Assistant in the U.S. House of Representatives, legislative Director in the U.S. Senate, and Special Assistant in the Department of State. 

    Having been published in 2010, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb offers a modern perspective of the events leading up to the decision to drop the bomb on Japan and takes a controversial stance asserting that the United States did not need to deploy atomic weapons to force Japan to surrender.  For the purposes of this investigation I found that the book contributed detailed accounts and insights of the events that led up to the Potsdam Conference and augmented my understanding of the sequence of events that led towards the two atomic bombings of Japan.  I decided to use this book because other historians often use Alperovitz as a reference. 

    However, in condemning the bombings the book fails to acknowledge key relevant topics such as the casualties sustained by Americans during the Pacific Campaign and the fighting resolve that the Japanese have demonstrated time and again, often willing to take their own lives than surrender.  The damage inflicted by the atomic bombs also lacks context by not including the damage inflicted in other areas of conflict such as Russia and Germany.  The book also treats the decision as a black and white affair and fails to take into account the fact that it was a complex decision contributed to by multiple people in a stressful and “fog of war” atmosphere. 

  
Analysis:

    It is difficult to determine whether Truman’s decision to drop the bomb stemmed from his uncertainty over Japanese surrender or from his fear of an aggressive Soviet Union. Torikai thinks that the perceived meaning of the word “mokusatsu” was instrumental in the decision and that Truman was led to believe that the Japanese were unwilling to surrender based on the language of their reply. 
The Allies were under “real pressure” at Potsdam to neutralize or marginalize the growing threat of the Soviet Union as well as end the war quickly.   This in turn put pressure on Japan to respond quickly and decisively to the Potsdam Declaration. Unfortunately, it was radically different than the Atlantic Charter that allowed the “right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live”.  This new declaration included language that called for “eliminating for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest”.13 Alperovitz writes that even those who had supported the Administrations position regarding the changes, like The New York Times, pointed out that the language of the changes was broad enough to include not just the military caste but also the Emperor of Japan as culprits in starting the war.  Kumiko Torikai argues that under pressure to buy time to adjust to sudden changes in the terms of surrender, the Prime Minister, 77-year-old Suzuki Kantaro, held a press conference and said:

My thinking is that the joint declaration is virtually the same as the Cairo Declaration. The government of Japan does not consider it having any crucial value. We simply mokusatsu-suru. The only alternative for us is to be determined to continue our fight till the end . 

The only semi-official Domei Press translated Suzuki’s comment into English as “the Japanese government ignores this, and we are determined to continue our fight in the war till the end”.15 U.S. and U.K. press then reported this statement as “Japan rejects Potsdam Declaration” and “Japan Officially Turns Down Allied Surrender Ultimatum”.   Consequently, Truman took this as another case of Japanese “death before dishonor” fanaticism and as evidence that the only way to end the war was to make the Japanese people face the threat of total annihilation.  However, it was clear that this was not the outcome that the Japanese government intended.  As early as January 1945 the Japanese had been sending out intermediaries to the Allies expressing their willingness to surrender under the terms of the Atlantic Charter.  

The statement issued by Suzuki was not meant to be interpreted as the Japanese government ignoring the peace treaty. The problem came from the translation of the word ‘mokusatsu” from Japanese to English.  Torikai takes from Ohno Susumu, professor emeritus of Gakushuin University to describe the word “mokusatsu” as a delicate phrase reflecting the mentality of the Japanese people in interpersonal communication.  The word is meant to mean pretending not to notice a mistake made by others so as to avoid downgrading yourself.19  In this case, the Japanese Prime minister meant to buy time for the cabinet to react to the likelihood of a Soviet invasion if they did not surrender and whether or not the new Potsdam Declaration edited by Truman and Byrnes could accuse the Emperor along with top generals of being prime instigators of the war by failing to mention the post war status of the Emperor in the Potsdam Declaration.   Interestingly, Hasegwa Saji of the Domei Press, who was allegedly responsible for translating the Prime Minister’s statement admitted unofficially in 1970 that he should have translated “mokusatsu” as “no comment” instead of “ignore” but admitted that he was not aware of the expression at the time.

Conclusion:
It was never the intention of the Japanese government to spurn the Allies. They had exhaustedly tried to signal to them that they were willing to agree to the terms of the Atlantic Charter only to be taken completely by surprise when the new Potsdam Declaration was announced to the public, which called into doubt the immunity of the Emperor from being tried as a war criminal.  The shocked Japanese government was then forced to make a public announcement regarding the Declaration for the people as well as to by time in order for the government to figure out how to deal with the situation, resulting in the Prime Minster issuing a statement that was mistranslated and interpreted as yet another refusal of peace.  Alperovitz contends that the mistranslation did not effect Truman’s decision.  Torikai believes it played a role.  In hindsight, it seems as though the atomic bomb solution for Japan was not necessary for ending the war, especially since the Emperor system remained.

Bibliography
Alperovitz, G. (1995). The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb. In G. Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb (p. Chapter 32). New York, NY: Random House.
Black, D. J. (2007). The Second World War, V.3: The Japanese War, 1941-1945. Ashgate.
Chappell, J. D. (1997). Before the Bomb: How America Approached the End of the Pacific War. University Press of Kentucky.
Gar Alperovitz. (n.d.). About Gar. Retrieved July 2013, from Gar Alperovitz: http://www.garalperovitz.com/about-gar/
Ham, P. (2012). Hiroshima Nagasaki . Random House.
Hellegers, D. M. (2002). We, the Japanese People: Washington. Stanford University Press.
Hoffmann, S.-L. (2011). Human Rights in the Twentieth Century . Cambridge University Press.
Institute for Historical Review. (1997, May-June). Was Hiroshima Necessary? Retrieved July 2013, from Institute for Historical Review: http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v16/v16n3p-4_Weber.html
Iriye, A. (2009). Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War, 1841-1945. Harvard University Press.
Nimmo, W. F. (2001). Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific: The United States, Japan, and Asia/Pacific Region, 1895-1945. Greenwood Publishing Group.
Torikai, K. (2009). Voices of the Invisible Presence: Diplomatic Interpreters in Post-World War. In K. Torikai, Voices of the Invisible Presence: Diplomatic Interpreters in Post-World War (pp. 33-38). John Benjamins Publishing Co.
Torikai, K. (2009). Voices of the Invisible Presence: Diplomatic Interpreters in Post-World War. Retrieved July 2013, from Google Books: http://books.google.com/books?id=I1nu69nmlxgC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false


To what extent did Japanese forces deliberately instigate the Marco Polo Bridge Incident?



Plan of Investigation


To what extent did Japanese forces deliberately instigate the Marco Polo Bridge Incident?


The Marco Polo Bridge Incident took place July 7th, 1937. Japanese and Chinese scholars hold diametrically opposing views of what actually occurred throughout the course of the incident; the one fact most agree on is that it became the cassus belli of the 2nd Sino-Japanese War. From the Mukden Incident of 1931, tensions between Japan and China escalated and this latest Incident served as “the trigger for the Sino-Japanese War.” Analysis of contemporary Japanese, Chinese and Western historians’ books, study of the memoirs and statements made by actual combatants and participants on both sides, and a personal interview with a very knowledgeable Chinese scholar is hoped to disclose Marco Polo Bridge Incident’s course of the event, focusing on its causes, the mysteries around the “first shot” and the so called “lost soldier”, and the subsequent events following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident.


155 Words



Summary of Evidence


To determine the extent to which the Marco Polo Bridge Incident was a deliberate act of Japanese aggression or an unfortunate series of misunderstandings, one must understand both the preceding events and the course of the events itself.


Preceding Events:


China in the 1930s was tumultuous due to the Civil War between Nationalists and Communists. During the Central Plains War, Japan fabricated the Mukden Incident and set up Manchukuo in Manchuria. Between February and May of 1933, the Kwantung Army began its offensive in Rehe Province and signing the Tanggu Truce on May 31st, recognising Rehe Province as part of Manchukuo. In June of 1935, the He-Umezu Agreement was signed, forcing the Nationalist government to leave Hebei Province, allowing Japanese troops to control areas around Beiping, (situated in Hebei Province). In June that same year, 6000 additional soldiers were stationed in the Hebei area adding to a total of 8400 soldiers.


The Course of Marco Polo Bridge Incident


From May 1937, Japanese troops in Fengtai conducted daily and nightly military exercises at a wasteland 1 kilometre north of Wanping Town. Foreign powers were allowed to hold military manoeuvres without informing the authorities provided they used blank ammunition. However, on July 7th Chinese troops reported to their brigade commander that Japanese troops were armed with live ammunition and their manoeuvres were different from usual; Japanese troops from the 7th and 8th Companies had stopped manoeuvres around 10:30 PM. At 10:40, Private 2nd Class Shimura was reported to be missing. A Japanese agent telephoned Jicha authorities to claim that while the 1st company was manoeuvring, shots were fired at them from the Chinese garrison in Wanping creating chaos, and they needed to enter Wanping Town to search for this lost soldier. If prevented, Japanese armed troops would enter. Chinese troops subsequently reported Japanese troops approaching Wanping Town but the Chinese officers in Wanping allowed Japanese commanders to enter the town to search unmolested. Either during or immediately after negotiations, Japanese troops began to shoot at Chinese troops situated at Marco Polo Bridge.


Negotiations resumed after fighting came to a halt at 9 AM on the 8th, but broke down shortly afterwards. A stalemate continued until Japanese infantry reinforcement arrived around 3:00 PM and captured the bridge. Negotiations offered by the Japanese with the demand that Chinese troops retreat from the Left Shore were rejected. . Fighting ensued, and the Chinese re-captured the bridge at 9AM on the 9th.


By the 10th, Japanese troops severed all routes connecting Wanping to Beiping and Japanese reinforcements, including heavy artillery, planes, and tanks, were transported to the area. On that day, the Japanese chief of staff listed 4 requirements for Chinese troops to prevent further fighting:


Apologise to the Japanese Armies and punish those responsible.


Take action against those who initiated the incident.


Chinese troops around Marco Polo Bridge should be removed.


Ban all Communist and anti-Japanese Organizations.


On July 11th, General Zhang signed the agreement with Colonel Matsui. That same day, the Konoe Cabinet sent three divisions to Northern China. The Nationalist government still attempted to negotiate through 3rd parties. Chiang made a speech on the 17th providing 4 solutions to the problem and decided not to declare war. On the 19th, General Zhang agreed to a similar agreement. After taking over Marco Polo Bridge after a fierce battle erupted on the 21st, Japan launched an attack on Beijing, capturing it on July 27th. Chiang realized that war was unavoidable and resistance officially began. Within a month the Chinese General Headquarters declared a general mobilization.


596 Words

Evaluation of Sources:


Interview on December 25th, 2007 with Luo Cunkang, Manager of Research Department at Museum of the War of Chinese People’s Resistance against Japanese Aggression,


Luo Cunkang is one of the spokesman for the only official comprehensive memorial for the “Resistance against Japanese Aggression” in China” , and his role for the interview, as I was referred to him by other museum directors, is to promote the core ethos of the Hall and to provide a general Chinese scholar’s standpoint on this incident, a topic he specializes. His exhaustive knowledge of the incident is due both to his studies and to his numerous encounters with soldiers or relatives of soldiers present at the incident and with other Chinese scholars. He had numerous meetings with Japanese scholars and was very respectful towards Japanese views. He spoke about the incident itself and also discussed its significance in the context of 20th Century Asia. It must be said that he, being a manager in the museum, is a representative for the memorial so it could be suggested he is limited in expressing his own opinions, and doubts regarding the event, and has to be careful with usage of words since it needs to follow the purpose of the museum.

Sankichi Yasui, Marco Polo Bridge Incident (Hong Kong, Kehua Publisher, 1999)


Professor Yasui Sankichi of Kobe University wrote this book for a Japanese audience to present the Marco Polo Bridge Incident as objectively and factually as possible. He was the head of the Japanese China Modern History Research Centre. Published in Hong Kong, the book was translated and directly published without deletion of content. Some errors present in the Japanese edition, published in 1993, were amended for this translation edition, published in 1999, due to newly available information and research. It is dedicated to describing the Marco Polo Bridge Incident and his opinions are based on the numerous quotes from Japanese soldiers and officers present at the Incident , not found in most Chinese books. Thus many valuable insights describing minutia of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident are offered, leading the author to state how “some of my perspectives differ from orthodox Chinese perspectives that may make Chinese readers feel uneasy.” Nevertheless it has been criticized stating that whilst the Sino-Japanese War was a war resulting from Japanese invasion, the cause of the Incident itself was an accident.


393 Words

Analysis:



The Marco Polo Bridge Incident has been regarded as the catalyst for the 8 year Sino-Japanese War and can possibly even be considered the opening of World War II.


Furthermore it was significant in uniting the Chinese people because it was the start of China’s resistance. Chiang Kai-Shek attempted to preserve peace but ultimately recognized the inevitability of war. This incident instigated Chinese citizens to fight against the Japanese invasion.


Although it occurred half a century ago, scholars around the world still have not agreed upon who initiated the incident. Some scholars like Professor Nakumura Akita, Historian Masanori Ito , and Higashinakano Shudo blame Communists for purposely instigating the incident to create chaos between the Nationalists and the Japanese. On the other hand, Orthodox historians like Surugadai University professor Inoue Hisashi, Taiwanese scholar Yunhan Li , and Chinese scholar Sibai Sun claim Japan initiated the incident as a pretext for a full-scale invasion. They state that the Japanese army already fabricated a series of events to reach the surroundings of Beiping, and the Incident was merely a continuation of Japan’s expansion and so the incident of the “lost soldier” was fictitious. Other scholars and historians like Yasui Sankichi and Hattori Takushiro say the initial cause of the incident was completely accidental.


The “first shot” and the “lost soldier” have been the primary sources of controversy. The Chinese claimed that the Japanese fired the first shot when both sides were negotiating after Colonel Matsui demanded to enter Wanping. Japanese troops claimed that the Chinese fired the first shot around 10:40 when they were manoeuvring west of Marco Polo Bridge. The significance of the “first shot” is that it resulted in a soldier getting lost. The key instigator of the incident rests in the “lost soldier.”


The matter of the lost soldier (2nd Class Private Shimura) is a different story. The Chinese, by all accounts, stated that the Japanese demanded to enter Wanping town to find the lost soldier.


Most Chinese scholars and some Japanese scholars believe that this soldier was discovered to be “lost” at around 10:40 and was reported to the Captain. It can be concluded that Shimura was discovered long before Japanese officials informed Jicha authorities to discuss the issue of the lost soldier. Some Japanese writers question whether Colonel Matsui used the lost soldier as a reason to enter Wanping Town. Scholars like Professor Hata and Professor Nakamura Akira stated that General Jin’s allegation that Colonel Matsui demanded to enter the town due to the lost soldier is false. However, despite the fact that soldiers’ memoirs omitted this event, this incident was announced in 1938’s official symposium, and telegrams sent between Chinese officials show that his disappearance was indeed a reason for Japanese officials to enter the town.


The “first shot” and the “lost soldier” were occasional incidents in themselves and they were not orchestrated, but Company Commander Shimizu Setsuro’s demand of Chinese troops to retreat from Marco Polo Bridge or otherwise be attacked was a very provocative move that lead to conflict. Author Iris Chang stated this move was provoking a full-scale war with China. He, along with Japanese troops, exploited these accidents and Konoe cabinet’s decision to send another 3 divisions within days also demonstrates Japan’s ambitions to expand since it also follows, as argued by as Dexin Cai. However, scholars like Shougang Zhang and Shengze Zhang argue that both governments attempted to avoid war to some levels but due their national policies, they had no choice to fight or else be considered a weakling so it ultimately resulted in an all-out war.


597 Words

Conclusion


The first shot starting the Marco Polo Bridge Incident continues to be debated amongst scholars. To this day the war is a major point of contention between China and Japan and remains a major roadblock for Sino-Japanese relations. Wading through the nationalism and ideology that pervades such discussion both sides of the sea of Japan is a minefield and, based on past Japanese actions in Manchuria and the available evidence, it appears that the Japanese troops purposely used the excuse of the lost soldier to attack and occupy Wanping. It can be concluded the Konoe Cabinet, through the deployment of more troops in the days after the Incident, used the opportunity to expand their Manchukuo territories and exploited the originally small event to achieve their aims. The Chinese government, after impassively responding to Japanese interests for the past 8 years, decided finally to defend rather than submit. Both resulted in this minor incident quickly escalating into full-scale war. It can be assumed that even if the Incident did not take place, another minor event would have instigated the war. Tensions were stored already due to series of similar incidents and the Marco Polo Bridge Incident became the trigger.


198 Words



List of Sources


Article

Dong, Linyi, “Why is it that the LuGou Bridge Incident became the beginning of the wars all over the country? Shandong Normal University Newspaper, 4th Edition, 1987.  “From Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor, Who was responsible?” ASIAN PERSPECTIVE, Vol. 31, No. 1, 2007.  Books  Akira, Nakamura. The road to the Greater East Asian War. Tokyo: Tendensha, 1990.  Benson, John, and Takao Matsumura. Japan 1865-1945: From isolation to occupation. Essex: Pearson Education Limited, 2001.  Brower, Daniel R. The World in the 20th Century-The Age of Global War and Revolution. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1992.  Chang, Iris. The Rape of Nanking. New York: Penguin Books, 1997.  CPC Central Committee Party School Communist Party Historical Archives Center, The LuGou Bridge Incident and Beijing and Tianjing Anti-Japanese War. Beijing: CPC Central Committee Party School Research, Office 1986.  Ferguson, Niall. The War of the Worlds. London: Penguin Books, 2007.  Harries, Meirion, and Susan Harries. Soldiers of the Sun: the Rise and Fall of the Imperial Japanese Army. New York: Random House, 1991.  Hattori, Takushiro. The Complete History of the Greater East Asia War (1). Yuxiang Zhang, Trans, Hong Kong: The Commercial Press, 1984.  Hunter, Alan. Peace Studies in the Chinese Century. Hampshire, England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006.  Li, Yunhan. Marco Polo Bridge Incident. Taiwan Dongdatushu Company, 1987.  Liu, Dejun. Research works about Anti-Japanese war, Jinan: Jilu Book Publisher. 2005.  Liu, Yifei. The records of Incident of LuGou Bridge blooded War ---7.7 Incident. Beijing: Tuan Jie Publishers, 1994  McClain, James L. A Modern History, Japan. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2002.  New History Textbook 2005 version. Fushosha, 49  Qu, Jiayuan, and Zhaoqin Bai, History about LuGou Bridge Incident, Beijing: Beijing Publishers, 1997.  Rhoads, Murphey, A History of Asia. Lin Huang, trans, Beijing, Hainian Publisher, 2005.  Roberts, J. M. The Penguin History of the Twentieth Century, London: Penguin Group, 1999.  Sankichi, Yasui. Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Guifang Shi and Xutian Wang, trans. Hong Kong: Kehua Chuban Corporation, 1999.  Shudo, Higashinakano. The Nanking Massacre: Fact versus Fiction: A Historian's Quest for the Truth, Sekai Shuppan, Inc, 2005.  Takushiro, Hattori. Great East Asia War History (1). Shangwu Yinshua Guan.  Wu, Yuexing, Zhibo Lin, Hua Lin, and Youyu Liu. Stories of LuGou Bridge Incident. Beijing: Beijing People’s University Publisher, 1987.  Yang, Qing, and Yang Wang. Articles about the Anti-Japanese War during recent 10 years. Beijing: Zhong Gong Dang Shi Chu, 2005.  Zhang, Chunxiang. The Incident of LuGou Bridge and eight-year Anti-Japanese War, Beijing: Beijing Chu Ban She, 1990.  CD-Rom  Encarta 2005 Reference Library. CD-ROM. Microsoft, 2004  Interview  Luo, Cunkang, personal interview, December 25th, 2007.  Magazine  Tucker-Jones, Anthony. “Clash of the Titans.” Military Illustrated Feb 2008: 9.
Pamphlet

Museum of the War of Chinese People’s Resistance against Japanese Aggression Pamphlet, English Edition.

Videos

The records of Anti-Japanese War, Dir Xiaochun You, VCD, Tianjin Taida Audio&Video Distribution Co, 25 July 2007.

Anti-Japanese War, Dir. Ermao Huang, VCD, Guangdong Youlin Audio& Video Distribution Co, 2002.

Why We Fight World War II – The Complete Series, Dir. Frank Capra, DVD, Good Times Video, 1943.

Website

“International Sino-Japanese Conference”, 12 February 2008, http://chinajapan.org/articles/10.2/10.2news2-7.pdf

People’s Republic of China Japanese History Editorial Board, 15 Feb, 2008. http://www.chinarshgb.cn/htm/xxjg.html

Qi, Xiaojing, “Japanese Historian stated the Marco Polo Bridge Incident is an inevitable outcome of Japanese’s policy of expansionism and invasion”, October 2007, February 10th, 2008, http://2006.chinataiwan.org/web/webportal/W5272501/Uqxjing/A514011.html,

(http://www.ne.jp/asahi/kyokasho/net21/e_yukou_seimei20001205.htm#++++) 8 February, 2008.
 
EXAMPLE 2


A. Plan of Investigation


Are the Japanese to blame for instigating the Marco Polo Bridge Incident?


The Marco Polo bridge incident occurred on the 7th of July 1937 yet it is still unclear to this day as to who caused this incident. In order to create an objective view on the circumstances of the incident, Japanese and Chinese viewpoints will be taken into account when deciding whether or not Japan is to blame for the incident. These viewpoints will be coming from Pulitzer Prize winning books and Japanese and Chinese sources. Both Japanese and Chinese journalists and army members have clear different views on to who is to blame for this event. Although with rising tensions between China and Japan due to the recent Mukden incident of 1931 both standpoints are needed to determine whether or not Japan is solely to blame for instigating the Marco Polo bridge incident.


B. Summary of Evidence


The Incident:
The Marco Polo Bridge Incident occurred on the 7th of July 1937. The incident was caused by a conflict between Japanese and Chinese Army troops in the small walled town of Wanping, southwest of Beiping (Beijing)[1]. Starting June 1937 The Japanese Imperial army was preforming military training manoeuvres every night close to the western end of the Marco Polo Bridge1. The Chinese Government complied with the Japanese army training only provided that the Japanese gave them advanced notice of these training manoeuvres, the Japanese agreed to these terms[2]. They asked for advanced notice so the Chinese inhabitants were not disturbed. However the night of the 7th of July training manoeuvres were carried out without prior notice1. This alarmed the local Chinese forces and it lead to a brief exchange of fire at approximately 11 pm. After the small conflict a Japanese soldier was reported missing from his post, which lead his company commander Major Kiyonao Ichiki to believe he had be captured by the Chinese troops. Major Kiyonao then reported this to the regimental commander colonel Renya Mutaguchi. The Chinese regimental commander Ji Xingwen received a telephone message from the Japanese wanting permission to search Wanping for their missing soldier.  The Chinese commander of the 29th Route Army General Qin Dechun received a call from Japanese military intelligence also requesting permission to enter and search Wanping[3]. Qin refused this demand due to the fact that the Japanese army had not given notice of their military training maneuvers that night3. The Chinese agreed to have the garrison of Wanping conduct a search along with a Japanese officer. As both Chinese and Japanese were preparing their investigators a Japanese infantry tried to gain access to Wanping but were fended off by Wanping’s defences3.  Around 3:30 a.m. on the 8th of July 4 Japanese reinforcements consisting of mountain guns and a group of machine gunners arrived at Wanping from the previously occupied railway junction of Fentai1. At 4:50 am the Japanese investigators were granted access to Wanping but despite that at 5 am Japanese machine gunmen proceeded to open fire on the Chinese at the Marco Polo Bridge3. Colonel Xingwen led 1000 Chinese troops to hold the bridge but the Japanese took hold of the bridge that afternoon. The Chinese were able to retake the bridge the morning of the 9th after taking advantage of the mist and rain of the morning3.
Word count: 399


C. Evaluation of Sources


Epstein, Israel. History Should Not Be Forgotten. Beijing: China Intercontinental, 2005. Print.


History Should Not Be Forgotten is a book written by a Jewish journalist born in Warsaw 1915. Israel Epstein is an internationally known journalist who moved to China in 1917. He was born at the time of Imperial Russian control over Poland and when the German army approached Warsaw Epstein and his mother fled to China. Epstein started working as a journalist in 1931 for “Peking” and “Tientsin Times”. In 1933 Epstein started working with American journalist Edgar Snow and became a correspondent for the United Press of the United States in 1937. Epstein was one of the few foreign born Chinese citizens to be a member of the Communist Party of China. After the war on Japanese aggression was over, Epstein was actively involved and reporting on activities opposing U.S. involvement in China’s internal affairs.


This source will be very vital for the investigation as it coming from a journalist who was a journalist in China during the time of the Marco Polo bridge incident. Although it is very valuable for the investigation of who was responsible for the Marco Polo incident, the source has limitations. The limitations are that the author of the book was communist and actively involved in the front against Japanese aggression, the view will be highly biased against the Japanese due to Epstein’s history.


Toland, John. The Rising Sun: The Decline and fall of the Japanese Empire. Random House, 1982. Print.


The Rising Sun: the decline and fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936-1945 was written by John Toland who was one of the most widely read military historians of the 20th century. Toland was a Pulitzer Prize winning historian for The Rising Sun and the book is a collection of facts and interviews about the Japanese Imperial Army. Said in countless book reviews, Toland is said not to have interjected any biased or judgmental views in the telling of the events within the book. Said by the Chicago Sun-Times The Rising Sun is “similar in scope to William Shirer’s ‘Rise and Fall of the Third Reich’” and “it also presents for the first time a great deal of fresh information”.


This book is vital to the investigation of the topic of whether or not Japan is to blame for the Marco Polo Bridge incident as it was one of the first books to tell the Japanese perspective of the conflict, instead of American or Chinese. This book uses interviews from Japanese Generals who were in the Imperial Army at the time of the Marco Polo Incident. Although said by book reviewers that Toland presents events without bias or judgement, the evidence within the book is greatly subjected to bias. As the book is telling the accounts from the Japanese perspective the views presented are in favor of Japan.


D. Analysis


The Marco Polo bridge incident was considered to be complete misunderstanding according to the British Historian Niall Fergusson. “A Japanese soldier went missing and was wrongly presumed to have been kidnapped (he was actually relieving himself)”. However both accounts are told, both Chinese and Japanese are blamed to have instigated the incident. The investigation of this incident is critical in its historical context as the Marco Polo Incident is said to have started the Chinese war against Japanese aggression (the second Sino-Japanese war)[[4]][[5]]. It is also speculated by Niall Fergusson that it was not only the started of second Sino-Japanese war but the start of WWII[6].


Epstein argues “The Marco Polo (Lugou) Bridge, outside Wanping City, located more than 10 kilometers from downtown Beiping, is on the vital communication line in southwestern Beijing, and of strategic importance since ancient times.” This clearly shows a possible Japanese motive for occupying this land had they been aware that the surroundings and general location of the Lugou Bridge was of strategic importance. Also in his book Epstein states that Japan, prior to the Marco Polo Incident, had occupied three Northeastern Chinese Provinces (Heilongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning)[7] showing the reader that Japan had previous acts of aggression against China.


According to John Toland it was not until the Sino-Japanese war had concluded that Japanese officers of the war, including ones that were directly involved in the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, claimed that Mao’s agents had sparked the Incident[8] “We were then too simple to realize this was all a Communist plot” said by General Akio Doi, who Toland said to be a Russian expert. Mao had been known to want a united front against Japanese aggression[9], the reasoning proposed by Japanese General Akio Doi would give China a reason to blame Japan for causing the Marco Polo Incident. If Japan was seen to be instigating an event such as the Marco Polo Incident then Mao could unite China against Japanese aggression.





Although it is a possibility for China to have constructed the incident as a communist plot, the actions of the Imperial Japanese Army on the day of the Marco Polo Incident must be taken into account. On the day of the incident, Japanese forces were under the impression that Chinese forces had captured a member of their army. The Japanese forces responded to this by calling General Qin Dechun of the Chinese army, which they requested entrance to the suspected town. These actions are those of a country concerned for a member of their army. The Chinese refused to allow Japanese entry to Wanping due to the previous events of not informing China of their military training. The action of the day directly implementing blame on the Japanese is the event of Japanese army trying to forcefully gain access to the town of Wanping. Also after a Japanese investigator was allowed into the town to conduct a search Japanese forces open fired on the Chinese. This shows their instigation of the Incident.


E. Conclusion


Simply looking at the collected evidence given one can easily see how the Japanese were the instigators of this incident, however they were not solely to blame. The Chinese were refusing access to their town, which could have been seen as trying to stand against Japanese aggression, which inevitably was a reason for China’s unison against Japan. Had China granted access to the Japanese force into their town, the incident could have possibly been avoided s the Japanese would not have forcefully tried to gain access. To conclude the Japanese were not solely to blame for this incident although they are the primary instigators shown by the presented evidence.


F. List of Sources

  1.     "The Marco Polo Bridge Incident." History - China Culture. Cultural China. Web. 14 Nov. 2011. .  2.     "Marco Polo Bridge Incident (Asian History) -- Britannica Online Encyclopedia."Encyclopedia - Britannica Online Encyclopedia. Encyclopedia Britannica Inc. Web. 13 Nov. 2011. .  3.     Epstein, Israel. History Should Not Be Forgotten. Beijing: China Intercontinental, 2005. Print.  4.     Ferguson, Niall. "China's War." The War of the World. Penguin. Print.  5.     Harper, Damian. China. Footscray, Vic., Australia: Lonely Planet Publications, 2007. Print.  6.     Peng, Xunhou. China in the World Anti-fascist War. [Beijing]: China Intercontinental,  2005. Print.  7.     Simkin, John. "Mao Zedong." Spartacus Educational. Web. 13 Nov. 2011. .  8.     Toland, John. The Rising Sun. The Decline and fall of the Japanese Empire. Random House, 1982. Print.  9.     Xiang, Ah. "Marco Polo Bridge Incident." Resistance Wars. Web. 10 Nov. 2011. .  10.  Xu, Haiyan. Historical View of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident: a Comparison of the Chinese and Japanese Accounts. Indiana University, 1990. Print.






[1] Encyclopedia Britannica  [2] Xiang, Ha  [3] "The Marco Polo Bridge Incident." History - China Culture. Cultural China. Web. 14 Nov. 2011. .     [4] (Harper, Damien: China p176)  [5] (Epstein, Israel: History Should Not Be Forgotten p13)  [6] (Ferguson, Niall: War of the World p306)  [7] (Epstein, Israel: History Should Not Be Forgotten p13)  [8] (Toland, John: The Rising Sun p43) [9] Simkin, John. "Mao Zedong." Spartacus Educational. Web. 13 Nov. 2011


How Many were Slaughtered at Nanking?

A.



The investigation justifies the number of lives claimed by the Nanjing Massacre in the 1930s. In respond to this assessment, a primary source- a letter written by John Rabe to Hitler, a Chinese documentary novel called The Rape of Nanking, and various perspectives from Chinese and Japanese historians, will be examined. Two of the sources in this investigation, a letter by John Rabe to Hitler in 1938, and a documentary novel called the Rape of Nanking composed by Iris Chang, will be accessed through origin, purpose, value, and limitation.

B.


In December 1937 the Japanese army marched into the Nanjing city beginning a reign of terror. “The troops murdered hundreds of thousands of civilians in horrific ways.” It was estimated the duration of the war had culminated in the death of twenty million Chinese. The city was practically collapsed into a defenceless habitat as “the government left Nanjing defenseless declaring it to be an “open city””. This therefore ensured massacres to prevail in all areas within and around the city. Since then, controversy aroused between groups from mainly China and Japan surrounds the number of people massacred by the Japanese troops during the years of the massacre. In one case a Chinese-German-made film called (John Rabe) has revealed the fact 300,000 people were killed when its film critic Song Ziwen asserts on the state-run Xinmin website, “'We always emphasize that 300,000 people were killed.” Similarily, numbers of Chinese official documents/historians point to the fact of apporximatly 300,000 deaths. Wu Tienwei, professor emeritus of history at Southern Illinois University, estimates a death toll of above 300,000. Sun Zhaiwei, a historian at the Jiangsu Acedemy of Social Sciences, concludes a number closing to 380,000. Contradictary, John Rabe’s diary and several Japanese historians have asserted relatively low figures compared to those submitted by the Chinese. In a letter addressing to Hitler from John Rabe in 1938 he stated, “We foreigners view the figure as having been from about 50,000 to 60,000.” Japanese historian, Hata Ikuhiko, argued a death toll of approximately 38000 to 42000 whereas he regarded the Chinese estimate of 300,000 deaths as exaggerated. Moreover, Fujiwara Akira, professor emeritus at Hitotsubashi University, has come up with an estimation of 200,000 deaths.

C.


The first source to be evaluated according to its origin, purpose, value, and limitation is a primary source, a letter written in June 1938 by John Rabe to Hitler. The letter upholds a purpose “to persuade Hitler to intervene and stop the inhuman acts of violence committed by the Japanese.” The value of it lies in the fact it is a primary source written by an eye witness of the massacre. Moreover, its weight was shown when it was aimed at addressing to Hitler himself. The limitation of it is it failed to observe the full duration of the Nanjing Massacre since John Rabe left Nanjing in February 1938. The letter hasn’t been verified by any authority but exclusively accounted from the view of a foreigner whose observation in the area had been limited. The second source to be evaluated is an English history documentary novel called The Rape of Nanking. Its purpose is to narrate the events of the massacre from perspectives of the Japanese military, Chinese victims, and westerners. Its value is shown in its ability to blend in three various aspects to reconstruct a wider and more realistic context of history. It was also the “first comprehensive examination of the destruction of this Chinese imperial city.” The limitation is the book procured the information through various sources instead of first hand experiences. The book has been criticized for its nature of “seriously flawed” and “full of misinformation and harebrained explanations.” This’ perhaps due to the fact she lacks the experience with the subject matter.

D.



The majority of the Chinese historians share a similar perspective on the fact of approximately 300,000 people were massacred throughout the course. Such fact is that certain of them based their research on the official Chinese burial records. Many people were desperate in dodging the gun fire by diving into the water while the fire persisted. This certainly would challenge the reliability of the burial records since some bodies might have been washed away or sunken to the riverbed. This inaccuracy also applies to the circumstance when gasoline was being set fire on corpses. Some experts including those from Japan have questioned the reliability of the 300,000 figure in areas concerning of double counting, and miscounting. The fact burial records were exclusively acquired from burial grounds miles away from the seashore; this therefore eliminated the possibility of taking into account of those corpses that were washed onshore then buried on spot. There were people questioning if 300,000 people existed inside the Nanking city after the Japanese troops marched in. This query was contradicted by numbers of Chinese official documents stating the number of people inside the city at that time were approximately 500,000. Nevertheless, although those factors stated above are influential to the death toll of 300,000, there still existed an uncertainty of whether those assumptions actually took place during the massacre for most of them were theories and infer. Contrary, the estimation of 300,000 deaths was reinforced by numerous primary elements. Interviews were conducted on 1,700 survivors of the massacre and arrived at a conclusion of 340,000 deaths. There was one case when the Japanese foreign minister Hirota Koki in January 1938 ordered to forward a telegram to America informing no less than 300,000 people were killed. And that was only the first month of the massacre. This is very ponderous evidence since it was devised by Japanese at that time.

Drawing to a conclusion from the analysis carried out, there is a higher possibility the 300,000 death toll is comparatively justified than the other assumptions. As have been briefly mentioned above, relatively low figures are often based on imaginative factors and theories such as double counting, miscounting, and so on, whereas the 300,000 death toll is closely associated with researches and investigations that were carried out practically namely interviews, and most importantly the recognition of certain Japanese officials.

 EXAMPLE 2

Section A: Plan of the investigation


The purpose of this essay is to investigate “How many Chinese citizens were killed in Nanking by the Japanese army during 13th December 1937 to 24th January 1938.” To answer this question, I will focus on the numbers of the buried dead bodies. I am going to use Rape of Nanking by Iris Chang because it was the first best seller book about the Nanking Massacre written in English. I will use Nankin Jiken by Ikuhiko Hata. because this is a recognized book by a Japanese historian who has a neutral standpoint about the Nanking Massacre. To take a diversified stand point, I will use books that are critical of Chang’s book and books that support her point of view with regard to numbers of victims. Also I will use reports from the foreigners who were in the Nanking safety zone because they researched the scale of the damage at that time.

 Section B: Summary of evidence  The 2nd Sino-Japanese war began with the Marco Polo bridge incident on 7th July 1937  By 15th August, the Japanese navy started the first bomb attack on Nanking, the Chinese capital, without the declaration on war . Nanking was about 4,737km² in size and its population was around 1,000,000 in March 1937 . Because of the bombings, thousands of citizens fled from Nanking. The population decreased to 500,000 in November 1937 .  After the fall of Shanghai on 12th November, the Japanese army decided to invade Nanking on 20th November unilaterally, the Japanese government did not agree . Chiang Kai-shek decided to defend Nanking. He burned down the villages around the city so that the Japanese army could not use them . All important people and foreigners were asked to leave Nanking by November .To protect those citizens who were left behind, the 'International Committee of the Nanking safety zone' was created by the foreigners who stayed in Nanking . They made a 3.8km safety area within Nanking. The capital of China was removed from Nanking to Chongqing on 15th of November.  On 1st December the Japanese government officially accepted the Nanking capture operation. On 9th of December, Japan asked China to surrender Nanking  but China refused. Japan started to attack Nanking on 10th  December. There were about 120,000 Japanese soldiers and the Chinese army was about 50,000~100,000 . The problem of the Chinese army was that they had to recruit in a hurry so there were many untrained soldiers.   After Japan defeated the Chinese army outside Nanking, on 13th December 1937, the Japanese army broke into Nanking and started the sweep operation. Because the Chinese head quarters withdrew on 12th of December , the Chinese chain of command collapsed. Chinese soldiers started to change from uniforms to plain clothes in order to run away. Japan captured Nanking on 17th December. The “Nanking Massacre” happened after the capture of Nanking.  Since the Japanese army only had seventeen military police , there was nothing to stop the soldiers from ferocity. The Japanese army did not have enough supplies so soldiers started robbing . The Japanese army did not have the capability to take care of all the Chinese POW, so they decided to kill them.  
Japanese soldiers killed, raped and looted in Nanking. There were eye witnesses statements. Ohta, a Japanese Army Major stated in 1954when he was in prison in China that he and his unit dumped 19,000  dead bodies in the river from 15th of December for three days. He also stated that neighboring units disposed total of 130,000 bodies in the same period. Lu Shu said that he saw that 57,418 Chinese were killed by the Japanese Army in the night of 16th December . This report was one of the Chinese evidence of the Tokyo Trial. Members of the Safety Zone Committee wrote reports. Professor L. S. C. Smythe of the University of Nanking did a survey  in December 1937 about numbers of people killed during the massacre.  The German businessman, John Rabe who was the president of the Nanking safety Zone wrote in a letter to Hitler in 1937, that  he estimated that 60,000 Chinese died in the massacre.  Tsun-shan-tang and Red Swastika Society, charitable institutions in Nanking, were the main organizations that buried the dead bodies .  The Red Swastika Society buried 43,071 bodies . Tsun-shan-tang buried 112,266 .  
After the war the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Japan agreed that 260,000 Chinese died in Nanking.

 Section C : Evaluations of Sources 
Chang, Iris.(1997) The Rape of Nanking: the Forgotten Holocaust of World War II. London, Penguin Books, 1998  
According to Chang, the purpose of the book is “not to establish a quantitative record to qualify the event as one of the great evil deeds in history, but to understand the event so that lessons can be learned and warnings sounded.”  . Since it was the first book written in English about the Nanking massacre, it introduced the topic to the west. More than 500,000 copies were sold  which shows the strong influence this book had. Chang states that more than 300,000 people died in the massacre, a number allocated by the Chinese Government (see appendix 1).Some historians such like David M. Kennedy from Stanford University, argue that this book is more focused to impeach Japan instead of working on a historical analysis of the event . Chang  is a journalist and not a historian. This can be seen from misunderstandings in her book regarding history, especially in Japanese history. For example, she has dates of the Tokugawa period wrong for more than hundred years    . Picture No.6 in the book (see appendix 2) is taken out of context. This picture is part of a Japanese propaganda photo that shows the Japanese army protecting Chinese farmers on their way home. It was not a picture of women being rounded up . Chang is Chinese American and through her comments, we can see that her point of view is biased. Her tone of writing is emotional and you can see some anti-Japanese perspective .   

Ikuhiko, Hata. (1986). Nankin Jiken(Nanking Incident):Gyakusatu no kouzou(Mechanism of the massacre) 
Hata inspects what actually happened in Nanking in 1937 by analyzing  Japanese military records, soldier's diaries and witnesses reports. According to Syudo Higasinakano, a Japanese historian, this book focuses on analyzing the data without nationalism common to those books. Since it is published 40 years after the Nanking massacre happened, it can look to the incident one step back which helps to exclude personal emotions. Although the author is Japanese, he is a historian studying modern Japanese military history and he is standing on a neutral point. The author believes that the numbers of victims were 40,000 . The argued numbers of victims range from a few thousands to 300,000 so Hata’s estimate is roughly in the middle. However, from the bibliography it is clear that Hata uses less Chinese sources and that he focuses more on Japanese sources which makes the conclusion one-sided.  

Section D: Analysis  This investigation is historically important because if 300,000 citizens died in Nanking, this massacre would be one of the biggest in modern history. But there is debate about the numbers of the people killed there. This historical event still causes tension between Japan and China as it is considered the symbol of the Japanese cruel invasion in China  (see appendix 1).   Chang argues that 300,000 people died in Nanking and she supports this by three main points; The burial records of Tsun-shan-tang and the Red Swastika Society , the statements from Hisao Ohta, and Lu Su, and the other reports from Chinese eyewitnesses that were sent to the Tokyo Trials. . By adding the data of the burial records and the numbers that the eyewitnesses saw, Chang concluded that the numbers of victims were at least 260,000 . To support her point, she referred the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Japan where they agreed that the victims of the Nanking were 260,000. As conclusion, Chang said that at least about 260,000 people were certainly dead and by adding the statements of eyewitnesses and the Japanese records, it will be more than 400,000.  However, there are some problems with her conclusion. Iris Chang does not provide evidence to support her claim of 300,000 victims but merely adds the numbers of dead bodies on all records without assessing the sources. According to Hata, one cannot simply add the numbers of dead bodies witnessed by people because it could be ambiguous and uncertain . Sun Lu stated that he saw 57,400 Chinese were killed by the Japanese military on the night of 16th December. But the question is how could a person know the exact numbers of people by watching at night? Another example is the statement of Ohta, the diary of Taterou Kajitani, the sergeant of the Japanese army, proves that Ohta arrived in Nanking on 25th December  so it is impossible for Ohta to bury dead bodies in Nanking on the 15th December. Eyewitnesses are not always reliable sources to use to get the numbers of dead bodies.  Secondly, according to Minoru Kitamura, a Japanese historian studying Chinese modern history, the burial record from Red Swastika Society is trustful since it accords with the Japanese records . But the burial record of Tsun-shan-tang is not accurate. According to the Japanese newspapers in 1937, the Red Swastika Society was mentioned as organization requested by the Japanese government to bury the dead bodies but Tsun-shan-tang was not mentioned in any newspapers although it buried more than twice as much as the Red Swastika Society did . Also the Nanking safety zone report written by Miner Searle Bates, only mentions Red Swastika Society as the main organization working on burial . In a letter to the Nanking self-government, the leader of the Tsun-shan-tang wrote that they only got one truck to use where Red Swastika society got 10 trucks. So it is physically impossible for such a small organization to burry more than 100,000 dead bodies in one month . Tsun-shan-tang buried massacre victims but it seems that it record was inflated so it is difficult to estimate how many they did burry.  Hata’s conclusion is that the numbers of dead bodies were about 40,000 . He reached this conclusion by subtracting the inaccurate records of the buried dead bodies from the total number, 155,000. He supports his argument with the facts of the survey by Symthe, member of the Nanking Safety Zone Committee who also stated that the number of buried victims in Nanking was about 40,000   This is an objective conclusion since it is based on the record. However Hatta developed a method to subtracting the numbers of dead bodies that are over counted but he does not explain his exact method . 

Section E: Conclusion  I conclude that the minimum number of people who were killed in Nanking was at least about 50,000 based on the estimation of Rabe and the survey of Smythe. I decided to use the burial record of Red Swastika Society, because this figure is mentioned by Hata, Chang and Kasahara who all have different view points on the massacre. Based on the books I read, I can conclude that Tsun-shan-tang also buried dead bodies.  The only way to estimate the numbers of people killed in Nanking is by counting the numbers of the burials. But this method will only show the minimum numbers of the victims. Because it is clear that not all victims of the massacre are buried, bodies might have been burned or dumped in the river.  It is impossible to know the numbers of victims. It seems that historians are starting with a certain stand point and try to prove that their argument is right and they are not considering to investigate from an objective point of view.  The Nanking Massacre did happen, the exact number of Chinese citizens that were killed by the Japanese army during 13th December 1937 to 24th January 1938 we might never know.



Section F: List of Sources

  Ara,Kenichi (2002) Nankin Jiken no Syougen(The witnesses of the Nanking Incident):Nihonjin 48nin no syougen(witnesses of 48 Japanese). Tokyo. Syougakkan 2005  Barrres, Charles (1998)  Amerika wo yurugasu “Za reipu obu nankin” Tyuoukouron  1998, August, www.history.gr.jp/~nanking/books_chuokouron9808.html viewed on  01.11.2011  Chang, Iris.(1997) The Rape of Nanking: the Forgotten Holocaust of World War II. London, Penguin Books, 1998  The Diet Members Group for Japan’s Future and History Education (2008). The Truth of Nanjing:The League of nations Failed to even recognise the “Massacre of 20,000 Persons at Nanjing Tokyo,Nitisinhoudou. 2010  Fogel, Joshua. A. (2000) The Nanjing Massacre: in history and historiography, Berkeley, Los Angelos, London, University of California Press, 2000  Fujioka, Nobukastu. Syudou Higasinakano (1999). Za Reipu obu Nankin no kenkyuu( The study on the Rape of Nanking), Tokyo, Syoudensya, 2007  Hata, Ikuhiko(1986) .Nankin Jiken: Gyakusatu no koudou(The Nanking Incident: the mechanism of the massacre), Tokyo,Tyuoukouronsya, 2007   Kasahara, Tokushi.(1997) Nankin Jiken(The Nanking Incident), Tokyo, Iwanamisinyo, 2009  : so no jituzou wo motomete(The research of the Nanking Incident: to find the real image), Tokyo,Bungeisyusyun. 2007  Li, Fei Fei;Sabella, Robert; Liu, David (2002). Nanking 1937: Memory and healing, Armonk, New York, M.E. Sharpe,Inc. 2002  Takemoto, Tadao;Ohara, Yasuo (2000). The Alleged Nanking Massacre: Japan’s rebuttal to China’s forged claims, Tokyo, Meiseisya 2010  Wakabayashi, Bob.T (2001). The Nanking Massacre, now you see it..., Monumenta Nipponica, Vol. 56. No 4  Tokyo, Sophia University Press,2001

Why Did Macarthur Ignore the Postdam Declaration's Demand for the Removal of the Japanese Emperor?
-->

-->
Abstract
This essay analyzes the reason for the decision to exonerate the Emperor of Japan from WWII war crimes contrary to the terms first presented in the Potsdam Declaration of July 1945.
On July 17, 1945, President Harry S Truman, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Party General Secretary to the Soviet Union, Joseph Stalin met in Potsdam to discuss the terms of surrender for Germany.  Also, during the conference, Churchill, Truman and Chaing Kai Chek, Chairman of Nationalist China, outlined the terms of surrender for Japan.  On July 26, the Potsdam Declaration was issued to Japan calling for their unconditional surrender at the risk of total annihilation.  While the declaration did not specifically address the Emperor or the Emperor system, it did state; “stern justice will be meted to all war criminals”.   This language suggested that the Emperor might be vulnerable and in contrast to the Atlantic Charter that the Japanese had been negotiating for, be tried and hung as a war criminal. 
On August 6th & 9th, 1945, two atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  Japan surrendered.  By August 30th, the US occupied Japan with General MacArthur appointed Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers.  He was given absolute authority to implement the terms of the Potsdam Declaration with the eventual goal to democratize Japan. 
But Macarthur also had to deal with the Emperor.  While the other allied powers wanted the Emperor to be tried and hung as a war criminal, MacArthur learned that such an act would be the equivalent to crucifying Christ to the Japanese people who viewed the Emperor as a God and would rather die than see him deposed and humiliated.  As a consequence, MacArthur reasoned that he could use the Emperor as effective tool to further his larger goal to democratize and restore Japan as an ally in the Pacific.
This essay concludes that MacArthur needed the Emperor in order to fulfill the goals of the Potsdam Declaration.

Introduction/Background
            On the 17th of July 1945, U.S. President Harry S. Truman, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Communist Party General Secretary Joseph Stalin of the Soviet Union convened in Potsdam, Germany for a conference to discuss reparations for a defeated Nazi Germany. Nine days later at the same conference, Churchill and Truman sat down with Chairman Chaing Kai-shek, leader of the nationalist government of China to discuss the surrender terms for Japan.  Known as the Potsdam Declaration, Japan was issued an ultimatum for unconditional surrender with the threat of total annihilation should they refuse.  The Allies stayed true to their promise dropping atomic bombs both on Hiroshima on August 6th and Nagasaki 3, days later.  The bombings were followed up by the surrender of Japan and the occupation of Japanese soil by American forces on August 30th, 1945. The occupation would last until 1952. 
            Documents from the MacArthur Memorial show that the Truman administration had a general consensus that “fundamental changes” should be imposed in the political, industrial, and general economic conditions of German, Italy, and Japan.  (The MacArthur Memorial)  However, Japan was seen as a special case and was given special consideration.  The administration believed that:
In a few words, the basic point that was being made was that a viable Japanese economy is to be considered a first prerequisite of lasting peace in the Pacific. (The MacArthur Memorial)
The process of democratization and the roles played by General MacArthur and the Emperor is the scope of this essay. 

Content
Prior to the end of the Second World War, Japan had little in the way of democracy. It possessed no political parties and hosted no free elections, and women were denied what even those living in 40s considered “equal rights”.  (Constitutional Rights Foundation)  Despite the Meji Constitution outlining a few individual liberties, from an American standpoint there were few.  For instance, although free speech was protected under the constitution, the government prohibited what it considered to be “dangerous thoughts.” (Constitutional Rights Foundation) This was intentional.  The Meji Constitution (1889) was designed to concentrate actual political power into the hands of a small group of influential political leaders whose sole loyalty and responsibility was to the Emperor, not the people.  From 1930 to the end of the Second World War only military officials dominated this governing group. (Constitutional Rights Foundation)
             In the aftermath of the two atomic bombings and the surrender of Japan to the Allies, the Japanese government indicated it would accept the conditions of the Potsdam Declaration on the understanding that it would not include any demands that would compromise the authority of the Emperor as the sovereign ruler of the country, thereby preserving the “kokutai”.  The kokutai represents “a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal.” (National Diet Library) 
However, the Allies were adamant that under the occupation the most powerful leader would be the military governor and stated, “the authority of the Emperor… to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers.” (National Diet Library)  Additionally, the Allies aimed to ultimately create a system where democratically elected leaders would hold the highest authority in Japan, stating that, “the ultimate form of Government of Japan shall…be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people.”  (Constitutional Rights Foundation)
On September 6, 1945, General MacArthur was installed as the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) over the occupation forces in Japan.  While control of Japan would be through the Japanese government, MacArthur could employ such measures as necessary, including the “use of force”.  (National Diet Library)  It was also stated that the Potsdam Declaration did not override Japan’s “unconditional surrender” and that the government of the UK, Soviet Union, or China was under the authority of MacArthur. 
However, while MacArthur held power over the government, the Emperor was still a powerful symbol to the people and held a considerable influence over their hearts and minds despite being stripped of all formal authority.  General MacArthur was told by his advisors that executing the Emperor would be the same as “crucifying Jesus Christ” to the people who saw him as a God and would lead to widespread unrest insurrections.  (Harvey)  MacArthur reflects on this in his autobiography: “... I would need at least one million reinforcements should such an action be taken … Military government would have to be instituted throughout all Japan, and guerrilla warfare would probably break out.” (Harvey)  Having chosen to keep the Japanese Parliament (the Diet), as well the original cabinet in place, MacArthur next faced the question of what to do with Hirohito.  In his memoirs, MacArthur wrote of his first meeting with the Emperor.
Shortly after my arrival in Tokyo, I was urged by members of my staff to summon the Emperor to my headquarters as a show of power. I brushed the suggestions aside. "To do so," I explained, "would be to outrage the feelings of the Japanese people and make a martyr of the Emperor in their eyes.
No, I shall wait and in time the Emperor will voluntarily come to see me. In this case, the patience of the East rather than the haste of the West will best serve our purpose."
The Emperor did indeed shortly request an interview. (On 27 September 1945) In cutaway, striped trousers, and top hat, riding in his Daimler with the imperial grand chamberlain facing him on the jump seat, Hirohito arrived at the embassy. I had, from the start of the occupation, directed that there should be no derogation in his treatment. Every honor due a sovereign was to be his. I met him cordially, and recalled that I had at one time been received by his father at the close of the Russo-Japanese War. He was nervous and the stress of the past months showed plainly. I dismissed everyone but his own interpreter, and we sat down before an open fire at one end of the long reception hall.
I offered him an American cigarette, which he took with thanks. I noticed how his hands shook as I lighted it for him. I tried to make it as easy for him as I could, but I knew how deep and dreadful must be his agony of humiliation. I had an uneasy feeling he might plead his own cause against indictment as a war criminal. There had been considerable outcry from some of the Allies, notably the Russians and the British, to include him in this category. Indeed, the initial list of those proposed by them was headed by the Emperor's name. Realizing the tragic consequences that would follow such an unjust action, I had stoutly resisted such efforts. When Washington seemed to be veering toward the British point of view, I had advised that I would need at least one million reinforcements should such action be taken. I believed that if the Emperor were indicted, and perhaps hanged, as a war criminal, military government would have to be instituted throughout all Japan, and guerrilla warfare would probably break out. The Emperor's name had then been stricken from the list. But of all this he knew nothing. But my fears were groundless. What he said was this: "I come to you, General MacArthur, to offer myself to the judgment of the powers you represent as the one to bear sole responsibility for every political and military decision made and action taken by my people in the conduct of war." A tremendous impression swept me. This courageous assumption of a responsibility implicit with death, a responsibility clearly belied by facts of which I was fully aware, moved me to the very marrow of my bones. He was an - Emperor by inherent birth, but in that instant I knew I faced the First Gentleman of Japan in his own right.  (MacArthur 287) 
Nevertheless, both the Russians and the British wanted Hirohito to be tried and hanged as a war criminal and by November, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered MacArthur to gather information regarding whether the Emperor been responsible for any war crimes and called for either the complete abolishment of the Emperor System or steps initiating its reform along democratic lines. (National Diet Library) In response, MacArthur sent a telegram dated January 25, 1946 reporting that he could find no evidence of the Emperor’s involvement with war crimes and that to try the Emperor would generate confusion and unrest in Japan.  In his classified telegram to the War Department he wrote:
No specific and tangible evidence has been uncovered with regard to his exact activities, which might connect him in varying degree with the political decisions of the Japanese Emperor during the last decade.  I have gained the definite impression from as complete a research as was possible to me that his connection with affairs of state up to the time of the end of the war was largely ministerial and automatically responsive to the advice of his counselors.  There are those who believe that even had he positive ideas it would have been quite possible that any effort on his part to thwart the current of public opinion controlled and represented by the dominant military clique would have placed him in actual jeopardy.  If he is to be tried great changes must be made in the occupational plans and due preparation therefore should be accomplished in preparedness before actual action is initiated.  His indictment will unquestionably cause a tremendous convulsion among the Japanese people.  He is a symbol which (sic) unites all Japanese. Destroy him and the nation will disintegrate. (National Diet Library)
On August 14th, 1945, the Emperor submitted and publicly stated during the New Years Address the “Imperial Rescript for the Termination of the War” in which he stated, “The kokutai (“the line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal”) has been maintained.” During the address, the Emperor also renounced his claim to Godhood and stated that the concept of the Emperor’s divinity was not true. (National Diet Library) That same day, MacArthur commented on Hirohito’s Imperial Rescript, praising the Emperor for taking the first steps to democratizing Japan.  He wrote in a press release;
The Emperor’s New Year’s statement pleases me very much.  By it he undertakes a leading part in the democratization of his people.  He squarely takes his stand for the future along liberal lines.  His action reflects the irresistible influence of a sound idea.  A sound idea cannot be stopped.” (National Diet Library)
Early into his position as military governor, MacArthur saw the need for a complete overhaul of the Meji Constitution. In his autobiography he said:
We could not simply encourage the growth of democracy. We had to make sure that it grew. Under the old constitution, government flowed downward from the emperor, who held the supreme authority, to those to whom he had delegated power. It was a dictatorship to begin with; a hereditary one, and the people existed to serve it. (Constitutional Rights Foundation)
To this end, MacArthur assembled a team to draft a new constitution for Japan composing of himself, Courtney Whitney, the Chief Government Section at GHQ, and the Steering Committee.  The team worked on the language of the new constitution, paying special attention to the language of the document pertaining to the relationship between the people and the Emperor.  For example, the team had originally drafted “The Emperor shall be the symbol of the state and of the Unity of the People,…” along with recognition and declaration regarding to, “the sovereignty of the people’s will.” (National Diet Library)  In March, the phrase “the sovereignty of the people’s will” was replaced with “the supreme will of the people” which made the principles for sovereignty of the people ambiguous.  (National Diet Library)  Ultimately, the language was amended to include “proclaim that sovereign power resides with the people” and the passage relating to the Emperor to read, “deriving his position from the will of the people with who resides sovereign power.” (National Diet Library)
The Japanese parliament was stunned by the radical changes in the new “model constitution” finding it hard to grasp the concept of “rule by the people” which conflicted so much with the Japanese tradition of ultimate obedience to the Emperor.  The average people of Japan were also confused and upset.  MacArthur had chosen to keep Hirohito only as “the symbol of the State and of the unity of the people.” (Constitutional Rights Foundation) After debating among themselves and failing to come to a consensus, the Japanese cabinet went to the Emperor to ask if they should accept the model constitution.  On February 22, Hirohito made his decision in favor of the “model” becoming the basis for which the new Japanese constitution was written.  “Upon these principles,” Hirohito said, “will we truly rest the welfare of our people and the rebuilding of Japan.” (Constitutional Rights Foundation) However, even following the enactment of the constitution the problems in interpreting the “sovereignty of the people and the Emperor as a symbol” still proved to be a contentious issue. (National Diet Library)

Conclusion
            The Constitutional Rights Foundation credits MacArthur with developing democracy in Japan by abolishing laws that suppressed political, civil, and religious liberties and by forcing the Diet to pass new laws for free, democratic elections.
His policies dismantled the Japanese military industrial complex and disbarred 200,000 wartime officials from ever holding office in the new Japan. He even eliminated government support from Shinto, the official state religion.  (Constitutional Rights Foundation) 
The Japanese eventually welcomed these changes. The Americans encouraged an atmosphere of free public debate and discussion on nearly every kind of issue, from politics to marriage to women’s rights. After years of wartime censorship and thought control, most Japanese appreciated their new freedom. (CountriesQuest.com)
 However, this could not be accomplished without the cooperation of Hirohito. Without the humility and bravery Hirohito displayed in surrendering to the Allies, the lives of countless solders and civilians on both sides would have been lost in the subsequent invasion.  (Sanello)
 Bibliography
Constitutional Rights Foundation. Bringing Democracy to Japan. Los Angeles.

Harvey, Robert. "American Shogun: MacArthur, Hirohito and the American Duel with Japan." n.d.

MacArthur, General Douglas. Reminiscences. Naval Institute Press, 2001.

National Diet Library. "Emperor, Imperial Rescript Denying His Divinity (Professing His Humanity)." 2003-2004. Birth of the Constitution of Japan. April 2013 .

—. "Popular Sovereignty and the Emperor System." 2003-2004. Birth of the Japanese Constitution. April 2013 .

—. "Telegram, MacArthur to Eisenhower ... concerning exemption of the Emperor from War Criminals." 2003-2004. Documents with Commentaries. April 2013 .

Sanello, Frank. "Why Gen MacArthur Spared Emperor Hirohito's Life but not Gen Tojo's." Red Room. June 2013 .

The MacArthur Memorial. "The Occupation of Japan Economic Policy and Reform." The Proceedings of a Symposium Sponsored by the MacArthur Memorial. Norfolk: The MacArthur Memorial, 1980.